Respondents Brief — United States, Petitioner v. Washington, et al.
Supreme Court briefMar 25, 2022
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No. 21-404
In the Supreme Court of the United States
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF WASHINGTON; JAY ROBERT INSLEE, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON; JOEL SACKS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
DIRECTOR OF THE WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR AND INDUSTRIES; AND THE WASHINGTON STATE
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES,
RESPONDENTS.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STATE OF WASHINGTON’S RESPONSE BRIEF
ROBERT W. FERGUSON
Attorney General
NOAH G. PURCELL
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
ANASTASIA R. SANDSTROM
Senior Counsel
1125 Washington Street SE
Olympia, WA 98504-0100 PETER B. GONICK
TERA M. HEINTZ
360-753-6200
noah.purcell@atg.wa.gov
Deputy Solicitors General
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
40 U.S.C. § 3172(a) allows states to regulate
workers’ compensation on federal land and projects
“in the same way and to the same extent as if the
premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
State.” Text, history, and precedent demonstrate that
this provision waives federal immunity from state
workers’ compensation laws on federal projects.
Washington enacted a workers’ compensation
law in 2018 tailored to the dangers faced by private
employees at the Hanford nuclear site, a uniquely
dangerous workplace where private contractors have
routinely failed to provide employees with protective
equipment or monitor exposures to toxic substances.
After unsuccessfully challenging the law in the lower
courts, the federal government sought certiorari,
which this Court granted, on this question: “Whether
a state workers’ compensation law that applies
exclusively to federal contract workers who perform
services at a specified federal facility is barred by
principles of intergovernmental immunity, or is
instead authorized by 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a) . . . .”
The federal government has maintained
throughout this case that if Washington’s law applied
to all workers at Hanford and to workplaces other
than Hanford, it would comply with § 3172. In 2022,
Washington amended the prior statute to expand its
protections to all workers at Hanford and at other
radioactive waste sites in Washington.
ii
The questions presented are:
1. Whether this case is moot given that the
federal government sought only a declaration that
Washington’s prior law was invalid and Washington
has now repealed the portions of that law to which the
government objected.
2. If this case is not moot, whether Washington’s
prior law was authorized by 40 U.S.C. § 3172, which
waives federal immunity from state workers’
compensation laws on federal land and projects like
the Hanford site.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................... 4
A.
Washington’s Workers’ Compensation
System Is Tailored to Address the
Risks of Specific Industries and
Employers ........................................................ 4
B.
The Hanford Nuclear Cleanup Site
Poses Special Dangers to Workers .................. 8
C.
Through Statutes and Contracts, the
Federal Government Has Authorized
Washington to Cover Hanford
Workers Under Its Workers’
Compensation System ................................... 10
D.
In 2018, Washington Adopted a
Presumption to Protect Hanford
Workers ......................................................... 12
E.
The District Court and Ninth Circuit
Upheld Washington’s Law ............................ 17
F.
The Federal Government Sought
Certiorari on a Specific Question
While Detailing Ways Washington
Could Amend its Law to Resolve the
Question Presented ....................................... 20
G.
Washington Amended its Law to
Cover Workers at All Radiological
Hazardous Waste Sites in Washington ........ 21
iv
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ......................... 23
ARGUMENT............................................................. 24
A.
The State Has Repealed and Replaced
the Challenged Law, so the Court
Should Vacate and Remand Based on
Mootness or Prudential
Considerations ............................................... 24
B.
40 U.S.C. § 3172(a) Completely
Waives Intergovernmental Immunity,
Allowing States to Regulate Workers’
Compensation on Federal Lands and
Projects As if They Were Under
Exclusive State Jurisdiction.......................... 30
C.
1.
The text of Section 3172(a)
supports the State’s reading ............... 30
2.
Comparing Section 3172(a) to
other waivers of immunity
supports the State’s reading ............... 41
3.
Precedent supports the State’s
reading................................................. 44
4.
The government’s concerns
about the purported
consequences of the lower
court’s ruling are overblown ............... 47
Washington’s Prior Law Complied
with 40 U.S.C. § 3172 .................................... 48
v
D.
Though the Court Should Not
Evaluate Washington’s Revised Law
in the First Instance, the New Law
Clearly Complies with 40 U.S.C. §
3172 ................................................................ 53
CONCLUSION ......................................................... 55
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
62 Cases of Jam v. United States
340 U.S. 593 (1951) ................................................39
Atkinson v. State Tax Comm’n of Oregon
303 U.S. 20 (1938) ..................................................32
Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R. Co.
331 U.S. 519 (1947) ................................................36
Bowen v. Kizer
485 U.S. 386 (1988) (per curiam) ..........................25
Capetola v. Barclay White Co.
139 F.2d 556 (3d Cir. 1943) .............................11, 18
City of Frederick v. Shankle
367 Md. 5, 785 A.2d 749 (2001) ...............................6
Cohens v. Virginia
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)..........................45, 46
Collector v. Day
78 U.S. 113 (1870),
overruled in part by
Graves v. People of State of
New York ex rel. O’Keefe
306 U.S. 466 (1939) ................................................33
Cyr v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
47 Wash. 2d 92, 286 P.2d 1038 (1955) ....................6
vii
Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury
489 U.S. 803 (1989) ................................................41
Dawson v. Steager
139 S. Ct. 698 (2019) .................................. 41, 51, 54
Demarest v. Manspeaker
498 U.S. 184 (1991) ................................................47
Dennis v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
109 Wash. 2d 467, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987) ................6
Diffenderfer v. Cent. Baptist Church
404 U.S. 412 (1972) (per curiam) ..........................26
Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller
486 U.S. 174 (1988) ......... 2, 18, 20, 24, 38, 44-45, 47
Hall v. Beals
396 U.S. 45 (1969) (per curiam) ......................25, 27
Hancock v. Train
426 U.S. 167 (1976) ................................................46
Harry v. Buse Timber & Sales, Inc.
166 Wash. 2d 1, 201 P.3d 1011 (2009). .................49
James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula
309 U.S. 94 (1940) ..................................................48
Lawrence v. Chater
516 U.S. 163 (1996) (per curiam) ..........................28
Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp.
494 U.S. 472 (1990) ..........................................25, 28
viii
Linnell v. City of St. Louis Park
305 N.W.2d 599 (Minn. 1981)..................................6
Marquis v. City of Spokane
130 Wash. 2d 97, 922 P.2d 43 (1996) ....................27
Mayo v. United States
319 U.S. 441 (1943) ................................................46
McCulloch v. Maryland
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)..........................33, 46
Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner
459 U.S. 392 (1983) ................................................46
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington
243 U.S. 219 (1917) ...................................... 4, 23, 52
Murray v. Joe Gerrick & Co.
291 U.S. 315 (1934) ..........................................11, 32
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v.
City of New York
140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) ............................................25
North Dakota v. United States
495 U.S. 423 (1990)
(plurality opinion) ...........................21, 32, 46-47, 53
Peak v. Small Bus. Admin.
660 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1981) ............................11, 18
Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Indep. Sch. Dist.
361 U.S. 376 (1960) ................................................46
ix
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
464 U.S. 238 (1984) ................................................48
South Carolina v. Baker
485 U.S. 505 (1988) ..........................................37, 46
Sperbeck v. Dep’t of Indus., Lab. & Human Rels.
46 Wis. 2d 282, 174 N.W.2d 546 (1970) ..................6
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo
141 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1944) ..........................11, 18
U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Provenzano
469 U.S. 14 (1984) (per curiam) ............................25
United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.
Mayor & Council of Camden
465 U.S. 208 (1984) ................................................26
United States v. County of Fresno
429 U.S. 452 (1977) ..........................................37, 46
United States v. Microsoft
138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (per curiam) ......................25
Washington v. United States
460 U.S. 536 (1983) ................................................46
Weston v. City of Charleston
27 U.S. (2 Peters) 449 (1829) .................................33
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.
348 U.S. 483 (1955) ................................................51
x
Statutes
5 U.S.C. § 8102(a) ......................................................13
40 U.S.C. § 3172(a) ............................................ passim
40 U.S.C. § 3172(b) ....................................................32
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 to 6992k
(Resource Conservation and Recovery Act) ..........42
42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) ....................................................42
42 U.S.C. §§ 7384 to 7385s-6
(Energy Employees Occupational Illness
Compensation Program Act) .................................15
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 to 7515
(Clean Air Act) .......................................................42
42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) ....................................................42
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 to 9675
(Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act) .........................42
42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4)..........................................19, 42
49 U.S.C. § 5126(a) ..............................................35, 42
1911 Wash. Sess. Laws 345 (ch. 74, § 1).....................4
1937 Wash. Sess. Laws 1031 (ch. 212) .......................5
1937 Wash. Sess. Laws 525 (ch. 147, § 1).................11
1987 Wash. Sess. Laws 2401 (ch. 515, § 2).................7
xi
2018 Wash. Sess. Laws 226 (ch. 9, § 1) ....................12
2018 Wash. Sess. Laws 1573 (ch. 264) .......................7
2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1944 (ch. 251) .......................7
2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1955 (ch. 252) .......................7
Former 40 U.S.C. § 290
(recodified as 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a)) ........................11
Wash. Rev. Code § 51.04.010 ....................................13
Wash. Rev. Code § 51.04.130 ....................................12
Wash. Rev. Code § 51.08.140 ..................................6, 7
Wash. Rev. Code § 51.12.060 ..............................13, 22
Wash. Rev. Code § 51.16.035(1) ..................................4
Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.050 ....................................14
Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.060-.095 ............................14
Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.185 ......................................7
Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.185(1)(a)..............................7
Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.187(2)(a)............................12
Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.187(2)(b)............................12
Wash. Rev. Code § 51.36.010 ....................................14
Wash. Rev. Code § 51.52.050(2)(a)..............................6
xii
Former Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.187(1)
(2018) ................................................................13, 23
Former Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.187(1)(b)
(2018) ......................................................................13
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-901.01.........................................6
Cal. Lab. Code § 3212 ..................................................6
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-209 ..........................................6
Fla. Stat. § 112.18 .......................................................6
820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 305/6 ...........................................6
Ohio Rev. Code § 742.38 ..............................................6
Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.802 ..............................................6
53 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 637 ..............................................6
Va. Code § 65.2-402 .....................................................6
Regulations
20 C.F.R. § 30.625-.627 .............................................15
Wash. Admin. Code § 296-17-31011 ...........................4
Wash. Admin. Code § 296-17-850 ...............................5
Wash. Admin. Code § 296-17-855 ...............................5
Wash. Admin. Code §§ 296-17A-0101 to -7400 ..........4
Wash. Admin. Code § 296-17A-0101-02 .....................4
xiii
Wash. Admin. Code § 296-17A-2103 ..........................5
Wash. Admin. Code § 296-17A-7308-03 .....................4
Wash. Admin. Code § 296-17A-7400 ..........................5
Legislative Materials
S. Rep. No. 74-2294, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).....11
Senate Report, Rep. No. 74-2294, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1936) ............................................................38
Substitute H.B. 1723, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 2018),
https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?
BillNumber=1723&Year=2017 ............... 1-3, 12-17,
19-21, 26-30, 48-53
Substitute S.B. 5890, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 2022),
https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?
BillNumber=5890&Initiative=
false&Year=2021 ....................... 21-24, 26-29, 53-54
Other Authorities
4 Arthur Larson et al.,
Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law
§ 52.07[2] (2021) .......................................................6
About AWB, https://www.awb.org/about-us/
who-we-are/ ............................................................17
xiv
Associated Press, Washington state to boost
workers’ comp rates for Amazon (Dec. 2, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/workers-com
pensation-washington-017a509e68d942
7839c5e49b0096fb3e ................................................5
Department of Ecology, State of Washington,
Other mixed waste facilities we oversee,
https://ecology.wa.gov/Waste-Toxics/
Nuclear-waste/Radioactive-waste-disposal
(last visited Mar. 21, 2022) ..............................22, 54
https://www.hanford.gov/page.cfm/200Area.............14
https://www.hanford.gov/page.cfm/300Area.............14
https://www.hanford.gov/page.cfm/RiverCorridor ...14
Letter from Doug S. Shoop, Manager, Dep’t
of Energy (Richland WA), to David R. Einan,
Manager, EPA (Richland WA) & Alexandra K.
Smith, Nuclear Waste Program Manager,
Dep’t of Ecology (Richland WA) (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.hanford.gov/files.cfm/2019_
Hanford_Lifecycle_Report_w-Transmittal_
Letter.pdf (contains attachment: 2019 Hanford
Lifecycle Scope, Schedule and Cost Report) ..........15
Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/
(last visited Mar. 22, 2022) ....................................34
Webster’s New International Dictionary of
the English Language (1936).................................32
xv
Susannah Frame, Contamination events force
project shut down at Hanford nuclear site,
KING-TV (May 16, 2019, 8:26 PM),
https://www.king5.com/article/news/
investigations/contamination-eventsforce-project-shut-down-at-hanford-nuclearsite/281-31e25448-4b84-4a42-a068-a
d8be72b1b92 ............................................................9
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Savannah River Nat’l Lab’y,
Hanford Tank Vapor Assessment Report
(Oct. 30, 2014),
https://srnl.doe.gov/documents/Hanford_
TVAT_Report_2014-10-30-FINAL.pdf ....................9
Wash. State Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., Hanford–
Department of Energy (DOE) Data (Nov. 2021),
https://lni.wa.gov/insurance/_docs/HanfordDOE%20Data.pdf...................................................16
1
INTRODUCTION
The Hanford nuclear reservation is a uniquely
dangerous worksite, permeated by a “witch’s brew” of
billions of gallons of radioactive waste. Over 10,000
Washingtonians work at the site, virtually all
employed by private companies hired by the federal
government. For decades, those companies have failed
to protect workers, exposing them to dangerous
conditions without providing adequate protective gear
or even monitoring their exposures to toxic wastes.
Countless workers have fallen ill, yet many were
unable to recover workers’ compensation because
their employers kept no record of what toxins they
were exposed to, when they were exposed, or what
health impacts those toxins have.
Washington responded to this problem in 2018
by enacting House Bill 1723,1 creating a presumption
for private employees at Hanford that certain
illnesses arose from their employment. The bill
imposed no direct obligations on the federal
government, instead regulating only private
businesses operating at Hanford.
The federal government sued, claiming that
H.B. 1723 violated the Supremacy Clause, but federal
law authorized Washington’s approach. Under 40
U.S.C. § 3172(a), States can regulate workers’
compensation on federal land and projects “in the
same way and to the same extent as if the premises
Substitute H.B. 1723, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2018), https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=1723&
Year=2017, will be referenced throughout as H.B. 1723.
1
2
were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State[.]”
This language, far broader than other waiver statutes,
completely waives federal immunity as to workers’
compensation on federal land and projects.
The federal government disagrees, contending
that § 3172(a) simply applies normal intergovernmental immunity principles to federal land. U.S. Br.
33. That reading of the statute makes no textual or
historical sense, and this Court rejected it in Goodyear
Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988), holding
that although intergovernmental immunity normally
precludes direct state regulation of federal activities,
§ 3172(a) “provides the requisite clear congressional
authorization” for States to regulate federal facilities
as to workers’ compensation. Id. at 182. This Court
held that the statute “places no express limitation on
the type of workers’ compensation scheme that is
authorized.” Id. at 183. The federal government
concedes that H.B. 1723 is a workers’ compensation
law. U.S. Br. 42.
The federal government says it is implausible
that Congress completely waived federal immunity
from State workers’ compensation laws, but its
argument relies on false premises and ignores
§ 3172(a)’s text. The government claims that
Congress never would have allowed States to adopt
regulations that apply only to companies that contract
with the federal government, because the political
process fails to “provide a sufficient check against
abuse” of such companies. U.S. Br. 16. But Congress
may reasonably have concluded that such
companies—which in Washington include Microsoft,
3
Boeing, and Amazon—are perfectly capable of
protecting themselves. Indeed, the private employers
operating at Hanford include large, sophisticated
Washington corporations, and the largest business
association in Washington lobbied against H.B. 1723.
There is thus no reason for the Court to deviate from
§ 3172(a)’s text based on speculation about Congress’s
intent. Instead, the Court should conclude, like the
court of appeals, that “§ 3172 removes federal
jurisdiction as a barrier to a state’s authority over
workers’ compensation laws for all who are located in
the state.” Pet. App. 72a.
Although § 3172(a) authorized H.B. 1723, there
is no longer any reason for this Court to decide that
question. Since the federal government filed this case,
it has maintained that if Washington’s law applied
beyond Hanford and to employers who do not contract
with the federal government, it would be valid.
Relying on that representation, the Washington
Legislature recently enacted Senate Bill 5890,2 which
extends the worker-protective presumptions in H.B.
1723 to all workers in Washington at all facilities that
store or dispose of certain types of radiological waste.
Thus, Washington law now provides precisely what
the federal government has said § 3172(a) authorizes.
Because the government seeks only a
declaration that H.B. 1723 is invalid, and because the
portions of that law the government challenged have
now been replaced, the government’s challenge is
2 Substitute S.B. 5890, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2022), https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=5890&
Initiative=false&Year=2021, will be referenced throughout as
S.B. 5890.
4
moot. The Court should therefore do what it routinely
does when an intervening change in law renders the
question presented hypothetical: dismiss the petition,
vacate the lower court opinions, and remand to the
district court to consider any remaining claims.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
Washington’s Workers’ Compensation
System Is Tailored to Address the Risks of
Specific Industries and Employers
Washington adopted its industrial insurance
system in 1911 to provide “sure and certain relief” to
workers. 1911 Wash. Sess. Laws 345 (ch. 74, § 1).
From the beginning, Washington has treated
employers differently based on the specific hazards
their workers face. See 1911 Wash. Sess. Laws 345-46;
see also Wash. Rev. Code § 51.16.035(1); Wash.
Admin. Code § 296-17-31011. In 1917, this Court
upheld Washington’s system of distinguishing
employers based on the unique work conditions and
risks they create. See Mountain Timber Co. v.
Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 241-46 (1917).
Under Washington’s system, the Department of
Labor and Industries (L&I) classifies “all occupations
or industries in accordance with their degree of
hazard and fix[es] therefor basic rates of premium[s.]”
Wash. Rev. Code § 51.16.035(1); accord Wash. Admin.
Code § 296-17-31011. L&I regulations recognize
hundreds of categories of occupations and industries,
from “excavation work” to “pet grooming,” each
subject to its own rate. See generally Wash. Admin.
Code §§ 296-17A-0101 to -7400; -0101-02 (excavation
work); -7308-03 (pet grooming). Though the categories
5
are typically phrased in terms of types of work, rather
than by naming specific companies, many of the
categories apply to only a single business or handful
of businesses because they are the only ones in
Washington operating in that industry. For example,
Wash. Admin. Code § 296-17A-2103 covers fulfillment
standards for distribution of goods for an on-line
business; it currently applies only to Amazon.3 See
also, e.g., Wash. Admin. Code § 296-17A-7400
(applying only to state employees at “[m]ental health
or acute care hospitals without a fully implemented
safe patient handling program”).
As in most states, Washington’s system
differentiates not only between industries, but also
within industries. If an employer’s workers suffer
more injuries than most other employers in the same
industry, L&I charges that employer more. Wash.
Admin. Code §§ 296-17-850, -855. Thus, an employer
in the same industry as another but with a worse
safety record may pay a rate several times higher than
its competitors.
Because workers can be harmed through
chronic occupational exposure as well as workplace
injuries, Washington began covering occupational
diseases in 1937 to ensure that an employer’s workers’
compensation responsibilities match the harm
experienced by its employees. 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws
1031 (ch. 212). An occupational disease is a disease or
condition that arises proximately and naturally out of
3 Associated Press, Washington state to boost workers’
comp rates for Amazon (Dec. 2, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/
workers-compensation-washington-017a509e68d9427839c5e49b
0096fb3e.
6
the distinctive conditions of employment. Wash. Rev.
Code § 51.08.140; Dennis v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 109
Wash. 2d 467, 481-82, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987).
While this system has generally achieved the
State’s goals of fairly compensating workers and
allocating the cost of workplace illnesses and injuries
to the employers who cause them, it has proven
inadequate in one key respect. Because Washington’s
workers’ compensation system normally places the
burden of proof on the worker to demonstrate that a
workplace incident caused their illness, the system
does not function properly when certain workers
routinely fall ill but for some reason are unable to
document what exposures or incidents led to their
illness. See Cyr v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 47 Wash. 2d
92, 96, 286 P.2d 1038 (1955) (worker generally has
burden to show entitlement to benefits); Wash. Rev.
Code § 51.52.050(2)(a). Like many other states,
Washington has responded to this problem by
adopting several presumptions that switch the normal
burden of proof, so that if workers in certain
categories get sick with certain illnesses tied to their
work, the burden is on their employer to prove that
the illness is not work related.4
4 Presumption laws like this are common nationwide.
See, e.g., City of Frederick v. Shankle, 367 Md. 5, 785 A.2d 749
(2001); Linnell v. City of St. Louis Park, 305 N.W.2d 599 (Minn.
1981); Sperbeck v. Dep’t of Indus., Lab. & Human Rels., 46 Wis.
2d 282, 174 N.W.2d 546 (1970); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-901.01; Cal.
Lab. Code § 3212; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-209; Fla. Stat. § 112.18;
820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 305/6; Ohio Rev. Code § 742.38; Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 656.802; 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 637; Va. Code § 65.2-402; 4 Arthur
Larson et al., Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 52.07[2]
(2021).
7
In 1987, Washington adopted such a
presumption for firefighters. 1987 Wash. Sess. Laws
2401, 2402 (ch. 515, § 2); see also Wash. Rev. Code
§ 51.32.185. Specifically, the legislature recognized
that firefighters are often exposed to toxic fumes,
chemicals, and substances in their work, but usually
cannot document exactly what they were exposed to
or in what quantities. J.A. 131; CA9.SER.361. For
that reason, it was often difficult for firefighters to
access workers’ compensation benefits when they bore
the burden of proving that their illness was caused by
their work. The legislature therefore adopted a
firefighter occupational disease presumption under
which certain respiratory conditions, heart problems,
infectious diseases, and cancers are presumed to arise
naturally and proximately out of employment as a
firefighter. Wash. Rev. Code § 51.08.140; Wash. Rev.
Code § 51.32.185(1)(a). This shifts the burden to the
employer—virtually always the State or local
governments in the case of firefighters—to show that
a hazardous exposure at work did not cause the
worker’s disease.
In 2018, Washington added a similar
presumption for police officers and other first
responders suffering from post-traumatic stress
disorder. 2018 Wash. Sess. Laws 1573 (ch. 264). And
in 2021, Washington created presumptions for
frontline workers and health care workers related to
COVID-19. 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1944 (ch. 251);
2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1955 (ch. 252).
8
B.
The Hanford Nuclear Cleanup Site Poses
Special Dangers to Workers
The Hanford nuclear production complex
manufactured plutonium for decades. J.A. 178; U.S.
Br. 4. The site was home to nine nuclear reactors, J.A.
156, which produced thousands of tons of solid nuclear
waste and hundreds of billions of gallons of
contaminated liquid waste, J.A. 159. This waste
includes a “witch’s brew of a wide range of hazardous
chemicals and radioactive elements.” J.A. 180. Much
of the liquid waste was simply dumped on the land at
Hanford, and many of the “solid wastes were buried in
the ground in pits or trenches.” J.A. 160.
Cleanup of the site is being conducted almost
entirely by private companies hired by the
Department of Energy (DOE). Those companies
employ roughly 10,000 workers at the site. U.S. Br. 6;
J.A. 46, 178. Cleanup of the site, in DOE’s words, is
“unprecedented in scale and complexity,” exposing
workers to many hazardous chemicals and radioactive
substances. J.A. 42-43, 89-90, 97-106, 159-67.
Employees at Hanford work amid a unique mix
of toxic and radioactive substances present nowhere
else. The scale of the waste and dangers is almost
unimaginable. See, e.g., J.A. 156-69. The tank farms
alone contain 177 underground tanks storing 53
million gallons of radioactive and toxic chemical
substances, with around 67 tanks that have leaked
into the ground. J.A. 85-86, 161-65. The tank farm
waste contains multiple hazardous substances that
severely damage human health. J.A. 85-86, 88-90,
93-97, 172-76. For example, even small doses of
9
ionizing radiation (which permeates Hanford’s mixed
waste) can cause cancer. J.A. 125-26, 173-76.
Hanford’s hazards extend beyond workers who
work directly with hazardous materials. Toxic and
radioactive substances were dumped at sites
throughout the facility, often with no records kept of
where. J.A. 160-61. Scientists have found that office
workers at Hanford are at increased risk of exposure
to dangerous substances, with an increased risk of
disease. J.A. 97-98, 198-200; see also J.A. 172-76.
Releases at Hanford have caused highly dangerous
radioactive materials to contaminate workers,
drifting outside the direct cleanup areas and polluting
clothing and cars. See, e.g., J.A. 198-200.5
DOE admitted in a 2014 report that the work
conditions are hazardous: “The ongoing emission of
tank vapors, which contain a mixture of toxic
chemicals, is inconsistent with the provision of a safe
and healthful workplace free from recognized
hazards.”6 The problem has continued since the 2014
report, with continued emissions of dangerous vapors.
J.A. 87-88, 102-03, 199; see also J.A. 94-99, 164-69,
192-96, 198-99; Frame supra note 5.
5 Susannah
Frame, Contamination events force project
shut down at Hanford nuclear site, KING-TV (May 16, 2019, 8:26
PM), https://www.king5.com/article/news/investigations/contam
ination-events-force-project-shut-down-at-hanford-nuclear-site/
281-31e25448-4b84-4a42-a068-ad8be72b1b92.
6 See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Savannah River Nat’l Lab’y,
Hanford Tank Vapor Assessment Report 15 (Oct. 30, 2014),
https://srnl.doe.gov/documents/Hanford_TVAT_Report_2014-1030-FINAL.pdf.
10
Despite knowing of these dangers, private
contractors operating at Hanford have not protected
their employees. Contractors have not consistently
supplied their workers with personal protective
equipment. J.A. 97-98; CA9.SER.344. And neither the
contractors nor DOE have consistently monitored
conditions to allow medical professionals to know
about particular workers’ exposures to hazards.
J.A. 195, 166-69, 172-73; CA9.SER.300-01, 311.
Multiple federal and expert reports “have documented
poor Hanford contractor practices that limit the
ability to detect worker exposures.” J.A. 167. Because
of these failures, workers often have a difficult time
identifying specific incidents at work that caused their
diseases or conditions. J.A. 141, 168-69, 172-73.
And with no documentation of exposures, fairly
compensating Hanford workers for injuries and
diseases presents challenges not present at most
Washington worksites. J.A. 141, 169, 172-73.
Hanford is thus a uniquely dangerous place to
work. As summarized by the L&I medical director, the
combination of exposure to hazardous substances and
the lack of careful monitoring “presents a unique set
of medical challenges not found elsewhere in
Washington.” J.A. 172-73.
C.
Through Statutes and Contracts, the
Federal Government Has Authorized
Washington to Cover Hanford Workers
Under Its Workers’ Compensation System
Following a rash of worker injuries on the
Golden Gate Bridge Project, Congress authorized
states to apply their workers’ compensation laws on
11
federal lands and projects. Former 40 U.S.C. § 2907;
S. Rep. No. 74-2294, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936). The
change came after this Court held that a state
workers’ compensation statute did not apply to a
federal facility. Murray v. Joe Gerrick & Co., 291 U.S.
315, 318-19 (1934).
Congress enacted the 1936 law to provide “more
adequate protection” to workers on federal projects
and property “wherever situated[.]” S. Rep. No. 742294, at 1. The law freed state workers’ compensation
laws “from any restraint by reason of the exclusive
federal jurisdiction.” Peak v. Small Bus. Admin., 660
F.2d 375, 376 n.1 (8th Cir. 1981); accord Capetola v.
Barclay White Co., 139 F.2d 556, 559 (3d Cir. 1943);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 141 F.2d 362, 363 (D.C.
Cir. 1944).
Washington has long exercised its authority
under this law to protect workers at federal facilities.
In 1937, employees of federal contractors gained
industrial insurance. 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws 525 (ch.
147, § 1). Ever since, private employees working on
federal projects in Washington, such as employees of
contractors at Hanford, have received industrial
insurance benefits. Additionally, while many major
employers in Washington, like Boeing, Microsoft, and
Amazon, have contracts with the federal government,
their employees are covered by state workers’
compensation laws regardless of whether they work
on federal contracts.
7 This statute was once codified at 40 U.S.C. § 290. It was
recodified as 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a) in 2002 with minimal changes.
12
Although the duty to provide industrial
insurance coverage normally falls on employers,
rather than on an entity that hires those employers to
carry out a contract, for decades DOE has agreed to
pay for some contractors’ obligations at Hanford
under an agreement between L&I and DOE. J.A. 14345; CA9.SER.373; Wash. Rev. Code § 51.04.130. L&I
and DOE entered into the current memorandum of
understanding (MOU) in June 2018—after the law
challenged here became effective. CA9.SER.373-75;
2018 Wash. Sess. Laws 226 (ch. 9, § 1). In the MOU,
DOE agrees to follow Washington law without
reservation. CA9.SER.373.
D.
In
2018,
Washington
Adopted
a
Presumption to Protect Hanford Workers
In 2018, Washington enacted H.B. 1723 for
“Hanford site workers.” In light of the many dangers
discussed above of working at Hanford, the difficulty
workers have had in proving which exposures to
which chemicals made them sick, and the consistently
poor safety record of employers operating at Hanford,
the legislature responded, just as it has for
firefighters, police officers, and frontline health
workers, by creating a rebuttable presumption that
certain diseases and conditions of Hanford site
workers are occupational diseases. Wash. Rev. Code
§ 51.32.187(2)(a); H.B. 1723; 2018 Wash. Sess. Laws
226 (ch. 9, § 1). The presumption is not absolute, but
is rebuttable with evidence including “use of tobacco
products, physical fitness and weight, lifestyle,
hereditary factors, and exposure from other
employment or nonemployment activities.” Wash.
Rev. Code § 51.32.187(2)(b). This law furthered the
State’s goal of ensuring “sure and certain relief” for
13
workers harmed through their employment. Wash.
Rev. Code § 51.04.010.
H.B. 1723 was tailored to protect as many
Hanford workers as possible while complying with
federal law. Because federal law preempts application
of state workers’ compensation laws to federal
employees, 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a), Washington has never
attempted to apply those laws, including H.B. 1723, to
federal employees. Wash. Rev. Code § 51.12.060. But
with the exception of roughly 400 federal employees,
virtually all workers at Hanford—over 10,000—are
employees of private companies hired by the federal
government. U.S. Br. 6; J.A. 46. These are the same
types of private employees who have long received the
protection of Washington’s workers’ compensation
laws on federal land, and these were the employees
covered by H.B. 1723. Former Wash. Rev. Code
§ 51.32.187(1) (2018).
H.B. 1723’s presumption did not apply to the
entire Hanford site, but rather covered only workers
in the most contaminated areas and areas where
cleanup efforts posed the greatest dangers: “the two
hundred east, two hundred west, three hundred area,
environmental restoration disposal facility site,
central plateau, or the river corridor locations.”
Former Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.187(1)(b) (2018); see
also U.S. Br. App. 7a (map showing areas of Hanford
covered by H.B. 1723). These areas are all profoundly
contaminated with radioactive and hazardous waste
and all home to massive cleanup efforts. See generally
14
J.A. 158-59.8 H.B. 1723 did not apply to parts of the
Hanford reservation where certain private companies
operate, but these facilities (US Ecology and PermaFix Northwest) do not handle the type of high-level
radioactive waste present at the parts of Hanford
covered by the law, so they do not expose workers to
the same risks. See J.A. 131, 180-81, 194-96, 198
(“Workers at the Hanford site thus have much higher
potential for harmful exposures than workers at
Perma-Fix Northwest and US Ecology.”). H.B. 1723
similarly did not apply to the small number of state
employees who occasionally enter Hanford to conduct
brief inspections, but there is no evidence that any
such worker has ever been sickened by an exposure at
Hanford or that their employers have failed to provide
them with protective gear or take other safety
measures, as the covered employers have failed to do.
See, e.g., J.A. 166-68.
While H.B. 1723 shifted the burden of proof, it
did not provide greater benefits to Hanford workers
than to workers at other places of employment. Wash.
Rev. Code §§ 51.32.050, .060-.095; Wash. Rev. Code
§ 51.36.010.
The cost of H.B. 1723 is a tiny fraction
of the total expenses incurred by the United States
in cleaning up Hanford. The federal government
estimates that the cleanup will cost between $323
billion and $677 billion, with annual costs of between
8
See also https://www.hanford.gov/page.cfm/River
Corridor; https://www.hanford.gov/page.cfm/200Area; https://
www.hanford.gov/page.cfm/300Area.
15
$3 billion and $15 billion for at least the next half
century.9
Since the early 2000’s, the federal government
has operated a compensation program for federal
employees and some contractors who become ill after
working at certain nuclear sites, including Hanford.
See Energy Employees Occupational Illness
Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7384 to 7385s-6. Under that program, “the Federal
Government has paid out more than $1.75 billion to
Hanford workers as of June 2020,” roughly $100
million annually. Pet. App. 19a & n.9. Payments that
workers receive under state workers’ compensation
laws are deducted from any recovery under
EEOICPA. See 20 C.F.R. § 30.625-.627.
Unlike the total cleanup cost at Hanford and
the cost of federal compensation programs, the cost of
state workers’ compensation at Hanford has been and
remains modest. In the decade before enactment of
H.B. 1723, private contractor employees at Hanford
submitted an average of 300-350 State workers’
compensation claims annually. J.A. 67. DOE paid
roughly $115 million in state workers’ compensation
benefits during that time, averaging roughly $11
million annually. J.A. 67. DOE provided no estimate
at the district court about how H.B. 1723 had affected
9 Letter from Doug S. Shoop, Manager, Dep’t of Energy
(Richland WA), to David R. Einan, Manager, EPA (Richland WA)
& Alexandra K. Smith, Nuclear Waste Program Manager, Dep’t
of Ecology (Richland WA) (Jan. 31, 2019), https://
www.hanford.gov/files.cfm/2019_Hanford_Lifecycle_Report_w-T
ransmittal_Letter.pdf (contains attachment: 2019 Hanford
Lifecycle Scope, Schedule and Cost Report, at pages ES-2 to
ES-3).
16
its costs. But since H.B. 1723’s enactment, the number
of workers’ compensation claims filed by employees at
Hanford has actually declined, and the total cost of
claims has barely budged.10 The United States notes
that the presumption law applied retroactively, but
the record reflects that in the first year after the
legislature adopted H.B. 1723, DOE received fewer
than 100 claims invoking the statutory presumption.
J.A. 68, 146. The pace of claims invoking the
presumption has only declined since then, with a total
of just 259 claims filed in over three years. Hanford–
DOE Data.
The United States says that H.B. 1723’s
legislative history reflects that Washington
legislators “emphasized that the costs of the bill would
fall on the federal government.” U.S. Br. 12 (citing
Pet. 7-8). But this refers to an earlier version of H.B.
1723. In the final version, the Washington legislature
changed the bill to give the State Fund—the
central fund applicable to all employers who are
not self-insured—responsibility for claims that were
not covered by the MOU with DOE. J.A. 140.
H.B. 1723 passed with overwhelming bipartisan
support,11 despite several large business associations,
including the Association of Washington Business,
Wash. State Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., Hanford–
Department of Energy (DOE) Data (Nov. 2021) (Hanford–
DOE Data), https://lni.wa.gov/insurance/_docs/Hanford-DOE%
20Data.pdf.
10
11 See supra note 1.
17
“Washington’s oldest and largest statewide business
association,”12 testifying against the bill.13
E.
The District Court and Ninth Circuit
Upheld Washington’s Law
The United States filed a complaint in 2018,
asserting that H.B. 1723 impermissibly “singles out
and discriminates against the Federal Government
and its contractors, purports to directly regulate the
Federal Government, and imposes significant
burdens on the Federal Government and its
contractors without imposing them on other
employers in the State, all in violation of the
Supremacy Clause ....” J.A. 28-29. The complaint
sought declaratory and injunctive relief declaring the
then-existing statute invalid and enjoining its
enforcement. J.A. 40. No damages were sought.
J.A. 40. The complaint acknowledged that federal law
waives intergovernmental immunity so that “States
may enforce their workers’ compensation laws against
private employers working on federal land ‘in the
same way and to the same extent as if the premises
were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State.’”
J.A. 33-34 (quoting 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a)). Washington
argued that the waiver of intergovernmental
immunity in 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a) authorized
Washington’s law.
12
About AWB, https://www.awb.org/about-us/who-we-
are/.
13 H.B. Rep. on H.B. 1723, at 5, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 2018).
18
The district court ruled for Washington on
cross-motions for summary judgment. CA9.ER.6. It
held that “[t]he plain language” of § 3172(a) “allow[s]
the state to regulate federal lands within its
geographical boundaries with all the tools that could
be brought to bear on non-federally owned land.”
CA9.ER.7. The federal government had conceded in
its briefing that § 3172(a) “authorizes the State to
regulate on federal land as it permissibly may do so
under state law.” EWDC.ECF.33, at 3. And at oral
argument, the United States stipulated that if the
federal government was not involved and the Hanford
site was on state land, Washington could adopt and
apply H.B. 1723. J.A. 213, 222.
The court of appeals unanimously affirmed, in
an opinion by Judge Milan Smith. The court began by
examining the statute’s language, Pet. App. 65a-66a,
concluding that “[t]he plain text of § 3172 does not
purport to limit the workers’ compensation laws for
which it waives intergovernmental immunity to only
those that are ‘generally applicable.’” Pet. App. 68a. In
interpreting the statutory language, the panel cited
Goodyear, which addressed the waiver statute and
held that it “place[d] no express limitation” on
permissible workers’ compensation laws. Goodyear
Atomic Corp., 486 U.S. at 183. The Court also cited
many court of appeals opinions reading the same
waiver broadly to mean that “§ 3172 removes federal
jurisdiction as a barrier to a state’s authority over
workers’ compensation laws for all who are located in
the state.” Pet. App. 72a (citing Peak, 660 F.2d at 376
n.1; Capetola, 139 F.2d at 559; Travelers Ins. Co., 141
F.2d at 363).
19
The court also compared § 3172(a)’s language
to other waivers of intergovernmental immunity
and found it materially broader. While other
waivers specify that states cannot apply a more
stringent rule on federal land than applies on
state land, § 3172(a) contains no such limitation.
Pet. App. 70a-71a (contrasting § 3172(a) with the
waiver in the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9620(a)(4)).
The court emphasized that the United States
conceded in oral argument and at the district court
that “Washington could enforce a version of H.B. 1723
that did not involve the Federal Government and
where the Hanford site were a state project.”
Pet. App. 73a. Because it “could” apply the
presumption to a project under the State’s exclusive
jurisdiction, it could apply this presumption in the
same way and to the same extent on federal land. Pet.
App. 73a, 80a-81a.
The court also emphasized that while some of
the federal government’s arguments hinted at
preemption concerns, the government had not
actually made a preemption argument, so “the United
States has waived that argument[.]” Pet. App. 74a.
The United States unsuccessfully moved for
rehearing en banc. Pet. App. 22a-23a. Judge Smith
concurred in the denial of rehearing en banc, noting
that “a state may enact a workers’ compensation
scheme for federally-owned property as long as it
could enact the same scheme ‘in the same way and to
the same extent’ if the property were under the
20
jurisdiction of the state.” Pet. App. 25a (quoting
40 U.S.C. § 3172(a)).
Like the United States, the dissent from the
denial of rehearing focused on the law’s alleged
singling out of the federal government. E.g., Pet. App.
38a-40a. Also like the United States, the dissent
conceded that a law similar to H.B. 1723 that applied
more broadly to include non-federal actors would be
permissible. Pet. App. 47a n.2 (“States may apply
different standards to different types of facilities or
different types of work, so long as in drawing these
distinctions they do not discriminate against the
Federal Government.”); see also Pet. App. 46a-48a
(dissent from denial of rehearing generally describing
Goodyear Atomic Corp., 486 U.S. 174, as allowing any
type of workers’ compensation scheme subject only to
the requirement that the scheme apply equally to
federally owned and other facilities).
F.
The
Federal
Government
Sought
Certiorari on a Specific Question While
Detailing Ways Washington Could Amend
its Law to Resolve the Question Presented
The federal government sought certiorari on a
very narrow and specific question: “Whether a state
workers’ compensation law that applies exclusively to
federal contract workers who perform services at a
specified federal facility is barred by principles of
intergovernmental immunity, or is instead authorized
by 40 U.S.C. 3172(a) ....” Pet. I (Question Presented);
U.S. Br. I. The government repeatedly characterized
the alleged problem with Washington’s law as
singling out of the federal government. Pet. 11; U.S.
Br. 16. And its arguments implicitly conceded that if
21
the law applied to federal and non-federal actors, it
would not violate intergovernmental immunity. For
example, the United States described the Supremacy
Clause as allowing application of a state law or
regulation to federal contractors “if it is ‘imposed on
some basis unrelated to the object’s status as a
Government contractor or supplier’—that is, if it is
‘imposed equally on other similarly situated
constituents of the State.’” Pet. 13 (quoting North
Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 437-38 (1990)
(plurality opinion)); see also U.S. Br. 16 (“Section
3172(a) authorizes States to apply workers’
compensation laws evenhandedly to federal contract
workers and other similarly situated employees ....”).
Similarly, the United States acknowledged that states
may distinguish among workers in their workers’
compensation programs if significant differences
between the classes of workers justify the differential
treatment. Pet. 15; U.S. Br. 24.
G.
Washington Amended its Law to Cover
Workers at All Radiological Hazardous
Waste Sites in Washington
After the Court granted certiorari, the
Washington legislature, relying on the federal
government’s representations about what sort of law
would address its concerns, repealed and replaced
large portions of H.B. 1723. The legislature enacted
Substitute Senate Bill 5890, eliminating all
references to the “Hanford nuclear site” and “United
States department of energy Hanford site workers.”
The presumption now applies instead to all workers
in Washington “working at a radiological hazardous
22
waste facility for at least [one] eight hour shift . . .
including conducting an inspection of the facility.”
S.B. 5890, at 2 (appended to Suggestion of Mootness
at 3a). “‘Radiological hazardous waste facility’ means
any structure and its lands where high-level
radioactive waste as defined by 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1402 or
mixed waste as defined by [Wash. Admin. Code §] 173303-040 is stored or disposed of, except for military
installations as defined in 31 C.F.R. Part 802.227 and
listed in Appendix A to 31 C.F.R. Part 802.” S.B. 5890
(Suggestion of Mootness at 3a-4a).
Because high level radioactive waste is stored
and disposed of at all parts of Hanford covered under
H.B. 1723, those same areas remain covered
under S.B. 5890. See Reply in Support of Suggestion
of Mootness 4-9. But in addition to covering private
employees of federal contractors, the new law now
covers state inspectors at the Hanford site and any
other workers who perform an 8-hour shift there,
excepting federal employees. See S.B. 5890; Wash.
Rev. Code § 51.12.060 (exempting federal employees
from Washington’s workers’ compensation laws). The
new law also applies to a range of non-federal facilities
within the State, including facilities the United States
previously argued were comparable to Hanford but
not covered under the prior law, such as Perma-Fix
Northwest and Energy Northwest. U.S. Br. 7.14
14 See, e.g., Department of Ecology, State of Washington,
Other mixed waste facilities we oversee, https://ecology.wa.gov/
Waste-Toxics/Nuclear-waste/Radioactive-waste-disposal
(last
visited Mar. 21, 2022) (listing Washington facilities with mixed
waste permits).
23
Washington filed a Suggestion of Mootness,
explaining how this new law rendered the current
proceedings moot.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Washington’s adoption of S.B. 5890 resolves
this case. The basis for the federal government’s
complaint and petition for certiorari was that
Washington’s presumption law applied only at
Hanford and only to employees of federal contractors.
The new law eliminates these objections. It covers any
worker at any radiological hazardous waste site, with
the exception of federal military installations. The
new law thus affords the federal government all the
relief it sought, so the Court should dismiss the case
as moot, vacate the opinion below, and remand for
further proceedings if necessary.
In any event, the court of appeals correctly
upheld the former statute, so if the Court does reach
the merits, it should affirm. This Court has long held
that states may treat employers based on the
workplace safety risks they create for their employees.
Mountain Timber Co., 243 U.S. at 243-46. And
Congress has waived intergovernmental immunity for
state workers’ compensation laws on federal land and
projects. 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a). This waiver authorizes
Washington to protect workers at Hanford just as it
could protect workers elsewhere. Washington
properly exercised its authority by adopting a law
tailored to the medical, safety, and employer-history
concerns presented at Hanford. Former Wash. Rev.
Code § 51.32.187(1) (2018).
24
ARGUMENT
Although the Supremacy Clause generally
prevents states from directly regulating the federal
government or applying different rules to federal
contractors than apply to others, the United States
properly concedes that the doctrine does not apply if
Congress waives intergovernmental immunity, as it
has done for workers’ compensation. Goodyear Atomic
Corp., 486 U.S. at 185-86; U.S. Br. 16, 22. The key
question presented here is thus the scope of the
waiver Congress adopted in 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a). The
statutory text, comparisons to other statutory
waivers, and this Court’s precedent all indicate that
§ 3172(a) is best read as a complete waiver of
intergovernmental immunity, authorizing application
of Washington’s former law at Hanford.
Ultimately, however, there is no need for this
Court to resolve the precise scope of the waiver in
§ 3172(a), because Washington has now repealed and
replaced the portions of Washington law to which the
federal government objected. This renders this case
moot.
A.
The State Has Repealed and Replaced the
Challenged Law, so the Court Should
Vacate and Remand Based on Mootness or
Prudential Considerations
The statutory provisions that formed the basis
for the federal government’s lawsuit no longer exist,
and the Court can no longer provide any relief by
25
invalidating the former law. The case is thus moot,
and the Court would be providing a purely advisory
opinion if it answered the now hypothetical question
presented. Even if the case were not technically moot,
prudential considerations would strongly counsel
against issuing a constitutional ruling that would
have no effect on any existing law. The Court should
vacate the decision below and remand for the district
court to consider whether the government has any
residual claims.
When circumstances change while an appeal is
pending that prevent the Court from providing
effective relief, the case becomes moot. Lewis v. Cont’l
Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990). To
nevertheless decide the case would be to issue an
“advisory opinion[] on abstract propositions of law.”
Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969) (per curiam). This
Court therefore routinely dismisses cases as moot or
remands for consideration of any remaining claims
where an intervening change in the law makes
answering the question presented meaningless. See,
e.g., New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of
New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (dismissing because
city rule restricting transport of firearms was
rescinded and state statute enacted prohibiting such
rules); United States v. Microsoft, 138 S. Ct. 1186,
1188 (2018) (per curiam) (dismissing because
legislation enacted after oral argument had
terminated the parties’ dispute “over the issue with
respect to which certiorari was granted”); Bowen v.
Kizer, 485 U.S. 386, 387 (1988) (per curiam)
(dismissing because legislation enacted after case was
argued mooted the case); U.S. Dep’t of Justice v.
Provenzano, 469 U.S. 14, 15-16 (1984) (per curiam)
26
(dismissing as moot based on intervening change in
law); United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor
& Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1984)
(same); Diffenderfer v. Cent. Baptist Church, 404 U.S.
412, 414 (1972) (per curiam) (same).
Here, enactment of S.B. 5890 renders this case
moot. The federal government sought only declaratory
and injunctive relief—no damages—invalidating
H.B. 1723. The central premise of its argument and
the question presented to this Court was that
Washington could not adopt a workers’ compensation
law that applied only to federal contract employees at
a federal facility. See U.S. Br. I; J.A. 28-40. But the
government repeatedly acknowledged that the State
could apply workers’ compensation laws to federal
facilities that also apply elsewhere. E.g., U.S. Br.
32-33 (“States may extend to federal lands and
facilities the same workers’ compensation provisions
that apply to similarly situated non-federal
premises.”). The State has now repealed and replaced
the portion of the former law that limited its coverage
to Hanford and to employees of federal contractors.
The new law instead applies to anyone who works at
a “[r]adiological hazardous waste facility,” defined as
“any structure and its lands where” certain
radioactive wastes are stored or disposed. S.B. 5890
§ 1(1)(b). The federal government agrees that S.B.
5890 uses a “completely different” coverage formula
than the prior law, and that any legal challenge to the
new law would raise different issues and require
development of a different record, so this Court should
not opine on S.B. 5890. Opp. Sugg. Mootness at 13, 17.
27
Thus, the key feature of the law the United
States sought to invalidate no longer exists, and
ruling on the merits of the prior statute would have
no impact on Washington’s law or any other law going
forward. It would be a purely “advisory opinion[] on
abstract propositions of law.” Hall, 396 U.S. at 48.
The
government
erroneously
contends,
however, that this case is not technically moot
because invalidating H.B. 1723 could entitle it to
refunds from a small group of Washingtonians whose
claims for benefits under the old law were approved
but are still on appeal. Opp. Sugg. Mootness at 11-12.
There are fewer than 70 such claims, and in any event,
any claim that was allowed under H.B. 1723 would
also be allowed under S.B. 5890, so even as to this
small number, invalidating the prior law will have no
impact. Reply Supporting Mootness 4-9.
The government claims that some “relatively
low” number of claims allowed under H.B. 1723 might
be denied under S.B. 5890, Opp. Sugg. Mootness at 14,
but as the State has detailed at length in its Reply in
Support of Suggestion of Mootness, that is legally and
factually incorrect. The plain language of S.B. 5890’s
coverage definition extends to all parts of Hanford
covered by H.B. 1723, and L&I, the state agency that
drafted S.B. 5890 and will implement it, interprets
the statute to cover all workers at Hanford who were
covered under H.B. 1723. In Washington “[a] court
must give great weight to the statute’s interpretation
by the agency which is charged with its
administration, absent a compelling indication that
such interpretation conflicts with the legislative
intent.” Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wash. 2d 97,
922 P.2d 43, 50 (1996).
28
This Court should thus follow its regular
practice when a change in law moots a case and
“vacate the judgment and remand for further
proceedings in which the parties may, if necessary,
amend their pleadings or develop the record more
fully.” Lewis, 494 U.S. at 482 (citations omitted).
Even if S.B. 5890 somehow failed to render this
case completely moot, the Court should still vacate the
lower court decision and remand for further
proceedings to “conserve[] the scarce resources of this
Court.” Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996)
(per curiam). The federal government agrees that
“vacating and remanding would be a reasonable
approach here,” but it urges the Court to decide the
case anyway. Opp. Sugg. Mootness at 18. Its reasons
are unpersuasive.
The government first claims that the Court
should hear argument and issue a constitutional
ruling because of the “concrete significance” of the
impacts of such a ruling. Id. But the outermost limit
of the practical impact the government can claim is its
potential ability to recoup or avoid somewhere
between $17 and $37 million worth of payments to
sick workers. Id. at 11. Given that the government
expects to spend at least $8 million every day for the
next 50 years cleaning up the Hanford site, supra n.6,
this claim provides no justification for the Court to
spend its time resolving this case. And the
government’s estimate of how much it might save is
wildly overstated because it assumes that none of the
claims allowed under H.B. 1723 would be allowed
under S.B. 5890, when in fact all of them would be.
29
The United States also contends that review is
warranted here despite its limited practical impact
because the State allegedly brought about the
intervening change in law to insulate a favorable
decision from the Court’s review while continuing to
subject the United States to the same harm. Opp.
Suggestion Mootness 19. This argument is doubly
wrong. First, the State is not insulating anything from
review because the State is asking this Court to vacate
the lower courts’ decisions on mootness or prudential
grounds; no “favorable decision” would survive.
Second, S.B. 5890 does not subject the United States
to the same harm it alleged from H.B. 1723. The
“harm” alleged in this case, from the United States’
initial complaint through its petition and briefing to
this Court, was “a state workers’ compensation law
that applies exclusively to federal contract workers.”
J.A. 38; U.S. Br. I (emphasis added). The United
States has repeatedly conceded that Washington
could instead adopt a law that turned on working at a
particular type of facility, whether on federal land or
not, see, e.g., Pet. 13, 16, 18, which is exactly what
Washington has now done. Thus, while the United
States may object to the new law, the harm it alleges
is not the same. As the United States concedes
elsewhere, any challenge to the new law would “raise
different issues and require development of a different
record.” Opp. Suggestion Mootness 17.
In short, this case is moot, but even if it were
not, the miniscule stakes alleged by the government
here would not warrant this Court’s issuance of a
constitutional ruling. The Court should vacate the
lower court rulings and remand to the district court.
30
B.
40 U.S.C. § 3172(a) Completely Waives
Intergovernmental Immunity, Allowing
States to Regulate Workers’ Compensation on Federal Lands and Projects As if
They Were Under Exclusive State
Jurisdiction
There is no dispute between the parties that
§ 3172(a) waives intergovernmental immunity as to
state workers’ compensation laws. The central
question for this Court is whether § 3172(a) effects a
complete or a partial waiver of such immunity. The
federal government offers an ever-changing array of
theories about how Congress supposedly intended to
limit § 3172(a)’s waiver. But all signs here—the
sweeping scope of the statutory text, the contrast of
its language with partial waivers enacted around the
same time, and this Court’s prior interpretations of
the unambiguous statutory language—point to the
same conclusion: Congress completely waived
immunity as to state workers’ compensation laws for
federal land and projects. Thus, if this Court does not
dismiss this case as moot, it should uphold H.B. 1723
as falling within Congress’s broad waiver of
intergovernmental immunity in § 3172(a).
1.
The text of Section 3172(a) supports
the State’s reading
The plain text of 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a) effects a
total waiver of intergovernmental immunity as to
state workers’ compensation laws on federal land and
projects. The government disputes this plain reading
only by relying on words not found in the text and
taking statutory language out of context.
31
The waiver’s language is sweeping:
The state authority charged with
enforcing and requiring compliance with the
state workers’ compensation laws . . . may
apply the laws to all land and premises
in the State which the Federal Government
owns or holds by deed or act of cession, and
to all projects, buildings, constructions,
improvements, and property in the State and
belonging to the Government, in the same way
and to the same extent as if the premises were
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State in
which the land, premises, projects, buildings,
constructions, improvements, or property are
located.
40 U.S.C. § 3172(a). Thus, the waiver gives states
authority to regulate federal projects “in the same way
and to the same extent as if the premises were under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the State[.]” The plain
meaning of this language, as the lower court held, is
that it “removes federal jurisdiction as a barrier to a
state’s authority over workers’ compensation laws[.]”
Pet. App. 72a.
Several features support this reading. First,
the waiver is written based on what the State could do
under its “exclusive jurisdiction.” That is an expansive
term clearly designed to waive intergovernmental
immunity, because “exclusive jurisdiction” means
more than just ownership; it means full regulatory
authority. This interpretation is supported by
precedent and contemporary dictionaries. Webster’s
Dictionary from 1934, for example, defines “jurisdiction,” as relevant here, as: “authority of a sovereign
32
power to govern or legislate; power or right to exercise
authority; control.” Jurisdiction, Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language (1936).
The term “exclusive” was similarly defined as “excluding or having the power to exclude,” while “exclude”
means “to refuse participation, enjoyment, consideration or inclusion.” Id. (exclusive, exclude). Case law
from the same time period applied the same understanding: exclusive jurisdiction meant complete authority to regulate, not just ownership. See, e.g., Murray,
291 U.S. 319 (after effective date of the state’s cession
of land, the “jurisdiction of the federal government
was exclusive” and “laws subsequently enacted by the
state were ineffective in the navy yard”; North
Dakota, 495 U.S. at 435 (plurality opinion) (citing
cases recognizing that states have no jurisdiction to
tax or regulate liquor sales on military bases under
“exclusive federal jurisdiction”) (case omitted);
Atkinson v. State Tax Comm’n of Oregon, 303 U.S. 20,
23-25 (1938) (distinguishing federal ownership of land
from “exclusive jurisdiction” over that land).
The idea that the federal government would
retain some degree of immunity from state regulation
on land under the state’s “exclusive jurisdiction” is
irreconcilable with the plain meaning and judicial
construction of that term. The federal intention to
entirely waive jurisdiction as to workers’
compensation is confirmed by § 3172(b), which
specifies that: “The Government under this section
does not relinquish its jurisdiction for any other
purpose.” (Emphasis added.) That phrasing only
makes sense if the government has relinquished its
jurisdiction for some purpose, namely as to workers’
compensation.
33
The relinquishment of federal “jurisdiction”
and grant of “exclusive jurisdiction of the State” is
particularly telling because, from its origins,
intergovernmental immunity has been characterized
as an incident of jurisdiction. The parties in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819), for example, characterized their respective
claims about state taxation of a federal bank on state
land as a matter of competing assertions of
jurisdiction. Id. at 342 (noting Maryland’s argument
that “the jurisdiction of the state extends over all its
territory” and the government’s competing argument
that Congress’s actions created a strong ground “to
infer a cessation of state jurisdiction”). The McCulloch
Court also framed intergovernmental immunity as an
incident of sovereignty and jurisdiction. Id. at 429 (“It
may be objected to this definition, that the power of
taxation is not confined to the people and property of
a state. It may be exercised upon every object brought
within its jurisdiction. This is true. But to what source
do we trace this right? It is obvious, that it is an
incident of sovereignty, and is co-extensive with that
to which it is an incident.”).15
Another feature reflecting the breadth of
§ 3172(a)’s waiver is that it waives immunity over
federal land and projects “as if the premises were
15 See also, e.g., Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113, 123 (1870),
overruled in part by Graves v. People of State of New York ex rel.
O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) (invalidating federal tax on state
judicial officer as violating intergovernmental immunity,
reasoning: “ ‘If the right to impose the tax exists, it is a right
which, in its nature, acknowledges no limits. It may be carried to
any extent within the jurisdiction of the State . . . .’ ” (quoting
Weston v. City of Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Peters) 449, 466 (1829))).
34
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State”
(emphasis added). “As if” presupposes a hypothetical
situation: it means “as it would be if // it was as if he
had lost his last friend.”16 The statutory language is
thus explicitly framed in the hypothetical: states may
apply their workers compensation laws to federal
premises “as it would be if” those premises were under
the states’ exclusive jurisdiction. It is hard to imagine
a clearer attempt to give states full regulatory
authority over workers’ compensation on federal
land. Indeed, as detailed below, the state is
unaware of any other federal waiver statute that
grants states authority “as if” the federal premises
were under exclusive state jurisdiction. See infra
p. 41-43.
The straightforward meaning of this statutory
language effectuates a complete waiver of
intergovernmental immunity as to workers’
compensation on federal lands or projects. As the
court of appeals explained, § 3172(a) “permits the
States to apply workers’ compensations laws to
federal land located in the state, without limitation.”
Pet. App. 73a-74a.
The federal government critiques this plain
reading, but its arguments focus more on the
imagined consequences of a complete waiver of
immunity than on the statute’s plain language.
To begin, the government argues that the plain
reading adopted by the court of appeals ignores the
statutory phrase “in the same way and to the same
16 As if, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/as%20if (last visited Mar. 22, 2022).
35
extent,” but that is incorrect. U.S. Br. 38-39. The
statute says that the State may regulate “in the same
way and to the same extent as if the premises were
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State[.]”
40 U.S.C. § 3172(a). This language makes clear that
the State’s power is identical—no more and no less—
to what it would be on premises under the State’s
exclusive jurisdiction. The government suggests that
this language must mean something else. It claims
that the phrase means that a “state workers’
compensation provision that applies to construction
workers on private or state-owned sites can be applied
‘in the same way and to the same extent’ to
construction workers at a federally owned site.” U.S.
Br. 32. But “in the same way and to the same extent”
does not reference how states treat other workers; it
references how states could regulate under their
“exclusive jurisdiction.” This is markedly different
from other waiver statutes, which explicitly reference
how states actually regulate others. See, e.g.,
49 U.S.C. § 5126(a) (providing that “person[s] under
contract with” the federal government to transport
hazardous materials are subject to state regulation “in
the same way and to the same extent that any person”
is regulated); infra p. 41-43.
The federal government also insists repeatedly
that § 3172(a) prohibits regulations on federal land
that differ from those on state or private land, U.S. Br.
16, 32-33, but that is not what the statute says. When
Congress wants to prohibit stricter state regulation on
federal land, it knows exactly how to say so, and it has
in many other waiver statutes detailed below.
See infra p. 41-43. It did not do so here. As the court
of appeals correctly held: “[t]he plain text of
36
§ 3172 does not purport to limit the workers’
compensation
laws
for
which
it
waives
intergovernmental immunity to only those that are
‘generally applicable.’” Pet. App. 68a.
The government also argues that the statute’s
header supports its interpretation, but “the heading of
a section cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.”
Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 331
U.S. 519, 529 (1947). And the header language does
not support the government’s interpretation in any
event. The header states: “Extension of state workers’
compensation laws to buildings, works, and property
of the Federal Government.” U.S. Br. 32. The
government argues that the use of the word
“extension” implies that the “provisions also apply
elsewhere in the State.” U.S. Br. 32. But in stating
that § 3172(a) results in an “extension” of such laws,
the header merely states the obvious: before
enactment of § 3172(a), state workers’ compensation
laws did not apply to “buildings, works, and property
of the Federal Government[,]” and after enactment of
the statute, they do. 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a). This
language cannot support the weight the government
puts on it.
Unhappy with § 3172(a)’s broad text, the
federal government tries to limit its meaning by
claiming that the statute’s legislative history
indicates that it was directed solely to “address
problems of territorial jurisdiction” and simply
applied to federal land the same intergovernmental
immunity rules that applied elsewhere. U.S. Br. 40.
But this reading makes no sense. According to the
government, before the “late 1930s,” intergovernmental immunity was “understood to bar States from
37
imposing any tax or regulation” on federal contractors
even outside federal land. U.S. Br. 20-21 (citing
United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 459460 (1977)). According to the cases cited, this rule
began to change in 1937 to allow application of
nondiscriminatory state taxes to federal contractors.
County of Fresno, 429 U.S. at 459-460.17 But Congress
first enacted the materially identical predecessor to
§ 3172(a) in 1936, before this rule had changed. Thus,
on the government’s own telling, in 1936 states could
not regulate federal contractors at all, even on a
nondiscriminatory basis, outside federal land. If the
government were correct that Congress’s intent was
to allow states to regulate on federal land just as they
could on state land, the waiver would have done
nothing at all, because it would simply have extended
the complete immunity of federal contractors on nonfederal land onto federal land. That is nonsensical.
The much more plausible reading of the history is that
Congress intended to completely waive federal
immunity from state workers’ compensation laws on
federal land and projects.
Another problem with the government’s
version of the legislative history is that it understates
the breadth of § 3172(a)’s language. The actual
language of the waiver applies not just to “all land and
premises in the State which the Federal Government
owns or holds by deed or act of cession,” but also to “all
17 See also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 506
(1988) (before late 1930s, courts viewed “any tax on income a
party received under a contract with the government [as] a tax
on the contract and thus a tax ‘on’ the government because it
burdened the government’s power to enter into the contract ”).
38
projects, buildings, constructions, improvements, and
property in the State and belonging to the
Government.” § 3172 (emphasis added). This is
consistent with Congress’s goal of protecting laborers
“on projects, buildings, constructions, improvements,
and property wherever situated belonging to the
United States of America.” C.A.9.SER 365-66 (Senate
Report, Rep. No. 74-2294, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936))
(emphasis added). The text of the waiver thus extends
to federal projects outside of federal enclaves. Thus,
whenever immunity
applies to
government
contractors as a result of work on federal lands or
federal projects, § 3172 will apply.
In a last ditch effort to critique the court of
appeals’ reasoning, the government demands that this
Court accept any “plausible” interpretation of the
statute that avoids a complete waiver of immunity.
U.S. Br. 36-37. But as this Court held in Goodyear in
rejecting what the government claimed was a
“plausible” reading, any interpretation of § 3172(a)
must still be “squared with the statute’s language and
history.” Goodyear Atomic Corp., 486 U.S. at 183. As
in Goodyear, the government’s interpretation here
cannot be squared with § 3172(a)’s language or
history.
The federal government’s reading of § 3172(a)
is not plausible or even internally consistent. The
government claims that the statute “authoriz[es] state
officials to apply their workers’ compensation laws to
federal land and facilities if—but only if—they
apply those laws ‘in the same way and to the
same extent,’ 40 U.S.C. 3172(a), to other areas of the
39
State.” U.S. Br. 33. There are at least three problems
with this interpretation.
First, this reading adds words to § 3172(a) and
ignores words in the statute. Section 3172(a) says that
states may apply workers’ compensation laws to
federal land and projects “in the same way and to the
same extent as if the premises were under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the State[.]” 40 U.S.C.
§ 3172(a). Unlike many other waiver statutes, supra
p. 41-43, this language conspicuously does not say
state laws can apply “in the same way and to the same
extent as” they apply elsewhere. Nothing in this text
requires the state law actually to “apply in other areas
of the State,” U.S. Br. 32-33, and the Court should not
add such terms to the statute. 62 Cases of Jam v.
United States, 340 U.S. 593, 596 (1951) (court does not
add to statute). Here, unlike in other waiver statutes,
the “same way and same extent” language refers not
to how the State regulates elsewhere, but to what the
State could do if the federal land or project “were
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State.” By
insisting that § 3172(a) only allows laws that actually
apply elsewhere, the government also ignores the
phrase “as if,” which presupposes a hypothetical
comparison as detailed above. Supra p. 33-34. And by
claiming that the federal government retains federal
jurisdiction to assert immunity, the United States
reads the word “exclusive” entirely out of the statute.
Because the government’s interpretation adds to and
omits key words in § 3172(a)’s text, the Court should
reject it. See 62 Cases of Jam, 340 U.S. at 596.
Second, the government elsewhere has
conceded that § 3172(a) allows state workers’
40
compensation laws even if they apply only on federal
land. For example, the government has conceded that
“if a State has a special workers’ compensation
provision for employees who perform particularly
hazardous duties, that provision could be applied to
federal contract workers who perform those duties at
the federal facility.” Pet. 18 (citation omitted). So, for
example, Washington could adopt a workers’
compensation law or regulations that applied only to
workers directly involved in the dangerous task of
emptying tanks containing high-level radioactive
waste. Such a law would apply only to federal
contractors at Hanford, yet the United States
concedes it would be allowed under § 3172(a). Pet. 18.
Finally, the government’s reading would lead to
bizarre results Congress could not have intended. For
example, under the government’s theory, if a state
enacted special workers’ compensation protections for
workers engaged in shipbuilding, applying that law to
private employees on federal land (such as a Navy
base) would be perfectly fine if there was some other
shipbuilding facility in the state on non-federal land.
But if that private facility closed, so that the law no
longer applied to anyone outside federal land, the
state law would suddenly violate § 3172(a). That
makes no sense.
In sum, the government’s reading of § 3172(a)
ignores the statute’s text. The court of appeals’
faithful reading of that text should be affirmed.
41
2.
Comparing Section 3172 to other
waivers of immunity supports the
State’s reading
The flaws in the government’s textual
arguments are put into sharper relief by comparing
§ 3172’s broad waiver language to the far narrower
language Congress has used when it intends to grant
only a partial waiver of intergovernmental immunity.
Congress has used many approaches to indicate when
it intended to grant only partial immunity, but it used
none here.
For example, shortly after Congress enacted
the precursor statute to § 3172 in 1936, Congress
passed a partial waiver of intergovernmental
immunity as to state taxation of federal officers. Davis
v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 808
(1989). That waiver provided:
The United States consents to the taxation of
pay or compensation for personal service as an
officer or employee of the United States ... by a
duly constituted taxing authority having
jurisdiction, if the taxation does not
discriminate against the officer or employee
because of the source of the pay or
compensation.
Id. (citing 4 U.S.C. § 111) (emphasis added). This
unquestionably partial waiver of intergovernmental
immunity, unlike § 3172, used precise and narrow
language and explicitly forbade differential treatment
of federal officers or employees. Id. One of the primary
cases on which the government relies, Dawson v.
Steager, 139 S. Ct. 698 (2019), analyzed this partial
statutory waiver. This analysis is inapposite here.
42
Other partial waivers of immunity are
similarly explicit. For example, in the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 to 9675,
Congress provided that on federal land state laws
“shall not apply to the extent a State law would apply
any standard or requirement to [federal] facilities
which is more stringent than the standards and
requirements applicable to facilities which are not”
federal. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4). This waiver explicitly
forbids states from imposing more stringent laws on
federal land than on other land.
Even
where
federal
statutes
waive
intergovernmental immunity by giving states
authority to regulate federal land “in the same
manner and to the same extent” that states regulate
others, the waiver statutes omit the key feature of
§ 3172(a)’s language: “as if the premises were under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the State.” The court of
appeals identified numerous such statutes. Pet. App.
70a-71a. For example, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 to 6992k, allows
states to enforce their hazardous waste management
plans on federal agencies only if a state regulates the
agency “in the same manner, and to the same extent,
as any person is subject to such requirements.”
42 U.S.C. § 6961(a). The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401 to 7515, likewise, provides that a federal
facility “shall be subject to, and comply with, all
Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements . . .
respecting the control and abatement of air pollution
in the same manner, and to the same extent as any
nongovernmental entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a).
Similarly, 49 U.S.C. § 5126(a) provides that “person[s]
43
under contract with” the federal government to
transport hazardous materials are subject to state
regulation “in the same way and to the same extent
that any person” is regulated, and 16 U.S.C. § 835c1(b) authorizes state taxation of lands acquired by the
United States as part of the Columbia Basin Project
“in the same manner and to the same extent as
privately owned lands of like character.”
All of these waivers require states to regulate
federal land or contractors “in the same way and to
the same extent” that some other person or land is
actually regulated. But § 3172 is different: it allows
states to apply their laws “in the same way and to the
same extent as if the premises were under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the State.” 40 U.S.C.
§ 3172(a).
The federal government downplays the stark
contrast of § 3172’s broad language with these more
limited waivers, arguing that the court below flipped
the presumption on its head by requiring an express
retention of intergovernmental immunity rather than
an express waiver. But this is sleight of hand. The
court below analyzed the very broad language of
§ 3172 and properly concluded that the limitations
argued by the government were not reflected in the
statutory text. The court cited these other statutes
simply to demonstrate that when Congress wanted to
limit its waiver of intergovernmental immunity in
ways that the government claimed it had done in
§ 3172, it knew very well how to do that. The court of
appeals properly gave effect to the complete waiver
here.
44
3.
Precedent
reading
supports
the
State’s
Decisions of this Court also support the State’s
interpretation that § 3172 entirely waives intergovernmental
immunity
for
state
workers’
compensation laws on federal land and projects.
This Court confirmed the broad scope of the
waiver in Goodyear Atomic Corp., 486 U.S. at 186.
That case involved a worker who was injured while
working for a federal contractor on federal land, and
who received an extra compensation award under an
Ohio statute providing such awards to injured
employees if their employer caused the injury by
violating state safety regulations. Id. at 176-77. The
federal government first argued that the Ohio law
amounted to a direct regulation of the federal facility,
which would be prohibited under normal principles of
intergovernmental immunity. Id. at 182. This Court
decided that it need not resolve whether the law was
equivalent to a direct regulation because even if it
were, the predecessor to § 3172 “provides the requisite
clear congressional authorization for the application
of the provision.” Id.
This initial holding, on its own, refutes the
government’s contention that § 3172 simply applies
normal rules of intergovernmental immunity to
federal land. U.S. Br. 33. If that were all § 3172 did,
then it would still prohibit direct regulation of the
federal government on federal land. U.S. Br. 16
(“the doctrine prevents direct taxation or regulation of
the federal government”); 20 (same). But this Court
held that it didn’t need to decide whether Ohio’s law
was equivalent to direct regulation, because even if it
45
was, § 3172 “provides the requisite clear congressional
authorization for the application of” state law.
Goodyear Atomic Corp., 486 U.S. at 182.
That is not the only key holding of Goodyear.
The federal government’s second argument in the case
was that § 3172 waived intergovernmental immunity
only for “typical [no fault] workers’ compensation”
laws, and that Ohio’s special workers’ compensation
law thus could not be applied to federal lands. Id. at
183. This Court disagreed, holding that whether
Ohio’s law was “typical” made no difference because
§ 3172 “place[d] no express limitation on the type of
workers’ compensation scheme that is authorized.”
Id. at 183-84. This runs directly counter to the
government’s contention that § 3172 allows
application only of workers’ compensation laws that
apply to “similarly situated non-federal premises.”
U.S. Br. 32.
The government cites passages from Goodyear
out of context to distort its core holding. In the context
of Ohio’s law, which applied to all facilities in Ohio,
the Court noted that the waiver “compels the same
workers’ compensation award for an employee injured
at a federally owned facility as the employee would
receive if working for a wholly private facility.” Id. The
United States argues that this passage establishes a
“restriction on the types of state laws that could be
applied to federal land and facilities.” Br. 35; see also
Br. 39. But it does no such thing. The Goodyear Court
had no reason to decide whether the waiver statute
forbids state workers’ compensation laws tailored to
special hazards at a federal worksite, because no such
law was before the Court. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821) (explaining
46
that only “[t]he question actually before the Court
[was] investigated with care, and considered in its full
extent”). As the court of appeals explained in rejecting
this argument: “the Court considered there a state
workers’ compensation law that did not concern a
particular employer, or a particular site located in the
state, like HB 1723 does” and it “did not purport to
impose the limitation on the statute that the United
States seeks to impose here.” Pet. App. 68a.
Nor do other decisions of this Court compel a
different result. The United States cites several cases
about intergovernmental immunity, but most did not
involve a waiver of intergovernmental immunity at
all, or involved waivers that explicitly barred
differential treatment of the federal government or
federal officers. Br. 19-22 (citing North Dakota,
495 U.S. at 435 (plurality opinion) (no waiver statute);
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 523 (1988) (no
waiver statute); Washington v. United States,
460 U.S. 536, 546 (1983) (no waiver statute); Memphis
Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S. 392, 398 (1983)
(partial tax waiver barring discriminatory treatment);
United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452,
459-60 (1977) (no waiver statute); Hancock v. Train,
426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976) (Clean Air Act partial
waiver); Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Indep. Sch.
Dist., 361 U.S. 376, 387 (1960) (no waiver statute);
Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 447 (1943) (no
waiver statute); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)) (no waiver statute). These
cases are inapposite.
47
4.
The government’s concerns about
the purported consequences of
the lower court’s ruling are
overblown
This Court should also reject the government’s
speculation about the consequences of a complete
waiver of intergovernmental immunity as a pretense
for ignoring the plain language of § 3172. The
statutory text is controlling. Demarest v. Manspeaker,
498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991) (when text of statute is
unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete”).
In any case, the government’s prognostications
about such consequences are overblown. The
waiver does not grant states carte blanche on several
levels.
First, the waiver is narrowly limited to
state workers’ compensation laws and only to
compensate workers injured on federal lands and
projects.
Second, if a state workers’ compensation law
conflicted with a federal statute or interfered with a
federal objective, the federal government could argue
preemption, as it often does in intergovernmentalimmunity cases, such as Goodyear Atomic Corp., 486
U.S. at 177-78, and North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 440.
The government has made no such argument here, see
Pet. App. 75a, presumably because the government
concluded that it could not show that H.B. 1723 would
48
interfere with federal objectives. On the contrary, by
motivating contractors to create a safer work
environment, H.B. 1723 furthers federal safety
objectives. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
464 U.S. 238, 257 (1984) (holding state law
authorizing punitive damages was not preempted by
the federal remedial scheme governing nuclear power
plants as both sought to protect the public); J.A. 29
(“DOE’s top priority in conducting its cleanup
operations at Hanford is ensuring the health and
safety of its federal and contractor workforce”).
Finally, as this Court has recognized, Congress
always has the authority to limit states’ ability to
regulate. Thus, arguing that state rules will increase
costs in a way that “make it difficult or impossible” for
the federal government to obtain a service it needs
“ignores the power of Congress to protect the
performance of the functions of the national
government.” James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309
U.S. 94, 104 (1940).
C.
Washington’s Prior Law Complied with
40 U.S.C. § 3172
This Court has made clear that, as to land
within their exclusive jurisdiction, states can tailor
workers’ compensation laws in any rational way based
on the dangers posed by particular jobs, worksites, or
employers. Because § 3172 waives immunity and
allows state regulation “in the same way and to the
same extent as if the premises were under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the State,” the only remaining
question is whether H.B. 1723 satisfied this standard.
It clearly did.
49
A core policy of Washington’s Industrial
Insurance Act “is to allocate the cost of workplace
injuries to the industry that produces them, thereby
motivating employers to make workplaces safer.”
Harry v. Buse Timber & Sales, Inc., 166 Wash. 2d 1,
201 P.3d 1011, 1018 (2009). This Court upheld that
policy in Mountain Timber Co., 243 U.S. at 243-46,
making clear that Washington may tailor its workers’
compensation laws to address specific hazards.
Washington thus has authority to regulate employers
and workplaces differently as long as there is a
rational basis for such treatment.
Following this established law, Washington
has adopted varying workers’ compensation rates,
regulations, and laws to address specific risks to
worker safety. As one element of this targeted
approach, Washington has adopted presumption laws
to address the unique risks faced by firefighters,
police officers, and health care workers. The United
States concedes that these laws are acceptable under
the State’s exclusive jurisdiction. Br. 27.
So too is H.B. 1723. While the United States
challenges various choices made by the legislature,
each had a reasoned basis. For example, Washington
included office workers at Hanford within the
presumption based on the extensive contamination at
the site and scientific reports showing that office
workers suffered toxic exposures. J.A. 199-200.
Washington did not include state inspectors because
50
there was no evidence that they had suffered any
adverse health consequences or that their employers
had failed to provide them with adequate protective
gear, unlike federal contractors. See, e.g., J.A. 166-68.
The law did not cover nearby private companies
because they do not handle the type of high-level
waste pervasive at Hanford. J.A. 194-96. The United
States argues that a worker who has spent only one
shift at Hanford does not face the risk of “a worker
who spends a career in an occupation like mining,
milling, or refining.” U.S. Br. 28. But it provided no
evidence to rebut the expert testimony from the
State’s top workplace safety official that Hanford
“presents a unique set of very hazardous conditions to
Washington workers characterized by the presence of
quantities and types of hazardous substances found
nowhere else in Washington.” J.A. 130. And in any
event, the problem H.B. 1723 addressed was not
merely Hanford’s unique dangers, but also the unique
difficulty Hanford workers have had in recovering
workers’ compensation. See infra p. 10.
The decisions challenged by the federal
government are legislative choices entitled to
deference, and the United States has never argued
that the decisions lack a rational basis. Pet. App. 74a75a. Even if evidence suggested that conditions
warranted extension of the law to additional areas or
employers, “reform may take one step at a time,
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which
51
seems most acute to the legislative mind.” Williamson
v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489
(1955).
The government argues that “[e]ven if there
were sound reasons to believe that federal contract
workers at the Hanford site face greater job-related
dangers than typical employees, the State of
Washington cannot permissibly use affiliation with
the federal government as a ‘proxy’ for exposure to
such hazards.” Br. 27 (citing Dawson, 139 S. Ct. at
706).
But
this
argument
assumed
that
intergovernmental immunity applies. It does not; it
was waived. Washington may therefore regulate in
the best way it sees fit to address the hazardous
conditions within the bounds of Due Process and
Equal Protection. Pet. App. 74a-75a. And given that
virtually all Hanford workers are employed by private
companies who have contracted with the federal
government, it was perfectly reasonable to use that
status as a “proxy” for those the State wanted to
protect.
Similarly flawed is the government’s argument
that H.B. 1723 was invalid even under the State’s
reading of § 3172. U.S. Br. 39-40. The government
claims that under the State’s interpretation,
§ 3172 would only allow the State to regulate on
federal land in the same way that intergovernmental
immunity allows the State to regulate elsewhere.
There are two problems with this argument. First,
§ 3172 didn’t just import intergovernmental immunity
rules to federal land, it completely waived immunity.
As noted above, the government’s contrary theory
52
would mean that when Congress first waived
immunity in 1936, it actually wasn’t waiving
immunity at all, because States could not regulate
federal contractors even outside of federal land. Infra
p. 36-37. And second, § 3172 waives immunity not
only on federal land, but also on federal “projects,” as
detailed above, so the waiver would apply to federal
projects outside federal land. Infra p. 36-37. Thus,
§ 3172 fully waived immunity as to workers’
compensation on federal land and projects, and the
government has conceded at every stage of this case
that absent immunity, H.B. 1723 would be valid. See,
e.g., Pet. App. 73a.
Even absent a waiver, outside of federal land a
federal contract is not a magic wand allowing
employers to escape workers’ compensation laws. As
discussed above, many Washington employers—from
Boeing to Amazon—contract with the federal
government. If one of these companies had a
particularly dangerous worksite on land “under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the State,” 40 U.S.C.
§ 3172(a), the State could unquestionably adopt a law
specifying that certain injuries or illnesses at the site
were presumptively work-related. See Mountain
Timber Co., 243 U.S. 219. Under § 3172, if the
company then leased space on federal property and
moved the worksite there, the State could still “apply
the law[] . . . in the same way and to the same extent
as if the premises were under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the State[.]”
In short, “§ 3172 removes federal jurisdiction as
a barrier to a state’s authority over workers’
53
compensation laws for all who are located in
the state.” Pet. App. 72a. With that barrier
removed, H.B. 1723 was a valid exercise of the State’s
authority.
D.
Though the Court Should Not Evaluate
Washington’s Revised Law in the First
Instance, the New Law Clearly Complies
with 40 U.S.C. § 3172
The State and the federal government
agree that “‘[t]his Court should not evaluate
Washington’s new law in the first instance.’”
Opp. Suggestion Mootness 17 (quoting Suggestion
of Mootness 2). As the federal government concedes,
if it decides to challenge Washington’s revised law,
such a challenge would raise different issues and
require different evidence than was presented here.
Id.
If the Court nonetheless decides to opine about
S.B. 5890, the law is clearly valid under any
interpretation of § 3172. S.B. 5890 applies to
companies on both federal and non-federal land,
supra n. 14, and it applies without regard to whether
an employer contracts with the federal government.
This
Court
has
held
that
even
when
intergovernmental immunity applies, it allows state
regulation “imposed on some basis unrelated to the
object’s status as a Government contractor or
supplier.” North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 437-38 (plurality
54
opinion). And even on the reading of § 3172 advanced
by the federal government, the State may “extend to
federal lands and facilities the same workers’
compensation provisions that apply to similarly
situated non-federal premises.” U.S. Br. 32-33. There
is thus no basis to question the legality of S.B. 5890.
CONCLUSION
The Court should vacate the Ninth Circuit
opinion and remand to the district court on mootness
or prudential grounds; if the Court declines to do so,
then it should affirm.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
ROBERT W. FERGUSON
Attorney General
NOAH G. PURCELL
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
ANASTASIA R. SANDSTROM
Senior Counsel
PETER B. GONICK
TERA M. HEINTZ
Deputy Solicitors General
Mach 25, 2022
1125 Washington Street SE
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
360-753-6200
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.