Respondents Brief — Michael Sackett, et ux., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
Supreme Court briefJun 10, 2022
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No. 21-454
In the Supreme Court of the United States
MICHAEL SACKETT & CHANTELL SACKETT,
PETITIONERS
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS
JEFFREY PRIETO
General Counsel
DIMPLE CHAUDHARY
Deputy General Counsel
SUSANNAH LANDES WEAVER
Associate Deputy General
Counsel
STEVEN NEUGEBOREN
CAROLINE WEHLING
KARYN I.O. WENDELOWSKI
SIMMA ASHER KUPCHAN
Attorneys
Environmental Protection
Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
CARRIE RICCI
General Counsel
CRAIG R. SCHMAUDER
Acting Principal Deputy
General Counsel
ZAHEER TAJANI
Attorney
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310
BRIAN H. FLETCHER
Acting Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
T ODD KIM
Assistant Attorney General
MALCOLM L. STEWART
Deputy Solicitor General
MATTHEW GUARNIERI
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
JENNIFER SCHELLER NEUMANN
BRIAN C. TOTH
ARIEL MOURRAIN
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Ninth Circuit set forth the proper test
for determining whether wetlands are “waters of the
United States” under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
1362(7).
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Opinions below .............................................................................. 1
Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1
Statutes and regulations involved ............................................... 2
Statement ...................................................................................... 2
A. Statutory background............................................... 4
B. The present controversy .......................................... 8
C. Subsequent regulatory developments .................. 12
Summary of argument ............................................................... 14
Argument:
I. The mere presence of a berm or other barrier does
not defeat CWA coverage of an adjacent wetland
that has a significant nexus to a traditional
navigable water .............................................................. 17
A. The “waters of the United States” include
adjacent wetlands .................................................... 19
B. There is no sound basis for imposing
petitioners’ rigid continuous-surfaceconnection requirement .......................................... 25
C. The significant-nexus test is a permissible
basis for identifying adjacent wetlands covered
by the CWA.............................................................. 31
D. The agencies’ understanding of the CWA’s
coverage of adjacent wetlands is entitled to
deference .................................................................. 38
II. Petitioners’ restrictive view of the tributaries
covered by the CWA is not properly before the
Court and lacks merit in any event .............................. 40
A. The Court should not consider petitioners’ new
arguments about covered tributaries.................... 41
B. Petitioners’ new arguments lack merit ................. 42
III. The court of appeals’ judgment should be affirmed... 48
Conclusion ................................................................................... 50
Appendix — Statutory and regulatory provisions ................ 1a
(III)
IV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Page
Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169 (2014) ................ 19
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984).............................................................. 38
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,
451 U.S. 304 (1981).................................................. 2, 4, 5, 48
County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund,
140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020) ......................................................... 36
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control
Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976).................................................. 4, 48
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) .................................................. 38
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481 (1987).............................................................. 32
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ................... 33
NRDC, Inc. v. Callaway,
392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975) ........................................... 6
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) ......... passim
Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41 (2014) ............ 32
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v.
United States Army Corps of Eng’rs,
531 U.S. 159 (2001).....................................7, 8, 26, 27, 28, 33
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) ............................ 32
Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795 (2019) ....................... 22
United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co.,
504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974) ............................................... 6
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) ....................... 38
United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp.,
411 U.S. 655 (1973)................................................................ 4
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
474 U.S. 121 (1985)..................................................... passim
V
Constitution, statutes, and regulations:
Page
U.S. Const. Art. I ................................................................... 38
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. ................................ 2
§ 402 .................................................................................... 5
§ 404 ......................................................................... passim
33 U.S.C. 1251(a) ................................................... 2, 33, 1a
33 U.S.C. 1251(b) ....................................................... 34, 2a
33 U.S.C. 1251 note ........................................................... 5
33 U.S.C. 1252(a) ............................................................. 34
33 U.S.C. 1311(a) ................................................... 5, 36, 3a
33 U.S.C. 1313 .................................................................... 2
33 U.S.C. 1319(a)(3)......................................................... 10
33 U.S.C. 1321 .................................................................... 2
33 U.S.C. 1342 ................................................................ 2, 5
33 U.S.C. 1342(b) ............................................................... 5
33 U.S.C. 1344 ........................................................ 2, 38, 3a
33 U.S.C. 1344(a) ................................................... 5, 37, 3a
33 U.S.C. 1344(e)(1) ............................................... 7, 37, 4a
33 U.S.C. 1344(f )(1)(A) ............................................... 7, 5a
33 U.S.C. 1344(f )(1)(C) ............................................. 43, 6a
33 U.S.C. 1344(g) ......................................................... 5, 7a
33 U.S.C. 1344(g)(1) ........................................ 7, 21, 45, 7a
33 U.S.C. 1361 .................................................................. 38
33 U.S.C. 1362(6) ....................................................... 5, 19a
33 U.S.C. 1362(7) .............................................passim, 19a
33 U.S.C. 1362(12)(A) ................................................ 5, 20a
33 U.S.C. 1377(e) ..................................................... 5, 7, 21
Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217,
91 Stat. 1566 .......................................................................... 6
Sec. 67(b), § 404(e)(1), 91 Stat. 1600 ................................ 7
Sec. 67(b), § 404(f )(1)(A), 91 Stat. 1600 ........................... 7
Sec. 67(b), § 404(g)(1), 91 Stat. 1601 .......................... 7, 23
VI
Statutes and regulations—Continued:
Page
Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816 ............................................................................ 5
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948,
ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155............................................................. 4
Rivers and Harbors Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1899,
ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121............................................................. 4
§ 9, 30 Stat. 1151 ........................................................ 20, 46
§ 10, 30 Stat. 1151 ...................................................... 20, 46
§ 13, 30 Stat. 1152 ............................................................ 47
5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) .................................................................. 36
33 U.S.C. 407 ...................................................................... 4, 47
33 C.F.R. 323.2(d) (1978)............................................... 20, 23a
33 C.F.R. (2008):
Section 328.3(a)(1) ................................................... 8, 24a
Section 328.3(a)(2) ................................................. 45, 24a
Section 328.3(a)(4) ................................................. 45, 24a
Section 328.3(a)(5) ................................................... 8, 24a
Section 328.3(a)(7) ..................................................... 8, 24a
Section 328.3(b).................................................... 8, 30, 25a
Section 328.3(c) .................................................... 8, 20, 35a
33 C.F.R. (2021):
Section 330.1 ...................................................................... 9
Section 330.1(b)................................................................ 37
40 C.F.R. (2008):
Section 230.3(s)(1) ..................................................... 8, 26a
Section 230.3(s)(5) ..................................................... 8, 26a
Section 230.3(s)(7) ..................................................... 8, 26a
Section 230.3(t) .......................................................... 8, 27a
VII
Miscellaneous:
Page
Charles D. Ablard & Brian Boru O’Neill,
Wetland Protection and Section 404 of
the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, 1 Vt. L. Rev. 51 (1976) ........... 47
Black’s Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed. 1968) ........................ 22
123 Cong. Rec. 10,420 (1977) ................................................ 21
123 Cong. Rec. 26,725 (1977) .................................................. 7
T. E. Dahl, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Status and
Trends of Wetlands in the Conterminous United
States 2004 to 2009 (Sept. 2011), https://www.
fws.gov/wetlands/documents/status-and-trends-ofwetlands-in-the-onterminous-united-states2004-to-2009.pdf .................................................................. 19
Development of New Regulations by the Corps
of Engineers, Implementing Section 404:
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Water
Resources of the House Comm. on Public
Works and Transportation, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975) .................................................................... 20
38 Fed. Reg. 13,528 (May 22, 1973) ....................................... 6
39 Fed. Reg. 12,115 (Apr. 3, 1974) ................................... 5, 20
40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 (July 25, 1975) ........................................ 6
42 Fed. Reg. 37,122 (July 19, 1977) ...................... 6, 20, 23, 38
51 Fed. Reg. 41,206 (Nov. 13, 1986) ....................................... 7
80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) ......................... 12, 35, 43
84 Fed. Reg. 56,626 (Oct. 22, 2019) ...................................... 13
85 Fed. Reg. 22,250 (Apr. 21, 2020) ........................... 3, 13, 31
86 Fed. Reg. 69,372 (Dec. 7, 2021) .............................. passim
H.R. 3199, 95th Cong. (1977) .................................................. 7
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 830, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977) .................................................................... 21
H.R. Rep. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) ................... 19
H.R. Rep. No. 1396, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) ................... 6
VIII
Miscellaneous—Continued:
Page
National Research Council, Wetlands: Characteristics and Boundaries (1995), https://nap.
nationalacademies.org/catalog/4766/wetlandscharacteristics-and-boundaries ............................... 3, 20, 30
S. Conf. Rep. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) ............ 19
S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) ................... 4, 34
S. Rep. No. 870, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).................. 7, 21
Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Public Works,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) ................................................ 20
R. Daniel Smith & Charles V. Klimas, Eng’r
Research & Dev. Ctr., A Regional Guidebook
for Applying the Hydrogeomorphic Approach
to Assessing Wetland Functions of Selected Regional Wetland Subclasses, Yazoo Basin, Lower
Mississippi River Alluvial Valley (Apr. 2002),
https://erdc-library.erdc.dren.mil/jspui/
bitstream/11681/6990/1/EL-TR-02-4.pdf ......................... 30
The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language (1975)................................................... 22
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs:
Regulatory Guidance Letter: No. 16-01
(Oct. 2016), https://www.spn. usace.army.
mil/Portals/68/docs/regulatory/resources/
RGL/RGL1601.pdf .................................................... 36
Regulatory Impact Analysis for 2021
Reissuance and Modification of
Nationwide Permits (Jan. 3, 2021),
https://www.regulations.gov/document/
COE-2020-0002-0511 ................................................. 37
IX
Miscellaneous—Continued:
Page
United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Connectivity of Streams & Wetlands to
Downstream Waters: A Review & Synthesis
of the Scientific Evidence (Jan. 2015),
https://ordspub.epa.gov/ords/eims/
eimscomm.getfile?p_download_
id=523020 .......................................................2, 19, 24, 29, 35
United States Environmental Protection Agency &
Dep’t of the Army:
Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Decision in Rapanos v.
United States & Carabell v. United States
(Dec. 2, 2008), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
default/files/2016-02/documents/cwa_
jurisdiction_ following_rapanos120208.pdf ............. 29
Technical Support Document for the Proposed
“Revised Definition of ‘ Waters of the United
States’ ” Rule (Nov. 18, 2021), https://www.
epa.gov/system/files/documents/2021-12/
tsd-proposedrule_508.pdf ....................... 29, 30, 35, 43
Webster’s New International Dictionary of
the English Language:
(2d ed. 1954) ..................................................................... 43
(2d ed. 1958) ..................................................................... 22
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 21-454
MICHAEL SACKETT & CHANTELL SACKETT,
PETITIONERS
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. A1A39) is reported at 8 F.4th 1075. The opinion of the district court (Pet. App. B1-B32) is not published in the
Federal Supplement but is available at 2019 WL
13026870.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
August 16, 2021. The petition for a writ of certiorari
was filed on September 22, 2021. The petition was
granted on January 24, 2022. The jurisdiction of this
Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
(1)
2
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
Pertinent statues and regulations are reprinted in
the appendix to this brief. App., infra, 1a-27a.
STATEMENT
The Clean Water Act (CWA or Act), 33 U.S.C. 1251
et seq., is the preeminent federal law protecting the Nation’s waters. Adopted in 1972, the Act was a “total restructuring” of the prior statutory framework. City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (citation
omitted). In its place, the CWA created a comprehensive scheme to “restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. 1251(a).
A centerpiece of that comprehensive framework is
the term “navigable waters,” which the CWA broadly
defines as “the waters of the United States, including
the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. 1362(7). Waters satisfying that definition are often called “covered” or “jurisdictional” waters because they determine the scope
of the Act’s key programs, including its water-quality
standards, oil-spill prevention program, and permitting
programs regulating the discharge of pollutants. See
33 U.S.C. 1313, 1321, 1342, 1344.
This case concerns the test for determining when
wetlands adjacent to other covered waters are themselves “waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C. 1362(7).
Wetlands, such as swamps, bogs, marshes, and fens, are
“transitional areas between terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems” characterized by sustained inundation or saturation with water. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), Connectivity of Streams & Wetlands to Downstream Waters: A Review & Synthesis of the Scientific
Evidence 2-5 (Jan. 2015) (2015 EPA Report). Wetlands
play a critical role in regulating water quality. Among
3
other things, they provide flood control and trap and filter sediment and other pollutants that would otherwise
be carried into downstream waters. See National Research Council, Wetlands: Characteristics and Boundaries 35, 38 (1995) (NRC Report).
For more than four decades, the expert agencies
charged with administering the Act—the EPA and the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps)—have interpreted the “waters of the United States” to include wetlands adjacent to other covered waters. The agencies
have consistently treated such adjacent wetlands as
covered even if (as is often the case) they are separated
from other covered waters by a natural or artificial barrier like a river berm or a dike. The agencies adhered
to the view that such a barrier does not categorically
preclude jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands even in a
2020 regulation that would have substantially curtailed
the CWA’s coverage in other respects. See 85 Fed. Reg.
22,250, 22,307 (Apr. 21, 2020). And the agencies are currently engaged in a rulemaking that, among other
things, proposes to reaffirm and refine their longstanding definition of covered adjacent wetlands. See 86 Fed.
Reg. 69,372 (Dec. 7, 2021).
Consistent with its longstanding interpretation of
the CWA, the EPA concluded in this case that the wetlands on petitioners’ property near Priest Lake, Idaho,
are covered waters. The wetlands at issue are 30 feet
from a tributary to Priest Lake and just 300 feet from
the lake itself. But petitioners contend that those wetlands are categorically excluded from the CWA’s coverage because they are separated from the adjacent tributary by a barrier—here, a road. That categorical limitation is inconsistent with the CWA’s text, structure,
and history, as well as this Court’s precedent. It would
4
also severely undermine a central component of the
CWA’s comprehensive scheme for protecting the Nation’s waters.
A. Statutory Background
1. Before the CWA, no comprehensive federal law
protected the Nation’s waters from pollution. In the
1890s, Congress had “passed a series of laws that were
later reenacted as the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.”
United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411
U.S. 655, 663 (1973); see Act of Mar. 3, 1899 (RHA), ch.
425, 30 Stat. 1121. The RHA principally focused on navigability, though it also contained a provision, which remains in force, generally prohibiting the discharge of
“refuse matter” into any “navigable water of the United
States” or any “tributary of any navigable water.” 33
U.S.C. 407. In 1948, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), ch. 758, 62 Stat.
1155, which focused on water-quality standards rather
than the conduct of individual polluters. See EPA v.
California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426
U.S. 200, 202-203 (1976).
In 1972, Congress enacted the CWA after concluding
that these prior efforts had been “inadequate in every
vital aspect.” S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7
(1971) (1971 Senate Report). Unlike its predecessors,
the CWA was “not merely another law ‘touching interstate waters.’ ” City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 317 (citation omitted). Instead, the Act was a “ ‘complete rewriting’ ” of existing law, designed to “establish an all-
5
encompassing program of water pollution regulation.”
Id. at 317-318 (citation omitted). 1
The Act’s centerpiece is a prohibition on the unauthorized “discharge of any pollutant.” 33 U.S.C. 1311(a).
The Act defines a “discharge” to include “any addition
of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source.” 33 U.S.C. 1362(12)(A). The term “pollutant”
includes “dredged spoil” and fill material, such as
“rock” and “sand.” 33 U.S.C. 1362(6). And, as noted
above, the Act broadly defines the term “navigable waters” to mean “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. 1362(7).
The CWA establishes two permitting programs for
authorizing discharges. Under Section 404, the Corps
may issue a permit “for the discharge of dredged or fill
material into the navigable waters at specified disposal
sites.” 33 U.S.C. 1344(a). Under Section 402, the EPA
may issue a permit for the discharge of other pollutants,
such as chemical waste or sewage. 33 U.S.C. 1342. The
Act allows States, Tribes, and territories to assume responsibility for those permitting programs in some circumstances. 33 U.S.C. 1342(b), 1344(g), 1377(e).
2. In 1974, the Corps published regulations implementing the Section 404 permitting program. 39 Fed.
Reg. 12,115 (Apr. 3, 1974). In that rulemaking, the Corps
viewed “navigable waters” as a term of art for waters
subject to Congress’s power to regulate interstate channels of commerce, and it construed Section 404 to apply
to the same limited set of waters as a pre-existing permitting program under the RHA. Ibid.; see id. at
The 1972 legislation was styled as an amendment to the FWPCA
and was renamed the Clean Water Act in 1977. See FWPCA
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816; 33 U.S.C.
1251 note.
1
6
12,119. Reviewing courts, Members of Congress, and
the EPA all disagreed with that approach. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d
1317, 1325 (6th Cir. 1974); H.R. Rep. No. 1396, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 23-27 (1974); 38 Fed. Reg. 13,528, 13,529
(May 22, 1973). The Corps ultimately was enjoined to
adopt new regulations recognizing the agency’s “full
regulatory mandate.” NRDC, Inc. v. Callaway, 392
F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).
The Corps then broadened its regulations to assert
Section 404 jurisdiction over “waters that have been
used in the past, are now used, or are susceptible to use”
in interstate or foreign commerce, including waters
“subject to the ebb and flow of the tide,” and their tributaries; interstate waters; certain other intrastate waters; and wetlands “adjacent” to waters within the foregoing categories. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320, 31,324 (July 25,
1975). The Corps defined “adjacent” to mean “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring,” and specified that
“[w]etlands separated from other waters of the United
States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river
berms, beach dunes and the like are ‘adjacent wetlands.’ ” 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,144 (July 19, 1977). The
regulations defined “wetlands” to mean “those areas
that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground
water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support,
and that under normal circumstances do support, a
prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.” Ibid.
In 1977, Congress substantially amended the CWA
while leaving unchanged the definition of “navigable
waters.” See Clean Water Act of 1977 (1977 Act), Pub.
L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566. In the runup to those
amendments, Congress considered proposals to amend
7
Section 404, and debate on those proposals “centered
largely on the issue of wetlands preservation.” Solid
Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. United States Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 170 (2001) (SWANCC )
(citation omitted). The House passed a bill that would
have limited the waters and adjacent wetlands to which
Section 404 applies. H.R. 3199, 95th Cong. § 16 (1977).
Many legislators objected, with one characterizing the
proposed limitation as an “open invitation” to pollute
other wetlands. 123 Cong. Rec. 26,725 (1977) (statement of Sen. Hart); see id. at 26,714-26,716. The Senate
ultimately rejected the proposal. Id. at 26,728; cf.
S. Rep. No. 870, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977) (1977
Senate Report).
Congress instead modified the CWA in other respects while explicitly reaffirming the Act’s coverage of
“adjacent” wetlands. The 1977 Act exempted certain
activities, including many agricultural and silvicultural
activities, from the Section 404 permitting program.
See § 67(b), 91 Stat. 1600 (33 U.S.C. 1344(f )(1)(A)). To
streamline the permitting process, the 1977 Act authorized the Corps to issue “general permits on a State, regional, or nationwide basis.” Ibid. (33 U.S.C. 1344(e)(1)).
And, as particularly relevant here, the 1977 Act established a mechanism for States and Tribes to issue
Section 404 permits for discharges into “navigable
waters”—except for a subset of covered waters, “including wetlands adjacent thereto,” for which the Corps retained exclusive permitting authority. § 67(b), 91 Stat.
1601 (33 U.S.C. 1344(g)(1)); see 33 U.S.C. 1377(e).
3. In 1986, the Corps revised its Section 404 regulations to take account of the 1977 Act and other developments. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,206 (Nov. 13, 1986). The
EPA adopted comparable regulations, and the agencies’
8
parallel regulations persisted in substantially the same
form for the next 30 years, including the period at issue
here. 86 Fed. Reg. at 69,373 & n.5.
Those regulations defined the term “waters of the
United States” to include “[a]ll waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including
all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide” (i.e., traditional navigable waters), and all “[t]ributaries” of such waters. 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(1) and (5)
(2008) (emphasis omitted); see 40 C.F.R. 230.3(s)(1) and
(5) (2008). 2 The regulatory definition also encompassed
“[w]etlands adjacent to” traditional navigable waters or
their tributaries. 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(7) (2008); see 40
C.F.R. 230.3(s)(7) (2008). The regulations contained the
same definitions of “wetlands” and “adjacent” that the
Corps had issued before the 1977 Act. See 33 C.F.R.
328.3(b) and (c) (2008); 40 C.F.R. 230.3(t) (2008).
B. The Present Controversy
1. Petitioners own .63 acres of property near Priest
Lake, “one of the largest lakes in Idaho.” Pet. App. A8.
The parcel is bounded by roads to the north and south.
Ibid. Across the south road is a line of houses fronting
As used in this brief, the term “traditional navigable waters” encompasses wholly intrastate waters used or susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce. Cf. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172 (referring to Congress’s “traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or
had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made”).
Petitioners, by contrast, appear to use the term to refer solely to
waters that themselves cross state lines. See, e.g., Pet. Br. 35
(equating “traditional ‘navigable waters’ ” with three categories of
“interstate waters”) (citation omitted); id. at 43 (distinguishing between “traditional navigable waters” and “intrastate navigable waters”).
2
9
Priest Lake, which is about 300 feet from petitioners’
property. Ibid. Across the north road “lies the Kalispell Bay Fen, a large wetlands complex that drains
into an unnamed tributary” of Kalispell Creek, which in
turn feeds into Priest Lake. Ibid. The unnamed tributary is about 30 feet from petitioners’ property. Id. at
A33. Historically, petitioners’ property was part of the
larger Kalispell Bay Fen complex, which then drained
directly into Priest Lake. J.A. 30-31. Today, petitioners’ property remains connected to the fen and the lake
by “shallow subsurface flow.” J.A. 32, 41.
Petitioners purchased the property in 2004. Pet.
App. A8. Eight years earlier, the Corps had determined
that the property contains wetlands covered by the
CWA. J.A. 10-12. The Corps had provided the thenowner of the property with information on the Corps’
nationwide permits, J.A. 12, which can obviate the need
to obtain a site-specific permit for some activities, including home construction. See 33 C.F.R. 330.1.
In 2007, without a CWA permit, petitioners—who
operated a commercial construction and excavation
business—dumped approximately 1700 cubic yards of
gravel and sand to fill the wetlands and prepare the site
for building. J.A. 19-20, 22-24; Pet. App. A8-A9. In May
2007, EPA and Corps employees inspected petitioners’
property in response to a complaint. J.A. 18. They observed soils, vegetation, and pooling water characteristic of wetlands. J.A. 19, 27-29; see Pet. App. A37-A39
(site-visit photos); J.A. 20-21, 46-50 (same). The EPA
ultimately informed petitioners that the property contains wetlands subject to CWA jurisdiction. J.A. 14.
Petitioners hired their own wetlands consultant, who
confirmed that the “site is part of a wetland.” J.A. 15.
10
In November 2007, the EPA issued an administrative
compliance order concluding that petitioners’ property
contains covered wetlands adjacent to other waters of
the United States and that petitioners had violated the
Act by discharging fill material into the wetlands without a permit. Pet. App. B2, D5-D7; see 33 U.S.C.
1319(a)(3). The order was based in part on the agency’s
finding that the wetlands on petitioners’ property improve Priest Lake’s water quality through sediment retention, contribute base flow to the Lake with beneficial
effects to fisheries, and provide flood control. J.A. 3540. The EPA directed petitioners to remove the fill material and restore the wetlands. Pet. App. D7-D8.
2. In 2008, petitioners brought this action under the
APA to challenge the EPA’s compliance order. Pet.
App. A9. The district court dismissed the complaint,
concluding that the CWA precludes pre-enforcement
judicial review. 2008 WL 3286801, at *2. The court of
appeals affirmed, 622 F.3d 1139, 1147, but this Court
granted certiorari and reversed, 566 U.S. 120, 131.
3. On remand, the district court granted summary
judgment to the EPA. Pet. App. B1-B32. The court first
found that substantial evidence supports the EPA’s determination that petitioners’ property contains “wetlands.” Id. at B18-B21. The court found that the property “was originally part of a large wetland complex
called the Kalispell Bay Fen,” which remains “mainly
undisturbed” across the road to the north. Id. at B20.
The district court also upheld the EPA’s determination that the wetlands on petitioners’ property are “ ‘water[s] of the United States’ ” because they are “adjacent
to a traditional navigable body of water; namely, Priest
Lake.” Pet. App. B21. The court explained that Priest
Lake “has been and is used in interstate commerce” and
11
is therefore a “ ‘traditional navigable water’ ” as defined
in the agencies’ regulations. Id. at B22 (citation omitted). The court also found, as an alternative basis for
upholding the EPA’s determination that the wetlands
on petitioners’ property are covered waters, that the
wetlands are adjacent to the unnamed tributary across
the road to the north, which flows into Kalispell Creek
and, in turn, into Priest Lake. Id. at B25-B30.
4. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. A1-A39.
The court first held that the case was not moot even
though the EPA had withdrawn the compliance order
while the appeal was pending. Id. at A12-A20. The
court then rejected petitioners’ challenge to the order
on the merits. Id. at A22-A36.
Petitioners contended that the EPA’s order was contrary to the CWA’s definition of “navigable waters,” 33
U.S.C. 1362(7), as interpreted by a plurality of this
Court in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
See Pet. App. A20. As relevant here, a four-Justice plurality in Rapanos concluded that wetlands are “covered
by the Act” based on their adjacency to other covered
waters only if the wetlands have “a continuous surface
connection” to those other waters. 547 U.S. at 742. In
a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy set forth an alternative test that focused on whether adjacent wetlands have a “significant nexus” to traditional navigable
waters. Id. at 759 (citation omitted). The four dissenting Justices would have applied a broader test, which
meant that at least five Justices concluded that wetlands may be treated as covered waters if they satisfy
“either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test.” Id. at
810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Here, the court of appeals determined that, under
Ninth Circuit precedent, the CWA covers at least those
12
adjacent wetlands that satisfy Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test. Pet. App. A22-A31. Applying that
test, the court explained that “[t]he record plainly supports EPA’s conclusion that the wetlands on [petitioners’] property are adjacent to a jurisdictional tributary
and that, together with the similarly situated Kalispell
Bay Fen, they have a significant nexus to Priest Lake,
a traditional navigable water.” Id. at A33.
The court of appeals emphasized that the wetlands
are just 30 feet from the unnamed tributary, and that
they are separated from the tributary only by an “artificial barrier[]” (a road), which does “not defeat adjacency.” Pet. App. A33. With respect to the “significant
nexus” requirement, the court found that the EPA had
appropriately analyzed the wetlands on petitioners’
property together with the Kalispell Bay Fen, and that
“[t]he record further supports EPA’s conclusion that
these wetlands, in combination, significantly affect the
integrity of Priest Lake.” Id. at A35. The court noted
that the wetlands “provide important ecological and water quality benefits” to Priest Lake and are “ ‘especially
important in maintaining the high quality of Priest
Lake’s water, fish, and wildlife.’ ” Ibid.
C. Subsequent Regulatory Developments
1. The lower courts decided this case under the regulations in effect when the events at issue occurred.
Pet. App. A6-A7 & n.1, B17 n.3. Between 2015 and 2020,
the EPA and the Corps undertook three significant
rulemakings. In the 2015 Clean Water Rule, the agencies adopted an approach under which some tributaries
and adjacent wetlands were deemed “jurisdictional by
rule,” based on their significant nexus to traditional
navigable waters, interstate waters, or the territorial
seas, without the need for “case-specific analysis.” 80
13
Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,058-37,059 (June 29, 2015). In 2019,
the agencies repealed the Clean Water Rule. 84 Fed.
Reg. 56,626, 56,626 (Oct. 22, 2019).
In the 2020 Navigable Waters Protection Rule
(NWPR), the agencies redefined the term “waters of
the United States.” 85 Fed. Reg. at 22,250. Although
the NWPR was in other respects consistent with the
Rapanos plurality opinion, see id. at 22,273, it departed
from the plurality’s approach to adjacent wetlands. The
NWPR provided that a natural berm or other barrier
does not defeat CWA coverage of an adjacent wetland,
and that an artificial barrier like a levee or a road does
not defeat coverage in certain circumstances, such as
where the wetland is inundated by flooding from a covered water at least once in a typical year. Id. at 22,30722,313, 22,338.
2. As a result of various stays and injunctions, the
Clean Water Rule never fully took effect, and the NWPR
took effect nationwide for only three months. 86 Fed.
Reg. at 69,382 & nn.15-18. The agencies are currently
engaged in another notice-and-comment rulemaking.
The proposed rule, which was published in December
2021, would limit the CWA’s coverage of adjacent wetlands to wetlands that satisfy either the significantnexus test or the continuous-surface-connection test.
Id. at 69,373; see id. at 69,449-69,450. The proposed rule
thus covers a narrower set of wetlands than the 1986
rule in effect when Rapanos was decided and when petitioners’ discharges occurred. That proposed approach
reflects the agencies’ consideration of “the statute as a
whole, the scientific record, relevant Supreme Court
case law, and the agencies’ experience and expertise after more than 30 years of implementing the 1986 regulations.” Id. at 69,374.
14
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. When a wetland is adjacent to another water covered by the CWA, the wetland itself is among the “waters of the United States,” 33 U.S.C. 1362(7), if it satisfies the significant-nexus test in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S.
715 (2006). The mere presence of a berm, levee, or other
similar barrier does not defeat CWA coverage.
A. Statutory text, structure, and history establish
that adjacent wetlands are “waters of the United
States” covered by the CWA. Although the Corps initially took a different view in implementing Section 404,
it quickly reversed course and revised its regulations to
include “adjacent wetlands.” In 1977, Congress approved that approach, amending the Act in a manner
that presupposes that “adjacent” wetlands are covered
“waters.” And in United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), this Court unanimously upheld the Corps’ regulations interpreting the
“waters of the United States” to include adjacent wetlands.
Congress had good reason to include adjacent wetlands in the CWA’s comprehensive scheme. Wetlands
play an essential role in protecting the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of neighboring waterways,
including by filtering pollutants, storing water, and
providing flood control. Leaving those wetlands unprotected would thwart the CWA’s comprehensive scheme
and seriously compromise its protection of traditional
navigable waters.
B. There is no sound basis for requiring that wetlands can be treated as covered waters only if they satisfy a continuous-surface-connection test. The Rapanos
plurality’s rationale for adopting such a test rested
15
largely on a misreading of Riverside Bayview. The plurality’s brief discussion did not otherwise attempt to
ground its continuous-surface-connection test in the
text, history, or purpose of the Act, and those considerations all weigh against foreclosing jurisdiction over
wetlands that are adjacent to other covered waters but
separated by a berm, dike, or other similar barrier.
Treating a continuous-surface-connection test as the
exclusive criterion for CWA coverage would also lead to
arbitrary and illogical results, which is why even the
2020 NWPR rejected that approach.
C. The significant-nexus test, by contrast, ensures
that the CWA covers those adjacent wetlands that significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s traditional navigable waters.
The Act is designed to provide comprehensive protections to traditional navigable waters, which necessitates
regulating the network of wetlands and tributaries that
significantly affect those waters—even in the absence
of a continuous surface connection. The significantnexus test also provides an administrable and nowfamiliar standard, which is soundly based in science and
well within Congress’s constitutional authority.
D. This Court has held that the agencies’ interpretations of the CWA are entitled to deference, and the
Chief Justice’s Rapanos concurrence emphasized that
the agencies could have “avoided” the result in those
consolidated cases through notice-and-comment rulemaking. 547 U.S. at 758. The agencies are following
that course here and have issued a proposed rule refining their longstanding view of the CWA’s coverage of
adjacent wetlands.
II. In addition to proposing a continuous-surfaceconnection test for adjacent wetlands, petitioners now
16
assert that this Court should drastically restrict the
tributaries covered by the CWA. Those arguments are
not properly before the Court and lack merit in any
event.
A. Petitioners’ new arguments about tributaries
contradict their assurance at the certiorari stage that
they were not challenging the jurisdictional status of
the tributary at issue here. And even if petitioners had
not explicitly disclaimed the issue, it still would not be
properly presented because it makes no difference to
the disposition of this case.
B. If the Court considers petitioners’ new arguments, it should reject them. Petitioners’ proposed limitations contradict the text, structure, and history of the
CWA. Indeed, petitioners’ reading would thwart the
Act’s fundamental design by giving it a narrower scope
than even the 1899 RHA.
First, petitioners’ proposed exclusion of artificial
tributaries is unsound. The text of the Act expressly
contemplates that drainage ditches may be covered waters; the distinction between natural and artificial tributaries has no bearing on whether a tributary can carry
water and pollutants into traditional navigable waters;
and the Rapanos plurality indicated that the artificial
drainage ditches at issue there would be covered tributaries as long as they contained relatively permanent
flows of water (as the tributary here undisputedly does).
Second, petitioners’ proposal to exclude all nonnavigable tributaries from the Act’s coverage would
radically depart from the way the statute has been understood for decades and would contradict the views of
all nine Justices in Rapanos. Congress deliberately
omitted the modifier “navigable” from the CWA’s definition of covered waters precisely because it intended
17
to extend the Act beyond the waters covered by prior
statutes keyed to navigability.
III. This Court should affirm the judgment of the
court of appeals. That court correctly applied the
significant-nexus test in upholding the EPA’s determination that the wetlands on petitioners’ property, which
are located 30 feet from a tributary of Priest Lake and
300 feet from the Lake itself, are covered waters. The
wetlands were historically part of a larger complex of
wetlands from which water flowed directly into the
Lake, and shallow subsurface flow remains. Taken as a
whole, the wetland complex significantly affects the integrity of the Lake, including its water quality. Excluding such wetlands from the CWA’s coverage would severely compromise the Act’s protection of the Nation’s
navigable waters.
ARGUMENT
I. THE MERE PRESENCE OF A BERM OR OTHER BARRIER DOES NOT DEFEAT CWA COVERAGE OF AN
ADJACENT WETLAND THAT HAS A SIGNIFICANT
NEXUS TO A TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATER
Petitioners do not dispute that at least some wetlands adjacent to other covered waters are covered by
the CWA. Rather, the parties’ disagreement concerns
the criteria used to determine which wetlands are sufficiently connected to other covered waters to come
within the “waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C.
1362(7). Petitioners assert that a restrictive version of
the “continuous surface connection” test articulated by
the plurality in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715
(2006), is the exclusive basis for CWA coverage of wetlands. That rigid approach has no grounding in the
CWA’s text, structure, or history. It would upend an
understanding of the Act’s coverage that has prevailed
18
for nearly half a century. And it would seriously compromise the Act’s comprehensive scheme by denying
protection to many adjacent wetlands—and thus the
covered waters with which those wetlands are inextricably linked.
Petitioners’ approach would also make the Act’s central jurisdictional provision turn on arbitrary and shifting distinctions. A small surface connection would suffice, but the presence of a berm would defeat coverage
despite a pervasive hydrological connection between a
waterway and an adjacent wetland. Building a levee to
protect a river and its adjacent wetlands could strip the
wetlands of CWA coverage. A natural river berm could
defeat coverage even though its very existence was a
result of floods reflecting the close connection between
the river and the neighboring wetlands. And the Act’s
coverage could come and go as floods or storms created
or breached natural barriers like berms and dunes.
This Court should reject petitioners’ restrictive test.
A continuous surface connection to a covered water is
certainly a permissible basis for CWA coverage of wetlands. But it has never been—and should not become—
the only basis. Rather, CWA coverage of wetlands can
also be established under Justice Kennedy’s significantnexus test, as it was in this case.
19
A. The “Waters Of The United States” Include Adjacent
Wetlands
As in answering any other question of statutory interpretation, the Court should interpret the CWA’s text
“with reference to the statutory context, ‘structure, history, and purpose.’ ” Abramski v. United States, 573
U.S. 169, 179 (2014) (citation omitted). All of those interpretive tools, as well as this Court’s precedent, establish that the waters covered by the CWA include adjacent wetlands—even if those wetlands are separated
by a berm or other barrier.
1. Although the CWA applies to “navigable waters,”
Congress broadly defined that term to include “the waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C. 1362(7). The
breadth of that definition reflected a deliberate choice.
The relevant House bill would have defined “navigable
waters” as the “navigable waters of the United States,
including the territorial seas.” H.R. Rep. No. 911, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 356 (1972) (emphasis omitted). But in
conference the word “navigable” was deleted from that
definition, and the conference report urged that the
term “be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation.” S. Conf. Rep. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 144 (1972).
The CWA’s broad definition is naturally read to encompass wetlands. Wetlands, such as swamps, bogs,
marshes, and fens, are “transitional areas between terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems.” 2015 EPA Report 25. The presence of water is “universally regarded as the
most basic feature of wetlands.” T. E. Dahl, U.S. Fish
& Wildlife Serv., Status and Trends of Wetlands in the
Conterminous United States 2004 to 2009, at 20 (Sept.
2011). Indeed, the “essential characteristic[]” of a wetland is “recurrent, sustained inundation or saturation at
20
or near the surface.” NRC Report 3 (emphases omitted).
After the CWA’s enactment, the Corps initially excluded most wetlands from the Section 404 permitting
program by taking the position that the program applied only to the waters covered by Sections 9 and 10 of
the Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA). The Corps’ initial
view was premised on prior uses of “navigable waters”
as a term of art for waters that Congress may regulate
as channels of interstate commerce. 39 Fed. Reg. at
12,115. That view was roundly criticized as failing to
reflect the full scope of the CWA, and the Corps quickly
adopted a broader definition of “waters of the United
States” that encompassed wetlands adjacent to other
covered waters. See pp. 5-6, supra.
The Corps defined “adjacent” to mean “bordering,
contiguous, or neighboring,” and it has adhered to that
definition since 1977. 42 Fed. Reg. at 37,144; see 33
C.F.R. 328.3(c) (2008). That definition does not require
that the wetlands directly abut another covered water.
To the contrary, the 1977 regulations explicitly provided that “[w]etlands separated from other waters of
the United States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like are ‘adjacent
wetlands.’ ” 33 C.F.R. 323.2(d) (1978); see 33 C.F.R.
328.3(c) (2008) (same).
2. The Corps’ revised regulations—and specifically
the CWA’s application to adjacent wetlands—were the
subject of extensive congressional hearings. See, e.g.,
Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Public Works, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 38-44, 6869, 239, 325-326 (1976); Development of New Regulations by the Corps of Engineers, Implementing Section
21
404: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works and
Transportation, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7, 10, 31 (1975).
The House then passed a bill that would have limited
Section 404 to a subset of traditional navigable waters
and wetlands adjacent to them, but the Senate rejected
that proposal. See 123 Cong. Rec. 10,420-10,421, 10,434,
26,728 (1977).
Congress instead modified Section 404 in a way that
incorporated into the statutory text an explicit endorsement of the Corps’ inclusion of adjacent wetlands. 1977
Act § 67(b), 91 Stat. 1601. That amendment authorizes
States and Tribes to administer the Section 404 permitting program covering “the discharge of dredged or fill
material into the navigable waters (other than those waters which are presently used, or are susceptible to use
in their natural condition or by reasonable improvement
as a means to transport interstate or foreign commerce
* * * including wetlands adjacent thereto).” 33 U.S.C.
1344(g)(1) (emphases added); see 33 U.S.C. 1377(e) (extension to Tribes).
The italicized reservation of authority to the Corps
presupposed that “wetlands adjacent” to traditional
navigable waters were subject to the Section 404 program, since otherwise the exclusion of those wetlands
from the States’ and Tribes’ potential permitting authority would have been superfluous. The 1977 legislative record confirms that understanding. See 1977 Senate Report 10 (stating that committee wished to “maintain[]” coverage of wetlands); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 830,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 98, 104 (1977) (stating that the
Corps will “continue” to exercise Section 404 jurisdiction over “adjacent wetlands”).
22
By using the pre-existing regulatory term “adjacent” wetlands, Congress signaled its intent to incorporate the Corps’ regulatory conception of adjacency.
“When a statutory term is ‘obviously transplanted from
another legal source,’ it ‘brings the old soil with it.’ ”
Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019) (citation omitted). Here, that soil includes the Corps’ specification that a berm or barrier does not defeat adjacency. And that specification also accords with the
term’s plain meaning. One would naturally describe a
marsh as “adjacent” to a stream even if they were separated by a berm or levee. Contemporaneous dictionaries likewise defined the term “adjacent” in ways that
do not require direct abutment. See Black’s Law Dictionary 62 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (“Lying near or close to;
sometimes, contiguous; neighboring. Adjacent implies
that the two objects are not widely separated, though
they may not actually touch[.]”) (capitalization altered;
citation and emphasis omitted); The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 16 (1975) (“Close
to; next to; lying near; adjoining.”); Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language 32 (2d
ed. 1958) (“Lying near, close, or contiguous; neighboring; bordering on.”) (emphasis omitted).
3. In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), this Court considered the “language, policies, and history” of the CWA, including the
amendments in the 1977 Act, and unanimously upheld
the Corps’ exercise of CWA jurisdiction over adjacent
wetlands. Id. at 139. The Court held that the Corps’
regulation defining “the waters of the United States” to
include wetlands adjacent to navigable waters “is valid
as a construction” of the Act. Id. at 131.
23
The Court first observed that “between open waters
and dry land may lie shallows, marshes, mudflats,
swamps, bogs—in short, a huge array of areas that are
not wholly aquatic but nevertheless fall far short of being dry land.” Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132. To
administer the statute, the Corps therefore “must necessarily choose some point at which water ends and land
begins.” Ibid. The Court further explained that, in
drawing that jurisdictional line, the Corps may take into
account “the evident breadth of congressional concern
for protection of water quality and aquatic ecosystems.”
Id. at 133. It quoted with apparent approval the Corps’
statement that “Federal jurisdiction under Section 404
must include any adjacent wetlands that form the border of or are in reasonable proximity to other waters of
the United States, as these wetlands are part of this
aquatic system.” Id. at 134 (quoting 42 Fed. Reg. at
37,128). The Court concluded that “the Corps’ ecological judgment about the relationship between waters and
their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate basis for
a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined
as waters under the Act.” Ibid.
The Court also viewed the 1977 Act as approving the
Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands.
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 137-139. The Court observed that “the scope of the Corps’ asserted jurisdiction over wetlands was specifically brought to Congress’
attention, and Congress rejected measures designed to
curb the Corps’ jurisdiction in large part because of its
concern that protection of wetlands would be unduly
hampered by a narrowed definition of ‘navigable waters.’ ” Id. at 137. The Court also cited Section 404(g)(1)
as express textual evidence “that the term ‘waters’ included adjacent wetlands.” Id. at 138.
24
4. Congress had good reason to approve the inclusion of adjacent wetlands within the “waters of the
United States.” Wetlands affect “the chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of downstream waters by
performing essential water-quality functions, “including interruption and delay of the transport of waterborne contaminants over long distances; retention of
sediment; retention and slow release of flood waters;
and prevention and mitigation of drinking water contamination.” 86 Fed. Reg. at 69,392; see 2015 EPA Report ES-3 (explaining that wetlands “improve water
quality through the assimilation, transformation, or sequestration of pollutants, including excess nutrients
and chemical contaminants such as pesticides and metals”). Allowing wetlands to be filled without any permitting requirement would deprive interconnected
aquatic systems of those benefits and thereby threaten
the integrity of traditional navigable waters.
The same reasoning applies with full force when an
adjacent wetland is separated from the neighboring waters by a berm or barrier. Adjacent wetlands behind
berms can serve important water-quality functions, filtering pollutants and sediment before they reach downstream waters, and can help reduce the impacts of
storm surges caused by hurricanes. 86 Fed. Reg. at
69,429. Whether natural or manmade, “berms, dikes,
and similar features * * * typically do not block all water flow,” since water can “overtop” or flow beneath
them. Id. at 69,421, 69,429. And “filling in wetlands
separated from another water by a berm can mean that
floodwater, impurities, or runoff that would have been
stored or contained in the wetlands will instead flow out
to major waterways.” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 775 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
25
B. There Is No Sound Basis For Imposing Petitioners’
Rigid Continuous-Surface-Connection Requirement
Petitioners urge the Court to adopt, as the exclusive
basis for CWA coverage of wetlands, a version of the
continuous-surface-connection test advocated by the
Rapanos plurality. But the plurality’s justifications for
that test are unpersuasive. And like the plurality, petitioners fail to acknowledge or justify the anomalous results that their rigid requirement would produce.
1. In concluding that only wetlands with a continuous surface connection to other covered waters are protected by the CWA, the Rapanos plurality relied primarily on two related propositions that it viewed as implicit in Riverside Bayview. First, the plurality suggested that the CWA term “waters” cannot reasonably
be construed to cover wetlands as such, and that discharges into wetlands therefore can be regulated only
when particular wetlands are properly deemed part of
other waters to which they are adjacent. See 547 U.S.
at 740. Second, the plurality concluded that this requirement will be satisfied only when “the wetland has
a continuous surface connection with [the adjacent] water.” Id. at 742. Those propositions are unsound and
rest on a misreading of Riverside Bayview.
a. The Rapanos plurality quoted the Riverside
Bayview Court’s statement that, “[o]n a purely linguistic level, it may appear unreasonable to classify ‘lands,’
wet or otherwise, as ‘waters.’ ” 547 U.S. at 740 (quoting
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132). In the next sentence of its opinion, however, the Riverside Bayview
Court stated that “[s]uch a simplistic response * * *
does justice neither to the problem faced by the Corps
in defining the scope of its authority under § 404(a) nor
to the realities of the problem of water pollution that the
26
[CWA] was intended to combat.” 474 U.S. at 132. The
Court concluded that “adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters under the Act.” Id. at 134. And, as explained above, the CWA’s text, history, and purpose
likewise confirm that adjacent wetlands are themselves
“waters” covered by the Act. See pp. 19-24, supra.
b. The Rapanos plurality read Riverside Bayview
as resting on the “inherent ambiguity in drawing the
boundaries of any ‘waters.’ ” 547 U.S. at 740. The plurality also described Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), as having read Riverside
Bayview to be “refer[ring] to the close connection between waters and the wetlands that they gradually
blend into.” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 741. The plurality
concluded that “only those wetlands with a continuous
surface connection to bodies that are ‘waters of the
United States’ in their own right” can be protected by
the CWA, because only in that circumstance is it “difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.” Id. at 742.
The Rapanos plurality misconceived the nature of
the line-drawing problem in Riverside Bayview. The
Court in that case identified “shallows, marshes, mudflats, swamps, [and] bogs” as examples of “areas that
are not wholly aquatic but nevertheless fall far short of
being dry land,” and it observed that “[w]here on this
continuum to find the limit of ‘waters’ is far from obvious.” 474 U.S. at 132. The line-drawing problem in Riverside Bayview thus did not involve identifying the
outer boundary of a covered water at a particular site.
Rather, it involved the criteria that should be used to
determine whether particular types of hydrogeographic
features should be regarded as “waters” under the Act.
27
That line-drawing problem—in essence, determining
how wet is wet enough—can arise even when a particular swamp or marsh is separated by a barrier from a
nearby lake or stream. After discussing at some length
the regulatory definition of “wetlands” and its application to the property at issue in that case, see id. at 129131, the Riverside Bayview Court upheld as reasonable
“the Corps’ approach of defining adjacent wetlands as
‘waters’ within the meaning of ” the CWA, id. at 132.
2. As further support for its continuous-surface-connection test, the Rapanos plurality invoked SWANCC’s
holding that certain isolated ponds were not covered by
the CWA. The SWANCC Court had described Riverside Bayview as resting on “the significant nexus between the wetlands and” the adjacent waters. 531 U.S.
at 167. The Rapanos plurality in turn described
SWANCC as “reject[ing] the notion that the ecological
considerations upon which the Corps relied in Riverside
Bayview * * * provided an independent basis for including entities like ‘wetlands’ * * * within the phrase
‘the waters of the United States.’ ” 547 U.S. at 741 (citation omitted). In the plurality’s view, “SWANCC
found such ecological considerations irrelevant to the
question whether physically isolated waters come
within the Corps’ jurisdiction,” because the coverage inquiry for the “[i]solated ponds” at issue in that case
“presented no boundary-drawing problem that would
have justified the invocation of ecological factors.” Id.
at 741-742.
Contrary to the Rapanos plurality’s suggestion, the
Court in SWANCC did not hold that the particular
“ecological considerations upon which the Corps relied
in Riverside Bayview,” 547 U.S. at 741—i.e., the potential importance of wetlands to the quality of adjacent
28
waters—were irrelevant to CWA jurisdiction. Rather,
the Court held that a different ecological concern,
namely the potential use of the isolated ponds as habitat
for migratory birds, could not justify treating those
ponds as “waters of the United States.” See 531 U.S. at
164-165, 171-172. That ecological concern was not cognizable because it was unrelated to “what Congress had
in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been
navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made.”
Id. at 172. Here, by contrast, as in Riverside Bayview,
the government seeks to protect adjacent wetlands
based on their importance to the integrity of traditional
navigable waters nearby.
3. Aside from its mistaken reliance on Riverside
Bayview and SWANCC, the Rapanos plurality did not
attempt to ground the continuous-surface-connection
test in the CWA’s text or history. See 547 U.S. at 739742. And making a continuous surface connection a necessary condition for CWA coverage would affirmatively
undermine the Act’s purpose by creating an illogical jurisdictional gap. It would include any wetland with a
continuous surface connection, no matter how small.
But it would categorically exclude wetlands separated
from covered waters by a berm, dike, sand dune, or
other natural or manmade barrier, even if they are
closely connected by subsurface flow or periodic
floods—and regardless of such wetlands’ ecological importance to covered waters nearby and downstream.
“[O]verwhelming” scientific evidence shows that such
wetlands may significantly affect downstream waters.
86 Fed. Reg. at 69,398 (discussing the evidence that
wetlands lacking a continuous surface connection may
nonetheless “improv[e] water quality” downstream)
29
(citing 2015 EPA Report 4-20 to 4-38); see EPA &
Corps, Technical Support Document for the Proposed
“Revised Definition of ‘Waters of the United States’ ”
Rule 179-189 (Nov. 18, 2021) (Technical Support Document).
4. The continuous-surface-connection test was not
briefed in Rapanos. See 547 U.S. at 800 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). And the plurality’s terse discussion of the
issue did not elaborate on that test in any detail: The
plurality distinguished a “continuous surface connection” from “an intermittent, physically remote hydrological connection,” but gave little further guidance on
the application of its test. Id. at 742 (plurality opinion).
That has not posed difficulties so long as the continuoussurface-connection test has been understood as a sufficient but not necessary condition for CWA coverage.
But if this Court made it the exclusive test, it would produce a host of thorny questions and potentially arbitrary results.
Petitioners, for example, repeatedly describe the Rapanos plurality’s test as requiring a “continuous surfacewater connection.” Pet. Br. 6 (emphasis added); see id.
at 8, 17, 21-22, 25. That formulation appears in Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Rapanos, see 547 U.S.
at 774, but not in the plurality opinion itself. The plurality opinion instead refers interchangeably to a “continuous surface connection” and a “continuous physical
connection.” Id. at 742, 751 n.13, 757. The agencies
have determined that a continuous surface connection
can be present when a wetland directly abuts another
covered water, even if surface water is not continuously
present between the two. See EPA & Corps, Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following the U.S. Supreme
30
Court’s Decision in Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States 7 & n.28 (Dec. 2, 2008) (Rapanos
Guidance). Petitioners’ demand for a continuous surface water connection would effectively limit CWA protection of wetlands to areas that are inundated throughout the year. But many wetlands have surface water
only seasonally or intermittently, and no scientific or
regulatory definition of wetlands demands year-round
surface water. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. 328.3(b) (2008); NRC
Report 3-5.
The continuous-surface-connection test would also
exclude jurisdiction and allow filling of wetlands that
are adjacent to a river but separated from it by a levee.
The Mississippi River, for example, features an extensive levee system built to prevent flooding. The Upper
Mississippi Valley alone includes more than 10,000
miles of levees. Technical Support Document 180.
Those levees would preclude CWA coverage under the
continuous-surface-connection test even though adjacent wetlands are often a necessary part of the floodcontrol project—detaining floodwaters to protect surrounding and downstream communities—and even
though the wetlands maintain a hydrologic connection
to the river system. Cf. R. Daniel Smith & Charles V.
Klimas, Eng’r Research & Dev. Ctr., A Regional Guidebook for Applying the Hydrogeomorphic Approach to
Assessing Wetland Functions of Selected Regional
Wetland Subclasses, Yazoo Basin, Lower Mississippi
River Alluvial Valley 47 (Apr. 2002).
More broadly, a continuous-surface-connection requirement could make loss of CWA jurisdiction a consequence of building a road, levee, or other barrier—even
if the construction had little or no effect on the interde-
31
pendent relationship between a wetland and a neighboring water. That could create perverse incentives to
build or modify such barriers in a manner aimed either
at destroying or preserving federal jurisdiction.
A continuous-surface-connection test would also
yield vexing problems as applied to natural barriers like
“berms, banks, or dunes.” 85 Fed. Reg. at 22,307. As
the agencies explained in the 2020 NWPR, those “natural separations” are themselves “evidence of a dynamic
and regular direct hydrological surface connection,”
ibid., and are thus evidence that the wetlands are “inseparably bound up with” the adjacent waters, id. at
22,311. A “natural river berm,” for example, “can be
created by repeated flooding and sedimentation events
when a river overtops its banks and deposits sediment
between the river and a wetland.” Ibid. For precisely
that reason, the 2020 NWPR “maintain[ed] jurisdiction” over adjacent wetlands separated by natural barriers even as it followed the Rapanos plurality in other
respects. Id. at 22,307. Any other rule would mean that
CWA jurisdiction would appear and disappear as floods,
storms, erosion, and other natural processes created or
breached river berms and other barriers. Under a
strict reading of petitioners’ test, even a beaver dam
built between a wetland and a covered water could sever
jurisdiction over the wetland.
C. The Significant-Nexus Test Is A Permissible Basis For
Identifying Adjacent Wetlands Covered By The CWA
The CWA’s broad term “waters of the United
States” and the included concept of adjacent wetlands
are not self-defining and require administrative or judicial construction. Any viable construction must be
consistent with the Act’s text, structure, and purpose;
must comport with this Court’s precedent; and must not
32
rely on arbitrary, unreasonable, or unworkable lines. A
continuous-surface-connection test alone does not satisfy that standard, but Justice Kennedy’s significantnexus test does. Under that test, adjacent wetlands are
covered by the Act if they “possess a ‘significant nexus’
to” traditional navigable waters. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at
759 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation
omitted). And wetlands “possess the requisite nexus,
and thus come within the statutory phrase ‘navigable
waters,’ if the wetlands, either alone or in combination
with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly
affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
other covered waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’ ” Id. at 780. Petitioners’ various criticisms (Br.
45-49) of that test lack merit.
1. The significant-nexus test responds to the fact
that the crucial CWA language is “Janus-faced,” with
two parts pointing in potentially different directions.
Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 57 (2014)
(plurality opinion). On the one hand, the text of the
definition—“the waters of the United States, including
the territorial seas,” 33 U.S.C. 1362(7)—is broad and
unqualified. That definition could be read literally to
refer to all water bodies within the United States. Cf.
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 492
(1987) (stating that the Act applies to “virtually all bodies of water”). Under that reading, the statute’s coverage would be limited only by the outer bounds of Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce.
On the other hand, the term being defined (“navigable waters”) had been used in prior laws with a more
limited reach. When “a statute includes an explicit definition,” a court “must follow that definition.” Stenberg
v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000). But the term being
33
defined nonetheless may shed light on how the definition is best read. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States,
559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). Thus, in SWANCC the Court
observed that the “term ‘navigable’ has at least the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navigable in fact
or which could reasonably be so made.” 531 U.S. at 172;
see pp. 27-28, supra (discussing SWANCC ). Although
SWANCC did not involve wetlands, the Court’s reasoning indicates that CWA coverage of wetlands is warranted to the extent, but only to the extent, such coverage will further the Act’s overarching purpose of protecting traditional navigable waters.
The significant-nexus test reasonably implements
that understanding of the CWA’s text and design. It
recognizes both that protection of traditional navigable
waters is the ultimate objective of the CWA’s discharge
prohibition and that the protection of such waters requires restrictions on discharges into additional waters
as well. A “significant nexus” is a shorthand description
of adjacent wetlands that “significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of traditional
navigable waters. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780-781 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). That standard is
grounded in Congress’s stated intent to “restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the Nation’s waters.” Id. at 759 (quoting 33 U.S.C.
1251(a)).
Riverside Bayview strongly supports that approach.
There, the Court recognized that, in determining
whether wetlands are appropriately treated as “waters”
under the CWA, the Corps could take account of “the
problem of water pollution that the [Act] was intended
34
to combat.” 474 U.S. at 132. The Court identified “the
evident breadth of congressional concern for protection
of water quality and aquatic ecosystems” as a principal
factor supporting the Corps’ decision “to interpret the
term ‘waters’ to encompass wetlands adjacent to waters
as more conventionally defined.” Id. at 133. And the
Court recognized that, in determining the proper characterization of hydrogeographic features that differ
substantially both from paradigmatic “waters” (e.g.,
lakes and streams) and from dry land, the agencies can
take into account the statutory purpose—ensuring adequate protection for traditional navigable waters—for
which that determination is being made. Id. at 134.
That reasoning strongly suggests that a “significant
nexus” to a traditional navigable water is a sufficient
basis for CWA coverage of a wetland.
2. Petitioners argue (Br. 46) that the significantnexus test gives undue weight to protection of water
quality at the expense of other objectives, including preserving “the primary responsibilities” of States in controlling pollution, 33 U.S.C. 1251(b). But restoring and
maintaining the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters is the CWA’s primary goal,
set forth in the first words of the first section of the statute. And the statute is designed to address that objective through a “comprehensive” federal program of pollution control. 33 U.S.C. 1252(a).
Achievement of Congress’s purposes requires regulation of discharges both into traditional navigable waters and into other waters whose “interconnection[s]”
with traditional navigable waters make them an appropriate subject of federal concern. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at
780 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see 1971
35
Senate Report at 77 (noting that “[w]ater moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source”) (quoted in Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133). Federal protection of
the Chesapeake Bay, for example, would be fundamentally incomplete and ineffectual if polluters could dump
fill into the interconnected network of adjacent wetlands in the same watershed. The significant-nexus test
identifies those wetlands that implicate the CWA’s core
concern of safeguarding traditional navigable waters.
The significant-nexus test also respects the role of
States and Tribes by limiting the Act’s coverage to wetlands and other waters that “significantly affect the integrity of waters where the federal interest is indisputable,” such as traditional navigable waters and the territorial seas, while leaving other “[w]aters that do not
implicate” such a federal interest “entirely to state and
tribal protection and management.” 86 Fed. Reg. at
69,399-69,400.
3. Petitioners are wrong to assert that the significant-nexus test is “ ‘opaque’ ” or produces “illogical” results. Pet. Br. 46-47 (citation omitted). In fact, application of the test reflects the empirical judgments that scientists routinely make. In 2015, the EPA produced an
exhaustive “peer-reviewed compilation and analysis” of
the “current scientific understanding of the connectivity of and mechanisms by which streams and wetlands,
singly or in combination, affect the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of downstream waters.” 80 Fed.
Reg. at 37,061-37,062. That report explains the basic
science behind evaluating the degree of connection that
wetlands and other waters have with downstream waters, as well as the associated effects of those connections. 2015 EPA Report ES-4; see Technical Support
36
Document 62-89. Whether the significant-nexus test is
satisfied in a particular case is “not a purely scientific
determination.” 86 Fed. Reg. at 69,390. But the test is
built on scientific and measurable concepts, and the
agencies’ application of it in a given case is subject to
judicial review. See 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A).
Petitioners’ amici assert that the continuous-surfaceconnection test is easier to apply than the significantnexus test. E.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. Br. 17-21. But a
continuous-surface-connection test would yield hard
questions of its own. See pp. 29-31, supra. And any
greater simplicity offered by the continuous-surfaceconnection test would come at the expense of arbitrariness and a profound mismatch with the CWA’s design.
Cf. County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct.
1462, 1470, 1476 (2020) (rejecting similar arguments
about a need for bright-line certainty in favor of a factspecific test). The significant-nexus test is administrable, and the agencies now have “over a decade of nationwide experience” with it. 86 Fed. Reg. at 69,405. And
individuals uncertain about the status of wetlands on
their property may obtain, at no cost to them, a jurisdictional determination from the Corps. See Corps, Regulatory Guidance Letter: No. 16-01, at 1-2 (Oct. 2016).
Moreover, a finding of CWA jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands means only that unauthorized discharges
into the wetlands are prohibited. See 33 U.S.C. 1311(a);
cf. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 135 n.9. The Corps
may grant a permit to authorize the discharge of
dredged or fill material into covered wetlands and other
waters, and its nationwide-permitting program, including for residential developments, provides a streamlined and cost-efficient way for individuals and businesses to undertake dredge and fill activities that will
37
have only minimal adverse environmental effects. 33
U.S.C. 1344(a) and (e)(1); see 33 C.F.R. 330.1(b).
Repeating certain cost estimates cited by the Rapanos plurality, 547 U.S. at 721, petitioners assert (Br.
10) that the Section 404 permitting process is cumbersome or expensive. Those figures are overstated. The
vast majority of Section 404 authorizations occur under
the Corps’ streamlined general permits, rather than
site-specific permits. See Corps, Regulatory Impact
Analysis for 2021 Reissuance and Modification of Nationwide Permits 10 (Jan. 3, 2021). Many general permits allow project proponents to discharge pollutants
without submitting any application to the Corps. Id. at
9. Even for those general permits that require advance
notice to the agency, the average processing time for
applications is less than two months. Id. at 11. The
Corps estimates that the total Section 404 permitting
cost for a typical project covered by a nationwide permit
requiring advance notice varies from about $4400 to
$14,700. Id. at 25. Those costs to individual dischargers
are far outweighed by the public benefits that result
from the CWA’s protection of wetlands. See 86 Fed.
Reg. at 69,446.
4. Finally, a principal advantage of the significantnexus test is that it focuses directly and specifically on
protecting traditional navigable waters, which is the ultimate justification for the CWA’s discharge prohibition. Other aspects of the jurisdictional inquiry, such as
the determination whether a wetland is adjacent to another covered water, are useful but inexact proxies for
importance to the larger aquatic environment. But an
affirmative finding under the significant-nexus test is
by definition a finding that Congress’s core purpose is
implicated.
38
Petitioners’ constitutional concerns (Br. 47-48) are
therefore insubstantial. By design, the significantnexus test permits jurisdiction over wetlands only if
they significantly affect the waters over which Congress has unquestioned Article I authority. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995); Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452
U.S. 264, 282 (1981). Indeed, although petitioners advocate a highly restrictive view of the CWA’s coverage,
they (a) recognize that “Congress’s power over the
channels of interstate commerce authorizes federal regulation of ” activities that do not occur on traditional
navigable waters “but nonetheless affect[] them” (Pet.
Br. 35), and (b) construe the CWA’s text as manifesting
Congress’s “desire to go to the full extent of the channels of commerce power” (id. at 44). Taken together,
those propositions further confirm that the CWA protects wetlands with a “significant nexus” to traditional
navigable waters.
D. The Agencies’ Understanding Of The CWA’s Coverage
Of Adjacent Wetlands Is Entitled To Deference
Congress entrusted the administration of the CWA
to the Corps and the EPA, and it authorized both agencies to issue regulations implementing the Act. See 33
U.S.C. 1344, 1361. Since before the 1977 Act, the agencies’ regulations have construed the CWA to cover wetlands (like the ones at issue here) that are adjacent to,
but do not directly abut, a tributary of a traditional navigable water. See 42 Fed. Reg. at 37,144; p. 20, supra.
In upholding that interpretation of the Act, the Court in
Riverside Bayview held that the agencies’ interpretation warrants deference so long as it is “reasonable.”
474 U.S. at 131 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC,
39
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-845 (1984)). Petitioners do not
ask this Court to revisit that approach here.
In Rapanos, the Chief Justice likewise explained
that, given the “broad, somewhat ambiguous, but nonetheless clearly limiting terms Congress employed in the
Clean Water Act, the Corps and the EPA would have
enjoyed plenty of room to operate” if they had addressed the relevant questions through rulemaking.
547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). But the
Chief Justice observed that the agencies had failed to
complete a notice-and-comment rulemaking after this
Court’s decision in SWANCC. Ibid. And he emphasized
that the agency could have “avoided” the result in Rapanos had it responded to the SWANCC decision by
identifying additional jurisdictional limitations by regulation.
Here, the agencies are taking the path prescribed by
the Chief Justice. The agencies are currently engaged
in notice-and-comment rulemaking that, among other
things, addresses the CWA’s coverage of wetlands and
responds to this Court’s decision in Rapanos. See 86
Fed. Reg. at 69,373. Before Rapanos, the agencies
treated adjacency to other covered waters, without
more, as a sufficient basis for exercising regulatory jurisdiction over wetlands. See Riverside Bayview, 474
U.S. at 131. The current proposed rule, however, generally requires also satisfying either the significantnexus test or the continuous-surface-connection test. 86
Fed. Reg. at 69,373, 69,449-69,450. The proposed rule
thus covers a narrower set of wetlands than the 1986
rule that was in effect when Rapanos was decided and
when petitioners’ discharges occurred. That approach
reflects the agencies’ consideration of “the statute as a
whole, the scientific record, relevant Supreme Court
40
case law, and the agencies’ experience and expertise after more than 30 years of implementing the 1986 regulations.” 86 Fed. Reg. at 69,374.
The comment period on the proposed rule closed on
February 7, 2022. 86 Fed. Reg. at 69,372. The agencies
currently expect to issue a final regulation by the end of
the year.
II. PETITIONERS’ RESTRICTIVE VIEW OF THE TRIBUTARIES COVERED BY THE CWA IS NOT PROPERLY
BEFORE THE COURT AND LACKS MERIT IN ANY
EVENT
In addition to arguing that the CWA covers only
those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to
other covered waters, petitioners now assert (e.g., Br.
5-6, 22-24) that the Court should adopt a highly restrictive view of the tributaries protected by the Act. Petitioners argue that, even if their wetlands had a continuous surface connection to the tributary that feeds into
Priest Lake, those wetlands would fall outside the
CWA’s coverage because the tributary (1) is a “constructed channel” rather than a natural hydrogeographic feature and (2) “is not a traditional navigable
water or an intrastate navigable water.” Pet. Br. 50, 52
(citation omitted). The Court should not consider those
arguments because they contradict assurances petitioners made in seeking this Court’s review and are irrelevant to the disposition of this case. If the Court does
consider petitioners’ new arguments, it should reject
them. Petitioners’ restrictive view of the CWA contradicts every opinion in Rapanos, as well as the text, purpose, and history of the Act. Indeed, petitioners’ new
interpretation would radically transform the CWA, giving it a more constricted scope than the 1899 RHA.
41
A. The Court Should Not Consider Petitioners’ New Arguments About Covered Tributaries
For two independent reasons, the Court should not
consider petitioners’ new arguments about tributaries.
First, in seeking this Court’s review, petitioners
stated (Cert. Reply Br. 8) that they were not disputing
“the extent to which the Clean Water Act regulates tributaries of traditional navigable waters,” and specifically
added that they were not “contest[ing] jurisdiction
over” the unnamed tributary in this case. Petitioners
touted (id. at 9) the limited nature of their challenge as
reason to grant certiorari. Petitioners’ merits brief, by
contrast, argues (at 50, 52) that the tributary is not a
“water[] of the United States.” The Court should not
entertain arguments that petitioners have unequivocally disclaimed.
Second, petitioners’ new arguments have no bearing
on the proper disposition of this case. The court of appeals held that the EPA had “reasonably determined
that [petitioners’] property contains wetlands that
share a significant nexus with Priest Lake, such that the
lot was regulable under the CWA and the relevant regulations.” Pet. App. A36. In this Court, petitioners do
not dispute that significant-nexus finding, nor do they
contest Priest Lake’s status as a traditional navigable
water. If the Court holds that the significant-nexus test
provides a permissible basis for CWA coverage, the
court of appeals’ judgment therefore must be affirmed.
And if the Court holds that a continuous surface connection is required, the judgment below can be reversed on
that ground alone, since the government does not contend that petitioners’ wetlands have a continuous surface connection either to the tributary or to Priest Lake
itself. Petitioners essentially ask the Court to decide
42
whether a continuous surface connection to the unnamed tributary would have supported CWA coverage
if such a connection existed. But the Court’s resolution
of that question would be academic.
B. Petitioners’ New Arguments Lack Merit
If the Court considers petitioners’ new arguments
concerning the jurisdictional status of the tributary, it
should reject them. Petitioners’ arguments are built on
the premise that the CWA departed only incrementally
from prior federal water-pollution statutes. But as the
Act’s text and structure demonstrate—and as this
Court has long recognized—the CWA was a complete
overhaul of existing law that marked a dramatic step
forward in the United States’ commitment to environmental protection. The practical implications of petitioners’ arguments, moreover, go well beyond protection of wetlands. Petitioners’ theory would, for example, allow the unpermitted filling of every tributary to
Priest Lake, choking off the Lake’s sources of water and
destroying its chemical, physical, and biological integrity.
1. Petitioners argue (Br. 5-6) that CWA coverage of
adjacent wetlands is limited to those wetlands that have
a “continuous surface-water connection” to “a stream,
ocean, river, lake, or similar hydrogeographic feature
that in ordinary parlance would be called a ‘water.’ ” Petitioners contend that, even if the wetlands on their
property had such a connection to the unnamed tributary across the road, the wetlands still would not be covered because the tributary is “not a ‘water’ but rather a
‘constructed channel,’ i.e., a type of non-water.” Pet.
Br. 50 (citation omitted).
Petitioners’ proposed distinction between natural
and artificial tributaries is unsound. Most obviously, it
43
would render superfluous Section 404’s exception for
“the discharge of dredged or fill material * * * for the
* * * maintenance of drainage ditches,” 33 U.S.C.
1344(f )(1)(C), because drainage ditches would not be
covered in the first place. More broadly, many of the
Nation’s urban waterways are channelized, and the
CWA has long been understood to encompass “natural,
modified, or constructed” tributaries of other covered
waters. 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,078. The Act’s specialized
definition of “navigable waters” does not turn on any
such distinctions, which have no bearing on a tributary’s
capacity to carry water (and pollutants) into traditional
navigable waters. See, e.g., Technical Support Document 149 n.47 (explaining that manmade ditches “perform many of the same functions as natural tributaries,”
including “convey[ing] water that carries nutrients, pollutants, and other constituents, both good and bad, to
downstream traditional navigable waters”).
Petitioners’ proposed distinction is also inconsistent
with Rapanos. That decision addressed consolidated
cases involving wetlands connected to traditional navigable waters by “ditches or man-made drains.” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 729 (plurality opinion). The Rapanos
plurality construed the Act to cover only tributaries
that are “relatively permanent,” on the theory that only
those tributaries are akin to the “ ‘geographical features’ ” listed in a dictionary definition of “water,” i.e.,
“ ‘streams, oceans, rivers, and lakes.’ ” Id. at 739 (brackets and ellipsis omitted) (quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary 2882 (2d ed. 1954)). The plurality
concluded that the cases should be remanded for the
lower courts to determine whether the channels at issue
satisfied the plurality’s rule that CWA coverage of tributaries is limited to those with “relatively permanent”
44
flow. Id. at 757. Those further lower-court proceedings
would have been superfluous if the manmade character
of the ditches and drains had precluded their treatment
as CWA “waters.”
Petitioners rely (Br. 23, 26 n.10, 50-51) on a footnote
in which the Rapanos plurality observed that “relatively continuous flow is a necessary condition for qualification as a ‘water,’ not an adequate condition.” 547
U.S. at 736 n.7. But the context in which that statement
appeared makes clear that the plurality was merely explaining why some water-treatment systems may be excluded from the scope of the “waters of the United
States.” See ibid. In the same footnote, the plurality
stated that, when “ditches, channels, conduits and the
like * * * ‘hold water permanently,’ ” “we usually refer
to them as ‘rivers,’ ‘creeks,’ or ‘streams,’ ” ibid. (citation
omitted), and that “[t]his distinction is particularly apt
in the context of a statute regulating water quality,”
ibid. The clear thrust of the opinion was that, so long
as a particular tributary is relatively permanent (as the
tributary at issue in this case undisputedly is), its natural or manmade character is irrelevant. 3
Many of petitioners’ amici urge the Court to adopt the Rapanos
plurality’s view that a nonnavigable tributary must be relatively
permanent to come within the “waters of the United States.” E.g.,
Freeport-McMoran Inc. Br. 20-24. That question is not presented
here. As the government explained in its brief in opposition (at 2122), the EPA determined that the unnamed tributary across the
road from the wetlands on petitioners’ property is “relatively permanent,” and the court of appeals upheld that determination. Pet.
App. A33-A34; see J.A. 30, 33. Petitioners acknowledge (Br. 51) that
“[t]he ditch does have a continuous (though small) year-round flow.”
This case therefore presents no occasion to address the proper
treatment of ephemeral or intermittent tributaries.
3
45
2. As the second step of their new framework, petitioners would limit the term “waters of the United
States” to “traditional navigable waters and intrastate
navigable waters that link with other modes of transport
to form interstate channels of commerce.” Pet. Br. 42;
see id. at 36-42. 4 Petitioners thus would exclude from
the “waters of the United States” all nonnavigable tributaries of traditional navigable waters—and presumably nonnavigable interstate waters and nonnavigable
impoundments as well, see 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(2) and (4)
(2008). Pet. Br. 23-24. Petitioners’ argument is at odds
with the views of all nine Justices in Rapanos, and it
would undo Congress’s considered and deliberate
choice to expand the CWA beyond the traditional navigable waters covered by the prior statutes Congress
had found lacking.
The Rapanos plurality recognized that a wetland
may be treated as a covered water if it has a continuous
surface connection to a “relatively permanent” tributary that “connect[s] to” traditional navigable waters,
without any further inquiry into the tributary’s navigability or status as a link in a channel of commerce. 547
U.S. at 742. The plurality further observed that the
1977 Act’s authorization for States to administer the
Section 404 program for “navigable waters . . . other
than” those used or suitable for use “to transport interstate or foreign commerce,” id. at 731 (quoting 33
U.S.C. 1344(g)(1)), “shows that the Act’s term ‘navigable waters’ includes something more than traditional
navigable waters,” ibid. And neither Justice Kennedy
As noted above (see p. 8 n.2, supra), petitioners, unlike the government, use the term “traditional navigable waters” to refer solely
to interstate waters.
4
46
nor the dissenting Justices in Rapanos endorsed the jurisdictional limitation that petitioners advocate. See id.
at 782-783 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 807-808 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Petitioners’ argument also lacks any sound basis in
the pre-CWA history on which they rely. Petitioners’
central premise is that, by 1972, the phrase “waters of
the United States” had become “a traditional statutory
shorthand for those waterbodies subject to Congress’s
power to regulate the aquatic channels of interstate
commerce.” Pet. Br. 29 (emphasis omitted). That
premise is false. The phrase “navigable waters of the
United States” was a term of art, but Congress deliberately omitted the qualifier “navigable” from the CWA
definition. See p. 19, supra. And while the agencies’
longstanding approach gives substantial operative effect both to that definition and to the defined term, petitioners’ requirement of actual navigability would effectively read the definition out of the statute.
Petitioners point (Br. 30-32) to the RHA, a statute
that principally addressed navigation. But the critical
term in each of that law’s operative provisions was “navigable.” No provision referred to the “waters of the
United States” without that qualifier, which Congress
deliberately omitted from the definition at issue here.
See, e.g., RHA §§ 9-10, 30 Stat. 1151. Petitioners emphasize (Br. 30-32) a portion of Section 10 that refers to
“other water[s] of the United States” without any mention of navigability. But the qualifier “other” refers
back to the preceding list of terms—“port, roadstead,
haven, harbor, canal, navigable river”—which make
clear that the reference is limited to navigable waters.
§ 10, 30 Stat. 1151. No analogous list of terms appears
in the definition at issue here.
47
Despite the RHA’s overall focus on navigability, Section 13—the one section of that law dealing specifically
with pollution—generally prohibits dumping refuse material into any “navigable water of the United States or
into any tributary of any navigable water of the United
States,” as well as depositing refuse material “on the
bank of any navigable water, or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water.” 33 U.S.C. 407. That provision does not limit the covered “tributar[ies]” to those
that are themselves used or susceptible to use for navigation. Petitioners’ approach would therefore have the
anomalous result of excluding from the CWA’s coverage
nonnavigable tributaries encompassed by Section 13.
Beyond their misplaced reliance on the RHA, petitioners identify no other evidence in the art, such as a
treatise or case law, supporting their claim that the
phrase “waters of the United States” had acquired a
specialized meaning. Petitioners identify no pre-1972
statute or decision in which Congress or this Court used
that phrase, standing alone, as a “shorthand for all waters subject to Congress’s power to regulate the aquatic
channels of interstate commerce.” Pet. Br. 32. Instead,
the only source petitioners identify (Br. 31) is a 1976
law-review article. And that article refutes their position by recognizing that the phrase “ ‘waters of the
United States,’ ” as used in the CWA, “indicates a desire
to break with traditional notions of navigability.”
Charles D. Ablard & Brian Boru O’Neill, Wetland Protection and Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, 1 Vt. L. Rev. 51, 66
(1976).
Most crucially, petitioners’ argument (Br. 36-42) reflects a fundamental misconception of the impetus for
the CWA and its relation to prior law. The Act was not
48
“merely another law ‘touching interstate waters,’ ” but
rather “a ‘total restructuring’ and ‘complete rewriting’
of [then] existing water pollution legislation.” City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (citations omitted). Congress concluded that prior measures
had been “inadequate in every vital aspect,” and it enacted a wholly new scheme of point-source-based pollution controls. EPA v. California ex rel. State Water
Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 203 (1976) (citation omitted). The Act cannot reasonably be understood as
merely a response to a perceived failure by the agencies
to use the tools Congress had already given them (see
Pet. Br. 39). Rather, it reflected Congress’s fundamental dissatisfaction with prior law.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ JUDGMENT SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED
The court of appeals correctly held that the wetlands
on petitioners’ property are among the “waters of the
United States” protected by the CWA. Pet. App. A33.
The wetlands are located only 30 feet from a tributary of
Kalispell Creek, which in turn feeds into Priest Lake, a
traditional navigable water. Id. at A33-A34; see J.A. 2021, 46, 48-49 (photos of the saturated property, after partial excavation and filling, and the tributary). Although
the wetlands are separated from that tributary by a
road, the court correctly recognized that the presence
of a manmade barrier does not “defeat adjacency.” Pet.
App. A33.
The court of appeals also correctly upheld the EPA’s
determination that the wetlands have a “significant
nexus” to Priest Lake. Pet. App. A34-A36. The court
found ample evidence that the wetlands on petitioners’
property are similarly situated to the Kalispell Bay Fen
49
across the road—indeed, historically petitioners’ wetlands and the fen were “part of one wetland system.”
J.A. 30; see Pet. App. A35. The court of appeals further
found that, together, those wetlands “significantly affect the integrity of Priest Lake.” Pet. App. A35; see
J.A. 21, 47 (photos of Kalispell Bay Fen). The EPA identified numerous physical, chemical, and biological benefits that the wetlands provide to the Lake—including
improving the Lake’s water quality through sediment
retention, contributing base flow to the Lake with beneficial effects to fisheries, storing water, and providing
flood control. J.A. 35-40; see Pet. App. A35-A36, B27B30. The EPA also determined that, notwithstanding
the road, “shallow subsurface flow is occurring” between the wetlands on petitioners’ property and both
the Lake and the wetlands across the road. J.A. 32. Petitioners do not dispute those findings in this Court.
The Kalispell Bay Fen is “one of the five largest”
complexes of wetlands along the shoreline of Priest
Lake and thus is “ ‘especially important in maintaining
the high quality of Priest Lake’s water, fish, and wildlife.’ ” Pet. App. A35 (citing agency findings reprinted
at J.A. 43); see J.A. 31-32, 44-45. If petitioners prevail
in this case, they will be able to discharge fill material
into the wetlands at issue without any permitting requirement. And the same scene will play out across the
country, severely weakening the Act’s protections for
adjacent wetlands and, in turn, the traditional navigable
waters that the CWA’s permitting regime is ultimately
intended to protect. That result would thwart Congress’s comprehensive pollution-control regime.
50
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.
JEFFREY PRIETO
General Counsel
DIMPLE CHAUDHARY
Deputy General Counsel
SUSANNAH LANDES WEAVER
Associate Deputy General
Counsel
STEVEN NEUGEBOREN
CAROLINE WEHLING
KARYN I.O. WENDELOWSKI
SIMMA ASHER KUPCHAN
Attorneys
Environmental Protection
Agency
BRIAN H. FLETCHER *
Acting Solicitor General
TODD KIM
Assistant Attorney General
MALCOLM L. STEWART
Deputy Solicitor General
MATTHEW GUARNIERI
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
JENNIFER SCHELLER NEUMANN
BRIAN C. TOTH
ARIEL MOURRAIN
Attorneys
CARRIE RICCI
General Counsel
CRAIG R. SCHMAUDER
Acting Principal Deputy
General Counsel
ZAHEER TAJANI
Attorney
Department of the Army
JUNE 2022
*
The Solicitor General is recused in this case.
APPENDIX
1.
33 U.S.C. 1251(a) and (b) provide:
Congressional declaration of goals and policy
(a)
Restoration and maintenance of chemical, physical
and biological integrity of Nation’s waters; national
goals for achievement of objective
The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation’s waters. In order to achieve this objective
it is hereby declared that, consistent with the provisions
of this chapter—
(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of
pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by
1985;
(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim goal of water quality which provides
for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish,
and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the
water be achieved by July 1, 1983;
(3) it is the national policy that the discharge of
toxic pollutants in toxic amounts be prohibited;
(4) it is the national policy that Federal financial
assistance be provided to construct publicly owned
waste treatment works;
(5) it is the national policy that areawide waste
treatment management planning processes be developed and implemented to assure adequate control of
sources of pollutants in each State;
(1a)
2a
(6) it is the national policy that a major research
and demonstration effort be made to develop technology necessary to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters, waters of the contiguous zone, and the oceans; and
(7) it is the national policy that programs for the
control of nonpoint sources of pollution be developed
and implemented in an expeditious manner so as to
enable the goals of this chapter to be met through the
control of both point and nonpoint sources of pollution.
(b)
Congressional recognition, preservation, and protection of primary responsibilities and rights of States
It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and
rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in
the exercise of his authority under this chapter. It is
the policy of Congress that the States manage the construction grant program under this chapter and implement the permit programs under sections 1342 and
1344 of this title. It is further the policy of the Congress to support and aid research relating to the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution and to provide Federal technical services and financial aid to State
and interstate agencies and municipalities in connection
with the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution.
3a
2.
33 U.S.C. 1311(a) provides:
Effluent limitations
(a)
Illegality of pollutant discharges except in compliance with law
Except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title,
the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.
3.
33 U.S.C. 1344 provides:
Permits for dredged or fill material
(a)
Discharge into navigable waters at specified disposal sites
The Secretary may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of dredged
or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites. Not later than the fifteenth day after the
date an applicant submits all the information required
to complete an application for a permit under this subsection, the Secretary shall publish the notice required
by this subsection.
(b)
Specification for disposal sites
Subject to subsection (c) of this section, each such
disposal site shall be specified for each such permit by
the Secretary (1) through the application of guidelines
developed by the Administrator, in conjunction with the
Secretary, which guidelines shall be based upon criteria
comparable to the criteria applicable to the territorial
seas, the contiguous zone, and the ocean under section
4a
1343(c) of this title, and (2) in any case where such guidelines under clause (1) alone would prohibit the specification of a site, through the application additionally of the
economic impact of the site on navigation and anchorage.
(c)
Denial or restriction of use of defined areas as disposal sites
The Administrator is authorized to prohibit the specification (including the withdrawal of specification) of
any defined area as a disposal site, and he is authorized
to deny or restrict the use of any defined area for specification (including the withdrawal of specification) as a
disposal site, whenever he determines, after notice and
opportunity for public hearings, that the discharge of
such materials into such area will have an unacceptable
adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish
beds and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas. Before making such determination, the Administrator shall consult
with the Secretary. The Administrator shall set forth
in writing and make public his findings and his reasons
for making any determination under this subsection.
(d)
“Secretary” defined
The term “Secretary” as used in this section means
the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of
Engineers.
(e)
General permits on State, regional, or nationwide
basis
(1) In carrying out his functions relating to the discharge of dredged or fill material under this section, the
Secretary may, after notice and opportunity for public
hearing, issue general permits on a State, regional, or
5a
nationwide basis for any category of activities involving
discharges of dredged or fill material if the Secretary
determines that the activities in such category are similar in nature, will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when performed separately, and will have
only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment. Any general permit issued under this subsection shall (A) be based on the guidelines described in
subsection (b)(1) of this section, and (B) set forth the requirements and standards which shall apply to any activity authorized by such general permit.
(2) No general permit issued under this subsection
shall be for a period of more than five years after the
date of its issuance and such general permit may be revoked or modified by the Secretary if, after opportunity
for public hearing, the Secretary determines that the activities authorized by such general permit have an adverse impact on the environment or such activities are
more appropriately authorized by individual permits.
(f )
Non-prohibited discharge of dredged or fill material
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the discharge of dredged or fill material—
(A) from normal farming, silviculture, and ranching activities such as plowing, seeding, cultivating,
minor drainage, harvesting for the production of food,
fiber, and forest products, or upland soil and water
conservation practices;
(B) for the purpose of maintenance, including
emergency reconstruction of recently damaged parts,
of currently serviceable structures such as dikes,
dams, levees, groins, riprap, breakwaters, causeways,
6a
and bridge abutments or approaches, and transportation structures;
(C) for the purpose of construction or maintenance of farm or stock ponds or irrigation ditches, or
the maintenance of drainage ditches;
(D) for the purpose of construction of temporary
sedimentation basins on a construction site which
does not include placement of fill material into the
navigable waters;
(E) for the purpose of construction or maintenance of farm roads or forest roads, or temporary
roads for moving mining equipment, where such
roads are constructed and maintained, in accordance
with best management practices, to assure that flow
and circulation patterns and chemical and biological
characteristics of the navigable waters are not impaired, that the reach of the navigable waters is not
reduced, and that any adverse effect on the aquatic
environment will be otherwise minimized;
(F) resulting from any activity with respect to
which a State has an approved program under section 1288(b)(4) of this title which meets the requirements of subparagraphs (B) and (C) of such section,
is not prohibited by or otherwise subject to regulation
under this section or section 1311(a) or 1342 of this title (except for effluent standards or prohibitions under section 1317 of this title).
(2) Any discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters incidental to any activity having as its
purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters into a
use to which it was not previously subject, where the
flow or circulation of navigable waters may be impaired
7a
or the reach of such waters be reduced, shall be required
to have a permit under this section.
(g)
State administration
(1) The Governor of any State desiring to administer its own individual and general permit program for
the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters (other than those waters which are presently
used, or are susceptible to use in their natural condition
or by reasonable improvement as a means to transport
interstate or foreign commerce shoreward to their ordinary high water mark, including all waters which are
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide shoreward to their
mean high water mark, or mean higher high water mark
on the west coast, including wetlands adjacent thereto)
within its jurisdiction may submit to the Administrator
a full and complete description of the program it proposes to establish and administer under State law or under an interstate compact. In addition, such State
shall submit a statement from the attorney general (or
the attorney for those State agencies which have independent legal counsel), or from the chief legal officer in
the case of an interstate agency, that the laws of such
State, or the interstate compact, as the case may be, provide adequate authority to carry out the described program.
(2) Not later than the tenth day after the date of the
receipt of the program and statement submitted by any
State under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Administrator shall provide copies of such program and statement to the Secretary and the Secretary of the Interior,
acting through the Director of the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service.
8a
(3) Not later than the ninetieth day after the date of
the receipt by the Administrator of the program and
statement submitted by any State, under paragraph (1)
of this subsection, the Secretary and the Secretary of
the Interior, acting through the Director of the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service, shall submit any comments with respect to such program and statement to
the Administrator in writing.
(h)
Determination of State’s authority to issue permits
under State program; approval; notification; transfers to State program
(1) Not later than the one-hundred-twentieth day
after the date of the receipt by the Administrator of a
program and statement submitted by any State under
paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Administrator shall
determine, taking into account any comments submitted
by the Secretary and the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Director of the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service, pursuant to subsection (g) of this section, whether such State has the following authority
with respect to the issuance of permits pursuant to such
program:
(A)
To issue permits which—
(i) apply, and assure compliance with, any
applicable requirements of this section, including,
but not limited to, the guidelines established under subsection (b)(1) of this section, and sections
1317 and 1343 of this title;
(ii) are for fixed terms not exceeding five
years; and
(iii) can be terminated or modified for cause
including, but not limited to, the following:
9a
(I)
mit;
violation of any condition of the per-
(II) obtaining a permit by misrepresentation, or failure to disclose fully all relevant
facts;
(III) change in any condition that requires
either a temporary or permanent reduction or
elimination of the permitted discharge.
(B) To issue permits which apply, and assure
compliance with, all applicable requirements of section 1318 of this title, or to inspect, monitor, enter,
and require reports to at least the same extent as required in section 1318 of this title.
(C) To assure that the public, and any other
State the waters of which may be affected, receive
notice of each application for a permit and to provide
an opportunity for public hearing before a ruling on
each such application.
(D) To assure that the Administrator receives
notice of each application (including a copy thereof )
for a permit.
(E) To assure that any State (other than the
permitting State), whose waters may be affected by
the issuance of a permit may submit written recommendations to the permitting State (and the Administrator) with respect to any permit application and,
if any part of such written recommendations are not
accepted by the permitting State, that the permitting
State will notify such affected State (and the Administrator) in writing of its failure to so accept such recommendations together with its reasons for so doing.
10a
(F) To assure that no permit will be issued if, in
the judgment of the Secretary, after consultation
with the Secretary of the department in which the
Coast Guard is operating, anchorage and navigation
of any of the navigable waters would be substantially
impaired thereby.
(G) To abate violations of the permit or the permit program, including civil and criminal penalties
and other ways and means of enforcement.
(H) To assure continued coordination with Federal and Federal-State water-related planning and
review processes.
(2) If, with respect to a State program submitted
under subsection (g)(1) of this section, the Administrator determines that such State—
(A) has the authority set forth in paragraph (1)
of this subsection, the Administrator shall approve
the program and so notify (i) such State and (ii) the
Secretary, who upon subsequent notification from
such State that it is administering such program,
shall suspend the issuance of permits under subsections (a) and (e) of this section for activities with respect to which a permit may be issued pursuant to
such State program; or
(B) does not have the authority set forth in paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Administrator shall
so notify such State, which notification shall also describe the revisions or modifications necessary so
that such State may resubmit such program for a determination by the Administrator under this subsection.
11a
(3) If the Administrator fails to make a determination with respect to any program submitted by a State
under subsection (g)(1) of this section within one-hundredtwenty days after the date of the receipt of such program, such program shall be deemed approved pursuant
to paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection and the Administrator shall so notify such State and the Secretary who,
upon subsequent notification from such State that it is
administering such program, shall suspend the issuance
of permits under subsection (a) and (e) of this section for
activities with respect to which a permit may be issued
by such State.
(4) After the Secretary receives notification from
the Administrator under paragraph (2) or (3) of this subsection that a State permit program has been approved,
the Secretary shall transfer any applications for permits
pending before the Secretary for activities with respect
to which a permit may be issued pursuant to such State
program to such State for appropriate action.
(5) Upon notification from a State with a permit program approved under this subsection that such State intends to administer and enforce the terms and conditions of a general permit issued by the Secretary under
subsection (e) of this section with respect to activities in
such State to which such general permit applies, the
Secretary shall suspend the administration and enforcement of such general permit with respect to such activities.
(i)
Withdrawal of approval
Whenever the Administrator determines after public
hearing that a State is not administering a program ap-
12a
proved under subsection (h)(2)(A) of this section, in accordance with this section, including, but not limited to,
the guidelines established under subsection (b)(1) of this
section, the Administrator shall so notify the State, and,
if appropriate corrective action is not taken within a reasonable time, not to exceed ninety days after the date of
the receipt of such notification, the Administrator shall
(1) withdraw approval of such program until the Administrator determines such corrective action has been
taken, and (2) notify the Secretary that the Secretary
shall resume the program for the issuance of permits
under subsections (a) and (e) of this section for activities
with respect to which the State was issuing permits and
that such authority of the Secretary shall continue in effect until such time as the Administrator makes the determination described in clause (1) of this subsection
and such State again has an approved program.
( j)
Copies of applications for State permits and proposed general permits to be transmitted to Administrator
Each State which is administering a permit program
pursuant to this section shall transmit to the Administrator (1) a copy of each permit application received by
such State and provide notice to the Administrator of
every action related to the consideration of such permit
application, including each permit proposed to be issued
by such State, and (2) a copy of each proposed general
permit which such State intends to issue. Not later
than the tenth day after the date of the receipt of such
permit application or such proposed general permit, the
Administrator shall provide copies of such permit application or such proposed general permit to the Secretary
13a
and the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.
If the Administrator intends to provide written comments to such State with respect to such permit application or such proposed general permit, he shall so notify
such State not later than the thirtieth day after the date
of the receipt of such application or such proposed general permit and provide such written comments to such
State, after consideration of any comments made in
writing with respect to such application or such proposed general permit by the Secretary and the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Director of the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service, not later than
the ninetieth day after the date of such receipt. If such
State is so notified by the Administrator, it shall not issue the proposed permit until after the receipt of such
comments from the Administrator, or after such ninetieth day, whichever first occurs. Such State shall not
issue such proposed permit after such ninetieth day if it
has received such written comments in which the Administrator objects (A) to the issuance of such proposed
permit and such proposed permit is one that has been
submitted to the Administrator pursuant to subsection
(h)(1)(E), or (B) to the issuance of such proposed permit
as being outside the requirements of this section, including, but not limited to, the guidelines developed under
subsection (b)(1) of this section unless it modifies such
proposed permit in accordance with such comments.
Whenever the Administrator objects to the issuance of
a permit under the preceding sentence such written objection shall contain a statement of the reasons for such
objection and the conditions which such permit would
include if it were issued by the Administrator. In any
case where the Administrator objects to the issuance of
14a
a permit, on request of the State, a public hearing shall
be held by the Administrator on such objection. If the
State does not resubmit such permit revised to meet
such objection within 30 days after completion of the
hearing or, if no hearing is requested within 90 days after the date of such objection, the Secretary may issue
the permit pursuant to subsection (a) or (e) of this section, as the case may be, for such source in accordance
with the guidelines and requirements of this chapter.
(k)
Waiver
In accordance with guidelines promulgated pursuant
to subsection (i)(2) of section 1314 of this title, the Administrator is authorized to waive the requirements of
subsection ( j) of this section at the time of the approval
of a program pursuant to subsection (h)(2)(A) of this section for any category (including any class, type, or size
within such category) of discharge within the State submitting such program.
(l)
Categories of discharges not subject to requirements
The Administrator shall promulgate regulations establishing categories of discharges which he determines
shall not be subject to the requirements of subsection ( j)
of this section in any State with a program approved
pursuant to subsection (h)(2)(A) of this section. The
Administrator may distinguish among classes, types,
and sizes within any category of discharges.
15a
(m) Comments on permit applications or proposed general permits by Secretary of the Interior acting through
Director of United States Fish and Wildlife Service
Not later than the ninetieth day after the date on
which the Secretary notifies the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Director of the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service that (1) an application for a
permit under subsection (a) of this section has been received by the Secretary, or (2) the Secretary proposes
to issue a general permit under subsection (e) of this section, the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the
Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service,
shall submit any comments with respect to such application or such proposed general permit in writing to the
Secretary.
(n)
Enforcement authority not limited
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the
authority of the Administrator to take action pursuant
to section 1319 of this title.
(o)
Public availability of permits and permit applications
A copy of each permit application and each permit issued under this section shall be available to the public.
Such permit application or portion thereof, shall further
be available on request for the purpose of reproduction.
(p)
Compliance
Compliance with a permit issued pursuant to this section, including any activity carried out pursuant to a general permit issued under this section, shall be deemed
compliance, for purposes of sections 1319 and 1365 of
this title, with sections 1311, 1317, and 1343 of this title.
16a
(q)
Minimization of duplication, needless paperwork,
and delays in issuance; agreements
Not later than the one-hundred-eightieth day after
December 27, 1977, the Secretary shall enter into agreements with the Administrator, the Secretaries of the
Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, and
Transportation, and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies to minimize, to the maximum extent practicable, duplication, needless paperwork, and delays in
the issuance of permits under this section. Such agreements shall be developed to assure that, to the maximum
extent practicable, a decision with respect to an application for a permit under subsection (a) of this section will
be made not later than the ninetieth day after the date
the notice for such application is published under subsection (a) of this section.
(r)
Federal projects specifically authorized by Congress
The discharge of dredged or fill material as part of
the construction of a Federal project specifically authorized by Congress, whether prior to or on or after December 27, 1977, is not prohibited by or otherwise subject to regulation under this section, or a State program
approved under this section, or section 1311(a) or 1342
of this title (except for effluent standards or prohibitions under section 1317 of this title), if information on
the effects of such discharge, including consideration of
the guidelines developed under subsection (b)(1) of this
section, is included in an environmental impact statement for such project pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 [42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.] and
such environmental impact statement has been submitted to Congress before the actual discharge of dredged
or fill material in connection with the construction of
17a
such project and prior to either authorization of such
project or an appropriation of funds for such construction.
(s)
Violation of permits
(1) Whenever on the basis of any information available to him the Secretary finds that any person is in violation of any condition or limitation set forth in a permit
issued by the Secretary under this section, the Secretary shall issue an order requiring such person to comply with such condition or limitation, or the Secretary
shall bring a civil action in accordance with paragraph
(3) of this subsection.
(2) A copy of any order issued under this subsection
shall be sent immediately by the Secretary to the State
in which the violation occurs and other affected States.
Any order issued under this subsection shall be by personal service and shall state with reasonable specificity
the nature of the violation, specify a time for compliance,
not to exceed thirty days, which the Secretary determines is reasonable, taking into account the seriousness
of the violation and any good faith efforts to comply with
applicable requirements. In any case in which an order
under this subsection is issued to a corporation, a copy
of such order shall be served on any appropriate corporate officers.
(3) The Secretary is authorized to commence a civil
action for appropriate relief, including a permanent or
temporary injunction for any violation for which he is
authorized to issue a compliance order under paragraph
(1) of this subsection. Any action under this paragraph
may be brought in the district court of the United States
18a
for the district in which the defendant is located or resides or is doing business, and such court shall have jurisdiction to restrain such violation and to require compliance. Notice of the commencement of such acton 1
shall be given immediately to the appropriate State.
(4) Any person who violates any condition or limitation in a permit issued by the Secretary under this section, and any person who violates any order issued by
the Secretary under paragraph (1) of this subsection,
shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $25,000
per day for each violation. In determining the amount
of a civil penalty the court shall consider the seriousness
of the violation or violations, the economic benefit (if
any) resulting from the violation, any history of such violations, any good-faith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements, the economic impact of the penalty
on the violator, and such other matters as justice may
require.
(t)
Navigable waters within State jurisdiction
Nothing in this section shall preclude or deny the
right of any State or interstate agency to control the
discharge of dredged or fill material in any portion of
the navigable waters within the jurisdiction of such
State, including any activity of any Federal agency, and
each such agency shall comply with such State or interstate requirements both substantive and procedural to
control the discharge of dredged or fill material to the
same extent that any person is subject to such requirements. This section shall not be construed as affecting
1
So in original.
Probably should be “action”.
19a
or impairing the authority of the Secretary to maintain
navigation.
4.
33 U.S.C. 1362 provides in pertinent part:
Definitions
Except as otherwise specifically provided, when used
in this chapter:
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*
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*
(6) The term “pollutant” means dredged spoil, solid
waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage
sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials,
radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal,
and agricultural waste discharged into water. This
term does not mean (A) “sewage from vessels or a discharge incidental to the normal operation of a vessel of
the Armed Forces” within the meaning of section 1322
of this title; or (B) water, gas, or other material which is
injected into a well to facilitate production of oil or gas,
or water derived in association with oil or gas production
and disposed of in a well, if the well used either to facilitate production or for disposal purposes is approved by
authority of the State in which the well is located, and if
such State determines that such injection or disposal
will not result in the degradation of ground or surface
water resources.
(7) The term “navigable waters” means the waters
of the United States, including the territorial seas.
(8) The term “territorial seas” means the belt of the
seas measured from the line of ordinary low water along
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that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with
the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of
inland waters, and extending seaward a distance of
three miles.
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*
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*
(12) The term “discharge of a pollutant” and the term
“discharge of pollutants” each means (A) any addition of
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source,
(B) any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the
contiguous zone or the ocean from any point source
other than a vessel or other floating craft.
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(14) The term “point source” means any discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft,
from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This
term does not include agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.
*
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21a
5.
33 C.F.R. 323.2(a)-(d) (1978) provide:
Definitions.
For the purpose of this regulation, the following
terms are defined:
(a) The term “waters of the United States” means:1
(1) The territorial seas with respect to the discharge
of fill material. (The transportation of dredged material by vessel for the purpose of dumping in the oceans,
including the territorial seas, at an ocean dump site approved under 40 CFR 228 is regulated by Section 103 of
the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of
1972, as amended (33 U.S.C. 1413). See 33 CFR 324.
Discharges of dredged or fill material into the territorial
seas are regulated by Section 404.):
(2) Coastal and inland waters, lakes, rivers, and
streams that are navigable waters of the United States,
including adjacent wetlands;
(3) Tributaries to navigable waters of the United
States, including adjacent wetlands (manmade nontidal
drainage and irrigation ditches excavated on dry land are
not considered waters of the United States under this
definition).
(4) Interstate waters and their tributaries, including adjacent wetlands; and
The terminology used by the FWPCA is “navigable waters”
which is defined in Section 502(7) of the Act as “waters of the
United States including the territorial seas.” For purposes of
clarity, and to avoid confusion with other Corps of Engineers regulatory programs, the term “waters of the United States” is used
throughout this regulation.
1
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(5) All other waters of the United States not identified in paragraphs (1)-(4) above, such as isolated wetlands and lakes, intermittent streams, prairie potholes,
and other waters that are not part of a tributary system
to interstate waters or to navigable waters of the United
States, the degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate commerce.2
In defining the jurisdiction of the FWPCA as the “waters of the
United States,” Congress, in the legislative history to the Act, specified that the term “be given the broadest constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which would have
been made or may be made for administrative purposes.” The waters listed in paragraphs (a)(1)-(4) fall within this mandate as discharges into those waterbodies may seriously affect water quality,
navigation, and other Federal interests, however, it is also recognized that the Federal government would have the right to regulate
the waters of the United States identified in paragraph (a)(5) under
this broad Congressional mandate to fulfill the objective of the Act:
“to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters” (Section 101(a)). Paragraph (a)(5) incorporates all other waters of the United States that could be regulated under the Federal government’s Constitutional powers to regulate and protect interstate commerce, including those for which the
connection to interstate commerce may not be readily obvious or
where the location or size of the waterbody generally may not require regulation through individual or general permits to achieve the
objective of the Act. Discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States identified in paragraphs (a)(1)-(4) will generally require individual or general permits unless those discharges
occur beyond the headwaters of a river or stream or in natural lakes
less than 10 acres in surface area. Discharges into these latter waters and into most of the waters identified in paragraph (a)(5) will be
permitted by this regulation, subject to the provisions listed in paragraph 323.4-2(b) unless the District Engineer develops information,
on a case-by-case basis, that the concerns for the aquatic environment as expressed in the EPA Guidelines (40 CFR 230) require regulation through an individual or general permit. (See 323.4-4).
2
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The landward limit of jurisdiction in tidal waters, in
the absence of adjacent wetlands, shall be the high tide
line and the landward limit of jurisdiction and all other
waters, in the absence of adjacent wetlands, shall be the
ordinary high water mark.
(b) The term “navigable waters of the United States”
means those waters of the United States that are subject
to the ebb and flow of the tide shoreward to the mean
high water mark (mean higher high water mark on the
Pacific coast) and/or are presently used, or have been
used in the past, or may be susceptible to use to transport
interstate or foreign commerce. (See 33 CFR 329 for a
more complete definition of this term.)
(c) The term “wetlands” means those areas that are
inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a
frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that
under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of
vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil
conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps marshes, bogs and similar areas.
(d) The term “adjacent” means bordering, contiguous, or neighboring. Wetlands separated from other
waters of the United States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like are
“adjacent wetlands.”
6.
33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)-(c) (2008) provide:
Definitions.
For the purpose of this regulation these terms are
defined as follows:
(a) The term waters of the United States means
24a
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were
used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which
are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers,
streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats,
sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation
or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign
commerce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be
taken and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial
purpose by industries in interstate commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined
as waters of the United States under the definition;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs
(a) (1) through (4) of this section;
(6) The territorial seas;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters
that are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs
(a) (1) through (6) of this section.
(8) Waters of the United States do not include prior
converted cropland. Notwithstanding the determination of an area’s status as prior converted cropland by
any other Federal agency, for the purposes of the Clean
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Water Act, the final authority regarding Clean Water
Act jurisdiction remains with EPA.
Waste treatment systems, including treatment ponds or
lagoons designed to meet the requirements of CWA
(other than cooling ponds as defined in 40 CFR 423.11(m)
which also meet the criteria of this definition) are not
waters of the United States.
(b) The term wetlands means those areas that are
inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a
frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that
under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence
of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated
soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps,
marshes, bogs, and similar areas.
(c) The term adjacent means bordering, contiguous,
or neighboring. Wetlands separated from other waters of the United States by man-made dikes or barriers,
natural river berms, beach dunes and the like are “adjacent wetlands.”
7.
40 C.F.R. 230.3 (2008) provides in pertinent part:
Definitions.
For purposes of this part, the following terms shall
have the meanings indicated:
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*
*
*
*
(s) The term waters of the United States means:
26a
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were
used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which
are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers,
streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats,
sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation
or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign
commerce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be
taken and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial
purposes by industries in interstate commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined
as waters of the United States under this definition;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs
(s)(1) through (4) of this section;
(6) The territorial sea;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters
that are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs
(s)(1) through (6) of this section; waste treatment systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons designed to
meet the requirements of CWA (other than cooling
ponds as defined in 40 CFR 423.11(m) which also meet
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the criteria of this definition) are not waters of the
United States.
Waters of the United States do not include prior converted cropland. Notwithstanding the determination
of an area’s status as prior converted cropland by any
other federal agency, for the purposes of the Clean Water Act, the final authority regarding Clean Water Act
jurisdiction remains with EPA.
(t) The term wetlands means those areas that are
inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a
frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that
under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of
vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil
conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes,
bogs and similar areas.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.