Reply Brief — Delta Air Lines, Inc., Petitioner v. Dev Anand Oman, et al.

Supreme Court briefNov 30, 2021

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NO. 21-396

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

________________

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,

v.

Petitioner,

DEV ANAND OMAN, TODD EICHMANN, ALBERT

FLORES, AND MICHAEL LEHR,

________________

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

________________

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

________________

PAUL D. CLEMENT

Counsel of Record

GEORGE W. HICKS, JR.

JULIE M.K. SIEGAL

KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP

1301 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 389-5000

paul.clement@kirkland.com

Counsel for Petitioner

November 30, 2021

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

REPLY BRIEF ............................................................ 1

I.

The Decision Below Is Profoundly Wrong .......... 3

II. The Question Presented Is Important And

Warrants The Court’s Review In This Case ..... 10

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 13

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc.

v. Wash. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.,

859 F.App’x 181 (9th Cir. 2021) ........................ 9, 11

Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh,

887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2018)................................ 4, 5

Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc.,

3 F.4th 1127 (9th Cir. 2021) .................................. 11

BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,

517 U.S. 559 (1996).................................................. 4

Brown-Forman Distillers Corp.

v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth.,

476 U.S. 573 (1986)............................................ 5, 11

Cal. Trucking Ass’n v. Bonta,

996 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2021).................................. 12

Granholm v. Heald,

544 U.S. 460 (2005).................................................. 4

Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc.,

491 U.S. 324 (1989).................................................. 3

Hirst v. Skywest, Inc.,

910 F.3d 961 (2018) ................................................. 5

Mayer v. Ringler Assocs., Inc.,

9 F.4th 78 (2d Cir. 2021).......................................... 5

North Dakota v. Heydinger,

825 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2016).................................... 5

Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n

v. Thomas,

139 S.Ct. 2449 (2019)............................................... 4

iii

Ward v. United Airlines, Inc.,

466 P.3d 309 (Cal. 2020) ...................................... 3, 6

Ward v. United Airlines, Inc.,

986 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2021).............................. 6, 8

Statute

Cal. Lab. Code §226(i) ................................................ 6

Other Authority

Orders in Pending Cases,

595 U.S. __ (Nov. 15, 2021) ................................... 12

REPLY BRIEF

The Ninth Circuit approved California’s express

extension of its wage-and-hour laws beyond

California’s territorial jurisdiction into areas governed

by federal law and its deregulatory preferences. The

Ninth Circuit not only condoned California’s overtly

extraterritorial regulation, but blessed California’s

fashioning of a special rule for “interstate

transportation workers” who are so actively engaged

in interstate commerce that they spend only a tiny

fraction of their workweek in any one state. The Ninth

Circuit’s deeply flawed decision relies on an unduly

narrow reading of the Commerce Clause and cannot

be reconciled with this Court’s decisions precluding

such extraterritorial regulation.

Respondents do not dispute that flight attendants

are quintessential employees involved in interstate

commerce, that interstate air travel requires uniform

national rules, that federal law reflects a deregulatory

policy, or that the legal questions here are important.

They instead double down on the Ninth Circuit’s view

that the Commerce Clause poses no obstacle to

California’s expressly extraterritorial regulation here

or to any non-price regulation. But precedents of this

Court (and the majority of circuits) firmly recognize

extraterritorial regulation, price or otherwise, as

beyond the states’ authority. Respondents also insist

that extending California’s wage-and-hour laws to

flight attendants who concededly spend most of their

workweek outside of California is unproblematic

because no other state imposes conflicting regulations

on “interstate transportation workers.” But the

absence of such conflicting state laws is explained by

2

the federal policy of deregulation and constitutional

limits on extraterritorial regulation. That situation

will not persist if the Ninth Circuit’s decision stands,

as other states will follow California’s lead and impose

conflicting requirements based on competing theories

for regulating “interstate transportation workers” who

do not spend a majority of their time in any one

jurisdiction. Indeed, Washington state has already

imposed its own problematic requirements on flight

attendants with the Ninth Circuit’s approval.

The Ninth Circuit has declared an open season for

state re-regulation of interstate airlines by reading

both the Commerce Clause and Airline Deregulation

Act (ADA) unduly narrowly. Respondents complain

that Delta did not raise a distinct ADA preemption

argument below, but the Ninth Circuit’s misguided

ADA test rendered any such argument futile.

Moreover, the Commerce Clause and ADA objections

are closely related, as evidenced by Respondents’

effort to invoke the absence of conflicting state

regulations—itself a product of ADA preemption—as

defeating Delta’s Commerce Clause argument. As a

result, this case presents an excellent companion to

the pending petitions attacking the Ninth Circuit’s

ADA preemption test, which have already precipitated

a call for the Solicitor General’s views. This Court

should either grant this petition outright or, at a

minimum, hold it pending resolution of those

petitions. One way or another, however, the Ninth

Circuit’s misguided reading of the Commerce Clause

should not stand.

3

I.

The Decision Below Is Profoundly Wrong.

A. California unabashedly created a special rule

for “interstate transportation workers” and extended

“California wage and hour laws to flight attendants

who work primarily outside California’s territorial

jurisdiction.” App.10, 5; Ward v. United Airlines, Inc.,

466 P.3d 309, 321, 324 (Cal. 2020). The Ninth

Circuit’s decision embracing that rule cannot be

squared with the Commerce Clause or this Court’s

jurisprudence interpreting it.

The extension of

California’s wage-and-hour laws to interstate

transportation workers who spend the vast majority of

their workweek elsewhere violates the principles that

this Court identified in Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc.,

491 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1989). See Pet.28-31.

Respondents offer no defense of the Ninth

Circuit’s application of Healy. Instead, they contend

that California’s extraterritorial rule does not really

regulate commerce and that Healy only applies in

price-control cases. They claim “there will be no effect

on the flow of goods or people in commerce” if Delta

just does what California tells it to do. BIO.19. That

is both wrong and beside the point. California cannot

adopt a special rule for “interstate transportation

workers” designed to fill a perceived regulatory gap

created by the conceded fact that they are so

pervasively involved in interstate commercial activity

that they do not spend the majority of their workweek

in any one state, and then disclaim any effect on

interstate commerce. The whole point of California’s

special rule is to regulate interstate activity and to

extend California’s wage-and-hour laws “outside

California’s territorial jurisdiction.”

The former

4

plainly affects interstate commerce and the latter is

unconstitutional even apart from any documented

effect on interstate commerce.

Doubling down on the Ninth Circuit’s constricted

reading of Healy, Respondents insist that the

prohibition on extraterritorial regulation applies only

to price controls. BIO.19-20; App.2-3. That argument

is wrong and implicates an acknowledged circuit split.

This Court has never limited Healy to price-control

cases. See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v.

Thomas, 139 S.Ct. 2449, 2471 (2019) (citing Healy

with approval); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 487

(2005) (reaffirming that direct regulation of interstate

commerce is “generally struck down … without

further inquiry”). Indeed, this Court has recognized

that the territorial limit on state legislative authority

is not some narrow Commerce Clause doctrine, but a

fundamental tenet of our federal system. See BMW of

N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571-72 (1996)

(citing Healy).

Respondents point to three circuit court decisions

that adopt their view that Healy applies only to state

statutes that dictate the price of out-of-state goods.

BIO.22. None of those cases involved the explicit

extension of state law “outside [the state’s] territorial

jurisdiction,” let alone the fashioning of special rules

to fill a perceived gap in the regulation of “interstate

transportation workers.” Moreover, at least two

circuits have expressly rejected the argument that the

Commerce Clause prohibition on extraterritorial

legislation is limited to price regulation. See Ass’n for

Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 670 (4th Cir.

2018); North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 919

5

(8th Cir. 2016); see also Mayer v. Ringler Assocs., Inc.,

9 F.4th 78, 85 (2d Cir. 2021) (rejecting interpretation

of California Insurance Code that would extend Code

to commerce that takes place wholly outside

California’s borders). Thus, at best, Respondents have

underscored that their principal defense of the

constitutionality

of

California’s

special

extraterritorial rule for interstate transportation

workers depends on a legal proposition on which the

circuits are divided. See, e.g., Ass’n for Accessible

Meds., 887 F.3d at 670 (Maryland’s effort to limit

Healy to price regulations, “while adopted by two of

our sister circuits, is too narrow”). Resolving that

acknowledged conflict among the circuits is just

another reason to grant review. 1

B. Even apart from the virtually per se rule

against extraterritorial legislation, California’s

special rule for “interstate transportation workers”

runs afoul of the Commerce Clause because it

impermissibly burdens interstate commerce by

imposing burdens on interstate commerce that clearly

exceed the vanishingly small local benefits. See

Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor

Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986). In Ward v. United

1 Respondents suggest that the decision below is in accord with

the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hirst v. Skywest, Inc., 910 F.3d

961 (2018), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 2745 (2019), but Hirst did not

involve any comparable effort to regulate extraterritorially.

Instead, Hirst involved an effort to apply the minimum-wage

laws of the state where flight attendants were based to the hours

worked in that state. That underscores the potential for conflict

created by the decision below, which expressly extends California

law extraterritorially to non-California residents, like

Respondent Lehr, and to time worked outside California.

6

Airlines, the Ninth Circuit suggested that California

has an interest in ensuring that employees “receive

the information they need to determine whether they

have been paid correctly.” 986 F.3d 1234, 1241 (9th

Cir. 2021). But California’s interest in providing that

information to an out-of-state resident who works for

an out-of-state employer and spends over 85% of his

workweek out of state is trivial at best. Indeed, the

California Supreme Court acknowledged that

California generally does not have a sufficient

regulatory interest in an employee unless she spends

more than half her workweek in California. App.10;

see also Ward, 466 P.3d at 320. That the court

fashioned a special exception for employees who spend

all their time in interstate commerce, but a majority

of their time in no one state, underscores the

exception’s disproportionate—indeed, exclusive—

burdening of interstate commerce.

That California exempts public employees, most

of whom spend all their time within California’s

territorial jurisdiction, from Sections 204 and 226

reinforces its de minimis interest in extending those

provisions to “interstate transportation workers.”

Respondents downplay the significance of the publicemployee exemption, insisting it follows a general

presumption that state laws do not apply to

governmental agencies. BIO.24. But the Section 226

carve-out is statutory, see Cal. Lab. Code §226(i), and

California extends other provisions of its wage-andhour laws to public employees, despite the supposed

presumption. The reality is that California deems

compliance with Sections 204 and 226 of such minimal

interest that it exempted hundreds of thousands of

public employees, while the California Supreme Court

7

fashioned a special rule to extend those same

provisions in a manner that forces Delta to reconfigure

its pay practices for employees who spend only a small

fraction of their workweek in California.

Respondents insist that California “has a great

interest in regulating employment in the state.”

BIO.23. But California generally draws the line on

that interest at employees who spend a majority of

their workweek in California. That rule sensibly

reflects the notion that a state’s interest in regulating

employment is limited to those who actually work

within the territorial jurisdiction of the state. The

state’s interest in interstate transportation workers

who merely start their multi-state rotations in

California but spend the majority of their workweek

elsewhere is vanishingly small.

At the same time, the burden on interstate

commerce is substantial, especially given that the

dominant theme of the federal regime is deregulation.

The decision below requires Delta to bifurcate its

national workforce into those employees who begin

their rotations in California and everyone else, and to

continue to monitor employees to ensure they are on

the correct side of that divide. For those flight

attendants who must now receive a Californiacompliant paystub, compliance is not simply a matter

of printing information that Delta already has. Contra

BIO.2, 13-14. Delta uses four different formulas to

calculate pay, and pays on a credit-based system, not

an hourly one. App.30. Working backwards to

produce a report about hours worked at rates of pay

that do not reflect how Delta actually calculates pay

would plainly require an overhaul of Delta’s payroll

8

system, if not its entire credit-based system (not to

mention the confusion it would cause to show hourly

wages that do not correspond to the way wages are

calculated). These burdens are substantial, especially

when judged against the preference for deregulation

reflected in the ADA. While federal law leaves Delta

free to adopt pay policies (and paystubs) tailored to the

unique dynamics of interstate air travel, where flights

(and thus shifts) can be canceled and rescheduled due

to the vagaries of everything from weather to federal

restrictions on landing at particular airports,

California law imposes requirements that require

artificial calculations that ignore the unique dynamics

of a uniquely interstate industry.

C. Respondents do not dispute that the Ninth

Circuit failed to account for the distinctively federal

nature of interstate air travel. Nor could they. The

Ninth Circuit’s insistence that Sections 204 and 226

do not “regulate[] in an area that requires national

uniformity,” Ward, 986 F.3d at 1242, ignores

Congress’ contrary judgment in the ADA and this

Court’s precedents about airlines and other interstate

transportation industries. Respondents attempt to

mitigate the concern by emphasizing the absence of

conflicting obligations that effectively “prohibit”

compliance with Sections 204 and 226. BIO.15

(emphasis omitted). But the dearth of other state laws

regulating the wage statements of flight attendants

and other “interstate transportation workers” is a

product of respect for Congress’ deregulatory policies

and the prohibition on extraterritorial state

regulation. In other words, the gap in state regulation

of flight attendants who spend the majority of their

time in interstate commerce is not a void that invites

9

California’s gap-filling effort, but a reflection of a

federal policy that deliberately favors deregulation.

If the decision below is allowed to stand, there is

no reason to think that California alone will attempt

to fill the gap. Not surprisingly, the re-regulatory

impulse has already been indulged by other states

within the Ninth Circuit. Washington, for example,

has already subjected flight attendants and pilots to

sick-leave requirements, with the Ninth Circuit’s

blessing in a decision subject to another pending

petition. See Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Wash.

Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 859 F.App’x 181 (9th Cir. 2021),

petition for cert. filed, No. 21-627 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2021).

Moreover, if states are given a green light to

regulate employees who spend a majority of their

workweek in no one state, there is no reason to think

states will not adopt competing and inconsistent

regulatory footholds. For example, Respondent Lehr

is based at SFO, but lives in Nevada. Nevada could

rationally determine that its paystub regulations

apply to all state residents, with the consequence that

Lehr’s paystub would be simultaneously regulated by

California and Nevada law. Georgia, in turn, could

reasonably assert jurisdiction over the pay stubs

issued by a Georgia-based employer. With workers

spreading their time across multiple states, the

possibility for conflicting state regulations is

substantial. Congress, of course, can express a

preference for the law of a particular state and has

done so elsewhere. See Pet.24 n.1. But in this context,

Congress has expressed a preference for deregulation,

not the conflicting possibilities for re-regulation

unleashed by the decision below.

10

II. The Question Presented Is Important And

Warrants The Court’s Review In This Case.

The decision below opens the door for expressly

extraterritorial regulation of flight attendants and

pilots in contravention of both the Commerce Clause

and the deregulatory policies of the ADA. The Court

should intervene now to correct the Ninth Circuit’s

erroneous jurisprudence and to stop California from

directly regulating interstate transportation workers

who concededly spend the vast majority of their

workweek elsewhere. There is no need to wait for

further percolation, because the decision below

already conflicts with this Court’s precedents, and

Respondents’ principal defense implicates an issue

that has already divided the circuits.

That

acknowledged split on the scope of this Court’s

extraterritoriality decisions is an issue only this Court

can resolve.

This case presents a clean vehicle for resolving the

question presented. It involves a purely legal question

that was thoroughly explored in the decisions below

and is dispositive in this case. There is no doubt that

California is extending its wage-and-hour laws

extraterritorially to workers who spend the majority

of their time working outside the state. That was the

essential premise of the California Supreme Court’s

decision to apply California “wage and hour

laws … outside California’s territorial jurisdiction.”

App.5.

Respondents’ claim that more record evidence

about the burden is needed is doubly unconvincing.

See BIO.16. First, there is no need to examine the

degree of burden on interstate commerce when a state

11

avowedly regulates extraterritorially as California

has done here. E.g., Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579.

And both the burdens on Delta’s pay practices and the

virtual absence of any legitimate “local” interest in

“interstate transportation workers” who spend most of

their workweeks outside the state are obvious.

Finally, it bears emphasis that the decision below

does not stand alone, but is part of a pattern of Ninth

Circuit decisions interpreting both the Commerce

Clause and the ADA narrowly and paving the way for

substantial state re-regulation of the interstate airline

industry. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc., 3

F.4th 1127 (9th Cir. 2021), petition for cert. filed,

No. 21-260 (U.S. Aug. 19, 2021); Air Transp. Ass’n, 859

F.App’x 181. Respondents counter that the petitions

in those cases focus on ADA preemption and Delta did

not raise an independent ADA preemption argument

below. But raising such an argument below would

have been futile given the Ninth Circuit’s wellestablished narrow test for ADA preemption.

Moreover, the Commerce Clause and ADA preemption

issues are closely intertwined, as Respondents

themselves unwittingly underscore by emphasizing

that other states have yet to adopt conflicting

standards.

As noted, the explanation for that

reticence—and the resulting regulatory gap that

impelled the California Supreme Court to extend

California law extraterritorially—is the ADA and its

deregulatory preferences. In addition, the full impact

of the Ninth Circuit’s misguided analysis of state

efforts to re-regulate the interstate airline industry is

not its unduly narrow approach to extraterritoriality

or its unduly demanding requirements for ADA

preemption, but the combined effect of the two.

12

Respondents do not address, much less dispute,

the combined effect of the recent Ninth Circuit

decisions, which provide a blueprint for state

regulation of matters of national concern where the

congressional policy favors deregulation. Perceiving

obvious problems with this regime, this Court recently

called for the views of the Solicitor General in

Bernstein and California Trucking Association v.

Bonta, 996 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2021), petition for cert.

filed, No. 21-194 (U.S. Aug. 9, 2021). Orders in

Pending Cases, 595 U.S. __ (Nov. 15, 2021). At a

minimum, therefore, this Court should hold this

petition pending the Solicitor General’s response and

the Court’s disposition of those petitions. This case

could present a useful companion case so that the

Court can consider the various legal obstacles to state

efforts to re-regulate an industry Congress has chosen

to deregulate. It may be that when, as here, the state

attempts to re-regulate via avowedly extraterritorial

regulation, the Commerce Clause (and related

doctrines foreclosing extraterritorial legislation)

provides the proper remedy. On the other hand, a

broad interpretation of the ADA’s preemption

provision might preclude comparable state efforts.

But one way or another, the Ninth Circuit’s hostility

toward the deregulatory preference expressed by

federal law cannot stand.

13

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant the petition or, at a

minimum, hold the petition pending resolution of the

petitions in Bernstein and California Trucking

Association.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL D. CLEMENT

Counsel of Record

GEORGE W. HICKS, JR.

JULIE M.K. SIEGAL

KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP

1301 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 389-5000

paul.clement@kirkland.com

Counsel for Petitioner

November 30, 2021

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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