Reply Brief — Delta Air Lines, Inc., Petitioner v. Dev Anand Oman, et al.
Supreme Court briefNov 30, 2021
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NO. 21-396
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
________________
DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,
v.
Petitioner,
DEV ANAND OMAN, TODD EICHMANN, ALBERT
FLORES, AND MICHAEL LEHR,
________________
Respondents.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
________________
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
________________
PAUL D. CLEMENT
Counsel of Record
GEORGE W. HICKS, JR.
JULIE M.K. SIEGAL
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
1301 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 389-5000
paul.clement@kirkland.com
Counsel for Petitioner
November 30, 2021
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii
REPLY BRIEF ............................................................ 1
I.
The Decision Below Is Profoundly Wrong .......... 3
II. The Question Presented Is Important And
Warrants The Court’s Review In This Case ..... 10
CONCLUSION ......................................................... 13
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc.
v. Wash. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.,
859 F.App’x 181 (9th Cir. 2021) ........................ 9, 11
Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh,
887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2018)................................ 4, 5
Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc.,
3 F.4th 1127 (9th Cir. 2021) .................................. 11
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559 (1996).................................................. 4
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp.
v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth.,
476 U.S. 573 (1986)............................................ 5, 11
Cal. Trucking Ass’n v. Bonta,
996 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2021).................................. 12
Granholm v. Heald,
544 U.S. 460 (2005).................................................. 4
Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc.,
491 U.S. 324 (1989).................................................. 3
Hirst v. Skywest, Inc.,
910 F.3d 961 (2018) ................................................. 5
Mayer v. Ringler Assocs., Inc.,
9 F.4th 78 (2d Cir. 2021).......................................... 5
North Dakota v. Heydinger,
825 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2016).................................... 5
Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n
v. Thomas,
139 S.Ct. 2449 (2019)............................................... 4
iii
Ward v. United Airlines, Inc.,
466 P.3d 309 (Cal. 2020) ...................................... 3, 6
Ward v. United Airlines, Inc.,
986 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2021).............................. 6, 8
Statute
Cal. Lab. Code §226(i) ................................................ 6
Other Authority
Orders in Pending Cases,
595 U.S. __ (Nov. 15, 2021) ................................... 12
REPLY BRIEF
The Ninth Circuit approved California’s express
extension of its wage-and-hour laws beyond
California’s territorial jurisdiction into areas governed
by federal law and its deregulatory preferences. The
Ninth Circuit not only condoned California’s overtly
extraterritorial regulation, but blessed California’s
fashioning of a special rule for “interstate
transportation workers” who are so actively engaged
in interstate commerce that they spend only a tiny
fraction of their workweek in any one state. The Ninth
Circuit’s deeply flawed decision relies on an unduly
narrow reading of the Commerce Clause and cannot
be reconciled with this Court’s decisions precluding
such extraterritorial regulation.
Respondents do not dispute that flight attendants
are quintessential employees involved in interstate
commerce, that interstate air travel requires uniform
national rules, that federal law reflects a deregulatory
policy, or that the legal questions here are important.
They instead double down on the Ninth Circuit’s view
that the Commerce Clause poses no obstacle to
California’s expressly extraterritorial regulation here
or to any non-price regulation. But precedents of this
Court (and the majority of circuits) firmly recognize
extraterritorial regulation, price or otherwise, as
beyond the states’ authority. Respondents also insist
that extending California’s wage-and-hour laws to
flight attendants who concededly spend most of their
workweek outside of California is unproblematic
because no other state imposes conflicting regulations
on “interstate transportation workers.” But the
absence of such conflicting state laws is explained by
2
the federal policy of deregulation and constitutional
limits on extraterritorial regulation. That situation
will not persist if the Ninth Circuit’s decision stands,
as other states will follow California’s lead and impose
conflicting requirements based on competing theories
for regulating “interstate transportation workers” who
do not spend a majority of their time in any one
jurisdiction. Indeed, Washington state has already
imposed its own problematic requirements on flight
attendants with the Ninth Circuit’s approval.
The Ninth Circuit has declared an open season for
state re-regulation of interstate airlines by reading
both the Commerce Clause and Airline Deregulation
Act (ADA) unduly narrowly. Respondents complain
that Delta did not raise a distinct ADA preemption
argument below, but the Ninth Circuit’s misguided
ADA test rendered any such argument futile.
Moreover, the Commerce Clause and ADA objections
are closely related, as evidenced by Respondents’
effort to invoke the absence of conflicting state
regulations—itself a product of ADA preemption—as
defeating Delta’s Commerce Clause argument. As a
result, this case presents an excellent companion to
the pending petitions attacking the Ninth Circuit’s
ADA preemption test, which have already precipitated
a call for the Solicitor General’s views. This Court
should either grant this petition outright or, at a
minimum, hold it pending resolution of those
petitions. One way or another, however, the Ninth
Circuit’s misguided reading of the Commerce Clause
should not stand.
3
I.
The Decision Below Is Profoundly Wrong.
A. California unabashedly created a special rule
for “interstate transportation workers” and extended
“California wage and hour laws to flight attendants
who work primarily outside California’s territorial
jurisdiction.” App.10, 5; Ward v. United Airlines, Inc.,
466 P.3d 309, 321, 324 (Cal. 2020). The Ninth
Circuit’s decision embracing that rule cannot be
squared with the Commerce Clause or this Court’s
jurisprudence interpreting it.
The extension of
California’s wage-and-hour laws to interstate
transportation workers who spend the vast majority of
their workweek elsewhere violates the principles that
this Court identified in Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc.,
491 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1989). See Pet.28-31.
Respondents offer no defense of the Ninth
Circuit’s application of Healy. Instead, they contend
that California’s extraterritorial rule does not really
regulate commerce and that Healy only applies in
price-control cases. They claim “there will be no effect
on the flow of goods or people in commerce” if Delta
just does what California tells it to do. BIO.19. That
is both wrong and beside the point. California cannot
adopt a special rule for “interstate transportation
workers” designed to fill a perceived regulatory gap
created by the conceded fact that they are so
pervasively involved in interstate commercial activity
that they do not spend the majority of their workweek
in any one state, and then disclaim any effect on
interstate commerce. The whole point of California’s
special rule is to regulate interstate activity and to
extend California’s wage-and-hour laws “outside
California’s territorial jurisdiction.”
The former
4
plainly affects interstate commerce and the latter is
unconstitutional even apart from any documented
effect on interstate commerce.
Doubling down on the Ninth Circuit’s constricted
reading of Healy, Respondents insist that the
prohibition on extraterritorial regulation applies only
to price controls. BIO.19-20; App.2-3. That argument
is wrong and implicates an acknowledged circuit split.
This Court has never limited Healy to price-control
cases. See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v.
Thomas, 139 S.Ct. 2449, 2471 (2019) (citing Healy
with approval); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 487
(2005) (reaffirming that direct regulation of interstate
commerce is “generally struck down … without
further inquiry”). Indeed, this Court has recognized
that the territorial limit on state legislative authority
is not some narrow Commerce Clause doctrine, but a
fundamental tenet of our federal system. See BMW of
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571-72 (1996)
(citing Healy).
Respondents point to three circuit court decisions
that adopt their view that Healy applies only to state
statutes that dictate the price of out-of-state goods.
BIO.22. None of those cases involved the explicit
extension of state law “outside [the state’s] territorial
jurisdiction,” let alone the fashioning of special rules
to fill a perceived gap in the regulation of “interstate
transportation workers.” Moreover, at least two
circuits have expressly rejected the argument that the
Commerce Clause prohibition on extraterritorial
legislation is limited to price regulation. See Ass’n for
Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 670 (4th Cir.
2018); North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 919
5
(8th Cir. 2016); see also Mayer v. Ringler Assocs., Inc.,
9 F.4th 78, 85 (2d Cir. 2021) (rejecting interpretation
of California Insurance Code that would extend Code
to commerce that takes place wholly outside
California’s borders). Thus, at best, Respondents have
underscored that their principal defense of the
constitutionality
of
California’s
special
extraterritorial rule for interstate transportation
workers depends on a legal proposition on which the
circuits are divided. See, e.g., Ass’n for Accessible
Meds., 887 F.3d at 670 (Maryland’s effort to limit
Healy to price regulations, “while adopted by two of
our sister circuits, is too narrow”). Resolving that
acknowledged conflict among the circuits is just
another reason to grant review. 1
B. Even apart from the virtually per se rule
against extraterritorial legislation, California’s
special rule for “interstate transportation workers”
runs afoul of the Commerce Clause because it
impermissibly burdens interstate commerce by
imposing burdens on interstate commerce that clearly
exceed the vanishingly small local benefits. See
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986). In Ward v. United
1 Respondents suggest that the decision below is in accord with
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hirst v. Skywest, Inc., 910 F.3d
961 (2018), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 2745 (2019), but Hirst did not
involve any comparable effort to regulate extraterritorially.
Instead, Hirst involved an effort to apply the minimum-wage
laws of the state where flight attendants were based to the hours
worked in that state. That underscores the potential for conflict
created by the decision below, which expressly extends California
law extraterritorially to non-California residents, like
Respondent Lehr, and to time worked outside California.
6
Airlines, the Ninth Circuit suggested that California
has an interest in ensuring that employees “receive
the information they need to determine whether they
have been paid correctly.” 986 F.3d 1234, 1241 (9th
Cir. 2021). But California’s interest in providing that
information to an out-of-state resident who works for
an out-of-state employer and spends over 85% of his
workweek out of state is trivial at best. Indeed, the
California Supreme Court acknowledged that
California generally does not have a sufficient
regulatory interest in an employee unless she spends
more than half her workweek in California. App.10;
see also Ward, 466 P.3d at 320. That the court
fashioned a special exception for employees who spend
all their time in interstate commerce, but a majority
of their time in no one state, underscores the
exception’s disproportionate—indeed, exclusive—
burdening of interstate commerce.
That California exempts public employees, most
of whom spend all their time within California’s
territorial jurisdiction, from Sections 204 and 226
reinforces its de minimis interest in extending those
provisions to “interstate transportation workers.”
Respondents downplay the significance of the publicemployee exemption, insisting it follows a general
presumption that state laws do not apply to
governmental agencies. BIO.24. But the Section 226
carve-out is statutory, see Cal. Lab. Code §226(i), and
California extends other provisions of its wage-andhour laws to public employees, despite the supposed
presumption. The reality is that California deems
compliance with Sections 204 and 226 of such minimal
interest that it exempted hundreds of thousands of
public employees, while the California Supreme Court
7
fashioned a special rule to extend those same
provisions in a manner that forces Delta to reconfigure
its pay practices for employees who spend only a small
fraction of their workweek in California.
Respondents insist that California “has a great
interest in regulating employment in the state.”
BIO.23. But California generally draws the line on
that interest at employees who spend a majority of
their workweek in California. That rule sensibly
reflects the notion that a state’s interest in regulating
employment is limited to those who actually work
within the territorial jurisdiction of the state. The
state’s interest in interstate transportation workers
who merely start their multi-state rotations in
California but spend the majority of their workweek
elsewhere is vanishingly small.
At the same time, the burden on interstate
commerce is substantial, especially given that the
dominant theme of the federal regime is deregulation.
The decision below requires Delta to bifurcate its
national workforce into those employees who begin
their rotations in California and everyone else, and to
continue to monitor employees to ensure they are on
the correct side of that divide. For those flight
attendants who must now receive a Californiacompliant paystub, compliance is not simply a matter
of printing information that Delta already has. Contra
BIO.2, 13-14. Delta uses four different formulas to
calculate pay, and pays on a credit-based system, not
an hourly one. App.30. Working backwards to
produce a report about hours worked at rates of pay
that do not reflect how Delta actually calculates pay
would plainly require an overhaul of Delta’s payroll
8
system, if not its entire credit-based system (not to
mention the confusion it would cause to show hourly
wages that do not correspond to the way wages are
calculated). These burdens are substantial, especially
when judged against the preference for deregulation
reflected in the ADA. While federal law leaves Delta
free to adopt pay policies (and paystubs) tailored to the
unique dynamics of interstate air travel, where flights
(and thus shifts) can be canceled and rescheduled due
to the vagaries of everything from weather to federal
restrictions on landing at particular airports,
California law imposes requirements that require
artificial calculations that ignore the unique dynamics
of a uniquely interstate industry.
C. Respondents do not dispute that the Ninth
Circuit failed to account for the distinctively federal
nature of interstate air travel. Nor could they. The
Ninth Circuit’s insistence that Sections 204 and 226
do not “regulate[] in an area that requires national
uniformity,” Ward, 986 F.3d at 1242, ignores
Congress’ contrary judgment in the ADA and this
Court’s precedents about airlines and other interstate
transportation industries. Respondents attempt to
mitigate the concern by emphasizing the absence of
conflicting obligations that effectively “prohibit”
compliance with Sections 204 and 226. BIO.15
(emphasis omitted). But the dearth of other state laws
regulating the wage statements of flight attendants
and other “interstate transportation workers” is a
product of respect for Congress’ deregulatory policies
and the prohibition on extraterritorial state
regulation. In other words, the gap in state regulation
of flight attendants who spend the majority of their
time in interstate commerce is not a void that invites
9
California’s gap-filling effort, but a reflection of a
federal policy that deliberately favors deregulation.
If the decision below is allowed to stand, there is
no reason to think that California alone will attempt
to fill the gap. Not surprisingly, the re-regulatory
impulse has already been indulged by other states
within the Ninth Circuit. Washington, for example,
has already subjected flight attendants and pilots to
sick-leave requirements, with the Ninth Circuit’s
blessing in a decision subject to another pending
petition. See Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Wash.
Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 859 F.App’x 181 (9th Cir. 2021),
petition for cert. filed, No. 21-627 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2021).
Moreover, if states are given a green light to
regulate employees who spend a majority of their
workweek in no one state, there is no reason to think
states will not adopt competing and inconsistent
regulatory footholds. For example, Respondent Lehr
is based at SFO, but lives in Nevada. Nevada could
rationally determine that its paystub regulations
apply to all state residents, with the consequence that
Lehr’s paystub would be simultaneously regulated by
California and Nevada law. Georgia, in turn, could
reasonably assert jurisdiction over the pay stubs
issued by a Georgia-based employer. With workers
spreading their time across multiple states, the
possibility for conflicting state regulations is
substantial. Congress, of course, can express a
preference for the law of a particular state and has
done so elsewhere. See Pet.24 n.1. But in this context,
Congress has expressed a preference for deregulation,
not the conflicting possibilities for re-regulation
unleashed by the decision below.
10
II. The Question Presented Is Important And
Warrants The Court’s Review In This Case.
The decision below opens the door for expressly
extraterritorial regulation of flight attendants and
pilots in contravention of both the Commerce Clause
and the deregulatory policies of the ADA. The Court
should intervene now to correct the Ninth Circuit’s
erroneous jurisprudence and to stop California from
directly regulating interstate transportation workers
who concededly spend the vast majority of their
workweek elsewhere. There is no need to wait for
further percolation, because the decision below
already conflicts with this Court’s precedents, and
Respondents’ principal defense implicates an issue
that has already divided the circuits.
That
acknowledged split on the scope of this Court’s
extraterritoriality decisions is an issue only this Court
can resolve.
This case presents a clean vehicle for resolving the
question presented. It involves a purely legal question
that was thoroughly explored in the decisions below
and is dispositive in this case. There is no doubt that
California is extending its wage-and-hour laws
extraterritorially to workers who spend the majority
of their time working outside the state. That was the
essential premise of the California Supreme Court’s
decision to apply California “wage and hour
laws … outside California’s territorial jurisdiction.”
App.5.
Respondents’ claim that more record evidence
about the burden is needed is doubly unconvincing.
See BIO.16. First, there is no need to examine the
degree of burden on interstate commerce when a state
11
avowedly regulates extraterritorially as California
has done here. E.g., Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579.
And both the burdens on Delta’s pay practices and the
virtual absence of any legitimate “local” interest in
“interstate transportation workers” who spend most of
their workweeks outside the state are obvious.
Finally, it bears emphasis that the decision below
does not stand alone, but is part of a pattern of Ninth
Circuit decisions interpreting both the Commerce
Clause and the ADA narrowly and paving the way for
substantial state re-regulation of the interstate airline
industry. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc., 3
F.4th 1127 (9th Cir. 2021), petition for cert. filed,
No. 21-260 (U.S. Aug. 19, 2021); Air Transp. Ass’n, 859
F.App’x 181. Respondents counter that the petitions
in those cases focus on ADA preemption and Delta did
not raise an independent ADA preemption argument
below. But raising such an argument below would
have been futile given the Ninth Circuit’s wellestablished narrow test for ADA preemption.
Moreover, the Commerce Clause and ADA preemption
issues are closely intertwined, as Respondents
themselves unwittingly underscore by emphasizing
that other states have yet to adopt conflicting
standards.
As noted, the explanation for that
reticence—and the resulting regulatory gap that
impelled the California Supreme Court to extend
California law extraterritorially—is the ADA and its
deregulatory preferences. In addition, the full impact
of the Ninth Circuit’s misguided analysis of state
efforts to re-regulate the interstate airline industry is
not its unduly narrow approach to extraterritoriality
or its unduly demanding requirements for ADA
preemption, but the combined effect of the two.
12
Respondents do not address, much less dispute,
the combined effect of the recent Ninth Circuit
decisions, which provide a blueprint for state
regulation of matters of national concern where the
congressional policy favors deregulation. Perceiving
obvious problems with this regime, this Court recently
called for the views of the Solicitor General in
Bernstein and California Trucking Association v.
Bonta, 996 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2021), petition for cert.
filed, No. 21-194 (U.S. Aug. 9, 2021). Orders in
Pending Cases, 595 U.S. __ (Nov. 15, 2021). At a
minimum, therefore, this Court should hold this
petition pending the Solicitor General’s response and
the Court’s disposition of those petitions. This case
could present a useful companion case so that the
Court can consider the various legal obstacles to state
efforts to re-regulate an industry Congress has chosen
to deregulate. It may be that when, as here, the state
attempts to re-regulate via avowedly extraterritorial
regulation, the Commerce Clause (and related
doctrines foreclosing extraterritorial legislation)
provides the proper remedy. On the other hand, a
broad interpretation of the ADA’s preemption
provision might preclude comparable state efforts.
But one way or another, the Ninth Circuit’s hostility
toward the deregulatory preference expressed by
federal law cannot stand.
13
CONCLUSION
The Court should grant the petition or, at a
minimum, hold the petition pending resolution of the
petitions in Bernstein and California Trucking
Association.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL D. CLEMENT
Counsel of Record
GEORGE W. HICKS, JR.
JULIE M.K. SIEGAL
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
1301 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 389-5000
paul.clement@kirkland.com
Counsel for Petitioner
November 30, 2021
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