Amicus Curiae Brief — 303 Creative LLC, et al., Petitioners v. Aubrey Elenis, et al.
Supreme Court briefMay 31, 2022
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 21-476
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
___________________________________
303 CREATIVE LLC, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
AUBREY ELENIS, et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals to the Tenth Circuit
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
ALABAMA CENTER FOR LAW AND LIBERTY
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
W. BRENT WOODALL
MATTHEW J. CLARK*
THE WOODALL LAW FIRM *Counsel of Record
121 S. Court St., Ste. B ALABAMA CENTER FOR
Florence, AL 35630
LAW AND LIBERTY
(256) 349-2507
2213 Morris Ave., Fl. 1
woodalltrialad@
Birmingham, AL 35203
hushmail.com
(256) 510-1828
matt@
alabamalawandliberty.org
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii
IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS
CURIAE ....................................................................... 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................... 1
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 4
I.
As
the
First
and
Thirteenth
Amendments Were Being Framed,
Public-Accommodation Laws Applied
Only to Businesses That Provided LifeSustaining Goods or Services .............................. 4
A.
Public-Accommodation
Laws
Under the Common Law ............................. 4
B.
“Good Reason” in the AngloAmerican Tradition ..................................... 8
C.
Nineteenth Century Views of
Accommodations
Before
the
Reconstruction Amendments .................... 10
D.
Conclusion: The Common Law
Background
of
the
First
ii
Amendment
and
the
Reconstruction Amendments .................... 11
II.
The Recent Trend in Expanding Public
Accommodation Laws Can Cause
Constitutional Problems ................................... 12
A.
Freedom of Speech..................................... 14
B.
Free Exercise of Religion........................... 20
C.
Freedom
from
Involuntary
Servitude .................................................... 24
CONCLUSION ......................................................... 29
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1
(1945) .................................................................... 18
Cavalier Mfg. v. Jackson, 823 So. 2d 1237
(Ala. 2001) ............................................................ 27
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) .............................................................. 20-22
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S.Ct.
1868 (2021) ..................................................... 20-24
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936) .................................................................... 19
Henderson v. McMurray, 987 F.3d 997 (11th
Cir. 2021) .............................................................. 22
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995)................... 6-7
Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S.Ct.
2448 (2018) ................................................. 9, 15, 20
Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 472, 88 Eng. Rep.
1458 (K.B. 1701) ............................................... 6, 10
Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963) ............... 7
iv
Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm’n, 138 S.Ct. 1719 (2018).......... 15, 24
Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo 418 U.S.
241 (1974) ....................................................... 18-19
NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S.Ct. 2361 (2018) ........... 15, 20
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) ................ 21
Ramirez v. Collier, 142 S.Ct. 1264 (2022)................. 22
Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904) ....7, 11-12
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888) ................... 11
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36
(1873) .................................................................... 29
Thompson v. Lacy, 3 Barn. & Ald. 283 ................. 8, 11
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969) .............................................. 14
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931
(1988) .............................................................. 27-28
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649
(1898) .............................................................. 11-12
W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943) .................................. 1, 16-17, 19-20, 22
v
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705
(1977) ...................................................16-17, 20, 22
Constitutions and Statutes
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601 ................................ 12-13
U.S. Const. amend. I ......................................... passim
U.S. Const. amend. XIII ............................... 3-4, 24-29
U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2 ..................................... 29-30
Other Authority
1 Timothy 6:8 (New American Standard
Bible 1995) .............................................................. 6
A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in
2 Papers of Thomas Jefferson (J. Boyd ed.
1950) ....................................................................... 9
Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation
(new ed. 2018)....................................................... 25
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138
S.Ct. 2671 (2018) .................................................. 24
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Two Challenges for the
Judge as Umpire: Statutory Ambiguity
and Constitutional Exceptions, 92 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1907 (2017) .................................... 22
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).......................... 23
vi
Herman Belz, Abolition of Slavery, in The
Heritage Guide to the Constitution (1st ed.
2005) ..................................................................... 25
Human
Needs,
NASA,
https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/162514main_H
uman_Needs.pdf (last visited May 20,
2022) ....................................................................... 5
James Kent, Commentaries on American
Law (1827) ........................................................ 7-11
James
Madison,
A
Memorial
and
Remonstrance (1785) .......................................... 8-9
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) ................... 23
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
(11th ed. 2020) ........................................................ 3
Noah Webster, Webster’s American 1828
Dictionary of the English Language
(compact ed., Walking Lion Press 2010)
(1828) .............................................................. 10-11
Restatement of Contracts (2d) § 367 (1979) ........ 26, 29
Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English
Language (1755) ................................................. 4-6
Saul McLeod, Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs,
Simple Psychology (last updated Apr. 4,
2022),
vii
https://www.simplypsychology.org/maslo
w.html. .................................................................... 6
The Declaration of Independence para. 2
(U.S. 1776) ............................................................ 25
Thomas Cooley, A Treatise on the
Constitutional Limitations Which Rest
Upon the Legislative Power of the States
of the American Union 363 (6th ed. 1890) ........... 26
Why
I
Create,
303
Creative,
https://303creative.com/about/
(last
visited May 27, 2022) ..................................... 17-18
William Blackstone, Commentaries ...............4, 6-8, 11
1
IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF
AMICUS CURIAE 1
Amicus Curiae Alabama Center for Law and
Liberty (“ACLL”) is a conservative nonprofit publicinterest firm located in Birmingham, Alabama,
dedicated to the defense of limited government, free
markets, and strong families. ACLL has an interest
in this case because it believes that freedom of speech
and free exercise of religion are indispensably
essential to limited government, because violating
these freedoms “invades the sphere of intellect and
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment
to our Constitution to reserve from all official
control.” W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943). Moreover, because ACLL believes in
free markets, it believes that, subject to limited
exceptions, people should be free to decline working
for another against their will.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
At common law, public-accommodation laws
applied only to a limited class of vendors: (1) those
who provided food, drink, shelter, and other lifesustaining services to people who needed them, or (2)
those who provided transportation or communication
1 Pursuant to Rule
37.3, all parties have consented to the
filing of this brief. Pursuant to Rule 37.6, no party or party’s
counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, or contributed
money that was intended to fund its preparation or submission;
and no person other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its
counsel, contributed money that was intended to fund the
preparation or submission of this brief.
2
that was necessary to secure those life-sustaining
goods or services. The common law’s rules made
sense: because people need certain fundamental
things in order to live, those goods or services should
not be declined without good reason. The First and
Thirteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution were adopted with that background in
mind.
But in recent years, the scope of publicaccommodation laws has expanded drastically.
Instead of occupying the limited sphere that publicaccommodation laws held in the 18th and 19th
centuries, they have now expanded to apply to just
about anyone who does business with the public.
Undoubtedly, some public-accommodation laws were
needed during the Civil Rights Era, as AfricanAmericans were being denied fundamental goods and
services simply because of their skin color. But the
trend today is to expand the scope from fundamental
goods or services to any goods or services available to
the public.
Regardless of whether the motivations behind
that expansion were good or not, if the expanded
public-accommodation laws cross constitutional lines,
then they are not valid. In this case, the Colorado
public-accommodation
law
violates
three
constitutional guarantees, at least as applied to
Petitioners. First, it violates Petitioners’ freedom to
refrain from speaking a message with which they
disagree. Second, it violates Petitioners’ right to
freely exercise their religion, both under an
originalist analysis of the Free Exercise Clause and
3
under this Court’s precedents. Finally, a prima facie
case exists that forcing Petitioners to engage in
personal-service contracts against their will violates
the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of
involuntary servitude. This position is supported not
only by the text and history of the Amendment, but
also by leading 19th and 20th century treatises and
this Court’s precedents.
Thus, whatever authority the states have to
expand
the
historical
function
of
publicaccommodation laws, they cannot do so if those laws
would violate the First or Thirteenth Amendments.
Failing to enforce constitutional guarantees of
freedom would give public-accommodation laws the
right to take the average American, who just wanted
to make a living, and shanghai him into supporting
causes with which he has deeply held fundamental
disagreements. 2 Just as teachers and students do not
shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse
gate, neither do Americans shed their constitutional
rights when they go to work. Thus, while publicaccommodation laws serve important purposes when
kept within their proper role, they may not be abused
to rob Americans of their First and Thirteenth
Amendment rights under the guise of a supposed
“duty to serve everyone,” or maybe more specifically,
a “duty not to offend anyone.”
2 To “shanghai” means “to put aboard a ship by force often
with the help of liquor or a drug,” or “to put by trickery into an
undesirable position.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
1143 (11th ed. 2020). This word originates from “use of this
method to secure sailors for voyages to eastern Asia[.]” Id.
4
ARGUMENT
I.
As the First and Thirteenth Amendments
Were
Being
Framed,
PublicAccommodation Laws Applied Only to
Businesses That Provided Life-Sustaining
Goods or Services
A.
Public-Accommodation Laws Under
the Common Law
At common law, most businesses were free to
serve whom they wished; only a select few were
subject to laws that did not allow them to turn down
customers. Summarizing the relevant rules,
Blackstone writes:
Also if an inn-keeper, or other victualler,
hangs out a sign and opens his house for
travellers [sic], it is an implied
engagement to entertain all persons who
travel that way; and upon this universal
assumpsit an action on the case will lie
against him for damages, if he without
good reason refuses to admit a traveller
[sic].
1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *164.
Three observations must be made about
Blackstone’s rule before proceeding further. First, the
rule applied to inn-keepers. Second, it applied to
“other victualler[s].” At the time, a “victualler” was
defined as “[o]ne who provides victuals.” 2 Samuel
5
Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language
(1755). 3 A “victual,” in turn, meant, “[p]rovision of
food; stores for the support of life; meat; sustenance.”
Id. 4
Thus, not everyone who provides goods or services
was forced to serve people who wanted their
business. Instead, only those who provided shelter,
food, sustenance, or had a store “for the support of
life” was subject to this rule. The reason is obvious:
there are certain goods or services that people need
in order to live.
Throughout history, different (and even rivaling)
schools of thought have still been able to agree on
what constitutes such needs. Scientists generally
recognize that food, water, air, and shelter are
needed to survive. 5 Abraham Maslow, the renown
humanist psychologist, reasoned that physiological
needs (such as food, water, and rest), as opposed to
psychological and self-fulfillment needs (such as
intimate relationships, feelings of prestige, and
reaching one’s potential), were the most fundamental
Available
at
https://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/views/search.php?term=vic
tualler (last visited May 20, 2022).
4
Available
at
https://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/views/search.php?term=vic
tual (last visited May 20, 2022).
5
See
Human
Needs,
NASA,
https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/162514main_Human_Needs.pdf (last
visited May 20, 2022).
3
6
set of needs in his “Hierarchy of Needs.” 6 And finally,
in a sentiment reflected by many who hold to the
Judeo-Christian worldview, the Apostle Paul wrote:
“If we have food and covering, with these we shall be
content.” 7
Thus, regardless of one’s worldview, it is
commonly accepted that people need food, water, air,
shelter, and clothing to live. This fits neatly within
Johnson’s definition of “victuals.” That would explain
why Blackstone wrote that innkeepers and other
victuallers could not turn down customers without
good reason. People literally could not live without
the services of victuallers.
In 1701, Chief Justice Holt of the King’s Bench
postulated that the rule extended beyond innkeepers
to include smiths (specifically those who worked with
horseshoes) and common carriers. Lane v. Cotton, 12
Mod. 472, 484-85, 88 Eng. Rep. 1458, 1464-65 (K.B.
1701) (Holt, C.J.). Chief Justice Holt reasoned,
“Whenever any subject takes upon himself a public
trust for the benefit of the rest of his fellow-subjects,
he is ipso facto bound to serve the subject in all the
things that are within the reach and comprehension
of such an office[.]” Id., 12 Mod. at 484. However, two
things are worth noting here.
First, this Court has interpreted Chief Justice
Holt’s rule to apply to “innkeepers, smiths, and
Saul McLeod, Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, Simple
Psychology
(last
updated
Apr.
4,
2022),
https://www.simplypsychology.org/maslow.html.
7 1 Timothy 6:8 (New American Standard Bible 1995).
6
7
others who ‘made profession of a public employment’”
who could be regarded as “a sort of public servants.”
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of
Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 571 (1995) (citations omitted).
Justice Douglas likewise focused on “innkeepers and
carriers” as prime examples of “common callings.”
Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 277 (1963)
(Douglas, J., concurring). This did not apply to
everyone who was employed, but to those who could
be regarded as public servants. It seems that this
Court and Chief Justice Holt focused on those who
provided victuals and infrastructure that was
necessary to secure victuals. For instance, although
shoeing a horse is not as critical to human survival as
food and water, having the transportation to get food
and water is critical to human survival.
Second,
Blackstone’s
view
of
public
accommodation laws might have been narrower than
Chief Justice Holt’s, since his recitation of the publicaccommodation doctrine was not as expansive. Since
this Court has recognized that Blackstone’s
Commentaries are the most satisfactory exposition of
the common law, 8 more weight should be given to
Blackstone’s view than to Holt’s if the two conflict. If
they do not conflict though, then they should be
harmonized by giving appropriate weight to
Blackstone’s view so that the “common calling”
doctrine remains the exception rather than the rule.
Finally, the common law applied the innkeeper
rule to “houses of public entertainment.” 2 James
8 Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904).
8
Kent, Commentaries on American Law 461 (1827)
(citing Thompson v. Lacy, 3 Barn. & Ald. 283).
However, houses of public entertainment constituted
inns only when “provisions and beds were furnished
for travelers[.]” Id. Thus, places like theaters, sports
arenas, and the like would not constitute a house of
public entertainment.
B.
“Good Reason” in
American Tradition
the
Anglo-
That brings us to the third observation of
Blackstone’s rule. Even though victuallers’ services
were so essential, they would escape liability for
turning down a customer if they had good reason.
While Blackstone did not provide any illustrations of
what “good reason” meant, he would undoubtedly
agree that the preservation of religious freedom
would be a good reason. As he said, “Upon these two
foundations, the law of nature and the law of
revelation, depend all human laws; that is to say, no
human laws should be suffered to contradict these.” 1
William
Blackstone,
Commentaries
*42.
In
Blackstone’s view, if a human law (such as the
innkeeper rule) caused one to disobey God, then that
law was bad law (or perhaps not even law at all—see
id. at *41). It stands to reason then that if a person
were to employ a victualler’s services for a purpose
that he would find sinful, then he would have good
reason to say no. With this notion James Madison
would agree, arguing that what is a “duty towards
9
the Creator” is a “right against man.” See James
Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance (1785). 9
Almost inseparably connected with freedom of
religion is freedom of speech. “As Jefferson famously
put it, ‘to compel a man to furnish contributions of
money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves and abhors is sinful and tyrannical.’”
Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 2464
(2018) (quoting A Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom, in 2 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 545 (J.
Boyd ed. 1950)). In Jefferson’s view, which became
quite influential, God alone had jurisdiction over the
heart and mind, giving government the power over
actions only. Thus, to force one to speak a message
with which he disagrees was to invade a province
that God alone had the right to judge: the realm of
the mind, heart, and spirit. Accord W. Va. St. Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding
that forcing one to salute the flag “invades the sphere
of the intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of
the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve
from all official control.”). Thus, by the time of the
American founding, protecting the freedom to speak
(or not to speak) would have been considered “good
reason” as well.
Finally, Chief Justice Holt and Chancellor Kent
are in agreement that lack of ability to perform the
contract constituted “good reason.” Chief Justice
Holt, for instance, excuses an innkeeper from
Available
at
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0163
(last visited May 30, 2022).
9
10
refusing to entertain a guest if his house is full. Lane,
12 Mod. at 484 (Holt, C.J.). Chancellor Kent likewise
notes that “reasonable compensation” for the
innkeeper was an indispensable element of the
innkeeper rule, meaning that if the customer was
unwilling to pay, then the innkeeper had no duty to
serve. See 2 Kent, supra, at 461.
C.
Nineteenth
Century
Views
of
Accommodations
Before
the
Reconstruction Amendments
By the time Chancellor Kent wrote Commentaries
on American Law, the predominant issue was not
who innkeepers were required to accommodate, but
rather who was an innkeeper. 2 Kent, supra, at 46162. To clarify any confusion, most of the states had
defined by statute who constituted an innkeeper and
established a licensing scheme. Id. at 462-63.
However, there is no indication that these statutes
changed the scope of who innkeepers were required
to accommodate. See id. at 461-63.
A year after Chancellor Kent wrote about the
duties of innkeepers under American law, Noah
Webster published his American Dictionary of the
English Language. Webster defined an “innkeeper”
as an “inn-holder,” noting that in this country, “the
innkeeper is often a tavern keeper or taverner, as
well as an innkeeper, the inn for furnishing lodgings
and provisions being usually used united with the
tavern for the sale of liquors.” Noah Webster,
Webster’s American 1828 Dictionary of the English
Language 448 (compact ed., Walking Lion Press
11
2010) (1828). Webster defined a “victualler” primarily
as, “[o]ne who furnishes provisions,” “keeps a house
of entertainment,” or “a provision-ship.” Id. at 899.
“Victuals” in particular meant “[f]ood for human
beings, prepared for eating; that which supports
human life; provisions; meant; sustenance.” Id.
Thus, Webster’s definition of inn-keepers and
victuallers do not deviate from Blackstone, Holt, or
Kent in any material way. One may argue that
“houses of entertainment” constitutes an expansion of
the duty to accommodate, since entertainment is not
necessary for human life. But as Chancellor Kent
noted, “houses of entertainment” had been a legal
term of art for almost a century, meaning one who
provides entertainment and lodgings. 2 Kent, supra,
at 461 (citing Thompson v. Lacy, supra). And
“provisions,” in the context of innkeepers and the
like, meant “[v]ictuals; food…. all manner of eatables
for man and beast.” See Webster, supra, at 645.
D.
Conclusion: The Common Law
Background
of
the
First
Amendment and the Reconstruction
Amendments
“‘The interpretation of the United States
Constitution is necessarily influenced by that fact
that its provisions are framed in the language of the
English common law, and are to be read in the light
of its history.’” Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65,
69 (1904) (quoting Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465,
478 (1888)). The Constitution “‘must be interpreted in
light of the common law, the principles and history of
12
which were familiarly known to the framers of the
Constitution.’” Schick, 195 U.S. at 69 (quoting United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898)). In
light of the common law, then, there is a presumption
that the First Amendment and Reconstruction
Amendments are not necessarily at odds with the
common-law accommodation rules as long as the
latter remain within their proper scope.
Putting it all together, the doctrine of public
accommodations that the Founding generation
understood is this: The government may require
those who provide goods and services to sustain
human life to serve every customer. However, such
victuallers may turn down customers if they have
good reason, which includes impossibility of
performance and preservation of certain unalienable
freedoms, such as First Amendment rights.
II.
The Recent Trend in Expanding Public
Accommodation
Laws
Can
Cause
Constitutional Problems
It is no secret that in modern times, public
accommodation laws are not as limited as they were
at common law, the American Founding era, or the
early 19th century. The Colorado statute at issue in
this case is an example of what publicaccommodation laws often look like today. That law
defines a place of “public accommodations” as follows:
As used in this part 6, “place of public
accommodation” means any place of business
engaged in any sales to the public and any
13
place offering services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations to the
public, including but not limited to any
business offering wholesale or retail sales to
the public; any place to eat, drink, sleep, or
rest, or any combination thereof; any
sporting or recreational area and facility;
any public transportation facility; a barber
shop, bathhouse, swimming pool, bath,
steam or massage parlor, gymnasium, or
other establishment conducted to serve the
health, appearance, or physical condition of a
person; a campsite or trailer camp; a
dispensary, clinic, hospital, convalescent
home, or other institution for the sick, ailing,
aged, or infirm; a mortuary, undertaking
parlor, or cemetery;
an educational
institution; or any public building, park,
arena, theater, hall, auditorium, museum,
library, exhibit, or public facility of any kind
whether indoor or outdoor. “Place of public
accommodation” shall not include a church,
synagogue, mosque, or other place that is
principally used for religious purposes.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601(1) (emphasis added).
Thus, between the 19th century and now, the duty
to accommodate the public has expanded from
businesses that provided life-sustaining services to
almost anyone that serves the public. Without a
doubt, some level of public-accommodation laws were
needed during the Civil Rights Era. Denying services
to anyone because of their skin color is reprehensible,
14
and denying basic services to someone because of
their skin color was without a doubt not “good
reason” to deny services to a customer. It is good that
public-accommodation laws remedied that injustice.
But as always, when the pendulum swings too far
one way (such as denying African-Americans
essential goods and services because of their race),
the pendulum can swing too far back the other way
(such as expanding the scope of publicaccommodation laws to include everyone). ACLL’s
position is that it is better to let the market solve
most of these issues than to have the government
force people to serve those whom they do not wish to
serve, with the limited exception of life-sustaining
services. But regardless of whether that is accurate
or not, even if the government can expand the scope
of public accommodations beyond what the common
law held, it may not do so if those laws infringe upon
constitutionally protected rights. Just as “[i]t can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights … at the schoolhouse
gate,” 10 neither can it be argued seriously that
business owners shed their constitutional rights at
their businesses’ doors.
A.
Freedom of Speech
The Free Speech Clause, applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that
neither the federal nor state governments may
abridge the freedom of speech. U.S. Const., amend. I.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506 (1969).
10
15
The freedom to speak includes the right not to speak.
Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2463. When the speech includes
“controversial subjects” that are “sensitive political
topics” and “matters of profound value and concern to
the public,” then that speech “occupies the highest
rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values and
merits special protection.” Id. at 2476 (cleaned up).
Consequently, “[g]overnments must not be allowed to
force persons to express a message contrary to their
deepest convictions.” NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S.Ct.
2361, 2379 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
In this case, forcing Petitioners to speak a
message with which they disagree under the guise of
a public-accommodation law undoubtedly violates the
Free Speech Clause. While Petitioners are in the
business of helping promote weddings, spreading the
news about a wedding is not the kind of lifesustaining service that the common law required a
victualler to promote. Even if it could somehow fit
within that category, the protection of religious
liberty is undoubtedly “good reason” to politely
decline promoting that particular event. 11 And as this
Court held in Janus and Justice Kennedy wrote in
his NIFLA concurrence, protecting the right not to
speak on a controversial matter in which a person
Opponents of this view often argue that eradicating
discrimination against people is never good reason to turn down
a customer. But as Justice Gorsuch astutely observed, it’s not
the identity of the customer but the content of the message that
matters to people like Petitioners. See Masterpiece Cakeshop
Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S.Ct. 1719, 1736 (2018)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
11
16
has a deeply held fundamental disagreement is good
cause as well.
Lest one object that ACLL is waxing poetic based
on general principles of free speech, this Court’s
precedents provide analogous examples. In Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977), the United States
Supreme Court addressed the question
of whether the State may constitutionally
require an individual to participate in the
dissemination of an ideological message by
displaying it on his private property in a
manner and for the express purpose that it be
observed and read by the public.
It held that the State may not do so. Id. Although
the issue in that case involved a phrase on a license
plate, the same principle should apply because 303
Creative is a private company and the forced
dissemination of a message on private property
(website, email, etc.) should be held to be just as
unconstitutional.
In Wooley the Court also wrote:
Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a
state measure which forces an individual, as
part of his daily life—indeed constantly while
his automobile is in public view—to be an
instrument for fostering public adherence to
an ideological point of view he finds
unacceptable. In doing so, the State ‘invades
the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is
17
the purpose of the First Amendment to our
Constitution to reserve from all official
control.’ [Barnette, 319 U.S.] at 642.
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
The Court in Wooley held that the State's second
claimed interest was not ideologically neutral with
the majority writing, “However, where the State's
interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how
acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an
individual's First Amendment right to avoid
becoming the courier for such message.” Id. at 717.
Certainly, this language should be applicable to the
owner of 303 Creative.
303 Creative's website includes the following
statement under the headline “Why I Create:”
As a Christian who believes that God gave
me the creative gifts that are expressed
through this business, I have always strived
to honor Him in how I operate it. My primary
objective is to design and create expressive
content—script, graphics, websites, and other
creative content—to convey the most
compelling and effective message I can to
promote my client’s purposes, goals, services,
products, events, causes, or values. Because
of my faith, however, I am selective about the
messages that I create or promote – while I
will serve anyone I am always careful to avoid
communicating ideas or messages, or
promoting events, products, services, or
18
organizations, that are inconsistent with my
religious beliefs. 12
That statement sounds very similar to how a
newspaper editor might describe how he decides
what stories, columns, and opinions to run in his
newspaper. The following language from Miami
Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo 418 U.S. 241, 256-57
(1974) (cleaned up) is on point:
We see that, beginning with Associated
Press [v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)], the
Court has expressed sensitivity as to whether
a restriction or requirement constituted the
compulsion exerted by government on a
newspaper to print that which it would not
otherwise print. The clear implication has
been that any such a compulsion to publish
that which “reason” tells them should not be
published' is unconstitutional. A responsible
press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but
press responsibility is not mandated by the
Constitution, and, like many other virtues, it
cannot be legislated.
Appellee's argument that the Florida
statute does not amount to a restriction of
appellant's right to speak, because “the
statute in question here has not prevented
the Miami Herald from saying anything it
wished,” begs the core question. Compelling
12 Why I Create, 303 Creative, https://303creative.com/about/
(last visited May 27, 2022).
19
editors or publishers to publish that which
“‘reason’ tells them should not be published”
is what is at issue in this case. The Florida
statute operates as a command in the same
sense as a statute or regulation forbidding
appellant to publish specified matter.
Governmental restraint on publishing need
not fall into familiar or traditional patterns to
be subject to constitutional limitations on
governmental powers. Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 -245 (1936). The
Florida statute exacts a penalty on the basis
of the content of a newspaper. The first phase
of the penalty resulting from the compelled
printing of a reply is exacted in terms of the
cost in printing and composing time and
materials and in taking up space that could
be devoted to other material the newspaper
may have preferred to print. It is correct, as
appellee contends, that a newspaper is not
subject to the finite technological limitations
of time that confront a broadcaster, but it is
not correct to say that, as an economic reality,
a newspaper can proceed to infinite expansion
of its column space to accommodate the
replies that a government agency determines
or a statute commands the readers should
have available.
Thus, no matter how one slices it, the First
Amendment protects Petitioners’ rights not to speak.
It does not matter whether this case most closely
resembles forcing newspapers to select which articles
to print (Miami Herald), displaying a message on a
20
license plate with which one disagrees (Wooley),
forcing a pro-life agency to display a pro-choice
message (NIFLA), forcing one to pay union dues to
support messages with which one disagrees (Janus),
or forcing one to salute the flag against one’s will
(Barnette). Each category has two things in common:
they violate fundamental free speech guarantees,
and
this
Court
has
declared
each
one
unconstitutional. The similar violation of Petitioners’
free speech rights should not get a pass here simply
because they were violated under the guise of publicaccommodation laws.
B.
Free Exercise of Religion
The First Amendment protects not only the
freedom to speak, but also the free exercise of
religion. U.S. Const., amend. I. In Employment Div.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Court cabined the
strict-scrutiny test from past cases into a limited
category of free-exercise cases. Smith, 494 U.S. at
881. Instead, Smith held that the Free Exercise
Clause does not “relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes).” Id. at 879 (cleaned up).
Respondents
may
argue
that
the
publicaccommodation law at issue here is such a law, and
therefore there is no free-exercise violation.
However, five (and maybe six) justices of the
Court have reasoned that Smith does not do justice
to the Free Exercise Clause. See Fulton v. City of
21
Philadelphia, 141 S.Ct. 1868, 1882-83 (2021)
(Barrett, J., joined by Kavanaugh, J., agreeing that
the Free Exercise Clause must be more than
“protection from discrimination” based on its text
and structure); id. at 1883-1926 (Alito, J., joined by
Thomas and Gorsuch, JJ., concurring in judgment)
(making the originalist case for religious
accommodations and that strict scrutiny should
replace Smith); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 576
U.S. 644, 711-12 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that permitting religious people to believe
and teach that same-sex marriage is immoral but not
to act on those beliefs may violate the Free Exercise
Clause).
As Justices Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch observed
in Fulton, a reasonable person at the time of the
Founding would have understood the free “exercise”
of religion to mean that one had the right to
unrestrained practice or outward performance of
their religion. Fulton, 141 S.Ct. at 1896 (Alito, J.,
concurring in judgment). The limited exceptions to
this rule are where the public peace or safety would
be endangered. Id. at 1901. This is a far cry from
modern times where, as Respondents appear to
believe, one’s dignity must come from the State
rather than from being made in the image of God.
Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 735 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Since the common law did not recognize a
requirement to uphold a person’s dignity but only
their life-sustaining services, and since the Founding
generation recognized only a public peace and safety
exception to the Free Exercise Clause, an originalist
reading of the Free Exercise Clause would not permit
22
the public accommodation law at issue here to force
Petitioners to violate their religious beliefs.
In the alternative, Justices Barrett and
Kavanaugh expressed skepticism of Justice Alito’s
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause and
though that a more “nuanced” approach may be
warranted. Fulton, 138 S.Ct. at 1883 (Barrett, J.,
concurring). But even if this is the case, Smith
reveals that when a person’s rights to free exercise of
religion and free speech are violated simultaneously,
strict scrutiny applies. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82
(citing Wooley and Barnette). 13
Thus, regardless of whether the standard for
judging free-exercise claims is Justice Alito’s
framework or Smith, strict scrutiny would apply. As
a threshold matter, ACLL shares Justice
Kavanaugh’s concerns about standards of review,
even the strict-scrutiny test. See Ramirez v. Collier,
142 S.Ct. 1264, 1286-87 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (citing Brett M. Kavanaugh, Two
Challenges for the Judge as Umpire: Statutory
Ambiguity and Constitutional Exceptions, 92 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1907, 1914-19 (2017)). ACLL believes
The U.S Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
interpreting the hybrid-rights doctrine, has postulated that it
applies when a case arises involving scenarios like the ones
described in Smith. Henderson v. McMurray, 987 F.3d 997,
1006-07 (11th Cir. 2021) (Pryor, C.J., for the court). Even if the
interpretation of the hybrid-rights doctrine is that limited, that
is not a problem here. As mentioned above, the hybrid-rights
passage in Smith cited Wooley and Barnette, which both
involved compelled speech. Since that aspect is also present in
this case, strict scrutiny applies.
13
23
that a simple test should apply: if a religious practice
jeopardizes the public peace or safety, then the First
Amendment would not cover it. Fulton, 141 S.Ct. at
1901 (Alito, J., concurring). Such a framework would
provide a clear strike zone for judges as umpires.
But if strict scrutiny applies, then there is no
question that the law at issue would fail that test
here. The level of the government’s interest depends
on the type of purported discrimination. This Court
has
recognized
that
eliminating
sex-based
discrimination is an important interest, and that
protecting homosexual conduct is a legitimate
interest. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003);
id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Assuming that
these precedents are correctly decided, then
regardless of whether the Court views this as sexbased discrimination or sexual-orientation-based
discrimination, the government’s interest in ending
such (purported) discrimination does not constitute a
compelling interest. Even if it could somehow be that
high, the availability of other vendors to do the job
for customers who wish to promote same-sex
weddings shows that Colorado’s one-size-fits-all
accommodation law is not narrowly tailored.
Thus, regardless of whether the issue is analyzed
under an originalist approach to the Free Exercise
Clause or under the Court’s current precedents, the
Colorado law at issue here is unconstitutional as
applied to Petitioners. Even though the question
presented focuses on free speech, the question of
whether public-accommodation laws may force one to
24
violate their religious convictions has been presented
to this Court again and again. See, e.g., Fulton, 139
S.Ct. 141 S.Ct. at 1874; Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.
v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S.Ct. 1719 (2018);
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S.Ct. 2671
(2018). The Court should take this opportunity to
note that if expanding the scope of publicaccommodation laws cannot undermine the Free
Speech Clause’s protections, then it should follow
that the same could not undermine the Free Exercise
Clause’s protections, either.
C.
Freedom
Servitude
from
Involuntary
As noted in Part I, supra, the common law limited
public-accommodation laws to those who provided
either life-sustaining services or to those who
provided things that were necessary to obtain lifesustaining services. But in modern times, pubicaccommodation laws have applied to everyone open
to the public. These policies of forcing nearly
everyone, not just those who provide life-sustaining
goods or services, to work for others against their
will may infringe on another constitutional provision:
the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of
involuntary servitude. This is especially true when it
comes to personal-service contracts, as Petitioners
would have to perform in this case.
The Thirteenth Amendment provides, in relevant
part, “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as punishment for a crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
25
United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.” U.S. Const., amend. XIII § 1 (emphasis
added). The amendment prohibits not only slavery—
which is clearly not at issue here or in cases of
public-accommodation laws generally—but also
involuntary servitude. The latter is broader than the
former: involuntary servitude refers to other forms of
forcing one to involuntarily serve others.
“Viewed in historical context and in the tradition
of American political thought, the amendment is an
affirmation of the idea that liberty, in the most
fundamental sense, consists in the right of
individuals not to be interfered with in the exercise
of their natural rights.” Herman Belz, Abolition of
Slavery, in The Heritage Guide to the Constitution
380 (1st ed. 2005). In the context of our natural
rights, American political thought has long held that
all men are endowed by their Creator with the
unalienable right of “liberty.” The Declaration of
Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Thus, involuntary
servitude has “been defined in personal libertarian
terms with respect to conditions of enforced
compulsory service[.]” Belz, supra, at 382.
The question of constitutional interpretation then
becomes whether a reasonable person at the time
would have read the amendment to believe that the
right from involuntary servitude was the right to be
free from working for another against his will. See
Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 38 (new
ed. 2018). In addition to the textual evidence and the
evidence from classical American political thought,
Thomas Cooley noted the possible connection
26
between involuntary servitude and requiring specific
performance of personal-service contracts—which
comes awfully close to telling Petitioners that they
must produce custom creative content against their
will. Specifically in the context of discussing slavery
and involuntary servitude, Cooley wrote, “Contracts
for personal services cannot, as a general rule, be
enforced, and application to be discharged from
service under them on habeas corpus is evidence that
the service is involuntary.” Thomas Cooley, A
Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which
Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the
American Union 363 n.3 (6th ed. 1890) (hereinafter
“Constitutional Limitations”).
This was not only the rule when Cooley wrote
Constitutional Limitations, but a form of it survives
to this day. The Second Restatement of Contracts
provides:
A court will refuse to grant specific
performance of a contract for service or
supervision that is personal in nature. The
refusal is based in part upon the
undesirability of compelling the continuance
of personal association after disputes have
arisen and confidence and loyalty are gone
and, in some instances, of imposing what
might seem like involuntary servitude.
Restatement of Contracts (2d) § 367 cmt. a (1979)
(emphasis added). Thus, it is not only Thomas Cooley
who noted the connection between specific
performance (at least of personal contracts) and
27
involuntary servitude; it was also the American Law
Institute. As the former Chief Justice of the Alabama
Supreme Court put it not long ago, requiring specific
performance of personal-service contracts “smacks of
slavery.” Cavalier Mfg. v. Jackson, 823 So. 2d 1237,
1244 n.3 (Ala. 2001) (Moore, C.J., dissenting). 14
While the text, history, and commentary on the
Involuntary Servitude Clause suggest that ordering
one to serve another against his will (at least when it
comes to personal-service contracts) may violate that
Amendment, there is also recent precedent on the
matter. In 1988, this Court considered the issue of
whether taking advantage of mentally disabled
people, convincing them to work for someone, and
then convincing them they were not free to leave
constituted involuntary servitude. In expounding the
meaning of the Involuntary Servitude Clause, the
Court held that absent several categories of
recognized exceptions, the Court’s precedents “clearly
define a Thirteenth Amendment prohibition of
involuntary servitude enforced by the use or
threatened use of physical or legal coercion.” United
States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944 (1988)
(emphasis added). Thus, under Kozminski, a prima
facie case of involuntary servitude exists when one
attempts to force another to work for him against his
will by use or threatened use of (1) physical coercion,
or (2) legal coercion. Isn’t the latter exactly what
public-accommodation laws do?
14 While “involuntary servitude” would have been the more
accurate term, the Chief Justice probably chose the words
“smacks of slavery” for the effect of alliteration. Still, his point
about involuntary servitude is well-taken.
28
As with any rule, there are exceptions. Kozminski
recognized several categories: (1) involuntary
servitude as punishment for a crime, (2) government
compelling citizens to “perform certain civic duties”
(such as jury service, military service, and
roadwork); and (3) “‘exceptional’ cases well
established in the common law at the time of the
Thirteenth Amendment” such as the right of parents
to their children or preventing sailors from
abandoning ship. Id. at 943-44. And of course,
because the common law required victuallers to serve
all customers unless they had good reasib, that rule
should be viewed as an exception as well. See Part I,
supra. But in the cases of others, it should be
presumed from the text and history of the
Amendment, the learned treatises commenting on
the issue, and this Court’s precedent that the
Amendment prohibits one from having to work for
another against his will. “The fact that the drafters
felt it necessary to exclude this situation indicates
that they thought involuntary servitude includes at
least situations in which the victim is compelled to
work by law.” Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942 (emphasis
added).
Thus, in light of the Thirteenth Amendment, the
question should be asked whether a state may ever
force one to work for another against his will, subject
to the limited historical exceptions. It might be
argued that the Involuntary Servitude Clause’s
prohibition on such work applies only to personalservice contracts. But even if that was the case, it
would apply here, because the personal creativity
29
required from Petitioners would make contracts
between them and those seeking to promote samesex weddings personal-service contracts. See
Restatement of Contracts (2d) § 367 cmt. b (1979).
The Thirteenth Amendment’s effect on publicaccommodation laws is a monumental issue that
deserves thorough briefing, argumentation, and
consideration. The Court need not go that far in this
case unless it finds, somehow, that the First
Amendment does not excuse Petitioners from
complying with the Colorado law in question. But
just as Justice Thomas frequently flags a potential
constitutional problem, analyzes it, and states that
he would be willing to consider that argument in the
appropriate case, the Court (or at least a special
writing from a Justice) should flag the issue of
whether the Involuntary Servitude Clause prohibits
sweeping public-accommodation laws like this.
Failing to take note of this constitutional issue risks
injuring the right for which more American blood
was spilled than any other right: the right of
“personal freedom of all the human race.” The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 39 (1873).
CONCLUSION
In recent years, public-accommodation laws have
grown from a defined and limited set of rules
affecting only those who provide life-sustaining
services to a behemoth-sized rule applying to nearly
everyone in business. While the reasons behind that
may be noble in some cases (or not noble in others),
the Constitution of the United States is still the
30
“Supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. Const., art. VI, cl.
2. However sweeping a state may desire to craft its
public-accommodation laws, it may not do so at the
expense of constitutional guarantees, such as the
right to free speech, free exercise of religion, and even
freedom from involuntary servitude. Because the
Colorado law at issue here violates at least three
constitutional guarantees and far exceeds the limited
historical role of such laws, the judgment of the
Tenth Circuit is due to be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
W. BRENT WOODALL
MATTHEW J. CLARK*
THE WOODALL LAW FIRM *Counsel of Record
121 S. Court St., Ste. B ALABAMA CENTER FOR
Florence, AL 35630
LAW AND LIBERTY
(256) 349-2507
2213 Morris Ave., Fl. 1
woodalltrialad@
Birmingham, AL 35203
hushmail.com
(256) 510-1828
matt@
alabamalawandliberty.org
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.