Petition for Writ of Certiorari — John Krakowski, et al., Petitioners v. Allied Pilots Association, et al.

Supreme Court briefAug 23, 2021

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Docket No. ________

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

In re: AMR Corporation, Debtor.

JOHN KRAKOWSKI, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

ALLIED PILOTS ASSOCIATION, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Joe D. Jacobson, Counsel of Record

Allen P. Press

Jacobson Press P.C.

222 South Central Ave., Suite 550

Clayton, MO 63105

Tel: (314) 899-9790

Email: Jacobson@ArchCityLawyers.com

Attorneys for Petitioners

LEGAL PRINTERS LLC ! Washington, DC ! 202-747-2400 ! legalprinters.com

QUESTION PRESENTED

A labor union operating under the Railway Labor

Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, et seq., has the exclusive statutory authority to bargain on behalf of the employees

who are members of its collective bargaining unit. This

exclusive bargaining authority brings with it the

“statutory obligation to serve the interests of all

members without hostility or discrimination toward

any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith

and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.” Air Line

Pilots Assoc. Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 76 (1991).

This statutory obligation is called the union’s duty

of fair representation.

The question presented is:

Where a labor union imposed as part of its collective

bargaining agreement a seniority system that admittedly discriminated in bad faith against a disfavored

employee group at a time when the union owed the

disfavored employees no duty of fair representation

because it did not yet represent them, may the union

subsequently, after the duty of fair representation to

those employees has attached, agree to re-implement

the same discriminatory seniority system following

elimination of the contractual status quo by a bankruptcy court order under 11 U.S.C. § 1113 approving

the employer’s abrogation of the collective bargaining

agreement and its seniority system?

i

LIST OF PARTIES

Petitioners John Krakowski, Kevin Horner, and M.

Alicia Sikes (“Pilots”) are airline pilots. Pilots were

plaintiffs in the two adversary proceedings in the

bankruptcy court and appellants in the district court

and in the court of appeals.

Respondent American Airlines, Inc. (“American” or

“AA”), is an international airline. American was a

defendant in the adversary proceedings in bankruptcy

court and an appellee in the district court and in the

court of appeals.

Respondent Allied Pilots Association (“APA”) is an

unincorporated association and labor union that has

served as the collective bargain representative under

the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) for all pilots employed

by American at all relevant times. APA was a defendant in the adversary proceedings in bankruptcy court

and an appellee in the district court and in the court of

appeals.

Pilots were all employed by American and represented by APA during the events giving rise to this

dispute. Pilots brought the two adversary actions as

class actions on behalf of a class of similarly-situated

American pilots.

ii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pilots and the members of the putative class are all

individuals.

American is a Delaware Corporation. American is

100% owned by American Airlines Group, Inc., a

publicly-traded corporation (NASDAQ: AAL). More

than 10% of American Airlines Group’s shares are

owned by The Vanguard Group, Inc.

APA is an unincorporated association of airline

pilots employed by American.

iii

LIST OF PROCEEDINGS

In addition to the proceedings that are the subject

of this Petition for Certiorari, the following proceedings

in federal court are directly related, as that term is

defined in Rule 14(1)(b)(iii), to the case in this Court:

Allied Pilots Assoc. v. AMR Corp. (In re AMR Corp.),

471 B.R. 51, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1945, 56 Bankr. Ct.

Dec. (LRP) 102 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012), subsequent

proceeding In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. 384, 2012 Bankr.

LEXIS 3756, 194 L.R.R.M. 2035, 2012 WL 3422541

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012), subsequent proceeding In re

AMR Corp., 478 B.R. 599, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 4258, 68

Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 137 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).

In re AMR Corp., 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 4169, 194

L.R.R.M. 2152 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 5, 2012), affirmed

sub nom. Supplement B Pilot Beneficiaries v. AMR

Corp. (In re AMR Corp.), 523 B.R. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2014),

affirmed Supplement B Pilot Beneficiaries v. AMR

Corp. (In re AMR Corp.), 622 F. App’x 64, 2015 U.S.

App. LEXIS 21122 (2d Cir. 2015).

Scerba v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

175291 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2013), magistrate’s report

adopted 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45890 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.

31, 2014), affirmed 589 F. App’x 554, 2014 U.S. App.

LEXIS 18739, 201 L.R.R.M. 3215, 2014 WL 4851713

(2d Cir. 2014), writ denied 135 S. Ct. 2313, 191 L. Ed.

2d 979, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 3374, 83 U.S.L.W. 3856, 203

L.R.R.M. 3148 (2015).

There are no directly-related state court cases.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PETITION FOR WRIT

Question Presented . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

List of Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

Corporate Disclosure Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

List of Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Table of Cited Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Opinions Below. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Jurisdictional Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Statutes Involved in the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Statement of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

v

APPENDIX

Court of Appeals Decision (Feb. 1, 2021) . . . . APP-1

Dec. 2019 District Court Decision

(Krakowski II). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APP-4

Oct. 2019 District Court Decision

(Krakowski I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APP-24

June 2018 Bankruptcy Court Decision

(Krakowski I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APP-60

April 2017 Bankruptcy Court Decision

(Krakowski II). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APP-140

Sept. 22, 2015 Bankruptcy Court Decision

(Krakowski II). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APP-166

Sept. 3, 2015 Bankruptcy Court Decision

(Krakowski I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APP-190

June 2014 Bankruptcy Court Decision

(Krakowski I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APP-219

Denial of Rehearing and

Rehearing En Banc (March 24, 2021) . . . . . APP-236

45 U.S.C. § 152 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APP-238

11 U.S.C. § 1113 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APP-247

vi

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Cases

Pages

14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,

556 U.S. 247 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Air Line Pilots Assoc. Int’l v. O’Neill,

499 U.S. 65 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Baker v. Newspaper & Graphic

Communications Union,

628 F.2d 156 (D.C. 1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Bakos v. American Airlines, Inc.,

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98671 (E.D. Pa. 2017),

aff’d, 748 Fed. Appx. 468 (3d Cir. 2018) . . . . . . . . . . 9

Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass’n,

387 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . 6, 7–8, 10, 24

Bernard v. Air Line Pilots Asso., Int’l,

873 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Local 1251, UAW v. Robertshaw Controls Co.,

405 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Northwest Airlines Corp. v. Assoc. Flight

Attendants-CWA (In re Nw. Airlines Corp.),

483 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,

468 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

vii

Statutes and Rules

11 U.S.C. § 1113 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

28 U.S.C. § 158 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

28 U.S.C. § 1331 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4

28 U.S.C. § 1337 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4

28 U.S.C. § 1412 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4

29 U.S.C. §§ 151, et seq. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i, 23

45 U.S.C. §§ 151, et seq. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

45 U.S.C. § 152 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

49 U.S.C. § 42112 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Rule 4(a)(2), F.R.A.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Other Authorities

Dawson, Andrew B., Collective Bargaining

Agreements in Corporate Reorganizations,

84 Am. Bankr. L.J. 103 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24–25

Ruben, George, U.S. Bureau of Labor

Statistics, “Modest labor-management bargains

continue in 1984 despite the recovery,”

Monthly Labor Review (Jan. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

viii

Other Sources

Canadian Union of Public Employees

https: //cupe.ca/fact-sheet-two-tierbargaining-how-recognize-it-and-reject-it . . . . . . . . 29

Teamsters for a Democratic Union

https://www .tdu.org/how_two_tier_

contracts_hurt_workers_and_weaken

_unions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

United Electrical, Radio & Machine

Workers of America

https://www.ueunion.org/stw _twotier.html . . . . . 29

ix

OPINIONS BELOW

Krakowski v. Allied Pilots Association., 834 Fed.

Appx. 660, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 2644, 2021 WL

319443, Appeal Nos. 19-3506 (L), 19-4378 (CON) (2d

Cir. Feb. 1, 2021), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied Doc.

No. 156 (March 24, 2021).

Krakowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 610 B.R. 714,

2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218479, 2019 WL 6879517, Case

No. 17-CV-03237 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2019) (“Krakowski

II”).

Krakowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 610 B.R. 434,

2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171319, Case No. 18-cv-06187

(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2019) (Krakowski I”).

Krakowski v. American Airlines, Inc. (In re AMR

Corp.), 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1726, 2018 L.R.R.M.

208039, Adv. No. 13-01283 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 12,

2018) (“Krakowski I”).

Krakowski v. American Airlines, Inc. (In re AMR

Corp.), 567 B.R. 247, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1035, 64

Bankr. Ct. Dec. 6, Adv. No. 14-01920 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

April 14, 2017) (“Krakowski II”).

Krakowski v. American Airlines, Inc. (In re AMR

Corp.), 538 B.R. 213, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3189, Adv.

No. 14-01920 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2015)

(“Krakowski II”).

Krakowski v. American Airlines, Inc. (In re AMR

Corp.), 536 B.R. 360, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3038, 61

Bankr. Ct. Dec. 138, Adv. No. 13-01283 (Bankr.

S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2015) (“Krakowski I”).

1

Krakowski v. American Airlines, Inc. (In re AMR

Corp.), 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 2610, 199 L.R.R.M. 3584,

164 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P10,695, Adv. No. 13-01283

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2014) (“Krakowski I”).

2

JURISDICTIONAL FACTS

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The court of appeals issued its judgment February 1,

2021 (Appeal No. 19-3506, Doc. 149-1). A petition for

rehearing or rehearing en banc was timely filed February 16, 2021 (Doc. 153) and denied March 24, 2021

(Doc. 156).

The court of appeals had jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) from the final judgments of the

United States District Court for the Southern District

of New York in a pair of appeals to that district court

from the final orders of the United States Bankruptcy

Court for the Southern District of New York. The bankruptcy court orders were entered in two separate but

related adversary actions. The district court had jurisdiction to hear the appeals from the bankruptcy court’s

final orders under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).

This was a consolidated appeal from two separate

judgments. The first case, referred to as Krakowski I,

was filed in the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Missouri on May 1, 2012, Case No.

12-cv-00954-JAR. The district court had jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337 because the action

was filed under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.

§§ 151, et seq. The Eastern District of Missouri exercised its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1412 to transfer

the action to the bankruptcy court, which had a thenpending bankruptcy, In re AMR Corp., Case No.

11-15463. (E.D. Mo Case No. 12-cv-00954-JAR, Doc.

37). The transferred case was docketed by the bank3

ruptcy court as Adversary Proceeding No. 13-01283.

The bankruptcy court entered its final order June 12,

2018 (Doc. 151) and a notice of appeal to the district

court was timely filed June 26, 2019 (Doc. 153). The

district court entered its judgment affirming the final

order of the bankruptcy court October 2, 2019 (Doc. 31)

and a notice of appeal to the court of appeals was

timely filed October 23, 2019 (Doc. 32).

The second case, referred to as Krakowski II, was

filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on March 3, 2013, Case No.

13-cv-00838-RWS. The district court had jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337 because the action

was filed under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.

§§ 151, et seq. The Eastern District of Missouri exercised its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1412 to transfer

the action to the bankruptcy court, which had a thenpending bankruptcy, In re AMR Corp., Case No. 1115463. (E.D. Mo Case No. 13-cv-00838-RWS, Doc. 15).

The transferred case was docketed by the bankruptcy

court as Adversary Proceeding No. 14-01920-SHL. The

bankruptcy court entered a memorandum of decision

dismissing the action April 14, 2017 (Doc. 54) and a

notice of appeal to the district court was filed April 28,

2017 (Doc. 56). A final order of dismissal was filed by

the bankruptcy court May 9, 2017 (Doc. 59). The notice

of appeal was deemed filed as of that date. Rule 4(a)(2),

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The district court

entered its judgment affirming the final order of the

bankruptcy court December 18, 2019 (Doc. 20) and a

notice of appeal to the court of appeals was timely filed

December 23, 2019 (Doc. 21).

4

STATUTES INVOLVED IN THE CASE

The statutes involved in the case are: (1) the Railway Labor Act, specifically 45 U.S.C. § 152, which is

the section of the RLA granting the collective bargaining representative, or union, the exclusive right to

represent the members of its collective bargaining unit,

which exclusive right gives rise to the union’s duty of

fair representation; and (2) 11 U.S.C. § 1113, the

section of the Bankruptcy Code authorizing an employer who is a debtor-in-possession in bankruptcy to,

among other things, abrogate its collective bargaining

agreement with a union representing the employer’s

employees.

The two statutes are set out in full in the Appendix.

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 2001, American entered into an agreement with

Trans World Airlines (“TWA”) to acquire TWA’s assets,

including its aircrafts, routes, and gates, and to hire

almost all of TWA’s unionized employees. Bensel v.

Allied Pilots Ass’n, 387 F.3d 298, 301 (3d Cir. 2004).

APA was the collective bargaining representative for

the American pilots. The TWA pilots were represented

by a different union.

American conditioned the asset purchase on TWA

filing for bankruptcy and on the waiver of the TWA

pilots’ right to have their seniority position within the

consolidated airline determined by a neutral arbitrator

— a contractual labor-protective provision referred to

as the pilots’ Allegheny-Mohawk rights. Id. When the

TWA pilots resisted this demand, TWA filed a motion

in bankruptcy court under 11 U.S.C. § 1113 to abrogate

the pilots’ collective bargaining agreement. The threat

of contract abrogation caused the TWA pilots to waive

their Allegheny-Mohawk rights. Id. at 302.

With the elimination of the TWA pilots’ right to

compel a seniority integration arbitration, APA had a

free hand to negotiate directly with American to decide

the TWA pilots’ future positions within the future

integrated seniority list. APA negotiated an amendment to its collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”)

with American that gave the TWA pilots dramatically

reduced seniority on the combined list. This amendment was known as Supplement CC. Under Supplement CC, more than half the incoming TWA pilots,

about 1,200 in all, were stapled to the bottom of the

6

seniority list with no seniority. The remaining 1,100

TWA pilots were integrated into the list with only a

small fraction of their former seniority at TWA. As a

result, TWA pilots with a dozen years of flying experience were made junior to American pilots with only a

day of flying experience.1

At the time the seniority lists were integrated, APA

and its officers acknowledged the unfairness of the

seniority integration to the TWA pilots. APA could get

away with disadvantaging the TWA pilots as severely

as it did in Supplement CC because at the time the

seniority lists were integrated, the TWA pilots were

not members of the American pilots bargaining unit to

which APA owed a duty of fair representation. [R. 49495].

APA successfully argued before the Third Circuit in

an appeal from a class action brought by former TWA

pilots that APA was free to treat the TWA pilots in a

discriminatory and bad faith manner because it owed

no duty of fair representation to the former TWA pilots

until APA was certified by the National Mediation

Board (“NMB”) as the pilots’ representative on April 3,

2001. Bensel, 387 F.3d at 303, 312-15.

The Third Circuit held that the creation of a

nominally-independent “TWA, LLC” by American to

hold the TWA pilots before the merger of the two pilot

groups immunized APA from liability: “This fiction

1

See Appellants’ Appendix in the Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit (“Record” or “R.”) at 491, 492-93. Record consists of

two consecutively-numbered volumes.

7

enabled APA to unilaterally negotiate the Class’ seniority with American without the Class’ input.” Id. at 314.

The extreme and prejudicial seniority integration

established by Supplement CC was mitigated somewhat by the reservation of a fixed number of Captain

positions for the former TWA pilots as well as by the

establishment of a protective “fence” giving the former

TWA pilots a preference in bidding on flights into and

out of TWA’s former hub in St. Louis. The reserved

Captain positions and the protective fence were established by Supplement CC. APA acknowledged that the

reserved Captain seats and protective fence, which

provided some job protection to the former TWA pilots,

were “integral” to the seniority list. [R. 493].

Without the protective aspects of Supplement CC,

most of the former TWA Captains would have been

immediately demoted to First Officer because their

resulting seniority would not allow them to successfully bid for a Captain position at American. APA

recognized that these protective aspects of Supplement

CC were necessary to prevent the legacy American

pilots from reaping a further unfair windfall by gaining

employment advancement opportunities that belonged

to the former TWA pilots before the merger of the two

pilot groups. [R. 158, 493].

The protective aspects of Supplement CC notwithstanding, the seniority integration of the TWA pilots

into the American pilots’ seniority list is recognized as

the most unfair and one-sided seniority integration in

aviation history. It led directly to Congress passing a

law to prevent a recurrence of such an unfair airline

seniority integration in the future. That law is known

8

as the McCaskill-Bond Amendment, codified at 49

U.S.C. § 42112. [R. 493-94]. See Bakos v. American

Airlines, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98671, *5-6 (E.D.

Pa. 2017), aff’d, 748 Fed. Appx. 468 (3d Cir. 2018).

Supplement CC’s protections, while critical to the

former TWA pilots in preserving a portion of the

economic opportunities the TWA operations brought to

the merged air carrier, had minimal impact on the

much larger group of legacy American pilots. Nevertheless, there were several attempts in the years following

the merger by legacy American pilots to get the APA

Board to pass resolutions to terminate those protections. The APA’s Board, however, recognized that “the

protections and restrictions of Supplement CC go hand

in hand with the seniority numbers; if you change one,

you have to change the other.” In its official communications to its members, APA stated that it would be

“unfair and discriminatory” to terminate Supplement

CC’s protections for the former TWA pilots without

restoring their seniority. [R. 495-96].

Due to the interconnected nature of the seniority

list and the job protections in Supplement CC, and

because APA was unwilling to adjust the former TWA

pilots’ seniority upward to eliminate the need for those

job protections, APA’s Board never passed a resolution

to terminate the Supplement CC job protections. [R.

495-96].

Ten years after its acquisition of the TWA assets

and pilots, American was in bankruptcy. Pursuant to

11 U.S.C. § 1113, American began negotiating with

APA to amend the CBA as part of American’s reorganization. American proposed to APA that Supplement

9

CC’s job protections for the former TWA pilots be eliminated while keeping the former TWA pilots in their

inferior positions on the seniority list. APA immediately agreed to American’s proposal, notwithstanding

that it would directly and discriminatorily harm the

former TWA pilots to whom APA now owed a duty of

fair representation. [R. 496].2

APA’s willingness to agree that American could end

the Supplement CC’s protections alarmed the former

TWA pilots. APA’s General Counsel Edgar James

addressed their concerns in a February 2012 letter to

a lawyer representing former TWA pilots. In this letter

James stated APA’s intentions about the proposed

termination of Supplement CC:

APA well understands its duty to fairly represent all pilots. … We recognize that the minimum staffing requirements in Supplement CC

were intended to provide protections for former

TWA pilots within the parameters of that

document. To the extent that the restructuring

negotiations result in the diminution or modification of those protections, APA intends to

pursue conditions which will result in provisions

reflecting the protections provided under

Supplement CC.

2

As observed by the Third Circuit in Bensel, the legal

loophole permitting APA to treat the former TWA pilots in a

discriminatory and bad faith manner closed April 3, 2001, when

the NMB recognized APA as the former TWA pilots’ collective

bargaining representative. “It is only subsequent to April 3, 2002

that APA held a statutory duty to the Class.” Bensel, 387 F.3d at

314

10

[R.274].

Ultimately, American and APA could not agree to

other changes in the CBA demanded by American.

Unable to negotiate a modification of the CBA, American sought and obtained an order from the bankruptcy

court under 11 U.S.C. § 1113 abrogating the CBA in its

entirety. This order abrogated the entire CBA, including its seniority list and Supplement CC, thus clearing

the way for a new CBA to be negotiated between

American, as debtor-in-possession, and APA. [R. 496].

Although Supplement CC was terminated, American

continued “to apply certain terms of Supplement CC as

non-contractual employment conditions for former

TWA Pilots.” [R. 375]. American’s continued application of these certain terms was “non-contractual”

because the abrogation eliminated the status quo relating to Supplement CC and the abrogated seniority list.

American’s abrogation of the CBA allowed APA the

opportunity to correct the harm caused to the former

TWA pilots in the 2001 seniority integration. Indeed,

with the contractual slate wiped clean by the bankruptcy court’s abrogation order, APA had a duty to

negotiate new provisions that did not treat any of the

pilots whom it represented, and to whom it owed a

duty of fair representation, in a manner that was

discriminatory or in bad faith. Notwithstanding its

duty, APA soon agreed with American to enter into a

new CBA that reinstated the abrogated seniority list,

a list that was admittedly discriminatory against the

former TWA pilots, but without reinstating the reserved Captain seats and protective fence former Supplement CC had provided. [R. 497]. As a result, those

11

former TWA pilots still in the bargaining unit would

suffer the full discriminatory and harmful impact of

the unfair seniority integration without any mitigation

through job protections.

Recognizing the harsh impact of the re-imposition

of the abrogated discriminatory seniority list combined

with the abrogation of the Supplement CC job protections, American and APA agreed to an arbitral process

for the purported objective of addressing the “loss of

flying opportunities” suffered by the former TWA

pilots. This agreement was reflected in a letter of

agreement entered into by American and APA denominated LOA 12-05, which provided that American and

APA would engage in interest arbitration to establish

alternative contractual rights for the former TWA

pilots.

LOA 12-05 imposed material limitations on what

alternative rights the arbitrators could award. These

limitations included that the contractual rights must

be non-economical, i.e., that they not cost American

any money (except for training), and that they not

modify the seniority list that American and APA had

just (re)established:

The Company [American] and APA agree that

the TWA Pilots’ existing seniority placements on

the Pilots’ System Seniority List are final and

shall continue pursuant to Section 13 of the

CBA notwithstanding the termination of Supplement CC and any preferential flying rights

associated with those seniority placements. …

12

The arbitrators shall decide what non-economic

conditions should be provided to TWA Pilots as

a result of the loss of flying opportunities due

the termination of Supplement CC and the closing of the STL base, provided that training costs

associated with the closure of the base shall be

considered non-economic. In no event shall the

arbitrators have authority to modify the Pilots’

System Seniority List, require the establishment

or continuation of any flight operation at any

location, or impose material costs beyond training costs on the Company, and any preferential

flying rights under the award shall not modify

or be deemed a modification of the TWA Pilots’

seniority placements on the Pilots’ System

Seniority List.

[R. 375, 376].

The bankruptcy court in its orders mocked Pilots’

assertion that the arbitration to replace the Supplement CC job protections was intended to “replicate” the

protections established in Supplement CC. [See, e.g.,

Appendix (“APP.”) at 68, 84–85, 99–101, 203–06, 223],

The bankruptcy court went so far as to declare that,

“One cannot build even a metaphorical fence around

something that does not exist.” [APP-40].3 The district

court followed the bankruptcy court’s lead [APP-30, 33,

38, 39–42, 54] and, in turn, the Second Circuit adopted

3

Pilots did not ask that a fence, metaphorical or otherwise,

be built around the to-be-closed St. Louis base or any other base.

Rather, they merely asked for job protections that would replicate

the level of protection they had had under Supplement CC.

13

both the district court’s and the bankruptcy court’s

multiple opinions as its own. [APP-2].

Yet “replicate” is how APA sold the reinstatement

of the abrogated seniority list and the replacement of

Supplement CC with the LOA 12-05 arbitration to the

members of its collective bargaining unit, including the

former TWA pilots. Sometimes using the term

“replicate” and sometimes phrasing it slightly differently, APA consistently represented that the intention

of the LOA 12-05 arbitration was to provide the same

level of job protections the former TWA Pilots had had

under Supplement CC. APA made this representation

on numerous occasions and in numerous venues —

excluding critically, however, on the most important

occasion and in the most important venue, that is,

during the LOA 12-05 arbitration itself.

APA attorney Steven Hoffman, in commenting on

an early draft of LOA 12-05, asked his law partner Ed

James, the APA’s General Counsel, whether the document’s description of the scope of the remedy would

“adequately cover the rights Supp CC currently provides to the STL pilots.” [R. 277].

APA Board member Doug Gabel, a former TWA

pilot and a member of APA’s negotiating team during

the American bankruptcy, was involved in drafting

LOA 12-05. Gabel expressed his concerns with the

initial draft of proposed LOA 12-05. He worried that if

the arbitrators were entirely precluded from modifying

seniority, then any preferential flying of any type could

be argued to be a de facto modification of the seniority

list and thus outside the scope of what could be considered by the arbitrators. [R. 161].

14

APA General Counsel James told Gabel that his

fears were “silly” because modifying the seniority list

was limited to the concept of literally changing the

seniority order and that no one could argue that a job

preference of some type was a seniority modification

prohibited by LOA 12-05. [R. 161].

Gabel replied to James: “I am still troubled that

someone might make the case that any substitute protections are a de facto change in the former TWA pilots’

placement on the seniority list.” Gabel then spoke with

James and with American’s lawyer about his concern.

The lawyers said they understood Gabel’s concern and

would address it in the next draft of the agreement.

The next, and final, draft of LOA 12-05 included the

following new language: “any preferential flying rights

under the award shall not modify or be deemed a

modification of the TWA Pilots seniority placements on

the Pilots System Seniority List.” The lawyers assured

Gabel that this new wording made it clear and would

preclude any objection to a proposed award of preferential flying rights to the TWA pilots as being a de facto

modification to the seniority list. This assurance by

APA’s and American’s lawyers satisfied Gabel that the

LOA 12-05 arbitration would result in job protections

for the former TWA pilots that would replicate Supplement CC’s protections. [R. 161].

The new proposed CBA that included LOA 12-05

was put out for member ratification in December 2012.

APA General Counsel James came to St. Louis for a

pilot meeting to explain the proposed new CBA.

Former TWA pilot Dave Williams met privately with

James in advance of the meeting to discuss proposed

15

LOA 12-05 and the interest arbitration it provided.

James assured Williams that the protections provided

by Supplement CC would be replicated so they would

be “just like they were in 2001.” At the pilots meeting,

James explained to the pilot group, consisting mostly

of former TWA pilots: “It will be up to the arbitration

and particularly your base and team to determine what

the protections, replication of Supp CC will be.” [R.

289].

Following APA’s repeated assurances that the

objective of LOA 12-05 was to replicate Supplement

CC’s protections, the new CBA received pilot approval,

including from a majority of the former TWA pilots.

American then sought approval of the CBA from the

bankruptcy court. In addressing the bankruptcy court,

and in response to objections from former TWA pilots,

APA General Counsel James told the bankruptcy

court:

What’s happening now is the company is closing

St. Louis as the result of the abrogation of Supp

CC and we said there was protected flying that

we promised those pilots back in 2001 and so

we’re going to go to three members of the

National Academy of Arbitrators, they will

decide how to replicate those protections and the

debtors agreed with us to do that. Just take it

out of our hands, say here was the intent back in

2001, let these three respected neutrals decide

how to replicate those protections. …

… not only do we have the legal duty to go in

and make the presentation on what ought to

16

happen … we think that’s the only fair way to

try and see if we can replicate what happened in

2001.

[R. 293-94].4

The Bankruptcy Court approved the new CBA. APA

and American began preparing for the LOA 12-05 arbitration. James reiterated the goal of the arbitration in

a February 2013 email to Gabel shortly before the

arbitration began, stating: “the purpose of the interest

arbitration is to develop non-seniority protections

equivalent to the ones Supplement CC provided ― not

better or worse than them.” [R. 298-99]. While this

statement said “equivalent” rather than “replicate,” it

meant the same: new job protections as good as the old.

The LOA 12-05 process, however, mandated the reimposition of an admittedly discriminatory seniority

list and limited arbitral authority to non-economic

4

The bankruptcy judge suggested in open court that what

the objecting former TWA pilots were seeking was an order

keeping the St. Louis base open, fence and all. [R. 294]. APA’s

General Counsel James corrected the court, noting that objecting

pilots “would concede” that the St. Louis base was closing and that

what they wanted was to reopen the 2001 seniority integration,

which was something to which APA would not agree. “We’re not

going back and redoing the whole integration from 2001.” James

then reiterated: “we’re going to let the arbitrators decide how to

replicate that which they’re losing.” [R. 295].

The bankruptcy judge nevertheless persisted in his written

orders in his mistaken belief that the request to “replicate” meant

that the objectors sought to keep the St. Louis base open and

fenced.

17

mitigation of the economic harm visited upon the

former TWA pilots. With these limits upon the arbitrators, combined with the abandonment of procedural

provisions that provided for a position advocated by

APA instead of by competing pilot groups, see infra at

19, it is not surprising that the LOA 12-05 arbitration

award did not come close to replicating the job protections in Supplement CC. Only 346 Captain positions

were reserved for the former TWA pilots, just 32% of

the 1,060 Captain positions reserved by Supplement

CC, and the award states that number of Captain

positions can never be increased. [R. 165-66].

The arbitration award also did not provide the

former TWA pilots any protected opportunities to fly.

While former TWA pilots were previously able to

successfully bid for flights out of St. Louis notwithstanding their low seniority because of the protective

fence, with no protected flying provided to replace that

lost when the St. Louis base closed, the former TWA

pilots became unable to successfully bid for flights

anywhere because of their low seniority numbers. As a

result, nearly all of the former TWA pilots, including

nearly all of those holding reserved Captain seats, were

placed on “reserve pilot” status. A reserve pilot flies

only when a regularly scheduled pilot is unable to fly.

Reserve pilots are paid substantially less than pilots

who have regularly scheduled flights. This situation,

and the resulting reductions in pay, continued for

years. [R. 165-66].

The result of the arbitration, which discriminated

against and harmed only the former TWA pilots, was

the natural result of the arbitration process APA

18

adopted. It was a highly partisan process covered with

a gloss of neutrality.

An early draft of LOA 12-05 prepared by American

called for “participation [at the arbitration] by both

TWA Pilots and AA Pilots.” APA General Counsel

James directed that the language be removed, explaining to his law partner Hoffman that he was “of the

view that it is APA v. AA, and we get an institutional

position rather than invite the AA pilots to beat up on

the TWA pilots without the latter being able to

threaten to re-open the seniority list.” [R. 155]. The

provision calling for pilot group participation at the

arbitration was therefore removed and replaced with

the final language of LOA 12-05, which states: “the

Company and APA will engage in final and binding

interest arbitration …” [R. 375].

In obtaining bankruptcy court approval of LOA

12-05, James affirmed that American and APA would

be the parties to the arbitration, not separate pilot

groups, and represented that “we [APA] have the legal

duty to go in and make the presentation [to the arbitrators] on what ought to happen” with the TWA pilots.

[R. 294]. APA, however, then did almost nothing to

develop an official institutional position that it could

advocate at the arbitration and ultimately declined to

take an institutional position at all.

APA’s Negotiating Committee did nothing to

develop an official APA position to present at the

arbitration. [R. 306-07]. If they had done so, then their

fulfillment of their “legal duty” to develop an official

union position would have subjected that position to

the standards inherent in the duty of fair represen19

tation. Instead, in an apparent effort to evade their

duty, APA told legacy American pilot Mark Stephens

and former TWA pilot Gabel to develop APA’s position

for the arbitration. Stephens and Gable had just one

substantive meeting and that meeting did not produce

any agreement about what APA’s institutional position

should be. Thereafter, despite its acknowledged “legal

duty” to do so, APA made no further effort to develop

an institutional position for the arbitration. [R. 101].

Instead, APA announced it would be “neutral” and

not present an official institutional position at the arbitration. It instead created two ad hoc pilot committees,

one a legacy “AA Pilots Committee” and the other a

former “TWA Pilots Committee,” giving each committee “party status” and funding to present competing

proposals against each other and American at the

arbitration. [R. 142].

Using its purported neutrality as an excuse, APA

declined to inform the arbitrators that the intent of

LOA 12-05 was to replicate the protections provided by

Supplement CC — not by building a metaphorical

fence around a non-existent base, but by providing a

level of job protections equivalent to those that had

been provided by Supplement CC’s reserved Captain

positions and protective fence.

APA’s “neutrality” allowed its AA Pilots Committee

to submit a proposal that eliminated most of the

protected Captain positions provided under Supplement CC, effectively transferring 313 Captain positions

held by former TWA pilots to legacy American pilots.

The AA Pilots Committee’s proposal suggested that the

arbitrators mitigate this lose of Captain jobs by requir20

ing American to continue to pay the 313 former TWA

pilots as though they were still Captains. This suggestion by the AA Pilots Committee, if accepted, would

have imposed material costs upon American — an

outcome which was explicitly prohibited by LOA 12-05

and thus outside the power of the arbitrators. [R. 163].

APA knew that its AA Pilots Committee was going

to make their improper and predatory proposal before

the proposal was submitted to the arbitrators. The

Chairman of the AA Pilots Committee admitted he

discussed the proposal with APA’s Board — excluding

the two former TWA pilots who served on the Board —

before the arbitration. [R. 292-94].

The hearing soon made clear that APA’s fake

neutrality was designed to aid the legacy American

pilots in their efforts to deprive the former TWA pilots

of all job protections.

American’s lawyer noted in his opening remarks

that, “The AA Committee’s proposal gives no preferential flying opportunities to the TWA pilots outside of

St. Louis. So right off the bat, it’s not responsive to

what’s been asked of this Board.” [R. 164]. American’s

lawyer however, also disavowed the representations

previously made to the TWA pilots and the bankruptcy

court that the intent of LOA 12-05 was to replicate the

economic protections previously provided by Supplement CC, stating: “Replicate … is not the standard.”

APA General Counsel James, who attended the

hearing, sitting at counsel table, did nothing to correct

this misstatement, claiming simply that APA was

“neutral.” [R. 164].

21

American and APA’s AA Pilots Committee both

then presented arguments that violated the agreement

surrounding the clarifying language added to LOA

12-05 at Gabel’s request. Each argued to the arbitrators that the clarifying language meant that the job

preferences advocated by the TWA Pilots Committee

were de facto modifications of the seniority list and

thus prohibited by LOA 12-05. Thus they made the

very argument that APA General Counsel James had

told Gabel in October 2012 would be “silly” to make,

and for which the clarifying language was added to

establish that this was not the intent. [R. 164].

James again sat silent and took no action to present

to the arbitrators the agreed-upon intent of LOA 12-05

that the Supplement CC protections would be replicated, notwithstanding that he told the former TWA

pilots that this was the intent of LOA 12-05 to induce

the former TWA pilots to support the new CBA and

LOA 12-05. [R. 164].

In the end, as the result of APA’s actions in negotiating the new CBA and its LOA 12-05, and as a result of

APA’s fake neutrality during the interest arbitration,

the former TWA pilots ended up materially worse visaa-vis the legacy American pilots than they had been

previously under the abrogated CBA, seniority list, and

Supplement CC protections.

22

ARGUMENT

This case sits at the confluence of two important

issues relating to collective bargaining agreements

under federal labor law. The first relates to the duty of

fair representation. The duty of fair representation in

the context of collective bargaining is simply the duty

of the collective bargaining agent, or union, not to discriminate against or intentionally harm disfavored

members of the bargaining unit in negotiating the

union’s CBA with the employer. Bernard v. Air Line

Pilots Asso., Int’l, 873 F.2d 213, 216 (9th Cir. 1989).5

The duty of fair representation contains a loophole:

a union can lawfully discriminate against and intentionally harm a disfavored group if the members of the

group are not employees currently represented by the

union. This loophole allows a union to negotiate discriminatory and intentionally harmful CBA terms and

conditions applicable to future members of the bargaining unit. When the disfavored group are not yet

members of the bargaining unit, the union can discriminate against them because the union does not owe

them a duty of fair representation.

The pre-bankruptcy relationship of the former TWA

pilots to their union, the APA, presents a textbook case

of aggressive albeit lawful discrimination using this

5

Unions operating under the National Labor Relations Act,

29 U.S.C. §§ 151, et seq. (“NLRA”), owe the same duty of fair

representation to their members. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556

U.S. 247 (2009). Thus this case presents issues of broader interest

than to just those in the railway and aviation industries.

23

loophole. Before the former TWA pilots became members of the American pilots bargaining unit, the APA,

APA, acting on behalf of its then-members, the legacy

AA pilots, negotiated with American a seniority integration between the legacy AA pilots and the incoming

TWA pilots that discriminated against and intentionally harmed the latter. While this seniority integration

eliminated most of the seniority and related job opportunities that the pilots had accrued at TWA, APA did

not violate its duty of fair representation to them

because APA did not owe a duty to the TWA pilots

whom it did not yet represent. Bensel v. Allied Pilots

Ass’n, 387 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2004).

The second important doctrine at issue in this case

relating to collective bargaining comes from the ability

of an employer who becomes a bankruptcy debtor-inpossession to obtain an order allowing it to reject its

collective bargaining agreements with its employees as

part of its reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 1113.

Employers with unionized work forces who become

debtors-in-possession in bankruptcy routinely seek to

reject their CBAs. Bankruptcy courts consistently issue

Section 1113 orders abrogating CBAs at the request of

those employers. Andrew B. Dawson, Collective Bargaining Agreements in Corporate Reorganizations, 84

Am. Bankr. L.J. 103, 114-16 (2010).

In this study of every large publicly-traded company

bankruptcy filed between 2001 and 2007, researchers

identified each bankruptcy case in which the debtor

was a large publicly-traded company with a unionized

workforce. 316 large publicly-traded company bankruptcies were filed in the time period. Of these, 136 of

24

the companies had a unionized workforce. Id. at 116.

The researchers then analyzed court records to identify

in which of these 136 bankruptcy cases a Section 1113

motion was filed. The researchers found that employers filed at least one Section 1113 motion to reject a

CBA in 30 of the 136 cases. In other words, a Section

1113 motion was filed in 22% of the cases. Those 30

cases had a total of 103 Section 1113 motions filed, as

some companies had CBAs with multiple unions representing different employee groups. The majority of the

Section 1113 motions — 62 out of 103 — were settled,

presumably with an agreed modification to the CBA.

Nine other Section 1113 motions were never ruled

upon because the employer failed to reorganize. Of the

remaining 32 motions, the CBA was abrogated by the

bankruptcy court in every instance. Only once in all

these cases over seven years did a bankruptcy court

deny an employer’s Section 1113 motion — and that

court granted a second motion to abrogate the CBA. Id.

Our case presents the collision of these two common

issues in labor law: first, the use by labor unions of a

loophole in the duty of fair representation that allows

them to discriminate against or intentionally harm

incoming or other future employees who are not yet

part of the collective bargaining unit; and, second, the

use by employers of Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy

Code to abrogate their CBAs and thereby eliminate the

status quo in the workplace. These two common issues

collide because by the time the employer abrogates the

CBA in bankruptcy, the disfavored group of employees,

who have been the victims of intentional discrimination, perhaps for years, are now members of the collective bargaining unit and thus are owed a duty of fair

25

representation by their union the same as all of the

other bargaining unit members.

An abrogated seniority list is no longer part of the

status quo. “Seniority is wholly a creation of the collective agreement and does not exist apart from that

agreement.” Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 468

F.2d 1201, 1205 (2d Cir. 1972), quoting Local 1251,

UAW v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 405 F.2d 29, 33 (2d

Cir. 1968) (en banc); Baker v. Newspaper & Graphic

Communications Union, 628 F.2d 156, 160 (D.C. 1980)

(following Local 1251).

Once a bankruptcy court grants a Section 1113

motion to abrogate a CBA, the CBA “cease[s] to exist,”

and the status quo previously created by the CBA is

terminated. Northwest Airlines Corp. v. Association of

Flight Attendants-CWA (In re Nw. Airlines Corp.), 483

F.3d 160, 169-70, 173 (2d Cir. 2007). In short, there is

no seniority status quo after a CBA’s abrogation.

Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court here inconsistently

allowed APA to reinstate the abrogated seniority list

without simultaneously requiring it to replicate the job

protections provided by Supplement CC on the basis

that Supplement CC was “part of the pilots’ collective

bargaining agreement that was swept away by the

Court’s grant of Section 1113 relief.” Krakowski II, 567

B.R. 247, 256 [APP-155 (citing prior Krakowski decisions)]. This holding was affirmed by the district court

and the court of appeals.

Thus the collision of the two important issues in

labor law described above, along with the fundamental

legal principle that a seniority list that is abrogated

26

ceases to exist, brings us to the heart of the issue, as

set out in the Question Presented, to-wit:

When a discriminatory or intentionally harmful

CBA is abrogated and thus no longer part of the workplace status quo, can the union nonetheless reinstate

its discriminatory provisions in a new CBA without

breaching the union’s duty of fair representation to the

disfavored employees intentionally harmed by those

discriminatory provisions?

And, assuming that the re-adoption of the discriminatory provisions of an abrogated CBA in a new CBA

can somehow be viewed as simply restoring the status

quo, does that conclusion change and does the union’s

conduct breach its duty of fair representation if, in

reinstating the abrogated discriminatory provisions,

the new CBA fails to reinstate other provisions of the

abrogated CBA that had once helped mitigate the

intentional harm of the discriminatory provisions?

These are questions the courts below assiduously

failed to answer, or even acknowledge, despite multiple

attempts by Pilots to raise them. Instead, the bankruptcy court, the district courts, and the court of

appeals all adopted the internally inconsistent position

that the Section 1113 order eliminated the status quo

with respect to the Supplement CC job protections

while preserving unabated the status quo of its integral

seniority list.

The question presented by the petition for certiorari

is important and worthy of the Court’s attention

because this combination of conditions, that is, union

discrimination in a bankruptcy proceeding against dis27

favored members of a collective bargaining unit who

were merely future members when their abrogated

discriminatory CBA was adopted, can be expected to

occur many times in the future. It can be expected to

occur not just in cases where an incumbent employee

group, like the legacy American pilots here, had imposed a discriminatory seniority integration upon a group

of incoming employees, but also in the many workplaces where a union had agreed to a two-tier wage

scheme imposing lower wages (and often worse terms

and conditions of employment) on future members of

the bargaining unit for the benefit of the then-incumbent members.6

This combination of conditions can be expected to

recur frequently because an employer who demands

that their employees’ union agree to a two-tier wage

scheme, or any scheme that benefits present employees

6

A two-tier wage scheme is one in which existing employees

keep their current wages and benefits while new hires are

employed at materially lower wages and, usually, materially lower

benefit levels. Two-tier wage scheme became increasingly common

in the mid-1980s and were widely adopted in several industries,

including among airlines, in 1984. George Ruben, U.S. Bureau of

Labor Statistics, “Modest labor-management bargains continue in

1984 despite the recovery,” Monthly Labor Review (Jan. 1985)

(available online at: https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1985/01/art1full.pdf) at 3, 4 (auto manufacturers), 6-7 (airlines), 7 (aircraft and

aerospace).

The Court may take judicial notice that many of the

famous employers listed in this BLS publication as having negotiated a two-tier wage scheme subsequently were debtors in wellpublicized bankruptcy cases, including United Airlines, Northwest

Airlines, Republic Airlines, and Frontier Airlines.

28

over future employees, justifies the demand by reason

of financial hardship. The employer demands concessions from the union to remain competitive — and the

union agrees to take those concessions out of the hide

of the new guys and gals on the job. Since two-tier

wage schemes are justified by the employer’s financial

hardship, it is not surprising that those same financial

hardship leads some of those employers to ultimately

find themselves in bankruptcy. And it is in bankruptcy

where Section 1113 awaits the financially challenged

employer as a tool to leverage further wage and cost

concessions through abrogation of its CBA, leading to

situations like that in the present case, which future

situations will again raise the same important issues.7

The law of the duty of fair representation as it now

exists, with its loophole allowing unions to discriminate against and intentionally harm incoming future

7

Although in this case it was the union, APA, that sought

the discriminatory seniority integration, often it is the employer

who entices the union to discriminate against future bargaining

unit members by offering a two-tier wage scheme to benefit existing union members at the expense of future members.

Many unions are strongly opposed to these two-tier

schemes, both because they violate a fundamental principle of

unionism of equal pay for equal work and because in the long run

they are destructive of unionism. These concerns are discussed on

the websites of many union-side organizations, including: the

United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America

(https://www.ueunion.org/stwd_twotier.html); Teamsters for a

Democratic Union (https://www.tdu.org/how_two_tier_contracts

_hurt_workers_and_weaken_unions); and the Canadian Union of

Public Employees (https://cupe.ca/fact-sheet-two-tier-bargaining

-how-recognize-it-and-reject-it).

29

members of the bargaining unit, is well-established

and may only be changed by an Act of Congress. But

the extension of this loophole in the Second Circuit’s

decision below — allowing a union to discriminate

against and intentionally harm existing members of the

collective bargaining unit when negotiating a new CBA

after the old status quo has been completely wiped

away in bankruptcy by a Section 1113 order — is not

well-established. It is not good policy. It is not consistent with the duty of fair representation. The Second

Circuit’s decision in this case institutionalizes a union’s

discrimination against a disfavored group to whom it

owes a statutory duty not to discriminate and it does so

contrary to the well-established doctrine that a union

bears the full duty of representation towards employees, including the duty of fair representation, once it is

certified to represent them.

The existing loophole in the law permits the union

to discriminate against those who are not yet members

of the bargaining unit. The Second Circuit’s decision

stretches that loophole beyond recognition to allow a

union to discriminate against current members of the

bargaining unit.

The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to

correct the Second Circuit’s erroneous extension of this

legal loophole and to insure that discrimination against

and intentional harm towards disfavored employees,

once eliminated by abrogation of the discriminatory

CBA that initially caused such harm, cannot be

revived, reinstated, and institutionalized during the

employer’s bankruptcy, and that such a reversion to a

pre-bankruptcy discriminatory status quo is a violation

30

of the duty of fair representation that every union owes

to the members of the collective bargaining unit whom

it exclusively represents.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court should grant the Petition for a

Writ of Certiorari to the Second Circuit and the

Question Presented should be set for briefing and oral

argument before the Supreme Court.

JACOBSON PRESS P.C.

By:

/s/ Joe D. Jacobson

Joe D. Jacobson, Counsel of Record

Allen P. Press

222 South Central Ave., Suite 550

Clayton, Missouri 63105

Tel: (314) 899-9789

Direct: (314) 899-9790

Fax: (314) 899-0282

Jacobson@ArchCityLawyers.com

Press@ArchCityLawyers.com

Attorneys for petitioners

31

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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