Amicus Curiae Brief — Michael Sackett, et ux., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
Supreme Court briefJun 17, 2022
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No. 21-454
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
MICHAEL SACKETT; CHANTELL SACKETT,
Petitioners,
v.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY;
MICHAEL S. REGAN, ADMINISTRATOR,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari To The United States Court of
Appeals For The Ninth Circuit
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
CLEAN WATER AGENCIES
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
CLEAN WATER AGENCIES
Amanda E. Aspatore
General Counsel
1130 Connecticut Ave. N.W.
Suite 1050
Washington, DC 20036
(201) 833-2672
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
Alexandra Dapolito Dunn
Counsel of Record
700 K St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 639-1324
alexandra.dunn@bakerbotts.
com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae National Association of Clean
Water Agencies
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................ iii
INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE .............................. 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT........................................... 3
ARGUMENT ........................................................................ 6
I.
II.
The CWA Is Not an Unlawful Delegation of
Legislative Power to the Agencies ...................... 6
A.
The Act Provides an Intelligible
Principle to Guide its Interpretation ......... 7
B.
Finding a Nondelegation Issue Would
Undo the Act’s Preclusive Effect,
Subjecting Regulated Entities to
Significant Burdens ................................... 10
This Court Should Provide Clarity On
Certain WOTUS Exclusions .............................. 12
A.
The Court Should Clarify That
Groundwater Is Not a WOTUS ................ 12
B.
The Court Must Preserve the
Agencies’ Ability to Exclude Waste
Treatment Systems from CWA
Jurisdiction ................................................. 15
C.
The Exclusion Of Stormwater Control
Features from the Scope of CWA
J urisdiction Is Necessary For the
Work of Clean Water Agencies ................ 17
ii
D.
Congress, the Agencies, and the
States
Have
Recognized
the
Importance of the Innovative Water
Management Strategies Fostered by
WOTUS Exclusions ................................... 18
E.
Agency Discretion to Exclude
Features
From
the
WOTUS
Definition Promotes Innovative Water
Management
Strategies
And
Affordability................................................ 22
CONCLUSION .................................................................. 24
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE(S)
CASES
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,
564 U.S. 410 (2011) ....................................................... 11
American Power & Light Co. v. United States
Securities & Exchange Commission,
329 U.S. 90 (1946) ........................................................... 8
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,
451 U.S. 304 (1981) ..................................................10, 11
County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund,
140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020) ..............................................14, 15
Exxon Corp. v. Train,
554 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977) ....................................... 14
Gundy v. United States,
139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) ..................................................... 8
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 394 (1928) ......................................................... 7
Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361 (1989) ......................................................... 6
Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Aracoma
Coal Co.,
556 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009) ......................................... 16
Rapanos v. United States,
547 U.S. 715 (2006) ....................................................9, 13
Rice v. Harken Exploration Co.,
250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001) ......................................... 14
iv
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County
v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,
531 U.S. 159 (2001) ......................................................8, 9
United States v. Riverside Bayview,
474 U.S. 121 (1985) ......................................................... 9
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.,
531 U.S. 457 (2001) ......................................................... 8
STATUTES
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) ............................................................... 6
33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) ............................................................. 13
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) ............................................................6, 8
33 U.S.C. § 403 ...................................................................... 7
33 U.S.C. § 1252(a) ........................................................13, 14
33 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(5) ....................................................13, 14
33 U.S.C. § 1256(e)(1) ......................................................... 14
33 U.S.C. § 1281 .................................................................. 19
33 U.S.C. § 1283(f)(2) ......................................................... 20
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) ......................................................... 13
33 U.S.C. § 1342 ....................................................... 13, 14, 18
33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)–(h) ...................................................... 13
33 U.S.C. § 1377a ................................................................ 20
CODE AND REGULATIONS
42 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) ............................................................ 15
Boston Zoning Code Art. 32 § 32-6 ................................... 21
v
New Jersey Administrative Code, NJDEPN.J.A.C. § 7.8.1.2 .......................................................... 21
OTHER AUTHORIES
45 Fed. Reg. 33,290 (May 19, 1980) .................................. 15
51 Fed. Reg. 41,206 (Nov. 13, 1986) .................................. 15
80 Fed. Reg. 37,059 (Jun. 29, 2015) .............................15, 17
84 Fed. Reg. 4154 (Feb. 14, 2019) ..................................... 22
85 Fed. Reg. 22,250 (Apr. 21, 2020) ....................... 15, 17, 18
86 Fed. Reg. 69,372 (Dec. 7, 2021) ....................... 4, 5, 12, 16
S. Rep. No. 92-414 (1971) ..............................................11, 14
S. Rep. No. 92-1236 (1972) ................................................. 17
S. Rep. No. 95-370 (1977) ................................................... 20
Comments of Sierra Club, Puget Soundkeeper
Alliance, Idaho Conservation League, & Mi
Familia Vota, Proposed Rule, Revised
Definition of “Waters of the United States,”
EPA-HQ-OW-2021-0602-0328 (Feb. 7, 2022) ............ 13
Comments of WWALS Watershed Coalition, Inc.,
Proposed Rule, Revised Definition of “Waters
of the United States,”
EPA-HQ-OW-2021-0602-0551 (Feb. 12, 2022),
Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OW-2021-0602 ................... 13
EPA, Benefits of Green Infrastructure,
https://www.epa.gov/green-infrastructure/
benefits-green-infrastructure ..................................... 19
EPA, Green Infrastructure, https://www.epa.gov/
green-infrastructure .................................................... 19
vi
EPA, Green Infrastructure Municipal Handbook
(2008), https://www.epa.gov/greeninfrastructure/green-infrastructure-municipalhandbook ....................................................................... 20
EPA, Green Infrastructure Modeling Toolkit,
https://www.epa.gov/water-research/greeninfrastructure-modeling-toolkit .................................. 19
EPA, Managing Wet Weather with Green
Infrastructure: Municipal Handbook –
Incentive Mechanisms,
EPA-833-F-09-001 (Jun. 2009), https://www.epa.
gov/sites/default/files/2015-10/documents/gi_
munichandbook_incentives.pdf ................................... 16
EPA, National Management Measures Guidance to
Control Nonpoint Source Pollution from Urban
Areas (2005),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201509/documents/urban_guidance_0.pdf ......................... 20
EPA, National Water Reuse Action Plan:
Collaborative Implementation,
EPA 820-R-20-001 (Feb. 2020),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2020-02/
documents/national-water-reuse-action-plancollaborative-implementation-version-1.pdf.............. 21
EPA, National Water Reuse Action Plan: Update on
Collaborative Progress—Year 2 (Mar. 2022),
https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/
2022-03/wrap-annual-update_2022.pdf ...................... 21
EPA, Promoting Innovation for a Sustainable Water
Future: Progress Report, EPA-820-F-15-002 (Jul.
2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/201507/documents/promoting-innovation-report2015.pdf.......................................................................... 19
vii
U.S. Geological Survey, What is groundwater?,
https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/what-groundwater .......... 14
1
INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE 1
The National Association of Clean Water Agencies
(“NACWA”) is a nonprofit trade association representing
more than 350 municipal clean water agencies that own,
operate, and manage publicly owned treatment works,
wastewater and stormwater sewer systems, water
reclamation districts, and infrastructure relating to all
aspects of wastewater collection, treatment, and disposal.
NACWA submits this brief to help ensure that the
Court preserves two central aspects of current U.S. water
quality regulation: (1) the existence of a federal water
quality regime that displaces what would otherwise be an
ad hoc, activist-driven legal landscape that could cripple
the ability of public agencies to provide affordable and
sustainable clean water services to communities
throughout the country; and (2) the ability of federal
agencies to exclude waters from that regime where doing
so would serve environmental, regulatory, or efficiency
aims.
Some amici urge this Court to curtail the authority of
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”)
(collectively, “the Agencies”) to administer the operative
provisions of the Clean Water Act (“CWA” or “the Act”)
based on their own interpretation of constitutional limits
on legislative delegations of authority. However, such a
ruling could undermine or even dismantle the Agencies’
All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No counsel for a
party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor has such counsel or
any party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the
preparation and submission of this brief. No person other than amicus
curiae and its members have made a monetary contribution to the
preparation and submission of this brief.
1
2
50-year-old regulatory program and dramatically increase
legal uncertainty and risk for NACWA members,
threatening not only their provision of affordable clean
water services, but also their substantial investments in
critical public infrastructure. The CWA’s federal
regulatory scheme, though not perfect, has for years
displaced what could otherwise be a chaotic judicial
patchwork of water quality requirements driven by
plaintiffs’ lawsuits, that is potentially untethered from key
technical, affordability, and feasibility considerations. The
existence of a federal scheme which requires such issues
to be taken into account is vital to NACWA’s members,
who rely on a consistent and predictable regulatory
approach to facilitate their critical work and safeguard
their long-term investments.
Separately, litigants in suits challenging previous
CWA rulemakings have continuously sought to limit the
ability of the Agencies to exclude waters from the
stringent requirements of the Act, even where doing so
would foster improved water management practices,
downstream water quality, and regulatory certainty. Such
limits also threaten the ability of NACWA’s members to
protect public health and the environment and minimize
costs for local communities. It is therefore of equal
importance to NACWA members that this Court preserve
the flexibility of the Agencies to exclude specific
categories of waters from the CWA, and clarify that the
text and structure of the Act actually require that the
Agencies exclude one of these categories of waters –
groundwater.
3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The legal certainty provided by the Clean Water Act’s
displacement of federal common law tort actions against
clean water utilities, as well as long-standing exclusions of
certain waters from the regulatory definition of “waters of
the United States” (“WOTUS”), are essential to the work
NACWA’s members carry out to protect human health
and the environment and steward public funds. NACWA
submits this brief to provide insight as to how the
structure and jurisdictional reach of the CWA impact the
provision of clean water services and development of
critical infrastructure and to ask this Court to consider
these impacts in resolving the question presented.
This Court should reject the requests of several amici
for it to find that the CWA unlawfully delegates legislative
authority to the Agencies. Such a finding would be in
direct contravention to this Court’s precedent as to the
permissible scope of congressional delegation, which
requires that Congress provide an intelligible principle to
agencies to guide their exercise of discretion in
administering a regulatory system. The CWA clearly
provides such a limiting principle by confining the Act’s
jurisdictional reach to “navigable waters.” Further, a
finding of unlawful delegation of legislative authority
would upend the federal regulatory structure that has for
five decades shielded regulated entities from an
inconsistent, unpredictable, and unworkable patchwork of
activist-driven and judicially created water quality
requirements. The continued operations of clean water
agencies throughout the country depend on this Court’s
clear rejection of these nondelegation arguments. The
Agencies’ half-century history of substantially successful
administration of the CWA, bolstered by guidance from
4
the courts, evidences the fact that there is no
constitutional delegation problem with the CWA.
The Agencies’ long-term administration of the Act has
also fostered the development of significant technical
expertise, which the Agencies have in part applied by
consistently recognizing certain exclusions from the
definition of “waters of the United States.” These
exclusions have facilitated better water management
practices, improved downstream water quality, and
promoted regulatory certainty. They should be recognized
by the Court as it provides guidance on the appropriate
scope of federal CWA jurisdiction.
Of particular import to NACWA’s members are
exclusions for groundwater, waste treatment systems, and
stormwater control infrastructure. NACWA’s members
have long relied on these exclusions to perform essential
wastewater
treatment,
flood,
and
stormwater
management and water conservation activities, including
the implementation of green infrastructure and other
innovative practices that provide important public health
and environmental benefits consistent with the goals of
the CWA.
These exclusions have been embedded as core limits on
the jurisdictional reach of the CWA for decades and
provide vital stability in an ever-shifting regulatory
landscape. In doing so, they help prevent unnecessary
expenditures of limited municipal resources and support
continued efficient and effective water management
operations. NACWA has consistently worked with the
Agencies to improve the clarity of these exclusions, most
recently by submitting comments on the Agencies’
proposed rule to revise their definition of WOTUS. See
Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 86
5
Fed. Reg. 69,372 (Dec. 7, 2021), Docket No. EPA-HQ-OW2021-0602.
In considering the bounds of the CWA’s reach,
NACWA asks that this Court recognize that one of these
key excluded categories—groundwater—is not a
“navigable water” subject to federal CWA jurisdiction and
reject any formulation of a WOTUS definition that would
prevent the Agencies from implementing other sensible
regulatory exclusions. Such a ruling would provide critical
support to NACWA members’ ability to adopt novel and
advanced technologies that benefit the millions of
American water ratepayers they serve.
6
ARGUMENT
I. THE CWA IS NOT AN UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE AGENCIES
Congress enacted the CWA in 1972 “to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation’s waters,” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a), creating a broad
pollution control program that relies on cooperative
federalism for implementation. The Act’s programs to
protect water quality are limited to “navigable waters,”
defined in the Act as “the waters of the United States,
including the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). Several
amici have suggested that, in delegating power to the
Agencies to administer programs for all “waters of the
United States,” Congress has unlawfully granted the
Agencies legislative authority in violation of the
nondelegation doctrine. See Amicus Brief of Liberty
J ustice Center (filed Apr. 14, 2022); Amicus Brief of
Americans for Prosperity Foundation (filed Apr. 14, 2022).
These legal arguments are inherently flawed and should
not be accepted by this Court.
At its core, the nondelegation doctrine seeks to
preserve the constitutional balance of separation of
powers. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371
(1989). However, this doctrine is intended to be used as a
last resort in instances of clear legislative abdication, as it
is a chainsaw rather than a scalpel. This is apparent from
the doctrine’s 85-year history, throughout which this
Court has repeatedly refused to find congressional
delegation to be unconstitutional unless “Congress had
failed to articulate any policy or standard” to confine the
Executive’s discretion. Id. at 373, n.7 (emphasis added).
There is no basis for this Court to take up amici’s
invitation to find an unlawful delegation in the CWA. The
7
Act clearly provides an intelligible principle to shape the
Agencies’ interpretation of their authority by limiting the
Agencies’ jurisdiction to “navigable waters.” 2 This fact is
underscored by the Agencies’ 50 years of implementation
of the Act with direction from the courts.
A holding that the CWA amounts to an unlawful
delegation of congressional authority would be
detrimental to the reliable and affordable provision of
clean water throughout the country. Displacement of a
comprehensive federal regime would resuscitate the
threat of federal common law causes of action against
NACWA’s members, thereby exposing them to an ad hoc
patchwork of judicial water quality requirements that flies
in the face of both clear congressional intent and common
sense. The Court should avoid these consequences by
rejecting amici’s nondelegation arguments.
A. THE ACT PROVIDES AN INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE
TO GUIDE ITS INTERPRETATION
All that is required to withstand a nondelegation
challenge is a demonstration that Congress included “an
intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed
to conform.” J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). Specifically, this Court has found
Congress has used the term “navigable waters” in other contexts as
well, including in determining the extent of the authority of the Corps
of Engineers under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of
1899, see 33 U.S.C. § 403 (regulating activities in “navigable . . . waters
of the United States”), and in establishing the limits of the jurisdiction
of federal courts conferred by Art. III § 2 of the United States
Constitution over admiralty and maritime cases. While the term has
different meaning depending on its context, it nevertheless has been
consistently held to provide an intelligible principle from which
congressional intent can be gleaned.
2
8
it “constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates
the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it,
and the boundaries of this delegated authority.” American
Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
Applying this standard, this Court has upheld challenged
delegations made pursuant to the Clean Air Act, see
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 473
(2001), the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
see Am. Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. at 104–105, and the
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, see
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129–2130 (2019).
As this Court emphasized in Gundy, “a nondelegation
inquiry always begins (and often almost ends) with
statutory interpretation.” 139 S. Ct. at 2123. The CWA
confines federal authority to “navigable waters,” defined
in section 502(7) of the statute as “waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas.” Previous decisions
of this Court have made clear that both “navigable” and
“waters” impose boundaries on the jurisdictional scope of
the CWA, thereby providing an intelligible principle upon
which the Agencies must base their WOTUS definition.
Consistent with this Court’s observation in Gundy, then,
the nondelegation inquiry for the CWA begins and ends
with the text of the statute.
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers (“SWANCC”),
this Court held that Congress’ use of the term “navigable”
in the Act imposed clear limits on the Act’s jurisdictional
reach, having “at least the import of showing us what
Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the
CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or
had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so
9
made.” 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001). 3 These limits are tied to
the Commerce Clause, which serves as the source of
Congress’ power to regulate waters and which thereby
imposes bounds on the Agencies’ authority under the
CWA. Even Justice Kennedy in his Rapanos concurring
opinion reiterated that “the word ‘navigable’ in the Act
must be given some effect,” and that the term “navigable”
constrains the Agencies’ discretion over their
jurisdictional reach by requiring “the existence of a
significant nexus between the wetlands in question and
navigable waters in the traditional sense.” Rapanos v.
United States, 547 U.S. 715, 779 (2006) (Kennedy, J .,
concurring) (emphasis added).
Congress’ use of the term “waters” as a jurisdictional
touchstone also imposes significant limits on the Agencies’
discretion to determine the jurisdictional reach of the
CWA. Under the Act, the Agencies have authority to
regulate “waters” but not lands, and while “the transition
from water to solid ground is not necessarily or even
typically an abrupt one,” the Agencies “must necessarily
choose some point at which water ends and land begins.”
United States v. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121, 132
(1985). While ultimately this choice is informed by the
Agencies’ expertise, see id. at 134, it is also guided by
“legislative history and underlying policies of [the
Agencies’] statutory grants of authority,” id. at 132.
The Court also specifically found that the text of the statute was the
source of these jurisdictional limits: “In order to rule for respondents
here, we would have to hold that the jurisdiction of the Corps extends
to ponds that are not adjacent to open water. But we conclude that the
text of the statute will not allow this.” Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 168 (2001).
3
10
In limiting the reach of the CWA to “navigable
waters,” then, Congress clearly provided an intelligible
principle upon which to base a WOTUS definition, and this
Court should reject the nondelegation arguments
proffered by amici in this case.
B. FINDING A NONDELEGATION ISSUE WOULD UNDO
THE ACT’S PRECLUSIVE EFFECT, SUBJECTING
REGULATED ENTITIES TO SIGNIFICANT BURDENS
In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, this Court held that
the CWA displaced federal common law:
Congress has not left the formulation of
appropriate federal standards to the courts
through application of often vague and
indeterminate nuisance concepts and
maxims of equity jurisprudence, but rather
has occupied the field through the
establishment
of
a
comprehensive
regulatory program supervised by an
expert administrative agency. . . . The
establishment of such a self-consciously
comprehensive program by Congress . . .
strongly suggests that there is no room for
courts to attempt to improve on that
program with federal common law.
451 U.S. 304, 317–319 (1981) (emphases added). In
considering the preclusive effect of the CWA, the Court
emphasized the key role of agency expertise in addressing
water pollution control, finding both that “the general area
is particularly unsuited to the approach inevitable under a
regime of federal common law,” and that Congress had
“criticized past approaches” that relied on piecemeal
litigation. Id. at 325.
11
Building on this reasoning in the context of the Clean
Air Act, in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,
this Court reiterated that “[Congress’] delegation is what
displaces federal common law,” and emphasized that
displacing federal common law does not circumvent
judicial review, but rather channels this review to an
assessment of whether an expert agency abused its
discretion under its delegated authority. 564 U.S. 410, 426
(2011) (emphasis added).
Finding a nondelegation issue in this case would
undermine the basis for the CWA’s preclusive effect by
calling into question Congress’ grant of authority to the
Agencies. And relegating federal pollution control to
federal common law would reintroduce the kinds of
“sporadic” and “ad hoc” decision-making that Congress
roundly rejected in enacting the CWA. 4 For example,
Congress carefully constrained the availability of CWA
citizen suits to avoid exposing dischargers to disparate
“court-developed definition[s] of water quality.” See S.
REP. NO. 92-414, at 79-80 (1971). Subjecting NACWA’s
members to such a water quality scheme now would
significantly reduce their ability to plan for the long-term
investments in critical infrastructure necessary for the
continued provision of sustainable, affordable clean water
nationwide.
Reliance on the development of federal common law
would likewise subject regulated entities to the
unpredictability of local courts without the availability of
the administrative protections and opportunities for
engagement offered by federal agency regulation. Nor
would it entail the mandatory consideration of factors such
See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 325 (1981) (citing S.
REP. NO. 92-414 at 95 (1971)).
4
12
as costs, feasibility, and societal impacts which are
ensconced in the CWA’s regime and are so critical to the
work of clean water agencies.
The programs Congress set up in the CWA serve as a
crucial bulwark against piecemeal, time- and resourceconsuming litigation that would untenably interfere with
the public services performed by clean water agencies. In
the face of these significant practical consequences, it is
imperative that this Court not take up amici’s invitation
to find an unlawful delegation of legislative authority.
II. THIS COURT SHOULD PROVIDE CLARITY ON CERTAIN
WOTUS EXCLUSIONS
In defining WOTUS, the Agencies have long
recognized waters which fall outside the scope of the
CWA’s programs. These exclusions are based on a variety
of considerations, from practical concerns related to
administrability to more fundamental limits on the scope
of federal regulatory authority grounded in the language
of the CWA. The Court should take this opportunity to
provide clarity on a number of these exclusions vital to
clean water utilities, specifically, those for groundwater,
waste treatment systems, and stormwater control
features.
A. THE
COURT
SHOULD
CLARIFY
GROUNDWATER IS NOT A WOTUS
THAT
The Agencies’ longstanding position that groundwater
is not a WOTUS stems from both the text and structure of
the Act. As the Agencies’ recent proposed rule reiterates,
“they have never interpreted groundwater [to] be a ‘water
of the United States’ under the Clean Water Act.” 86 Fed.
Reg. at 69,424 n. 47 (2021). Nevertheless, the
13
appropriateness of the Agencies’ position has been
repeatedly called into question. 5
In enacting the CWA, Congress crafted careful limits
on federal authority, preserving significant authority for
the states to control pollution. In its declaration of goals
and policy, Congress explicitly affirmed “the primary
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce,
and eliminate pollution” and to preserve “land and water
resources.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). This policy is reiterated
throughout the substantive provisions of the CWA. 6 The
regulation of groundwater as a WOTUS would
inappropriately shift the authority of the states in this
regard to EPA and the Corps.
Moreover, it defies logic to include groundwater under
any concept of navigability. Groundwater is “water that
exists underground in saturated zones beneath the land
surface,” moving at “rates of 7-60 centimeters (3-25
See, e.g., Comments of Sierra Club, Puget Soundkeeper Alliance,
Idaho Conservation League, & Mi Familia Vota, Proposed Rule,
Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” EPA-HQ-OW2021-0602-0328, at 25 (Feb. 7, 2022); Comments of WWALS
Watershed Coalition, Inc., Proposed Rule, Revised Definition of
“Waters of the United States,” EPA-HQ-OW-2021-0602-0551 (Feb. 12,
2022), Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OW-2021-0602.
6
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b), 1344(g)–(h) (creating a mechanism for
states to receive delegation of permitting authority and implement
permitting programs); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a), 1254(a)(5) (directing EPA
to address groundwater pollution through information gathering and
coordination with the States); 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (imposing a
certification requirement that allows states to prevent the Agencies
from issuing permits that would violate state water quality standards).
See also Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 803 (2006) (Stevens,
J ., dissenting) (assigning states “nearly exclusive responsibility for
containing pollution from nonpoint sources”).
5
14
inches) per day in an aquifer.”7 This water “fills the pores
and fractures in underground materials such as sand,
gravel, and other rock.” 8 It is not, nor can it ever be,
navigable.
This fact is underscored by Congress’ disparate
treatment of “ground waters” and “navigable waters”
throughout the Act, 9 as well as the Act’s legislative history,
which confirms that Congress expressly decided not to
regulate groundwater through the CWA’s federal
pollution control programs. 10 In addition, as the Fifth
Circuit emphasized in Exxon Corp. v. Train, the Act’s
“simple requirement” in 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(D) that
EPA find adequate authority “under State law” to “control
the disposal of pollutants into wells” before approving a
state National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(“NPDES”) program demonstrates an intent on the part
of Congress to “stop short of establishing federal controls
over groundwater pollution.” 554 F.2d 1310, 1324-1325,
1328 (5th Cir. 1977). 11
This Court, too, has recognized the bifurcated system
Congress established under the CWA for protecting
groundwater and surface water. Cnty. of Maui v. Hawaii
Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020). County of Maui
found federal authority to regulate discharges conveyed
U.S. Geological Survey, What is groundwater?, https://www.usgs.
gov/faqs/what-groundwater.
8
Id.
9
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a), 1254(a)(5), 1256(e)(1).
10
See S. REP. NO. 92-414 at 73 (1971) (rejecting adoption of “[s]everal
bills pending before the Committee provided authority to establish
Federally approved standards for groundwaters”).
11
See also Rice v. Harken Expl. Co., 250 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2001)
(reaffirming that “ground waters are not protected waters under the
CWA”).
7
15
via groundwater to “navigable waters” under certain
circumstances. See id. at 1468. However, treating
groundwater as a method of conveyance is wholly different
from regulating groundwater as a WOTUS itself, and this
Court was careful to draw such a distinction, finding that
“Congress left general groundwater regulatory authority
to the States; its failure to include groundwater in the
general EPA permitting provision was deliberate.” Id. at
1472.
As this Court considers the appropriate scope of
federal CWA jurisdiction, it should take the opportunity
to provide stakeholders with long-sought clarity and hold
that the text and structure of the CWA precludes
groundwater from being included by the Agencies in any
WOTUS definition.
B. THE COURT MUST PRESERVE THE AGENCIES’
ABILITY
TO EXCLUDE WASTE TREATMENT
SYSTEMS FROM CWA JURISDICTION
Since the early days of CWA implementation, the
Agencies have recognized that, at times, waters that could
otherwise be considered “WOTUS” must be excluded
from such a designation where they are part of waste
treatment systems designed to improve downstream
water quality. See 45 Fed. Reg. at 33,424 (specifying in
regulations promulgated in 1980 that “[w]aste treatment
systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons designed
to meet the requirements of CWA . . . are not waters of the
United States”). This exclusion was preserved throughout
the Agencies’ 1986 Rule, see 51 Fed. Reg. at 41,250 (citing
42 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)), 2015 rule, see 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,059
(emphasizing that “waste treatment systems have been
excluded . . . since 1992 and 1979 respectively”), and 2020
Rule, see 85 Fed. Reg. at 22,317 (noting that “exclusions
16
[for] waste treatment systems . . . have been expressly
included in regulatory text for decades”). And the
Agencies’ current proposed rule retains an explicit
regulatory exclusion for waste treatment systems. See 86
Fed. Reg. at 69,385 (“[T]he agencies are proposing to
retain the waste treatment system exclusion . . . from the
1986 regulations.”). Yet, as with groundwater, plaintiff’s
groups have frequently attacked the legality of the waste
treatment system exclusion. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl.
Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 188 (4th Cir.
2009).
The Agencies’ existing exclusion for waste treatment
systems covers a wide array of water features relied on by
clean water agencies that are designed to enhance surface
water quality, reduce environmental impacts, and
promote water sustainability. These features vary by
facility, but can include constructed wetlands and other
green infrastructure, wastewater collection bins, basins
and channels, cooling ponds, stormwater sedimentation
ponds, low volume waste ponds, and wastewater and
treated water conveyances, such as pipes and channels.
EPA has long recognized the importance of such features
to the efficient and effective treatment and management
of water resources. 12
Notably, waste treatment systems address pollutants
before they are discharged into navigable waters.
However, regulating waste treatment systems as
WOTUS, either in whole or in part, would mandate
application of technological and water quality-based limits
See, e.g., EPA, Managing Wet Weather with Green Infrastructure:
Municipal Handb ook – Incentive Mechanisms, EPA-833-F-09-001
J( un.
2009),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-10/
documents/gi_munichandbook_incentives.pdf.
12
17
on discharges into the features themselves, thereby
completely precluding their use for treatment. Such a
requirement to treat discharges before they reach a
treatment system would be nonsensical and would have
significant ramifications for clean water agencies that
utilize such systems to meet CWA obligations.
Congress made clear that, while standards of
performance apply to end-of-pipe discharges, facilities
should be left with “the responsibility to achieve the level
of performance by the application of whatever technique
determined availab le and desirab le.” 13 Retaining a
WOTUS exclusion for these systems is essential to enable
clean water utilities to create and implement important
pollution control strategies, consistent with the purpose of
the CWA.
C. THE EXCLUSION OF STORMWATER CONTROL
FEATURES FROM THE SCOPE OF CWA
JURISDICTION IS NECESSARY FOR THE WORK OF
CLEAN WATER AGENCIES
Similar to waste treatment systems, stormwater
control infrastructure includes a wide variety of features
critical to public clean water agencies, including
stormwater retention basins, curbs, gutters, and sewers.
The Agencies have historically not regulated these
features as WOTUS, and in their more recent rulemakings
have recognized the appropriateness of such exclusion.
See, e.g., 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,059 (2015) (reiterating the
Agencies’ intent to retain exclusion of “stormwater control
features constructed to convey, treat, or store
stormwater,” and arguing that “[finding these features
jurisdictional] was never the agencies’ intent”); see also 85
13
S. REP. NO. 92-1236, at 128 (1972) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added).
18
Fed. Reg. at 22,323 (2020) (excluding stormwater control
features constructed or excavated in upland or in nonjurisdictional waters to convey, treat, infiltrate, or store
stormwater runoff).
As with waste treatment systems, regulating
stormwater management features as WOTUS makes no
practical sense and would impose additional regulatory
burdens that would interfere with the ability of these
features to perform their intended function. Such a
definition would impose limits on stormwater discharges
into the very features intended to treat and manage them.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1342. Additionally, absent a clear
regulatory exclusion, these features could be subjected to
lengthy and costly jurisdictional determinations, further
increasing the costs for public utilities needing to utilize
them. The Court should therefore uphold the authority of
the Agencies to exclude these features from CWA
jurisdiction.
D. CONGRESS, THE AGENCIES, AND THE STATES HAVE
RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
INNOVATIVE WATER MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
FOSTERED BY WOTUS EXCLUSIONS
Many of the features covered by the WOTUS
exclusions for groundwater, waste treatment systems, and
stormwater control are green infrastructure and other
innovative water management processes employed by
clean water agencies for their human health,
environmental, and societal benefits. Exclusions for such
features from the WOTUS definition support critical
public policy aims acknowledged by Congress and both
state and federal agencies.
Green infrastructure mimics the natural hydrologic
cycle by using natural vegetation to capture and store
19
runoff and allow it to gradually infiltrate into the ground
so as to avoid unnatural flow regimes and erosive flows
that can destroy stream habitat and disrupt aquatic
systems. 14
EPA has explicitly recognized the value of these
practices in managing stormwater and wastewater,
dedicating an entire section of its website to green
infrastructure and its benefits 15 and developing a green
infrastructure modeling toolkit to “incorporate green…
infrastructure practices to help communities manage their
water resources in a more sustainable way.” 16
Congress has likewise demonstrated its clear support
for maintaining and expanding innovative treatment
works, creating a funding program authorizing EPA to
issue grants for construction. See 33 U.S.C. § 1281. This
program includes a wide array of important treatment
strategies, such as “aerated lagoons, trickling filters,
EPA’s Progress Report on Promoting Innovation for a Sustainable
Water Future highlights 10 areas with “the most promising
opportunities to employ technology and institutional innovation to
help solve current water resource issues and promote economic
growth,” which include conserving and reusing water, as well as
improving and greening water infrastructure. See EPA, Promoting
Innovation for a Sustainable Water Future: Progress Report, EPA820-F-15-002 (Jul. 2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/201507/documents/promoting-innovation-report-2015.pdf.
15
See EPA, Green Infrastructure, https://www.epa.gov/greeninfrastructure. EPA notes the specific benefits provided by green
infrastructure to water quality and quantity, air quality, climate
resiliency, habitat and wildlife, and communities. See EPA, Benefits
of Green Infrastructure, https://www.epa.gov/green-infrastructure/
benefits-green-infrastructure.
16
See EPA, Green Infrastructure Modeling Toolkit,
https://www.epa.gov/water-research/green-infrastructure-modelingtoolkit.
14
20
stabilization ponds, land application systems, [and] sand
filters.” Id. at 1283(f)(2). 17 Further, Congress explicitly
recognized the value of green infrastructure in the CWA
in 2019, amending the Act to direct EPA to “promote the
use of green infrastructure in, and coordinate the
integration of green infrastructure into, permitting and
enforcement under this chapter, planning efforts,
research, technical assistance, and funding guidance.” Id.
at 1377a.
States, too, recognize, encourage, and at times require
the use of green infrastructure. Multiple EPA guidance
documents describe how these practices can be used at the
local level to protect surface waters by treating runoff
through methods including infiltration, storage, filtration,
and evaporation, 18 and many states encourage or require
the use of green infrastructure to meet groundwater
Strong congressional support for innovative technologies is also
apparent in the Senate Committee Report for the 1977
Amendments—specifically, the Committee Report emphasized that
“[t]he committee intends that all of those involved in implementing the
program—the
Environmental
Protection
Agency,
States,
communities, and consulting engineers—redirect the program away
from the conventional collection and secondary treatment approach
and toward the use of alternative technologies, especially those which
rely on natural systems, such as land or lagoons or marshes, in order
to make use of waste waters.” S. REP. NO. 95-370, COMMITTEE ON
ENV. & PUB. WORKS, at *5 (Jul. 19, 1977).
18
See, e.g., EPA’s Green Infrastructure Municipal Handbook (2008),
https://www.epa.gov/green-infrastructure/green-infrastructuremunicipal-handbook; see also EPA’s National Management
Measures Guidance to Control Nonpoint Source Pollution from
Urb an Areas, at Chapter 5 (2005), https://www.epa.gov/
sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/urban_guidance_0.pdf.
17
21
recharge, stormwater runoff quantity, and stormwater
runoff quality standards. 19
In addition to green infrastructure, clean water
agencies also rely on WOTUS exclusions when utilizing
water reuse and recycling practices for aquifer recharge.
During that process, treated water is conveyed
underground to replenish groundwater stored in aquifers
for beneficial purposes, especially to supplement drinking
water supplies. Such recycling projects are engineered,
designed, and operated to treat and attenuate pollutants
and abate their discharge into surface waters.
EPA’s Water Reuse Action Plan (“WRAP”)
acknowledges the important role water reuse and
recycling can play in supplementing drinking water
supplies. 20 Likewise, recycled water can also be reused for
other applications such as irrigation. As EPA’s WRAP
See, e.g., New J ersey Administrative Code, NJ DEP-N.J.A.C.
§ 7.8.1.2 (defining green infrastructure to mean stormwater
management measures “that manage stormwater close to its source
either by . . . infiltration into subsoil, treat[ment] . . . by vegetation or
soil, or stor[age] . . . for reuse”); see also, Boston Zoning Code Art. 32
§ 32-6 (requiring certain development projects in the Groundwater
Conservation Overlay District to “promote infiltration of rainwater
into the ground by capturing within a suitably-designed system a
volume of rainfall on the lot equivalent to no less than 1.0 inches across
. . . that portion of the surface area of the lot to be occupied by the
Proposed Project”).
20
EPA, National Water Reuse Action Plan: Collab orative
Implementation (“WRAP”), EPA 820-R-20-001 (Feb. 2020),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2020-02/documents/nationalwater-reuse-action-plan-collaborative-implementation-version-1.pdf.
In addition, a recent WRAP progress update indicates the specific
accomplishments of the WRAP program, highlighting advance reuse
projects. EPA, National Water Reuse Action Plan: Update on
Collab orative Progress—Year 2 (Mar. 2022), https://www.epa.gov/
system/files/documents/2022-03/wrap-annual-update_2022.pdf.
19
22
explains, such reuse can help reinforce water
sustainability, resilience, and security in communities. 21
E. AGENCY DISCRETION TO EXCLUDE FEATURES
FROM THE WOTUS DEFINITION PROMOTES
INNOVATIVE WATER MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
AND AFFORDABILITY
Preserving Agency flexibility to promulgate and
broadly implement exclusions from the WOTUS definition
is key to fostering innovative water management
strategies. As EPA noted in a recent rulemaking, various
control features “have evolved considerably over the past
several years, and their nomenclature is not consistent,”
so a flexible regulatory approach is essential for
appropriately addressing the “diverse range of
[innovative] features that are currently in place and may
be developed in the future.”22
Arbitrarily limiting exclusions risks omitting critical
components, creating uncertainty based on inconsistent
terminology, and hampering the development and
implementation of new components. By contrast, clear
exclusion of innovative practices from the WOTUS
definition allows for investment in them.
Investments in critical infrastructure, technologies,
and practices by clean water utilities transform the social,
See WRAP at 7. EPA’s WRAP also emphasizes that “[a] central
tenet of water reuse is that the source of water for potential reuse
must be appropriately treated and verified to meet applicable fit-forpurpose specifications to protect public health, the environment, and
any other particular end user needs or quality endpoint.” Ibid.
(emphasis added). Facilitating innovative treatment technologies is
critical to this effort.
22
Proposed Rule, Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,”
84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4192 (Feb. 14, 2019).
21
23
economic, and environmental health of the communities
they serve, but they also require a multi-year planning
horizon dependent on regulatory consistency and
predictability. Appropriate but flexible application of
WOTUS exclusions allow clean water utilities to efficiently
assess federal permitting obligations and develop
infrastructure projects that can meet them in a manner
that minimizes costs and helps keep rates affordable.
24
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should preserve
the CWA’s federal regulatory scheme and its critical
preclusive effect, clarify that groundwater is not a
“navigable water,” and preserve the ability of the
Agencies to foster effective, efficient, and innovative water
management practices through the adoption of regulatory
WOTUS exclusions, consistent with the purposes of the
CWA.
Respectfully submitted,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF CLEAN WATER
AGENCIES
Amanda E. Aspatore
General Counsel
1130 Connecticut Ave.
N.W.
Suite 1050
Washington, DC 20036
(201) 833-2672
June 2022
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
Alexandra Dapolito
Dunn
Thomas C. Jackson
Sarah M. Douglas
700 K St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 639-1324
Stephanie F. Cagniart
98 San Jacinto
Boulevard
Suite 1500
Austin, TX 78701
(512) 322-2537
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.