Amicus Curiae Brief — First Midwest Bank, as Guardian of the Estate of Michael D. LaPorta, Petitioner v. City of Chicago, Illinois

No. 21-414

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------FIRST MIDWEST BANK, as Guardian of the

Estate of Michael D. LaPorta,

Petitioner,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS,

Respondent.

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

BLACK COPS AGAINST POLICE BRUTALITY

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------MAHESHA P. SUBBARAMAN

Counsel of Record

SUBBARAMAN PLLC

222 S. 9th St., Ste. 1600

Minneapolis, MN 55402

(612) 315-9210

mps@subblaw.com

October 7, 2021

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COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964

WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Authorities .............................................

ii

Interest of the Amicus Curiae .............................

1

Summary of the Argument ..................................

2

Argument .............................................................

4

Municipalities are liable for off-duty police

conduct that involves preventable abuse of a

service weapon and erodes public trust ...........

4

Conclusion............................................................ 14

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Bonsignore v. New York, 683 F.2d 635 (2d Cir.

1982) ........................................................................13

Corridon v. Bayonne, 324 A.2d 42 (N.J. Superior

Ct. 1974) ..................................................................12

Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Detroit,

385 Mich. 519 (1971) ...............................................10

Doerr v. Commonwealth, 491 A.2d 299 (Pa.

Commw. Ct. 1985) ............................................. 11, 12

EEOC v. New Jersey, 620 F. Supp. 977 (D.N.J.

1985) ........................................................................10

Gibson v. Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510 (7th Cir.

1990) ....................................................................13

Gonzales v. Tucson, 604 P.2d 1161 (Ariz. Ct. App.

1979) ........................................................................10

Hairston v. D.C., 638 F. Supp. 198 (D.D.C.

1986) ....................................................................11

In re Application of Russell, 51 Conn. 577

(1884) .................................................................... 9

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) ......................14

Marusa v. D.C., 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ...... 13, 14

Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d

525 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) ..........................................13

Miller v. New Jersey, 144 F. App’x 926 (3d Cir.

2005) ........................................................................10

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

People ex rel. Connolly v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs,

18 Hun 403 (N.Y. Supreme Ct. 1877) ................... 6, 7

People ex rel. Hayes v. Carroll, 42 Hun 438 (N.Y.

Supreme Ct. 1887) .......................................... 7, 8, 14

People ex rel. Minchen v. McLean, 21 N.Y.S. 625

(N.Y. Superior Ct. 1893) ............................................8

People ex rel. Robinson v. Bell, 8 N.Y.S. 748 (N.Y.

Supreme Ct. 1890) ....................................................9

State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469 (R.I. 1979) ...................4

Timus v. United States, 406 A.2d 1269 (D.C.

1979) ........................................................................10

RULES

S. Ct. R. 37.2(a) .............................................................1

OTHER AUTHORITIES

18 MARCUS HUN, REPORTS OF CASES HEARD AND

DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF NEW YORK (1877), https://bit.ly/

3BlZ13S ................................................................. 6, 7

42 MARCUS HUN, REPORTS OF CASES HEARD AND

DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF NEW YORK (1887), https://bit.ly/

3iBadls ............................................................. 7, 8, 14

A. E. COSTELLO, HISTORY OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT OF JERSEY CITY (1891) ......................................9

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Brief of Amicus Curiae B-CAP in Support of

Respondents, Pottawattamie Cnty., Iowa v.

McGhee, No. 08-1065 (U.S. filed Sep. 18,

2009) ..........................................................................2

De Lacy Davis, From the Field: Why I Founded

Black Cops Against Police Brutality, J. OF

ETHNICITY IN CRIM. J. (ONLINE), Sept. 24, 2021,

https://bit.ly/3laWVhl................................................1

Debo P. Adegbile, Policing Through an American

Prism, 126 YALE L.J. 2222 (2017) .............................4

Manny Howard, Halt, Off-Duty Police!, N.Y. MAG.,

Jan. 23, 1995, at 14, https://bit.ly/3oHLyjn ............12

Mike Baker, et al., Three Words. 70 Cases. The

Tragic History of ‘I Can’t Breathe.’, N.Y. TIMES,

June 29, 2020, https://nyti.ms/3koIumX ................14

RULES & REGULATIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF

THE POLICE FORCE OF THE CITY OF BROOKLYN

(1893) ..................................................................... 5, 6

Sir Robert Peel’s Nine Principles of Policing,

N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2014, https://nyti.ms/

3uHqCdb ......................................................... 4, 5, 14

1

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE1

Black Cops Against Police Brutality (B-CAP) is a

grassroots civic organization dedicated to being the

conscience of the American criminal justice system.

B-CAP seeks to improve the relationship between the

police and the community and to safeguard the basic

constitutional rights of every citizen against police

abuse—especially for those living in urban America. In

this regard, B-CAP is particularly concerned with

government liability for police misconduct and racial

unfairness in the administration of justice.

Dr. De Lacy Davis founded B-CAP in 1991.2 For 20

years, Dr. Davis was a New Jersey police sergeant with

the East Orange Police Department. Dr. Davis received

twelve police commendations and led the Community

Services Unit. Following his retirement, Dr. Davis

completed his doctoral degree, researching the factors

that cause police to shoot unarmed black males. Based

on his research and professional experience, Dr. Davis

realized that police reform cannot succeed unless such

reform is both community-centered and pursued at

every level of law enforcement.

1

This amicus brief is filed with the consent of Petitioner and

Respondent after timely notice to both. See S. Ct. R. 37.2(a). No

counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part; nor has

any person or entity, other than Black Cops Against Police

Brutality and its counsel, contributed money intended to fund the

preparation or submission of this brief.

2

See De Lacy Davis, From the Field: Why I Founded Black

Cops Against Police Brutality, J. OF ETHNICITY IN CRIM. J.

(ONLINE), Sept. 24, 2021, https://bit.ly/3laWVhl.

2

B-CAP’s advocacy carries forward these ideas.

B-CAP’s police-officer members have participated in

community protests and negotiated police reforms on

behalf of victims of police brutality. B-CAP has also

provided sensitivity training to police departments

and educational workshops to the public on what to do

when stopped by the police. Finally, B-CAP has

testified before legislative bodies and supported legal

actions seeking to hold government accountable for

police abuses. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae B-CAP

in Support of Respondents, Pottawattamie Cnty., Iowa

v. McGhee, No. 08-1065 (U.S. filed Sep. 18, 2009).

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The “grievous” nature of Michael LaPorta’s case is

undeniable. App-2. While off duty, Officer Patrick Kelly

drew his service weapon and shot LaPorta in the head

“at the end of a night of drinking together.” Id. LaPorta

survived, but he is now “severely and permanently

disabled” because of a shocking act of police brutality—

an attack presaged by Kelly’s commission of two

earlier off-duty drunken assaults against other

persons, neither of which resulted in municipal disciplinary action. Pet. 6–7.

Recognizing the egregious nature of LaPorta’s

injuries—and the core lack of municipal discipline that

let these injuries occur—a Chicago jury awarded $44.7

million in damages to LaPorta. Pet. 10. The jury agreed

with LaPorta that the police department’s failure “to

3

maintain an adequate early warning system” and “to

adequately investigate and discipline officers” allowed

Kelly to retain his service weapon and ultimately shoot

LaPorta. App-8.

The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding the jury

could not hold a municipality liable on such “novel”

theories. App-2. In the panel’s view, the municipal

failures found by the jury were irrelevant because

“Kelly’s actions were those of a private citizen in the

course of a purely private social interaction.” App-13.

But this conclusion defies almost two centuries of

history, which teaches the exact opposite lesson about

modern policing.

Since the advent of the first organized police force in

the 1830s, municipalities have recognized that effective

policing depends on public trust. Municipalities have

therefore long regulated and disciplined officers for

private conduct that erodes public trust, including offduty abuse of service weapons. Courts have then rejected

officer appeals based on the argument that officers may

not be disciplined for their private social interactions

while off duty.

Against this backdrop, the LaPorta jury did

nothing novel. It enforced time-honored principles that

are the bedrock of every police department in America.

Public trust in the police depends on fidelity to these

principles as does police efficacy. The Court should

grant review to reinforce these principles, ensuring the

police remain accountable to the people.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

4

ARGUMENT

Municipalities are liable for off-duty police

conduct that involves preventable abuse of a

service weapon and erodes public trust.

The origins of the modern police department go

back to 1829 and Sir Robert Peel—“the father of

London’s police force”3 and two-time British Prime

Minister.4 In advocating “the value of a formal police

force,” Peel had to face “the people’s skepticism about

. . . quasi-military power that could threaten liberty if

unchecked.”5 What followed was the articulation of

nine principles governing “every new officer.”6

Peel’s Principles instructed police officers that

“[t]he ability of the police to perform their duties is

dependent upon public approval of police actions.”7

By seeking “the willing cooperation of the public in

voluntary observance of the law,” officers would be able

3

Debo P. Adegbile, Policing Through an American Prism,

126 YALE L.J. 2222, 2230 & n.25 (2017).

4

A failed attempt to kill Peel while he was prime minister

led to the famous M’Naghten test for insanity defenses. See State

v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469, 472 (R.I. 1979) (“Daniel M’Naghten

attempted to assassinate Sir Robert Peel . . . but mistakenly shot

Peel’s private secretary instead.”).

5

Adegbile, supra note 3, at 2229.

6

Id. at 2230. Scholars dispute whether Peel stated these

principles himself, with some arguing “they were formulated in

1829 by the two first commissioners of London’s Metropolitan

Police Department.” Sir Robert Peel’s Nine Principles of Policing,

N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2014, https://nyti.ms/3uHqCdb.

7

Peel’s Nine Principles, supra note 6 (Principle 2).

5

“to secure and maintain” the public’s respect.8 Officers

were therefore obligated “at all times” to “maintain a

relationship with the public that gives reality to the

historic tradition that the police are the public and

the public are the police.”9

American police departments assimilated these

lessons. Brooklyn (N.Y.) police regulations in 1893

required officers “in their conduct and deportment” to

be “on all occasions . . . civil and orderly.”10 This meant

refraining “at all times . . . from harsh, violent, coarse

and profane language”11 and answering public

inquiries “with all possible attention and courtesy.”12

Officers could “use their clubs” only “in self-defense”; to

rebuff “violent resistance to them in the discharge of

their duty”; and in similar “urgent circumstances.”13

Otherwise, police leadership expected “[c]oolness and

firmness” of “every officer in all cases.”14

Hard consequences awaited officers who broke

these rules (thereby eroding public trust)—especially

if the violation stemmed from public intoxication.

Brooklyn regulations dictated the suspension of “any

8

Peel’s Nine Principles, supra note 6 (Principle 3).

Id. (Principle 7) (bold added).

10

RULES & REGULATIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

POLICE FORCE OF THE CITY OF BROOKLYN 37 (1893).

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Id.

9

6

member of the police force . . . found intoxicated or

unable to perform duty.”15 And if the officer at issue

also proved “violent, disorderly, or unable to take care

of himself,” he was to “be detained as a prisoner, and

taken before a [court] magistrate.”16

Through these rules, police departments made

clear their responsibility for their officers’ actions at all

times, even when off-duty. Courts then enforced these

rules with vigor. In the 1877 case of People ex rel.

Connolly v. Board of Police Commissioners, a New York

court affirmed the removal of a New York City

patrolman for off-duty misconduct (attempted sexual

advantage of a minor).17 The officer argued that his

misconduct could not justify removal as he was not “at

that time in uniform and on actual duty.”18

The court disagreed: the municipality (through its

police board) had “the power and . . . the duty” to

“dismiss an officer who is guilty of criminal or

immoral conduct when off duty as an unfit person to

be a member of the force.”19 The municipality’s

15

Id. at 38.

Id.

17

Reported in: 18 MARCUS HUN, REPORTS OF CASES HEARD

AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW

YORK 403–05 (1877), https://bit.ly/3BlZ13S.

18

Id. at 405.

19

Id.

16

7

“jurisdiction” over its officers was “not limited to acts

committed by policemen while on actual duty.”20

The court finally noted the significant danger of

excusing an officer’s misconduct because the officer

was “out of uniform” and “not in the actual discharge

of official duty.”21 “Under such a rule, the force might

be made up of drunkards who were careful to keep

sober in uniform; or criminals or public brawlers with

sufficient caution to avoid committing thefts or acts of

violence while on actual duty.”22

Connolly is no outlier. In the 1887 case of People ex

rel. Hayes v. Carroll,23 a New York court affirmed the

removal of a Brooklyn patrolman who committed an

assault on his “day off ” while “he was not in uniform.”24

The officer argued that the municipality could not fire

him “for his conduct when off duty.”25 The court rejected this defense, observing the police department’s

“rule” that “no policeman shall willfully abuse or illtreat a citizen.”26 The court then stressed that an

officer “must not be a brawler and fighter either when

on or off duty, for his efficiency depends upon a public

20

Id.

Id.

22

Id.

23

Reported in: 42 MARCUS HUN, REPORTS OF CASES HEARD

AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW

YORK 438–40 (1887), https://bit.ly/3iBadls.

24

Id. at 439.

25

Id.

26

Id.

21

8

respect for his office and a confidence in the acts and

deportment of the officer.”27

Another New York court of the same era was even

more blunt: “[t]he idea that a citizen is compelled to

ask protection against the lawless acts of a sworn

protector of the public peace ‘loaded with rum’ is

almost too revolting to be credited.” People ex rel.

Minchen v. McLean, 21 N.Y.S. 625, 626 (N.Y. Superior

Ct. 1893). The court declared that the officer at issue

“should have been arrested then and there, and

consigned to prison for his offences.” Id. at 626–27.

“This officer, clothed in the dignity of his office,

representing in theory ‘law and order,’ should have

been an exemplar of all that was orderly.” Id.

The Minchen court also recognized that off-duty

police misconduct—and municipal failures to address

it—threatened police efficacy as much as the public

trust. Even when an officer was “nominally off duty,”

he was still “liable to be called upon by his superior

officers whenever the exigencies of the department

required his services.” Id. Such “police discipline” was

not possible, however, so long as off-duty officers were

(for example) free to wander “the public streets and in

public places in a state of inebriety.” Id.

Being off-duty also was no excuse for an officer’s

conscious disregard of police duty. A New York court in

1890 affirmed the removal of a Brooklyn patrolman

27

Id.

9

who, while off-duty, “failed to arrest” a person “who

committed an assault in [the officer’s] presence” and

then escaped. People ex rel. Robinson v. Bell, 8 N.Y.S.

748, 748 (N.Y. Supreme Ct. 1890). The court found it

was “no excuse” that the officer “was ‘off duty.’ ” Id.

“Taking off his uniform did not divest him of his powers

as a police officer.” Id.

Connecticut’s high court voiced the same view in

1884 to reject the idea that police officers, while offduty, could use their discovery of felonies to claim

private rewards. See In re Application of Russell, 51

Conn. 577, 594 (1884). The court explained that

officers are “bound, without other compensation or

reward than that given by the law, to communicate”

information within their jurisdiction enabling “the

conviction of perpetrators of crime.” Id. The court also

noted that “[t]o withhold such information would be a

flagrant breach of duty” justifying removal. Id.

In sum: American police departments have long

understood that “[f ]rom the time” a police officer “is

given his shield” to the day “he resigns it,” the officer

“is really never off duty”—“once a policeman, always

a policeman.”28 “Sleeping or waking, on duty or off,”

an officer “never rids himself of his office as policeman

and is never free from the rules of the department

and the supervision of his commanding officers.”29

On this indispensable foundation rests the “special

28

A. E. COSTELLO, HISTORY OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT OF

JERSEY CITY 365 (1891).

29

Id.

10

relationship between the community policed and a

policeman.” Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v. City of

Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 522–23 (1971).

To then ensure that officers are “immediately

prepared to perform their duties” no matter “where

they are or what they are doing,” most jurisdictions

require officers “to be armed at all times.” Id.; see also,

e.g., EEOC v. New Jersey, 620 F. Supp. 977, 984–85

(D.N.J. 1985) (observing that all New Jersey state

police officers are required both “to be ‘on call’ 24 hours

a day” and “to carry a service weapon at all times”);

Timus v. United States, 406 A.2d 1269, 1275 (D.C.

1979) (explaining under D.C. law, special police officers

are issued a service revolver and “required to possess

the pistol while [they are] off duty”).

By the same token—and consistent with Peel’s

Principles—American police departments have made

clear their responsibility for their officers’ handling of

service weapons at all times, even while off-duty.

Department regulations often require special boards of

inquiry “to review the circumstances surrounding each

discharge” of a police firearm and “unauthorized use of

a service weapon by an officer or any other person.”

Gonzales v. Tucson, 604 P.2d 1161, 1163 (Ariz. Ct. App.

1979). Departments may even impose proactive

restrictions on an officer’s possession of his service

weapon in certain risky situations. See, e.g., Miller v.

New Jersey, 144 F. App’x 926, 927–28 (3d Cir. 2005)

(detailing New Jersey Attorney General guidelines

that prohibit officers involved in a domestic violence

11

incident “from carrying any weapon while off-duty”

pending an internal investigation).

Most importantly, police departments review offduty police shootings. For example, when officer

James Hairston “shot and killed Adam Tyree Boyd”

while Hairston was “working at his off-duty job,” the

D.C. Metropolitan Police Department undertook “a

two-step administrative investigation to ensure conformance with MPD regulations.” Hairston v. D.C., 638

F. Supp. 198, 199, 201 (D.D.C. 1986). The results of

this investigation were then referable to a “Use of

Service Weapon Review Board (USWRB) for a recommendation of whether adverse action should be taken.”

Id. at 201. The USWRB found Hairston’s off-duty

shooting of Boyd “was unjustified.” Id.

Courts have then upheld police department findings of service-weapon abuse (and discipline) against

officers asserting the defense that they were off-duty.

In Doerr v. Commonwealth, a liquor-control-board

officer “became embroiled in a heated argument” with

a relative that “escalated into physical violence.” 491

A.2d 299, 301 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985). The officer “lost

possession and control of her service revolver,” leading

to a formal suspension and later termination. Id. at

301, 304. The officer appealed, insisting that the

incident was “nothing more than a private domestic

dispute” that “did not occur during her duty hours.” Id.

at 302.

The court rejected this analysis: “an incident need

not occur during an employee’s tour of duty . . . to

12

constitute ‘just cause’ warranting removal.” Id. The

court had to consider the incident’s “destructive impact

on public respect for the police service.” Id. at 303. The

court observed that the officer “had been drinking beer

for several hours in a bar” before the incident; she

“sought the confrontation”; she then “[lost] control of

her weapon”; and, as a result, she was “unable to

participate” in a later police raid “to which she was

assigned.” Id. The court thus found it “clear” that the

incident eroded public trust. Id.

The same erosion of public trust occurs when

municipalities neglect preventable service-weapon

abuses, especially abuses during off-duty time.30 “[A]

municipality has a plain duty of care in its supervision

of those whom it arms.” Corridon v. Bayonne, 324

A.2d 42, 44 (N.J. Superior Ct. 1974). Thus, police

departments must provide “adequate training and

experience in the . . . use of weapons.” Id. But this is

not all: departments must also identify and redress

situations “unreasonably increasing the already great

hazard” that service weapons pose. Id. One such

situation is service weapons remaining in the hands of

30

The prevalence of off-duty service-weapon use (and abuse)

is nothing new or surprising. A January 1995 article in New York

magazine reported New York transit cops had already that month

“shot four people while off duty, zero people while on duty.”

Manny Howard, Halt, Off-Duty Police!, N.Y. MAG., Jan. 23, 1995,

at 14, https://bit.ly/3oHLyjn. The article also quoted a police

lieutenant’s “perfectly good explanation” for this phenomenon:

“You’re off duty twice as much as you’re on. A tour is only eight

hours. That leaves sixteen hours off duty and officers are expected

to uphold the duty all the time.” Id. (italics in original).

13

“deranged police officers.” Gibson v. Chicago, 910 F.2d

1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990).

For this reason, courts have found “police

departments liable”—or allowed lawsuits to proceed—

based on off-duty assaults “against members of the

general public” enabled by the “use of . . . service

revolvers.” Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles, 78 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 525, 529 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (collecting cases);

cf. Bonsignore v. New York, 683 F.2d 635, 638 (2d Cir.

1982) (“The City could reasonably have anticipated

that its negligence in failing to identify officers . . .

unfit to carry guns would result in an unfit officer

injuring someone using the gun he was required to

carry.”).

Consider Marusa v. D.C., 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir.

1973). After having “consumed an excessive amount of

liquor in a bar,” D.C. Officer Delbert Clark drew his

service revolver and shot Duane Marusa. Id. at 830.

The D.C. Circuit revived Marusa’s common-law claims.

Id. The court found “[t]he fact that Officer Clark was

out of uniform at the time of the alleged assault on

Marusa [did] not affect [its] conclusion.” Id.

Indeed, “Officer Clark’s tort was made possible

only through the use of his service revolver, which he

carried by [D.C.] authority.” Id. The municipality “not

only authorized but required” officers to “carry their

service revolvers . . . ‘at all times’ . . . whether in or out

of uniform.” Id. The municipality then had “a duty to

minimize the risk of injury . . . presented by this

policy.” Id. And if a D.C. police officer later “misuse[d]

14

his weapon” during his off-duty hours (as Officer Clark

did), a “judge or jury might reasonably find that

[officer] misuse to have been proximately caused by the

government’s negligence.” Id.

It follows that when a jury finds exactly this—as

the jury in Michael LaPorta’s case did—they are not

doing anything “novel.” App-2. They are “giv[ing]

reality to the historic tradition that the police are the

public and the public are the police.”31 Under this

tradition, a police officer “must not be a brawler and

fighter either when on or off duty, for his efficiency

depends upon a public respect for his office.”32 And as

new acts of police brutality continue to emerge, this

tradition matters now more than ever.33

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

CONCLUSION

The “very essence of civil liberty” is “the right of

every individual to claim the protection of the laws”

when “he receives an injury.” Marbury v. Madison, 5

U.S. 137, 163 (1803). Michael LaPorta sought to

vindicate that right here, and, by extension, the right

of every Chicago resident to a police department that

is accountable to the people. In holding against

LaPorta, the Seventh Circuit lost sight of these

31

Peel’s Nine Principles, supra note 6 (Principle 7).

HUN, supra note 23, at 439.

33

See, e.g., Mike Baker, et al., Three Words. 70 Cases. The

Tragic History of ‘I Can’t Breathe.’, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2020,

https://nyti.ms/3koIumX.

32

15

principles, blinded by a shortsighted view of municipal

liability. The Court should grant review and reverse.

Respectfully submitted,

MAHESHA P. SUBBARAMAN

Counsel of Record

SUBBARAMAN PLLC

222 S. 9th St., Ste. 1600

Minneapolis, MN 55402

(612) 315-9210

mps@subblaw.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Black Cops Against

Police Brutality

Dated: October 7, 2021