Amicus Curiae Brief — Michael Sackett, et ux., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

Supreme Court briefApr 18, 2022

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No. 21-454

In The

___________

MICHAEL SACKETT; CHANTELL SACKETT,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY; MICHAEL S. REGAN, ADMINISTRATOR,

Respondents.

___________

On Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit

___________

BRIEF OF THE CATO INSTITUTE,

ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF

AMERICA, MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL

FOUNDATION, NFIB SMALL BUSINESS LEGAL

CENTER, AND WASHINGTON LEGAL

FOUNDATION, AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT

OF PETITIONERS

___________

Karen Harned

Rob Smith

NFIB SMALL BUSINESS

LEGAL CENTER

555 12th Street, NW,

Suite 1001

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 314-2061

Jay R. Schweikert

Counsel of Record

William M. Yeatman*

CATO INSTITUTE

1000 Mass. Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 842-0200

jschweikert@cato.org

Cory L. Andrews

John M. Masslon II

WASHINGTON LEGAL

FOUNDATION

2009 Mass. Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 588-0302

Joseph A. Bingham

Kaitlyn D. Schiraldi

Mountain States Legal

Foundation

2596 South Lewis Way

Lakewood, Colorado

80227

(303) 292-2021

jbingham@mslegal.org

April 18, 2022

Leah Pilconis

ASSOCIATED GENERAL

CONTRACTORS OF

AMERICA

2300 Wilson Blvd., Ste.

300

Arlington, VA 22201

(703) 837-5332

*Admitted to the D.C. Bar

under D.C. App. R. 46-A.

Supervised by a D.C. Bar

member.

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Ninth Circuit set forth the proper test

for determining whether wetlands are “waters of the

United States” under the Clean Water Act, 33 U. S. C.

§1362(7).

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page(s)

QUESTION PRESENTED ......................................... i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................ ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... iii

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE ............................. 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT ......................................................... 3

ARGUMENT

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT DEFER IN

DEFINING “NAVIGABLE WATERS” ................. 5

A. Relative Expertise: Courts or

Agencies? ........................................................ 6

B. Is the Question Presented “Major”? .............. 9

C. To What Extent Is the Text

“Imprecise”? .................................................. 11

D. Which Institution Can “Clarify,

Illuminate, or Stabilize” the Law?............... 13

E. Can the Agency Be “Trusted”?..................... 15

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 17

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.

200 (1995) ............................................................... 2

City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013) .......... 3

Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,

782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015) ................................ 16

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) .................... 5

Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019) ........... 12

Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715

(2006) ............................................................. passim

Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120 (2012)................. passim

Sackett v. EPA, 8 F. 4th 1075 (9th Cir. 2021) ......... 16

Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S.

Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) ..... 2, 11

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co.,

578 U.S. 590 (2016) ........................................ 10, 16

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,

Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) ........................................ 7

Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302

(2014) ...................................................................... 4

Regulations

80 Fed. Reg. 37,053 (June 29, 2015)................. passim

85 Fed. Reg. 22,250 (Apr. 21, 2020)...........7, 8, 12, 14

86 Fed. Reg. 69,372 (Dec. 7, 2021)....................... 8, 14

iv

Exec. Order 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497

(Mar. 3, 2017).................................................... 8, 13

Exec. Order 13,990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,037 (Jan.

25, 2021) ................................................................ 14

Other Authorities

Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration,

114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245 (2001) ....................... 13, 15

Joshua Ozymy & Melissa L. Jarrell, Illegal

Discharge: Exploring the History of the

Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Clean

Water Act, 32 Fordham Env’t L. Rev. 195

(2021) .................................................................... 10

Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of

Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L.

Rev 363 (1986) ............................................... passim

White House Briefing Room, “Fact Sheet:

List of Agency Actions for Review” (Jan.

20, 2021), https://bit.ly/3AM85ha ........................ 14

1

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1

The Cato Institute is a nonpartisan public-policy

research foundation established in 1977 and

dedicated to advancing the principles of individual

liberty, free markets, and limited government. Cato’s

Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies was

established in 1989 to help restore the principles of

limited constitutional government that are the

foundation of liberty. Toward those ends, Cato

publishes books and studies, conducts conferences,

and produces the annual Cato Supreme Court Review.

The Associated General Contractors of America

(“AGC”) is a nationwide trade association of

construction companies and related firms. It has

served the construction industry since 1918, and over

time, it has become the recognized leader of the

construction industry in the United States. The

association now has more than 27,000 members in 89

chapters stretching from Puerto Rico to Hawaii. Its

members are engaged in building, heavy, civil,

industrial, utility, and other construction for both

public and private property owners and developers.

Because Section 404 permits are commonly required

for those projects, AGC members depend on the

stability and predictability of the federal

government’s permitting process, which is a

prerequisite to hundreds of billions of dollars in

investments each year and massive amounts of

economic activity.

1 All

parties consented to the filing of this brief. No party’s

counsel authored this brief in any part and amici alone funded

its preparation and submission.

2

Mountain States Legal Foundation (“MSLF”) is a

nonprofit, public-interest law firm organized under

the laws of the state of Colorado. MSLF is dedicated

to bringing before the courts issues vital to the

defense and preservation of individual liberties, the

right to own and use property, the free enterprise

system, and limited and ethical government. Since its

creation in 1977, MSLF attorneys have been active in

litigation regarding the proper interpretation and

application

of

statutory,

regulatory,

and

constitutional provisions. See Adarand Constructors,

Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (MSLF serving as

lead counsel).

The National Federation of Independent Business

(“NFIB”) is the nation’s leading small business

association. Its membership spans the spectrum of

business operations, ranging from sole proprietor

enterprises to firms with hundreds of employees.

Founded in 1943 as a nonprofit, nonpartisan

organization. NFIB’s mission is to promote and

protect the right of its members to own, operate, and

grow their businesses. The NFIB Small Business

Legal Center is a nonprofit, public interest law firm

established to provide legal resources and be the voice

for small businesses in the nation’s courts.

Washington Legal Foundation is a nonprofit,

public-interest law firm and policy center with

supporters nationwide. WLF promotes free

enterprise, individual rights, limited government,

and the rule of law. It often appears as amicus curiae

in cases interpreting the phrase “waters of the United

States.” See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty.

v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).

3

All amici, as organizations interested in properly

constitutionally limited government, have an interest

in a constitutionally faithful interpretation of

agencies’ regulatory powers.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In reviewing agency action, courts face conflicting

constitutional principles. On the one hand, the

judiciary must refrain from “arrogating to itself

policymaking properly left, under the separation of

powers, to the Executive.” City of Arlington v. FCC,

569 U.S. 290, 327 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

On the other, courts have an “obligation,” one that is

“no less firmly rooted in our constitutional structure,”

to ensure that the executive branch “confine[s] itself

to its proper role.” Id. Given this dichotomy between

judicial deference and Article III oversight, “[a]

congressional grant of authority over some portion of

a statute does not necessarily mean that Congress

granted the agency interpretive authority over all its

provisions.” Id.

The Clean Water Act illustrates the point. Most of

the statute consists of interlocking regulatory

programs with technical sounding names, including

Water Quality Standards, Total Maximum Daily

Loads, and the National Pollutant Discharge

Elimination System. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(a),

1313(d), 1342. For these complex regulatory schemes,

agencies exercise interpretive primacy, subject to

searching reasonableness review by the courts.

The question presented here, however, reflects a

different class of statutory text. Defining “navigable

4

waters” is the jurisdictional key that unlocks the

agencies’ power under the Clean Water Act’s

regulatory programs—including the power to seek

criminal sanctions. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)

(authorizing prosecutors to seek prison terms of up to

one year for negligent violations). Because it’s an

authority of a higher order, fixing the statute’s

jurisdictional scope poses a greater risk of executive

overreach, interpretive instability, and regulatory

inscrutability, all of which have plagued the agencies’

past interpretive approaches to the detriment of

landowners and operators.

Of course, Congress bears the ultimate

responsibility for the unsatisfactory status quo.

Although this Court “expect[s] Congress to speak

clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of

vast economic and political significance,” Utility Air

Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)

(citations and quotations omitted), the phrase “waters

of the United States” is “not a term of art with a

known meaning,” and this “critical ambiguity” has

persisted for fifty years, confounding agencies, courts,

and—most importantly—landowners, far too many of

whom have been denied regulatory certainty as to the

enjoyment of their property. Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S.

120, 133 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).

For a statute that touches on millions of acres of

land, the lack of clarity is both dismaying and

counterproductive. Unless and until Congress “do[es]

what it should have done in the first place [and]

provide[s] a reasonably clear rule regarding the reach

of the Clean Water Act,” id., the judiciary must “say

what the law is” in a manner that regulated entities

5

can comprehend. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177

(1803).

In this context, concerns over “judicial

policymaking” are misplaced because the judiciary is

the appropriate institution to establish limits on the

government’s regulatory authority under the Clean

Water Act. Here, it is this Court’s duty to provide

long-needed certainty to the regulated public.

Accordingly, the Court should reverse and clarify that

the Rapanos plurality provides the proper test for

determining the outer bounds of federal jurisdiction

under the Clean Water Act.

ARGUMENT

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT DEFER IN

DEFINING “NAVIGABLE WATERS”

In 1986, then-judge Breyer set forth workable

criteria for balancing the competing constitutional

demands placed on courts in administrative law

cases, a conflict he presented as pitting “the need for

regulation” against “the need for checks.” Stephen

Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and

Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev 363, 363 (1986). This

framework poses a set of questions whose answers

allow the judiciary “to allocate the law-interpreting

function between court and agency in a way likely to

work best within any particular statutory scheme,”

id. at 371, including:

Is the particular question one that the agency

or the court is more likely to answer correctly?

. . . A court may also ask whether the legal

question is an important one. Congress is more

likely to have focused upon, and answered,

6

major questions, while leaving interstitial

matters to answer themselves in the course of

the statute’s daily administration. A court may

also look to see whether the language is

“inherently imprecise,” i.e., whether the words

of the statute are phrased so broadly as to

invite agency interpretation. It might also

consider the extent to which the answer to the

legal question will clarify, illuminate or

stabilize a broad area of the law. Finally, a

court might ask itself whether the agency can

be trusted to give a properly balanced answer.

Courts sometimes fear that certain agencies

suffer from “tunnel vision” and as a result

might seek to expand their power beyond the

authority that Congress gave them.

Id. at 370–71.

In other words, the framework instructs which

statutory questions are best left to the courts, in their

role as a constitutional check, and which are best left

to agencies, given their comparative advantages.

Each of these factors supports judicial primacy in

interpreting the extent of federal jurisdiction under

the Clean Water Act.

A. Relative

Agencies?

Expertise:

Courts

or

Under Breyer’s framework, courts first ask

whether the question presented is “one that the

agency or the court is more likely to answer correctly.”

Id. at 370. The purpose of this inquiry is to determine

7

which institution—the executive or the judiciary—

has comparatively greater expertise.

For the Clean Water Act’s substantive regulatory

programs, the agencies routinely bring their technical

and scientific expertise to bear. But, again, defining

“navigable waters” is a separate class of statutory

interpretation. As the agencies have conceded,

“science cannot dictate where to draw the line of

federal jurisdiction.” See 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250, 22,257

(Apr. 21, 2020). This Court, too, has recognized the

limited utility of technical expertise in interpreting a

legal concept like “navigable waters,” writing that the

agencies “may appropriately look” to tools of statutory

construction, including “the legislative history and

underlying policies of its statutory grants of

authority” when “[f]aced with [the] problem of

defining the bounds of its regulatory authority.”

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474

U.S. 121, 132 (1985).

The regulatory history leaves no doubt that legal

expertise, rather than scientific know-how, is

paramount in setting limits on federal authority

under the Clean Water Act. In practice, agencies defer

to judicial interpretations of congressional intent.

In 2015, for example, the agencies completed a

rulemaking to define the “waters of the United

States” based on Justice Kennedy’s opinion in

Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). See 80

Fed. Reg. 37,053 (June 29, 2015). According to the

rule’s preamble, “[t]he key to the agencies’

interpretation of the CWA is the significant nexus

standard, as established and refined in Supreme

8

Court opinions.” Id. at 37,060. Crucially, the agencies

didn’t merely adopt Justice Kennedy’s “significant

nexus” framework for case-by-case jurisdictional

determinations of wetlands adjacent to non-navigable

waters, which is how the test was set forth in

Rapanos. Instead, the 2015 rule employed the

significant nexus concept as the scientific basis for the

categorical inclusion of entire classes of putative

“waters of the U.S.” Id. at 37,068–71 (establishing

categorical jurisdiction for classes of tributaries and

adjacent waters).

Two years later, a new president ordered the

agencies to rethink the 2015 rule “in a manner

consistent with the opinion of Justice Antonin Scalia

in [Rapanos].” See Exec. Order 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg.

12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017). So prompted, the agencies

undertook another notice-and-comment rulemaking,

leading to an interpretation of “navigable waters”

that is based on the analysis in the Rapanos

plurality’s opinion. See generally 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250

(Apr. 21, 2020) (citing Rapanos plurality 147 times).

The current administration has begun yet another

judicially driven approach to defining the “waters of

the United States.” Last December, the agencies

proposed to return to the pre-2015 regime. See 86 Fed.

Reg. 69,372, 69,373 (Dec. 7, 2021) (“[T]he agencies are

proposing to exercise their discretion under the

statute to return generally to the familiar pre-2015

definition that has bounded the Act’s protections for

decades[.]”). Under this proposed interpretation, the

agencies may choose to apply either Justice

9

Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test or the Rapanos

plurality’s more definite test.

Although the three rulemakings since 2015 have

relied on this Court’s opinions in Rapanos, the

agencies’ deferential approach began long before that

case. In 1974, the Army Corps of Engineers first

responded to the passage of the Clean Water Act by

adopting the historical judicial interpretation of

“navigable waters” and thus limiting the statute’s

reach to waters that are “navigable in fact or readily

susceptible of being rendered so.” Rapanos v. United

States, 547 U.S. 715, 723–24 (2006) (plurality opinion)

(recounting regulatory history) (quotations and

citations omitted). But then “a District Court enjoined

these regulations as too narrow,” so the Corps

adopted a new interpretation that “deliberately

sought to extend the definition of ‘the waters of the

United States’ to the outer limits of Congress’s

commerce power.” Id. at 724 (citations omitted). The

upshot is that courts have taken the lead in setting

the limits of federal authority under the Clean Water

Act throughout the statute’s fifty-year history.

B. Is the Question Presented “Major”?

The second query asks whether the legal

controversy is “important,” because “Congress is more

likely to have focused upon, and answered, major

questions, while leaving interstitial matters to

answer themselves in the course of a statute’s daily

administration.” Breyer, Judicial Review, supra at

370. Higher stakes call for closer judicial scrutiny as

to whether Congress indeed authorized such a

10

“major” exercise of the government’s regulatory

power.

There can be no doubt that the instant case

involves policy questions of the utmost economic and

social significance. The Clean Water Act is “not

merely another law but rather was viewed by

Congress as a total restructuring and complete

rewriting of the existing water pollution legislation.”

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 804 (Breyer, J., dissenting)

(citations and quotations omitted). Defining “waters

of the United States” determines the statute’s

regulatory reach, “and the consequences to

landowners even for inadvertent violations can be

crushing.” U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co.,

578 U.S. 590, 602 (2016) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Between 1983 and 2019, the EPA criminally

prosecuted 828 defendants under the Clean Water

Act. See Joshua Ozymy & Melissa L. Jarrell, Illegal

Discharge: Exploring the History of the Criminal

Enforcement of the U.S. Clean Water Act, 32 Fordham

Envtl. L. Rev. 195, 206–08, 210 (2021). Of those cases,

250 led to incarceration. Id. at 218‒19. Given the

severity of criminal sanctions under the Clean Water

Act, it is imperative that there be a clear articulation

of what constitutes criminal liability. Yet regulated

parties enjoy no such certainty. As the law now

stands, they “have to feel their way on a case-by-case

basis.” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, C.J.,

concurring). Under the prevailing jurisdictional test,

“[a]ny piece of land that is wet at least part of the year

is in danger of being classified by EPA employees as

wetlands covered by the Act.” Sackett, 566 U.S. at 132

(Alito, J., concurring). Even the agencies concede that

11

“almost all waters and wetlands across the country

theoretically could be subject to a case-specific

jurisdictional determination” under the status quo.

See 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,056 (describing pre-2015

regime). With so much of the nation’s land at issue, as

well as the financial property and liberty of its

citizens, the scope of the EPA’s authority under the

Clean Water Act is by no means an “interstitial”

matter.

C. To

What

Extent

“Imprecise”?

Is

the

Text

The third question asks if the statutory text is

“inherently precise, i.e., whether the words of the

statute are phrased so broadly as to invite agency

interpretation.” Breyer, Judicial Review, supra at

370–71. Granted, the phrase “waters of the United

States” is “notoriously unclear.” Sackett, 566 U.S. at

132 (Alito, J. concurring). But the text is far from

being so “imprecise” that it is rendered immune from

judicial interpretation through the traditional tools of

statutory construction. After all, in Rapanos, a

plurality undertook an extensive textual analysis and

thereby distilled a workable framework that would

provide much-needed certainty to property owners.

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 730–42. Before that, this Court

rebuffed an attempt by the agencies to read the

modifier “navigable” in “navigable waters” as mere

surplusage. See Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 172 (“We

cannot agree that Congress’ separate definitional use

of the phrase ‘waters of the United States’ constitutes

12

a basis for reading the term ‘navigable waters’ out of

the statute.”).

Furthermore, any inferences drawn from textual

“imprecision” must account for the social and

economic significance of the interpretation. If the

question presented is interstitial, then textual

ambiguity favors the agencies’ interpretative

authority. But if the controversy centers on a “major”

question, then this Court expects a clear statement

from Congress. For regulatory agencies to exercise

authority over these sorts of important matters,

“Congress must either: (i) expressly and specifically

decide the major policy question itself and delegate to

the agency the authority to regulate and enforce; or

(ii) expressly and specifically delegate to the agency

the authority both to decide the major policy question

and to regulate and enforce.” Paul v. United States,

140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., statement

respecting denial of certiorari) (citations omitted).

Of course, Congress did not itself “expressly and

specifically” define the boundaries of the Clean Water

Act. Nor did Congress “expressly and specifically

delegate” authority to decide this “major policy

question” to any agency. In past rulemakings to

define the “waters of the United States,” the relevant

agencies couldn’t identify any specific delegation for

their action, but instead grounded their interpretive

authority in the statute as a whole. See, e.g., 85 Fed.

Reg. at 22,251 (“The authority for this action is the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251

et seq., including sections 301, 304, 311, 401, 402, 404,

and 501.”). Such textual “imprecision” favors judicial

13

interpretive authority where, as here, the Court is

faced with a “major” question.

D. Which

Institution

Can

“Clarify,

Illuminate, or Stabilize” the Law?

The next question asks which institution—courts

or agencies—can “clarify, illuminate or stabilize a

broad area of the law.” Breyer, Judicial Review, supra

at 371. Here, courts possess a clear comparative

advantage because agency-driven interpretations are

inherently unstable.

Due to the relative ease of regulating versus

legislating, “[w]e live today in an era of presidential

administration.”

Elena

Kagan,

Presidential

Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2246 (2001).

In contemporary American government, it is the

presidency, rather than Congress, that leads “in

setting the direction and influencing the outcome of”

administrative policymaking. Id. Because “regulatory

activity . . . [is] more and more an extension of the

President’s own policy and political agenda,”

wholesale shifts in administrative policymaking occur

whenever a new person occupies the White House. Id.

at 2248

Defining the “waters of the United States”

provides a quintessential example of our modern era

of presidential administration. After Rapanos, the

Obama administration leveraged the “significant

nexus” concept to justify a broad interpretation of

federal authority. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,053. Then

President Trump ordered his administration to

undertake a rulemaking “rescinding or revising” his

predecessor’s definition, see Exec. Order 13,778,

14

leading to the agencies’ adoption of a narrower

interpretation of federal jurisdiction under the Clean

Water Act. See 85 Fed. Reg. at 22,250.

Now the policy pendulum is swinging back. On his

first day in office, President Biden ordered an

“immediate[]

review”

of

his

predecessor’s

jurisdictional rule to determine whether it comports

with the new administration’s agenda. See Exec.

Order 13,990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,037, 7,037 (Jan. 25,

2021); see also White House Briefing Room, “Fact

Sheet: List of Agency Actions for Review” (Jan. 20,

2021), https://bit.ly/3AM85ha (identifying rules

subject to review under Executive Order 13,990). The

Biden administration currently is considering

comment on a “waters of the U.S.” definition that

would codify the status quo before the 2015 Obamaera rule. See 86 Fed. Reg. 69,372 (Dec. 7, 2021). If

finalized, this would be the fourth definition of

“waters of the U.S.” since 2015.

Again, the agencies’ pre-2015 jurisdictional

framework is the same test at issue in the instant

case, and the Biden administration’s attempt to

resurrect this much maligned interpretation speaks

volumes about the agencies’ long-running failure to

“illuminate” this important area of the law. In prior

rulemakings, the agencies heaped criticism on the

pre-2015 regime for its failure to clarify the scope of

federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. See 80

Fed. Reg. at 37,056 (observing that pre-2015 regime

“did not provide the public or agency staff with the

kind of information needed to ensure timely,

consistent,

and

predictable

jurisdictional

determinations”); 85 Fed. Reg. at 22,256 (discussing

15

how stakeholders needed “clarity and certainty

regarding the scope of the waters federally

regulated”). Members of this Court have been

similarly critical of the status quo. See, e.g., Sackett,

566 U.S. at 133 (Alito, J., concurring) (“But far from

providing clarity and predictability, the Agency’s

latest informal guidance advises property owners that

many jurisdictional determinations concerning

wetlands can only be made on a case-by-case basis by

EPA field staff.”).

In sum, agencies are incapable of stabilizing this

important area of the law. Every time the presidency

changes hands from one party to the other, the

jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act gets a new

gloss. Of course, political accountability is typically a

virtue for administrative policymaking. See Kagan,

Presidential Administration, supra at 2332

(observing that “presidential leadership establishes

an electoral link between the public and the

bureaucracy”). But not always. For obvious “major”

policy questions, such as the definition of “waters of

the United States,” the ping-pong policymaking

inherent to presidential administration is too

unsettling to pass constitutional muster. Between the

courts and agencies, the former is far better suited to

clarify, illuminate, and stabilize the law.

E. Can the Agency Be “Trusted”?

The final question for assessing comparative

institutional competence asks “whether the agency

can be trusted to give a properly balanced answer.”

Breyer, Judicial Review, supra at 371. Regarding this

inquiry, Breyer explained that “Courts sometimes

16

fear that certain agencies suffer from ‘tunnel vision’

and as a result might seek to expand their power

beyond the authority that Congress gave them.” Id.

Such “fears” of agency overreach are evident in this

Court’s opinions. See, e.g., Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 734

(plurality opinion) (“[T]he Corps has stretched the

term ‘waters of the United States’ beyond parody[.]”).

Even Justice Kennedy, the progenitor of the

“significant nexus” concept, has warned about the

agencies’ “ominous” application of his idea, which

“continues to raise troubling questions regarding the

Government’s power to cast doubt on the full use and

enjoyment of private property throughout the

Nation.” Hawkes, 578 U.S. at 603 (concurring).

More broadly, courts have repeatedly rebuked the

government over the agencies’ regulatory tactics,

including at multiple prior junctures of this case. A

decade ago, for example, the Court unanimously

rejected the agencies’ “strongarming of regulated

parties” in these sorts of disputes. Sackett, 566 U.S.

at 130–31. And in the opinion below, the Ninth

Circuit admonished the agencies over their “litigation

strategy” of “[f]orcing the Sacketts to engage in years

of litigation, under threat of tens of thousands of

dollars in daily fines, only to assert at the eleventh

hour that the dispute has actually been moot for a

long time.” See Sackett v. EPA, 8 F. 4th 1075, 1086

(9th Cir. 2021); see also Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army

Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 1001 (8th Cir. 2015),

aff’d, 578 U.S. 590 (2016) (objecting to the agency’s

“transparently obvious litigation strategy” of forcing

on the regulated party the “prohibitive costs, risk, and

delay” of dealing with the government).

17

CONCLUSION

The statutory context, regulatory history, and

importance of the question presented all point to this

Court’s comparative “expertise” over agencies in

establishing limits on federal authority under the

Clean Water Act. Because the judiciary—and not the

agencies—appropriately

exercises

interpretive

primacy, this controversy does not implicate concerns

about “judicial policymaking.” To protect reliance

interests long harmed by the regulatory uncertainty

in this important area of the law, the Court should

reverse and clarify the scope of federal jurisdiction

under the Clean Water Act.

Respectfully submitted,

Karen Harned

Rob Smith

NFIB SMALL BUSINESS

LEGAL CENTER

1201 F St., NW #200

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 314-2061

Leah Pilconis

ASSOCIATED GENERAL

CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA

2300 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 300

Arlington, VA 22201

(703) 837-5332

Cory L. Andrews

John M. Masslon II

WASHINGTON LEGAL

FOUNDATION

2009 Mass. Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20036

Jay R. Schweikert

Counsel of Record

William M. Yeatman*

CATO INSTITUTE

1000 Mass. Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 842-0200

jschweikert@cato.org

Joseph A. Bingham

Kaitlyn D. Schiraldi

Mountain States Legal

Foundation

2596 South Lewis Way

Lakewood, CO 80227

(303) 292-2021

jbingham@mslegal.org

*Admitted to the D.C.

Bar under D.C. App. R.

18

(202) 588-0302

April 18, 2022

46-A. Supervised by a

D.C. Bar member.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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