Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Miguel Angel Santana, Petitioner v. Maryland

No. 21-_________

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

___________

MIGUEL ANGEL SANTANA,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND,

_____________

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals

_____________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_____________

Beth S. Brinkmann

Mark W. Mosier

Kevin B. Collins

Counsel of Record

Adam L.D. Stempel

Megan C. Keenan

COVINGTON & BURLING LLP

One CityCenter

850 Tenth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20001

kcollins@cov.com

(202) 662-6000

September 20, 2021

Counsel for Petitioner

Miguel Angel Santana

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether, when a government witness provides

material false testimony about an immunity agreement and the government fails to correct that false

testimony in front of the jury, the government cures

that due process violation by merely making defense

counsel aware of the falsity of the testimony.

ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS



State of Maryland v. Santana, No. 08-K-17000083, Circuit Court for Charles County, Maryland. Judgment entered December 12, 2019.



Santana v. State of Maryland, No. CSA-REG2146-2019, Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. Judgment entered January 15, 2021.



Santana v. State of Maryland, No. COA-PET0008-2021, Court of Appeals of Maryland. Petition for certiorari denied April 23, 2021.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED.......................................... i

RELATED PROCEEDINGS ...................................... ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................v

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI .............1

OPINIONS BELOW ....................................................1

JURISDICTION ..........................................................1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED ........1

INTRODUCTION ........................................................2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .......10

I.

The Appellate Courts Are Deeply Divided

Over Whether a Government Witness’s

Uncorrected False Testimony About

Immunity Agreements Violates Due

Process When the Government Informs

Defense Counsel of the Falsity, But Not

the Jury. ..............................................................10

II. The Decision Below Is Wrong and

Highlights Why the Minority Position in

the Circuit Split Is Contrary to This

Court’s Precedent................................................19

III. This Question Is Important and Goes to

the Constitutional Integrity of Criminal

Convictions. .........................................................28

CONCLUSION ..........................................................32

iv

Appendix A: Order Denying Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari, Santana v. State of Maryland, No. COA-PET-0008-2021 (Md.

Apr. 23, 2021) .......................................1a

Appendix B: Opinion, Santana v. State of Maryland,

No. CSA-REG-2146-2019 (Md. Ct. Spec.

App. Jan. 15, 2021) ..............................2a

Appendix C: Trial Tr., State of Maryland v. Santana,

No. 08-K-17-000083 (Charles Cnty. Cir.

Ct. Mar. 27, 2019) ..............................10a

Appendix D: Trial Tr., State of Maryland v. Santana,

No. 08-K-17-000083 (Charles Cnty. Cir.

Ct. Mar. 28, 2019) ..............................47a

Appendix E: Trial Tr., State of Maryland v. Santana,

No. 08-K-17-000083 (Charles Cnty. Cir.

Ct. Apr. 1, 2019) .................................53a

Appendix F: Trial Tr., State of Maryland v. Santana,

No. 08-K-17-000083 (Charles Cnty. Cir.

Ct. Apr. 3, 2019) .................................57a

Appendix G: State’s Exhibit 208, State of Maryland

v. Santana, No. 08-K-17-000083

(Charles Cnty. Cir. Ct. admitted Mar.

27, 2019) .............................................60a

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Berger v. United States,

295 U.S. 78 (1935) ................................................ 31

Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83 (1963) ................................................ 17

Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands v.

Bowie,

243 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2001) .............................. 31

Ford v. Georgia,

498 U.S. 411 (1991) .............................................. 26

Gomez v. Comm’r of Correction,

243 A.3d 1163 (Conn. 2020) ......................... passim

Hamric v. Bailey,

386 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1967) ................................ 20

Hayes v. Brown,

399 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) ................ 31

Jenkins v. Artuz,

294 F.3d 284 (2d Cir. 2002) ............... 15, 22, 23, 29

Lee v. Kemna,

534 U.S. 362 (2002) .............................................. 26

Long v. Pfister,

874 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2017) .......................... 10, 15

vi

Mills v. Scully,

826 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1987) ............................... 14

Napue v. Illinois,

360 U.S. 264 (1959) ...................................... passim

People v. Lueck,

182 N.E.2d 733 (Ill. 1962) .................................... 12

People v. Smith,

870 N.W.2d 299 (2015)......................................... 12

Perry v. New Hampshire,

565 U.S. 228 (2012) ................................................ 2

Sivak v. Hardison,

658 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2011) ................................ 11

State v. Brunette,

501 A.2d 419 (Me. 1985) ...................................... 13

State v. Yates,

629 A.2d 807 (N.H. 1993)..................................... 13

United States v. Agurs,

427 U.S. 97 (1976) ................................................ 29

United States v. Bagley,

473 U.S. 667 (1985) .............................................. 23

United States v. Barham,

595 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1979) .............. 15, 16, 25, 29

United States v. Crockett,

435 F.3d 1305 (10th Cir. 2006) ........................ 4, 18

vii

United States v. Flores-Rivera,

787 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015) ................................ 3, 17

United States v. Foster,

874 F.2d 491 (8th Cir. 1988) ................................ 12

United States v. Griley,

814 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1987) ................................ 30

United States v. Harris,

498 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1974) ................... 16, 20, 22

United States v. Iverson,

637 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1981) .............................. 16

United States v. Iverson,

648 F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ........................ 16, 22

United States v. LaPage,

231 F.3d 488 (9th Cir. 2000) .......................... 11, 30

United States v. Mangual-Garcia,

505 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007) .............................. 17, 30

United States v. Meinster,

619 F.2d 1041 (4th Cir. 1980) .................... 4, 17, 18

United States v. Saadeh,

61 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 1995) .................................. 22

United States v. Sanfilippo,

564 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1977) .............. 15, 16, 23, 28

United States v. Stein,

846 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 2017) ...................... 15, 23

viii

United States v. Valdivia,

680 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2012) .................................. 24

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. XIV .............................................. 1

Statutes & Rules

28 U.S.C. § 1257 .......................................................... 1

Md. Rule 4-323 .......................................................... 26

Md. Rule 8-131 .......................................................... 26

Other Authorities

Charlie DeVore, A Lie Is A Lie: An

Argument for Strict Protection Against A

Prosecutor’s Knowing Use of Perjured

Testimony, 101 J. Crim. L. &

Criminology 667 (2011) ........................................ 17

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Angel Miguel Santana respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of

the Maryland Court of Special Appeals.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals (Pet. App. 2a–39a) is unreported. The order of

the Maryland Court of Appeals denying certiorari

(Pet. App. 1a) is unreported.

JURISDICTION

The Circuit Court for Charles County, Maryland,

entered a judgment of conviction against Petitioner on

December 12, 2019. Petitioner timely appealed the

judgment of conviction to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, and that court entered judgment against

Petitioner on January 15, 2021. Petitioner timely petitioned the Maryland Court of Appeals for certiorari,

and the Maryland Court of Appeals denied that petition on April 23, 2021. Petitioner timely filed this

petition for a writ of certiorari on September 20, 2021,

consistent with this Court’s March 19, 2020 order automatically extending the time to file a petition for

certiorari to 150 days from the date of the order denying discretionary review. This Court has jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISION INVOLVED

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

U.S. Constitution provides in relevant part:

2

No State shall . . . deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.

INTRODUCTION

In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959), this

Court made clear that the “principle that a State may

not knowingly use false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction” is “implicit in

any concept of ordered liberty.” This principle extends

to circumstances where the government does “not solicit[] false evidence [but] allows it to go uncorrected

when it appears.” Id. The “knowing use of false evidence” is “so extremely unfair that its admission

violates fundamental conceptions of justice,” Perry v.

New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 237 (2012) (quotations

and citation omitted), and requires a new trial.

Napue plainly established that the prosecutor’s reliance on material, false testimony about the scope of

a plea agreement violates a defendant’s due process

rights. And Napue made clear that, once such testimony is presented, the government may not let false

testimony go uncorrected.

But in the decades since this Court decided Napue,

a deep split involving sixteen federal and state courts

has developed over what satisfies that obligation.

Two federal courts of appeals and four state appellate courts have held that the government can

discharge its obligation under Napue only by correcting the false testimony in front of the jury that is

adjudicating the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

In these courts, the government cannot cure a Napue

3

violation by simply making defense counsel aware of

the falsity.

In six other federal courts of appeals and the Supreme Court of Connecticut, it is sometimes sufficient

for the government to make defense counsel aware of

the falsity through evidentiary disclosure or oral representation—namely, in circumstances where such

disclosure can prevent the false testimony from unfairly impacting the trial. In assessing whether

informing defense counsel—but not the jury—is sufficient to cure the due process harm to the defendant,

these courts consider various factors: for example,

“whether and how the prosecutor adopts and uses the

false testimony” and “the importance of the witness

and his or her false testimony to the state’s case,”

whether “defense counsel is prevented from effectively

impeaching the witness,” or whether the “prosecutor

becomes complicit in the falsehood, such as by adopting or otherwise affirmatively capitalizing on a

witness’ false testimony.” Gomez v. Comm’r of Correction, 243 A.3d 1163, 1173–74 (Conn. 2020).

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, however,

adopted a different, minority position embraced by

only three federal appellate courts: that the government “always” satisfies its obligation to correct false

testimony by disclosing the scope of its immunity

agreements (and, thus, the falsity of the testimony) to

defense counsel—even if the government does not correct the record in front of the jury, and even if the

evidence cannot disabuse the jury of the false impression given by the false testimony of the government

witness. Id. at 1174 (emphasis added) (citing United

States v. Flores-Rivera, 787 F.3d 1, 31–32 (1st Cir.

4

2015); United States v. Meinster, 619 F.2d 1041, 1045–

46 & n.8 (4th Cir. 1980)); see also United States v.

Crockett, 435 F.3d 1305, 1318 (10th Cir. 2006).

This case demonstrates how far the minority position strays from this Court’s decision in Napue.

Below, the government’s star witness—the only witness who testified that Petitioner was involved in the

crimes—testified that he had received immunity from

the prosecution for his testimony in this case. The

government conceded that no deal existed, that the

government knew no such deal existed at the time of

the trial, and that this false testimony was material.

Yet the government failed to correct the jury’s misimpression, and even bolstered the credibility of its

falsely-testifying witness in the prosecutor’s closing

argument to the jury.

Had that occurred in any of the thirteen jurisdictions that are on the other sides of this split,

Petitioner’s conviction would have been reversed as

fundamentally unfair. But because Petitioner was

tried in a court that follows the minority rule, his conviction stands. This Court should grant certiorari to

resolve this deeply entrenched split, and reverse the

judgment of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arises from a homicide that occurred in

Waldorf, Maryland, in January 2016. Two people ran

from around a corner in a residential cul-de-sac and

shot Lydell Wood, who died from his injuries. There

were several witnesses, but no one was able to identify

the shooters. Pet. App. 4a.

5

In late March 2016, Rashaad Brawner was arrested for his involvement in a different homicide (the

“March 2016 homicide”). Several months later, in the

course of plea negotiations with the government,

Brawner claimed that Petitioner Miguel Santana and

another man were the shooters in Wood’s killing.

Brawner claimed that he had helped them look for

Wood and had driven them to the scene of the shooting, but then left before the crime occurred. Pet. App.

8a.

In January 2017, Brawner agreed to plead guilty

to manslaughter in the March 2016 homicide in which

he had been charged, based on the government’s

agreement that he would receive a sentence of ten

years in prison with five years suspended. Brawner’s

deal was conditioned on his testimony in any future

case brought by the State of Maryland against Petitioner. Pet. App. 8a. Consequently, the agreement

required Brawner to testify against Petitioner in the

trial on murder charges the government brought

against Petitioner for Wood’s killing. Brawner was

not charged for his admitted involvement in Wood’s

killing. And Brawner’s written plea agreement in connection with his manslaughter conviction in the

March 2016 homicide did not indicate that there was

any government promise of immunity for Wood’s killing. See Pet. App. 60a–65a.

At Petitioner’s trial, the government called thirtysix witnesses, but only one—Brawner—testified that

he could identify Petitioner as one of the shooters.

Pet. App. 10a. At trial, Brawner testified that he

drove the two shooters to the scene, and that he drove

6

the getaway car for one of them. Brawner further testified that he retrieved the gun that was used to kill

Wood from a trash can and returned it to Petitioner.

Pet. App. 9a.

Brawner also testified on direct examination that

the prosecutor who previously handled the Wood case

had promised him immunity against any prosecution

for his involvement in Wood’s killing, separate and

apart from his plea agreement in the March 2016

homicide. Pet. App. 41a–42a. After eliciting this testimony, the prosecutor did not press Brawner on the

existence of an oral immunity agreement, nor did he

take any steps to correct that testimony.

On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned

Brawner about this purported immunity deal for his

involvement in the Wood killing. Pet. App. 43a–44a.

Defense counsel reviewed the written terms of the

government’s agreement in the March 2016 homicide

with Brawner, and then asked him whether he had a

deal with the government in the Wood killing.

Brawner insisted, under oath, that he had been promised by the other prosecutor that he would not be

charged in connection with Wood’s killing, and that

was why Brawner had no concern in admitting and

testifying about his role in the killing. Pet. App. 44a–

45a. Because Brawner said he had been “told” of this

promise of immunity on an unspecified date, Pet. App.

44a–45a, defense counsel had no evidentiary means of

verifying this claim or impeaching Brawner.

At no point during Brawner’s testimony or on redirect did the government correct the record for the jury

7

on the falsity of Brawner’s testimony that he received

immunity from prosecution for Wood’s killing.

At the end of Brawner’s testimony, defense counsel

raised the issue of Brawner’s statements about an immunity agreement that had not been provided to the

defense. The prosecutor denied that there was any

such agreement, and told defense counsel and the

judge: “That was not the deal.” Pet. App. 48a–50a.

Yet the prosecutor did not correct Brawner’s false testimony in front of the jury. Instead, in its closing

argument, the government focused heavily on

Brawner’s credibility, and specifically argued that

Brawner “had no motive to lie about his good friend

[Petitioner] Miguel Santana.” Pet. App. 54a.

After several hours of deliberations, the jury wrote

a note saying it was deadlocked. The trial judge again

instructed the jury on their duty to deliberate and

agree, and requested they continue to deliberate. Pet.

App. 58a. After additional deliberation, Petitioner

was convicted of Conspiracy to Commit Murder, and

of Possession of a Regulated Firearm by a Disqualified

Person. The jury could not reach a verdict on the

charge of First Degree Murder or several other

charges. The trial judge subsequently sentenced Petitioner to a sentence of life imprisonment. Pet. App.

10a.

Petitioner appealed, arguing that his due process

rights were violated by the false and uncorrected testimony of the government’s witness—the only

testimony that identified Petitioner as involved in the

crime. Pet. App. 20a–21a. The government conceded

in its brief that “Brawner’s testimony about the plea

8

agreement was material,” Appellee Br. 29, and that

the trial “was a close case that relied on Brawner’s testimony.” Id. at 45. Moreover, the government again

explained that the testimony of that key witness was

false, recounting that the “prosecutor was adamant

[at the bench conference] that Brawner had not been

granted immunity from prosecution in connection

with the Wood murder.” Id. at 25–26.

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed

Petitioner’s conviction. The court concluded that Petitioner’s due process claim was “not compelling,”

because, although Brawner had “testified [on direct

examination] that a former State’s Attorney had told

him he would not be prosecuted for Wood’s murder,”

the “prosecutor explained [at a bench conference] that

the deal was not what Brawner thought it was, but

the terms of the agreement were as they had been disclosed to [Petitioner].” Pet. App. 28a. The court

concluded that the jury had the opportunity to determine “the truthfulness and reliability” of Brawner’s

testimony because the jury had the opportunity to review the written plea agreement pertaining to

Brawner’s March 2016 case, and Petitioner cross-examined Brawner on the terms of that agreement. Pet.

App. 27a–28a. The court did not discuss the fact that

the written agreement concerned a different offense

than the purported oral agreement.

The court also stated that Petitioner had not preserved an objection to the false testimony of the

government witness because the issue was not raised

in Petitioner’s motion for a judgment of acquittal, and

Petitioner “did not advance an argument about the

falsity of [the] witness’[s] testimony during trial and

9

did not question whether [the] witness’[s] testimony

was false.” Pet. App. 24a–25a. The opinion did not

address the bench conference where defense counsel

explicitly raised the issue after challenging the truth

of the witness’s testimony on cross-examination,

much less explain why the objection raised during the

bench conference was insufficient.

Petitioner’s petition for certiorari in the Court of

Appeals of Maryland was denied.

10

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

The Appellate Courts Are Deeply Divided

Over Whether a Government Witness’s

Uncorrected False Testimony About Immunity Agreements Violates Due Process

When the Government Informs Defense

Counsel of the Falsity, But Not the Jury.

This Court’s review is warranted to resolve the

broad disagreement among the federal and state appellate courts about when, absent the government’s

correction in front of the jury of a government witness’s material false testimony about an immunity

agreement, the government can cure a Napue violation by making defense counsel aware that the

testimony was false. Federal and state appellate

courts have struggled to resolve this question. See,

e.g., Long v. Pfister, 874 F.3d 544, 548–550 (7th Cir.

2017) (discussing questions left open by this Court’s

opinions following Napue).

Just last year, the Supreme Court of Connecticut

examined the “split of opinion among the federal

courts of appeals on this question.” Gomez, 243 A.3d

at 1171. What it found was a deeply “fragmented” jurisprudence on Napue claims, id. at 1173, and a deep

circuit split. Two federal courts of appeals hold that

the government must affirmatively correct false testimony in front of the jury. Several other federal and

state appellate courts use a multi-factor test to ensure

that false testimony does not render a trial unfair.

But in a small minority of jurisdictions, including

Maryland, the government only violates due process

when it withholds evidence from defense counsel.

11

This Court’s intervention is warranted to resolve this

recognized split.

A. Two courts of appeals and four state supreme

courts have held, in unanimous panel decisions, that

the obligation to correct a government witness’s false

testimony rests wholly on the government.

In the Ninth Circuit, “the government’s duty to

correct perjury by its witnesses is not discharged

merely because defense counsel knows, and the jury

may figure out, that the testimony is false.” United

States v. LaPage, 231 F.3d 488, 491 (9th Cir. 2000).

That is because, “[w]here the prosecutor knows that

his witness has lied, he has a constitutional duty to

correct the [jury’s] false impression of the facts.” Id.

(emphasis added). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “[a] prosecutor has a special duty

commensurate with a prosecutor’s unique power, to

assure that defendants receive fair trials,” and the

government cannot “knowingly present lies to a jury

and then sit idly by while opposing counsel struggles

to contain this pollution of the trial.” Id. at 492. Accordingly, regardless of “whether the defense knew

about the false testimony and failed to object or crossexamine the witness,” defendants “c[an]not waive the

freestanding ethical and constitutional obligation of

the prosecutor as a representative of the government

to protect the integrity of the court and the criminal

justice system.” Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 909

(9th Cir. 2011) (quotations and citation omitted) (alteration in original).

12

The Eighth Circuit has likewise held that “[t]he

fact that defense counsel was also aware of the [correct information] but failed to correct the prosecutor’s

misrepresentation is of no consequence.” United

States v. Foster, 874 F.2d 491, 495 (8th Cir. 1988).

The Supreme Courts of Michigan, Illinois, New

Hampshire, and Maine adhere to this application of

Napue as well. In finding a Napue violation and remanding for a new trial, the Michigan Supreme Court

explained that “[d]ue process require[s] that the jury

be accurately apprised of the incentives underlying

the testimony of [a] critical witness, and plainly that

the prosecution not exploit any confusion relating to

this critical topic.” People v. Smith, 870 N.W.2d 299,

310 (2015). That is true even if the falsity had been

“fully disclosed and known . . . to defense counsel and

the trial court” and “defense counsel did not object,

ask for a mistrial, seek a conference outside the presence of the jury, or otherwise ask the court to strike

the allegedly false testimony.” Id. at 316, 321–22

(Zahra, J., dissenting).

The Illinois Supreme Court reached the same conclusion where the government “did nothing to correct

the false testimony” of its witness, People v. Lueck,

182 N.E.2d 733, 733–34 (Ill. 1962), despite “the fact

that false testimony was being given was known to the

defense at the time of trial,” and “the defense made no

attempt at the trial to expose the falsity of the testimony or to combat its effect. Id. at 734 (Hershey, C.J.,

dissenting).

These cases emphasize that the responsibility to

correct the jury’s misimpression created by the false

13

testimony of a government witness rests squarely

upon the government, not the defendant. And they

recognize that the purpose of Napue’s rule is to ensure

that the jury, as factfinder, is not misled.

To that end, the New Hampshire Supreme Court

reversed a conviction where both “the prosecutor and

the defense counsel knew” the testimony was false at

the time of trial and neither corrected the jury, because “the final responsibility rested with the

prosecutor, not [the defendant], to bring to the attention of the court and the jury the State’s official

position” that the testimony was false. State v. Yates,

629 A.2d 807, 808, 810 (N.H. 1993) (emphasis added).

Likewise, the Maine Supreme Court has held: “That

the prosecution . . . immediately and fully informed

both the defense counsel and the presiding justice

does not change our analysis. . . . The fact remains

that the jury was never informed” that the testimony

was false. State v. Brunette, 501 A.2d 419, 424 (Me.

1985).

B. Seven state and federal appellate courts have

taken more case-specific approaches, holding that, under certain circumstances, the government can

sometimes satisfy the prosecutor’s duty to prevent the

false testimony of a government witness from unfairly

affecting the trial by making defense counsel aware of

the falsity through evidentiary disclosure or oral representation.

These courts recognize that merely informing the

defendant “does not necessarily discharge the prosecutor from his duty to correct the false testimony.”

Gomez, 243 A.3d at 1173. “[S]haring the truth with

14

defense counsel, in itself, does nothing to disabuse the

jury of any misconceptions created by the false testimony.” Id. at 1175. And defense counsel is not always

able to undo the damage done by the government’s

witness, particularly in “the face of silence—or worse,

complicity—on the part of the prosecution and continued dissembling by the state’s witness.” Id. at 1176.

These courts accordingly look to the specific circumstances of the case to assess whether merely making

defense counsel aware of the falsehood is sufficient to

satisfy the prosecutor’s duty to correct the jury’s misapprehension.

For example, the Supreme Court of Connecticut

and the Second and Seventh Circuits “consider various factors in assessing whether the state has

satisfied its obligations under Napue merely by disclosing to defense counsel that a witness for the

prosecution has given material, false testimony.” Id.

at 1174. In addition to the government’s notice to defense counsel that its witness provided false

testimony, those courts look to factors including who

“elicits the false testimony, whether and how the prosecutor adopts and uses the false testimony, [and] the

importance of the witness and his or her false testimony to the state’s case.” Id. See, e.g., Mills v. Scully,

826 F.2d 1192, 1195 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Even where defense counsel is aware of the falsity, there may be a

deprivation of due process if the prosecutor reinforces

the deception by capitalizing on it in closing argument, or by posing misleading questions to the

witnesses.” (citations omitted)). These courts also

consider “whether—and to what effect—defense counsel tries to impeach the perfidious witness or whether

counsel has a clear tactical reason for not doing so,

15

and, most important, whether the truth ultimately is

revealed to the jury.” Gomez, 243 A.3d at 1174 (citing

Long v. Pfister, 874 F.3d at 549; Jenkins v. Artuz, 294

F.3d 284, 293 (2d Cir. 2002)).

The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits likewise recognize

that correction by the government of false testimony

of a government witness on the record in front of the

jury can be critical to safeguard a defendant’s due process rights. Although those courts “generally tak[e]

the view that disclosure [to defense counsel] is sufficient to satisfy Napue,” they “make an exception for

cases in which the prosecutor becomes complicit in the

falsehood, such as by adopting or otherwise affirmatively capitalizing on a witness’ false testimony.” Id.

at 1173; see, e.g., United States v. Stein, 846 F.3d 1135,

1147–48 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Barham,

595 F.2d 231, 243–44 n.17 (5th Cir. 1979); United

States v. Sanfilippo, 564 F.2d 176, 177–78 (5th Cir.

1977).

For example, in United States v. Sanfilippo, the

Fifth Circuit acknowledged that “the prosecutor may

have been obliged to step forward and set the record

straight when [the government’s witness] persisted in

misrepresenting the Government’s promise despite

repeated efforts by defense counsel to elicit the truth,”

but the court did not need to “ground reversal solely

on the failure to perform that duty,” because the prosecutor also capitalized on it in his closing argument.

564 F.2d at 178. Under such circumstances, it did not

matter that there may have been witnesses or hearings the defense could have called for to rebut:

“[t]hese tools being available to the defendants, the

16

question is whether the Government is relieved of responsibility,” and “[t]he cases hold that the duty to

correct the false testimony of a Government witness is

on the prosecutor.” Id. See also Barham, 595 F.2d

231, 243–44 n.17 (reversing conviction where the

prosecutor’s questions had “reinforced the deception

and thereby contributed to the deprivation of due process.”).

The Third and D.C. Circuits have also found due

process violations when “defense counsel, although

possibly aware of the relevant information, was unable, as a practical matter, to use it to cast doubt upon

contrary evidence proffered by the government or its

witnesses.” United States v. Iverson, 648 F.2d 737,

738 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (statement on order denying petition for rehearing), modifying 637 F.2d 799 (D.C.

Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Harris, 498 F.2d

1164, 1166, 1169–71 (3d Cir. 1974) (considering

whether the impeachment could have “sufficiently

mitigated the prejudice to defendants,” but finding no

Napue violation where defense counsel did not make

“any effort whatever” to correct the witness’s false testimony and rejected government offer to stipulate

falsity).

C. The decision below, however, adopts the minority position taken by the First, Fourth, and Tenth

Circuits, which have held that “disclosure of the facts

of a cooperation agreement to defense counsel always

is sufficient to protect a defendant’s rights under Napue,” and the government’s knowing use of false

testimony about a cooperation agreement does not violate due process in such instances. Gomez, 243 A.3d

17

at 1173 (emphasis added).1 Instead of recognizing

that cross-examination by defense counsel to try to

correct false testimony by a government witness cannot equate to the government correcting the testimony

that it knows to be false, those Circuits have held that

“[w]hen the defendant knows about the false testimony and fails to bring it to the jury or the court's

attention, the assumption is that he did so for strategic reasons,” and waives his Napue claim. United

States v. Mangual-Garcia, 505 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir.

2007). See also United States v. Flores-Rivera, 787

F.3d 1, 31–32 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Meinster, 619 F.2d 1041, 1045–46 & n.8 (4th Cir. 1980)

(defense counsel’s “knowledge of the [immunity deal]

1 In relying on disclosure to defense counsel to negate the due

process violation, some courts have conflated Napue violations

with Brady violations. Cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963). Napue and Brady provide related, but distinct, due process protections. Brady’s requirement that prosecutors disclose

exculpatory evidence to the defendant before trial serves the

broad goal of enabling the accused to investigate and prepare

themselves for trial by providing them with access to material

information in the government’s possession and an opportunity

to present or rebut that evidence to the jury. In contrast, Napue

places obligations on prosecutors during trial to protect defendants from being convicted based on the government’s knowing

use of false testimony that is presented to the jury adjudicating

the guilt or innocence of the criminal defendant. Moreover, although there may sometimes be “ambiguity involved in the degree

[of] unfairness inherent in a prosecutor’s withholding of a piece

of evidence at the discovery phase,” “this ambiguity simply does

not exist where a prosecutor knowingly uses perjured testimony

during trial. Either a prosecutor knows that a falsehood has

been uttered in open court or he does not.” Charlie DeVore, A

Lie Is A Lie: An Argument for Strict Protection Against A Prosecutor’s Knowing Use of Perjured Testimony, 101 J. Crim. L. &

Criminology 667, 675, 679 (2011).

18

precludes our granting the relief they seek” under Napue); United States v. Crockett, 435 F.3d 1305, 1318

(10th Cir. 2006) (holding that where “[t]he government ha[s] disclosed th[e] impeachment evidence,”

“Napue is inapposite”). These courts hew to this strict

standard even where defense counsel’s attack on the

witness’s credibility is rendered “speculative at best”

by the witness’s and the prosecutor’s “continued denial . . . of the existence of any promise” to the witness.

Meinster, 619 F.2d at 1052 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).

The decision here adopted that same flawed rationale. In rejecting the Napue claim, the appellate

court acknowledged that “Brawner testified that a former State’s Attorney had told him he would not be

prosecuted for Wood’s murder” but that the prosecutor

trying the case told the court and defense counsel in a

bench conference in the middle of trial that this testimony was not true. Pet. App. 28a. Notwithstanding

that false testimony by a government witness, which

the government acknowledged was material, the court

held that the government had fulfilled its obligation

to correct the false testimony by disclosing to defense

counsel a copy of its written agreement with the witness in a different case. That written agreement did

not include a promise of immunity to the witness related to the killing for which Petitioner was

prosecuted, in which the witness admitted involvement. See Pet. App. 60a–65a.

In joining the minority of courts, the court below

deepened an acknowledged split among multiple federal and state courts. Given this straightforward

19

division in authority on an important and recurring

question, this Court should grant certiorari.

II.

The Decision Below Is Wrong and Highlights Why the Minority Position in the

Circuit Split Is Contrary to This Court’s

Precedent.

The minority position of the First, Fourth, and

Tenth Circuit fails the standard set by this Court in

Napue that “a State may not knowingly use false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted

conviction,” and also may not “allow[] it to go uncorrected when it appears.” 360 U.S. at 270. The purpose

of Napue’s rule is to apprise the jury of the truth, so

that the jury does not base its verdict on a falsehood.

The minority rule assumes that defense counsel is

able to effectively correct the jury’s misimpression so

long as the prosecutor has made the defense aware of

the testimony’s falsity. This rule is wrong because its

assumption is wrong, and this case illustrates why:

Where the only basis to doubt the witness’s testimony

is a representation by the prosecutor, only the prosecutor can show the jury that the witness’s testimony

is false.

A. Petitioner was denied his due process right under Napue not to be convicted on the basis of false

testimony of a government witness, and his conviction

must be reversed. The undisputed facts of the case

reveal that: (1) Brawner testified on direct and crossexamination that he had been promised by the former

prosecutor that he would not be prosecuted for Wood’s

killing; (2) the government denied to the court that

20

Brawner had such an immunity agreement with respect to Wood’s killing; (3) the prosecutor did not

correct Brawner’s false testimony in front of the jury;

and (4) the government relied heavily on the testimony of Brawner, the only witness to identify

Petitioner as involved in Wood’s killing, and argued in

closing that Brawner “had no motive to lie about his

good friend [Petitioner].” Pet. App. 54a. On the face

of this record, Petitioner has stated a due process violation under Napue. Cf. Br. for United States in Opp.

to Certiorari, Schmidt v. United States (No. 00-997),

https://bit.ly/

387wDp9 (“[C]ourts of appeals have held that a defendant’s due process rights are violated if a critical

government witness testifies falsely, either on direct

or on cross-examination; the prosecutor does not correct the false testimony; and there is a reasonable

likelihood that the false testimony affected the outcome of the trial.”).2

B. This Court should grant review and hold that,

consistent with Napue, the government violated due

2 The appellate court’s comment, unsupported by any record ci-

tation, that it “[thought] that Brawner misunderstood the scope

of the plea agreement,” Pet. App. 28a, is immaterial. As the

Fourth Circuit has explained, “due process is violated not only

where the prosecution uses perjured testimony to support its

case, but also where it uses evidence which it knows creates a

false impression of a material fact.” Hamric v. Bailey, 386 F.2d

390, 394 (4th Cir. 1967). The Third Circuit has likewise recognized that, “when it should be obvious to the Government that

[the witness’s] answer, although made in good faith, is untrue,

the Government’s obligation to correct that statement is as compelling as it is in a situation where the Government knows that

the witness is intentionally committing perjury.” United States

v. Harris, 498 F.2d 1164, 1166, 1169–71 (3d Cir. 1974).

21

process when it failed to correct the jury about the

false testimony its witness has provided. The Court

should reach this result, regardless of whether it

adopts the bright-line rule applied by six courts, or

whether it adopts the case-by-case approach applied

by seven others.

The government clearly violated Petitioner’s due

process rights under the precedent of the Eighth and

Ninth Circuits and the state supreme courts in Michigan, Illinois, New Hampshire, and Maine. Those

courts hold that the obligation to correct a government

witness’s false testimony rests entirely on the government, and there is no dispute that the government

failed to correct the testimony here.

The government also violated Petitioner’s due process rights under the precedent of the federal courts of

appeals and state supreme courts that review a series

of case-specific factors. That is because the information that the government provided to defense

counsel about the scope of its agreements with the witness did not provide defense counsel with the ability

to effectively impeach the witness, and the government emphasized the witness’s credibility in its

closing argument.

Before trial, the government disclosed a written

plea agreement with its witness Brawner concerning

the March 2016 homicide, in which Brawner pleaded

guilty to manslaughter. But Brawner’s testimony at

trial was not about the terms of the written plea deal

(on which he could have been impeached using the

document itself); rather, Brawner testified that a

22

prosecutor had orally made a separate, additional immunity agreement with Brawner regarding his

admitted involvement in the killing for which Petitioner was being prosecuted. Petitioner could not

effectively cross-examine or impeach on this additional term that Brawner had supposedly been

promised orally using the written plea agreement because Brawner could, and did, reiterate his false

testimony. Thus, cross-examination by defense counsel could not have disabused the jury of the falsehood

regarding an oral promise of immunity to Brawner related to his admitted involvement in Wood’s killing.

This record would require reversal under the casespecific approaches adopted by other federal courts of

appeals that consider whether defense counsel could

have effectively impeached using the information the

government had provided it. Cf. Artuz, 294 F.3d at

294 (requiring new trial based on false testimony

where, among other things, “the jury was left with

“the mistaken impression” about the scope of the deal

even after defense counsel attempted to impeach);

United States v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510, 523 (7th Cir.

1995) (“[W]hen a defendant alleges that the prosecution used perjured testimony, we must inquire into

whether the defendant had adequate opportunity to

expose the alleged perjury on cross-examination.”);

Iverson, 648 F.2d at 738 (explaining that remand is

appropriate in “situations in which the defense counsel, although possibly aware of the relevant

information, was unable, as a practical matter, to use

it to cast doubt upon contrary evidence proffered by

the government or its witnesses”); Harris, 498 F.2d at

1171 n.10 (acknowledging new trial would be appropriate where subsequent answers provided on cross

23

examination “‘could not adequately overcome the

jury’s initial impression of the [witness’s false] testimony”).

Moreover, the government exacerbated the impact

of the false testimony when the prosecutor argued in

closing that Brawner was credible and had no reason

to lie about Petitioner. The case-specific approaches

adopted by other federal courts of appeals would have

required reversal based on the government’s decision

to bolster the credibility of the witness who had provided false testimony. Cf. Stein, 846 F.3d at 1147

(“Where the government not only fails to correct materially false testimony but also affirmatively

capitalizes on it, the defendant’s due process rights

are violated despite the government’s timely disclosure of evidence showing the falsity.”); Sanfilippo, 564

F.2d at 178 (remanding for new trial because “[c]oupled with the failure to correct [the witness]’s false

testimony at the time was the prosecutor’s capitalizing on it in his closing argument”); Artuz, 294 F.3d at

294 (requiring new trial based on false testimony

where, among other things, prosecutor “bolstered [the

witness]’s credibility in the course of her summation”).

C. This Court’s Napue ruling is of such significance and so critical to the criminal justice system

that “the standard of review applicable to the knowing

use of perjured testimony is equivalent to the Chapman harmless-error standard.” United States v.

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 679 n.9 (1985) (opinion of

Blackmun, J.). And the Maryland courts made no

finding of harmlessness, nor could they. Indeed, in the

government’s own words, “there is no question this

24

was a close case that relied on Brawner’s testimony.”

Appellee Br. at 45.

Brawner was the only percipient witness who testified that Petitioner was at the scene of the crime,

and he repeatedly testified in front of the jury to an

oral immunity agreement. Brawner explained he had

no concern about admitting and testifying about his

role in the killing because of his purported immunity.

Pet. App. 44a–45a. But “[t]he prosecutor was adamant” outside the presence of the jury that no such

agreement existed. Appellee Br. 25–26. In a case

where the jury hung on several counts, further blows

to the key cooperating witness’s credibility could certainly have changed the outcome of Petitioner’s case.

Had the government corrected the false testimony

by its witness at Petitioner’s trial, the jury could have

drawn any of several unfavorable inferences about the

witness’s credibility. For example, the jury could have

concluded that Brawner had to lie to implicate Petitioner in the killing in order to maintain favor with

the prosecutor, or else risk prosecution himself. Or,

the jury could have concluded that Brawner was exaggerating his knowledge of the crime to increase his

value to the government as a witness. See, e.g., United

States v. Valdivia, 680 F.3d 33, 54 (1st Cir. 2012) (explaining the court’s decision “account[ed] for the

potential puffery of cooperating witnesses”). Or, the

jury could have concluded that Brawner, having lied

about the scope of his agreements with the government, was an unreliable witness who was also lying

about the facts of the case. At a minimum, if the government had corrected that false testimony by its own

25

witness, the jurors would have learned that its witness’s oath to tell the truth on the stand was not

credible. See Barham, 595 F.2d at 243 (the “failure of

the Government to correct the false impression given

by [the witnesses] shielded from jury consideration

yet another, more persuasive reason to doubt their

testimony—the very fact that they had attempted to

give the jury a false impression concerning promises

from the Government.”).

Because the jury could have viewed Brawner’s lack

of immunity as a reason for him to lie and implicate

Petitioner, Brawner’s false testimony at Petitioner’s

trial was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt—

especially given the centrality of Brawner’s role in the

government’s case. Indeed, this Court has addressed

the “serious questions of credibility” surrounding testimony by cooperating government witnesses by

“ensuring that various procedural safeguards allow

criminal defendants to vigorously challenge the testimony of cooperating witnesses,” including that “the

government may never knowingly sponsor or suborn

perjury.” Br. for United States in Opp. to Certiorari

at 12, Ingram v. United States, No. 06-207,

https://bit.ly/2WgpAaS (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at

269).

D. The Maryland appellate court’s discussion in

this case of whether the Napue issue was preserved

does not weigh against granting certiorari, because

the Maryland court’s erroneous decision on preservation does not constitute an adequate and independent

state ground sufficient to preclude further review.

“[O]nly a ‘firmly established and regularly followed

state practice’ may be interposed by a State to prevent

26

subsequent review by this Court of a federal constitutional claim,” Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423–24

(1991), and even in those circumstances, there are “exceptional cases in which exorbitant application of a

generally sound rule renders the state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a federal question.” Lee

v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002).

Petitioner’s due process claim is reviewable under

either standard. Maryland rules establish that a contemporaneous objection is sufficient to preserve the

issue for appellate review, Md. Rule 4-323(a), (c); Md.

Rule 8-131(a), and Petitioner’s counsel contemporaneously raised this issue with the trial court, as the

record plainly indicates. Pet. App. 48a–51a. The

court’s intimation that Petitioner needed to raise the

issue again in his motion for a judgment of acquittal

in order to preserve the issue for appeal, Pet. App. 24a,

appears nowhere in the Maryland Rules, and is neither firmly established nor regularly followed in the

Maryland courts.3

Alternatively, the established preservation rule—

that a contemporaneous objection is required to preserve an issue on appeal—was grossly misapplied

here, based in part on the court’s severe misconstruction of the record below. The Maryland Court of

Special Appeals misread the record in concluding that

“Santana necessarily deprived the State of the opportunity to respond to these arguments or to present

3 The appropriate remedy for this due process violation is rever-

sal of the conviction and retrial, not acquittal, see Napue, 360

U.S. at 272.

27

countering evidence.” In fact, the record plainly indicates that Petitioner raised the issue of Brawner’s

false testimony in the sidebar where the government

confirmed the testimony was false. Petitioner did everything that the Maryland Rules require, and the

court’s application of a harsher bar on Petitioner cannot create an adequate and independent state ground

that precludes this Court’s federal appellate review.

As this Court explained in Napue itself: “In cases in

which there is a claim of denial of rights under the

Federal Constitution, this Court is not bound by the

conclusions of lower courts, but will reexamine the evidentiary basis on which those conclusions are

founded.” 360 U.S. at 272 (quotations and citation

omitted).

E. This case presents a good vehicle for this Court

to resolve the circuit split on the application of Napue

because of the several issues that are either uncontested or outright conceded by the government. This

is the rare case where government both admitted—

during the sidebar in the midst of trial and in its subsequent briefing—that the deal the witness testified

about did not exist, Pet. App. 48a–51a, Appellee Br.

25–26, and conceded that its witness’s false “testimony about the plea agreement was material,”

Appellee Br. 29. Because it is uncontested that the

government’s witness provided false, material testimony at Petitioner’s trial, and that the government

did not correct that testimony in front of the jury, the

question that is the subject of the circuit split—

whether, when a government witness provides material false testimony about an immunity agreement

and the government fails to correct that false testimony in front of the jury, the government cures that

28

due process violation by merely making defense counsel aware of the falsity of the testimony—is squarely

before this Court.

III.

This Question Is Important and Goes to

the Constitutional Integrity of Criminal

Convictions.

This Court’s review is warranted to resolve the disparate application of a critical due process protection,

which undermines the integrity of the judicial system.

To guarantee that the trial is not fundamentally unfair, the jury’s misimpression created by the false

testimony of a government witness must be corrected.

Even those courts that have held that informing defense counsel of the scope of the government’s

agreements to defense counsel is sometimes sufficient

to cure the due process violation recognize that such

disclosure is meaningless “unless [defense counsel] is

able to impart that knowledge to the jury.” United

States v. Sanfilippo, 564 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1977).

Because the jury makes the ultimate determination of

guilt or innocence, correcting the jury’s understanding—not defense counsel’s or the judge’s—is of the

utmost importance in ensuring that the trial is fair.

Napue and its progeny establish that the government has the obligation to correct the false testimony

by a government witness, both because of its responsibility to uphold the integrity of the court, and

because the government is the only one who is capable

of effectively counteracting its own witness’s false testimony.

Knowingly allowing false, material testimony to

stand “corrupt[s] the truth-seeking function of the

29

trial process” and the basic precept that, “though the

attorney for the sovereign must prosecute the accused

with earnestness and vigor, he must always be faithful to his client’s overriding interest that justice shall

be done.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104,

110–11 (1976) (quotations and citation omitted).

“That the [government’s] silence was not the result of

guile or a desire to prejudice matters little,” because

the impact of letting the false testimony stand uncorrected is the same regardless of the government’s

intent: it “prevent[s] . . . a trial that could in any real

sense be termed fair.” Napue, 360 U.S. at 270.

This issue strikes at the heart of the fundamental

fairness of a criminal trial. The minority position

adopted by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals

and the First, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits effectively

absolves the government of its duty to prevent false

testimony of a government witness from going uncorrected in front of the jury, thus allowing the jury to

reach a verdict on the basis of assertions the government knows to be false. This standard, as illustrated

by this case, is offensive to due process and should be

rectified.

Courts that require the prosecutor to affirmatively

correct the material false testimony of its witnesses

ensure that the jury does not convict a defendant

based on false testimony. Those courts understand

that, “under the Constitution, the defendant is entitled to a jury that is not laboring under a Governmentsanctioned false impression of material evidence

when it decides the question of guilt or innocence with

all its ramifications.” Barham, 595 F.2d at 242; see

also Jenkins, 294 F.3d at 295.

30

Not only does the minority rule excuse, as a practical matter, convictions founded on false testimony,

it also sets perverse and dangerous incentives for

prosecutors. Under this rule, a prosecutor is free to

elicit false testimony that a government witness saw

the defendant commit the crime with his own eyes—

and so long as the prosecutor has made the defense

aware that the testimony is false, he has fulfilled his

duty under the Constitution. If defense counsel fails

to adequately raise the issue and impeach the witness,

“the assumption is that he did so for strategic reasons.” Mangual-Garcia, 505 F.3d at 10–11 (1st Cir.

2007). This rule does not prevent the use of false testimony, it invites it.

And defense counsel is not always able to persuade

a jury that the government’s witness has testified

falsely. See Gomez, 243 A.3d at 1176. Because “[t]he

jury understands defense counsel’s duty of advocacy

and frequently listens to defense counsel with skepticism,” the prosecutor cannot “knowingly present lies

to a jury and then sit idly by while opposing counsel

struggles to contain this pollution of the trial.”

LaPage, 231 F.3d at 492. For that reason, when the

government knows that false, material testimony has

been presented at trial by its own witness, “[t]he government has an obligation to prevent” the jury’s

inaccurate assessment of a witness’s credibility “by

ensuring that a witness correctly describes his plea

arrangement to the jury.” United States v. Griley, 814

F.2d 967, 972 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Napue, 360 U.S.

at 269–70.

“Nowhere in the Constitution or in the Declaration of Independence, nor for that matter in the

31

Federalist or in any other writing of the Founding Fathers, can one find a single utterance that could justify

a decision by any oath-beholden servant of the law to

look the other way when confronted by the real possibility of being complicit in the wrongful use of false

evidence to secure a conviction in court.” Hayes v.

Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 988 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)

(quoting Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands v.

Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001)). In this

sense, Napue violations are a quintessential example

of the difference between what this Court has described as permissible “hard blows” by a prosecuting

attorney and impermissible “foul blows.” Berger v.

United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

The minority rule—applied by the Maryland Court

of Special Appeals in this case and by three federal

courts of appeals in other cases—permitted Petitioner’s conviction to stand after the government’s

star witness testified falsely about his immunity

agreement, and the government not only failed to correct the witness in front of the jury but capitalized in

closing argument on the witness’s credibility and denied that the witness had a motive to lie. An

interpretation of the law that sanctions such a tainted

conviction cannot stand. This Court should grant certiorari to resolve the split and reverse the decision

below.

32

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of

certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Beth S. Brinkmann

Mark W. Mosier

Kevin B. Collins

Counsel of Record

Adam L.D. Stempel

Megan C. Keenan

COVINGTON & BURLING LLP

One CityCenter

850 Tenth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20001

kcollins@cov.com

(202) 662-6000

September 20, 2021

Counsel for Petitioner

Miguel Angel Santana