Amicus Curiae Brief — 303 Creative LLC, et al., Petitioners v. Aubrey Elenis, et al.

Supreme Court briefMay 31, 2022

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No. 21-476

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

___________________________________

303 CREATIVE LLC, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

AUBREY ELENIS, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals to the Tenth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

ALABAMA CENTER FOR LAW AND LIBERTY

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

W. BRENT WOODALL

MATTHEW J. CLARK*

THE WOODALL LAW FIRM *Counsel of Record

121 S. Court St., Ste. B ALABAMA CENTER FOR

Florence, AL 35630

LAW AND LIBERTY

(256) 349-2507

2213 Morris Ave., Fl. 1

woodalltrialad@

Birmingham, AL 35203

hushmail.com

(256) 510-1828

matt@

alabamalawandliberty.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS

CURIAE ....................................................................... 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................... 1

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 4

I.

As

the

First

and

Thirteenth

Amendments Were Being Framed,

Public-Accommodation Laws Applied

Only to Businesses That Provided LifeSustaining Goods or Services .............................. 4

A.

Public-Accommodation

Laws

Under the Common Law ............................. 4

B.

“Good Reason” in the AngloAmerican Tradition ..................................... 8

C.

Nineteenth Century Views of

Accommodations

Before

the

Reconstruction Amendments .................... 10

D.

Conclusion: The Common Law

Background

of

the

First

ii

Amendment

and

the

Reconstruction Amendments .................... 11

II.

The Recent Trend in Expanding Public

Accommodation Laws Can Cause

Constitutional Problems ................................... 12

A.

Freedom of Speech..................................... 14

B.

Free Exercise of Religion........................... 20

C.

Freedom

from

Involuntary

Servitude .................................................... 24

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 29

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1

(1945) .................................................................... 18

Cavalier Mfg. v. Jackson, 823 So. 2d 1237

(Ala. 2001) ............................................................ 27

Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872

(1990) .............................................................. 20-22

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S.Ct.

1868 (2021) ..................................................... 20-24

Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233

(1936) .................................................................... 19

Henderson v. McMurray, 987 F.3d 997 (11th

Cir. 2021) .............................................................. 22

Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual

Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995)................... 6-7

Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S.Ct.

2448 (2018) ................................................. 9, 15, 20

Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 472, 88 Eng. Rep.

1458 (K.B. 1701) ............................................... 6, 10

Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963) ............... 7

iv

Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civil

Rights Comm’n, 138 S.Ct. 1719 (2018).......... 15, 24

Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo 418 U.S.

241 (1974) ....................................................... 18-19

NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S.Ct. 2361 (2018) ........... 15, 20

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) ................ 21

Ramirez v. Collier, 142 S.Ct. 1264 (2022)................. 22

Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904) ....7, 11-12

Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888) ................... 11

The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36

(1873) .................................................................... 29

Thompson v. Lacy, 3 Barn. & Ald. 283 ................. 8, 11

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,

393 U.S. 503 (1969) .............................................. 14

United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931

(1988) .............................................................. 27-28

United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649

(1898) .............................................................. 11-12

W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.

624 (1943) .................................. 1, 16-17, 19-20, 22

v

Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705

(1977) ...................................................16-17, 20, 22

Constitutions and Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601 ................................ 12-13

U.S. Const. amend. I ......................................... passim

U.S. Const. amend. XIII ............................... 3-4, 24-29

U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2 ..................................... 29-30

Other Authority

1 Timothy 6:8 (New American Standard

Bible 1995) .............................................................. 6

A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in

2 Papers of Thomas Jefferson (J. Boyd ed.

1950) ....................................................................... 9

Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation

(new ed. 2018)....................................................... 25

Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138

S.Ct. 2671 (2018) .................................................. 24

Brett M. Kavanaugh, Two Challenges for the

Judge as Umpire: Statutory Ambiguity

and Constitutional Exceptions, 92 Notre

Dame L. Rev. 1907 (2017) .................................... 22

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).......................... 23

vi

Herman Belz, Abolition of Slavery, in The

Heritage Guide to the Constitution (1st ed.

2005) ..................................................................... 25

Human

Needs,

NASA,

https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/162514main_H

uman_Needs.pdf (last visited May 20,

2022) ....................................................................... 5

James Kent, Commentaries on American

Law (1827) ........................................................ 7-11

James

Madison,

A

Memorial

and

Remonstrance (1785) .......................................... 8-9

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) ................... 23

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary

(11th ed. 2020) ........................................................ 3

Noah Webster, Webster’s American 1828

Dictionary of the English Language

(compact ed., Walking Lion Press 2010)

(1828) .............................................................. 10-11

Restatement of Contracts (2d) § 367 (1979) ........ 26, 29

Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English

Language (1755) ................................................. 4-6

Saul McLeod, Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs,

Simple Psychology (last updated Apr. 4,

2022),

vii

https://www.simplypsychology.org/maslo

w.html. .................................................................... 6

The Declaration of Independence para. 2

(U.S. 1776) ............................................................ 25

Thomas Cooley, A Treatise on the

Constitutional Limitations Which Rest

Upon the Legislative Power of the States

of the American Union 363 (6th ed. 1890) ........... 26

Why

I

Create,

303

Creative,

https://303creative.com/about/

(last

visited May 27, 2022) ..................................... 17-18

William Blackstone, Commentaries ...............4, 6-8, 11

1

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF

AMICUS CURIAE 1

Amicus Curiae Alabama Center for Law and

Liberty (“ACLL”) is a conservative nonprofit publicinterest firm located in Birmingham, Alabama,

dedicated to the defense of limited government, free

markets, and strong families. ACLL has an interest

in this case because it believes that freedom of speech

and free exercise of religion are indispensably

essential to limited government, because violating

these freedoms “invades the sphere of intellect and

spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment

to our Constitution to reserve from all official

control.” W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.

624, 642 (1943). Moreover, because ACLL believes in

free markets, it believes that, subject to limited

exceptions, people should be free to decline working

for another against their will.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

At common law, public-accommodation laws

applied only to a limited class of vendors: (1) those

who provided food, drink, shelter, and other lifesustaining services to people who needed them, or (2)

those who provided transportation or communication

1 Pursuant to Rule

37.3, all parties have consented to the

filing of this brief. Pursuant to Rule 37.6, no party or party’s

counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, or contributed

money that was intended to fund its preparation or submission;

and no person other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its

counsel, contributed money that was intended to fund the

preparation or submission of this brief.

2

that was necessary to secure those life-sustaining

goods or services. The common law’s rules made

sense: because people need certain fundamental

things in order to live, those goods or services should

not be declined without good reason. The First and

Thirteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution were adopted with that background in

mind.

But in recent years, the scope of publicaccommodation laws has expanded drastically.

Instead of occupying the limited sphere that publicaccommodation laws held in the 18th and 19th

centuries, they have now expanded to apply to just

about anyone who does business with the public.

Undoubtedly, some public-accommodation laws were

needed during the Civil Rights Era, as AfricanAmericans were being denied fundamental goods and

services simply because of their skin color. But the

trend today is to expand the scope from fundamental

goods or services to any goods or services available to

the public.

Regardless of whether the motivations behind

that expansion were good or not, if the expanded

public-accommodation laws cross constitutional lines,

then they are not valid. In this case, the Colorado

public-accommodation

law

violates

three

constitutional guarantees, at least as applied to

Petitioners. First, it violates Petitioners’ freedom to

refrain from speaking a message with which they

disagree. Second, it violates Petitioners’ right to

freely exercise their religion, both under an

originalist analysis of the Free Exercise Clause and

3

under this Court’s precedents. Finally, a prima facie

case exists that forcing Petitioners to engage in

personal-service contracts against their will violates

the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of

involuntary servitude. This position is supported not

only by the text and history of the Amendment, but

also by leading 19th and 20th century treatises and

this Court’s precedents.

Thus, whatever authority the states have to

expand

the

historical

function

of

publicaccommodation laws, they cannot do so if those laws

would violate the First or Thirteenth Amendments.

Failing to enforce constitutional guarantees of

freedom would give public-accommodation laws the

right to take the average American, who just wanted

to make a living, and shanghai him into supporting

causes with which he has deeply held fundamental

disagreements. 2 Just as teachers and students do not

shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse

gate, neither do Americans shed their constitutional

rights when they go to work. Thus, while publicaccommodation laws serve important purposes when

kept within their proper role, they may not be abused

to rob Americans of their First and Thirteenth

Amendment rights under the guise of a supposed

“duty to serve everyone,” or maybe more specifically,

a “duty not to offend anyone.”

2 To “shanghai” means “to put aboard a ship by force often

with the help of liquor or a drug,” or “to put by trickery into an

undesirable position.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary

1143 (11th ed. 2020). This word originates from “use of this

method to secure sailors for voyages to eastern Asia[.]” Id.

4

ARGUMENT

I.

As the First and Thirteenth Amendments

Were

Being

Framed,

PublicAccommodation Laws Applied Only to

Businesses That Provided Life-Sustaining

Goods or Services

A.

Public-Accommodation Laws Under

the Common Law

At common law, most businesses were free to

serve whom they wished; only a select few were

subject to laws that did not allow them to turn down

customers. Summarizing the relevant rules,

Blackstone writes:

Also if an inn-keeper, or other victualler,

hangs out a sign and opens his house for

travellers [sic], it is an implied

engagement to entertain all persons who

travel that way; and upon this universal

assumpsit an action on the case will lie

against him for damages, if he without

good reason refuses to admit a traveller

[sic].

1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *164.

Three observations must be made about

Blackstone’s rule before proceeding further. First, the

rule applied to inn-keepers. Second, it applied to

“other victualler[s].” At the time, a “victualler” was

defined as “[o]ne who provides victuals.” 2 Samuel

5

Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language

(1755). 3 A “victual,” in turn, meant, “[p]rovision of

food; stores for the support of life; meat; sustenance.”

Id. 4

Thus, not everyone who provides goods or services

was forced to serve people who wanted their

business. Instead, only those who provided shelter,

food, sustenance, or had a store “for the support of

life” was subject to this rule. The reason is obvious:

there are certain goods or services that people need

in order to live.

Throughout history, different (and even rivaling)

schools of thought have still been able to agree on

what constitutes such needs. Scientists generally

recognize that food, water, air, and shelter are

needed to survive. 5 Abraham Maslow, the renown

humanist psychologist, reasoned that physiological

needs (such as food, water, and rest), as opposed to

psychological and self-fulfillment needs (such as

intimate relationships, feelings of prestige, and

reaching one’s potential), were the most fundamental

Available

at

https://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/views/search.php?term=vic

tualler (last visited May 20, 2022).

4

Available

at

https://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/views/search.php?term=vic

tual (last visited May 20, 2022).

5

See

Human

Needs,

NASA,

https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/162514main_Human_Needs.pdf (last

visited May 20, 2022).

3

6

set of needs in his “Hierarchy of Needs.” 6 And finally,

in a sentiment reflected by many who hold to the

Judeo-Christian worldview, the Apostle Paul wrote:

“If we have food and covering, with these we shall be

content.” 7

Thus, regardless of one’s worldview, it is

commonly accepted that people need food, water, air,

shelter, and clothing to live. This fits neatly within

Johnson’s definition of “victuals.” That would explain

why Blackstone wrote that innkeepers and other

victuallers could not turn down customers without

good reason. People literally could not live without

the services of victuallers.

In 1701, Chief Justice Holt of the King’s Bench

postulated that the rule extended beyond innkeepers

to include smiths (specifically those who worked with

horseshoes) and common carriers. Lane v. Cotton, 12

Mod. 472, 484-85, 88 Eng. Rep. 1458, 1464-65 (K.B.

1701) (Holt, C.J.). Chief Justice Holt reasoned,

“Whenever any subject takes upon himself a public

trust for the benefit of the rest of his fellow-subjects,

he is ipso facto bound to serve the subject in all the

things that are within the reach and comprehension

of such an office[.]” Id., 12 Mod. at 484. However, two

things are worth noting here.

First, this Court has interpreted Chief Justice

Holt’s rule to apply to “innkeepers, smiths, and

Saul McLeod, Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, Simple

Psychology

(last

updated

Apr.

4,

2022),

https://www.simplypsychology.org/maslow.html.

7 1 Timothy 6:8 (New American Standard Bible 1995).

6

7

others who ‘made profession of a public employment’”

who could be regarded as “a sort of public servants.”

Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of

Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 571 (1995) (citations omitted).

Justice Douglas likewise focused on “innkeepers and

carriers” as prime examples of “common callings.”

Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 277 (1963)

(Douglas, J., concurring). This did not apply to

everyone who was employed, but to those who could

be regarded as public servants. It seems that this

Court and Chief Justice Holt focused on those who

provided victuals and infrastructure that was

necessary to secure victuals. For instance, although

shoeing a horse is not as critical to human survival as

food and water, having the transportation to get food

and water is critical to human survival.

Second,

Blackstone’s

view

of

public

accommodation laws might have been narrower than

Chief Justice Holt’s, since his recitation of the publicaccommodation doctrine was not as expansive. Since

this Court has recognized that Blackstone’s

Commentaries are the most satisfactory exposition of

the common law, 8 more weight should be given to

Blackstone’s view than to Holt’s if the two conflict. If

they do not conflict though, then they should be

harmonized by giving appropriate weight to

Blackstone’s view so that the “common calling”

doctrine remains the exception rather than the rule.

Finally, the common law applied the innkeeper

rule to “houses of public entertainment.” 2 James

8 Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904).

8

Kent, Commentaries on American Law 461 (1827)

(citing Thompson v. Lacy, 3 Barn. & Ald. 283).

However, houses of public entertainment constituted

inns only when “provisions and beds were furnished

for travelers[.]” Id. Thus, places like theaters, sports

arenas, and the like would not constitute a house of

public entertainment.

B.

“Good Reason” in

American Tradition

the

Anglo-

That brings us to the third observation of

Blackstone’s rule. Even though victuallers’ services

were so essential, they would escape liability for

turning down a customer if they had good reason.

While Blackstone did not provide any illustrations of

what “good reason” meant, he would undoubtedly

agree that the preservation of religious freedom

would be a good reason. As he said, “Upon these two

foundations, the law of nature and the law of

revelation, depend all human laws; that is to say, no

human laws should be suffered to contradict these.” 1

William

Blackstone,

Commentaries

*42.

In

Blackstone’s view, if a human law (such as the

innkeeper rule) caused one to disobey God, then that

law was bad law (or perhaps not even law at all—see

id. at *41). It stands to reason then that if a person

were to employ a victualler’s services for a purpose

that he would find sinful, then he would have good

reason to say no. With this notion James Madison

would agree, arguing that what is a “duty towards

9

the Creator” is a “right against man.” See James

Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance (1785). 9

Almost inseparably connected with freedom of

religion is freedom of speech. “As Jefferson famously

put it, ‘to compel a man to furnish contributions of

money for the propagation of opinions which he

disbelieves and abhors is sinful and tyrannical.’”

Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 2464

(2018) (quoting A Bill for Establishing Religious

Freedom, in 2 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 545 (J.

Boyd ed. 1950)). In Jefferson’s view, which became

quite influential, God alone had jurisdiction over the

heart and mind, giving government the power over

actions only. Thus, to force one to speak a message

with which he disagrees was to invade a province

that God alone had the right to judge: the realm of

the mind, heart, and spirit. Accord W. Va. St. Bd. of

Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding

that forcing one to salute the flag “invades the sphere

of the intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of

the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve

from all official control.”). Thus, by the time of the

American founding, protecting the freedom to speak

(or not to speak) would have been considered “good

reason” as well.

Finally, Chief Justice Holt and Chancellor Kent

are in agreement that lack of ability to perform the

contract constituted “good reason.” Chief Justice

Holt, for instance, excuses an innkeeper from

Available

at

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0163

(last visited May 30, 2022).

9

10

refusing to entertain a guest if his house is full. Lane,

12 Mod. at 484 (Holt, C.J.). Chancellor Kent likewise

notes that “reasonable compensation” for the

innkeeper was an indispensable element of the

innkeeper rule, meaning that if the customer was

unwilling to pay, then the innkeeper had no duty to

serve. See 2 Kent, supra, at 461.

C.

Nineteenth

Century

Views

of

Accommodations

Before

the

Reconstruction Amendments

By the time Chancellor Kent wrote Commentaries

on American Law, the predominant issue was not

who innkeepers were required to accommodate, but

rather who was an innkeeper. 2 Kent, supra, at 46162. To clarify any confusion, most of the states had

defined by statute who constituted an innkeeper and

established a licensing scheme. Id. at 462-63.

However, there is no indication that these statutes

changed the scope of who innkeepers were required

to accommodate. See id. at 461-63.

A year after Chancellor Kent wrote about the

duties of innkeepers under American law, Noah

Webster published his American Dictionary of the

English Language. Webster defined an “innkeeper”

as an “inn-holder,” noting that in this country, “the

innkeeper is often a tavern keeper or taverner, as

well as an innkeeper, the inn for furnishing lodgings

and provisions being usually used united with the

tavern for the sale of liquors.” Noah Webster,

Webster’s American 1828 Dictionary of the English

Language 448 (compact ed., Walking Lion Press

11

2010) (1828). Webster defined a “victualler” primarily

as, “[o]ne who furnishes provisions,” “keeps a house

of entertainment,” or “a provision-ship.” Id. at 899.

“Victuals” in particular meant “[f]ood for human

beings, prepared for eating; that which supports

human life; provisions; meant; sustenance.” Id.

Thus, Webster’s definition of inn-keepers and

victuallers do not deviate from Blackstone, Holt, or

Kent in any material way. One may argue that

“houses of entertainment” constitutes an expansion of

the duty to accommodate, since entertainment is not

necessary for human life. But as Chancellor Kent

noted, “houses of entertainment” had been a legal

term of art for almost a century, meaning one who

provides entertainment and lodgings. 2 Kent, supra,

at 461 (citing Thompson v. Lacy, supra). And

“provisions,” in the context of innkeepers and the

like, meant “[v]ictuals; food…. all manner of eatables

for man and beast.” See Webster, supra, at 645.

D.

Conclusion: The Common Law

Background

of

the

First

Amendment and the Reconstruction

Amendments

“‘The interpretation of the United States

Constitution is necessarily influenced by that fact

that its provisions are framed in the language of the

English common law, and are to be read in the light

of its history.’” Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65,

69 (1904) (quoting Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465,

478 (1888)). The Constitution “‘must be interpreted in

light of the common law, the principles and history of

12

which were familiarly known to the framers of the

Constitution.’” Schick, 195 U.S. at 69 (quoting United

States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898)). In

light of the common law, then, there is a presumption

that the First Amendment and Reconstruction

Amendments are not necessarily at odds with the

common-law accommodation rules as long as the

latter remain within their proper scope.

Putting it all together, the doctrine of public

accommodations that the Founding generation

understood is this: The government may require

those who provide goods and services to sustain

human life to serve every customer. However, such

victuallers may turn down customers if they have

good reason, which includes impossibility of

performance and preservation of certain unalienable

freedoms, such as First Amendment rights.

II.

The Recent Trend in Expanding Public

Accommodation

Laws

Can

Cause

Constitutional Problems

It is no secret that in modern times, public

accommodation laws are not as limited as they were

at common law, the American Founding era, or the

early 19th century. The Colorado statute at issue in

this case is an example of what publicaccommodation laws often look like today. That law

defines a place of “public accommodations” as follows:

As used in this part 6, “place of public

accommodation” means any place of business

engaged in any sales to the public and any

13

place offering services, facilities, privileges,

advantages, or accommodations to the

public, including but not limited to any

business offering wholesale or retail sales to

the public; any place to eat, drink, sleep, or

rest, or any combination thereof; any

sporting or recreational area and facility;

any public transportation facility; a barber

shop, bathhouse, swimming pool, bath,

steam or massage parlor, gymnasium, or

other establishment conducted to serve the

health, appearance, or physical condition of a

person; a campsite or trailer camp; a

dispensary, clinic, hospital, convalescent

home, or other institution for the sick, ailing,

aged, or infirm; a mortuary, undertaking

parlor, or cemetery;

an educational

institution; or any public building, park,

arena, theater, hall, auditorium, museum,

library, exhibit, or public facility of any kind

whether indoor or outdoor. “Place of public

accommodation” shall not include a church,

synagogue, mosque, or other place that is

principally used for religious purposes.

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601(1) (emphasis added).

Thus, between the 19th century and now, the duty

to accommodate the public has expanded from

businesses that provided life-sustaining services to

almost anyone that serves the public. Without a

doubt, some level of public-accommodation laws were

needed during the Civil Rights Era. Denying services

to anyone because of their skin color is reprehensible,

14

and denying basic services to someone because of

their skin color was without a doubt not “good

reason” to deny services to a customer. It is good that

public-accommodation laws remedied that injustice.

But as always, when the pendulum swings too far

one way (such as denying African-Americans

essential goods and services because of their race),

the pendulum can swing too far back the other way

(such as expanding the scope of publicaccommodation laws to include everyone). ACLL’s

position is that it is better to let the market solve

most of these issues than to have the government

force people to serve those whom they do not wish to

serve, with the limited exception of life-sustaining

services. But regardless of whether that is accurate

or not, even if the government can expand the scope

of public accommodations beyond what the common

law held, it may not do so if those laws infringe upon

constitutionally protected rights. Just as “[i]t can

hardly be argued that either students or teachers

shed their constitutional rights … at the schoolhouse

gate,” 10 neither can it be argued seriously that

business owners shed their constitutional rights at

their businesses’ doors.

A.

Freedom of Speech

The Free Speech Clause, applicable to the States

through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that

neither the federal nor state governments may

abridge the freedom of speech. U.S. Const., amend. I.

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.

503, 506 (1969).

10

15

The freedom to speak includes the right not to speak.

Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2463. When the speech includes

“controversial subjects” that are “sensitive political

topics” and “matters of profound value and concern to

the public,” then that speech “occupies the highest

rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values and

merits special protection.” Id. at 2476 (cleaned up).

Consequently, “[g]overnments must not be allowed to

force persons to express a message contrary to their

deepest convictions.” NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S.Ct.

2361, 2379 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

In this case, forcing Petitioners to speak a

message with which they disagree under the guise of

a public-accommodation law undoubtedly violates the

Free Speech Clause. While Petitioners are in the

business of helping promote weddings, spreading the

news about a wedding is not the kind of lifesustaining service that the common law required a

victualler to promote. Even if it could somehow fit

within that category, the protection of religious

liberty is undoubtedly “good reason” to politely

decline promoting that particular event. 11 And as this

Court held in Janus and Justice Kennedy wrote in

his NIFLA concurrence, protecting the right not to

speak on a controversial matter in which a person

Opponents of this view often argue that eradicating

discrimination against people is never good reason to turn down

a customer. But as Justice Gorsuch astutely observed, it’s not

the identity of the customer but the content of the message that

matters to people like Petitioners. See Masterpiece Cakeshop

Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S.Ct. 1719, 1736 (2018)

(Gorsuch, J., concurring).

11

16

has a deeply held fundamental disagreement is good

cause as well.

Lest one object that ACLL is waxing poetic based

on general principles of free speech, this Court’s

precedents provide analogous examples. In Wooley v.

Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977), the United States

Supreme Court addressed the question

of whether the State may constitutionally

require an individual to participate in the

dissemination of an ideological message by

displaying it on his private property in a

manner and for the express purpose that it be

observed and read by the public.

It held that the State may not do so. Id. Although

the issue in that case involved a phrase on a license

plate, the same principle should apply because 303

Creative is a private company and the forced

dissemination of a message on private property

(website, email, etc.) should be held to be just as

unconstitutional.

In Wooley the Court also wrote:

Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a

state measure which forces an individual, as

part of his daily life—indeed constantly while

his automobile is in public view—to be an

instrument for fostering public adherence to

an ideological point of view he finds

unacceptable. In doing so, the State ‘invades

the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is

17

the purpose of the First Amendment to our

Constitution to reserve from all official

control.’ [Barnette, 319 U.S.] at 642.

Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.

The Court in Wooley held that the State's second

claimed interest was not ideologically neutral with

the majority writing, “However, where the State's

interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how

acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an

individual's First Amendment right to avoid

becoming the courier for such message.” Id. at 717.

Certainly, this language should be applicable to the

owner of 303 Creative.

303 Creative's website includes the following

statement under the headline “Why I Create:”

As a Christian who believes that God gave

me the creative gifts that are expressed

through this business, I have always strived

to honor Him in how I operate it. My primary

objective is to design and create expressive

content—script, graphics, websites, and other

creative content—to convey the most

compelling and effective message I can to

promote my client’s purposes, goals, services,

products, events, causes, or values. Because

of my faith, however, I am selective about the

messages that I create or promote – while I

will serve anyone I am always careful to avoid

communicating ideas or messages, or

promoting events, products, services, or

18

organizations, that are inconsistent with my

religious beliefs. 12

That statement sounds very similar to how a

newspaper editor might describe how he decides

what stories, columns, and opinions to run in his

newspaper. The following language from Miami

Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo 418 U.S. 241, 256-57

(1974) (cleaned up) is on point:

We see that, beginning with Associated

Press [v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)], the

Court has expressed sensitivity as to whether

a restriction or requirement constituted the

compulsion exerted by government on a

newspaper to print that which it would not

otherwise print. The clear implication has

been that any such a compulsion to publish

that which “reason” tells them should not be

published' is unconstitutional. A responsible

press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but

press responsibility is not mandated by the

Constitution, and, like many other virtues, it

cannot be legislated.

Appellee's argument that the Florida

statute does not amount to a restriction of

appellant's right to speak, because “the

statute in question here has not prevented

the Miami Herald from saying anything it

wished,” begs the core question. Compelling

12 Why I Create, 303 Creative, https://303creative.com/about/

(last visited May 27, 2022).

19

editors or publishers to publish that which

“‘reason’ tells them should not be published”

is what is at issue in this case. The Florida

statute operates as a command in the same

sense as a statute or regulation forbidding

appellant to publish specified matter.

Governmental restraint on publishing need

not fall into familiar or traditional patterns to

be subject to constitutional limitations on

governmental powers. Grosjean v. American

Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 -245 (1936). The

Florida statute exacts a penalty on the basis

of the content of a newspaper. The first phase

of the penalty resulting from the compelled

printing of a reply is exacted in terms of the

cost in printing and composing time and

materials and in taking up space that could

be devoted to other material the newspaper

may have preferred to print. It is correct, as

appellee contends, that a newspaper is not

subject to the finite technological limitations

of time that confront a broadcaster, but it is

not correct to say that, as an economic reality,

a newspaper can proceed to infinite expansion

of its column space to accommodate the

replies that a government agency determines

or a statute commands the readers should

have available.

Thus, no matter how one slices it, the First

Amendment protects Petitioners’ rights not to speak.

It does not matter whether this case most closely

resembles forcing newspapers to select which articles

to print (Miami Herald), displaying a message on a

20

license plate with which one disagrees (Wooley),

forcing a pro-life agency to display a pro-choice

message (NIFLA), forcing one to pay union dues to

support messages with which one disagrees (Janus),

or forcing one to salute the flag against one’s will

(Barnette). Each category has two things in common:

they violate fundamental free speech guarantees,

and

this

Court

has

declared

each

one

unconstitutional. The similar violation of Petitioners’

free speech rights should not get a pass here simply

because they were violated under the guise of publicaccommodation laws.

B.

Free Exercise of Religion

The First Amendment protects not only the

freedom to speak, but also the free exercise of

religion. U.S. Const., amend. I. In Employment Div.

v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Court cabined the

strict-scrutiny test from past cases into a limited

category of free-exercise cases. Smith, 494 U.S. at

881. Instead, Smith held that the Free Exercise

Clause does not “relieve an individual of the

obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of

general applicability on the ground that the law

proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion

prescribes (or proscribes).” Id. at 879 (cleaned up).

Respondents

may

argue

that

the

publicaccommodation law at issue here is such a law, and

therefore there is no free-exercise violation.

However, five (and maybe six) justices of the

Court have reasoned that Smith does not do justice

to the Free Exercise Clause. See Fulton v. City of

21

Philadelphia, 141 S.Ct. 1868, 1882-83 (2021)

(Barrett, J., joined by Kavanaugh, J., agreeing that

the Free Exercise Clause must be more than

“protection from discrimination” based on its text

and structure); id. at 1883-1926 (Alito, J., joined by

Thomas and Gorsuch, JJ., concurring in judgment)

(making the originalist case for religious

accommodations and that strict scrutiny should

replace Smith); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 576

U.S. 644, 711-12 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)

(arguing that permitting religious people to believe

and teach that same-sex marriage is immoral but not

to act on those beliefs may violate the Free Exercise

Clause).

As Justices Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch observed

in Fulton, a reasonable person at the time of the

Founding would have understood the free “exercise”

of religion to mean that one had the right to

unrestrained practice or outward performance of

their religion. Fulton, 141 S.Ct. at 1896 (Alito, J.,

concurring in judgment). The limited exceptions to

this rule are where the public peace or safety would

be endangered. Id. at 1901. This is a far cry from

modern times where, as Respondents appear to

believe, one’s dignity must come from the State

rather than from being made in the image of God.

Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 735 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

Since the common law did not recognize a

requirement to uphold a person’s dignity but only

their life-sustaining services, and since the Founding

generation recognized only a public peace and safety

exception to the Free Exercise Clause, an originalist

reading of the Free Exercise Clause would not permit

22

the public accommodation law at issue here to force

Petitioners to violate their religious beliefs.

In the alternative, Justices Barrett and

Kavanaugh expressed skepticism of Justice Alito’s

interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause and

though that a more “nuanced” approach may be

warranted. Fulton, 138 S.Ct. at 1883 (Barrett, J.,

concurring). But even if this is the case, Smith

reveals that when a person’s rights to free exercise of

religion and free speech are violated simultaneously,

strict scrutiny applies. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82

(citing Wooley and Barnette). 13

Thus, regardless of whether the standard for

judging free-exercise claims is Justice Alito’s

framework or Smith, strict scrutiny would apply. As

a threshold matter, ACLL shares Justice

Kavanaugh’s concerns about standards of review,

even the strict-scrutiny test. See Ramirez v. Collier,

142 S.Ct. 1264, 1286-87 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring) (citing Brett M. Kavanaugh, Two

Challenges for the Judge as Umpire: Statutory

Ambiguity and Constitutional Exceptions, 92 Notre

Dame L. Rev. 1907, 1914-19 (2017)). ACLL believes

The U.S Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,

interpreting the hybrid-rights doctrine, has postulated that it

applies when a case arises involving scenarios like the ones

described in Smith. Henderson v. McMurray, 987 F.3d 997,

1006-07 (11th Cir. 2021) (Pryor, C.J., for the court). Even if the

interpretation of the hybrid-rights doctrine is that limited, that

is not a problem here. As mentioned above, the hybrid-rights

passage in Smith cited Wooley and Barnette, which both

involved compelled speech. Since that aspect is also present in

this case, strict scrutiny applies.

13

23

that a simple test should apply: if a religious practice

jeopardizes the public peace or safety, then the First

Amendment would not cover it. Fulton, 141 S.Ct. at

1901 (Alito, J., concurring). Such a framework would

provide a clear strike zone for judges as umpires.

But if strict scrutiny applies, then there is no

question that the law at issue would fail that test

here. The level of the government’s interest depends

on the type of purported discrimination. This Court

has

recognized

that

eliminating

sex-based

discrimination is an important interest, and that

protecting homosexual conduct is a legitimate

interest. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197

(1976); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003);

id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Assuming that

these precedents are correctly decided, then

regardless of whether the Court views this as sexbased discrimination or sexual-orientation-based

discrimination, the government’s interest in ending

such (purported) discrimination does not constitute a

compelling interest. Even if it could somehow be that

high, the availability of other vendors to do the job

for customers who wish to promote same-sex

weddings shows that Colorado’s one-size-fits-all

accommodation law is not narrowly tailored.

Thus, regardless of whether the issue is analyzed

under an originalist approach to the Free Exercise

Clause or under the Court’s current precedents, the

Colorado law at issue here is unconstitutional as

applied to Petitioners. Even though the question

presented focuses on free speech, the question of

whether public-accommodation laws may force one to

24

violate their religious convictions has been presented

to this Court again and again. See, e.g., Fulton, 139

S.Ct. 141 S.Ct. at 1874; Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.

v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S.Ct. 1719 (2018);

Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S.Ct. 2671

(2018). The Court should take this opportunity to

note that if expanding the scope of publicaccommodation laws cannot undermine the Free

Speech Clause’s protections, then it should follow

that the same could not undermine the Free Exercise

Clause’s protections, either.

C.

Freedom

Servitude

from

Involuntary

As noted in Part I, supra, the common law limited

public-accommodation laws to those who provided

either life-sustaining services or to those who

provided things that were necessary to obtain lifesustaining services. But in modern times, pubicaccommodation laws have applied to everyone open

to the public. These policies of forcing nearly

everyone, not just those who provide life-sustaining

goods or services, to work for others against their

will may infringe on another constitutional provision:

the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of

involuntary servitude. This is especially true when it

comes to personal-service contracts, as Petitioners

would have to perform in this case.

The Thirteenth Amendment provides, in relevant

part, “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,

except as punishment for a crime whereof the party

shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the

25

United States, or any place subject to their

jurisdiction.” U.S. Const., amend. XIII § 1 (emphasis

added). The amendment prohibits not only slavery—

which is clearly not at issue here or in cases of

public-accommodation laws generally—but also

involuntary servitude. The latter is broader than the

former: involuntary servitude refers to other forms of

forcing one to involuntarily serve others.

“Viewed in historical context and in the tradition

of American political thought, the amendment is an

affirmation of the idea that liberty, in the most

fundamental sense, consists in the right of

individuals not to be interfered with in the exercise

of their natural rights.” Herman Belz, Abolition of

Slavery, in The Heritage Guide to the Constitution

380 (1st ed. 2005). In the context of our natural

rights, American political thought has long held that

all men are endowed by their Creator with the

unalienable right of “liberty.” The Declaration of

Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Thus, involuntary

servitude has “been defined in personal libertarian

terms with respect to conditions of enforced

compulsory service[.]” Belz, supra, at 382.

The question of constitutional interpretation then

becomes whether a reasonable person at the time

would have read the amendment to believe that the

right from involuntary servitude was the right to be

free from working for another against his will. See

Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 38 (new

ed. 2018). In addition to the textual evidence and the

evidence from classical American political thought,

Thomas Cooley noted the possible connection

26

between involuntary servitude and requiring specific

performance of personal-service contracts—which

comes awfully close to telling Petitioners that they

must produce custom creative content against their

will. Specifically in the context of discussing slavery

and involuntary servitude, Cooley wrote, “Contracts

for personal services cannot, as a general rule, be

enforced, and application to be discharged from

service under them on habeas corpus is evidence that

the service is involuntary.” Thomas Cooley, A

Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which

Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the

American Union 363 n.3 (6th ed. 1890) (hereinafter

“Constitutional Limitations”).

This was not only the rule when Cooley wrote

Constitutional Limitations, but a form of it survives

to this day. The Second Restatement of Contracts

provides:

A court will refuse to grant specific

performance of a contract for service or

supervision that is personal in nature. The

refusal is based in part upon the

undesirability of compelling the continuance

of personal association after disputes have

arisen and confidence and loyalty are gone

and, in some instances, of imposing what

might seem like involuntary servitude.

Restatement of Contracts (2d) § 367 cmt. a (1979)

(emphasis added). Thus, it is not only Thomas Cooley

who noted the connection between specific

performance (at least of personal contracts) and

27

involuntary servitude; it was also the American Law

Institute. As the former Chief Justice of the Alabama

Supreme Court put it not long ago, requiring specific

performance of personal-service contracts “smacks of

slavery.” Cavalier Mfg. v. Jackson, 823 So. 2d 1237,

1244 n.3 (Ala. 2001) (Moore, C.J., dissenting). 14

While the text, history, and commentary on the

Involuntary Servitude Clause suggest that ordering

one to serve another against his will (at least when it

comes to personal-service contracts) may violate that

Amendment, there is also recent precedent on the

matter. In 1988, this Court considered the issue of

whether taking advantage of mentally disabled

people, convincing them to work for someone, and

then convincing them they were not free to leave

constituted involuntary servitude. In expounding the

meaning of the Involuntary Servitude Clause, the

Court held that absent several categories of

recognized exceptions, the Court’s precedents “clearly

define a Thirteenth Amendment prohibition of

involuntary servitude enforced by the use or

threatened use of physical or legal coercion.” United

States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944 (1988)

(emphasis added). Thus, under Kozminski, a prima

facie case of involuntary servitude exists when one

attempts to force another to work for him against his

will by use or threatened use of (1) physical coercion,

or (2) legal coercion. Isn’t the latter exactly what

public-accommodation laws do?

14 While “involuntary servitude” would have been the more

accurate term, the Chief Justice probably chose the words

“smacks of slavery” for the effect of alliteration. Still, his point

about involuntary servitude is well-taken.

28

As with any rule, there are exceptions. Kozminski

recognized several categories: (1) involuntary

servitude as punishment for a crime, (2) government

compelling citizens to “perform certain civic duties”

(such as jury service, military service, and

roadwork); and (3) “‘exceptional’ cases well

established in the common law at the time of the

Thirteenth Amendment” such as the right of parents

to their children or preventing sailors from

abandoning ship. Id. at 943-44. And of course,

because the common law required victuallers to serve

all customers unless they had good reasib, that rule

should be viewed as an exception as well. See Part I,

supra. But in the cases of others, it should be

presumed from the text and history of the

Amendment, the learned treatises commenting on

the issue, and this Court’s precedent that the

Amendment prohibits one from having to work for

another against his will. “The fact that the drafters

felt it necessary to exclude this situation indicates

that they thought involuntary servitude includes at

least situations in which the victim is compelled to

work by law.” Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942 (emphasis

added).

Thus, in light of the Thirteenth Amendment, the

question should be asked whether a state may ever

force one to work for another against his will, subject

to the limited historical exceptions. It might be

argued that the Involuntary Servitude Clause’s

prohibition on such work applies only to personalservice contracts. But even if that was the case, it

would apply here, because the personal creativity

29

required from Petitioners would make contracts

between them and those seeking to promote samesex weddings personal-service contracts. See

Restatement of Contracts (2d) § 367 cmt. b (1979).

The Thirteenth Amendment’s effect on publicaccommodation laws is a monumental issue that

deserves thorough briefing, argumentation, and

consideration. The Court need not go that far in this

case unless it finds, somehow, that the First

Amendment does not excuse Petitioners from

complying with the Colorado law in question. But

just as Justice Thomas frequently flags a potential

constitutional problem, analyzes it, and states that

he would be willing to consider that argument in the

appropriate case, the Court (or at least a special

writing from a Justice) should flag the issue of

whether the Involuntary Servitude Clause prohibits

sweeping public-accommodation laws like this.

Failing to take note of this constitutional issue risks

injuring the right for which more American blood

was spilled than any other right: the right of

“personal freedom of all the human race.” The

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 39 (1873).

CONCLUSION

In recent years, public-accommodation laws have

grown from a defined and limited set of rules

affecting only those who provide life-sustaining

services to a behemoth-sized rule applying to nearly

everyone in business. While the reasons behind that

may be noble in some cases (or not noble in others),

the Constitution of the United States is still the

30

“Supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. Const., art. VI, cl.

2. However sweeping a state may desire to craft its

public-accommodation laws, it may not do so at the

expense of constitutional guarantees, such as the

right to free speech, free exercise of religion, and even

freedom from involuntary servitude. Because the

Colorado law at issue here violates at least three

constitutional guarantees and far exceeds the limited

historical role of such laws, the judgment of the

Tenth Circuit is due to be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

W. BRENT WOODALL

MATTHEW J. CLARK*

THE WOODALL LAW FIRM *Counsel of Record

121 S. Court St., Ste. B ALABAMA CENTER FOR

Florence, AL 35630

LAW AND LIBERTY

(256) 349-2507

2213 Morris Ave., Fl. 1

woodalltrialad@

Birmingham, AL 35203

hushmail.com

(256) 510-1828

matt@

alabamalawandliberty.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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