Respondents Brief — Michael Sackett, et ux., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

Supreme Court briefJun 10, 2022

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No. 21-454

In the Supreme Court of the United States

MICHAEL SACKETT & CHANTELL SACKETT,

PETITIONERS

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS

JEFFREY PRIETO

General Counsel

DIMPLE CHAUDHARY

Deputy General Counsel

SUSANNAH LANDES WEAVER

Associate Deputy General

Counsel

STEVEN NEUGEBOREN

CAROLINE WEHLING

KARYN I.O. WENDELOWSKI

SIMMA ASHER KUPCHAN

Attorneys

Environmental Protection

Agency

Washington, D.C. 20460

CARRIE RICCI

General Counsel

CRAIG R. SCHMAUDER

Acting Principal Deputy

General Counsel

ZAHEER TAJANI

Attorney

Department of the Army

Washington, D.C. 20310

BRIAN H. FLETCHER

Acting Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

T ODD KIM

Assistant Attorney General

MALCOLM L. STEWART

Deputy Solicitor General

MATTHEW GUARNIERI

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

JENNIFER SCHELLER NEUMANN

BRIAN C. TOTH

ARIEL MOURRAIN

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Ninth Circuit set forth the proper test

for determining whether wetlands are “waters of the

United States” under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.

1362(7).

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinions below .............................................................................. 1

Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1

Statutes and regulations involved ............................................... 2

Statement ...................................................................................... 2

A. Statutory background............................................... 4

B. The present controversy .......................................... 8

C. Subsequent regulatory developments .................. 12

Summary of argument ............................................................... 14

Argument:

I. The mere presence of a berm or other barrier does

not defeat CWA coverage of an adjacent wetland

that has a significant nexus to a traditional

navigable water .............................................................. 17

A. The “waters of the United States” include

adjacent wetlands .................................................... 19

B. There is no sound basis for imposing

petitioners’ rigid continuous-surfaceconnection requirement .......................................... 25

C. The significant-nexus test is a permissible

basis for identifying adjacent wetlands covered

by the CWA.............................................................. 31

D. The agencies’ understanding of the CWA’s

coverage of adjacent wetlands is entitled to

deference .................................................................. 38

II. Petitioners’ restrictive view of the tributaries

covered by the CWA is not properly before the

Court and lacks merit in any event .............................. 40

A. The Court should not consider petitioners’ new

arguments about covered tributaries.................... 41

B. Petitioners’ new arguments lack merit ................. 42

III. The court of appeals’ judgment should be affirmed... 48

Conclusion ................................................................................... 50

Appendix — Statutory and regulatory provisions ................ 1a

(III)

IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Page

Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169 (2014) ................ 19

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837 (1984).............................................................. 38

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,

451 U.S. 304 (1981).................................................. 2, 4, 5, 48

County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund,

140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020) ......................................................... 36

EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control

Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976).................................................. 4, 48

Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation

Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) .................................................. 38

International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,

479 U.S. 481 (1987).............................................................. 32

Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ................... 33

NRDC, Inc. v. Callaway,

392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975) ........................................... 6

Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) ......... passim

Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41 (2014) ............ 32

Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v.

United States Army Corps of Eng’rs,

531 U.S. 159 (2001).....................................7, 8, 26, 27, 28, 33

Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) ............................ 32

Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795 (2019) ....................... 22

United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co.,

504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974) ............................................... 6

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) ....................... 38

United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp.,

411 U.S. 655 (1973)................................................................ 4

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,

474 U.S. 121 (1985)..................................................... passim

V

Constitution, statutes, and regulations:

Page

U.S. Const. Art. I ................................................................... 38

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. ................................ 2

§ 402 .................................................................................... 5

§ 404 ......................................................................... passim

33 U.S.C. 1251(a) ................................................... 2, 33, 1a

33 U.S.C. 1251(b) ....................................................... 34, 2a

33 U.S.C. 1251 note ........................................................... 5

33 U.S.C. 1252(a) ............................................................. 34

33 U.S.C. 1311(a) ................................................... 5, 36, 3a

33 U.S.C. 1313 .................................................................... 2

33 U.S.C. 1319(a)(3)......................................................... 10

33 U.S.C. 1321 .................................................................... 2

33 U.S.C. 1342 ................................................................ 2, 5

33 U.S.C. 1342(b) ............................................................... 5

33 U.S.C. 1344 ........................................................ 2, 38, 3a

33 U.S.C. 1344(a) ................................................... 5, 37, 3a

33 U.S.C. 1344(e)(1) ............................................... 7, 37, 4a

33 U.S.C. 1344(f )(1)(A) ............................................... 7, 5a

33 U.S.C. 1344(f )(1)(C) ............................................. 43, 6a

33 U.S.C. 1344(g) ......................................................... 5, 7a

33 U.S.C. 1344(g)(1) ........................................ 7, 21, 45, 7a

33 U.S.C. 1361 .................................................................. 38

33 U.S.C. 1362(6) ....................................................... 5, 19a

33 U.S.C. 1362(7) .............................................passim, 19a

33 U.S.C. 1362(12)(A) ................................................ 5, 20a

33 U.S.C. 1377(e) ..................................................... 5, 7, 21

Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217,

91 Stat. 1566 .......................................................................... 6

Sec. 67(b), § 404(e)(1), 91 Stat. 1600 ................................ 7

Sec. 67(b), § 404(f )(1)(A), 91 Stat. 1600 ........................... 7

Sec. 67(b), § 404(g)(1), 91 Stat. 1601 .......................... 7, 23

VI

Statutes and regulations—Continued:

Page

Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,

86 Stat. 816 ............................................................................ 5

Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948,

ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155............................................................. 4

Rivers and Harbors Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1899,

ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121............................................................. 4

§ 9, 30 Stat. 1151 ........................................................ 20, 46

§ 10, 30 Stat. 1151 ...................................................... 20, 46

§ 13, 30 Stat. 1152 ............................................................ 47

5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) .................................................................. 36

33 U.S.C. 407 ...................................................................... 4, 47

33 C.F.R. 323.2(d) (1978)............................................... 20, 23a

33 C.F.R. (2008):

Section 328.3(a)(1) ................................................... 8, 24a

Section 328.3(a)(2) ................................................. 45, 24a

Section 328.3(a)(4) ................................................. 45, 24a

Section 328.3(a)(5) ................................................... 8, 24a

Section 328.3(a)(7) ..................................................... 8, 24a

Section 328.3(b).................................................... 8, 30, 25a

Section 328.3(c) .................................................... 8, 20, 35a

33 C.F.R. (2021):

Section 330.1 ...................................................................... 9

Section 330.1(b)................................................................ 37

40 C.F.R. (2008):

Section 230.3(s)(1) ..................................................... 8, 26a

Section 230.3(s)(5) ..................................................... 8, 26a

Section 230.3(s)(7) ..................................................... 8, 26a

Section 230.3(t) .......................................................... 8, 27a

VII

Miscellaneous:

Page

Charles D. Ablard & Brian Boru O’Neill,

Wetland Protection and Section 404 of

the Federal Water Pollution Control

Act Amendments of 1972, 1 Vt. L. Rev. 51 (1976) ........... 47

Black’s Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed. 1968) ........................ 22

123 Cong. Rec. 10,420 (1977) ................................................ 21

123 Cong. Rec. 26,725 (1977) .................................................. 7

T. E. Dahl, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Status and

Trends of Wetlands in the Conterminous United

States 2004 to 2009 (Sept. 2011), https://www.

fws.gov/wetlands/documents/status-and-trends-ofwetlands-in-the-onterminous-united-states2004-to-2009.pdf .................................................................. 19

Development of New Regulations by the Corps

of Engineers, Implementing Section 404:

Hearings before the Subcomm. on Water

Resources of the House Comm. on Public

Works and Transportation, 94th Cong.,

1st Sess. (1975) .................................................................... 20

38 Fed. Reg. 13,528 (May 22, 1973) ....................................... 6

39 Fed. Reg. 12,115 (Apr. 3, 1974) ................................... 5, 20

40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 (July 25, 1975) ........................................ 6

42 Fed. Reg. 37,122 (July 19, 1977) ...................... 6, 20, 23, 38

51 Fed. Reg. 41,206 (Nov. 13, 1986) ....................................... 7

80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) ......................... 12, 35, 43

84 Fed. Reg. 56,626 (Oct. 22, 2019) ...................................... 13

85 Fed. Reg. 22,250 (Apr. 21, 2020) ........................... 3, 13, 31

86 Fed. Reg. 69,372 (Dec. 7, 2021) .............................. passim

H.R. 3199, 95th Cong. (1977) .................................................. 7

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 830, 95th Cong.,

1st Sess. (1977) .................................................................... 21

H.R. Rep. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) ................... 19

H.R. Rep. No. 1396, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) ................... 6

VIII

Miscellaneous—Continued:

Page

National Research Council, Wetlands: Characteristics and Boundaries (1995), https://nap.

nationalacademies.org/catalog/4766/wetlandscharacteristics-and-boundaries ............................... 3, 20, 30

S. Conf. Rep. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) ............ 19

S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) ................... 4, 34

S. Rep. No. 870, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).................. 7, 21

Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control

Act Amendments of 1972: Hearings Before the

Senate Comm. on Public Works,

94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) ................................................ 20

R. Daniel Smith & Charles V. Klimas, Eng’r

Research & Dev. Ctr., A Regional Guidebook

for Applying the Hydrogeomorphic Approach

to Assessing Wetland Functions of Selected Regional Wetland Subclasses, Yazoo Basin, Lower

Mississippi River Alluvial Valley (Apr. 2002),

https://erdc-library.erdc.dren.mil/jspui/

bitstream/11681/6990/1/EL-TR-02-4.pdf ......................... 30

The American Heritage Dictionary of the

English Language (1975)................................................... 22

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs:

Regulatory Guidance Letter: No. 16-01

(Oct. 2016), https://www.spn. usace.army.

mil/Portals/68/docs/regulatory/resources/

RGL/RGL1601.pdf .................................................... 36

Regulatory Impact Analysis for 2021

Reissuance and Modification of

Nationwide Permits (Jan. 3, 2021),

https://www.regulations.gov/document/

COE-2020-0002-0511 ................................................. 37

IX

Miscellaneous—Continued:

Page

United States Environmental Protection Agency,

Connectivity of Streams & Wetlands to

Downstream Waters: A Review & Synthesis

of the Scientific Evidence (Jan. 2015),

https://ordspub.epa.gov/ords/eims/

eimscomm.getfile?p_download_

id=523020 .......................................................2, 19, 24, 29, 35

United States Environmental Protection Agency &

Dep’t of the Army:

Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following the U.S.

Supreme Court’s Decision in Rapanos v.

United States & Carabell v. United States

(Dec. 2, 2008), https://www.epa.gov/sites/

default/files/2016-02/documents/cwa_

jurisdiction_ following_rapanos120208.pdf ............. 29

Technical Support Document for the Proposed

“Revised Definition of ‘ Waters of the United

States’ ” Rule (Nov. 18, 2021), https://www.

epa.gov/system/files/documents/2021-12/

tsd-proposedrule_508.pdf ....................... 29, 30, 35, 43

Webster’s New International Dictionary of

the English Language:

(2d ed. 1954) ..................................................................... 43

(2d ed. 1958) ..................................................................... 22

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 21-454

MICHAEL SACKETT & CHANTELL SACKETT,

PETITIONERS

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. A1A39) is reported at 8 F.4th 1075. The opinion of the district court (Pet. App. B1-B32) is not published in the

Federal Supplement but is available at 2019 WL

13026870.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

August 16, 2021. The petition for a writ of certiorari

was filed on September 22, 2021. The petition was

granted on January 24, 2022. The jurisdiction of this

Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

2

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

Pertinent statues and regulations are reprinted in

the appendix to this brief. App., infra, 1a-27a.

STATEMENT

The Clean Water Act (CWA or Act), 33 U.S.C. 1251

et seq., is the preeminent federal law protecting the Nation’s waters. Adopted in 1972, the Act was a “total restructuring” of the prior statutory framework. City of

Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (citation

omitted). In its place, the CWA created a comprehensive scheme to “restore and maintain the chemical,

physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. 1251(a).

A centerpiece of that comprehensive framework is

the term “navigable waters,” which the CWA broadly

defines as “the waters of the United States, including

the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. 1362(7). Waters satisfying that definition are often called “covered” or “jurisdictional” waters because they determine the scope

of the Act’s key programs, including its water-quality

standards, oil-spill prevention program, and permitting

programs regulating the discharge of pollutants. See

33 U.S.C. 1313, 1321, 1342, 1344.

This case concerns the test for determining when

wetlands adjacent to other covered waters are themselves “waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C. 1362(7).

Wetlands, such as swamps, bogs, marshes, and fens, are

“transitional areas between terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems” characterized by sustained inundation or saturation with water. Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA), Connectivity of Streams & Wetlands to Downstream Waters: A Review & Synthesis of the Scientific

Evidence 2-5 (Jan. 2015) (2015 EPA Report). Wetlands

play a critical role in regulating water quality. Among

3

other things, they provide flood control and trap and filter sediment and other pollutants that would otherwise

be carried into downstream waters. See National Research Council, Wetlands: Characteristics and Boundaries 35, 38 (1995) (NRC Report).

For more than four decades, the expert agencies

charged with administering the Act—the EPA and the

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps)—have interpreted the “waters of the United States” to include wetlands adjacent to other covered waters. The agencies

have consistently treated such adjacent wetlands as

covered even if (as is often the case) they are separated

from other covered waters by a natural or artificial barrier like a river berm or a dike. The agencies adhered

to the view that such a barrier does not categorically

preclude jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands even in a

2020 regulation that would have substantially curtailed

the CWA’s coverage in other respects. See 85 Fed. Reg.

22,250, 22,307 (Apr. 21, 2020). And the agencies are currently engaged in a rulemaking that, among other

things, proposes to reaffirm and refine their longstanding definition of covered adjacent wetlands. See 86 Fed.

Reg. 69,372 (Dec. 7, 2021).

Consistent with its longstanding interpretation of

the CWA, the EPA concluded in this case that the wetlands on petitioners’ property near Priest Lake, Idaho,

are covered waters. The wetlands at issue are 30 feet

from a tributary to Priest Lake and just 300 feet from

the lake itself. But petitioners contend that those wetlands are categorically excluded from the CWA’s coverage because they are separated from the adjacent tributary by a barrier—here, a road. That categorical limitation is inconsistent with the CWA’s text, structure,

and history, as well as this Court’s precedent. It would

4

also severely undermine a central component of the

CWA’s comprehensive scheme for protecting the Nation’s waters.

A. Statutory Background

1. Before the CWA, no comprehensive federal law

protected the Nation’s waters from pollution. In the

1890s, Congress had “passed a series of laws that were

later reenacted as the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.”

United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411

U.S. 655, 663 (1973); see Act of Mar. 3, 1899 (RHA), ch.

425, 30 Stat. 1121. The RHA principally focused on navigability, though it also contained a provision, which remains in force, generally prohibiting the discharge of

“refuse matter” into any “navigable water of the United

States” or any “tributary of any navigable water.” 33

U.S.C. 407. In 1948, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), ch. 758, 62 Stat.

1155, which focused on water-quality standards rather

than the conduct of individual polluters. See EPA v.

California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426

U.S. 200, 202-203 (1976).

In 1972, Congress enacted the CWA after concluding

that these prior efforts had been “inadequate in every

vital aspect.” S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7

(1971) (1971 Senate Report). Unlike its predecessors,

the CWA was “not merely another law ‘touching interstate waters.’ ” City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 317 (citation omitted). Instead, the Act was a “ ‘complete rewriting’ ” of existing law, designed to “establish an all-

5

encompassing program of water pollution regulation.”

Id. at 317-318 (citation omitted). 1

The Act’s centerpiece is a prohibition on the unauthorized “discharge of any pollutant.” 33 U.S.C. 1311(a).

The Act defines a “discharge” to include “any addition

of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point

source.” 33 U.S.C. 1362(12)(A). The term “pollutant”

includes “dredged spoil” and fill material, such as

“rock” and “sand.” 33 U.S.C. 1362(6). And, as noted

above, the Act broadly defines the term “navigable waters” to mean “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. 1362(7).

The CWA establishes two permitting programs for

authorizing discharges. Under Section 404, the Corps

may issue a permit “for the discharge of dredged or fill

material into the navigable waters at specified disposal

sites.” 33 U.S.C. 1344(a). Under Section 402, the EPA

may issue a permit for the discharge of other pollutants,

such as chemical waste or sewage. 33 U.S.C. 1342. The

Act allows States, Tribes, and territories to assume responsibility for those permitting programs in some circumstances. 33 U.S.C. 1342(b), 1344(g), 1377(e).

2. In 1974, the Corps published regulations implementing the Section 404 permitting program. 39 Fed.

Reg. 12,115 (Apr. 3, 1974). In that rulemaking, the Corps

viewed “navigable waters” as a term of art for waters

subject to Congress’s power to regulate interstate channels of commerce, and it construed Section 404 to apply

to the same limited set of waters as a pre-existing permitting program under the RHA. Ibid.; see id. at

The 1972 legislation was styled as an amendment to the FWPCA

and was renamed the Clean Water Act in 1977. See FWPCA

Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816; 33 U.S.C.

1251 note.

1

6

12,119. Reviewing courts, Members of Congress, and

the EPA all disagreed with that approach. See, e.g.,

United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d

1317, 1325 (6th Cir. 1974); H.R. Rep. No. 1396, 93d

Cong., 2d Sess. 23-27 (1974); 38 Fed. Reg. 13,528, 13,529

(May 22, 1973). The Corps ultimately was enjoined to

adopt new regulations recognizing the agency’s “full

regulatory mandate.” NRDC, Inc. v. Callaway, 392

F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).

The Corps then broadened its regulations to assert

Section 404 jurisdiction over “waters that have been

used in the past, are now used, or are susceptible to use”

in interstate or foreign commerce, including waters

“subject to the ebb and flow of the tide,” and their tributaries; interstate waters; certain other intrastate waters; and wetlands “adjacent” to waters within the foregoing categories. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320, 31,324 (July 25,

1975). The Corps defined “adjacent” to mean “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring,” and specified that

“[w]etlands separated from other waters of the United

States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river

berms, beach dunes and the like are ‘adjacent wetlands.’ ” 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,144 (July 19, 1977). The

regulations defined “wetlands” to mean “those areas

that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground

water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support,

and that under normal circumstances do support, a

prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.” Ibid.

In 1977, Congress substantially amended the CWA

while leaving unchanged the definition of “navigable

waters.” See Clean Water Act of 1977 (1977 Act), Pub.

L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566. In the runup to those

amendments, Congress considered proposals to amend

7

Section 404, and debate on those proposals “centered

largely on the issue of wetlands preservation.” Solid

Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. United States Army

Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 170 (2001) (SWANCC )

(citation omitted). The House passed a bill that would

have limited the waters and adjacent wetlands to which

Section 404 applies. H.R. 3199, 95th Cong. § 16 (1977).

Many legislators objected, with one characterizing the

proposed limitation as an “open invitation” to pollute

other wetlands. 123 Cong. Rec. 26,725 (1977) (statement of Sen. Hart); see id. at 26,714-26,716. The Senate

ultimately rejected the proposal. Id. at 26,728; cf.

S. Rep. No. 870, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977) (1977

Senate Report).

Congress instead modified the CWA in other respects while explicitly reaffirming the Act’s coverage of

“adjacent” wetlands. The 1977 Act exempted certain

activities, including many agricultural and silvicultural

activities, from the Section 404 permitting program.

See § 67(b), 91 Stat. 1600 (33 U.S.C. 1344(f )(1)(A)). To

streamline the permitting process, the 1977 Act authorized the Corps to issue “general permits on a State, regional, or nationwide basis.” Ibid. (33 U.S.C. 1344(e)(1)).

And, as particularly relevant here, the 1977 Act established a mechanism for States and Tribes to issue

Section 404 permits for discharges into “navigable

waters”—except for a subset of covered waters, “including wetlands adjacent thereto,” for which the Corps retained exclusive permitting authority. § 67(b), 91 Stat.

1601 (33 U.S.C. 1344(g)(1)); see 33 U.S.C. 1377(e).

3. In 1986, the Corps revised its Section 404 regulations to take account of the 1977 Act and other developments. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,206 (Nov. 13, 1986). The

EPA adopted comparable regulations, and the agencies’

8

parallel regulations persisted in substantially the same

form for the next 30 years, including the period at issue

here. 86 Fed. Reg. at 69,373 & n.5.

Those regulations defined the term “waters of the

United States” to include “[a]ll waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including

all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the

tide” (i.e., traditional navigable waters), and all “[t]ributaries” of such waters. 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(1) and (5)

(2008) (emphasis omitted); see 40 C.F.R. 230.3(s)(1) and

(5) (2008). 2 The regulatory definition also encompassed

“[w]etlands adjacent to” traditional navigable waters or

their tributaries. 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(7) (2008); see 40

C.F.R. 230.3(s)(7) (2008). The regulations contained the

same definitions of “wetlands” and “adjacent” that the

Corps had issued before the 1977 Act. See 33 C.F.R.

328.3(b) and (c) (2008); 40 C.F.R. 230.3(t) (2008).

B. The Present Controversy

1. Petitioners own .63 acres of property near Priest

Lake, “one of the largest lakes in Idaho.” Pet. App. A8.

The parcel is bounded by roads to the north and south.

Ibid. Across the south road is a line of houses fronting

As used in this brief, the term “traditional navigable waters” encompasses wholly intrastate waters used or susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce. Cf. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172 (referring to Congress’s “traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or

had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made”).

Petitioners, by contrast, appear to use the term to refer solely to

waters that themselves cross state lines. See, e.g., Pet. Br. 35

(equating “traditional ‘navigable waters’ ” with three categories of

“interstate waters”) (citation omitted); id. at 43 (distinguishing between “traditional navigable waters” and “intrastate navigable waters”).

2

9

Priest Lake, which is about 300 feet from petitioners’

property. Ibid. Across the north road “lies the Kalispell Bay Fen, a large wetlands complex that drains

into an unnamed tributary” of Kalispell Creek, which in

turn feeds into Priest Lake. Ibid. The unnamed tributary is about 30 feet from petitioners’ property. Id. at

A33. Historically, petitioners’ property was part of the

larger Kalispell Bay Fen complex, which then drained

directly into Priest Lake. J.A. 30-31. Today, petitioners’ property remains connected to the fen and the lake

by “shallow subsurface flow.” J.A. 32, 41.

Petitioners purchased the property in 2004. Pet.

App. A8. Eight years earlier, the Corps had determined

that the property contains wetlands covered by the

CWA. J.A. 10-12. The Corps had provided the thenowner of the property with information on the Corps’

nationwide permits, J.A. 12, which can obviate the need

to obtain a site-specific permit for some activities, including home construction. See 33 C.F.R. 330.1.

In 2007, without a CWA permit, petitioners—who

operated a commercial construction and excavation

business—dumped approximately 1700 cubic yards of

gravel and sand to fill the wetlands and prepare the site

for building. J.A. 19-20, 22-24; Pet. App. A8-A9. In May

2007, EPA and Corps employees inspected petitioners’

property in response to a complaint. J.A. 18. They observed soils, vegetation, and pooling water characteristic of wetlands. J.A. 19, 27-29; see Pet. App. A37-A39

(site-visit photos); J.A. 20-21, 46-50 (same). The EPA

ultimately informed petitioners that the property contains wetlands subject to CWA jurisdiction. J.A. 14.

Petitioners hired their own wetlands consultant, who

confirmed that the “site is part of a wetland.” J.A. 15.

10

In November 2007, the EPA issued an administrative

compliance order concluding that petitioners’ property

contains covered wetlands adjacent to other waters of

the United States and that petitioners had violated the

Act by discharging fill material into the wetlands without a permit. Pet. App. B2, D5-D7; see 33 U.S.C.

1319(a)(3). The order was based in part on the agency’s

finding that the wetlands on petitioners’ property improve Priest Lake’s water quality through sediment retention, contribute base flow to the Lake with beneficial

effects to fisheries, and provide flood control. J.A. 3540. The EPA directed petitioners to remove the fill material and restore the wetlands. Pet. App. D7-D8.

2. In 2008, petitioners brought this action under the

APA to challenge the EPA’s compliance order. Pet.

App. A9. The district court dismissed the complaint,

concluding that the CWA precludes pre-enforcement

judicial review. 2008 WL 3286801, at *2. The court of

appeals affirmed, 622 F.3d 1139, 1147, but this Court

granted certiorari and reversed, 566 U.S. 120, 131.

3. On remand, the district court granted summary

judgment to the EPA. Pet. App. B1-B32. The court first

found that substantial evidence supports the EPA’s determination that petitioners’ property contains “wetlands.” Id. at B18-B21. The court found that the property “was originally part of a large wetland complex

called the Kalispell Bay Fen,” which remains “mainly

undisturbed” across the road to the north. Id. at B20.

The district court also upheld the EPA’s determination that the wetlands on petitioners’ property are “ ‘water[s] of the United States’ ” because they are “adjacent

to a traditional navigable body of water; namely, Priest

Lake.” Pet. App. B21. The court explained that Priest

Lake “has been and is used in interstate commerce” and

11

is therefore a “ ‘traditional navigable water’ ” as defined

in the agencies’ regulations. Id. at B22 (citation omitted). The court also found, as an alternative basis for

upholding the EPA’s determination that the wetlands

on petitioners’ property are covered waters, that the

wetlands are adjacent to the unnamed tributary across

the road to the north, which flows into Kalispell Creek

and, in turn, into Priest Lake. Id. at B25-B30.

4. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. A1-A39.

The court first held that the case was not moot even

though the EPA had withdrawn the compliance order

while the appeal was pending. Id. at A12-A20. The

court then rejected petitioners’ challenge to the order

on the merits. Id. at A22-A36.

Petitioners contended that the EPA’s order was contrary to the CWA’s definition of “navigable waters,” 33

U.S.C. 1362(7), as interpreted by a plurality of this

Court in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).

See Pet. App. A20. As relevant here, a four-Justice plurality in Rapanos concluded that wetlands are “covered

by the Act” based on their adjacency to other covered

waters only if the wetlands have “a continuous surface

connection” to those other waters. 547 U.S. at 742. In

a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy set forth an alternative test that focused on whether adjacent wetlands have a “significant nexus” to traditional navigable

waters. Id. at 759 (citation omitted). The four dissenting Justices would have applied a broader test, which

meant that at least five Justices concluded that wetlands may be treated as covered waters if they satisfy

“either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test.” Id. at

810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Here, the court of appeals determined that, under

Ninth Circuit precedent, the CWA covers at least those

12

adjacent wetlands that satisfy Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test. Pet. App. A22-A31. Applying that

test, the court explained that “[t]he record plainly supports EPA’s conclusion that the wetlands on [petitioners’] property are adjacent to a jurisdictional tributary

and that, together with the similarly situated Kalispell

Bay Fen, they have a significant nexus to Priest Lake,

a traditional navigable water.” Id. at A33.

The court of appeals emphasized that the wetlands

are just 30 feet from the unnamed tributary, and that

they are separated from the tributary only by an “artificial barrier[]” (a road), which does “not defeat adjacency.” Pet. App. A33. With respect to the “significant

nexus” requirement, the court found that the EPA had

appropriately analyzed the wetlands on petitioners’

property together with the Kalispell Bay Fen, and that

“[t]he record further supports EPA’s conclusion that

these wetlands, in combination, significantly affect the

integrity of Priest Lake.” Id. at A35. The court noted

that the wetlands “provide important ecological and water quality benefits” to Priest Lake and are “ ‘especially

important in maintaining the high quality of Priest

Lake’s water, fish, and wildlife.’ ” Ibid.

C. Subsequent Regulatory Developments

1. The lower courts decided this case under the regulations in effect when the events at issue occurred.

Pet. App. A6-A7 & n.1, B17 n.3. Between 2015 and 2020,

the EPA and the Corps undertook three significant

rulemakings. In the 2015 Clean Water Rule, the agencies adopted an approach under which some tributaries

and adjacent wetlands were deemed “jurisdictional by

rule,” based on their significant nexus to traditional

navigable waters, interstate waters, or the territorial

seas, without the need for “case-specific analysis.” 80

13

Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,058-37,059 (June 29, 2015). In 2019,

the agencies repealed the Clean Water Rule. 84 Fed.

Reg. 56,626, 56,626 (Oct. 22, 2019).

In the 2020 Navigable Waters Protection Rule

(NWPR), the agencies redefined the term “waters of

the United States.” 85 Fed. Reg. at 22,250. Although

the NWPR was in other respects consistent with the

Rapanos plurality opinion, see id. at 22,273, it departed

from the plurality’s approach to adjacent wetlands. The

NWPR provided that a natural berm or other barrier

does not defeat CWA coverage of an adjacent wetland,

and that an artificial barrier like a levee or a road does

not defeat coverage in certain circumstances, such as

where the wetland is inundated by flooding from a covered water at least once in a typical year. Id. at 22,30722,313, 22,338.

2. As a result of various stays and injunctions, the

Clean Water Rule never fully took effect, and the NWPR

took effect nationwide for only three months. 86 Fed.

Reg. at 69,382 & nn.15-18. The agencies are currently

engaged in another notice-and-comment rulemaking.

The proposed rule, which was published in December

2021, would limit the CWA’s coverage of adjacent wetlands to wetlands that satisfy either the significantnexus test or the continuous-surface-connection test.

Id. at 69,373; see id. at 69,449-69,450. The proposed rule

thus covers a narrower set of wetlands than the 1986

rule in effect when Rapanos was decided and when petitioners’ discharges occurred. That proposed approach

reflects the agencies’ consideration of “the statute as a

whole, the scientific record, relevant Supreme Court

case law, and the agencies’ experience and expertise after more than 30 years of implementing the 1986 regulations.” Id. at 69,374.

14

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. When a wetland is adjacent to another water covered by the CWA, the wetland itself is among the “waters of the United States,” 33 U.S.C. 1362(7), if it satisfies the significant-nexus test in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S.

715 (2006). The mere presence of a berm, levee, or other

similar barrier does not defeat CWA coverage.

A. Statutory text, structure, and history establish

that adjacent wetlands are “waters of the United

States” covered by the CWA. Although the Corps initially took a different view in implementing Section 404,

it quickly reversed course and revised its regulations to

include “adjacent wetlands.” In 1977, Congress approved that approach, amending the Act in a manner

that presupposes that “adjacent” wetlands are covered

“waters.” And in United States v. Riverside Bayview

Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), this Court unanimously upheld the Corps’ regulations interpreting the

“waters of the United States” to include adjacent wetlands.

Congress had good reason to include adjacent wetlands in the CWA’s comprehensive scheme. Wetlands

play an essential role in protecting the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of neighboring waterways,

including by filtering pollutants, storing water, and

providing flood control. Leaving those wetlands unprotected would thwart the CWA’s comprehensive scheme

and seriously compromise its protection of traditional

navigable waters.

B. There is no sound basis for requiring that wetlands can be treated as covered waters only if they satisfy a continuous-surface-connection test. The Rapanos

plurality’s rationale for adopting such a test rested

15

largely on a misreading of Riverside Bayview. The plurality’s brief discussion did not otherwise attempt to

ground its continuous-surface-connection test in the

text, history, or purpose of the Act, and those considerations all weigh against foreclosing jurisdiction over

wetlands that are adjacent to other covered waters but

separated by a berm, dike, or other similar barrier.

Treating a continuous-surface-connection test as the

exclusive criterion for CWA coverage would also lead to

arbitrary and illogical results, which is why even the

2020 NWPR rejected that approach.

C. The significant-nexus test, by contrast, ensures

that the CWA covers those adjacent wetlands that significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological

integrity of the Nation’s traditional navigable waters.

The Act is designed to provide comprehensive protections to traditional navigable waters, which necessitates

regulating the network of wetlands and tributaries that

significantly affect those waters—even in the absence

of a continuous surface connection. The significantnexus test also provides an administrable and nowfamiliar standard, which is soundly based in science and

well within Congress’s constitutional authority.

D. This Court has held that the agencies’ interpretations of the CWA are entitled to deference, and the

Chief Justice’s Rapanos concurrence emphasized that

the agencies could have “avoided” the result in those

consolidated cases through notice-and-comment rulemaking. 547 U.S. at 758. The agencies are following

that course here and have issued a proposed rule refining their longstanding view of the CWA’s coverage of

adjacent wetlands.

II. In addition to proposing a continuous-surfaceconnection test for adjacent wetlands, petitioners now

16

assert that this Court should drastically restrict the

tributaries covered by the CWA. Those arguments are

not properly before the Court and lack merit in any

event.

A. Petitioners’ new arguments about tributaries

contradict their assurance at the certiorari stage that

they were not challenging the jurisdictional status of

the tributary at issue here. And even if petitioners had

not explicitly disclaimed the issue, it still would not be

properly presented because it makes no difference to

the disposition of this case.

B. If the Court considers petitioners’ new arguments, it should reject them. Petitioners’ proposed limitations contradict the text, structure, and history of the

CWA. Indeed, petitioners’ reading would thwart the

Act’s fundamental design by giving it a narrower scope

than even the 1899 RHA.

First, petitioners’ proposed exclusion of artificial

tributaries is unsound. The text of the Act expressly

contemplates that drainage ditches may be covered waters; the distinction between natural and artificial tributaries has no bearing on whether a tributary can carry

water and pollutants into traditional navigable waters;

and the Rapanos plurality indicated that the artificial

drainage ditches at issue there would be covered tributaries as long as they contained relatively permanent

flows of water (as the tributary here undisputedly does).

Second, petitioners’ proposal to exclude all nonnavigable tributaries from the Act’s coverage would

radically depart from the way the statute has been understood for decades and would contradict the views of

all nine Justices in Rapanos. Congress deliberately

omitted the modifier “navigable” from the CWA’s definition of covered waters precisely because it intended

17

to extend the Act beyond the waters covered by prior

statutes keyed to navigability.

III. This Court should affirm the judgment of the

court of appeals. That court correctly applied the

significant-nexus test in upholding the EPA’s determination that the wetlands on petitioners’ property, which

are located 30 feet from a tributary of Priest Lake and

300 feet from the Lake itself, are covered waters. The

wetlands were historically part of a larger complex of

wetlands from which water flowed directly into the

Lake, and shallow subsurface flow remains. Taken as a

whole, the wetland complex significantly affects the integrity of the Lake, including its water quality. Excluding such wetlands from the CWA’s coverage would severely compromise the Act’s protection of the Nation’s

navigable waters.

ARGUMENT

I. THE MERE PRESENCE OF A BERM OR OTHER BARRIER DOES NOT DEFEAT CWA COVERAGE OF AN

ADJACENT WETLAND THAT HAS A SIGNIFICANT

NEXUS TO A TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATER

Petitioners do not dispute that at least some wetlands adjacent to other covered waters are covered by

the CWA. Rather, the parties’ disagreement concerns

the criteria used to determine which wetlands are sufficiently connected to other covered waters to come

within the “waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C.

1362(7). Petitioners assert that a restrictive version of

the “continuous surface connection” test articulated by

the plurality in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715

(2006), is the exclusive basis for CWA coverage of wetlands. That rigid approach has no grounding in the

CWA’s text, structure, or history. It would upend an

understanding of the Act’s coverage that has prevailed

18

for nearly half a century. And it would seriously compromise the Act’s comprehensive scheme by denying

protection to many adjacent wetlands—and thus the

covered waters with which those wetlands are inextricably linked.

Petitioners’ approach would also make the Act’s central jurisdictional provision turn on arbitrary and shifting distinctions. A small surface connection would suffice, but the presence of a berm would defeat coverage

despite a pervasive hydrological connection between a

waterway and an adjacent wetland. Building a levee to

protect a river and its adjacent wetlands could strip the

wetlands of CWA coverage. A natural river berm could

defeat coverage even though its very existence was a

result of floods reflecting the close connection between

the river and the neighboring wetlands. And the Act’s

coverage could come and go as floods or storms created

or breached natural barriers like berms and dunes.

This Court should reject petitioners’ restrictive test.

A continuous surface connection to a covered water is

certainly a permissible basis for CWA coverage of wetlands. But it has never been—and should not become—

the only basis. Rather, CWA coverage of wetlands can

also be established under Justice Kennedy’s significantnexus test, as it was in this case.

19

A. The “Waters Of The United States” Include Adjacent

Wetlands

As in answering any other question of statutory interpretation, the Court should interpret the CWA’s text

“with reference to the statutory context, ‘structure, history, and purpose.’ ” Abramski v. United States, 573

U.S. 169, 179 (2014) (citation omitted). All of those interpretive tools, as well as this Court’s precedent, establish that the waters covered by the CWA include adjacent wetlands—even if those wetlands are separated

by a berm or other barrier.

1. Although the CWA applies to “navigable waters,”

Congress broadly defined that term to include “the waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C. 1362(7). The

breadth of that definition reflected a deliberate choice.

The relevant House bill would have defined “navigable

waters” as the “navigable waters of the United States,

including the territorial seas.” H.R. Rep. No. 911, 92d

Cong., 2d Sess. 356 (1972) (emphasis omitted). But in

conference the word “navigable” was deleted from that

definition, and the conference report urged that the

term “be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation.” S. Conf. Rep. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d

Sess. 144 (1972).

The CWA’s broad definition is naturally read to encompass wetlands. Wetlands, such as swamps, bogs,

marshes, and fens, are “transitional areas between terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems.” 2015 EPA Report 25. The presence of water is “universally regarded as the

most basic feature of wetlands.” T. E. Dahl, U.S. Fish

& Wildlife Serv., Status and Trends of Wetlands in the

Conterminous United States 2004 to 2009, at 20 (Sept.

2011). Indeed, the “essential characteristic[]” of a wetland is “recurrent, sustained inundation or saturation at

20

or near the surface.” NRC Report 3 (emphases omitted).

After the CWA’s enactment, the Corps initially excluded most wetlands from the Section 404 permitting

program by taking the position that the program applied only to the waters covered by Sections 9 and 10 of

the Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA). The Corps’ initial

view was premised on prior uses of “navigable waters”

as a term of art for waters that Congress may regulate

as channels of interstate commerce. 39 Fed. Reg. at

12,115. That view was roundly criticized as failing to

reflect the full scope of the CWA, and the Corps quickly

adopted a broader definition of “waters of the United

States” that encompassed wetlands adjacent to other

covered waters. See pp. 5-6, supra.

The Corps defined “adjacent” to mean “bordering,

contiguous, or neighboring,” and it has adhered to that

definition since 1977. 42 Fed. Reg. at 37,144; see 33

C.F.R. 328.3(c) (2008). That definition does not require

that the wetlands directly abut another covered water.

To the contrary, the 1977 regulations explicitly provided that “[w]etlands separated from other waters of

the United States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like are ‘adjacent

wetlands.’ ” 33 C.F.R. 323.2(d) (1978); see 33 C.F.R.

328.3(c) (2008) (same).

2. The Corps’ revised regulations—and specifically

the CWA’s application to adjacent wetlands—were the

subject of extensive congressional hearings. See, e.g.,

Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972: Hearings Before the Senate

Comm. on Public Works, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 38-44, 6869, 239, 325-326 (1976); Development of New Regulations by the Corps of Engineers, Implementing Section

21

404: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works and

Transportation, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7, 10, 31 (1975).

The House then passed a bill that would have limited

Section 404 to a subset of traditional navigable waters

and wetlands adjacent to them, but the Senate rejected

that proposal. See 123 Cong. Rec. 10,420-10,421, 10,434,

26,728 (1977).

Congress instead modified Section 404 in a way that

incorporated into the statutory text an explicit endorsement of the Corps’ inclusion of adjacent wetlands. 1977

Act § 67(b), 91 Stat. 1601. That amendment authorizes

States and Tribes to administer the Section 404 permitting program covering “the discharge of dredged or fill

material into the navigable waters (other than those waters which are presently used, or are susceptible to use

in their natural condition or by reasonable improvement

as a means to transport interstate or foreign commerce

* * * including wetlands adjacent thereto).” 33 U.S.C.

1344(g)(1) (emphases added); see 33 U.S.C. 1377(e) (extension to Tribes).

The italicized reservation of authority to the Corps

presupposed that “wetlands adjacent” to traditional

navigable waters were subject to the Section 404 program, since otherwise the exclusion of those wetlands

from the States’ and Tribes’ potential permitting authority would have been superfluous. The 1977 legislative record confirms that understanding. See 1977 Senate Report 10 (stating that committee wished to “maintain[]” coverage of wetlands); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 830,

95th Cong., 1st Sess. 98, 104 (1977) (stating that the

Corps will “continue” to exercise Section 404 jurisdiction over “adjacent wetlands”).

22

By using the pre-existing regulatory term “adjacent” wetlands, Congress signaled its intent to incorporate the Corps’ regulatory conception of adjacency.

“When a statutory term is ‘obviously transplanted from

another legal source,’ it ‘brings the old soil with it.’ ”

Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019) (citation omitted). Here, that soil includes the Corps’ specification that a berm or barrier does not defeat adjacency. And that specification also accords with the

term’s plain meaning. One would naturally describe a

marsh as “adjacent” to a stream even if they were separated by a berm or levee. Contemporaneous dictionaries likewise defined the term “adjacent” in ways that

do not require direct abutment. See Black’s Law Dictionary 62 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (“Lying near or close to;

sometimes, contiguous; neighboring. Adjacent implies

that the two objects are not widely separated, though

they may not actually touch[.]”) (capitalization altered;

citation and emphasis omitted); The American Heritage

Dictionary of the English Language 16 (1975) (“Close

to; next to; lying near; adjoining.”); Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language 32 (2d

ed. 1958) (“Lying near, close, or contiguous; neighboring; bordering on.”) (emphasis omitted).

3. In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,

Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), this Court considered the “language, policies, and history” of the CWA, including the

amendments in the 1977 Act, and unanimously upheld

the Corps’ exercise of CWA jurisdiction over adjacent

wetlands. Id. at 139. The Court held that the Corps’

regulation defining “the waters of the United States” to

include wetlands adjacent to navigable waters “is valid

as a construction” of the Act. Id. at 131.

23

The Court first observed that “between open waters

and dry land may lie shallows, marshes, mudflats,

swamps, bogs—in short, a huge array of areas that are

not wholly aquatic but nevertheless fall far short of being dry land.” Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132. To

administer the statute, the Corps therefore “must necessarily choose some point at which water ends and land

begins.” Ibid. The Court further explained that, in

drawing that jurisdictional line, the Corps may take into

account “the evident breadth of congressional concern

for protection of water quality and aquatic ecosystems.”

Id. at 133. It quoted with apparent approval the Corps’

statement that “Federal jurisdiction under Section 404

must include any adjacent wetlands that form the border of or are in reasonable proximity to other waters of

the United States, as these wetlands are part of this

aquatic system.” Id. at 134 (quoting 42 Fed. Reg. at

37,128). The Court concluded that “the Corps’ ecological judgment about the relationship between waters and

their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate basis for

a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined

as waters under the Act.” Ibid.

The Court also viewed the 1977 Act as approving the

Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands.

Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 137-139. The Court observed that “the scope of the Corps’ asserted jurisdiction over wetlands was specifically brought to Congress’

attention, and Congress rejected measures designed to

curb the Corps’ jurisdiction in large part because of its

concern that protection of wetlands would be unduly

hampered by a narrowed definition of ‘navigable waters.’ ” Id. at 137. The Court also cited Section 404(g)(1)

as express textual evidence “that the term ‘waters’ included adjacent wetlands.” Id. at 138.

24

4. Congress had good reason to approve the inclusion of adjacent wetlands within the “waters of the

United States.” Wetlands affect “the chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of downstream waters by

performing essential water-quality functions, “including interruption and delay of the transport of waterborne contaminants over long distances; retention of

sediment; retention and slow release of flood waters;

and prevention and mitigation of drinking water contamination.” 86 Fed. Reg. at 69,392; see 2015 EPA Report ES-3 (explaining that wetlands “improve water

quality through the assimilation, transformation, or sequestration of pollutants, including excess nutrients

and chemical contaminants such as pesticides and metals”). Allowing wetlands to be filled without any permitting requirement would deprive interconnected

aquatic systems of those benefits and thereby threaten

the integrity of traditional navigable waters.

The same reasoning applies with full force when an

adjacent wetland is separated from the neighboring waters by a berm or barrier. Adjacent wetlands behind

berms can serve important water-quality functions, filtering pollutants and sediment before they reach downstream waters, and can help reduce the impacts of

storm surges caused by hurricanes. 86 Fed. Reg. at

69,429. Whether natural or manmade, “berms, dikes,

and similar features * * * typically do not block all water flow,” since water can “overtop” or flow beneath

them. Id. at 69,421, 69,429. And “filling in wetlands

separated from another water by a berm can mean that

floodwater, impurities, or runoff that would have been

stored or contained in the wetlands will instead flow out

to major waterways.” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 775 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).

25

B. There Is No Sound Basis For Imposing Petitioners’

Rigid Continuous-Surface-Connection Requirement

Petitioners urge the Court to adopt, as the exclusive

basis for CWA coverage of wetlands, a version of the

continuous-surface-connection test advocated by the

Rapanos plurality. But the plurality’s justifications for

that test are unpersuasive. And like the plurality, petitioners fail to acknowledge or justify the anomalous results that their rigid requirement would produce.

1. In concluding that only wetlands with a continuous surface connection to other covered waters are protected by the CWA, the Rapanos plurality relied primarily on two related propositions that it viewed as implicit in Riverside Bayview. First, the plurality suggested that the CWA term “waters” cannot reasonably

be construed to cover wetlands as such, and that discharges into wetlands therefore can be regulated only

when particular wetlands are properly deemed part of

other waters to which they are adjacent. See 547 U.S.

at 740. Second, the plurality concluded that this requirement will be satisfied only when “the wetland has

a continuous surface connection with [the adjacent] water.” Id. at 742. Those propositions are unsound and

rest on a misreading of Riverside Bayview.

a. The Rapanos plurality quoted the Riverside

Bayview Court’s statement that, “[o]n a purely linguistic level, it may appear unreasonable to classify ‘lands,’

wet or otherwise, as ‘waters.’ ” 547 U.S. at 740 (quoting

Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132). In the next sentence of its opinion, however, the Riverside Bayview

Court stated that “[s]uch a simplistic response * * *

does justice neither to the problem faced by the Corps

in defining the scope of its authority under § 404(a) nor

to the realities of the problem of water pollution that the

26

[CWA] was intended to combat.” 474 U.S. at 132. The

Court concluded that “adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters under the Act.” Id. at 134. And, as explained above, the CWA’s text, history, and purpose

likewise confirm that adjacent wetlands are themselves

“waters” covered by the Act. See pp. 19-24, supra.

b. The Rapanos plurality read Riverside Bayview

as resting on the “inherent ambiguity in drawing the

boundaries of any ‘waters.’ ” 547 U.S. at 740. The plurality also described Solid Waste Agency of Northern

Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), as having read Riverside

Bayview to be “refer[ring] to the close connection between waters and the wetlands that they gradually

blend into.” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 741. The plurality

concluded that “only those wetlands with a continuous

surface connection to bodies that are ‘waters of the

United States’ in their own right” can be protected by

the CWA, because only in that circumstance is it “difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.” Id. at 742.

The Rapanos plurality misconceived the nature of

the line-drawing problem in Riverside Bayview. The

Court in that case identified “shallows, marshes, mudflats, swamps, [and] bogs” as examples of “areas that

are not wholly aquatic but nevertheless fall far short of

being dry land,” and it observed that “[w]here on this

continuum to find the limit of ‘waters’ is far from obvious.” 474 U.S. at 132. The line-drawing problem in Riverside Bayview thus did not involve identifying the

outer boundary of a covered water at a particular site.

Rather, it involved the criteria that should be used to

determine whether particular types of hydrogeographic

features should be regarded as “waters” under the Act.

27

That line-drawing problem—in essence, determining

how wet is wet enough—can arise even when a particular swamp or marsh is separated by a barrier from a

nearby lake or stream. After discussing at some length

the regulatory definition of “wetlands” and its application to the property at issue in that case, see id. at 129131, the Riverside Bayview Court upheld as reasonable

“the Corps’ approach of defining adjacent wetlands as

‘waters’ within the meaning of ” the CWA, id. at 132.

2. As further support for its continuous-surface-connection test, the Rapanos plurality invoked SWANCC’s

holding that certain isolated ponds were not covered by

the CWA. The SWANCC Court had described Riverside Bayview as resting on “the significant nexus between the wetlands and” the adjacent waters. 531 U.S.

at 167. The Rapanos plurality in turn described

SWANCC as “reject[ing] the notion that the ecological

considerations upon which the Corps relied in Riverside

Bayview * * * provided an independent basis for including entities like ‘wetlands’ * * * within the phrase

‘the waters of the United States.’ ” 547 U.S. at 741 (citation omitted). In the plurality’s view, “SWANCC

found such ecological considerations irrelevant to the

question whether physically isolated waters come

within the Corps’ jurisdiction,” because the coverage inquiry for the “[i]solated ponds” at issue in that case

“presented no boundary-drawing problem that would

have justified the invocation of ecological factors.” Id.

at 741-742.

Contrary to the Rapanos plurality’s suggestion, the

Court in SWANCC did not hold that the particular

“ecological considerations upon which the Corps relied

in Riverside Bayview,” 547 U.S. at 741—i.e., the potential importance of wetlands to the quality of adjacent

28

waters—were irrelevant to CWA jurisdiction. Rather,

the Court held that a different ecological concern,

namely the potential use of the isolated ponds as habitat

for migratory birds, could not justify treating those

ponds as “waters of the United States.” See 531 U.S. at

164-165, 171-172. That ecological concern was not cognizable because it was unrelated to “what Congress had

in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been

navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made.”

Id. at 172. Here, by contrast, as in Riverside Bayview,

the government seeks to protect adjacent wetlands

based on their importance to the integrity of traditional

navigable waters nearby.

3. Aside from its mistaken reliance on Riverside

Bayview and SWANCC, the Rapanos plurality did not

attempt to ground the continuous-surface-connection

test in the CWA’s text or history. See 547 U.S. at 739742. And making a continuous surface connection a necessary condition for CWA coverage would affirmatively

undermine the Act’s purpose by creating an illogical jurisdictional gap. It would include any wetland with a

continuous surface connection, no matter how small.

But it would categorically exclude wetlands separated

from covered waters by a berm, dike, sand dune, or

other natural or manmade barrier, even if they are

closely connected by subsurface flow or periodic

floods—and regardless of such wetlands’ ecological importance to covered waters nearby and downstream.

“[O]verwhelming” scientific evidence shows that such

wetlands may significantly affect downstream waters.

86 Fed. Reg. at 69,398 (discussing the evidence that

wetlands lacking a continuous surface connection may

nonetheless “improv[e] water quality” downstream)

29

(citing 2015 EPA Report 4-20 to 4-38); see EPA &

Corps, Technical Support Document for the Proposed

“Revised Definition of ‘Waters of the United States’ ”

Rule 179-189 (Nov. 18, 2021) (Technical Support Document).

4. The continuous-surface-connection test was not

briefed in Rapanos. See 547 U.S. at 800 (Stevens, J.,

dissenting). And the plurality’s terse discussion of the

issue did not elaborate on that test in any detail: The

plurality distinguished a “continuous surface connection” from “an intermittent, physically remote hydrological connection,” but gave little further guidance on

the application of its test. Id. at 742 (plurality opinion).

That has not posed difficulties so long as the continuoussurface-connection test has been understood as a sufficient but not necessary condition for CWA coverage.

But if this Court made it the exclusive test, it would produce a host of thorny questions and potentially arbitrary results.

Petitioners, for example, repeatedly describe the Rapanos plurality’s test as requiring a “continuous surfacewater connection.” Pet. Br. 6 (emphasis added); see id.

at 8, 17, 21-22, 25. That formulation appears in Justice

Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Rapanos, see 547 U.S.

at 774, but not in the plurality opinion itself. The plurality opinion instead refers interchangeably to a “continuous surface connection” and a “continuous physical

connection.” Id. at 742, 751 n.13, 757. The agencies

have determined that a continuous surface connection

can be present when a wetland directly abuts another

covered water, even if surface water is not continuously

present between the two. See EPA & Corps, Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following the U.S. Supreme

30

Court’s Decision in Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States 7 & n.28 (Dec. 2, 2008) (Rapanos

Guidance). Petitioners’ demand for a continuous surface water connection would effectively limit CWA protection of wetlands to areas that are inundated throughout the year. But many wetlands have surface water

only seasonally or intermittently, and no scientific or

regulatory definition of wetlands demands year-round

surface water. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. 328.3(b) (2008); NRC

Report 3-5.

The continuous-surface-connection test would also

exclude jurisdiction and allow filling of wetlands that

are adjacent to a river but separated from it by a levee.

The Mississippi River, for example, features an extensive levee system built to prevent flooding. The Upper

Mississippi Valley alone includes more than 10,000

miles of levees. Technical Support Document 180.

Those levees would preclude CWA coverage under the

continuous-surface-connection test even though adjacent wetlands are often a necessary part of the floodcontrol project—detaining floodwaters to protect surrounding and downstream communities—and even

though the wetlands maintain a hydrologic connection

to the river system. Cf. R. Daniel Smith & Charles V.

Klimas, Eng’r Research & Dev. Ctr., A Regional Guidebook for Applying the Hydrogeomorphic Approach to

Assessing Wetland Functions of Selected Regional

Wetland Subclasses, Yazoo Basin, Lower Mississippi

River Alluvial Valley 47 (Apr. 2002).

More broadly, a continuous-surface-connection requirement could make loss of CWA jurisdiction a consequence of building a road, levee, or other barrier—even

if the construction had little or no effect on the interde-

31

pendent relationship between a wetland and a neighboring water. That could create perverse incentives to

build or modify such barriers in a manner aimed either

at destroying or preserving federal jurisdiction.

A continuous-surface-connection test would also

yield vexing problems as applied to natural barriers like

“berms, banks, or dunes.” 85 Fed. Reg. at 22,307. As

the agencies explained in the 2020 NWPR, those “natural separations” are themselves “evidence of a dynamic

and regular direct hydrological surface connection,”

ibid., and are thus evidence that the wetlands are “inseparably bound up with” the adjacent waters, id. at

22,311. A “natural river berm,” for example, “can be

created by repeated flooding and sedimentation events

when a river overtops its banks and deposits sediment

between the river and a wetland.” Ibid. For precisely

that reason, the 2020 NWPR “maintain[ed] jurisdiction” over adjacent wetlands separated by natural barriers even as it followed the Rapanos plurality in other

respects. Id. at 22,307. Any other rule would mean that

CWA jurisdiction would appear and disappear as floods,

storms, erosion, and other natural processes created or

breached river berms and other barriers. Under a

strict reading of petitioners’ test, even a beaver dam

built between a wetland and a covered water could sever

jurisdiction over the wetland.

C. The Significant-Nexus Test Is A Permissible Basis For

Identifying Adjacent Wetlands Covered By The CWA

The CWA’s broad term “waters of the United

States” and the included concept of adjacent wetlands

are not self-defining and require administrative or judicial construction. Any viable construction must be

consistent with the Act’s text, structure, and purpose;

must comport with this Court’s precedent; and must not

32

rely on arbitrary, unreasonable, or unworkable lines. A

continuous-surface-connection test alone does not satisfy that standard, but Justice Kennedy’s significantnexus test does. Under that test, adjacent wetlands are

covered by the Act if they “possess a ‘significant nexus’

to” traditional navigable waters. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at

759 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation

omitted). And wetlands “possess the requisite nexus,

and thus come within the statutory phrase ‘navigable

waters,’ if the wetlands, either alone or in combination

with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly

affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of

other covered waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’ ” Id. at 780. Petitioners’ various criticisms (Br.

45-49) of that test lack merit.

1. The significant-nexus test responds to the fact

that the crucial CWA language is “Janus-faced,” with

two parts pointing in potentially different directions.

Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 57 (2014)

(plurality opinion). On the one hand, the text of the

definition—“the waters of the United States, including

the territorial seas,” 33 U.S.C. 1362(7)—is broad and

unqualified. That definition could be read literally to

refer to all water bodies within the United States. Cf.

International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 492

(1987) (stating that the Act applies to “virtually all bodies of water”). Under that reading, the statute’s coverage would be limited only by the outer bounds of Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce.

On the other hand, the term being defined (“navigable waters”) had been used in prior laws with a more

limited reach. When “a statute includes an explicit definition,” a court “must follow that definition.” Stenberg

v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000). But the term being

33

defined nonetheless may shed light on how the definition is best read. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States,

559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). Thus, in SWANCC the Court

observed that the “term ‘navigable’ has at least the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navigable in fact

or which could reasonably be so made.” 531 U.S. at 172;

see pp. 27-28, supra (discussing SWANCC ). Although

SWANCC did not involve wetlands, the Court’s reasoning indicates that CWA coverage of wetlands is warranted to the extent, but only to the extent, such coverage will further the Act’s overarching purpose of protecting traditional navigable waters.

The significant-nexus test reasonably implements

that understanding of the CWA’s text and design. It

recognizes both that protection of traditional navigable

waters is the ultimate objective of the CWA’s discharge

prohibition and that the protection of such waters requires restrictions on discharges into additional waters

as well. A “significant nexus” is a shorthand description

of adjacent wetlands that “significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of traditional

navigable waters. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780-781 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). That standard is

grounded in Congress’s stated intent to “restore and

maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity

of the Nation’s waters.” Id. at 759 (quoting 33 U.S.C.

1251(a)).

Riverside Bayview strongly supports that approach.

There, the Court recognized that, in determining

whether wetlands are appropriately treated as “waters”

under the CWA, the Corps could take account of “the

problem of water pollution that the [Act] was intended

34

to combat.” 474 U.S. at 132. The Court identified “the

evident breadth of congressional concern for protection

of water quality and aquatic ecosystems” as a principal

factor supporting the Corps’ decision “to interpret the

term ‘waters’ to encompass wetlands adjacent to waters

as more conventionally defined.” Id. at 133. And the

Court recognized that, in determining the proper characterization of hydrogeographic features that differ

substantially both from paradigmatic “waters” (e.g.,

lakes and streams) and from dry land, the agencies can

take into account the statutory purpose—ensuring adequate protection for traditional navigable waters—for

which that determination is being made. Id. at 134.

That reasoning strongly suggests that a “significant

nexus” to a traditional navigable water is a sufficient

basis for CWA coverage of a wetland.

2. Petitioners argue (Br. 46) that the significantnexus test gives undue weight to protection of water

quality at the expense of other objectives, including preserving “the primary responsibilities” of States in controlling pollution, 33 U.S.C. 1251(b). But restoring and

maintaining the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters is the CWA’s primary goal,

set forth in the first words of the first section of the statute. And the statute is designed to address that objective through a “comprehensive” federal program of pollution control. 33 U.S.C. 1252(a).

Achievement of Congress’s purposes requires regulation of discharges both into traditional navigable waters and into other waters whose “interconnection[s]”

with traditional navigable waters make them an appropriate subject of federal concern. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at

780 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see 1971

35

Senate Report at 77 (noting that “[w]ater moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source”) (quoted in Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133). Federal protection of

the Chesapeake Bay, for example, would be fundamentally incomplete and ineffectual if polluters could dump

fill into the interconnected network of adjacent wetlands in the same watershed. The significant-nexus test

identifies those wetlands that implicate the CWA’s core

concern of safeguarding traditional navigable waters.

The significant-nexus test also respects the role of

States and Tribes by limiting the Act’s coverage to wetlands and other waters that “significantly affect the integrity of waters where the federal interest is indisputable,” such as traditional navigable waters and the territorial seas, while leaving other “[w]aters that do not

implicate” such a federal interest “entirely to state and

tribal protection and management.” 86 Fed. Reg. at

69,399-69,400.

3. Petitioners are wrong to assert that the significant-nexus test is “ ‘opaque’ ” or produces “illogical” results. Pet. Br. 46-47 (citation omitted). In fact, application of the test reflects the empirical judgments that scientists routinely make. In 2015, the EPA produced an

exhaustive “peer-reviewed compilation and analysis” of

the “current scientific understanding of the connectivity of and mechanisms by which streams and wetlands,

singly or in combination, affect the chemical, physical,

and biological integrity of downstream waters.” 80 Fed.

Reg. at 37,061-37,062. That report explains the basic

science behind evaluating the degree of connection that

wetlands and other waters have with downstream waters, as well as the associated effects of those connections. 2015 EPA Report ES-4; see Technical Support

36

Document 62-89. Whether the significant-nexus test is

satisfied in a particular case is “not a purely scientific

determination.” 86 Fed. Reg. at 69,390. But the test is

built on scientific and measurable concepts, and the

agencies’ application of it in a given case is subject to

judicial review. See 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A).

Petitioners’ amici assert that the continuous-surfaceconnection test is easier to apply than the significantnexus test. E.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. Br. 17-21. But a

continuous-surface-connection test would yield hard

questions of its own. See pp. 29-31, supra. And any

greater simplicity offered by the continuous-surfaceconnection test would come at the expense of arbitrariness and a profound mismatch with the CWA’s design.

Cf. County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct.

1462, 1470, 1476 (2020) (rejecting similar arguments

about a need for bright-line certainty in favor of a factspecific test). The significant-nexus test is administrable, and the agencies now have “over a decade of nationwide experience” with it. 86 Fed. Reg. at 69,405. And

individuals uncertain about the status of wetlands on

their property may obtain, at no cost to them, a jurisdictional determination from the Corps. See Corps, Regulatory Guidance Letter: No. 16-01, at 1-2 (Oct. 2016).

Moreover, a finding of CWA jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands means only that unauthorized discharges

into the wetlands are prohibited. See 33 U.S.C. 1311(a);

cf. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 135 n.9. The Corps

may grant a permit to authorize the discharge of

dredged or fill material into covered wetlands and other

waters, and its nationwide-permitting program, including for residential developments, provides a streamlined and cost-efficient way for individuals and businesses to undertake dredge and fill activities that will

37

have only minimal adverse environmental effects. 33

U.S.C. 1344(a) and (e)(1); see 33 C.F.R. 330.1(b).

Repeating certain cost estimates cited by the Rapanos plurality, 547 U.S. at 721, petitioners assert (Br.

10) that the Section 404 permitting process is cumbersome or expensive. Those figures are overstated. The

vast majority of Section 404 authorizations occur under

the Corps’ streamlined general permits, rather than

site-specific permits. See Corps, Regulatory Impact

Analysis for 2021 Reissuance and Modification of Nationwide Permits 10 (Jan. 3, 2021). Many general permits allow project proponents to discharge pollutants

without submitting any application to the Corps. Id. at

9. Even for those general permits that require advance

notice to the agency, the average processing time for

applications is less than two months. Id. at 11. The

Corps estimates that the total Section 404 permitting

cost for a typical project covered by a nationwide permit

requiring advance notice varies from about $4400 to

$14,700. Id. at 25. Those costs to individual dischargers

are far outweighed by the public benefits that result

from the CWA’s protection of wetlands. See 86 Fed.

Reg. at 69,446.

4. Finally, a principal advantage of the significantnexus test is that it focuses directly and specifically on

protecting traditional navigable waters, which is the ultimate justification for the CWA’s discharge prohibition. Other aspects of the jurisdictional inquiry, such as

the determination whether a wetland is adjacent to another covered water, are useful but inexact proxies for

importance to the larger aquatic environment. But an

affirmative finding under the significant-nexus test is

by definition a finding that Congress’s core purpose is

implicated.

38

Petitioners’ constitutional concerns (Br. 47-48) are

therefore insubstantial. By design, the significantnexus test permits jurisdiction over wetlands only if

they significantly affect the waters over which Congress has unquestioned Article I authority. See, e.g.,

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995); Hodel

v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452

U.S. 264, 282 (1981). Indeed, although petitioners advocate a highly restrictive view of the CWA’s coverage,

they (a) recognize that “Congress’s power over the

channels of interstate commerce authorizes federal regulation of ” activities that do not occur on traditional

navigable waters “but nonetheless affect[] them” (Pet.

Br. 35), and (b) construe the CWA’s text as manifesting

Congress’s “desire to go to the full extent of the channels of commerce power” (id. at 44). Taken together,

those propositions further confirm that the CWA protects wetlands with a “significant nexus” to traditional

navigable waters.

D. The Agencies’ Understanding Of The CWA’s Coverage

Of Adjacent Wetlands Is Entitled To Deference

Congress entrusted the administration of the CWA

to the Corps and the EPA, and it authorized both agencies to issue regulations implementing the Act. See 33

U.S.C. 1344, 1361. Since before the 1977 Act, the agencies’ regulations have construed the CWA to cover wetlands (like the ones at issue here) that are adjacent to,

but do not directly abut, a tributary of a traditional navigable water. See 42 Fed. Reg. at 37,144; p. 20, supra.

In upholding that interpretation of the Act, the Court in

Riverside Bayview held that the agencies’ interpretation warrants deference so long as it is “reasonable.”

474 U.S. at 131 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC,

39

Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-845 (1984)). Petitioners do not

ask this Court to revisit that approach here.

In Rapanos, the Chief Justice likewise explained

that, given the “broad, somewhat ambiguous, but nonetheless clearly limiting terms Congress employed in the

Clean Water Act, the Corps and the EPA would have

enjoyed plenty of room to operate” if they had addressed the relevant questions through rulemaking.

547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). But the

Chief Justice observed that the agencies had failed to

complete a notice-and-comment rulemaking after this

Court’s decision in SWANCC. Ibid. And he emphasized

that the agency could have “avoided” the result in Rapanos had it responded to the SWANCC decision by

identifying additional jurisdictional limitations by regulation.

Here, the agencies are taking the path prescribed by

the Chief Justice. The agencies are currently engaged

in notice-and-comment rulemaking that, among other

things, addresses the CWA’s coverage of wetlands and

responds to this Court’s decision in Rapanos. See 86

Fed. Reg. at 69,373. Before Rapanos, the agencies

treated adjacency to other covered waters, without

more, as a sufficient basis for exercising regulatory jurisdiction over wetlands. See Riverside Bayview, 474

U.S. at 131. The current proposed rule, however, generally requires also satisfying either the significantnexus test or the continuous-surface-connection test. 86

Fed. Reg. at 69,373, 69,449-69,450. The proposed rule

thus covers a narrower set of wetlands than the 1986

rule that was in effect when Rapanos was decided and

when petitioners’ discharges occurred. That approach

reflects the agencies’ consideration of “the statute as a

whole, the scientific record, relevant Supreme Court

40

case law, and the agencies’ experience and expertise after more than 30 years of implementing the 1986 regulations.” 86 Fed. Reg. at 69,374.

The comment period on the proposed rule closed on

February 7, 2022. 86 Fed. Reg. at 69,372. The agencies

currently expect to issue a final regulation by the end of

the year.

II. PETITIONERS’ RESTRICTIVE VIEW OF THE TRIBUTARIES COVERED BY THE CWA IS NOT PROPERLY

BEFORE THE COURT AND LACKS MERIT IN ANY

EVENT

In addition to arguing that the CWA covers only

those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to

other covered waters, petitioners now assert (e.g., Br.

5-6, 22-24) that the Court should adopt a highly restrictive view of the tributaries protected by the Act. Petitioners argue that, even if their wetlands had a continuous surface connection to the tributary that feeds into

Priest Lake, those wetlands would fall outside the

CWA’s coverage because the tributary (1) is a “constructed channel” rather than a natural hydrogeographic feature and (2) “is not a traditional navigable

water or an intrastate navigable water.” Pet. Br. 50, 52

(citation omitted). The Court should not consider those

arguments because they contradict assurances petitioners made in seeking this Court’s review and are irrelevant to the disposition of this case. If the Court does

consider petitioners’ new arguments, it should reject

them. Petitioners’ restrictive view of the CWA contradicts every opinion in Rapanos, as well as the text, purpose, and history of the Act. Indeed, petitioners’ new

interpretation would radically transform the CWA, giving it a more constricted scope than the 1899 RHA.

41

A. The Court Should Not Consider Petitioners’ New Arguments About Covered Tributaries

For two independent reasons, the Court should not

consider petitioners’ new arguments about tributaries.

First, in seeking this Court’s review, petitioners

stated (Cert. Reply Br. 8) that they were not disputing

“the extent to which the Clean Water Act regulates tributaries of traditional navigable waters,” and specifically

added that they were not “contest[ing] jurisdiction

over” the unnamed tributary in this case. Petitioners

touted (id. at 9) the limited nature of their challenge as

reason to grant certiorari. Petitioners’ merits brief, by

contrast, argues (at 50, 52) that the tributary is not a

“water[] of the United States.” The Court should not

entertain arguments that petitioners have unequivocally disclaimed.

Second, petitioners’ new arguments have no bearing

on the proper disposition of this case. The court of appeals held that the EPA had “reasonably determined

that [petitioners’] property contains wetlands that

share a significant nexus with Priest Lake, such that the

lot was regulable under the CWA and the relevant regulations.” Pet. App. A36. In this Court, petitioners do

not dispute that significant-nexus finding, nor do they

contest Priest Lake’s status as a traditional navigable

water. If the Court holds that the significant-nexus test

provides a permissible basis for CWA coverage, the

court of appeals’ judgment therefore must be affirmed.

And if the Court holds that a continuous surface connection is required, the judgment below can be reversed on

that ground alone, since the government does not contend that petitioners’ wetlands have a continuous surface connection either to the tributary or to Priest Lake

itself. Petitioners essentially ask the Court to decide

42

whether a continuous surface connection to the unnamed tributary would have supported CWA coverage

if such a connection existed. But the Court’s resolution

of that question would be academic.

B. Petitioners’ New Arguments Lack Merit

If the Court considers petitioners’ new arguments

concerning the jurisdictional status of the tributary, it

should reject them. Petitioners’ arguments are built on

the premise that the CWA departed only incrementally

from prior federal water-pollution statutes. But as the

Act’s text and structure demonstrate—and as this

Court has long recognized—the CWA was a complete

overhaul of existing law that marked a dramatic step

forward in the United States’ commitment to environmental protection. The practical implications of petitioners’ arguments, moreover, go well beyond protection of wetlands. Petitioners’ theory would, for example, allow the unpermitted filling of every tributary to

Priest Lake, choking off the Lake’s sources of water and

destroying its chemical, physical, and biological integrity.

1. Petitioners argue (Br. 5-6) that CWA coverage of

adjacent wetlands is limited to those wetlands that have

a “continuous surface-water connection” to “a stream,

ocean, river, lake, or similar hydrogeographic feature

that in ordinary parlance would be called a ‘water.’ ” Petitioners contend that, even if the wetlands on their

property had such a connection to the unnamed tributary across the road, the wetlands still would not be covered because the tributary is “not a ‘water’ but rather a

‘constructed channel,’ i.e., a type of non-water.” Pet.

Br. 50 (citation omitted).

Petitioners’ proposed distinction between natural

and artificial tributaries is unsound. Most obviously, it

43

would render superfluous Section 404’s exception for

“the discharge of dredged or fill material * * * for the

* * * maintenance of drainage ditches,” 33 U.S.C.

1344(f )(1)(C), because drainage ditches would not be

covered in the first place. More broadly, many of the

Nation’s urban waterways are channelized, and the

CWA has long been understood to encompass “natural,

modified, or constructed” tributaries of other covered

waters. 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,078. The Act’s specialized

definition of “navigable waters” does not turn on any

such distinctions, which have no bearing on a tributary’s

capacity to carry water (and pollutants) into traditional

navigable waters. See, e.g., Technical Support Document 149 n.47 (explaining that manmade ditches “perform many of the same functions as natural tributaries,”

including “convey[ing] water that carries nutrients, pollutants, and other constituents, both good and bad, to

downstream traditional navigable waters”).

Petitioners’ proposed distinction is also inconsistent

with Rapanos. That decision addressed consolidated

cases involving wetlands connected to traditional navigable waters by “ditches or man-made drains.” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 729 (plurality opinion). The Rapanos

plurality construed the Act to cover only tributaries

that are “relatively permanent,” on the theory that only

those tributaries are akin to the “ ‘geographical features’ ” listed in a dictionary definition of “water,” i.e.,

“ ‘streams, oceans, rivers, and lakes.’ ” Id. at 739 (brackets and ellipsis omitted) (quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary 2882 (2d ed. 1954)). The plurality

concluded that the cases should be remanded for the

lower courts to determine whether the channels at issue

satisfied the plurality’s rule that CWA coverage of tributaries is limited to those with “relatively permanent”

44

flow. Id. at 757. Those further lower-court proceedings

would have been superfluous if the manmade character

of the ditches and drains had precluded their treatment

as CWA “waters.”

Petitioners rely (Br. 23, 26 n.10, 50-51) on a footnote

in which the Rapanos plurality observed that “relatively continuous flow is a necessary condition for qualification as a ‘water,’ not an adequate condition.” 547

U.S. at 736 n.7. But the context in which that statement

appeared makes clear that the plurality was merely explaining why some water-treatment systems may be excluded from the scope of the “waters of the United

States.” See ibid. In the same footnote, the plurality

stated that, when “ditches, channels, conduits and the

like * * * ‘hold water permanently,’ ” “we usually refer

to them as ‘rivers,’ ‘creeks,’ or ‘streams,’ ” ibid. (citation

omitted), and that “[t]his distinction is particularly apt

in the context of a statute regulating water quality,”

ibid. The clear thrust of the opinion was that, so long

as a particular tributary is relatively permanent (as the

tributary at issue in this case undisputedly is), its natural or manmade character is irrelevant. 3

Many of petitioners’ amici urge the Court to adopt the Rapanos

plurality’s view that a nonnavigable tributary must be relatively

permanent to come within the “waters of the United States.” E.g.,

Freeport-McMoran Inc. Br. 20-24. That question is not presented

here. As the government explained in its brief in opposition (at 2122), the EPA determined that the unnamed tributary across the

road from the wetlands on petitioners’ property is “relatively permanent,” and the court of appeals upheld that determination. Pet.

App. A33-A34; see J.A. 30, 33. Petitioners acknowledge (Br. 51) that

“[t]he ditch does have a continuous (though small) year-round flow.”

This case therefore presents no occasion to address the proper

treatment of ephemeral or intermittent tributaries.

3

45

2. As the second step of their new framework, petitioners would limit the term “waters of the United

States” to “traditional navigable waters and intrastate

navigable waters that link with other modes of transport

to form interstate channels of commerce.” Pet. Br. 42;

see id. at 36-42. 4 Petitioners thus would exclude from

the “waters of the United States” all nonnavigable tributaries of traditional navigable waters—and presumably nonnavigable interstate waters and nonnavigable

impoundments as well, see 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(2) and (4)

(2008). Pet. Br. 23-24. Petitioners’ argument is at odds

with the views of all nine Justices in Rapanos, and it

would undo Congress’s considered and deliberate

choice to expand the CWA beyond the traditional navigable waters covered by the prior statutes Congress

had found lacking.

The Rapanos plurality recognized that a wetland

may be treated as a covered water if it has a continuous

surface connection to a “relatively permanent” tributary that “connect[s] to” traditional navigable waters,

without any further inquiry into the tributary’s navigability or status as a link in a channel of commerce. 547

U.S. at 742. The plurality further observed that the

1977 Act’s authorization for States to administer the

Section 404 program for “navigable waters . . . other

than” those used or suitable for use “to transport interstate or foreign commerce,” id. at 731 (quoting 33

U.S.C. 1344(g)(1)), “shows that the Act’s term ‘navigable waters’ includes something more than traditional

navigable waters,” ibid. And neither Justice Kennedy

As noted above (see p. 8 n.2, supra), petitioners, unlike the government, use the term “traditional navigable waters” to refer solely

to interstate waters.

4

46

nor the dissenting Justices in Rapanos endorsed the jurisdictional limitation that petitioners advocate. See id.

at 782-783 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment);

id. at 807-808 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Petitioners’ argument also lacks any sound basis in

the pre-CWA history on which they rely. Petitioners’

central premise is that, by 1972, the phrase “waters of

the United States” had become “a traditional statutory

shorthand for those waterbodies subject to Congress’s

power to regulate the aquatic channels of interstate

commerce.” Pet. Br. 29 (emphasis omitted). That

premise is false. The phrase “navigable waters of the

United States” was a term of art, but Congress deliberately omitted the qualifier “navigable” from the CWA

definition. See p. 19, supra. And while the agencies’

longstanding approach gives substantial operative effect both to that definition and to the defined term, petitioners’ requirement of actual navigability would effectively read the definition out of the statute.

Petitioners point (Br. 30-32) to the RHA, a statute

that principally addressed navigation. But the critical

term in each of that law’s operative provisions was “navigable.” No provision referred to the “waters of the

United States” without that qualifier, which Congress

deliberately omitted from the definition at issue here.

See, e.g., RHA §§ 9-10, 30 Stat. 1151. Petitioners emphasize (Br. 30-32) a portion of Section 10 that refers to

“other water[s] of the United States” without any mention of navigability. But the qualifier “other” refers

back to the preceding list of terms—“port, roadstead,

haven, harbor, canal, navigable river”—which make

clear that the reference is limited to navigable waters.

§ 10, 30 Stat. 1151. No analogous list of terms appears

in the definition at issue here.

47

Despite the RHA’s overall focus on navigability, Section 13—the one section of that law dealing specifically

with pollution—generally prohibits dumping refuse material into any “navigable water of the United States or

into any tributary of any navigable water of the United

States,” as well as depositing refuse material “on the

bank of any navigable water, or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water.” 33 U.S.C. 407. That provision does not limit the covered “tributar[ies]” to those

that are themselves used or susceptible to use for navigation. Petitioners’ approach would therefore have the

anomalous result of excluding from the CWA’s coverage

nonnavigable tributaries encompassed by Section 13.

Beyond their misplaced reliance on the RHA, petitioners identify no other evidence in the art, such as a

treatise or case law, supporting their claim that the

phrase “waters of the United States” had acquired a

specialized meaning. Petitioners identify no pre-1972

statute or decision in which Congress or this Court used

that phrase, standing alone, as a “shorthand for all waters subject to Congress’s power to regulate the aquatic

channels of interstate commerce.” Pet. Br. 32. Instead,

the only source petitioners identify (Br. 31) is a 1976

law-review article. And that article refutes their position by recognizing that the phrase “ ‘waters of the

United States,’ ” as used in the CWA, “indicates a desire

to break with traditional notions of navigability.”

Charles D. Ablard & Brian Boru O’Neill, Wetland Protection and Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act Amendments of 1972, 1 Vt. L. Rev. 51, 66

(1976).

Most crucially, petitioners’ argument (Br. 36-42) reflects a fundamental misconception of the impetus for

the CWA and its relation to prior law. The Act was not

48

“merely another law ‘touching interstate waters,’ ” but

rather “a ‘total restructuring’ and ‘complete rewriting’

of [then] existing water pollution legislation.” City of

Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (citations omitted). Congress concluded that prior measures

had been “inadequate in every vital aspect,” and it enacted a wholly new scheme of point-source-based pollution controls. EPA v. California ex rel. State Water

Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 203 (1976) (citation omitted). The Act cannot reasonably be understood as

merely a response to a perceived failure by the agencies

to use the tools Congress had already given them (see

Pet. Br. 39). Rather, it reflected Congress’s fundamental dissatisfaction with prior law.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ JUDGMENT SHOULD BE

AFFIRMED

The court of appeals correctly held that the wetlands

on petitioners’ property are among the “waters of the

United States” protected by the CWA. Pet. App. A33.

The wetlands are located only 30 feet from a tributary of

Kalispell Creek, which in turn feeds into Priest Lake, a

traditional navigable water. Id. at A33-A34; see J.A. 2021, 46, 48-49 (photos of the saturated property, after partial excavation and filling, and the tributary). Although

the wetlands are separated from that tributary by a

road, the court correctly recognized that the presence

of a manmade barrier does not “defeat adjacency.” Pet.

App. A33.

The court of appeals also correctly upheld the EPA’s

determination that the wetlands have a “significant

nexus” to Priest Lake. Pet. App. A34-A36. The court

found ample evidence that the wetlands on petitioners’

property are similarly situated to the Kalispell Bay Fen

49

across the road—indeed, historically petitioners’ wetlands and the fen were “part of one wetland system.”

J.A. 30; see Pet. App. A35. The court of appeals further

found that, together, those wetlands “significantly affect the integrity of Priest Lake.” Pet. App. A35; see

J.A. 21, 47 (photos of Kalispell Bay Fen). The EPA identified numerous physical, chemical, and biological benefits that the wetlands provide to the Lake—including

improving the Lake’s water quality through sediment

retention, contributing base flow to the Lake with beneficial effects to fisheries, storing water, and providing

flood control. J.A. 35-40; see Pet. App. A35-A36, B27B30. The EPA also determined that, notwithstanding

the road, “shallow subsurface flow is occurring” between the wetlands on petitioners’ property and both

the Lake and the wetlands across the road. J.A. 32. Petitioners do not dispute those findings in this Court.

The Kalispell Bay Fen is “one of the five largest”

complexes of wetlands along the shoreline of Priest

Lake and thus is “ ‘especially important in maintaining

the high quality of Priest Lake’s water, fish, and wildlife.’ ” Pet. App. A35 (citing agency findings reprinted

at J.A. 43); see J.A. 31-32, 44-45. If petitioners prevail

in this case, they will be able to discharge fill material

into the wetlands at issue without any permitting requirement. And the same scene will play out across the

country, severely weakening the Act’s protections for

adjacent wetlands and, in turn, the traditional navigable

waters that the CWA’s permitting regime is ultimately

intended to protect. That result would thwart Congress’s comprehensive pollution-control regime.

50

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be

affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.

JEFFREY PRIETO

General Counsel

DIMPLE CHAUDHARY

Deputy General Counsel

SUSANNAH LANDES WEAVER

Associate Deputy General

Counsel

STEVEN NEUGEBOREN

CAROLINE WEHLING

KARYN I.O. WENDELOWSKI

SIMMA ASHER KUPCHAN

Attorneys

Environmental Protection

Agency

BRIAN H. FLETCHER *

Acting Solicitor General

TODD KIM

Assistant Attorney General

MALCOLM L. STEWART

Deputy Solicitor General

MATTHEW GUARNIERI

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

JENNIFER SCHELLER NEUMANN

BRIAN C. TOTH

ARIEL MOURRAIN

Attorneys

CARRIE RICCI

General Counsel

CRAIG R. SCHMAUDER

Acting Principal Deputy

General Counsel

ZAHEER TAJANI

Attorney

Department of the Army

JUNE 2022

*

The Solicitor General is recused in this case.

APPENDIX

1.

33 U.S.C. 1251(a) and (b) provide:

Congressional declaration of goals and policy

(a)

Restoration and maintenance of chemical, physical

and biological integrity of Nation’s waters; national

goals for achievement of objective

The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of

the Nation’s waters. In order to achieve this objective

it is hereby declared that, consistent with the provisions

of this chapter—

(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of

pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by

1985;

(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim goal of water quality which provides

for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish,

and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the

water be achieved by July 1, 1983;

(3) it is the national policy that the discharge of

toxic pollutants in toxic amounts be prohibited;

(4) it is the national policy that Federal financial

assistance be provided to construct publicly owned

waste treatment works;

(5) it is the national policy that areawide waste

treatment management planning processes be developed and implemented to assure adequate control of

sources of pollutants in each State;

(1a)

2a

(6) it is the national policy that a major research

and demonstration effort be made to develop technology necessary to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters, waters of the contiguous zone, and the oceans; and

(7) it is the national policy that programs for the

control of nonpoint sources of pollution be developed

and implemented in an expeditious manner so as to

enable the goals of this chapter to be met through the

control of both point and nonpoint sources of pollution.

(b)

Congressional recognition, preservation, and protection of primary responsibilities and rights of States

It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and

rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in

the exercise of his authority under this chapter. It is

the policy of Congress that the States manage the construction grant program under this chapter and implement the permit programs under sections 1342 and

1344 of this title. It is further the policy of the Congress to support and aid research relating to the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution and to provide Federal technical services and financial aid to State

and interstate agencies and municipalities in connection

with the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution.

3a

2.

33 U.S.C. 1311(a) provides:

Effluent limitations

(a)

Illegality of pollutant discharges except in compliance with law

Except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title,

the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.

3.

33 U.S.C. 1344 provides:

Permits for dredged or fill material

(a)

Discharge into navigable waters at specified disposal sites

The Secretary may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of dredged

or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites. Not later than the fifteenth day after the

date an applicant submits all the information required

to complete an application for a permit under this subsection, the Secretary shall publish the notice required

by this subsection.

(b)

Specification for disposal sites

Subject to subsection (c) of this section, each such

disposal site shall be specified for each such permit by

the Secretary (1) through the application of guidelines

developed by the Administrator, in conjunction with the

Secretary, which guidelines shall be based upon criteria

comparable to the criteria applicable to the territorial

seas, the contiguous zone, and the ocean under section

4a

1343(c) of this title, and (2) in any case where such guidelines under clause (1) alone would prohibit the specification of a site, through the application additionally of the

economic impact of the site on navigation and anchorage.

(c)

Denial or restriction of use of defined areas as disposal sites

The Administrator is authorized to prohibit the specification (including the withdrawal of specification) of

any defined area as a disposal site, and he is authorized

to deny or restrict the use of any defined area for specification (including the withdrawal of specification) as a

disposal site, whenever he determines, after notice and

opportunity for public hearings, that the discharge of

such materials into such area will have an unacceptable

adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish

beds and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas. Before making such determination, the Administrator shall consult

with the Secretary. The Administrator shall set forth

in writing and make public his findings and his reasons

for making any determination under this subsection.

(d)

“Secretary” defined

The term “Secretary” as used in this section means

the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of

Engineers.

(e)

General permits on State, regional, or nationwide

basis

(1) In carrying out his functions relating to the discharge of dredged or fill material under this section, the

Secretary may, after notice and opportunity for public

hearing, issue general permits on a State, regional, or

5a

nationwide basis for any category of activities involving

discharges of dredged or fill material if the Secretary

determines that the activities in such category are similar in nature, will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when performed separately, and will have

only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment. Any general permit issued under this subsection shall (A) be based on the guidelines described in

subsection (b)(1) of this section, and (B) set forth the requirements and standards which shall apply to any activity authorized by such general permit.

(2) No general permit issued under this subsection

shall be for a period of more than five years after the

date of its issuance and such general permit may be revoked or modified by the Secretary if, after opportunity

for public hearing, the Secretary determines that the activities authorized by such general permit have an adverse impact on the environment or such activities are

more appropriately authorized by individual permits.

(f )

Non-prohibited discharge of dredged or fill material

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the discharge of dredged or fill material—

(A) from normal farming, silviculture, and ranching activities such as plowing, seeding, cultivating,

minor drainage, harvesting for the production of food,

fiber, and forest products, or upland soil and water

conservation practices;

(B) for the purpose of maintenance, including

emergency reconstruction of recently damaged parts,

of currently serviceable structures such as dikes,

dams, levees, groins, riprap, breakwaters, causeways,

6a

and bridge abutments or approaches, and transportation structures;

(C) for the purpose of construction or maintenance of farm or stock ponds or irrigation ditches, or

the maintenance of drainage ditches;

(D) for the purpose of construction of temporary

sedimentation basins on a construction site which

does not include placement of fill material into the

navigable waters;

(E) for the purpose of construction or maintenance of farm roads or forest roads, or temporary

roads for moving mining equipment, where such

roads are constructed and maintained, in accordance

with best management practices, to assure that flow

and circulation patterns and chemical and biological

characteristics of the navigable waters are not impaired, that the reach of the navigable waters is not

reduced, and that any adverse effect on the aquatic

environment will be otherwise minimized;

(F) resulting from any activity with respect to

which a State has an approved program under section 1288(b)(4) of this title which meets the requirements of subparagraphs (B) and (C) of such section,

is not prohibited by or otherwise subject to regulation

under this section or section 1311(a) or 1342 of this title (except for effluent standards or prohibitions under section 1317 of this title).

(2) Any discharge of dredged or fill material into the

navigable waters incidental to any activity having as its

purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters into a

use to which it was not previously subject, where the

flow or circulation of navigable waters may be impaired

7a

or the reach of such waters be reduced, shall be required

to have a permit under this section.

(g)

State administration

(1) The Governor of any State desiring to administer its own individual and general permit program for

the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters (other than those waters which are presently

used, or are susceptible to use in their natural condition

or by reasonable improvement as a means to transport

interstate or foreign commerce shoreward to their ordinary high water mark, including all waters which are

subject to the ebb and flow of the tide shoreward to their

mean high water mark, or mean higher high water mark

on the west coast, including wetlands adjacent thereto)

within its jurisdiction may submit to the Administrator

a full and complete description of the program it proposes to establish and administer under State law or under an interstate compact. In addition, such State

shall submit a statement from the attorney general (or

the attorney for those State agencies which have independent legal counsel), or from the chief legal officer in

the case of an interstate agency, that the laws of such

State, or the interstate compact, as the case may be, provide adequate authority to carry out the described program.

(2) Not later than the tenth day after the date of the

receipt of the program and statement submitted by any

State under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Administrator shall provide copies of such program and statement to the Secretary and the Secretary of the Interior,

acting through the Director of the United States Fish

and Wildlife Service.

8a

(3) Not later than the ninetieth day after the date of

the receipt by the Administrator of the program and

statement submitted by any State, under paragraph (1)

of this subsection, the Secretary and the Secretary of

the Interior, acting through the Director of the United

States Fish and Wildlife Service, shall submit any comments with respect to such program and statement to

the Administrator in writing.

(h)

Determination of State’s authority to issue permits

under State program; approval; notification; transfers to State program

(1) Not later than the one-hundred-twentieth day

after the date of the receipt by the Administrator of a

program and statement submitted by any State under

paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Administrator shall

determine, taking into account any comments submitted

by the Secretary and the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Director of the United States Fish and

Wildlife Service, pursuant to subsection (g) of this section, whether such State has the following authority

with respect to the issuance of permits pursuant to such

program:

(A)

To issue permits which—

(i) apply, and assure compliance with, any

applicable requirements of this section, including,

but not limited to, the guidelines established under subsection (b)(1) of this section, and sections

1317 and 1343 of this title;

(ii) are for fixed terms not exceeding five

years; and

(iii) can be terminated or modified for cause

including, but not limited to, the following:

9a

(I)

mit;

violation of any condition of the per-

(II) obtaining a permit by misrepresentation, or failure to disclose fully all relevant

facts;

(III) change in any condition that requires

either a temporary or permanent reduction or

elimination of the permitted discharge.

(B) To issue permits which apply, and assure

compliance with, all applicable requirements of section 1318 of this title, or to inspect, monitor, enter,

and require reports to at least the same extent as required in section 1318 of this title.

(C) To assure that the public, and any other

State the waters of which may be affected, receive

notice of each application for a permit and to provide

an opportunity for public hearing before a ruling on

each such application.

(D) To assure that the Administrator receives

notice of each application (including a copy thereof )

for a permit.

(E) To assure that any State (other than the

permitting State), whose waters may be affected by

the issuance of a permit may submit written recommendations to the permitting State (and the Administrator) with respect to any permit application and,

if any part of such written recommendations are not

accepted by the permitting State, that the permitting

State will notify such affected State (and the Administrator) in writing of its failure to so accept such recommendations together with its reasons for so doing.

10a

(F) To assure that no permit will be issued if, in

the judgment of the Secretary, after consultation

with the Secretary of the department in which the

Coast Guard is operating, anchorage and navigation

of any of the navigable waters would be substantially

impaired thereby.

(G) To abate violations of the permit or the permit program, including civil and criminal penalties

and other ways and means of enforcement.

(H) To assure continued coordination with Federal and Federal-State water-related planning and

review processes.

(2) If, with respect to a State program submitted

under subsection (g)(1) of this section, the Administrator determines that such State—

(A) has the authority set forth in paragraph (1)

of this subsection, the Administrator shall approve

the program and so notify (i) such State and (ii) the

Secretary, who upon subsequent notification from

such State that it is administering such program,

shall suspend the issuance of permits under subsections (a) and (e) of this section for activities with respect to which a permit may be issued pursuant to

such State program; or

(B) does not have the authority set forth in paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Administrator shall

so notify such State, which notification shall also describe the revisions or modifications necessary so

that such State may resubmit such program for a determination by the Administrator under this subsection.

11a

(3) If the Administrator fails to make a determination with respect to any program submitted by a State

under subsection (g)(1) of this section within one-hundredtwenty days after the date of the receipt of such program, such program shall be deemed approved pursuant

to paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection and the Administrator shall so notify such State and the Secretary who,

upon subsequent notification from such State that it is

administering such program, shall suspend the issuance

of permits under subsection (a) and (e) of this section for

activities with respect to which a permit may be issued

by such State.

(4) After the Secretary receives notification from

the Administrator under paragraph (2) or (3) of this subsection that a State permit program has been approved,

the Secretary shall transfer any applications for permits

pending before the Secretary for activities with respect

to which a permit may be issued pursuant to such State

program to such State for appropriate action.

(5) Upon notification from a State with a permit program approved under this subsection that such State intends to administer and enforce the terms and conditions of a general permit issued by the Secretary under

subsection (e) of this section with respect to activities in

such State to which such general permit applies, the

Secretary shall suspend the administration and enforcement of such general permit with respect to such activities.

(i)

Withdrawal of approval

Whenever the Administrator determines after public

hearing that a State is not administering a program ap-

12a

proved under subsection (h)(2)(A) of this section, in accordance with this section, including, but not limited to,

the guidelines established under subsection (b)(1) of this

section, the Administrator shall so notify the State, and,

if appropriate corrective action is not taken within a reasonable time, not to exceed ninety days after the date of

the receipt of such notification, the Administrator shall

(1) withdraw approval of such program until the Administrator determines such corrective action has been

taken, and (2) notify the Secretary that the Secretary

shall resume the program for the issuance of permits

under subsections (a) and (e) of this section for activities

with respect to which the State was issuing permits and

that such authority of the Secretary shall continue in effect until such time as the Administrator makes the determination described in clause (1) of this subsection

and such State again has an approved program.

( j)

Copies of applications for State permits and proposed general permits to be transmitted to Administrator

Each State which is administering a permit program

pursuant to this section shall transmit to the Administrator (1) a copy of each permit application received by

such State and provide notice to the Administrator of

every action related to the consideration of such permit

application, including each permit proposed to be issued

by such State, and (2) a copy of each proposed general

permit which such State intends to issue. Not later

than the tenth day after the date of the receipt of such

permit application or such proposed general permit, the

Administrator shall provide copies of such permit application or such proposed general permit to the Secretary

13a

and the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.

If the Administrator intends to provide written comments to such State with respect to such permit application or such proposed general permit, he shall so notify

such State not later than the thirtieth day after the date

of the receipt of such application or such proposed general permit and provide such written comments to such

State, after consideration of any comments made in

writing with respect to such application or such proposed general permit by the Secretary and the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Director of the

United States Fish and Wildlife Service, not later than

the ninetieth day after the date of such receipt. If such

State is so notified by the Administrator, it shall not issue the proposed permit until after the receipt of such

comments from the Administrator, or after such ninetieth day, whichever first occurs. Such State shall not

issue such proposed permit after such ninetieth day if it

has received such written comments in which the Administrator objects (A) to the issuance of such proposed

permit and such proposed permit is one that has been

submitted to the Administrator pursuant to subsection

(h)(1)(E), or (B) to the issuance of such proposed permit

as being outside the requirements of this section, including, but not limited to, the guidelines developed under

subsection (b)(1) of this section unless it modifies such

proposed permit in accordance with such comments.

Whenever the Administrator objects to the issuance of

a permit under the preceding sentence such written objection shall contain a statement of the reasons for such

objection and the conditions which such permit would

include if it were issued by the Administrator. In any

case where the Administrator objects to the issuance of

14a

a permit, on request of the State, a public hearing shall

be held by the Administrator on such objection. If the

State does not resubmit such permit revised to meet

such objection within 30 days after completion of the

hearing or, if no hearing is requested within 90 days after the date of such objection, the Secretary may issue

the permit pursuant to subsection (a) or (e) of this section, as the case may be, for such source in accordance

with the guidelines and requirements of this chapter.

(k)

Waiver

In accordance with guidelines promulgated pursuant

to subsection (i)(2) of section 1314 of this title, the Administrator is authorized to waive the requirements of

subsection ( j) of this section at the time of the approval

of a program pursuant to subsection (h)(2)(A) of this section for any category (including any class, type, or size

within such category) of discharge within the State submitting such program.

(l)

Categories of discharges not subject to requirements

The Administrator shall promulgate regulations establishing categories of discharges which he determines

shall not be subject to the requirements of subsection ( j)

of this section in any State with a program approved

pursuant to subsection (h)(2)(A) of this section. The

Administrator may distinguish among classes, types,

and sizes within any category of discharges.

15a

(m) Comments on permit applications or proposed general permits by Secretary of the Interior acting through

Director of United States Fish and Wildlife Service

Not later than the ninetieth day after the date on

which the Secretary notifies the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Director of the United States

Fish and Wildlife Service that (1) an application for a

permit under subsection (a) of this section has been received by the Secretary, or (2) the Secretary proposes

to issue a general permit under subsection (e) of this section, the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the

Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service,

shall submit any comments with respect to such application or such proposed general permit in writing to the

Secretary.

(n)

Enforcement authority not limited

Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the

authority of the Administrator to take action pursuant

to section 1319 of this title.

(o)

Public availability of permits and permit applications

A copy of each permit application and each permit issued under this section shall be available to the public.

Such permit application or portion thereof, shall further

be available on request for the purpose of reproduction.

(p)

Compliance

Compliance with a permit issued pursuant to this section, including any activity carried out pursuant to a general permit issued under this section, shall be deemed

compliance, for purposes of sections 1319 and 1365 of

this title, with sections 1311, 1317, and 1343 of this title.

16a

(q)

Minimization of duplication, needless paperwork,

and delays in issuance; agreements

Not later than the one-hundred-eightieth day after

December 27, 1977, the Secretary shall enter into agreements with the Administrator, the Secretaries of the

Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, and

Transportation, and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies to minimize, to the maximum extent practicable, duplication, needless paperwork, and delays in

the issuance of permits under this section. Such agreements shall be developed to assure that, to the maximum

extent practicable, a decision with respect to an application for a permit under subsection (a) of this section will

be made not later than the ninetieth day after the date

the notice for such application is published under subsection (a) of this section.

(r)

Federal projects specifically authorized by Congress

The discharge of dredged or fill material as part of

the construction of a Federal project specifically authorized by Congress, whether prior to or on or after December 27, 1977, is not prohibited by or otherwise subject to regulation under this section, or a State program

approved under this section, or section 1311(a) or 1342

of this title (except for effluent standards or prohibitions under section 1317 of this title), if information on

the effects of such discharge, including consideration of

the guidelines developed under subsection (b)(1) of this

section, is included in an environmental impact statement for such project pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 [42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.] and

such environmental impact statement has been submitted to Congress before the actual discharge of dredged

or fill material in connection with the construction of

17a

such project and prior to either authorization of such

project or an appropriation of funds for such construction.

(s)

Violation of permits

(1) Whenever on the basis of any information available to him the Secretary finds that any person is in violation of any condition or limitation set forth in a permit

issued by the Secretary under this section, the Secretary shall issue an order requiring such person to comply with such condition or limitation, or the Secretary

shall bring a civil action in accordance with paragraph

(3) of this subsection.

(2) A copy of any order issued under this subsection

shall be sent immediately by the Secretary to the State

in which the violation occurs and other affected States.

Any order issued under this subsection shall be by personal service and shall state with reasonable specificity

the nature of the violation, specify a time for compliance,

not to exceed thirty days, which the Secretary determines is reasonable, taking into account the seriousness

of the violation and any good faith efforts to comply with

applicable requirements. In any case in which an order

under this subsection is issued to a corporation, a copy

of such order shall be served on any appropriate corporate officers.

(3) The Secretary is authorized to commence a civil

action for appropriate relief, including a permanent or

temporary injunction for any violation for which he is

authorized to issue a compliance order under paragraph

(1) of this subsection. Any action under this paragraph

may be brought in the district court of the United States

18a

for the district in which the defendant is located or resides or is doing business, and such court shall have jurisdiction to restrain such violation and to require compliance. Notice of the commencement of such acton 1

shall be given immediately to the appropriate State.

(4) Any person who violates any condition or limitation in a permit issued by the Secretary under this section, and any person who violates any order issued by

the Secretary under paragraph (1) of this subsection,

shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $25,000

per day for each violation. In determining the amount

of a civil penalty the court shall consider the seriousness

of the violation or violations, the economic benefit (if

any) resulting from the violation, any history of such violations, any good-faith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements, the economic impact of the penalty

on the violator, and such other matters as justice may

require.

(t)

Navigable waters within State jurisdiction

Nothing in this section shall preclude or deny the

right of any State or interstate agency to control the

discharge of dredged or fill material in any portion of

the navigable waters within the jurisdiction of such

State, including any activity of any Federal agency, and

each such agency shall comply with such State or interstate requirements both substantive and procedural to

control the discharge of dredged or fill material to the

same extent that any person is subject to such requirements. This section shall not be construed as affecting

1

So in original.

Probably should be “action”.

19a

or impairing the authority of the Secretary to maintain

navigation.

4.

33 U.S.C. 1362 provides in pertinent part:

Definitions

Except as otherwise specifically provided, when used

in this chapter:

*

*

*

*

*

(6) The term “pollutant” means dredged spoil, solid

waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage

sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials,

radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal,

and agricultural waste discharged into water. This

term does not mean (A) “sewage from vessels or a discharge incidental to the normal operation of a vessel of

the Armed Forces” within the meaning of section 1322

of this title; or (B) water, gas, or other material which is

injected into a well to facilitate production of oil or gas,

or water derived in association with oil or gas production

and disposed of in a well, if the well used either to facilitate production or for disposal purposes is approved by

authority of the State in which the well is located, and if

such State determines that such injection or disposal

will not result in the degradation of ground or surface

water resources.

(7) The term “navigable waters” means the waters

of the United States, including the territorial seas.

(8) The term “territorial seas” means the belt of the

seas measured from the line of ordinary low water along

20a

that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with

the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of

inland waters, and extending seaward a distance of

three miles.

*

*

*

*

*

(12) The term “discharge of a pollutant” and the term

“discharge of pollutants” each means (A) any addition of

any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source,

(B) any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the

contiguous zone or the ocean from any point source

other than a vessel or other floating craft.

*

*

*

*

*

(14) The term “point source” means any discernible,

confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft,

from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This

term does not include agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.

*

*

*

*

*

21a

5.

33 C.F.R. 323.2(a)-(d) (1978) provide:

Definitions.

For the purpose of this regulation, the following

terms are defined:

(a) The term “waters of the United States” means:1

(1) The territorial seas with respect to the discharge

of fill material. (The transportation of dredged material by vessel for the purpose of dumping in the oceans,

including the territorial seas, at an ocean dump site approved under 40 CFR 228 is regulated by Section 103 of

the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of

1972, as amended (33 U.S.C. 1413). See 33 CFR 324.

Discharges of dredged or fill material into the territorial

seas are regulated by Section 404.):

(2) Coastal and inland waters, lakes, rivers, and

streams that are navigable waters of the United States,

including adjacent wetlands;

(3) Tributaries to navigable waters of the United

States, including adjacent wetlands (manmade nontidal

drainage and irrigation ditches excavated on dry land are

not considered waters of the United States under this

definition).

(4) Interstate waters and their tributaries, including adjacent wetlands; and

The terminology used by the FWPCA is “navigable waters”

which is defined in Section 502(7) of the Act as “waters of the

United States including the territorial seas.” For purposes of

clarity, and to avoid confusion with other Corps of Engineers regulatory programs, the term “waters of the United States” is used

throughout this regulation.

1

22a

(5) All other waters of the United States not identified in paragraphs (1)-(4) above, such as isolated wetlands and lakes, intermittent streams, prairie potholes,

and other waters that are not part of a tributary system

to interstate waters or to navigable waters of the United

States, the degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate commerce.2

In defining the jurisdiction of the FWPCA as the “waters of the

United States,” Congress, in the legislative history to the Act, specified that the term “be given the broadest constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which would have

been made or may be made for administrative purposes.” The waters listed in paragraphs (a)(1)-(4) fall within this mandate as discharges into those waterbodies may seriously affect water quality,

navigation, and other Federal interests, however, it is also recognized that the Federal government would have the right to regulate

the waters of the United States identified in paragraph (a)(5) under

this broad Congressional mandate to fulfill the objective of the Act:

“to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters” (Section 101(a)). Paragraph (a)(5) incorporates all other waters of the United States that could be regulated under the Federal government’s Constitutional powers to regulate and protect interstate commerce, including those for which the

connection to interstate commerce may not be readily obvious or

where the location or size of the waterbody generally may not require regulation through individual or general permits to achieve the

objective of the Act. Discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States identified in paragraphs (a)(1)-(4) will generally require individual or general permits unless those discharges

occur beyond the headwaters of a river or stream or in natural lakes

less than 10 acres in surface area. Discharges into these latter waters and into most of the waters identified in paragraph (a)(5) will be

permitted by this regulation, subject to the provisions listed in paragraph 323.4-2(b) unless the District Engineer develops information,

on a case-by-case basis, that the concerns for the aquatic environment as expressed in the EPA Guidelines (40 CFR 230) require regulation through an individual or general permit. (See 323.4-4).

2

23a

The landward limit of jurisdiction in tidal waters, in

the absence of adjacent wetlands, shall be the high tide

line and the landward limit of jurisdiction and all other

waters, in the absence of adjacent wetlands, shall be the

ordinary high water mark.

(b) The term “navigable waters of the United States”

means those waters of the United States that are subject

to the ebb and flow of the tide shoreward to the mean

high water mark (mean higher high water mark on the

Pacific coast) and/or are presently used, or have been

used in the past, or may be susceptible to use to transport

interstate or foreign commerce. (See 33 CFR 329 for a

more complete definition of this term.)

(c) The term “wetlands” means those areas that are

inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a

frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that

under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of

vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil

conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps marshes, bogs and similar areas.

(d) The term “adjacent” means bordering, contiguous, or neighboring. Wetlands separated from other

waters of the United States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like are

“adjacent wetlands.”

6.

33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)-(c) (2008) provide:

Definitions.

For the purpose of this regulation these terms are

defined as follows:

(a) The term waters of the United States means

24a

(1) All waters which are currently used, or were

used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which

are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;

(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;

(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers,

streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats,

sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation

or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign

commerce including any such waters:

(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes; or

(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be

taken and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or

(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial

purpose by industries in interstate commerce;

(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined

as waters of the United States under the definition;

(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs

(a) (1) through (4) of this section;

(6) The territorial seas;

(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters

that are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs

(a) (1) through (6) of this section.

(8) Waters of the United States do not include prior

converted cropland. Notwithstanding the determination of an area’s status as prior converted cropland by

any other Federal agency, for the purposes of the Clean

25a

Water Act, the final authority regarding Clean Water

Act jurisdiction remains with EPA.

Waste treatment systems, including treatment ponds or

lagoons designed to meet the requirements of CWA

(other than cooling ponds as defined in 40 CFR 423.11(m)

which also meet the criteria of this definition) are not

waters of the United States.

(b) The term wetlands means those areas that are

inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a

frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that

under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence

of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated

soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps,

marshes, bogs, and similar areas.

(c) The term adjacent means bordering, contiguous,

or neighboring. Wetlands separated from other waters of the United States by man-made dikes or barriers,

natural river berms, beach dunes and the like are “adjacent wetlands.”

7.

40 C.F.R. 230.3 (2008) provides in pertinent part:

Definitions.

For purposes of this part, the following terms shall

have the meanings indicated:

*

*

*

*

*

(s) The term waters of the United States means:

26a

(1) All waters which are currently used, or were

used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which

are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;

(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;

(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers,

streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats,

sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation

or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign

commerce including any such waters:

(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes; or

(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be

taken and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or

(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial

purposes by industries in interstate commerce;

(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined

as waters of the United States under this definition;

(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs

(s)(1) through (4) of this section;

(6) The territorial sea;

(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters

that are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs

(s)(1) through (6) of this section; waste treatment systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons designed to

meet the requirements of CWA (other than cooling

ponds as defined in 40 CFR 423.11(m) which also meet

27a

the criteria of this definition) are not waters of the

United States.

Waters of the United States do not include prior converted cropland. Notwithstanding the determination

of an area’s status as prior converted cropland by any

other federal agency, for the purposes of the Clean Water Act, the final authority regarding Clean Water Act

jurisdiction remains with EPA.

(t) The term wetlands means those areas that are

inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a

frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that

under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of

vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil

conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes,

bogs and similar areas.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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