Respondents Brief — United States, Petitioner v. Washington, et al.

Supreme Court briefMar 25, 2022

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No. 21-404

In the Supreme Court of the United States

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PETITIONER,

v.

STATE OF WASHINGTON; JAY ROBERT INSLEE, IN HIS

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF

WASHINGTON; JOEL SACKS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

DIRECTOR OF THE WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF

LABOR AND INDUSTRIES; AND THE WASHINGTON STATE

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES,

RESPONDENTS.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STATE OF WASHINGTON’S RESPONSE BRIEF

ROBERT W. FERGUSON

Attorney General

NOAH G. PURCELL

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

ANASTASIA R. SANDSTROM

Senior Counsel

1125 Washington Street SE

Olympia, WA 98504-0100 PETER B. GONICK

TERA M. HEINTZ

360-753-6200

noah.purcell@atg.wa.gov

Deputy Solicitors General

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

40 U.S.C. § 3172(a) allows states to regulate

workers’ compensation on federal land and projects

“in the same way and to the same extent as if the

premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the

State.” Text, history, and precedent demonstrate that

this provision waives federal immunity from state

workers’ compensation laws on federal projects.

Washington enacted a workers’ compensation

law in 2018 tailored to the dangers faced by private

employees at the Hanford nuclear site, a uniquely

dangerous workplace where private contractors have

routinely failed to provide employees with protective

equipment or monitor exposures to toxic substances.

After unsuccessfully challenging the law in the lower

courts, the federal government sought certiorari,

which this Court granted, on this question: “Whether

a state workers’ compensation law that applies

exclusively to federal contract workers who perform

services at a specified federal facility is barred by

principles of intergovernmental immunity, or is

instead authorized by 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a) . . . .”

The federal government has maintained

throughout this case that if Washington’s law applied

to all workers at Hanford and to workplaces other

than Hanford, it would comply with § 3172. In 2022,

Washington amended the prior statute to expand its

protections to all workers at Hanford and at other

radioactive waste sites in Washington.

ii

The questions presented are:

1. Whether this case is moot given that the

federal government sought only a declaration that

Washington’s prior law was invalid and Washington

has now repealed the portions of that law to which the

government objected.

2. If this case is not moot, whether Washington’s

prior law was authorized by 40 U.S.C. § 3172, which

waives federal immunity from state workers’

compensation laws on federal land and projects like

the Hanford site.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................... 4

A.

Washington’s Workers’ Compensation

System Is Tailored to Address the

Risks of Specific Industries and

Employers ........................................................ 4

B.

The Hanford Nuclear Cleanup Site

Poses Special Dangers to Workers .................. 8

C.

Through Statutes and Contracts, the

Federal Government Has Authorized

Washington to Cover Hanford

Workers Under Its Workers’

Compensation System ................................... 10

D.

In 2018, Washington Adopted a

Presumption to Protect Hanford

Workers ......................................................... 12

E.

The District Court and Ninth Circuit

Upheld Washington’s Law ............................ 17

F.

The Federal Government Sought

Certiorari on a Specific Question

While Detailing Ways Washington

Could Amend its Law to Resolve the

Question Presented ....................................... 20

G.

Washington Amended its Law to

Cover Workers at All Radiological

Hazardous Waste Sites in Washington ........ 21

iv

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ......................... 23

ARGUMENT............................................................. 24

A.

The State Has Repealed and Replaced

the Challenged Law, so the Court

Should Vacate and Remand Based on

Mootness or Prudential

Considerations ............................................... 24

B.

40 U.S.C. § 3172(a) Completely

Waives Intergovernmental Immunity,

Allowing States to Regulate Workers’

Compensation on Federal Lands and

Projects As if They Were Under

Exclusive State Jurisdiction.......................... 30

C.

1.

The text of Section 3172(a)

supports the State’s reading ............... 30

2.

Comparing Section 3172(a) to

other waivers of immunity

supports the State’s reading ............... 41

3.

Precedent supports the State’s

reading................................................. 44

4.

The government’s concerns

about the purported

consequences of the lower

court’s ruling are overblown ............... 47

Washington’s Prior Law Complied

with 40 U.S.C. § 3172 .................................... 48

v

D.

Though the Court Should Not

Evaluate Washington’s Revised Law

in the First Instance, the New Law

Clearly Complies with 40 U.S.C. §

3172 ................................................................ 53

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 55

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

62 Cases of Jam v. United States

340 U.S. 593 (1951) ................................................39

Atkinson v. State Tax Comm’n of Oregon

303 U.S. 20 (1938) ..................................................32

Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R. Co.

331 U.S. 519 (1947) ................................................36

Bowen v. Kizer

485 U.S. 386 (1988) (per curiam) ..........................25

Capetola v. Barclay White Co.

139 F.2d 556 (3d Cir. 1943) .............................11, 18

City of Frederick v. Shankle

367 Md. 5, 785 A.2d 749 (2001) ...............................6

Cohens v. Virginia

19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)..........................45, 46

Collector v. Day

78 U.S. 113 (1870),

overruled in part by

Graves v. People of State of

New York ex rel. O’Keefe

306 U.S. 466 (1939) ................................................33

Cyr v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.

47 Wash. 2d 92, 286 P.2d 1038 (1955) ....................6

vii

Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury

489 U.S. 803 (1989) ................................................41

Dawson v. Steager

139 S. Ct. 698 (2019) .................................. 41, 51, 54

Demarest v. Manspeaker

498 U.S. 184 (1991) ................................................47

Dennis v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.

109 Wash. 2d 467, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987) ................6

Diffenderfer v. Cent. Baptist Church

404 U.S. 412 (1972) (per curiam) ..........................26

Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller

486 U.S. 174 (1988) ......... 2, 18, 20, 24, 38, 44-45, 47

Hall v. Beals

396 U.S. 45 (1969) (per curiam) ......................25, 27

Hancock v. Train

426 U.S. 167 (1976) ................................................46

Harry v. Buse Timber & Sales, Inc.

166 Wash. 2d 1, 201 P.3d 1011 (2009). .................49

James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula

309 U.S. 94 (1940) ..................................................48

Lawrence v. Chater

516 U.S. 163 (1996) (per curiam) ..........................28

Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp.

494 U.S. 472 (1990) ..........................................25, 28

viii

Linnell v. City of St. Louis Park

305 N.W.2d 599 (Minn. 1981)..................................6

Marquis v. City of Spokane

130 Wash. 2d 97, 922 P.2d 43 (1996) ....................27

Mayo v. United States

319 U.S. 441 (1943) ................................................46

McCulloch v. Maryland

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)..........................33, 46

Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner

459 U.S. 392 (1983) ................................................46

Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington

243 U.S. 219 (1917) ...................................... 4, 23, 52

Murray v. Joe Gerrick & Co.

291 U.S. 315 (1934) ..........................................11, 32

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v.

City of New York

140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) ............................................25

North Dakota v. United States

495 U.S. 423 (1990)

(plurality opinion) ...........................21, 32, 46-47, 53

Peak v. Small Bus. Admin.

660 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1981) ............................11, 18

Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Indep. Sch. Dist.

361 U.S. 376 (1960) ................................................46

ix

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,

464 U.S. 238 (1984) ................................................48

South Carolina v. Baker

485 U.S. 505 (1988) ..........................................37, 46

Sperbeck v. Dep’t of Indus., Lab. & Human Rels.

46 Wis. 2d 282, 174 N.W.2d 546 (1970) ..................6

Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo

141 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1944) ..........................11, 18

U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Provenzano

469 U.S. 14 (1984) (per curiam) ............................25

United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.

Mayor & Council of Camden

465 U.S. 208 (1984) ................................................26

United States v. County of Fresno

429 U.S. 452 (1977) ..........................................37, 46

United States v. Microsoft

138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (per curiam) ......................25

Washington v. United States

460 U.S. 536 (1983) ................................................46

Weston v. City of Charleston

27 U.S. (2 Peters) 449 (1829) .................................33

Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.

348 U.S. 483 (1955) ................................................51

x

Statutes

5 U.S.C. § 8102(a) ......................................................13

40 U.S.C. § 3172(a) ............................................ passim

40 U.S.C. § 3172(b) ....................................................32

42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 to 6992k

(Resource Conservation and Recovery Act) ..........42

42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) ....................................................42

42 U.S.C. §§ 7384 to 7385s-6

(Energy Employees Occupational Illness

Compensation Program Act) .................................15

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 to 7515

(Clean Air Act) .......................................................42

42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) ....................................................42

42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 to 9675

(Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act) .........................42

42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4)..........................................19, 42

49 U.S.C. § 5126(a) ..............................................35, 42

1911 Wash. Sess. Laws 345 (ch. 74, § 1).....................4

1937 Wash. Sess. Laws 1031 (ch. 212) .......................5

1937 Wash. Sess. Laws 525 (ch. 147, § 1).................11

1987 Wash. Sess. Laws 2401 (ch. 515, § 2).................7

xi

2018 Wash. Sess. Laws 226 (ch. 9, § 1) ....................12

2018 Wash. Sess. Laws 1573 (ch. 264) .......................7

2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1944 (ch. 251) .......................7

2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1955 (ch. 252) .......................7

Former 40 U.S.C. § 290

(recodified as 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a)) ........................11

Wash. Rev. Code § 51.04.010 ....................................13

Wash. Rev. Code § 51.04.130 ....................................12

Wash. Rev. Code § 51.08.140 ..................................6, 7

Wash. Rev. Code § 51.12.060 ..............................13, 22

Wash. Rev. Code § 51.16.035(1) ..................................4

Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.050 ....................................14

Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.060-.095 ............................14

Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.185 ......................................7

Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.185(1)(a)..............................7

Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.187(2)(a)............................12

Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.187(2)(b)............................12

Wash. Rev. Code § 51.36.010 ....................................14

Wash. Rev. Code § 51.52.050(2)(a)..............................6

xii

Former Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.187(1)

(2018) ................................................................13, 23

Former Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.187(1)(b)

(2018) ......................................................................13

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-901.01.........................................6

Cal. Lab. Code § 3212 ..................................................6

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-209 ..........................................6

Fla. Stat. § 112.18 .......................................................6

820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 305/6 ...........................................6

Ohio Rev. Code § 742.38 ..............................................6

Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.802 ..............................................6

53 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 637 ..............................................6

Va. Code § 65.2-402 .....................................................6

Regulations

20 C.F.R. § 30.625-.627 .............................................15

Wash. Admin. Code § 296-17-31011 ...........................4

Wash. Admin. Code § 296-17-850 ...............................5

Wash. Admin. Code § 296-17-855 ...............................5

Wash. Admin. Code §§ 296-17A-0101 to -7400 ..........4

Wash. Admin. Code § 296-17A-0101-02 .....................4

xiii

Wash. Admin. Code § 296-17A-2103 ..........................5

Wash. Admin. Code § 296-17A-7308-03 .....................4

Wash. Admin. Code § 296-17A-7400 ..........................5

Legislative Materials

S. Rep. No. 74-2294, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).....11

Senate Report, Rep. No. 74-2294, 74th Cong., 2d

Sess. (1936) ............................................................38

Substitute H.B. 1723, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess.

(Wash. 2018),

https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?

BillNumber=1723&Year=2017 ............... 1-3, 12-17,

19-21, 26-30, 48-53

Substitute S.B. 5890, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess.

(Wash. 2022),

https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?

BillNumber=5890&Initiative=

false&Year=2021 ....................... 21-24, 26-29, 53-54

Other Authorities

4 Arthur Larson et al.,

Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law

§ 52.07[2] (2021) .......................................................6

About AWB, https://www.awb.org/about-us/

who-we-are/ ............................................................17

xiv

Associated Press, Washington state to boost

workers’ comp rates for Amazon (Dec. 2, 2020),

https://apnews.com/article/workers-com

pensation-washington-017a509e68d942

7839c5e49b0096fb3e ................................................5

Department of Ecology, State of Washington,

Other mixed waste facilities we oversee,

https://ecology.wa.gov/Waste-Toxics/

Nuclear-waste/Radioactive-waste-disposal

(last visited Mar. 21, 2022) ..............................22, 54

https://www.hanford.gov/page.cfm/200Area.............14

https://www.hanford.gov/page.cfm/300Area.............14

https://www.hanford.gov/page.cfm/RiverCorridor ...14

Letter from Doug S. Shoop, Manager, Dep’t

of Energy (Richland WA), to David R. Einan,

Manager, EPA (Richland WA) & Alexandra K.

Smith, Nuclear Waste Program Manager,

Dep’t of Ecology (Richland WA) (Jan. 31, 2019),

https://www.hanford.gov/files.cfm/2019_

Hanford_Lifecycle_Report_w-Transmittal_

Letter.pdf (contains attachment: 2019 Hanford

Lifecycle Scope, Schedule and Cost Report) ..........15

Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/

(last visited Mar. 22, 2022) ....................................34

Webster’s New International Dictionary of

the English Language (1936).................................32

xv

Susannah Frame, Contamination events force

project shut down at Hanford nuclear site,

KING-TV (May 16, 2019, 8:26 PM),

https://www.king5.com/article/news/

investigations/contamination-eventsforce-project-shut-down-at-hanford-nuclearsite/281-31e25448-4b84-4a42-a068-a

d8be72b1b92 ............................................................9

U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Savannah River Nat’l Lab’y,

Hanford Tank Vapor Assessment Report

(Oct. 30, 2014),

https://srnl.doe.gov/documents/Hanford_

TVAT_Report_2014-10-30-FINAL.pdf ....................9

Wash. State Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., Hanford–

Department of Energy (DOE) Data (Nov. 2021),

https://lni.wa.gov/insurance/_docs/HanfordDOE%20Data.pdf...................................................16

1

INTRODUCTION

The Hanford nuclear reservation is a uniquely

dangerous worksite, permeated by a “witch’s brew” of

billions of gallons of radioactive waste. Over 10,000

Washingtonians work at the site, virtually all

employed by private companies hired by the federal

government. For decades, those companies have failed

to protect workers, exposing them to dangerous

conditions without providing adequate protective gear

or even monitoring their exposures to toxic wastes.

Countless workers have fallen ill, yet many were

unable to recover workers’ compensation because

their employers kept no record of what toxins they

were exposed to, when they were exposed, or what

health impacts those toxins have.

Washington responded to this problem in 2018

by enacting House Bill 1723,1 creating a presumption

for private employees at Hanford that certain

illnesses arose from their employment. The bill

imposed no direct obligations on the federal

government, instead regulating only private

businesses operating at Hanford.

The federal government sued, claiming that

H.B. 1723 violated the Supremacy Clause, but federal

law authorized Washington’s approach. Under 40

U.S.C. § 3172(a), States can regulate workers’

compensation on federal land and projects “in the

same way and to the same extent as if the premises

Substitute H.B. 1723, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.

2018), https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=1723&

Year=2017, will be referenced throughout as H.B. 1723.

1

2

were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State[.]”

This language, far broader than other waiver statutes,

completely waives federal immunity as to workers’

compensation on federal land and projects.

The federal government disagrees, contending

that § 3172(a) simply applies normal intergovernmental immunity principles to federal land. U.S. Br.

33. That reading of the statute makes no textual or

historical sense, and this Court rejected it in Goodyear

Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988), holding

that although intergovernmental immunity normally

precludes direct state regulation of federal activities,

§ 3172(a) “provides the requisite clear congressional

authorization” for States to regulate federal facilities

as to workers’ compensation. Id. at 182. This Court

held that the statute “places no express limitation on

the type of workers’ compensation scheme that is

authorized.” Id. at 183. The federal government

concedes that H.B. 1723 is a workers’ compensation

law. U.S. Br. 42.

The federal government says it is implausible

that Congress completely waived federal immunity

from State workers’ compensation laws, but its

argument relies on false premises and ignores

§ 3172(a)’s text. The government claims that

Congress never would have allowed States to adopt

regulations that apply only to companies that contract

with the federal government, because the political

process fails to “provide a sufficient check against

abuse” of such companies. U.S. Br. 16. But Congress

may reasonably have concluded that such

companies—which in Washington include Microsoft,

3

Boeing, and Amazon—are perfectly capable of

protecting themselves. Indeed, the private employers

operating at Hanford include large, sophisticated

Washington corporations, and the largest business

association in Washington lobbied against H.B. 1723.

There is thus no reason for the Court to deviate from

§ 3172(a)’s text based on speculation about Congress’s

intent. Instead, the Court should conclude, like the

court of appeals, that “§ 3172 removes federal

jurisdiction as a barrier to a state’s authority over

workers’ compensation laws for all who are located in

the state.” Pet. App. 72a.

Although § 3172(a) authorized H.B. 1723, there

is no longer any reason for this Court to decide that

question. Since the federal government filed this case,

it has maintained that if Washington’s law applied

beyond Hanford and to employers who do not contract

with the federal government, it would be valid.

Relying on that representation, the Washington

Legislature recently enacted Senate Bill 5890,2 which

extends the worker-protective presumptions in H.B.

1723 to all workers in Washington at all facilities that

store or dispose of certain types of radiological waste.

Thus, Washington law now provides precisely what

the federal government has said § 3172(a) authorizes.

Because the government seeks only a

declaration that H.B. 1723 is invalid, and because the

portions of that law the government challenged have

now been replaced, the government’s challenge is

2 Substitute S.B. 5890, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.

2022), https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=5890&

Initiative=false&Year=2021, will be referenced throughout as

S.B. 5890.

4

moot. The Court should therefore do what it routinely

does when an intervening change in law renders the

question presented hypothetical: dismiss the petition,

vacate the lower court opinions, and remand to the

district court to consider any remaining claims.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Washington’s Workers’ Compensation

System Is Tailored to Address the Risks of

Specific Industries and Employers

Washington adopted its industrial insurance

system in 1911 to provide “sure and certain relief” to

workers. 1911 Wash. Sess. Laws 345 (ch. 74, § 1).

From the beginning, Washington has treated

employers differently based on the specific hazards

their workers face. See 1911 Wash. Sess. Laws 345-46;

see also Wash. Rev. Code § 51.16.035(1); Wash.

Admin. Code § 296-17-31011. In 1917, this Court

upheld Washington’s system of distinguishing

employers based on the unique work conditions and

risks they create. See Mountain Timber Co. v.

Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 241-46 (1917).

Under Washington’s system, the Department of

Labor and Industries (L&I) classifies “all occupations

or industries in accordance with their degree of

hazard and fix[es] therefor basic rates of premium[s.]”

Wash. Rev. Code § 51.16.035(1); accord Wash. Admin.

Code § 296-17-31011. L&I regulations recognize

hundreds of categories of occupations and industries,

from “excavation work” to “pet grooming,” each

subject to its own rate. See generally Wash. Admin.

Code §§ 296-17A-0101 to -7400; -0101-02 (excavation

work); -7308-03 (pet grooming). Though the categories

5

are typically phrased in terms of types of work, rather

than by naming specific companies, many of the

categories apply to only a single business or handful

of businesses because they are the only ones in

Washington operating in that industry. For example,

Wash. Admin. Code § 296-17A-2103 covers fulfillment

standards for distribution of goods for an on-line

business; it currently applies only to Amazon.3 See

also, e.g., Wash. Admin. Code § 296-17A-7400

(applying only to state employees at “[m]ental health

or acute care hospitals without a fully implemented

safe patient handling program”).

As in most states, Washington’s system

differentiates not only between industries, but also

within industries. If an employer’s workers suffer

more injuries than most other employers in the same

industry, L&I charges that employer more. Wash.

Admin. Code §§ 296-17-850, -855. Thus, an employer

in the same industry as another but with a worse

safety record may pay a rate several times higher than

its competitors.

Because workers can be harmed through

chronic occupational exposure as well as workplace

injuries, Washington began covering occupational

diseases in 1937 to ensure that an employer’s workers’

compensation responsibilities match the harm

experienced by its employees. 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws

1031 (ch. 212). An occupational disease is a disease or

condition that arises proximately and naturally out of

3 Associated Press, Washington state to boost workers’

comp rates for Amazon (Dec. 2, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/

workers-compensation-washington-017a509e68d9427839c5e49b

0096fb3e.

6

the distinctive conditions of employment. Wash. Rev.

Code § 51.08.140; Dennis v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 109

Wash. 2d 467, 481-82, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987).

While this system has generally achieved the

State’s goals of fairly compensating workers and

allocating the cost of workplace illnesses and injuries

to the employers who cause them, it has proven

inadequate in one key respect. Because Washington’s

workers’ compensation system normally places the

burden of proof on the worker to demonstrate that a

workplace incident caused their illness, the system

does not function properly when certain workers

routinely fall ill but for some reason are unable to

document what exposures or incidents led to their

illness. See Cyr v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 47 Wash. 2d

92, 96, 286 P.2d 1038 (1955) (worker generally has

burden to show entitlement to benefits); Wash. Rev.

Code § 51.52.050(2)(a). Like many other states,

Washington has responded to this problem by

adopting several presumptions that switch the normal

burden of proof, so that if workers in certain

categories get sick with certain illnesses tied to their

work, the burden is on their employer to prove that

the illness is not work related.4

4 Presumption laws like this are common nationwide.

See, e.g., City of Frederick v. Shankle, 367 Md. 5, 785 A.2d 749

(2001); Linnell v. City of St. Louis Park, 305 N.W.2d 599 (Minn.

1981); Sperbeck v. Dep’t of Indus., Lab. & Human Rels., 46 Wis.

2d 282, 174 N.W.2d 546 (1970); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-901.01; Cal.

Lab. Code § 3212; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-209; Fla. Stat. § 112.18;

820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 305/6; Ohio Rev. Code § 742.38; Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 656.802; 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 637; Va. Code § 65.2-402; 4 Arthur

Larson et al., Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 52.07[2]

(2021).

7

In 1987, Washington adopted such a

presumption for firefighters. 1987 Wash. Sess. Laws

2401, 2402 (ch. 515, § 2); see also Wash. Rev. Code

§ 51.32.185. Specifically, the legislature recognized

that firefighters are often exposed to toxic fumes,

chemicals, and substances in their work, but usually

cannot document exactly what they were exposed to

or in what quantities. J.A. 131; CA9.SER.361. For

that reason, it was often difficult for firefighters to

access workers’ compensation benefits when they bore

the burden of proving that their illness was caused by

their work. The legislature therefore adopted a

firefighter occupational disease presumption under

which certain respiratory conditions, heart problems,

infectious diseases, and cancers are presumed to arise

naturally and proximately out of employment as a

firefighter. Wash. Rev. Code § 51.08.140; Wash. Rev.

Code § 51.32.185(1)(a). This shifts the burden to the

employer—virtually always the State or local

governments in the case of firefighters—to show that

a hazardous exposure at work did not cause the

worker’s disease.

In 2018, Washington added a similar

presumption for police officers and other first

responders suffering from post-traumatic stress

disorder. 2018 Wash. Sess. Laws 1573 (ch. 264). And

in 2021, Washington created presumptions for

frontline workers and health care workers related to

COVID-19. 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1944 (ch. 251);

2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1955 (ch. 252).

8

B.

The Hanford Nuclear Cleanup Site Poses

Special Dangers to Workers

The Hanford nuclear production complex

manufactured plutonium for decades. J.A. 178; U.S.

Br. 4. The site was home to nine nuclear reactors, J.A.

156, which produced thousands of tons of solid nuclear

waste and hundreds of billions of gallons of

contaminated liquid waste, J.A. 159. This waste

includes a “witch’s brew of a wide range of hazardous

chemicals and radioactive elements.” J.A. 180. Much

of the liquid waste was simply dumped on the land at

Hanford, and many of the “solid wastes were buried in

the ground in pits or trenches.” J.A. 160.

Cleanup of the site is being conducted almost

entirely by private companies hired by the

Department of Energy (DOE). Those companies

employ roughly 10,000 workers at the site. U.S. Br. 6;

J.A. 46, 178. Cleanup of the site, in DOE’s words, is

“unprecedented in scale and complexity,” exposing

workers to many hazardous chemicals and radioactive

substances. J.A. 42-43, 89-90, 97-106, 159-67.

Employees at Hanford work amid a unique mix

of toxic and radioactive substances present nowhere

else. The scale of the waste and dangers is almost

unimaginable. See, e.g., J.A. 156-69. The tank farms

alone contain 177 underground tanks storing 53

million gallons of radioactive and toxic chemical

substances, with around 67 tanks that have leaked

into the ground. J.A. 85-86, 161-65. The tank farm

waste contains multiple hazardous substances that

severely damage human health. J.A. 85-86, 88-90,

93-97, 172-76. For example, even small doses of

9

ionizing radiation (which permeates Hanford’s mixed

waste) can cause cancer. J.A. 125-26, 173-76.

Hanford’s hazards extend beyond workers who

work directly with hazardous materials. Toxic and

radioactive substances were dumped at sites

throughout the facility, often with no records kept of

where. J.A. 160-61. Scientists have found that office

workers at Hanford are at increased risk of exposure

to dangerous substances, with an increased risk of

disease. J.A. 97-98, 198-200; see also J.A. 172-76.

Releases at Hanford have caused highly dangerous

radioactive materials to contaminate workers,

drifting outside the direct cleanup areas and polluting

clothing and cars. See, e.g., J.A. 198-200.5

DOE admitted in a 2014 report that the work

conditions are hazardous: “The ongoing emission of

tank vapors, which contain a mixture of toxic

chemicals, is inconsistent with the provision of a safe

and healthful workplace free from recognized

hazards.”6 The problem has continued since the 2014

report, with continued emissions of dangerous vapors.

J.A. 87-88, 102-03, 199; see also J.A. 94-99, 164-69,

192-96, 198-99; Frame supra note 5.

5 Susannah

Frame, Contamination events force project

shut down at Hanford nuclear site, KING-TV (May 16, 2019, 8:26

PM), https://www.king5.com/article/news/investigations/contam

ination-events-force-project-shut-down-at-hanford-nuclear-site/

281-31e25448-4b84-4a42-a068-ad8be72b1b92.

6 See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Savannah River Nat’l Lab’y,

Hanford Tank Vapor Assessment Report 15 (Oct. 30, 2014),

https://srnl.doe.gov/documents/Hanford_TVAT_Report_2014-1030-FINAL.pdf.

10

Despite knowing of these dangers, private

contractors operating at Hanford have not protected

their employees. Contractors have not consistently

supplied their workers with personal protective

equipment. J.A. 97-98; CA9.SER.344. And neither the

contractors nor DOE have consistently monitored

conditions to allow medical professionals to know

about particular workers’ exposures to hazards.

J.A. 195, 166-69, 172-73; CA9.SER.300-01, 311.

Multiple federal and expert reports “have documented

poor Hanford contractor practices that limit the

ability to detect worker exposures.” J.A. 167. Because

of these failures, workers often have a difficult time

identifying specific incidents at work that caused their

diseases or conditions. J.A. 141, 168-69, 172-73.

And with no documentation of exposures, fairly

compensating Hanford workers for injuries and

diseases presents challenges not present at most

Washington worksites. J.A. 141, 169, 172-73.

Hanford is thus a uniquely dangerous place to

work. As summarized by the L&I medical director, the

combination of exposure to hazardous substances and

the lack of careful monitoring “presents a unique set

of medical challenges not found elsewhere in

Washington.” J.A. 172-73.

C.

Through Statutes and Contracts, the

Federal Government Has Authorized

Washington to Cover Hanford Workers

Under Its Workers’ Compensation System

Following a rash of worker injuries on the

Golden Gate Bridge Project, Congress authorized

states to apply their workers’ compensation laws on

11

federal lands and projects. Former 40 U.S.C. § 2907;

S. Rep. No. 74-2294, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936). The

change came after this Court held that a state

workers’ compensation statute did not apply to a

federal facility. Murray v. Joe Gerrick & Co., 291 U.S.

315, 318-19 (1934).

Congress enacted the 1936 law to provide “more

adequate protection” to workers on federal projects

and property “wherever situated[.]” S. Rep. No. 742294, at 1. The law freed state workers’ compensation

laws “from any restraint by reason of the exclusive

federal jurisdiction.” Peak v. Small Bus. Admin., 660

F.2d 375, 376 n.1 (8th Cir. 1981); accord Capetola v.

Barclay White Co., 139 F.2d 556, 559 (3d Cir. 1943);

Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 141 F.2d 362, 363 (D.C.

Cir. 1944).

Washington has long exercised its authority

under this law to protect workers at federal facilities.

In 1937, employees of federal contractors gained

industrial insurance. 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws 525 (ch.

147, § 1). Ever since, private employees working on

federal projects in Washington, such as employees of

contractors at Hanford, have received industrial

insurance benefits. Additionally, while many major

employers in Washington, like Boeing, Microsoft, and

Amazon, have contracts with the federal government,

their employees are covered by state workers’

compensation laws regardless of whether they work

on federal contracts.

7 This statute was once codified at 40 U.S.C. § 290. It was

recodified as 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a) in 2002 with minimal changes.

12

Although the duty to provide industrial

insurance coverage normally falls on employers,

rather than on an entity that hires those employers to

carry out a contract, for decades DOE has agreed to

pay for some contractors’ obligations at Hanford

under an agreement between L&I and DOE. J.A. 14345; CA9.SER.373; Wash. Rev. Code § 51.04.130. L&I

and DOE entered into the current memorandum of

understanding (MOU) in June 2018—after the law

challenged here became effective. CA9.SER.373-75;

2018 Wash. Sess. Laws 226 (ch. 9, § 1). In the MOU,

DOE agrees to follow Washington law without

reservation. CA9.SER.373.

D.

In

2018,

Washington

Adopted

a

Presumption to Protect Hanford Workers

In 2018, Washington enacted H.B. 1723 for

“Hanford site workers.” In light of the many dangers

discussed above of working at Hanford, the difficulty

workers have had in proving which exposures to

which chemicals made them sick, and the consistently

poor safety record of employers operating at Hanford,

the legislature responded, just as it has for

firefighters, police officers, and frontline health

workers, by creating a rebuttable presumption that

certain diseases and conditions of Hanford site

workers are occupational diseases. Wash. Rev. Code

§ 51.32.187(2)(a); H.B. 1723; 2018 Wash. Sess. Laws

226 (ch. 9, § 1). The presumption is not absolute, but

is rebuttable with evidence including “use of tobacco

products, physical fitness and weight, lifestyle,

hereditary factors, and exposure from other

employment or nonemployment activities.” Wash.

Rev. Code § 51.32.187(2)(b). This law furthered the

State’s goal of ensuring “sure and certain relief” for

13

workers harmed through their employment. Wash.

Rev. Code § 51.04.010.

H.B. 1723 was tailored to protect as many

Hanford workers as possible while complying with

federal law. Because federal law preempts application

of state workers’ compensation laws to federal

employees, 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a), Washington has never

attempted to apply those laws, including H.B. 1723, to

federal employees. Wash. Rev. Code § 51.12.060. But

with the exception of roughly 400 federal employees,

virtually all workers at Hanford—over 10,000—are

employees of private companies hired by the federal

government. U.S. Br. 6; J.A. 46. These are the same

types of private employees who have long received the

protection of Washington’s workers’ compensation

laws on federal land, and these were the employees

covered by H.B. 1723. Former Wash. Rev. Code

§ 51.32.187(1) (2018).

H.B. 1723’s presumption did not apply to the

entire Hanford site, but rather covered only workers

in the most contaminated areas and areas where

cleanup efforts posed the greatest dangers: “the two

hundred east, two hundred west, three hundred area,

environmental restoration disposal facility site,

central plateau, or the river corridor locations.”

Former Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.187(1)(b) (2018); see

also U.S. Br. App. 7a (map showing areas of Hanford

covered by H.B. 1723). These areas are all profoundly

contaminated with radioactive and hazardous waste

and all home to massive cleanup efforts. See generally

14

J.A. 158-59.8 H.B. 1723 did not apply to parts of the

Hanford reservation where certain private companies

operate, but these facilities (US Ecology and PermaFix Northwest) do not handle the type of high-level

radioactive waste present at the parts of Hanford

covered by the law, so they do not expose workers to

the same risks. See J.A. 131, 180-81, 194-96, 198

(“Workers at the Hanford site thus have much higher

potential for harmful exposures than workers at

Perma-Fix Northwest and US Ecology.”). H.B. 1723

similarly did not apply to the small number of state

employees who occasionally enter Hanford to conduct

brief inspections, but there is no evidence that any

such worker has ever been sickened by an exposure at

Hanford or that their employers have failed to provide

them with protective gear or take other safety

measures, as the covered employers have failed to do.

See, e.g., J.A. 166-68.

While H.B. 1723 shifted the burden of proof, it

did not provide greater benefits to Hanford workers

than to workers at other places of employment. Wash.

Rev. Code §§ 51.32.050, .060-.095; Wash. Rev. Code

§ 51.36.010.

The cost of H.B. 1723 is a tiny fraction

of the total expenses incurred by the United States

in cleaning up Hanford. The federal government

estimates that the cleanup will cost between $323

billion and $677 billion, with annual costs of between

8

See also https://www.hanford.gov/page.cfm/River

Corridor; https://www.hanford.gov/page.cfm/200Area; https://

www.hanford.gov/page.cfm/300Area.

15

$3 billion and $15 billion for at least the next half

century.9

Since the early 2000’s, the federal government

has operated a compensation program for federal

employees and some contractors who become ill after

working at certain nuclear sites, including Hanford.

See Energy Employees Occupational Illness

Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 7384 to 7385s-6. Under that program, “the Federal

Government has paid out more than $1.75 billion to

Hanford workers as of June 2020,” roughly $100

million annually. Pet. App. 19a & n.9. Payments that

workers receive under state workers’ compensation

laws are deducted from any recovery under

EEOICPA. See 20 C.F.R. § 30.625-.627.

Unlike the total cleanup cost at Hanford and

the cost of federal compensation programs, the cost of

state workers’ compensation at Hanford has been and

remains modest. In the decade before enactment of

H.B. 1723, private contractor employees at Hanford

submitted an average of 300-350 State workers’

compensation claims annually. J.A. 67. DOE paid

roughly $115 million in state workers’ compensation

benefits during that time, averaging roughly $11

million annually. J.A. 67. DOE provided no estimate

at the district court about how H.B. 1723 had affected

9 Letter from Doug S. Shoop, Manager, Dep’t of Energy

(Richland WA), to David R. Einan, Manager, EPA (Richland WA)

& Alexandra K. Smith, Nuclear Waste Program Manager, Dep’t

of Ecology (Richland WA) (Jan. 31, 2019), https://

www.hanford.gov/files.cfm/2019_Hanford_Lifecycle_Report_w-T

ransmittal_Letter.pdf (contains attachment: 2019 Hanford

Lifecycle Scope, Schedule and Cost Report, at pages ES-2 to

ES-3).

16

its costs. But since H.B. 1723’s enactment, the number

of workers’ compensation claims filed by employees at

Hanford has actually declined, and the total cost of

claims has barely budged.10 The United States notes

that the presumption law applied retroactively, but

the record reflects that in the first year after the

legislature adopted H.B. 1723, DOE received fewer

than 100 claims invoking the statutory presumption.

J.A. 68, 146. The pace of claims invoking the

presumption has only declined since then, with a total

of just 259 claims filed in over three years. Hanford–

DOE Data.

The United States says that H.B. 1723’s

legislative history reflects that Washington

legislators “emphasized that the costs of the bill would

fall on the federal government.” U.S. Br. 12 (citing

Pet. 7-8). But this refers to an earlier version of H.B.

1723. In the final version, the Washington legislature

changed the bill to give the State Fund—the

central fund applicable to all employers who are

not self-insured—responsibility for claims that were

not covered by the MOU with DOE. J.A. 140.

H.B. 1723 passed with overwhelming bipartisan

support,11 despite several large business associations,

including the Association of Washington Business,

Wash. State Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., Hanford–

Department of Energy (DOE) Data (Nov. 2021) (Hanford–

DOE Data), https://lni.wa.gov/insurance/_docs/Hanford-DOE%

20Data.pdf.

10

11 See supra note 1.

17

“Washington’s oldest and largest statewide business

association,”12 testifying against the bill.13

E.

The District Court and Ninth Circuit

Upheld Washington’s Law

The United States filed a complaint in 2018,

asserting that H.B. 1723 impermissibly “singles out

and discriminates against the Federal Government

and its contractors, purports to directly regulate the

Federal Government, and imposes significant

burdens on the Federal Government and its

contractors without imposing them on other

employers in the State, all in violation of the

Supremacy Clause ....” J.A. 28-29. The complaint

sought declaratory and injunctive relief declaring the

then-existing statute invalid and enjoining its

enforcement. J.A. 40. No damages were sought.

J.A. 40. The complaint acknowledged that federal law

waives intergovernmental immunity so that “States

may enforce their workers’ compensation laws against

private employers working on federal land ‘in the

same way and to the same extent as if the premises

were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State.’”

J.A. 33-34 (quoting 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a)). Washington

argued that the waiver of intergovernmental

immunity in 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a) authorized

Washington’s law.

12

About AWB, https://www.awb.org/about-us/who-we-

are/.

13 H.B. Rep. on H.B. 1723, at 5, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess.

(Wash. 2018).

18

The district court ruled for Washington on

cross-motions for summary judgment. CA9.ER.6. It

held that “[t]he plain language” of § 3172(a) “allow[s]

the state to regulate federal lands within its

geographical boundaries with all the tools that could

be brought to bear on non-federally owned land.”

CA9.ER.7. The federal government had conceded in

its briefing that § 3172(a) “authorizes the State to

regulate on federal land as it permissibly may do so

under state law.” EWDC.ECF.33, at 3. And at oral

argument, the United States stipulated that if the

federal government was not involved and the Hanford

site was on state land, Washington could adopt and

apply H.B. 1723. J.A. 213, 222.

The court of appeals unanimously affirmed, in

an opinion by Judge Milan Smith. The court began by

examining the statute’s language, Pet. App. 65a-66a,

concluding that “[t]he plain text of § 3172 does not

purport to limit the workers’ compensation laws for

which it waives intergovernmental immunity to only

those that are ‘generally applicable.’” Pet. App. 68a. In

interpreting the statutory language, the panel cited

Goodyear, which addressed the waiver statute and

held that it “place[d] no express limitation” on

permissible workers’ compensation laws. Goodyear

Atomic Corp., 486 U.S. at 183. The Court also cited

many court of appeals opinions reading the same

waiver broadly to mean that “§ 3172 removes federal

jurisdiction as a barrier to a state’s authority over

workers’ compensation laws for all who are located in

the state.” Pet. App. 72a (citing Peak, 660 F.2d at 376

n.1; Capetola, 139 F.2d at 559; Travelers Ins. Co., 141

F.2d at 363).

19

The court also compared § 3172(a)’s language

to other waivers of intergovernmental immunity

and found it materially broader. While other

waivers specify that states cannot apply a more

stringent rule on federal land than applies on

state land, § 3172(a) contains no such limitation.

Pet. App. 70a-71a (contrasting § 3172(a) with the

waiver in the Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 9620(a)(4)).

The court emphasized that the United States

conceded in oral argument and at the district court

that “Washington could enforce a version of H.B. 1723

that did not involve the Federal Government and

where the Hanford site were a state project.”

Pet. App. 73a. Because it “could” apply the

presumption to a project under the State’s exclusive

jurisdiction, it could apply this presumption in the

same way and to the same extent on federal land. Pet.

App. 73a, 80a-81a.

The court also emphasized that while some of

the federal government’s arguments hinted at

preemption concerns, the government had not

actually made a preemption argument, so “the United

States has waived that argument[.]” Pet. App. 74a.

The United States unsuccessfully moved for

rehearing en banc. Pet. App. 22a-23a. Judge Smith

concurred in the denial of rehearing en banc, noting

that “a state may enact a workers’ compensation

scheme for federally-owned property as long as it

could enact the same scheme ‘in the same way and to

the same extent’ if the property were under the

20

jurisdiction of the state.” Pet. App. 25a (quoting

40 U.S.C. § 3172(a)).

Like the United States, the dissent from the

denial of rehearing focused on the law’s alleged

singling out of the federal government. E.g., Pet. App.

38a-40a. Also like the United States, the dissent

conceded that a law similar to H.B. 1723 that applied

more broadly to include non-federal actors would be

permissible. Pet. App. 47a n.2 (“States may apply

different standards to different types of facilities or

different types of work, so long as in drawing these

distinctions they do not discriminate against the

Federal Government.”); see also Pet. App. 46a-48a

(dissent from denial of rehearing generally describing

Goodyear Atomic Corp., 486 U.S. 174, as allowing any

type of workers’ compensation scheme subject only to

the requirement that the scheme apply equally to

federally owned and other facilities).

F.

The

Federal

Government

Sought

Certiorari on a Specific Question While

Detailing Ways Washington Could Amend

its Law to Resolve the Question Presented

The federal government sought certiorari on a

very narrow and specific question: “Whether a state

workers’ compensation law that applies exclusively to

federal contract workers who perform services at a

specified federal facility is barred by principles of

intergovernmental immunity, or is instead authorized

by 40 U.S.C. 3172(a) ....” Pet. I (Question Presented);

U.S. Br. I. The government repeatedly characterized

the alleged problem with Washington’s law as

singling out of the federal government. Pet. 11; U.S.

Br. 16. And its arguments implicitly conceded that if

21

the law applied to federal and non-federal actors, it

would not violate intergovernmental immunity. For

example, the United States described the Supremacy

Clause as allowing application of a state law or

regulation to federal contractors “if it is ‘imposed on

some basis unrelated to the object’s status as a

Government contractor or supplier’—that is, if it is

‘imposed equally on other similarly situated

constituents of the State.’” Pet. 13 (quoting North

Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 437-38 (1990)

(plurality opinion)); see also U.S. Br. 16 (“Section

3172(a) authorizes States to apply workers’

compensation laws evenhandedly to federal contract

workers and other similarly situated employees ....”).

Similarly, the United States acknowledged that states

may distinguish among workers in their workers’

compensation programs if significant differences

between the classes of workers justify the differential

treatment. Pet. 15; U.S. Br. 24.

G.

Washington Amended its Law to Cover

Workers at All Radiological Hazardous

Waste Sites in Washington

After the Court granted certiorari, the

Washington legislature, relying on the federal

government’s representations about what sort of law

would address its concerns, repealed and replaced

large portions of H.B. 1723. The legislature enacted

Substitute Senate Bill 5890, eliminating all

references to the “Hanford nuclear site” and “United

States department of energy Hanford site workers.”

The presumption now applies instead to all workers

in Washington “working at a radiological hazardous

22

waste facility for at least [one] eight hour shift . . .

including conducting an inspection of the facility.”

S.B. 5890, at 2 (appended to Suggestion of Mootness

at 3a). “‘Radiological hazardous waste facility’ means

any structure and its lands where high-level

radioactive waste as defined by 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1402 or

mixed waste as defined by [Wash. Admin. Code §] 173303-040 is stored or disposed of, except for military

installations as defined in 31 C.F.R. Part 802.227 and

listed in Appendix A to 31 C.F.R. Part 802.” S.B. 5890

(Suggestion of Mootness at 3a-4a).

Because high level radioactive waste is stored

and disposed of at all parts of Hanford covered under

H.B. 1723, those same areas remain covered

under S.B. 5890. See Reply in Support of Suggestion

of Mootness 4-9. But in addition to covering private

employees of federal contractors, the new law now

covers state inspectors at the Hanford site and any

other workers who perform an 8-hour shift there,

excepting federal employees. See S.B. 5890; Wash.

Rev. Code § 51.12.060 (exempting federal employees

from Washington’s workers’ compensation laws). The

new law also applies to a range of non-federal facilities

within the State, including facilities the United States

previously argued were comparable to Hanford but

not covered under the prior law, such as Perma-Fix

Northwest and Energy Northwest. U.S. Br. 7.14

14 See, e.g., Department of Ecology, State of Washington,

Other mixed waste facilities we oversee, https://ecology.wa.gov/

Waste-Toxics/Nuclear-waste/Radioactive-waste-disposal

(last

visited Mar. 21, 2022) (listing Washington facilities with mixed

waste permits).

23

Washington filed a Suggestion of Mootness,

explaining how this new law rendered the current

proceedings moot.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Washington’s adoption of S.B. 5890 resolves

this case. The basis for the federal government’s

complaint and petition for certiorari was that

Washington’s presumption law applied only at

Hanford and only to employees of federal contractors.

The new law eliminates these objections. It covers any

worker at any radiological hazardous waste site, with

the exception of federal military installations. The

new law thus affords the federal government all the

relief it sought, so the Court should dismiss the case

as moot, vacate the opinion below, and remand for

further proceedings if necessary.

In any event, the court of appeals correctly

upheld the former statute, so if the Court does reach

the merits, it should affirm. This Court has long held

that states may treat employers based on the

workplace safety risks they create for their employees.

Mountain Timber Co., 243 U.S. at 243-46. And

Congress has waived intergovernmental immunity for

state workers’ compensation laws on federal land and

projects. 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a). This waiver authorizes

Washington to protect workers at Hanford just as it

could protect workers elsewhere. Washington

properly exercised its authority by adopting a law

tailored to the medical, safety, and employer-history

concerns presented at Hanford. Former Wash. Rev.

Code § 51.32.187(1) (2018).

24

ARGUMENT

Although the Supremacy Clause generally

prevents states from directly regulating the federal

government or applying different rules to federal

contractors than apply to others, the United States

properly concedes that the doctrine does not apply if

Congress waives intergovernmental immunity, as it

has done for workers’ compensation. Goodyear Atomic

Corp., 486 U.S. at 185-86; U.S. Br. 16, 22. The key

question presented here is thus the scope of the

waiver Congress adopted in 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a). The

statutory text, comparisons to other statutory

waivers, and this Court’s precedent all indicate that

§ 3172(a) is best read as a complete waiver of

intergovernmental immunity, authorizing application

of Washington’s former law at Hanford.

Ultimately, however, there is no need for this

Court to resolve the precise scope of the waiver in

§ 3172(a), because Washington has now repealed and

replaced the portions of Washington law to which the

federal government objected. This renders this case

moot.

A.

The State Has Repealed and Replaced the

Challenged Law, so the Court Should

Vacate and Remand Based on Mootness or

Prudential Considerations

The statutory provisions that formed the basis

for the federal government’s lawsuit no longer exist,

and the Court can no longer provide any relief by

25

invalidating the former law. The case is thus moot,

and the Court would be providing a purely advisory

opinion if it answered the now hypothetical question

presented. Even if the case were not technically moot,

prudential considerations would strongly counsel

against issuing a constitutional ruling that would

have no effect on any existing law. The Court should

vacate the decision below and remand for the district

court to consider whether the government has any

residual claims.

When circumstances change while an appeal is

pending that prevent the Court from providing

effective relief, the case becomes moot. Lewis v. Cont’l

Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990). To

nevertheless decide the case would be to issue an

“advisory opinion[] on abstract propositions of law.”

Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969) (per curiam). This

Court therefore routinely dismisses cases as moot or

remands for consideration of any remaining claims

where an intervening change in the law makes

answering the question presented meaningless. See,

e.g., New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of

New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (dismissing because

city rule restricting transport of firearms was

rescinded and state statute enacted prohibiting such

rules); United States v. Microsoft, 138 S. Ct. 1186,

1188 (2018) (per curiam) (dismissing because

legislation enacted after oral argument had

terminated the parties’ dispute “over the issue with

respect to which certiorari was granted”); Bowen v.

Kizer, 485 U.S. 386, 387 (1988) (per curiam)

(dismissing because legislation enacted after case was

argued mooted the case); U.S. Dep’t of Justice v.

Provenzano, 469 U.S. 14, 15-16 (1984) (per curiam)

26

(dismissing as moot based on intervening change in

law); United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor

& Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1984)

(same); Diffenderfer v. Cent. Baptist Church, 404 U.S.

412, 414 (1972) (per curiam) (same).

Here, enactment of S.B. 5890 renders this case

moot. The federal government sought only declaratory

and injunctive relief—no damages—invalidating

H.B. 1723. The central premise of its argument and

the question presented to this Court was that

Washington could not adopt a workers’ compensation

law that applied only to federal contract employees at

a federal facility. See U.S. Br. I; J.A. 28-40. But the

government repeatedly acknowledged that the State

could apply workers’ compensation laws to federal

facilities that also apply elsewhere. E.g., U.S. Br.

32-33 (“States may extend to federal lands and

facilities the same workers’ compensation provisions

that apply to similarly situated non-federal

premises.”). The State has now repealed and replaced

the portion of the former law that limited its coverage

to Hanford and to employees of federal contractors.

The new law instead applies to anyone who works at

a “[r]adiological hazardous waste facility,” defined as

“any structure and its lands where” certain

radioactive wastes are stored or disposed. S.B. 5890

§ 1(1)(b). The federal government agrees that S.B.

5890 uses a “completely different” coverage formula

than the prior law, and that any legal challenge to the

new law would raise different issues and require

development of a different record, so this Court should

not opine on S.B. 5890. Opp. Sugg. Mootness at 13, 17.

27

Thus, the key feature of the law the United

States sought to invalidate no longer exists, and

ruling on the merits of the prior statute would have

no impact on Washington’s law or any other law going

forward. It would be a purely “advisory opinion[] on

abstract propositions of law.” Hall, 396 U.S. at 48.

The

government

erroneously

contends,

however, that this case is not technically moot

because invalidating H.B. 1723 could entitle it to

refunds from a small group of Washingtonians whose

claims for benefits under the old law were approved

but are still on appeal. Opp. Sugg. Mootness at 11-12.

There are fewer than 70 such claims, and in any event,

any claim that was allowed under H.B. 1723 would

also be allowed under S.B. 5890, so even as to this

small number, invalidating the prior law will have no

impact. Reply Supporting Mootness 4-9.

The government claims that some “relatively

low” number of claims allowed under H.B. 1723 might

be denied under S.B. 5890, Opp. Sugg. Mootness at 14,

but as the State has detailed at length in its Reply in

Support of Suggestion of Mootness, that is legally and

factually incorrect. The plain language of S.B. 5890’s

coverage definition extends to all parts of Hanford

covered by H.B. 1723, and L&I, the state agency that

drafted S.B. 5890 and will implement it, interprets

the statute to cover all workers at Hanford who were

covered under H.B. 1723. In Washington “[a] court

must give great weight to the statute’s interpretation

by the agency which is charged with its

administration, absent a compelling indication that

such interpretation conflicts with the legislative

intent.” Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wash. 2d 97,

922 P.2d 43, 50 (1996).

28

This Court should thus follow its regular

practice when a change in law moots a case and

“vacate the judgment and remand for further

proceedings in which the parties may, if necessary,

amend their pleadings or develop the record more

fully.” Lewis, 494 U.S. at 482 (citations omitted).

Even if S.B. 5890 somehow failed to render this

case completely moot, the Court should still vacate the

lower court decision and remand for further

proceedings to “conserve[] the scarce resources of this

Court.” Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996)

(per curiam). The federal government agrees that

“vacating and remanding would be a reasonable

approach here,” but it urges the Court to decide the

case anyway. Opp. Sugg. Mootness at 18. Its reasons

are unpersuasive.

The government first claims that the Court

should hear argument and issue a constitutional

ruling because of the “concrete significance” of the

impacts of such a ruling. Id. But the outermost limit

of the practical impact the government can claim is its

potential ability to recoup or avoid somewhere

between $17 and $37 million worth of payments to

sick workers. Id. at 11. Given that the government

expects to spend at least $8 million every day for the

next 50 years cleaning up the Hanford site, supra n.6,

this claim provides no justification for the Court to

spend its time resolving this case. And the

government’s estimate of how much it might save is

wildly overstated because it assumes that none of the

claims allowed under H.B. 1723 would be allowed

under S.B. 5890, when in fact all of them would be.

29

The United States also contends that review is

warranted here despite its limited practical impact

because the State allegedly brought about the

intervening change in law to insulate a favorable

decision from the Court’s review while continuing to

subject the United States to the same harm. Opp.

Suggestion Mootness 19. This argument is doubly

wrong. First, the State is not insulating anything from

review because the State is asking this Court to vacate

the lower courts’ decisions on mootness or prudential

grounds; no “favorable decision” would survive.

Second, S.B. 5890 does not subject the United States

to the same harm it alleged from H.B. 1723. The

“harm” alleged in this case, from the United States’

initial complaint through its petition and briefing to

this Court, was “a state workers’ compensation law

that applies exclusively to federal contract workers.”

J.A. 38; U.S. Br. I (emphasis added). The United

States has repeatedly conceded that Washington

could instead adopt a law that turned on working at a

particular type of facility, whether on federal land or

not, see, e.g., Pet. 13, 16, 18, which is exactly what

Washington has now done. Thus, while the United

States may object to the new law, the harm it alleges

is not the same. As the United States concedes

elsewhere, any challenge to the new law would “raise

different issues and require development of a different

record.” Opp. Suggestion Mootness 17.

In short, this case is moot, but even if it were

not, the miniscule stakes alleged by the government

here would not warrant this Court’s issuance of a

constitutional ruling. The Court should vacate the

lower court rulings and remand to the district court.

30

B.

40 U.S.C. § 3172(a) Completely Waives

Intergovernmental Immunity, Allowing

States to Regulate Workers’ Compensation on Federal Lands and Projects As if

They Were Under Exclusive State

Jurisdiction

There is no dispute between the parties that

§ 3172(a) waives intergovernmental immunity as to

state workers’ compensation laws. The central

question for this Court is whether § 3172(a) effects a

complete or a partial waiver of such immunity. The

federal government offers an ever-changing array of

theories about how Congress supposedly intended to

limit § 3172(a)’s waiver. But all signs here—the

sweeping scope of the statutory text, the contrast of

its language with partial waivers enacted around the

same time, and this Court’s prior interpretations of

the unambiguous statutory language—point to the

same conclusion: Congress completely waived

immunity as to state workers’ compensation laws for

federal land and projects. Thus, if this Court does not

dismiss this case as moot, it should uphold H.B. 1723

as falling within Congress’s broad waiver of

intergovernmental immunity in § 3172(a).

1.

The text of Section 3172(a) supports

the State’s reading

The plain text of 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a) effects a

total waiver of intergovernmental immunity as to

state workers’ compensation laws on federal land and

projects. The government disputes this plain reading

only by relying on words not found in the text and

taking statutory language out of context.

31

The waiver’s language is sweeping:

The state authority charged with

enforcing and requiring compliance with the

state workers’ compensation laws . . . may

apply the laws to all land and premises

in the State which the Federal Government

owns or holds by deed or act of cession, and

to all projects, buildings, constructions,

improvements, and property in the State and

belonging to the Government, in the same way

and to the same extent as if the premises were

under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State in

which the land, premises, projects, buildings,

constructions, improvements, or property are

located.

40 U.S.C. § 3172(a). Thus, the waiver gives states

authority to regulate federal projects “in the same way

and to the same extent as if the premises were under

the exclusive jurisdiction of the State[.]” The plain

meaning of this language, as the lower court held, is

that it “removes federal jurisdiction as a barrier to a

state’s authority over workers’ compensation laws[.]”

Pet. App. 72a.

Several features support this reading. First,

the waiver is written based on what the State could do

under its “exclusive jurisdiction.” That is an expansive

term clearly designed to waive intergovernmental

immunity, because “exclusive jurisdiction” means

more than just ownership; it means full regulatory

authority. This interpretation is supported by

precedent and contemporary dictionaries. Webster’s

Dictionary from 1934, for example, defines “jurisdiction,” as relevant here, as: “authority of a sovereign

32

power to govern or legislate; power or right to exercise

authority; control.” Jurisdiction, Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language (1936).

The term “exclusive” was similarly defined as “excluding or having the power to exclude,” while “exclude”

means “to refuse participation, enjoyment, consideration or inclusion.” Id. (exclusive, exclude). Case law

from the same time period applied the same understanding: exclusive jurisdiction meant complete authority to regulate, not just ownership. See, e.g., Murray,

291 U.S. 319 (after effective date of the state’s cession

of land, the “jurisdiction of the federal government

was exclusive” and “laws subsequently enacted by the

state were ineffective in the navy yard”; North

Dakota, 495 U.S. at 435 (plurality opinion) (citing

cases recognizing that states have no jurisdiction to

tax or regulate liquor sales on military bases under

“exclusive federal jurisdiction”) (case omitted);

Atkinson v. State Tax Comm’n of Oregon, 303 U.S. 20,

23-25 (1938) (distinguishing federal ownership of land

from “exclusive jurisdiction” over that land).

The idea that the federal government would

retain some degree of immunity from state regulation

on land under the state’s “exclusive jurisdiction” is

irreconcilable with the plain meaning and judicial

construction of that term. The federal intention to

entirely waive jurisdiction as to workers’

compensation is confirmed by § 3172(b), which

specifies that: “The Government under this section

does not relinquish its jurisdiction for any other

purpose.” (Emphasis added.) That phrasing only

makes sense if the government has relinquished its

jurisdiction for some purpose, namely as to workers’

compensation.

33

The relinquishment of federal “jurisdiction”

and grant of “exclusive jurisdiction of the State” is

particularly telling because, from its origins,

intergovernmental immunity has been characterized

as an incident of jurisdiction. The parties in

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316

(1819), for example, characterized their respective

claims about state taxation of a federal bank on state

land as a matter of competing assertions of

jurisdiction. Id. at 342 (noting Maryland’s argument

that “the jurisdiction of the state extends over all its

territory” and the government’s competing argument

that Congress’s actions created a strong ground “to

infer a cessation of state jurisdiction”). The McCulloch

Court also framed intergovernmental immunity as an

incident of sovereignty and jurisdiction. Id. at 429 (“It

may be objected to this definition, that the power of

taxation is not confined to the people and property of

a state. It may be exercised upon every object brought

within its jurisdiction. This is true. But to what source

do we trace this right? It is obvious, that it is an

incident of sovereignty, and is co-extensive with that

to which it is an incident.”).15

Another feature reflecting the breadth of

§ 3172(a)’s waiver is that it waives immunity over

federal land and projects “as if the premises were

15 See also, e.g., Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113, 123 (1870),

overruled in part by Graves v. People of State of New York ex rel.

O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) (invalidating federal tax on state

judicial officer as violating intergovernmental immunity,

reasoning: “ ‘If the right to impose the tax exists, it is a right

which, in its nature, acknowledges no limits. It may be carried to

any extent within the jurisdiction of the State . . . .’ ” (quoting

Weston v. City of Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Peters) 449, 466 (1829))).

34

under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State”

(emphasis added). “As if” presupposes a hypothetical

situation: it means “as it would be if // it was as if he

had lost his last friend.”16 The statutory language is

thus explicitly framed in the hypothetical: states may

apply their workers compensation laws to federal

premises “as it would be if” those premises were under

the states’ exclusive jurisdiction. It is hard to imagine

a clearer attempt to give states full regulatory

authority over workers’ compensation on federal

land. Indeed, as detailed below, the state is

unaware of any other federal waiver statute that

grants states authority “as if” the federal premises

were under exclusive state jurisdiction. See infra

p. 41-43.

The straightforward meaning of this statutory

language effectuates a complete waiver of

intergovernmental immunity as to workers’

compensation on federal lands or projects. As the

court of appeals explained, § 3172(a) “permits the

States to apply workers’ compensations laws to

federal land located in the state, without limitation.”

Pet. App. 73a-74a.

The federal government critiques this plain

reading, but its arguments focus more on the

imagined consequences of a complete waiver of

immunity than on the statute’s plain language.

To begin, the government argues that the plain

reading adopted by the court of appeals ignores the

statutory phrase “in the same way and to the same

16 As if, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/as%20if (last visited Mar. 22, 2022).

35

extent,” but that is incorrect. U.S. Br. 38-39. The

statute says that the State may regulate “in the same

way and to the same extent as if the premises were

under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State[.]”

40 U.S.C. § 3172(a). This language makes clear that

the State’s power is identical—no more and no less—

to what it would be on premises under the State’s

exclusive jurisdiction. The government suggests that

this language must mean something else. It claims

that the phrase means that a “state workers’

compensation provision that applies to construction

workers on private or state-owned sites can be applied

‘in the same way and to the same extent’ to

construction workers at a federally owned site.” U.S.

Br. 32. But “in the same way and to the same extent”

does not reference how states treat other workers; it

references how states could regulate under their

“exclusive jurisdiction.” This is markedly different

from other waiver statutes, which explicitly reference

how states actually regulate others. See, e.g.,

49 U.S.C. § 5126(a) (providing that “person[s] under

contract with” the federal government to transport

hazardous materials are subject to state regulation “in

the same way and to the same extent that any person”

is regulated); infra p. 41-43.

The federal government also insists repeatedly

that § 3172(a) prohibits regulations on federal land

that differ from those on state or private land, U.S. Br.

16, 32-33, but that is not what the statute says. When

Congress wants to prohibit stricter state regulation on

federal land, it knows exactly how to say so, and it has

in many other waiver statutes detailed below.

See infra p. 41-43. It did not do so here. As the court

of appeals correctly held: “[t]he plain text of

36

§ 3172 does not purport to limit the workers’

compensation

laws

for

which

it

waives

intergovernmental immunity to only those that are

‘generally applicable.’” Pet. App. 68a.

The government also argues that the statute’s

header supports its interpretation, but “the heading of

a section cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.”

Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 331

U.S. 519, 529 (1947). And the header language does

not support the government’s interpretation in any

event. The header states: “Extension of state workers’

compensation laws to buildings, works, and property

of the Federal Government.” U.S. Br. 32. The

government argues that the use of the word

“extension” implies that the “provisions also apply

elsewhere in the State.” U.S. Br. 32. But in stating

that § 3172(a) results in an “extension” of such laws,

the header merely states the obvious: before

enactment of § 3172(a), state workers’ compensation

laws did not apply to “buildings, works, and property

of the Federal Government[,]” and after enactment of

the statute, they do. 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a). This

language cannot support the weight the government

puts on it.

Unhappy with § 3172(a)’s broad text, the

federal government tries to limit its meaning by

claiming that the statute’s legislative history

indicates that it was directed solely to “address

problems of territorial jurisdiction” and simply

applied to federal land the same intergovernmental

immunity rules that applied elsewhere. U.S. Br. 40.

But this reading makes no sense. According to the

government, before the “late 1930s,” intergovernmental immunity was “understood to bar States from

37

imposing any tax or regulation” on federal contractors

even outside federal land. U.S. Br. 20-21 (citing

United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 459460 (1977)). According to the cases cited, this rule

began to change in 1937 to allow application of

nondiscriminatory state taxes to federal contractors.

County of Fresno, 429 U.S. at 459-460.17 But Congress

first enacted the materially identical predecessor to

§ 3172(a) in 1936, before this rule had changed. Thus,

on the government’s own telling, in 1936 states could

not regulate federal contractors at all, even on a

nondiscriminatory basis, outside federal land. If the

government were correct that Congress’s intent was

to allow states to regulate on federal land just as they

could on state land, the waiver would have done

nothing at all, because it would simply have extended

the complete immunity of federal contractors on nonfederal land onto federal land. That is nonsensical.

The much more plausible reading of the history is that

Congress intended to completely waive federal

immunity from state workers’ compensation laws on

federal land and projects.

Another problem with the government’s

version of the legislative history is that it understates

the breadth of § 3172(a)’s language. The actual

language of the waiver applies not just to “all land and

premises in the State which the Federal Government

owns or holds by deed or act of cession,” but also to “all

17 See also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 506

(1988) (before late 1930s, courts viewed “any tax on income a

party received under a contract with the government [as] a tax

on the contract and thus a tax ‘on’ the government because it

burdened the government’s power to enter into the contract ”).

38

projects, buildings, constructions, improvements, and

property in the State and belonging to the

Government.” § 3172 (emphasis added). This is

consistent with Congress’s goal of protecting laborers

“on projects, buildings, constructions, improvements,

and property wherever situated belonging to the

United States of America.” C.A.9.SER 365-66 (Senate

Report, Rep. No. 74-2294, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936))

(emphasis added). The text of the waiver thus extends

to federal projects outside of federal enclaves. Thus,

whenever immunity

applies to

government

contractors as a result of work on federal lands or

federal projects, § 3172 will apply.

In a last ditch effort to critique the court of

appeals’ reasoning, the government demands that this

Court accept any “plausible” interpretation of the

statute that avoids a complete waiver of immunity.

U.S. Br. 36-37. But as this Court held in Goodyear in

rejecting what the government claimed was a

“plausible” reading, any interpretation of § 3172(a)

must still be “squared with the statute’s language and

history.” Goodyear Atomic Corp., 486 U.S. at 183. As

in Goodyear, the government’s interpretation here

cannot be squared with § 3172(a)’s language or

history.

The federal government’s reading of § 3172(a)

is not plausible or even internally consistent. The

government claims that the statute “authoriz[es] state

officials to apply their workers’ compensation laws to

federal land and facilities if—but only if—they

apply those laws ‘in the same way and to the

same extent,’ 40 U.S.C. 3172(a), to other areas of the

39

State.” U.S. Br. 33. There are at least three problems

with this interpretation.

First, this reading adds words to § 3172(a) and

ignores words in the statute. Section 3172(a) says that

states may apply workers’ compensation laws to

federal land and projects “in the same way and to the

same extent as if the premises were under the

exclusive jurisdiction of the State[.]” 40 U.S.C.

§ 3172(a). Unlike many other waiver statutes, supra

p. 41-43, this language conspicuously does not say

state laws can apply “in the same way and to the same

extent as” they apply elsewhere. Nothing in this text

requires the state law actually to “apply in other areas

of the State,” U.S. Br. 32-33, and the Court should not

add such terms to the statute. 62 Cases of Jam v.

United States, 340 U.S. 593, 596 (1951) (court does not

add to statute). Here, unlike in other waiver statutes,

the “same way and same extent” language refers not

to how the State regulates elsewhere, but to what the

State could do if the federal land or project “were

under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State.” By

insisting that § 3172(a) only allows laws that actually

apply elsewhere, the government also ignores the

phrase “as if,” which presupposes a hypothetical

comparison as detailed above. Supra p. 33-34. And by

claiming that the federal government retains federal

jurisdiction to assert immunity, the United States

reads the word “exclusive” entirely out of the statute.

Because the government’s interpretation adds to and

omits key words in § 3172(a)’s text, the Court should

reject it. See 62 Cases of Jam, 340 U.S. at 596.

Second, the government elsewhere has

conceded that § 3172(a) allows state workers’

40

compensation laws even if they apply only on federal

land. For example, the government has conceded that

“if a State has a special workers’ compensation

provision for employees who perform particularly

hazardous duties, that provision could be applied to

federal contract workers who perform those duties at

the federal facility.” Pet. 18 (citation omitted). So, for

example, Washington could adopt a workers’

compensation law or regulations that applied only to

workers directly involved in the dangerous task of

emptying tanks containing high-level radioactive

waste. Such a law would apply only to federal

contractors at Hanford, yet the United States

concedes it would be allowed under § 3172(a). Pet. 18.

Finally, the government’s reading would lead to

bizarre results Congress could not have intended. For

example, under the government’s theory, if a state

enacted special workers’ compensation protections for

workers engaged in shipbuilding, applying that law to

private employees on federal land (such as a Navy

base) would be perfectly fine if there was some other

shipbuilding facility in the state on non-federal land.

But if that private facility closed, so that the law no

longer applied to anyone outside federal land, the

state law would suddenly violate § 3172(a). That

makes no sense.

In sum, the government’s reading of § 3172(a)

ignores the statute’s text. The court of appeals’

faithful reading of that text should be affirmed.

41

2.

Comparing Section 3172 to other

waivers of immunity supports the

State’s reading

The flaws in the government’s textual

arguments are put into sharper relief by comparing

§ 3172’s broad waiver language to the far narrower

language Congress has used when it intends to grant

only a partial waiver of intergovernmental immunity.

Congress has used many approaches to indicate when

it intended to grant only partial immunity, but it used

none here.

For example, shortly after Congress enacted

the precursor statute to § 3172 in 1936, Congress

passed a partial waiver of intergovernmental

immunity as to state taxation of federal officers. Davis

v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 808

(1989). That waiver provided:

The United States consents to the taxation of

pay or compensation for personal service as an

officer or employee of the United States ... by a

duly constituted taxing authority having

jurisdiction, if the taxation does not

discriminate against the officer or employee

because of the source of the pay or

compensation.

Id. (citing 4 U.S.C. § 111) (emphasis added). This

unquestionably partial waiver of intergovernmental

immunity, unlike § 3172, used precise and narrow

language and explicitly forbade differential treatment

of federal officers or employees. Id. One of the primary

cases on which the government relies, Dawson v.

Steager, 139 S. Ct. 698 (2019), analyzed this partial

statutory waiver. This analysis is inapposite here.

42

Other partial waivers of immunity are

similarly explicit. For example, in the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and

Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 to 9675,

Congress provided that on federal land state laws

“shall not apply to the extent a State law would apply

any standard or requirement to [federal] facilities

which is more stringent than the standards and

requirements applicable to facilities which are not”

federal. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4). This waiver explicitly

forbids states from imposing more stringent laws on

federal land than on other land.

Even

where

federal

statutes

waive

intergovernmental immunity by giving states

authority to regulate federal land “in the same

manner and to the same extent” that states regulate

others, the waiver statutes omit the key feature of

§ 3172(a)’s language: “as if the premises were under

the exclusive jurisdiction of the State.” The court of

appeals identified numerous such statutes. Pet. App.

70a-71a. For example, the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 to 6992k, allows

states to enforce their hazardous waste management

plans on federal agencies only if a state regulates the

agency “in the same manner, and to the same extent,

as any person is subject to such requirements.”

42 U.S.C. § 6961(a). The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 7401 to 7515, likewise, provides that a federal

facility “shall be subject to, and comply with, all

Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements . . .

respecting the control and abatement of air pollution

in the same manner, and to the same extent as any

nongovernmental entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a).

Similarly, 49 U.S.C. § 5126(a) provides that “person[s]

43

under contract with” the federal government to

transport hazardous materials are subject to state

regulation “in the same way and to the same extent

that any person” is regulated, and 16 U.S.C. § 835c1(b) authorizes state taxation of lands acquired by the

United States as part of the Columbia Basin Project

“in the same manner and to the same extent as

privately owned lands of like character.”

All of these waivers require states to regulate

federal land or contractors “in the same way and to

the same extent” that some other person or land is

actually regulated. But § 3172 is different: it allows

states to apply their laws “in the same way and to the

same extent as if the premises were under

the exclusive jurisdiction of the State.” 40 U.S.C.

§ 3172(a).

The federal government downplays the stark

contrast of § 3172’s broad language with these more

limited waivers, arguing that the court below flipped

the presumption on its head by requiring an express

retention of intergovernmental immunity rather than

an express waiver. But this is sleight of hand. The

court below analyzed the very broad language of

§ 3172 and properly concluded that the limitations

argued by the government were not reflected in the

statutory text. The court cited these other statutes

simply to demonstrate that when Congress wanted to

limit its waiver of intergovernmental immunity in

ways that the government claimed it had done in

§ 3172, it knew very well how to do that. The court of

appeals properly gave effect to the complete waiver

here.

44

3.

Precedent

reading

supports

the

State’s

Decisions of this Court also support the State’s

interpretation that § 3172 entirely waives intergovernmental

immunity

for

state

workers’

compensation laws on federal land and projects.

This Court confirmed the broad scope of the

waiver in Goodyear Atomic Corp., 486 U.S. at 186.

That case involved a worker who was injured while

working for a federal contractor on federal land, and

who received an extra compensation award under an

Ohio statute providing such awards to injured

employees if their employer caused the injury by

violating state safety regulations. Id. at 176-77. The

federal government first argued that the Ohio law

amounted to a direct regulation of the federal facility,

which would be prohibited under normal principles of

intergovernmental immunity. Id. at 182. This Court

decided that it need not resolve whether the law was

equivalent to a direct regulation because even if it

were, the predecessor to § 3172 “provides the requisite

clear congressional authorization for the application

of the provision.” Id.

This initial holding, on its own, refutes the

government’s contention that § 3172 simply applies

normal rules of intergovernmental immunity to

federal land. U.S. Br. 33. If that were all § 3172 did,

then it would still prohibit direct regulation of the

federal government on federal land. U.S. Br. 16

(“the doctrine prevents direct taxation or regulation of

the federal government”); 20 (same). But this Court

held that it didn’t need to decide whether Ohio’s law

was equivalent to direct regulation, because even if it

45

was, § 3172 “provides the requisite clear congressional

authorization for the application of” state law.

Goodyear Atomic Corp., 486 U.S. at 182.

That is not the only key holding of Goodyear.

The federal government’s second argument in the case

was that § 3172 waived intergovernmental immunity

only for “typical [no fault] workers’ compensation”

laws, and that Ohio’s special workers’ compensation

law thus could not be applied to federal lands. Id. at

183. This Court disagreed, holding that whether

Ohio’s law was “typical” made no difference because

§ 3172 “place[d] no express limitation on the type of

workers’ compensation scheme that is authorized.”

Id. at 183-84. This runs directly counter to the

government’s contention that § 3172 allows

application only of workers’ compensation laws that

apply to “similarly situated non-federal premises.”

U.S. Br. 32.

The government cites passages from Goodyear

out of context to distort its core holding. In the context

of Ohio’s law, which applied to all facilities in Ohio,

the Court noted that the waiver “compels the same

workers’ compensation award for an employee injured

at a federally owned facility as the employee would

receive if working for a wholly private facility.” Id. The

United States argues that this passage establishes a

“restriction on the types of state laws that could be

applied to federal land and facilities.” Br. 35; see also

Br. 39. But it does no such thing. The Goodyear Court

had no reason to decide whether the waiver statute

forbids state workers’ compensation laws tailored to

special hazards at a federal worksite, because no such

law was before the Court. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia,

19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821) (explaining

46

that only “[t]he question actually before the Court

[was] investigated with care, and considered in its full

extent”). As the court of appeals explained in rejecting

this argument: “the Court considered there a state

workers’ compensation law that did not concern a

particular employer, or a particular site located in the

state, like HB 1723 does” and it “did not purport to

impose the limitation on the statute that the United

States seeks to impose here.” Pet. App. 68a.

Nor do other decisions of this Court compel a

different result. The United States cites several cases

about intergovernmental immunity, but most did not

involve a waiver of intergovernmental immunity at

all, or involved waivers that explicitly barred

differential treatment of the federal government or

federal officers. Br. 19-22 (citing North Dakota,

495 U.S. at 435 (plurality opinion) (no waiver statute);

South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 523 (1988) (no

waiver statute); Washington v. United States,

460 U.S. 536, 546 (1983) (no waiver statute); Memphis

Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S. 392, 398 (1983)

(partial tax waiver barring discriminatory treatment);

United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452,

459-60 (1977) (no waiver statute); Hancock v. Train,

426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976) (Clean Air Act partial

waiver); Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Indep. Sch.

Dist., 361 U.S. 376, 387 (1960) (no waiver statute);

Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 447 (1943) (no

waiver statute); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.

(4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)) (no waiver statute). These

cases are inapposite.

47

4.

The government’s concerns about

the purported consequences of

the lower court’s ruling are

overblown

This Court should also reject the government’s

speculation about the consequences of a complete

waiver of intergovernmental immunity as a pretense

for ignoring the plain language of § 3172. The

statutory text is controlling. Demarest v. Manspeaker,

498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991) (when text of statute is

unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete”).

In any case, the government’s prognostications

about such consequences are overblown. The

waiver does not grant states carte blanche on several

levels.

First, the waiver is narrowly limited to

state workers’ compensation laws and only to

compensate workers injured on federal lands and

projects.

Second, if a state workers’ compensation law

conflicted with a federal statute or interfered with a

federal objective, the federal government could argue

preemption, as it often does in intergovernmentalimmunity cases, such as Goodyear Atomic Corp., 486

U.S. at 177-78, and North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 440.

The government has made no such argument here, see

Pet. App. 75a, presumably because the government

concluded that it could not show that H.B. 1723 would

48

interfere with federal objectives. On the contrary, by

motivating contractors to create a safer work

environment, H.B. 1723 furthers federal safety

objectives. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,

464 U.S. 238, 257 (1984) (holding state law

authorizing punitive damages was not preempted by

the federal remedial scheme governing nuclear power

plants as both sought to protect the public); J.A. 29

(“DOE’s top priority in conducting its cleanup

operations at Hanford is ensuring the health and

safety of its federal and contractor workforce”).

Finally, as this Court has recognized, Congress

always has the authority to limit states’ ability to

regulate. Thus, arguing that state rules will increase

costs in a way that “make it difficult or impossible” for

the federal government to obtain a service it needs

“ignores the power of Congress to protect the

performance of the functions of the national

government.” James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309

U.S. 94, 104 (1940).

C.

Washington’s Prior Law Complied with

40 U.S.C. § 3172

This Court has made clear that, as to land

within their exclusive jurisdiction, states can tailor

workers’ compensation laws in any rational way based

on the dangers posed by particular jobs, worksites, or

employers. Because § 3172 waives immunity and

allows state regulation “in the same way and to the

same extent as if the premises were under the

exclusive jurisdiction of the State,” the only remaining

question is whether H.B. 1723 satisfied this standard.

It clearly did.

49

A core policy of Washington’s Industrial

Insurance Act “is to allocate the cost of workplace

injuries to the industry that produces them, thereby

motivating employers to make workplaces safer.”

Harry v. Buse Timber & Sales, Inc., 166 Wash. 2d 1,

201 P.3d 1011, 1018 (2009). This Court upheld that

policy in Mountain Timber Co., 243 U.S. at 243-46,

making clear that Washington may tailor its workers’

compensation laws to address specific hazards.

Washington thus has authority to regulate employers

and workplaces differently as long as there is a

rational basis for such treatment.

Following this established law, Washington

has adopted varying workers’ compensation rates,

regulations, and laws to address specific risks to

worker safety. As one element of this targeted

approach, Washington has adopted presumption laws

to address the unique risks faced by firefighters,

police officers, and health care workers. The United

States concedes that these laws are acceptable under

the State’s exclusive jurisdiction. Br. 27.

So too is H.B. 1723. While the United States

challenges various choices made by the legislature,

each had a reasoned basis. For example, Washington

included office workers at Hanford within the

presumption based on the extensive contamination at

the site and scientific reports showing that office

workers suffered toxic exposures. J.A. 199-200.

Washington did not include state inspectors because

50

there was no evidence that they had suffered any

adverse health consequences or that their employers

had failed to provide them with adequate protective

gear, unlike federal contractors. See, e.g., J.A. 166-68.

The law did not cover nearby private companies

because they do not handle the type of high-level

waste pervasive at Hanford. J.A. 194-96. The United

States argues that a worker who has spent only one

shift at Hanford does not face the risk of “a worker

who spends a career in an occupation like mining,

milling, or refining.” U.S. Br. 28. But it provided no

evidence to rebut the expert testimony from the

State’s top workplace safety official that Hanford

“presents a unique set of very hazardous conditions to

Washington workers characterized by the presence of

quantities and types of hazardous substances found

nowhere else in Washington.” J.A. 130. And in any

event, the problem H.B. 1723 addressed was not

merely Hanford’s unique dangers, but also the unique

difficulty Hanford workers have had in recovering

workers’ compensation. See infra p. 10.

The decisions challenged by the federal

government are legislative choices entitled to

deference, and the United States has never argued

that the decisions lack a rational basis. Pet. App. 74a75a. Even if evidence suggested that conditions

warranted extension of the law to additional areas or

employers, “reform may take one step at a time,

addressing itself to the phase of the problem which

51

seems most acute to the legislative mind.” Williamson

v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489

(1955).

The government argues that “[e]ven if there

were sound reasons to believe that federal contract

workers at the Hanford site face greater job-related

dangers than typical employees, the State of

Washington cannot permissibly use affiliation with

the federal government as a ‘proxy’ for exposure to

such hazards.” Br. 27 (citing Dawson, 139 S. Ct. at

706).

But

this

argument

assumed

that

intergovernmental immunity applies. It does not; it

was waived. Washington may therefore regulate in

the best way it sees fit to address the hazardous

conditions within the bounds of Due Process and

Equal Protection. Pet. App. 74a-75a. And given that

virtually all Hanford workers are employed by private

companies who have contracted with the federal

government, it was perfectly reasonable to use that

status as a “proxy” for those the State wanted to

protect.

Similarly flawed is the government’s argument

that H.B. 1723 was invalid even under the State’s

reading of § 3172. U.S. Br. 39-40. The government

claims that under the State’s interpretation,

§ 3172 would only allow the State to regulate on

federal land in the same way that intergovernmental

immunity allows the State to regulate elsewhere.

There are two problems with this argument. First,

§ 3172 didn’t just import intergovernmental immunity

rules to federal land, it completely waived immunity.

As noted above, the government’s contrary theory

52

would mean that when Congress first waived

immunity in 1936, it actually wasn’t waiving

immunity at all, because States could not regulate

federal contractors even outside of federal land. Infra

p. 36-37. And second, § 3172 waives immunity not

only on federal land, but also on federal “projects,” as

detailed above, so the waiver would apply to federal

projects outside federal land. Infra p. 36-37. Thus,

§ 3172 fully waived immunity as to workers’

compensation on federal land and projects, and the

government has conceded at every stage of this case

that absent immunity, H.B. 1723 would be valid. See,

e.g., Pet. App. 73a.

Even absent a waiver, outside of federal land a

federal contract is not a magic wand allowing

employers to escape workers’ compensation laws. As

discussed above, many Washington employers—from

Boeing to Amazon—contract with the federal

government. If one of these companies had a

particularly dangerous worksite on land “under the

exclusive jurisdiction of the State,” 40 U.S.C.

§ 3172(a), the State could unquestionably adopt a law

specifying that certain injuries or illnesses at the site

were presumptively work-related. See Mountain

Timber Co., 243 U.S. 219. Under § 3172, if the

company then leased space on federal property and

moved the worksite there, the State could still “apply

the law[] . . . in the same way and to the same extent

as if the premises were under the exclusive

jurisdiction of the State[.]”

In short, “§ 3172 removes federal jurisdiction as

a barrier to a state’s authority over workers’

53

compensation laws for all who are located in

the state.” Pet. App. 72a. With that barrier

removed, H.B. 1723 was a valid exercise of the State’s

authority.

D.

Though the Court Should Not Evaluate

Washington’s Revised Law in the First

Instance, the New Law Clearly Complies

with 40 U.S.C. § 3172

The State and the federal government

agree that “‘[t]his Court should not evaluate

Washington’s new law in the first instance.’”

Opp. Suggestion Mootness 17 (quoting Suggestion

of Mootness 2). As the federal government concedes,

if it decides to challenge Washington’s revised law,

such a challenge would raise different issues and

require different evidence than was presented here.

Id.

If the Court nonetheless decides to opine about

S.B. 5890, the law is clearly valid under any

interpretation of § 3172. S.B. 5890 applies to

companies on both federal and non-federal land,

supra n. 14, and it applies without regard to whether

an employer contracts with the federal government.

This

Court

has

held

that

even

when

intergovernmental immunity applies, it allows state

regulation “imposed on some basis unrelated to the

object’s status as a Government contractor or

supplier.” North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 437-38 (plurality

54

opinion). And even on the reading of § 3172 advanced

by the federal government, the State may “extend to

federal lands and facilities the same workers’

compensation provisions that apply to similarly

situated non-federal premises.” U.S. Br. 32-33. There

is thus no basis to question the legality of S.B. 5890.

CONCLUSION

The Court should vacate the Ninth Circuit

opinion and remand to the district court on mootness

or prudential grounds; if the Court declines to do so,

then it should affirm.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

ROBERT W. FERGUSON

Attorney General

NOAH G. PURCELL

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

ANASTASIA R. SANDSTROM

Senior Counsel

PETER B. GONICK

TERA M. HEINTZ

Deputy Solicitors General

Mach 25, 2022

1125 Washington Street SE

Olympia, WA 98504-0100

360-753-6200

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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