Amicus Curiae Brief — National Pork Producers Council, et al., Petitioners v. Karen Ross, in Her Official Capacity as Secretary of the California Department of Food & Agriculture, et al.
Supreme Court briefAug 15, 2022
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No. 21-468
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
____________________
NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
KAREN ROSS, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY
OF THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FOOD &
AGRICULTURE, ET AL.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF OF WORKER SAFETY ADVOCATES AS
AMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS
DAVID S. MURASKIN
Counsel of Record
PUBLIC JUSTICE
1620 L St. NW, Suite 630
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 797-8600
dmuraskin@
publicjustice.net
LEORA N. FRIEDMAN
TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
1828 L St. NW,
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 973-0900
Counsel for Amici Curiae
i
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
Amici curiae do not issue stock and have no parent
corporations.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE......................................i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................iv
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................ 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..................................... 3
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 6
I.
Proposition
12
addresses
intensive
confinement that causes zoonotic disease to
spread among swine that will be sent to
California. ............................................................. 7
A. Gestation Crates........................................... 8
B. Confinement with less than 24 square
feet of usable floor space. ........................... 13
1. More Transmission............................. 13
2. Transmission of More Severe,
Novel,
and/or
AntibioticResistant Strains ................................ 15
II. With fewer intensively confined swine
entering California because of Proposition
12, the law will help protect the State’s
workers from zoonoses........................................ 17
A. Slaughterhouse Workers............................ 18
B. Livestock Auction Workers (and
Auction Attendees) ..................................... 23
C. Livestock Transport Workers .................... 24
III. California’s pork industry can incubate and
spread diseases among its employees and
in the surrounding population. .......................... 26
iii
IV. The only plausible conclusion is that
Proposition 12 is a constitutional
expression of California’s police powers to
protect the State. ................................................ 30
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 33
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page(s)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009)........................................ 32, 33
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007)............................................ 5, 6
Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co.,
125 U.S. 465 (1888).............................................. 31
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617 (1978)........................................ 31, 32
Clason v. Indiana,
306 U.S. 439 (1939).............................................. 31
Gonzales v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243 (2006).............................................. 31
Hill v. Colorado,
530 U.S. 703 (2000).............................................. 31
Maine v. Taylor,
477 U.S. 131 (1986).............................................. 32
McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC,
980 F.3d 937 (4th Cir. 2020).............. 13, 15, 16, 17
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab.,
Occupational Safety & Health Admin.,
142 S. Ct. 661 (2022)............................................ 27
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137 (1970)................................................ 5
v
Sligh v. Kirkwood,
237 U.S. 52 (1915)................................................ 31
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,
138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018)............................................ 5
Statutes
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25990 ........................ 4, 8
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25991 .................. 4, 8, 13
Other Authorities
Laura Valeria Alarcón et al., Biosecurity in
Pig Farms: A Review, Porcine Health
Mgmt., Jan. 2021 ................................................. 25
Animal Prod. & Health Div., Food & Agric.
Org. of the United Nations, Improved
Animal Health for Poverty Reduction &
Sustainable Livelihoods (2002),
https://tinyurl.com/2p95bdst ......................... 24, 25
Gustavo Arellano, As Pigs Await Slaughter at
Farmer John, Strangers Offer Water, Love
and Comfort to the Doomed, L.A. Times
(Mar. 5, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://tinyurl.com/mrx4222s ............................ 3, 4
vi
Associated Press, Farmer John Meatpacking
Plant in Vernon to Close Next Year, KTLA,
June 10, 2022,
https://tinyurl.com/3uh5b42y .............................. 22
Auction Schedule, Escalon Livestock Mkt.,
https://tinyurl.com/4mzmsfdm ............................ 23
Muhammed Aziz & Varun S. Yelamanchili,
Yersinia Enterocolitica, StatPearls (July 4,
2022), https://tinyurl.com/2p96hkjn .................... 13
Eugénie Baudon et al., Epidemiological
Features of Influenza Circulation in Swine
Populations: A Systematic Review and
Meta-analysis, PLoS ONE, June 2017 ................ 14
Rossana Capoferri et al., Comparison Between
Single- and Group-Housed Pregnant Sows
for Direct and Indirect Physiological,
Reproductive, Welfare Indicators and Gene
Expression Profiling, 24 J. Applied Animal
Welfare Sci. 246 (2020) ........................................ 10
Ricardo Castillo Neyra et al., MultidrugResistant and Methicillin-Resistant
Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) in Hog
Slaughter and Processing Plant Workers
and Their Community in North Carolina
(USA), 122 Env’t Health Persps. 471 (2014) ...... 18
vii
Dana Cole et al., Concentrated Swine Feeding
Operations and Public Health: A Review of
Occupational and Community Health
Effects, 108 Env’t Health Persps. 685
(2000) .............................................................. 13, 16
Elizabeth Anne Jessie Cook et al., Prevalence
and Risk Factors for Exposure to
Toxoplasma Gondii in Slaughterhouse
Workers in Western Kenya, BMC Infectious
Diseases, Sept. 2021 ............................................ 21
Ctr. for Food Sec. & Pub. Health, Zoonotic
Diseases of Swine, Iowa St. Univ. Coll.
Veterinary Med.,
https://tinyurl.com/2p898wvp........................ 21, 22
4 Variant Virus Infections Linked to Pig
Exposures, Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention (Aug. 12, 2016),
https://tinyurl.com/2hvuwnxp ............................. 24
Julie Funk & Wondwossen Abebe Gebreyes,
Risk Factors Associated with Salmonella
Prevalence on Swine Farms, 12 J. Swine
Health & Prod. 246 (2004)................................... 14
Maarten J. Gilbert et al., Livestock-Associated
MRSA ST398 Carriage in Pig
Slaughterhouse Workers Related to
Quantitative Environmental Exposure, 69
Occupational & Env’t Med. 472 (2012) ............... 22
viii
Mary J. Gilchrist et al., The Potential Role of
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations
in Infectious Disease Epidemics and
Antibiotic Resistance, 115 Env’t Health
Persps. 313 (2007).............................. 16, 17, 19, 20
Gregory C. Gray et al., Swine Workers and
Swine Influenza Virus Infections, 13
Emerging Infectious Diseases 1871 (2007) ......... 29
Michael Greger, The Long Haul: Risks
Associated with Livestock Transport, 5
Biosecurity & Bioterrorism: Biodefense
Strategy, Prac., and Sci. 301 (2007) .............. 24, 25
Verena Grün et al., Influence of Different
Housing Systems on Distribution, Function
and Mitogen-Response of Leukocytes in
Pregnant Sows, 3 Animals 1123 (2013) .......... 9, 10
Jae-Ho Guk et al., Hyper-Aerotolerant
Campylobacter coli From Swine May Pose
a Potential Threat to Public Health Based
on Its Quinolone Resistance, Virulence
Potential, and Genetic Relatedness,
Frontiers in Microbiology, July 16, 2021 ............ 20
Andrew A. Hill et al., A Farm Transmission
Model for Salmonella in Pigs, Applicable to
E.U. Member States, 36 Risk Analysis 461
(2016) ...................................................................... 7
ix
Institutional Animal Care & Use Comm.,
Zoonoses Associated with Swine, Wash. St.
Univ. (Jan. 2021),
https://tinyurl.com/vrsysrmt ............................... 5, 21
Meldra Ivbule et al., Presence of MethicillinResistant Staphylococcus Aureus in
Slaughterhouse Environment, Pigs,
Carcasses, and Workers, 61 J. Veterinary
Rsch. 267 (2017) ............................................ 28, 29
Yongdae Jeong et al., Improving Behavior
Characteristics and Stress Indices of
Gestating Sows Housed with Group
Housing Facility, 62 J. Animal Sci. & Tech.
875 (2020) ....................................................... 10, 11
E.S. Johnson et al., Non-Malignant Disease
Mortality in Meat Workers: A Model for
Studying the Role of Zoonotic
Transmissible Agents in Non-Malignant
Chronic Diseases in Humans, 64
Occupational & Env’t Med. 849 (2007) ......... 18, 22
M. Kulok et al., The Effects of Lack of
Movement in Sows During Pregnancy
Period on Cortisol, Acute Phase Proteins
and Lymphocytes Proliferation Level in
Piglets in Early Postnatal Period, 24 Polish
J. Veterinary Scis. 85 (2021) ............................... 11
x
Riikka Laukkanen et al., Contamination of
Carcasses with Human Pathogenic
Yersinia Enterocolitica 4/O:3 Originates
from Pigs Infected on Farms, 6 Foodborne
Pathogens & Disease 681 (2009) ............. 13, 14, 19
Xin Liu et al., A Comparison of the Behavior,
Physiology, and Offspring Resilience of
Gestating Sows When Raised in a Group
Housing System and Individual Stalls,
Animals, July 12, 2021 .................................... 9, 12
Wenjun Ma et al., The Pig as a Mixing Vessel
for Influenza Viruses: Human and
Veterinary Implications, 3 J. of Molecular
& Genetic Med. 158 (2009) ............................ 29, 30
Memorandum from Barbara Ferrer, Dir.,
Cnty. of L.A. Pub. Health, to Bd. of
Supervisors, Cnty. of L.A., Ensuring the
Safety and Well Being of Workers at
Industrial Facilities (Item No. A-1, Agenda
of May 26, 2020) (June 2, 2020),
https://tinyurl.com/h2e4hpse4 ........................... 3, 4
Riitta Merilahti-Palo et al., Risk of Yrsinia
Infection Among Butchers, 23 Scandinavian
J. Infectious Diseases 55 (1991) .......................... 19
Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus
(MRSA), Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention (Feb. 5, 2019),
https://tinyurl.com/5hdte8s4 ............................... 18
xi
Elodie Merlot et al., Improving Maternal
Welfare During Gestation Has Positive
Outcomes on Neonatal Survival and
Modulates Offspring Immune Response in
Pigs, Physiology & Behav., May 2022................. 12
E. Merlot et al., Prenatal Stress, Immunity
and Neonatal Health in Farm Animal
Species, 7 Animal 2016 (2013) ............................. 12
Modesto Livestock & Poultry Auction, Modesto
Livestock & Flea Mkt.,
https://tinyurl.com/yfew7vvd ......................... 23, 24
MRSA Infections (Methicillin-Resistant
Staphylococcus Aureus), Penn Med. (Sept.
1, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/27uk9kuw ........ 18, 19
Kendall P. Myers et al., Are Swine Workers in
the United States at Increased Risk of
Infection with Zoonotic Influenza Virus?, 42
Clinical Infectious Diseases 14
(2006) .................................................. 14, 16, 29, 30
Alex Padilla, Sec’y of the State of Cal., Official
Voter Information Guide (2018),
https://tinyurl.com/ms34fsmd ............................... 8
Pew Comm’n on Indus. Farm Animal Prod.,
Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial Farm
Animal Production in America (2008),
https://tinyurl.com/e62uft8r ...................... 9, 15, 16
Pork, Yosemite Foods,
https://yosemitefoods.com/products/pork/ ............. 4
xii
Premium Products, Olson Meat Co.,
https://www.olsonmeat.com/products ................... 4
Products, Clausen Meat Co.,
https://clausenmeat.com/products/ ........................ 4
QuickFacts Los Angeles County, California,
U.S. Census Bureau,
https://tinyurl.com/u6dnarwp.............................. 28
Lena Reiske et al., Interkingdom Cross-Talk
in Times of Stress: Salmonella
typhimurium Grown in the Presence of
Catecholamines Inhibits Porcine Immune
Functionality in vitro, Frontiers in
Immunology, Sept. 2020 ...................................... 11
Jason R. Rohr et al., Emerging Human
Infectious Diseases and the Links to Global
Food Production, 2 Nature 445 (2019) .......... 14, 15
Ana M. Rule et al., Food Animal Transport: A
Potential Source of Community Exposures
to Health Hazards From Industrial
Farming (CAFOs), 1 J. Infection & Pub.
Health 33 (2008) .................................................. 29
Sale Schedule, Petaluma Livestock Auction
Yard, https://tinyurl.com/mryrbzht ..................... 23
Schedule, Fresno Livestock Comm’n, LLC,
https://tinyurl.com/2kpm34cv.............................. 23
xiii
Scherer et al., Time Course of Infection with
Salmonella typhimurium and Its Influence
on Fecal Shedding, Distribution in Inner
Organisms, and Antibody Response in
Fattening Pigs, 71 J. Food Protection 699
(2008) .............................................................. 20, 21
Soc’y for Healthcare Epidemiology of Am. et
al., Policy Statement on Antimicrobial
Stewardship by the Society for Healthcare
Epidemiology of America (SHEA), the
Infectious Diseases Society of America
(IDSA), and the Pediatric Infectious
Diseases Society (PIDS), 33 Infection
Control & Hosp. Epidemiology 322 (2012).......... 19
Jonathan Steinberg et al., COVID-19
Outbreak Among Employees at a Meat
Processing Facility – South Dakota, MarchApril 2020, Morbidity & Mortality Wkly.
Rep., Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention (Aug. 7, 2020),
https://tinyurl.com/mvyxedv5 ........................ 26, 27
Mhairi A. Sutherland et al., Effects of
Transport at Weaning on the Behavior,
Physiology and Performance of Pigs, 4
Animals 657 (2014) .............................................. 25
Charles A. Taylor et al., Livestock Plants and
COVID-19 Transmission, Proc. of the Nat’l
Acad. of Scis. of the U.S. (Nov. 19, 2020),
https://tinyurl.com/2naxdkce ......................... 27, 28
xiv
M. Tuchscherer et al., Effects of Prenatal
Stress on Cellular and Humoral Immune
Responses in Neonatal Pigs, 86 Veterinary
Immunology & Immunopathology 195
(2002) .............................................................. 11, 12
U.S. Dep’t of Health. & Hum. Servs.,
Antibiotic Resistance Threats in the United
States (2019), https://tinyurl.com/2tcrrk53 ......... 19
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Rsch. Serv.,
COVID-19 Working Paper: Meatpacking
Working Conditions and the Spread of
COVID-19 (2021),
https://tinyurl.com/55ameyty .............................. 27
Jeanette I. Webster Marketon & Ronald
Glaser, Stress Hormones and Immune
Function, 252 Cellular Immunology 16
(2008) ...................................................................... 9
David O. Wiebers & Valery L. Feigin, What
the COVID-19 Crisis Is Telling Humanity,
54 Neuroepidemiology 283 (2020) ................. 29, 30
Terrance M. Wilson et al., Agroterrorism,
Biological Crimes, and Biological Warfare
Targeting Animal Agriculture, in Emerging
Diseases of Animals (Corrie Brown &
Carole Bolin eds., 2000) ....................................... 25
Yaqi You et al., Genomic Differences Between
Nasal Staphylococcus Aureus From Hog
Slaughterhouse Workers and Their
Communities, PLoS ONE, Mar. 2018 ................. 28
xv
C. R. Young et al., Enteric Colonization
Following Natural Exposure to
Campylobacter in Pigs, 68 Rsch. in
Veterinary Sci. 75 (2000) ..................................... 20
Weidong Yue et al., Prevalence of Porcine
Respiratory Pathogens in Slaughterhouses
in Shanxi Province, China, 7 Veterinary
Med. & Sci. 1339 (2021) ....................................... 15
Ming-yue Zhang et al., Effects of Confinement
Duration and Parity on Stereotypic
Behavioral and Physiological Responses of
Pregnant Sows, 179 Physiology & Behav.
369 (2017) ..................................................... 8, 9, 10
1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1
Amici submit this brief to correct Petitioners’
claim that Proposition 12’s in-state benefits are “bogus.” Pet’rs’ Br. 20. Amici work on occupational safety
and health, particularly the risks of disease spread in
the workplace, and represent food and agricultural
workers like those in California that face such hazards. Proposition 12 will protect thousands of California workers—particularly slaughterhouse, auction
house, and animal transportation workers—from the
risk of zoonotic disease. It will also insulate all Californians against the proven potential that food and
agriculture facilities will incubate and spread zoonoses to the broader population. Thus, Petitioners’ challenge could undermine amici’s long and ongoing efforts to create safe working environments and could
endanger amici’s members, their families, and their
communities.
Amicus David Michaels, PhD, MPH, was the longest tenured administrator in the history of OSHA,
serving as Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health from December 2009 to January 2016. Dr. Michaels, an epidemiologist, is currently a professor at George Washington University
School of Public Health, Departments of Environmental and Occupational Health and Epidemiology.
Amicus Jordan Barab served as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and
Health from 2009 to 2017. He was Senior Labor Policy
1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,
and no person other than amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution to this brief’s preparation and submission. All
parties have consented to this filing.
2
Advisor to the House Education and Labor Committee
from 2019 to 2021.
Amicus the National Council for Occupational
Safety and Health (“NCOSH”) consists of twenty-six
local nonprofits and a network of 2,000 advocates focused on creating safe working conditions, including
through providing technical assistance to build safe
workplaces and develop safety policies. NCOSH has
numerous ongoing campaigns seeking to improve the
conditions of food and agriculture workers, including
protecting them against zoonoses.
Amicus the National Joint Council of Food Inspection Locals represents the USDA Food Safety Inspection Service employees working throughout the country, including those in the meat processing plants
throughout California.
Amicus the Food Chain Workers Alliance is a coalition of groups representing workers throughout the
food chain, including advocacy organizations, worker
centers, and unions representing food workers, including warehouse, retail, and slaughterhouse workers and truckers throughout California.
Amicus the HEAL (Health, Environment, Agriculture, Labor) Food Alliance is a California-based national coalition whose members represent over 2 million farmers, fishers, workers, indigenous groups, scientists, organizers, and advocates. Many of its members work in or live adjacent to meat-packing plants,
and HEAL’s current campaigns include protecting the
dignity and safety of food workers and their families.
Amici Public Justice and Towards Justice are national legal advocacy organizations that represent
food workers, including slaughterhouse and other
3
meatpacking workers regarding unsafe conditions
stemming from COVID-19 and other diseases.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioners ask this Court to adopt an extreme,
never-before-heard-of rule that would strip the
dormant Commerce Clause of a core precept: that
states may protect their residents and interests, even
if doing so has some out-of-state effects. According to
Petitioners, every law that has “the practical effect of
controlling commerce outside the State” is “almost per
se invalid,” Pet’rs’ Br. 19, regardless of whether the
state is exercising an established local police power.
In our modern economy, such a rule would relieve
most producers of any state-level design or manufacturing requirement. The facts of this case in particular demonstrate why states must be able to legislate
even if their laws have out-of-state effects. Proposition 12 is a well-supported exercise of California’s historic police powers to protect public health and safety,
securing the State against the likely spread of zoonotic diseases among its workforce and into its general
population. Thus, Petitioners’ proposed rule is both
baseless and dangerous.
California is home to thousands of animal workers
who handle pigs or their carcasses, the meat of which
winds up on grocery store shelves across the State.
Smithfield Foods’ Farmer John plant operates in
Vernon, California, next to downtown Los Angeles,
where its over 1,800 workers process around 7,000
hogs per day. Memorandum from Barbara Ferrer,
Dir., Cnty. of L.A. Pub. Health, to Bd. of Supervisors,
Cnty. of L.A., Ensuring the Safety and Well Being of
Workers at Industrial Facilities (Item No. A-1,
Agenda of May 26, 2020) (June 2, 2020), at 4,
4
https://tinyurl.com/h2e4hpse; Gustavo Arellano, As
Pigs Await Slaughter at Farmer John, Strangers Offer Water, Love and Comfort to the Doomed, L.A.
Times (Mar. 5, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://tinyurl.com/mrx4222s.
California also houses several other hog slaughter
and processing facilities: Yosemite Foods in Stockton,
Clausen Meat Company Inc. in Turlock, and Olson
Meat Plant in Orland. Pork, Yosemite Foods,
https://yosemitefoods.com/products/pork/ (last visited
Aug. 9, 2022); Products, Clausen Meat Co.,
https://clausenmeat.com/products/ (last visited Aug.
9, 2022); Premium Products, Olson Meat Co.,
https://www.olsonmeat.com/products (last visited
Aug. 9, 2022).
Additionally, Californians work at livestock auction houses throughout the State that sell pigs.
Transport workers, who both live and travel throughout the State, convey the swine to the auction sites
and slaughter facilities.
The practices Proposition 12 says cannot be used
to produce pork sold in the State2 would significantly
reduce the risk of these workers contracting zoonotic
disease. These practices are known to facilitate the
faster and more dangerous spread of disease among
2 These practices are: employing gestation crates that “prevent[]
[sows] from lying down, standing up, fully extending [their]
limbs, or turning around freely” and confining sows in “less than
24 square feet of usable floorspace,” Cal. Health & Safety Code
§§ 25990(b)(2), 25991(e)(1), 25991(e)(3), i.e., intensive confinement.
5
hogs, which can then spread to humans. 3 Making
matters worse, as recent experience with COVID-19
confirms, animal facilities in California are likely to
incubate zoonotic diseases and increase their spread
among the broader population.
Contrary to Petitioners’ presentation, states can
legislate to secure the health and safety of their population, as long as the laws do not discriminate
against interstate commerce and are not protectionist. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080,
2093-94 (2018) (“[T]he Commerce Clause was designed to prevent states from engaging in economic
discrimination[.]”); Intervenor Resp’ts’ Br. at 11-21.
Yet even if the Court were to narrow states’ authority
and balance Proposition 12’s in-state interests
against the alleged out-of-state burdens, Proposition
12 should unquestionably survive. Given the significant risks to California’s workers, their families, and
communities produced by the intensive confinement
Proposition 12 addresses, it cannot be said that the
law’s “burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142,
143 (1970); see also Pet’rs’ Br. 44 (conceding the same
balancing test). Petitioners’ Pike argument rests on
their claim that Proposition 12’s in-state benefits are
“invalid or non-existent.” Pet’rs’ Br. 47. The Court
should thus affirm the dismissal of Petitioners’
dormant Commerce Clause claim, as these
3 Examples of zoonotic diseases transmissible from animals to
humans include swine flu, streptococcosis, and salmonellosis. Institutional Animal Care & Use Comm., Zoonoses Associated with
Swine,
Wash.
St.
Univ.
(Jan.
2021),
https://tinyurl.com/vrsysrmt.
6
allegations are implausible in light of the science on
zoonotic disease and worker health and safety detailed below. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007).
ARGUMENT
Proposition 12 substantially furthers California’s
public health and safety by protecting workers who
interact with animals, carcasses, and meat products,
as well as those with whom they come into contact.
Extreme animal confinement—particularly the
conditions regulated by Proposition 12—increases the
risk of zoonotic diseases jumping from animals to people. See infra Sections I-II.
Without regulation, animal agriculture can thus
introduce diseases to workers, their families, their
communities, and the entire State. See infra Section
III. This is especially true in California, as pigs are
kept and cared for at auction houses throughout the
State, and California’s largest slaughterhouse is located in the midst of its largest population center. See
infra Sections II-III. As a result—setting aside that
states may act as laboratories of democracy and enact
laws concerning commerce that are not discriminatory or protectionist—Petitioners have not stated a
plausible claim that Proposition 12 violates the
dormant Commerce Clause. Its out-of-state burdens
cannot be said to outweigh its benefits. See infra Section IV.
7
I.
Proposition 12 addresses intensive confinement that causes zoonotic disease to
spread among swine that will be sent to
California.
Breeding pigs confined (1) in gestation crates during pregnancy and (2) with less than twenty-four
square feet of space, as prohibited by Proposition 12,
are far more likely to contract zoonoses. Moreover, the
science is clear that those conditions make it more
likely their offspring that become pork products will
carry zoonoses. See, e.g., Andrew A. Hill et al., A Farm
Transmission Model for Salmonella in Pigs, Applicable to E.U. Member States, 36 Risk Analysis 461, 479
(2016) (“[B]reeding herd prevalence is likely to be a
strong predictor of national pig prevalence for many
MSs [member states][.]”); see also infra Sections I.A-B.
Thus, while Petitioners attack Proposition 12 because it limits the in-state sale of pork but addresses
breeding pigs’ conditions, and Petitioners claim
breeding pigs’ sole function is to produce offspring and
therefore they will not enter California, Pet’rs’ Br. 42,
in fact, Proposition 12 is a means to reduce the risk of
pigs meant to produce pork products bringing zoonoses into the State. Indeed, Petitioners do not dispute
that the animals born and raised alongside the sows
addressed by Proposition 12 are transported to the
State for slaughter and sale. See Pet. App. 204a (Complaint) ¶¶ 284-86 (alleging a “miniscule portion” of all
pork in the nation meets the requirements of Proposition 12). Proposition 12 ensures those are healthier
animals and thus less likely to infect California’s
workers, which also secures the health and safety of
California’s residents.
8
Hence, Petitioners’ assertion that Proposition 12 is
“based on philosophical preferences,” not in-state concerns, Pet’rs’ Br. 2, is not plausible. Proposition 12
meaningfully effectuates a valid state interest in
keeping out a known and proven risk to public health.
A.
Gestation Crates
By prohibiting the in-state sale of meat from
breeding pigs kept in gestation crates and their “immediate offspring,” Proposition 12 improves the
health of swine that enter California. See Cal. Health
& Safety Code §§ 25990(b)(2), 25991(e)(1),
25991(e)(3). In particular, breeding pigs housed in individual crates during pregnancy are more likely to
experience stress that renders them more susceptible
to zoonotic disease, which they can transmit to their
offspring, and more likely to birth offspring with
weaker immune systems. Those offspring with
weaker immune systems are, in turn, more likely to
contract diseases at the breeding facility and elsewhere.
Gestation crates are “tiny, metal cage[s]” that confine breeding pigs, and in which they “can barely
move.” Alex Padilla, Sec’y of the State of Cal., Official
Voter Information Guide 70 (2018), https://tinyurl.com/ms34fsmd.
In these crates, sows experience chronic stress.
For instance, they cannot, “move [in] and investigate
in [the] confined conditions” and they “cannot exhibit
the behaviors that meet their specific needs, such as
rooting behavior, among others, so they exhibit abnormal behaviors (such as stereotypic behavior).” Mingyue Zhang et al., Effects of Confinement Duration and
Parity on Stereotypic Behavioral and Physiological
9
Responses of Pregnant Sows, 179 Physiology & Behav.
369, 369 (2017) (explaining how “confinement in locations such as gestation stalls is a chronic stressor to
sows”). In crates, sows also cannot “resolve conflict
with neighboring sows.” Verena Grün et al., Influence
of Different Housing Systems on Distribution, Function and Mitogen-Response of Leukocytes in Pregnant
Sows, 3 Animals 1123, 1124 (2013) (detailing experiences “presumed to cause [sows] . . . chronic stress”). 4
Such stress can “increase [a sow’s] likelihood of infection and illness.” Pew Comm’n on Indus. Farm Animal Prod., Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial
Farm Animal Production in America 13 (2008),
https://tinyurl.com/e62uft8r; Jeanette I. Webster
Marketon & Ronald Glaser, Stress Hormones and Immune Function, 252 Cellular Immunology 16, 19
(2008) (“Stress has been shown to have detrimental
effects on the immune system.”).
For example, within “an experimentally controlled
setting,” Grün et al. housed 33 sows in individual
crates, and then relocated some to group housing at
week four of gestation to “compare the effect of two
distinct housing systems for pregnant sows (confinement in individual crates and group-housing) on several measures of blood cellular immunity.” Grün et
al., supra, at 1125-26. The study found individually
housed sows displayed higher “cortisol levels”—
4 See also Xin Liu et al., A Comparison of the Behavior, Physiology, and Offspring Resilience of Gestating Sows When Raised in
a Group Housing System and Individual Stalls, Animals, July
12, 2021, at 4 (showing that “the stress hormone (ACTH, A,
COR) level of gestating sows housed in [individual stalls] was
higher than that of gestating sows housed in [group housing systems] throughout the whole gestation period”).
10
around 25% higher than sows in group housing—
which is associated with more stress, as “cortisol
measurements [are] an indicator of the stressfulness.”
Id. at 1125, 1133-35. Moreover, individually housed
sows had lower T cell subsets, which is associated
with a weaker immune system and thus less resistance to infection. Id. at 1134. The researchers concluded that “differences in the stressfulness of the environment” between crate and group housing probably explained the individually crated sows’ lower T
level subsets. Id. at 1136. 5
This conclusion is not unique. A study of 360 arbitrarily chosen sows found that “the animals reared in
single crates showed a constant decline in the expression of genes related to immune response.” Rossana
Capoferri et al., Comparison Between Single- and
Group-Housed Pregnant Sows for Direct and Indirect
Physiological, Reproductive, Welfare Indicators and
Gene Expression Profiling, 24 J. Applied Animal Welfare Sci. 246, 256 (2020). By contrast, group-housedsows showed no “modulation of their immune response.” Id. According to the authors, the sows’ incapacity “to form social relationships” in crates could
have contributed to “inducing the severe immunosuppression highlighted by [the] gene expression profiling.” Id. 6
5 See also Zhang et al., supra, at 375 (in experiment gauging im-
pact of concentration on sows, noting “a belief that long-term
stress states have an inhibitory effect on the immune system”).
6 Crate housing is also associated with raising a sow’s adrena-
line, which is an “effective indicator[] of stress in pigs.” See Yongdae Jeong et al., Improving Behavior Characteristics and Stress
Indices of Gestating Sows Housed with Group Housing Facility,
62 J. Animal Sci. & Tech. 875, 881-82 (2020) (“[E]pinephrine [i.e.,
Footnote continued on next page
11
Further, the harms sows experience because of
crate housing harm their offspring. Crate-housed
sows are more likely to birth offspring with weaker
immune systems, making them far more likely to contract diseases from their mother, other animals at the
breeding facility, or animals that will surround them
at the other facilities where they live until slaughter.
See M. Kulok et al., The Effects of Lack of Movement
in Sows During Pregnancy Period on Cortisol, Acute
Phase Proteins and Lymphocytes Proliferation Level
in Piglets in Early Postnatal Period, 24 Polish J. Veterinary Scis. 85, 90 (2021) (study “suggest[ed] that the
piglets from mothers kept in restriction movement
pens will have a weaker immunity barrier compared
to the piglets given birth by mothers kept in free
movement pens”).
This is because prenatal stress “acts on the fetus
through the mother’s body.” Id. at 86 (internal citations omitted). In one study, the offspring’s “prenatal
stress” was associated with a “significant decrease in
thymus weight,” even after thirty-five days of life,
which can weaken their resistance to infection. M.
Tuchscherer et al., Effects of Prenatal Stress on Cellular and Humoral Immune Responses in Neonatal
Pigs, 86 Veterinary Immunology & Immunopathology
195, 202 (2002) (providing that “sustained thymus
adrenaline] level at the gestation and post-farrowing stages were
decreased in the GHF [group-housing facility] compared to that
in CON [individual confinement stall].”). Adrenaline, in turn,
can suppress the immune system. See Lena Reiske et al., Interkingdom Cross-Talk in Times of Stress: Salmonella typhimurium Grown in the Presence of Catecholamines Inhibits Porcine Immune Functionality in vitro, Frontiers in Immunology,
Sept. 2020, at 1.
12
atrophy” is indicative of “long-term impairment of cellular immune function in prenatally stressed piglets”). 7
Consistent with this, Xin Liu et al. found that the
offspring of crate-housed sows as compared to grouphoused sows “suffered with a higher level of stress
and had lower [disease] resistance and resilience,”
which the authors opined “may be caused by the [individual stall]-housing-related stress experienced by
their mothers during gestation.” Xin Liu et al., supra,
at 6-7.
Correspondingly, piglets born to crate-housed
sows have been shown to be at higher risk for contracting infections at the breeding facility, including
zoonotic infections, from their mother. See E. Merlot
et al., Prenatal Stress, Immunity and Neonatal Health
in Farm Animal Species, 7 Animal 2016, 2020 (2013)
(noting that “epidemiological data suggest that individual housing during pregnancy may increase the
transmission of pathogens from the mother to the fetus or neonate”); see, e.g., id. (explaining that “compared with group-housed sows, animals housed in individual pens during pregnancy were found to be
more at risk for post-weaning multisystemic wasting
syndrome developing in their offspring,” which is
caused by the offspring contracting a virus (internal
citation omitted)).
7 See also Elodie Merlot et al., Improving Maternal Welfare During Gestation Has Positive Outcomes on Neonatal Survival and
Modulates Offspring Immune Response in Pigs, Physiology & Behav., May 2022, at 1-2 (“Prenatal stress occurs when maternal
stress directly influences the development of the fetus. In the
porcine species, prenatal stress induces post-natal changes
in . . . [piglets’] immune response.”).
13
B.
Confinement with less than 24
square feet of usable floor space.
Proposition 12 also prohibits the in-state sale of
meat from sows housed “with less than 24 square feet
of usable floorspace per pig,” a prohibition that directly reduces the risk of all pigs at the breeding facility contracting diseases, including zoonoses. Cal.
Health & Safety Code § 25991(e)(3). Indeed, close
proximity is associated with both the spread of disease generally, as well as with the development of
more virulent, novel, and/or antibiotic-resistant
strains of those diseases.
1.
More Transmission
As Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III observed in describing what he called “the problem of viral disease”
in concentrated animal feeding operations, “[i]t is
well-established that close confinement leads to the
‘increased risk of the spread of disease’ between hogs.”
McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 980 F.3d 937, 980
(4th Cir. 2020) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted); see also Dana Cole et al., Concentrated Swine Feeding Operations and Public Health:
A Review of Occupational and Community Health Effects, 108 Env’t Health Persps. 685, 685 (2000) (noting
the “greater opportunities for horizontal spread of infectious agents among closely confined animals”).
One study concluded that “high prevalence of [Yersinia] enterocolitica 8 was associated with high [pig]
“Yersinia enterocolitica . . . is manifested as acute diarrhea,
mesenteric adenitis, terminal ileitis, and pseudoappendicitis. In
rare cases, it can even cause sepsis.” Muhammed Aziz & Varun
S. Yelamanchili, Yersinia Enterocolitica, StatPearls (July 4,
2022), https://tinyurl.com/2p96hkjn.
8
14
stocking density.” Riikka Laukkanen et al., Contamination of Carcasses with Human Pathogenic Yersinia
Enterocolitica 4/O:3 Originates from Pigs Infected on
Farms, 6 Foodborne Pathogens & Disease 681, 686
(2009). Another found that “groups of finisher pigs
categorized as having high Salmonella prevalence
were more likely to be stocked at higher pig densities . . . at the time of sampling, compared to low prevalence groups.” Julie Funk & Wondwossen Abebe Gebreyes, Risk Factors Associated with Salmonella Prevalence on Swine Farms, 12 J. Swine Health & Prod.
246, 249 (2004). In addition, a meta-analysis concluded that ten articles showed “[h]igher herd and pig
densities and higher number of pigs in farms or agricultural fairs were associated with higher influenza
prevalence.” Eugénie Baudon et al., Epidemiological
Features of Influenza Circulation in Swine Populations: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis, PLoS
ONE, June 2017, at 16.
Close confinement can increase disease transmission among pigs in several ways. Swine “density” increases animal “contact rates,” which creates more
opportunities for diseases to spread among the animals. Jason R. Rohr et al., Emerging Human Infectious Diseases and the Links to Global Food Production, 2 Nature 445, 451 (2019). In addition, high concentration results in contacts of longer duration
among the pigs, which also makes “animal-to-animal
transmission” more probable. Kendall P. Myers et al.,
Are Swine Workers in the United States at Increased
Risk of Infection with Zoonotic Influenza Virus?, 42
Clinical Infectious Diseases 14, 18 (2006). In confined
settings, viruses may also remain viable for longer periods of time due to the “reductions in ventilation and
sunshine exposure” that accompany such settings. Id.
15
This means that there is more viral load in the air at
any given time that can transmit disease from one animal to another. “The buildup of excrement [in a close
confinement facility is also] . . . ‘conducive to … breeding flies and insects,’ which are known ‘vectors of disease.’” McKiver, 980 F.3d at 980 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
2.
Transmission of More Severe,
Novel, and/or Antibiotic-Resistant Strains
Besides increasing the risk of infection, intensive
confinement also renders sows and their offspring
more likely to carry more damaging strains. In concentrated pig facilities, “numerous transmission
events” and “co-infection with several strains of pathogens” result in “infectious agents . . . evolv[ing] to become more virulent.” Pew Comm’n on Indus. Farm
Animal Prod., supra, at 13. 9
Sows in intensive confinement are also more likely
to carry novel strains capable of spreading infection
faster among people. See id. (“[T]he continual cycling
of viruses and other animal pathogens in large herds
or flocks increases opportunities for the generation of
novel viruses through mutation or recombinant
9 See also Rohr et al., supra, at 451 (“host densities increas[ing]
and transmission becom[ing] more frequent’’ results in “higher
virulence” and thus greater “incidence and severity of infectious
disease” (emphasis added)); Weidong Yue et al., Prevalence of
Porcine Respiratory Pathogens in Slaughterhouses in Shanxi
Province, China, 7 Veterinary Med. & Sci. 1339, 1344 (2021)
(“[I]nteractions between pathogens have . . . been indicated to
increase disease severity.”).
16
events that could result in more efficient human-tohuman transmission.”). 10
Further, antibiotic-resistant strains are more
likely to emerge among concentrated swine. Because
animals in intensive confinement have a greater
chance of transmitting disease among one another,
these operations are more likely to apply—and overuse—antibiotics on the herd. See Cole et al., supra, at
685 (stating that “antimicrobials are useful to decrease the spread of infectious disease between animals” given “greater opportunities for horizontal
spread of infectious agents among closely confined animals”); see also McKiver, 980 F.3d at 980 (Wilkinson,
J., concurring) (explaining that “[concentrated animal
feeding operations] commonly administer antibiotics
at subtherapeutic concentrations” as a means of “compensat[ing] for the stressors of close confinement” (internal citation omitted)).
In turn, “broad application of antimicrobials to
farm animals can . . . result[] in the evolution of
groups of resistant organisms.” Cole et al., supra, at
685; Mary J. Gilchrist et al., The Potential Role of
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations in Infectious Disease Epidemics and Antibiotic Resistance,
115 Env’t Health Persps. 313, 313 (2007) (“Increased
antibiotic resistance can be traced to the use and overuse of antibiotics. . . . Several recent studies clearly
demonstrate the transmission of multidrug-resistant
10 See also Myers et al., supra, at 5-6 (When “tens of thousands
of susceptible pigs . . . are housed in confinement facilities,
[they] serv[e] as a tremendous potential reservoir of susceptible
animals, whose dense populations may hasten viral mutation
and reassortment.”).
17
pathogens from swine to humans.”); McKiver, 980
F.3d at 980 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). 11
California thus has a valid basis for objecting to
intensive confinement, as it is proven to increase risk
of infection—including more aggressive, harder-totreat strains—among pigs that will enter California.
II.
With fewer intensively confined swine entering California because of Proposition
12, the law will help protect the State’s
workers from zoonoses.
By protecting the pigs that produce pork products
in California, Proposition 12 correspondingly protects
in-state animal workers from disease.
Petitioners do not contest that many pigs entering
California will be subjected to the disease-spreading
conditions Proposition 12 regulates. E.g., Pet’rs’ Br. 811. Slaughterhouse workers, drivers, and livestock
auction employees all live in California, where they
interact with the animals or their carcasses prior to
the meat entering the marketplace, including in their
home State. These workers will thus have a meaningfully increased risk of immediate infection if Proposition 12 cannot take effect—to say nothing of the increased risk to others with whom the workers interact. See infra Section III. In sum, contrary to Petitioners’ rhetoric, the in-state public health and safety benefits are far from “illusory and invalid.” Pet’rs’ Br. 20.
11 Antibiotic-resistant infection is not only dangerous for swine,
but also poses a serious human health threat to humans. See infra pp. 18-19.
18
A. Slaughterhouse Workers
California’s slaughterhouse workers are much
more likely to contract zoonotic disease without Proposition 12, as they are regularly exposed to infections
that spread among the animals. See E.S. Johnson et
al., Non-Malignant Disease Mortality in Meat Workers: A Model for Studying the Role of Zoonotic Transmissible Agents in Non-Malignant Chronic Diseases
in Humans, 64 Occupational & Env’t Med. 849, 849
(2007) (“Within the meat industry, exposures to
transmissible agents are expected to be highest for
workers employed in manufacturing establishments
where animals are slaughtered and processed.”).
For example, a study found that the “overall prevalence of MRSA [methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus] carriage identified in [the Smithfield swine
slaughter/processing plant worker] study population
in 2011 was higher than the estimate for the general
U.S. population.” Ricardo Castillo Neyra et al., Multidrug-Resistant and Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) in Hog Slaughter and Processing Plant Workers and Their Community in North
Carolina (USA), 122 Env’t Health Persps. 471, 476
(2014). MRSA can precipitate a “staph infection that
is difficult to treat because of resistance to some antibiotics,” resulting in serious illness or death. Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA), Ctrs.
for Disease Control & Prevention (Feb. 5, 2019),
https://tinyurl.com/5hdte8s4 (“Staph infection . . . can
cause serious infections that can lead to sepsis or
death.”); MRSA Infections (Methicillin-Resistant
Staphylococcus Aureus), Penn Med. (Sept. 1, 2021),
https://tinyurl.com/27uk9kuw
(“Pneumonia
and
19
bloodstream infections due to MRSA are linked with
high death rates.”). 12
Another study observed “an increased frequency of
antibodies against Y[ersinia] enterocolitica O:3 in the
workers of abattoirs slaughtering swine,” which contributed to the researchers’ conclusion that “yersinia
infections form an occupational health risk in the
workers slaughtering swine at abattoirs.” Riitta Merilahti-Palo et al., Risk of Yrsinia Infection Among
Butchers, 23 Scandinavian J. Infectious Diseases 55,
58-60 (1991); see also Laukkanen et al., supra, at 682,
684 (concluding that “the high prevalence of pathogenic Y. enterocolitica 4/O:3 in pigs appears to predispose to carcass contamination at the slaughterhouse,”
meaning slaughterhouse workers who handle pig carcasses are at increased risk of contracting the disease).
Researchers have also noted that “Salmonella can
be transmitted to humans through the slaughtering
process,” and “[m]eat packing . . . workers are at
greater risk of acquiring infection because of their
12 The prospect of pigs transmitting antibiotic-resistant infections to slaughterhouse workers is especially concerning, as
“[a]ntimicrobial resistance is a critical issue that significantly
impacts healthcare quality, patient safety, and public health.”
Soc’y for Healthcare Epidemiology of Am. et al., Policy Statement
on Antimicrobial Stewardship by the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA), the Infectious Diseases Society of
America (IDSA), and the Pediatric Infectious Diseases Society
(PIDS), 33 Infection Control & Hosp. Epidemiology 322, 323-24
(2012). Over 35,000 people in the United States die annually
from such infections as of 2019. See U.S. Dep’t of Health. & Hum.
Servs., Antibiotic Resistance Threats in the United States vii
(2019), https://tinyurl.com/2tcrrk53.
20
close access to animals[.]” Gilchrist et al., supra, at
315.
Thus, Petitioners’ efforts to diminish the public
health and safety effects of Proposition 12 are factually false. They assert that because Proposition 12 is
focused on the breeding facility and there is a “[g]eographical and temporal” separation between that facility and slaughter, the zoonotic risks addressed by
Proposition 12 have “disappeared” by the time the hog
enters California. Pet’rs’ Br. 12-13. Yet, as shown
above, slaughterhouse workers are at risk of contracting the same diseases as those spread by intensive
confinement at the breeding facility—to say nothing
of how intensive confinement in the breeding facility
weakens hogs’ immune systems and thus renders
them more vulnerable to disease elsewhere. See supra
Section I. Indeed, studies have shown that pigs with
intestinal Campylobacter by the age of 11 weeks remain carriers until slaughter. See C. R. Young et al.,
Enteric Colonization Following Natural Exposure to
Campylobacter in Pigs, 68 Rsch. in Veterinary Sci. 75,
77 (2000)13; see also Scherer et al., Time Course of Infection with Salmonella typhimurium and Its Influence on Fecal Shedding, Distribution in Inner Organisms, and Antibody Response in Fattening Pigs, 71 J.
Food Protection 699, 700 (2008) (study “show[ed] that
a Salmonella typhimurium DT104 infection
13 Campylobacter can cause campylobacteriosis, which is typi-
cally “self-limiting” but “may . . . lead to severe illnesses including bacteremia, meningitis, irritable bowel syndrome, Guillian–
Barré syndrome, or arthritis.” Jae-Ho Guk et al., Hyper-Aerotolerant Campylobacter coli From Swine May Pose a Potential
Threat to Public Health Based on Its Quinolone Resistance, Virulence Potential, and Genetic Relatedness, Frontiers in Microbiology, July 16, 2021, at 2.
21
experimentally induced in piglets aged 42 days with
an oral exposure . . . can persist until market age”).
Moreover, there are many ways slaughterhouse
workers can contract the zoonoses addressed by Proposition 12 from pigs or their carcasses. Infections can
enter through slaughterhouse workers’ broken skin.
For example, these workers can contract bacterial infection leptospirosis—which causes “fever, headache,
abdominal and muscle pain, vomiting, diarrhea, jaundice, and rash” and can result in “hemorrhagic pneumonia, liver and kidney failure” and even death—
when their “abraded skin” comes into “contact with
[an animal’s] contaminated urine” during slaughter.
Zoonoses Associated with Swine, supra.
Slaughterhouse workers can also contract zoonoses through inadvertent ingestion of animal waste or
tissue. Id. For example, “Salmonellosis, campylobacterosis, cryptosporidiosis, giardiasis, balantidiasis
and infections with pathogenic E. coli” can all infect
humans via “contact and accidental ingestion of fecal
material from infected animals.” Id.; see also Elizabeth Anne Jessie Cook et al., Prevalence and Risk
Factors for Exposure to Toxoplasma Gondii in Slaughterhouse Workers in Western Kenya, BMC Infectious
Diseases, Sept. 2021, at 2 (“[s]laughterhouse workers
are considered a high-risk group for T. gondii [Toxoplasma gondii] exposure because of their regular contact with raw meat,” which can cause vision loss and,
for the immunocompromised, “seizures and loss of
consciousness”).
Slaughterhouse workers may additionally acquire
infections through inhalation of aerosols, such as
Staphylococcus aureus. Ctr. for Food Sec. & Pub.
Health, Zoonotic Diseases of Swine, Iowa St. Univ.
22
Coll. Veterinary Med., https://tinyurl.com/2p898wvp
(last visited Aug. 12, 2022). A 2009-10 study of livestock-antibiotic resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(“MRSA”), for example, found MRSA “in 88% of the
cultured air samples from the lairage area” of slaughterhouses where live animals are stored to await
slaughter, and thus found it “likely that workers
[there] are regularly exposed to airborne MRSA.”
Maarten J. Gilbert et al., Livestock-Associated MRSA
ST398 Carriage in Pig Slaughterhouse Workers Related to Quantitative Environmental Exposure, 69 Occupational & Env’t Med. 472, 476 (2012); see also
Johnson et al., supra, at 852 (wholesale manufacturing meat workers experience “high aerosol . . . exposures to transmissible agents,” and are therefore at
“high risk” of infectious agents entering their circulatory system and “spread[ing] to target organs”).
As noted above, it is particularly logical for California to have been concerned with the risks intensive
confinement presents to slaughterhouse workers.
There are at least four pork slaughterhouses in the
State, including the Farmer John plant in Vernon.
See supra pp. 3-4. 14 Absent Proposition 12, all of their
14 Smithfield recently sold Farmer John and states it plans to
cease its operations there in 2023. Associated Press, Farmer
John Meatpacking Plant in Vernon to Close Next Year, KTLA,
June 10, 2022, https://tinyurl.com/3uh5b42y. The public record
is silent as to whether another processor will take over operations or the facility will close. However, even if Farmer John
were to close and Petitioners to argue this alters California’s interest in Proposition 12—arguments Petitioners have not
made—this would do nothing to negate that California appropriately exercised its police power to protect residents when it enacted Proposition 12, and that the law would continue to protect
workers in other in-state slaughterhouses and animal facilities.
See supra p. 4.
23
workers will face considerable risk of contracting serious infection from swine raised in extreme confinement.
B.
Livestock Auction Workers (and
Auction Attendees)
Livestock auction workers and attendees in California are also at high risk of contracting diseases
from pigs confined in ways inconsistent with Proposition 12, although Petitioners entirely fail to address
their roles and the risks their work presents to the
State. Livestock auctions are held regularly throughout California and can involve a substantial number
of pigs that came from intensive confinement, meaning that Proposition 12 would reduce the probability
of animal-to-human transmission at these auction
houses. See Pet’rs’ Br. 3, 9 (vast majority of pigs born
to sows that were housed in ways inconsistent with
Proposition 12).
There are many opportunities for animal-to-human transmission at these events. Fresno Livestock
Commission sells an “[a]verage [of] 200 pigs per
week.” Schedule, Fresno Livestock Comm’n, LLC,
https://tinyurl.com/2kpm34cv (last visited Aug. 9,
2022). The Escalan Livestock Market and Petaluma
Livestock Auction Yard also hold weekly pig sales.
Auction Schedule, Escalon Livestock Mkt., https://tinyurl.com/4mzmsfdm (last visited Aug. 9, 2022); Sale
Schedule, Petaluma Livestock Auction Yard,
https://tinyurl.com/mryrbzht (last visited Aug. 9,
2022). The Modesto Livestock & Poultry Auction even
advertises its weekly auction where it sells pigs as an
event with “[o]ver capacity crowds, with lots of action.” Modesto Livestock & Poultry Auction, Modesto
24
Livestock & Flea Mkt., https://tinyurl.com/yfew7vvd
(last visited Aug. 9, 2022).
Workers will come into contact with these pigs, as
they must be housed and cared for from delivery until
sale. The public, such as the purchaser, will also be
exposed. Therefore, for many of the same reasons
slaughterhouse workers are at risk, these staff and
attendees are more likely to contract disease when the
pigs are confined in ways that contradict Proposition
12.
C.
Livestock Transport Workers
Numerous individuals who transport pigs into and
around the State for sale and slaughter are also at increased risk of infection without Proposition 12. See
Michael Greger, The Long Haul: Risks Associated
with Livestock Transport, 5 Biosecurity & Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Prac., and Sci. 301, 301
(2007) (“The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations describes live animal transport as ‘ideally suited for spreading disease[.]’” (internal citation omitted)). Truckers are at
risk of inhaling infectious agents, as these workers
necessarily come into contact with live animals during transport, especially in loading the animals onto
and off the vehicle. See, e.g., 4 Variant Virus Infections
Linked to Pig Exposures, Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention
(Aug.
12,
2016),
https://tinyurl.com/2hvuwnxp (noting swine flu can transmit
to humans if “an infected pig . . . coughs or sneezes
and droplets with influenza virus in them spread
through the air”).
This risk is compounded by the fact that the trucks
are “poorly ventilated[,] stressful environment[s].”
25
Greger, supra, at 301 (quoting Animal Prod. & Health
Div., Food & Agric. Org. of the United Nations, Improved Animal Health for Poverty Reduction & Sustainable
Livelihoods
(2002),
https://tinyurl.com/2p95bdst). Also, pigs in transport travel for
long intervals. Id. at 301 (citing Terrance M. Wilson
et al., Agroterrorism, Biological Crimes, and Biological Warfare Targeting Animal Agriculture, in Emerging Diseases of Animals 23 (Corrie Brown & Carole
Bolin eds., 2000)) (“Before they are slaughtered, U.S.
livestock may travel an average of 1,000 miles.”). 15
These conditions create a perfect storm for disease
transmission among the pigs and to the truckers (or
those to whom they deliver the animals).
Pigs even leave pathogens on the truck after
transport, which can infect the truckers as they move
to the next load. Cleaning and disinfecting the vehicle
“is a very difficult task to carry out in practice.” Laura
Valeria Alarcón et al., Biosecurity in Pig Farms: A Review, Porcine Health Mgmt., Jan. 2021, at 5. “[I]t has
been shown that a high percentage of slaughterhouse
trucks were positive for Salmonella [even] after cleaning and disinfection procedures[.]” Id. In addition,
cleaning the vehicle itself is another way animal
transport workers can contract transmissible zoonotic
agents.
15 See also Mhairi A. Sutherland et al., Effects of Transport at
Weaning on the Behavior, Physiology and Performance of Pigs, 4
Animals 657, 658 (2014) (“During transport pigs are potentially
exposed to numerous stressors including handling at loading and
unloading, fluctuating temperatures, mixing with unfamiliar
pigs (and ensuing social stress), feed and water withdrawal, exposure to a novel environment, vibrations and noise[.]”); supra
Section I (stressed pigs are more vulnerable to disease).
26
In short, Proposition 12 would decrease the odds
of in-state animal workers contracting zoonotic infections, so Petitioners’ theory that the law would have
no effect on human health in California is false.
III.
California’s pork industry can incubate
and spread diseases among its employees
and in the surrounding population.
By reducing the slaughter and sale of pork from
diseased pigs and thereby protecting California’s
workers, Proposition 12 will also protect numerous
other California residents from disease. This is because an infection that enters an animal facility in
California, especially an infection that circulates
among employees, will jump to their households and
the greater population. Proposition 12 thus reduces
the potential for community transmission, as corroborated by slaughterhouses’ experience with COVID19. The law also limits other disease pathways into
California communities, such as spread from
transport trucks to those riding in vehicles behind
them. Put simply, Proposition 12 is not only a logical
expression of the State’s police power to protect the
health and safety of its workers, but also its power to
protect all California residents.
The COVID-19 pandemic highlights that disease
spreads efficiently among slaughterhouse workers.
One study of a “large outbreak of COVID-19” at a pork
processing facility explained why—the authors deduced that the “high employee density in work and
common areas” and “prolonged close contact between
employees over the course of a shift” may have contributed to the facility’s high number of COVID-19 infections. Jonathan Steinberg et al., COVID-19 Outbreak Among Employees at a Meat Processing Facility
27
– South Dakota, March-April 2020, Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention (Aug. 7, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/mvyxedv5.
“Production line” workers at slaughterhouses can be
less than six feet apart throughout their shift. Id. Accordingly, they are at high risk of inhaling pathogenic
respiratory droplets from one another. See id.; see also
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 142 S. Ct. 661, 666
(2022) (noting the COVID-19-related “risks associated with working in particularly crowded or cramped
environments”).
By enabling disease to proliferate in the plant,
slaughterhouses increased the risk of disease in the
community. One study found that “[m]eatpacking-dependent counties observed nearly 10 times more
COVID-19 cases in early May [2020], compared to
other manufacturing-dependent counties.” U.S. Dep’t
of Agric., Econ. Rsch. Serv., COVID-19 Working Paper: Meatpacking Working Conditions and the Spread
of
COVID-19,
at
6-7
(2021),
https://tinyurl.com/55ameyty (“By the end of May, 2020, our
analysis estimates that counties with at least 20 percent of their workforce employed in the meatpacking
industry comprised 13 of the 25 rural counties with
the highest rates of COVID-19 per 100,000 people and
8 of the top 10.”). A study published by the National
Academy of Sciences estimates that the additional
“COVID-19 infections and deaths related to livestock
plants” as of July 21, 2020, i.e., infections that would
not have occurred without the disease first spreading
in the plants, “[we]re 236,000 to 310,000 (6 to 8% of
all US cases) and 4,300 to 5,200 (3 to 4% of all US
deaths), respectively, with the vast majority occurring
among people not working at livestock plants.”
28
Charles A. Taylor et al., Livestock Plants and COVID19 Transmission, Proc. of the Nat’l Acad. of Scis. of
the
U.S.
(Nov.
19,
2020),
https://tinyurl.com/2naxdkce. The fact that slaughterhouses
can initiate such significant disease transmission in a
community is especially troubling in a highly populated metropolis like Los Angeles County, in which
Vernon and the Farmer John plant are located.
QuickFacts Los Angeles County, California, U.S. Census Bureau, https://tinyurl.com/u6dnarwp (last visited Aug. 12, 2022) (county population is more than
nine million).
Slaughterhouses can and will spread other zoonotic diseases just as they spread COVID-19. One study
found that household members of slaughterhouse
workers were more likely to carry antibiotic-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus than other community members, “rais[ing] concerns about potential flow of [bacteria with antibiotic-]resistance genes within households of hog workers.” Yaqi You et al., Genomic Differences Between Nasal Staphylococcus Aureus From
Hog Slaughterhouse Workers and Their Communities,
PLoS ONE, Mar. 2018, at 13 (determining “nasal S.
aureus from household members of hog workers . . . showed greater diversity of antibiotic resistance genes and higher prevalence of carriage of
multiple resistance genes than community resident[s]”); Meldra Ivbule et al., Presence of MethicillinResistant Staphylococcus Aureus in Slaughterhouse
Environment, Pigs, Carcasses, and Workers, 61 J. Veterinary Rsch. 267, 275 (2017) (indicating “[t]he high
presence of MRSA in pigs is a potential professional
hazard for staff working in the meat production
chain,” and that “[h]uman colonization implies that
29
carriers become a staphylococcal reservoir and may
transfer the infection to others” (emphasis added)). 16
Proposition 12 not only protects against disease
expanding from slaughterhouses to population centers, but also against zoonoses entering the greater
population through transport. Johns Hopkins School
of Public Health researchers determined that when
intensively confined animals are carried along a
state’s roads they place all drivers at risk. Specifically, when the researchers “drove cars, windows
down, behind trucks that were transporting broiler
chickens from farms to slaughterhouses in Virginia
and Maryland,” they “documented antibiotic-resistant bacteria in the air inside the cars, as well as
on the top of soda cans in the cars’ cupholders.” David
O. Wiebers & Valery L. Feigin, What the COVID-19
Crisis Is Telling Humanity, 54 Neuroepidemiology
283, 284-85 (2020) (citing Ana M. Rule et al., Food Animal Transport: A Potential Source of Community Exposures to Health Hazards From Industrial Farming
(CAFOs), 1 J. Infection & Pub. Health 33, 33-39
(2008)).
Indeed, given the risk that zoonotic diseases will
spread in slaughterhouses and similar environments
and then spread throughout neighboring communities, there is reason to think Proposition 12 would not
16 See also Gregory C. Gray et al., Swine Workers and Swine Influenza Virus Infections, 13 Emerging Infectious Diseases 1871,
1877 (2007) (observing “increased occupational risk of swine influenza virus infection for [swine-exposed, predominantly farm]
workers and their nonswine-exposed spouses” (emphasis added));
Myers et al., supra, at 18 (recognizing in connection with swine
workers on farms that “[a]fter work, [such workers] may readily
communicate [a novel zoonotic] virus to their family members
and neighbors”).
30
only protect public health in California, but could also
prevent the next pandemic. See Wenjun Ma et al., The
Pig as a Mixing Vessel for Influenza Viruses: Human
and Veterinary Implications, 3 J. of Molecular & Genetic Med. 158, 163 (2009) (“[T]he creation of novel
reassortant swine influenza viruses with zoonotic and
pandemic potential could . . . happen in modern swine
facilities in the backyard of a highly industrialized
country in North America[.]”). 17
For example, as intensive confinement “has become a global phenomenon, a host of avian influenza
(bird flu) viruses, including H5N1, have emerged in
countries with large-scale industrial poultry operations.” Wiebers & Feigin, supra, at 284. If a zoonotic
outbreak among slaughterhouse workers in California escalates to pandemic scale, California is among
the many states (and countries) that would shoulder
catastrophic public health and economic consequences. Thus, through Proposition 12 California is
protecting its people from immediate infection, as
well as from the longer-term risk of overrun hospitals.
An overburdened healthcare system would in turn deteriorate Californians’ health in other ways and deplete the State’s public fisc.
IV.
The only plausible conclusion is that
Proposition 12 is a constitutional expression of California’s police powers to protect the State.
Respondents accurately explain that states are
free to pass laws so long as they are not protectionist
17 See also Myers et al., supra, at 14 (advising that “[s]wine work-
ers . . . be included in pandemic surveillance and in antiviral and
immunization strategies”).
31
or discriminatory against interstate commerce, and
Proposition 12 should survive on this basis alone.
State Resp’ts’ Br. 9 (identifying “prohibiting protectionist laws that discriminate against interstate commerce” as “the core concern of the dormant Commerce
Clause”); Intervenor Resp’ts’ Br. 11-21. Yet, were the
Court to entertain Petitioners’ request that it examine the effects of the law, the foregoing wealth of evidence demonstrates how Proposition 12 would benefit
California and, for this reason, should also stand.
Indeed, Petitioners do not and could not dispute
that states may defend their internal public health
and safety. See Pet’rs’ Br. 36 (asserting “States may
exercise ‘police powers to protect the health and
safety of their citizens’” and that “[t]hey enjoy ‘great
latitude’ to do so” (first quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530
U.S. 703, 715 (2000); then quoting Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006))). The constitutional legitimacy of states shielding their inhabitants from
threats to public health is rooted in this Court’s ageold precedent. In Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern
Railway Co., this Court pronounced that “the states
have power to provide by law suitable measures to
prevent the introduction into the states of articles of
trade which, on account of their existing condition,
would bring in and spread disease, pestilence, and
death[.]” 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888). In Clason v. Indiana, this Court reiterated that “[t]he power of the
state to prescribe regulations which shall prevent the
production within its borders of . . . articles as would
spread disease and pestilence, is well established.”
306 U.S. 439, 443 (1939) (quoting Sligh v. Kirkwood,
237 U.S. 52, 59 (1915)). And more recently, the Court
indicated that its deference to local health and safety
interests endures, observing that “[t]he opinions of
32
the Court through the years have . . . recogniz[ed]
that incidental burdens on interstate commerce may
be unavoidable when a State legislates to safeguard
the health and safety of its people.” City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978).
Proposition 12 is a public health measure. By prohibiting the in-state sale of meat from breeding pigs
and their offspring housed in intensive confinement,
the law will protect California’s workers and residents from zoonoses, and the State from life-threatening and financially devastating outbreaks. See supra
Sections I-III. Therefore, Petitioners’ allegation that
Proposition 12 has no positive impact on California
lacks logic. Pet. App. 232a (Complaint) ¶¶ 465, 467
(alleging that Proposition 12 does not “advanc[e] any
legitimate local interest,” and specifically claiming it
“has no connection to human health”).
California need not wait until another pandemic
strikes. It may prospectively prevent the local harms
that will be caused by intensive confinement. See
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986) (“[T]he constitutional principles underlying the commerce clause
cannot be read as requiring the State of Maine to sit
idly by and wait until potentially irreversible environmental damage has occurred . . . before it acts to
avoid such consequences.” (internal citation omitted)).
Because, at the least, the Court should balance the
in-state interests against the alleged out-of-state concerns, and Petitioners’ balancing argument depends
on Proposition 12 lacking any connection to local
health and safety, their challenge must fail. Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663-64 (2009) (“[D]etermining
whether a complaint states a plausible claim is
33
context specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw
on its experience and common sense.”). Proposition
12’s health and safety benefits are well proven.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons and those given in
Respondents’ briefs, amici support Respondents’ request for affirmance.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID S. MURASKIN
Counsel of Record
PUBLIC JUSTICE
1620 L St. NW, Suite 630
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 797-8600
dmuraskin@publicjustice.net
LEORA N. FRIEDMAN
TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
1828 L Street NW, Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 973-0900
Counsel for Amici Curiae
August 15, 2022
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.