Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Carrie Rae Eldridge, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Supreme Court briefAug 17, 2021

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Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

AUG 1 7 2021

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

No.

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Carrie Rae Eldridge,

Petitioner

United States of America,

Respondent

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United State Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Carrie Rae Eldridge, in propria persona

1247 Ramona Street

Ramona, California 92065

(858)663-5548

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section

Page

Table of Contents..............................................................................

Table of Constitutional Authorities..............................................

Table of Statutes...............................................................................

Table of Case Authorities ...............................................................

Issues & Questions Presented .......................................................

Opinions Appealed............................................................................

Jurisdictional Statement.................................................................

Cause for the Petition......................................................................

The Standards of Statutory Construction....................................

ISSUE ARGUMENTS....................................................................

ISSUE A - Does subject-matter jurisdiction exist to

enforce the income tax as a direct tax without limitation

ISSUE B - Is the graduated taxation of citizens

unconstitutional class legislation that unlawfully

discriminates............................................................................

ISSUE C - Does graduated taxation of the American citizens

destroy equal protection under the 14th Amendment........

ISSUE D - Is a deficiency under IRC Sections 6211 and

6212 based only upon the Subtitle “A” tax laws................

Summary and conclusion................................................................

Relief requested................................................................................

Prayer for justice...............................................................................

Appendix - Orders Appealed

9th Circuit Mandate........

9th Circuit Order.............

9th Circuit Memorandum

U.S. Tax Court Order....

U.S. Tax Court Decision .

A-i

A-ii

A-iii

..A-v

A-vi

Certificate of Compliance

Certificate of Service

TABLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES

16th Amendment.................

Article I, Section 2, clause 3

Article I, Section 8, clause 1

Article I, Section 9, clause 4

12, passim

.........9, 13

......passim

.........9, 13

TABLE OF STATUTES

Title 15 U.S.C. Section 17..............

Title 26 U.S.C. Section 1461..........

Title 26 U.S.C. Section 6211..........

Title 26 U.S.C. Section 6212..........

Title 26 U.S.C. Section 1441(b).....

Title 26 U.S.C. Section 7701(a)(16)

30, passim

31, passim

. 32, passim

TABLE OF CASE AUTHORITIES

Case

Page

Billings v. U.S., 232 U.S. 261, 34 S.Ct. 421 (1914).........

Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.,

240 U.S. 1 (1916).......................................................... 13, 14, passim

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).....................

Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co.,

Ill U.S. 746, 762..........................................................

27, 28

Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14, 59 L.Ed. 441, L.R.A.

1915C, 960, 35 S.Ct.Rep. 240 (1915)....................

26, 27

DeSoto Securities Co. v. Commissioner,

235 F.2d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 1956)..............................

Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 US 107 (1911).................... 4, 11, 15, 16

Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145.................................

Marbury u. Madison, 5th US (2 Cranch) 137, (1803)....

Massachusetts Bd. Of Retirement v. Murgia,

427 U.S. 307, 96 S.Ct. 2562 (1976)............................

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625 (1923)...,

Miranda u. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966)................

Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 172 (1918)..................

Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,

157 U. S. 429, 157 U. S. 570 ................................

passim

TABLE OF CASE AUTHORITIES (cont.)

Case

Page

Reiter v Sonotone Corp., 442 US 330, 337, 60 L Ed 2d

931, 99 S Ct. 2326 (1979).........................................

Richards v. United States, 369 US 1, 9,

82 S. Ct. 585, 590, 7 L.Ed. 2d 492 (1962 ...............

Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36..............................

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654-657,

92 S.Ct. 1208, 1214-1216 (1972) ...........................

Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916).......

State of Rhode Island v. The State of

Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 709, 718 (1838).................

Steel Co., aka Chicago Steel & Pickling Co. v. Citizens

For A Better Environment, No. 96-643, 90 F.3d

1237 (1998)..................................................................

Steward Mach. Co. v. Collector, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) ...

Stratton's Independence, Ltd. V. Howbert,

231 U.S. 399, at 416 - 417 (1913)...........................

Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915)...................................

U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Murry........................

Water Quality Ass 'n v. United States,

795 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1986)..................................

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)........................

iii

4, 14, 21, 35

11, 16

27, 28

ISSUES & QUESTIONS PRESENTED

A. Does subject-matter jurisdiction exist to enforce the income tax as a

direct tax without limitation under the 16th Amendment?

B. Is the graduated taxation of citizens unconstitutional class

legislation that unlawfully discriminates against them by classifying

them differently, rather than treating them uniformly?

C. Does the graduated taxation of the American citizens destroy equal

protection under the 14th Amendment when imposed directly upon

them without uniformity?

D. Is a deficiency under IRC Sections 6211 and 6212 based only upon

the Subtitle “A” tax laws as stated therein?

OPINIONS APPEALED

Carrie Rae Eldridge v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (U.S. Ninth Circuit Court

of Appeals, No. 20-70221) an appeal from the United States Tax Court, U.S. Tax

Court No.: 14744-18.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This Petition for Writ of Certiorari, filed by a pro se Petitioner is filed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1254(1). The Petition seeks review of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's

Order in case No. 20-70221.

CAUSE FOR THE PETITION

The enforcement operations of the Internal Revenue Service, with respect to its

improper enforcement of the class legislation of the non-uniform federal personal

income tax as a direct tax without limitation under the 16th Amendment, violates

the Constitution. The class legislation of the graduated federal personal income tax

is responsible for the division of the American people, who are now divided precisely

along the class lines created by the tax-brackets of the graduated income tax law.

The result of the mal-administration of this class legislation will ultimately be the

complete destruction of our entire Constitutional Republic if the mal-administration

of the law By the IRS is not addressed and corrected by this court. This has now

become a matter of the highest level of national importance possible.

The class legislation of the federal personal income tax is destroying our

constitutional system of a representative government, of a people united under a

common Supreme Law (the Constitution), that creates, preserves, and protects equal

opportunity, equal protection, and the equal rights of all Americans, without

creating classes of citizens within the law that are treated differently under it. The

class legislation of the communistically graduated income tax, that is mal

administered today in place of constitutionally uniform indirect taxation authorized,

has resulted in the creation of the repugnant and destructive class warfare that is

now tearing America apart.

Since the late 1800s, the use by Congress of tax-brackets in the law, with different

rates of tax imposed on the persons of each bracket, is based on the power of

Congress to discriminate against the privileged persons (and the inanimate

commodities and articles of commerce) that are subject to taxation by the indirect

powers {Impost, Duty, Excise); where the amount of taxation imposed is graduated,

depending upon the amount of income realized from the privilege that is possessed,

where the privilege is subjected to excise taxation.

But the U.S. Congress possesses no power what-so-ever to discriminate in law

against the American citizens themselves, on any basis, including income,

particularly when earned through the exercise of a non-taxable right, rather than on

the basis of a taxable privilege that is enjoyed, and from which taxable income is

derived.

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the lower

federal courts are not adhering to, and are in fact violating, both the U.S.

Constitution and the written laws of the Internal Revenue Code in their income tax

enforcement operations and rulings. Many are operating now in open rebellion

against our constitutional system of taxation that grants only limited powers to tax,

i.e.: limited by either the Rule of uniformity if the tax is indirect, or by the Rule of

apportionment if direct.

The original Act of Congress that created the current personal income tax law was

the Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act of October 3, 1913. That Act of Congress did not

create or impose a direct tax, because that Act imposed a tariff. A tariff is one type

of an Impost, which is one of the three forms of indirect taxation that are

constitutionally authorized by Article 1, Section 8, clause 1. Those granted powers to

tax are then made enforceable at law, by a constitutionally authorized Congress,

under the original “Necessary and Proper” enabling enforcement clause of Article 1,

Section 8, clause 18. This gives the federal courts the ability to lawfully take a

subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce claims for those uniform indirect taxes, and the

apportioned direct taxes, of Article I. But no such jurisdiction is ever granted to

Congress to enforce claims for an unlimited direct tax, as unconstitutionally

practiced by the IRS in alleging deficiencies, and as held, in this case.

In this Petition it is alleged that the U.S. Tax Court, and the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals, each committed egregious reversible error and violated the U.S.

Constitution when they refused to address the irrefutable lack of a constitutionally

granted subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts that can be lawfully taken

under the 16th Amendment alone, to enforce the federal personal income tax as a

direct tax without any constitutional limitations; -for lack of an enabling

enforcement clause in the Amendment granting the authority to Congress to write

such tax law.

The 16th Amendment cannot be the source of a new taxing power for Congress to

exercise and enforce, as erroneously argued by the Commissioner and wrongfully

accepted by the lower courts in this dispute, for the irrefutable lack of an enabling

enforcement clause in that Amendment to properly authorize the U.S. Congress to

write new law to enforce a new power to tax (income) thereunder, allegedly directly

and without any applicable constitutional limitations, as wrongfully operationally

practiced by the IRS, erroneously argued by the Commissioner, and held in both the

lower courts, in this case. Those courts wrongfully and erroneously endorsed the

argument of the Commissioner and DOJ that the income tax is a direct tax newly

created under the 16th Amendment without any constitutional limitation being

applicable to the tax or taxing power. That holding was fatal reversible error.

It was fatal reversible error because the decisions of the lower courts in this case

directly contradict and violate the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court taken in

the controlling decisions of Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 240 US 1, (1916)

and Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 US 103 (1916), where the court declared that

the true constitutional nature of the tax on income imposed in 1913 by the

Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act, was indirect, under Article I, Section 8, clause 1.

Flint v Stone Tracy Co., 220 US 107 (1911) clearly establishes the constitutional

limits of the range and scope of the legal power to tax indirectly by Impost, Duty and

Excise.

"Excises are "taxes laid upon the manufacture, sale or consumption of

commodities within the country, upon licenses to pursue certain

occupations, and upon corporate privileges ... the requirement to pay

such taxes involves the exercise of the privilege and if business is not

done in the manner described no tax is payable...it is the privilege

which is the subject of the tax and not the mere buying, selling or

handling of goods. Cooley, Const. Lim., 7th ed., 680." Flint v. Stone

Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 151; 31 S.Ct. 342, 349 (1911); or a tax on

privileges, syn. "privilege tax". Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition

Additionally, the appellate decision in the instant case not only directly contradicts

both of the Supreme Court decisions taken in Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.,

240 US 1 (1916) and Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 US 103 (1916), it also

contradicts the decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in

Richmond, Virginia, in case #16-1689, which decision sustained the Richmond

district court’s holding in United States v. Lewis F. Carter, et al, case #3:15-cv-161,

that the federal income tax is constitutionally based, not on the 16th Amendment as

argued by the Commissioner, but only on the indirect taxing powers of Article I,

Section 8, clauses 1 and 18, i.e.: to tax indirectly by uniform taxation, where “income”

is used as the yardstick that measures the amount of the underlying indirect tax

that is owed as an Impost, Duty, or Excise. But the “income” is not itself the proper

subject, nor the object, of the indirect taxation. That “indirect” district court ruling

cited United States v. Melton, No. 94-5535, 1996 WL 271468, at *2 (4th Cir. May 22,

1996) (citing Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 240 US 1, 11, 16-19 (1916)) as the

basis for the “indirect tax” holding of the court, which was later sustained in the

Fourth Circuit in a subsequent action with the same defendant in Case No. #181471.

The federal income tax cannot be lawfully or constitutionally enforced by the federal

courts in a different manner in the different states and in the different U.S. Circuit

Courts of Appeals. It cannot lawfully be enforced as two different powers of taxation

in two or more different states, or in two or more different Circuit Courts, i.e.: as an

indirect tax in the Fourth Circuit, but as a direct tax without limitation as held in

the Ninth Circuit in this case. The income tax may only be lawfully enforced by the

lower courts as the same form of tax, under the same invoked power to tax, in

every state, and in every Circuit Court, in the country. This court now has a legal

duty to resolve the conflicted and contradictory rulings of the different Circuit

Courts of Appeals on this issue of the true constitutional nature of the federal

personal income tax that was enacted in 1913.

It is further alleged that the Tax Court, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,

committed further reversible error when they ruled that a “deficiency” for tax under

I.R.C. Sections 6211 and 6212 can violate those statutes and be based on Subtitle

“C” tax law, instead of just the Subtitle “A” laws that IRC Sections 6211 and 6212

mandate all deficiencies actually be based upon.

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit Court further erred when it ignored the lack and

absence of a properly declared and fully disclosed subject-matter jurisdiction of the

court to act in the civil action, to enforce the [alleged] deficiency as a direct tax under

the 16th Amendment without limitation, rather than as a uniform indirect tax

under Article I.

Thus, the standards of law used to control the decision in the lower courts was

wrongfully deemed to be “some substantive evidence” that was alleged presented by

the Commissioner, and a subsequent alleged failure of the Petitioner “to show by a

preponderance of evidence that the deficiency was arbitrary or erroneous”.

However, as all the Commissioner’s alleged evidence produced in the Tax Court was

improperly only based on payments earned outside of the Subtitle A tax laws that

are required to be used as the statutory foundation of a lawful deficiency claim under

IRC Sections 6211 and 6212, then clearly the wrong standards at law were adopted

by the court to decide this case.

Since there were no Subtitle “A” laws or “wages” that were used to calculate the

alleged deficiency, then it is the legal standards of:

1) the lack of a properly granted and fully disclosed subject-matter jurisdiction

of the court to act at law to enforce a direct tax without limitation on an

individual person (instead of upon the “several states”);

2) the constitutional limitations of Article I that

must still be applied to all federal taxation

whether direct or indirect, and

3) statutory construction;

that should have been used as the standards at law that controlled and commanded

the lower court decisions.

The absence of an enabling enforcement clause in the 16th Amendment is fatal to

the federal courts’ ability to lawfully take a fully granted subject-matter jurisdiction

of the court under that Amendment, to allow the court to enforce an allegedly new

and direct unlimited power to tax that was erroneously claimed by the

Commissioner to have been created in 1913 by the adoption of the 16th Amendment,

rather than as the indirect tax (it is) under the pre-existing Article I, Section 8,

clause 1 powers to tax by Impost, Duty, and Excise. Where Income” is used as the

yardstick that measures the amount of the indirect tax owed. “Income” is not the

taxable activity, or “thing'’, that is actually taxed (directly), it is the mechanism by

which the amount of the indirect tax due, is measured.

No taxing power that is alleged to have been created in 1913 by the adoption of the

16th Amendment can be shown to have been made constitutionally enforceable with

law that the U.S. Congress is constitutionally authorized to write, for lack of an

enabling enforcement clause in that Amendment.

That lack of a grant of

enforcement powers, by an enabling enforcement clause in that Amendment, is a

fatal defect in every claim that is made alleging subject-matter jurisdiction exists

and may be taken under authority of the 16th Amendment, rather than under Article

I, Section 8.

That enforcement authority of Congress, to write constitutionally authorized law, is

an essential and indispensable element of the federal courts’ ability to properly

establish that a fully-granted subject-matter jurisdiction of the court exists, that may

be lawfully taken by the court to enforce a specific claim for tax, i.e.: - here, the

Commissioner wrongfully demands the payment of a deficiency for an alleged direct

tax, that has been calculated outside of the Subtitle “A” tax laws, and is

erroneously alleged owed as a newly authorized direct tax without limitation under

authority of the 16th Amendment.

The federal courts, for want of an enabling enforcement clause in the 16th

Amendment, lack the ability to take a fully granted subject-matter jurisdiction of

the court to enforce claims for a direct tax, that are made under an alleged authority

of the 16th Amendment alone, severed from, and without foundational reliance upon

the indirect taxing powers granted and made enforceable at law under Article I

Section 8, clauses 1 and 18.

In summary, the direct and unlimited taxation of the labors and the fruits of labor

of the American People, derived from the simple exercise of the citizens’ right to

work, as operationally wrongfully practiced by the IRS in assessing deficiencies

outside of the subtitle “A” laws, - without a statutory specification of any liability for

the payment of any tax to lawfully enforce; without the use of the prerequisite

indirect basis of Excise, Duty, or Impost taxation; and without an applicable enabling

enforcement clause in the 16th Amendment to constitutionally authorize Congress to

write law to enforce any such alleged new power to tax income directly and without

limitation, is all patently unconstitutional.

Standards of Statutory Construction

The standards of statutory construction are well known.

Many examples were cited

in the Petitioner’s pleadings in the lower courts. Here, we cite just two:

"It is a basic principle of statutory construction that courts have no

right first to determine the legislative intent of a statute and then,

under the guise of its interpretation, proceed to either add words to or

eliminate other words from the statute's language. DeSoto Securities

Co. v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 1956); see also 2A

Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.38 (4th ed. 1984). Similarly, the

Secretary has no power to change the language of the revenue statutes

because he thinks Congress may have overlooked something." Water

Quality Ass 'n v. United States, 795 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1986), p. 1309 citing and quoting Calamaro

"As in all cases involving statutory construction, "our starting point

must be the language employed by Congress," Reiter v Sonotone Corp.,

442 US 330, 337, 60 L Ed 2d 931, 99 S Ct. 2326 (1979), and we assume

"that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of

the words used." Richards v United States, 369 US 1, 9, 7 L Ed 2d 492,

82 S Ct. 585 (1962)

This appeal and Petition are predicated on the plain and clear language used in the

controlling statutes and clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The allegations of judicial

error are based on the clear and specific language used in the provisions of the

Constitution granting the two forms of federal taxation that are authorized and

made enforceable at law, i.e.: direct and indirect; -where all direct taxation must

obey the Rule of apportionment regardless of the adoption of the 16th Amendment,

and all indirect taxation must obey the Rule of uniformity.

The lower courts have also violated the statutes of Title 26 that establish the limits

of authority that control the lawful issuance of a Notice of Deficiency. The courts

have erroneously ignored or overlooked the controlling provisions of the Subtitle A

laws of IRC Sections 6211, 6212, 1441(b), and 1461.

ISSUE ARGUMENTS

ISSUE A

A. Does subject-matter jurisdiction exist to enforce the income tax as a

direct tax without limitation under the 16th Amendment?

Subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts cannot be lawfully established and

does not exist under the 16th Amendment, to allow the federal courts to take

jurisdiction thereunder, as erroneously alleged in this case, to enforce upon the

Petitioner the direct and unlimited tax on income that is now claimed owed as a

deficiency. This is clearly true because of the irrefutable lack of an enabling

enforcement clause in that Amendment, that would authorize the U.S. Congress to

write new law to enforce, without any applicable limitation, the direct tax alleged

owed under the 16th Amendment (as the deficiency at issue in this case).

The only direct taxation that the U.S. Congress is constitutionally authorized by an

applicable enabling enforcement clause of the Constitution to enforce, is the direct

taxation authorized (and limited) by Article I, Section 2, clause 3, and Article I,

Section 9, clause 4. That direct taxation, under those Article I clauses, must be

“apportioned to the “several States” for payment, and must also be laid in “proportion

to the last census”, regardless of the adoption of the 16th Amendment. These

original clauses of the Constitution have never been repealed or amended, and the

16th Amendment cannot accomplish that repeal (or amending) without text in the

Amendment clearly stating such legal effect as the intended effect, which cannot

otherwise be effected by mere inference, presumption, conjecture, supposition,

assumption, or even by opinions of the lower courts.

No direct or completely unlimited tax or taxation can be constitutionally enforced by

the U.S. courts under the 16th Amendment (or any other alleged authority of the

Constitution) against an American citizen as a taxable “person”. Nor may tax be

lawfully laid or imposed as a direct tax upon their labor or the fruits of labor derived

from the simple exercise of the citizens’ right to work and to earn money from labors

undertaken exclusively within the fifty states without the involvement of some

underlying Impost, Duty, or Excise taxable activity or privilege. This is true because

there inarguably is no enabling enforcement clause in the 16th Amendment to

properly constitutionally authorize the U.S. Congress to write any new laws to

enforce upon the American citizens a new, unapportioned, disproportionately

imposed and otherwise completely unlimited, direct tax on all earnings and

payments, allegedly redefined by a statute as “taxable income” as “gross income”.

Without an enabling enforcement clause that is made applicable to the specific taxing

power alleged invoked and exercised, subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts

is lacking and cannot be properly identified, legally established, or lawfully taken,

by any federal court, to allow the court to enforce a deficiency as a direct and

unlimited tax on all earnings.

An applicable enabling enforcement clause is an

essential and indispensable element of properly establishing that there is a fully

granted subject-matter jurisdiction of the court that actually exists, and that can be

lawfully established, invoked, and taken by a federal court, to allow it to enforce a

specific claim for a particular type of tax (Impost, Duty, or Excise), of a specific

constitutional nature, i.e.: direct or indirect.

Previous to the adoption of the 16th Amendment the taxation of income had been

repeatedly upheld by this Supreme Court as a legitimate and constitutional exercise

of the indirect taxing powers given to Congress to tax uniformly by Impost, Duty,

and Excise under the power and authority granted by Article I, Section 8, clause 1 of

the U.S. Constitution, and made enforceable at law by a constitutionally authorized

Congress under the “Necessary and Proper” enabling enforcement clause of Article I,

Section 8, clause 18. see Springer v. U. S., 102 U.S. 586, 26 L. ed. 253 (1880); Pollock

v. Farmer's Loan & Trust, 158 U.S. 601, (1895); Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 433,

19 L. ed. 95 (1868); Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397, 48 L. ed. 496,

24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 376. (1904); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911); Stratton's

Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, at 416-417 (1913), and later, Bowers u.

Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170 (1926).

The Petitioner does not dispute this lawful, authorized, constitutional application of

the indirect taxing powers, but inarguably asserts that under Title 15 Section 17

there is no Impost, Duty or Excise tax or taxing power that reaches her person with

legal effect, or her right to work, or the fruits of her labors derived from her labors

conducted strictly within the State of California under and through a simple exercise

of her rights to work and to own and accumulate private property.

Furthermore, previous to the adoption of the 16th Amendment, all direct taxation

under Article I had to be apportioned to the States for payment and imposed in

proportion to the last census.

Therefore, any claim to an unlimited power to tax

directly and without limitation under the 16th Amendment, as a result of the

adoption of the Amendment, would certainly be a claim by the Commissioner to a

new power to tax, allegedly created by the Amendment. Any such new power, in

order to be enforceable in the federal courts, would require that an enabling

enforcement clause be present in the Amendment to authorize the U.S. Congress to

write law thereunder to enforce the new, previously non-existent, power to tax

without limitation. And only then could a federal court be able to identify both of

the essential constitutional elements necessary to fully establish that there was a

fully-granted subject-matter jurisdiction of the court that exists and could lawfully be

taken by it over the claim for a tax or deficiency alleged owed under authority of the

16th Amendment as a direct tax on all earnings.

In this case however, the Commissioner, the U.S. Tax Court, and the Ninth Circuit,

have all specifically rejected indirect taxation as the constitutional foundation for

the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court, and have instead erroneously endorsed

the Commissioner’s (IRS’) unlawful operational practice of enforcing the federal

income tax as a new power to tax directly and without any limitation under alleged

authority of the 16th Amendment, despite the irrefutable fact that there is no

enforcement authority granted to Congress under the Amendment because of the

fatal defect of the Amendment’s lack of an enabling enforcement clause to

constitutionally authorize the U.S. Congress to write new law to enforce this alleged

new and unlimited direct tax on “income”.

The 16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution plainly reads:

16th Amendment

"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,

from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the

several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."

The language that is used in this Amendment does not actually contain the word

"direct" in describing the tax on income that is addressed therein, and there

certainly is no enabling enforcement clause in the Amendment to properly grant a

new enforcement power to Congress to write new law, which is essential in order to

properly establish that a fully granted subject-matter jurisdiction of the court exists

to allow the enforcement by the court, of a new taxing power alleged created.

There is a particularly egregious error of the Tax Court in this dispute because the

legal effect of improperly adding by presumption the word "direct" to the 16th

Amendment in an interpretational opinion, rather than by factual inclusion, is to

wrongfully attempt to use the Amendment to destroy two other pre-existing

unrepealed and unamended clauses of the U.S. Constitution limiting the power to

tax directly. Article I, Section 2, clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution still reads today:

"Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States”,

and Article I, Section 9, clause 4 still commands: "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax

shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before

directed to be taken".

These clauses still exist in the U.S. Constitution. They have not been repealed nor

amended by any text of any Amendment stating such legal effect, not even with

respect to the taxation of income under the 16th Amendment.

Neither repeal, nor

amendment, of any provision of the Constitution may be lawfully or legitimately

assumed or inferred into alleged existence without being plainly stated in writing as

an intended legal effect1.

It is completely improper to use one clause of the Constitution (the 16th Amendment)

to destroy two other, pre-existing, Article I provisions that still constitutionally

limit the power to tax directly. This was carefully and specifically noted by the

Brushaber court in its original controlling decision.

“But it clearly results that the proposition and the contentions under it,

if acceded to, would cause one provision of the Constitution to destroy

another; that is, they would result in bringing the provisions of the

Amendment exempting

direct tax from apportionment into

irreconcilable conflict with the general requirement that all direct

taxes be apportioned. Moreover, the tax authorized by the

Amendment, being direct, would not come under the rule of uniformity

applicable under the Constitution to other than direct taxes, and thus it

would come to pass that the result of the Amendment would be to

See the very specific text of the 21st Amendment repealing prohibition.

authorize a particular direct tax not subject either to apportionment or

to the rule of geographical uniformity, thus giving power to impose a

different tax in one state or states than was levied in another state or

states. This result, instead of simplifying the situation end rrmldnpclear the_limitations on the taxing power, which obviously the

Amendment must have been intended to accomplish, would create

radical and destructive changes in our constitutional system

and multiply confusion ... In the matter of taxation, the Constitution

recognizes the two great classes of direct and indirect taxes, and lays

down two rules by which their imposition must be governed,

namely, the rule of apportionment as to direct taxes, and the rule of

uniformity as to duties, imposts, and excises.” Brushaber v. Union

Pacific R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1916)

(emphasis added)

Therefore, as a tax without apportionment under the 16th Amendment, the federal

personal income tax cannot be enforced as a direct tax, as it can only be lawfully

sustained and enforced in the courts as an indirect tax under the Constitution

because indirect taxation is not subject to the Rule of apportionment, only the Rule

of uniformity.

Clearly, the income tax can only be sustained, (as a tax without

apportionment and without proportionate imposition as stated in the 16th

Amendment, and without creating any inherent conflicts with any other part of the

Constitution), as an indirect tax under Article I, Section 8. Any other application

or interpretation of the Amendment’s legal effect would destructively engineer a

court-manufactured, irreconcilable, inherent conflict between the Amendment and

the two pre-existing limiting clauses of Article I, as noted by the Supreme Court, and

would be an improper attempt to use one clause of the Constitution (the 16th

Amendment) to destroy those two other unrepealed and unamended clauses

limiting the power of all direct taxation. This court has consistently been clear about

these matters:

"The provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment conferred______

no new

power of taxation but simply prohibited the previous complete and

plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the

beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to

which it inherently belonged . . ." Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240

U.S. 103, pg. 112."

"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts

and excises." Art. 1, § 8. If the tax is a direct one, it shall be

apportioned according to the census or enumeration. If it is a duty,

impost, or excise, it shall be uniform throughout the United States.

Together, these classes include every form of tax appropriate to

sovereignty. Cf. Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378, 288 U. S. 403, 288 U.

S. 405; Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U. S. 1, 240 U. S. 12."

Steward Mach. Co. v. Collector, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), at 581

"Whether the tax is to be classified as an "excise" is in truth not of

critical importance. If not that, it is an "impost" (.Pollock v. Farmers'

Loan & Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601, 158 U. S. 622, 158 U. S. 625; Pacific

Insurance Co. v. Soble, 7 Wall. 433, 74 U. S. 445), or a "duty" (Veazie

Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 75 U. S. 546, 75 U. S. 547; Pollock v.

Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 157 U. S. 570; Knowlton v.

Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 178 U. S. 46). A capitation or other "direct" tax

it certainly is not." Steward Mach. Co. v. Collector, 301 U.S. 548

(1937), at 581-2

"The [income] tax being an excise, its imposition must conform to the

canon of uniformity. There has been no departure from this

requirement. According to the settled doctrine the uniformity exacted is

geographical, not intrinsic. Knowlton v. Moore, supra, p. 178 U. S. 83;

Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., supra, p. 220 U. S. 158; Billings v. United

States, 232 U. S. 261, 232 U. S. 282; Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U. S. 605,

245 U. S. 613; LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U. S. 377, 256

U. S. 392; Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101, 282 U. S. 117; Wright v. Vinton

Branch Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U. S. 440." Steward Mach. Co. v.

Collector, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), at 583

"Evidently Congress adopted the income tax as the measure of the tax

to be imposed with respect to the doing of business in corporate form

because it desired that the excise should be imposed, approximately at

least, with regard to the amount of benefit presumably derived

by such corporations from the current operations of the government.

In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. 220 U.S. 107, 165, 55 S.L. ed. 107, 419, 31

Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912 B. 1312, it was held that Congress, in

exercising the right to tax a legitimate subject of taxation as a franchise

or privilege, was not debarred by the Constitution from measuring

the taxation by the total income, although derived in part from property

which, considered by itself, was not taxable. It was reasonable that

Congress should fix upon gross income, without distinction as to source,

as a convenient and sufficiently accurate index of the importance of the

business transacted.” Stratton's Independence, Ltd. V. Howbert, 231

U.S. 399, at 416 - 417 (1913)

The Sixteenth Amendment must be construed in connection with the

taxing clauses of the Original Constitution and the effect attributed to

them before the amendment was adopted. In Pollock ... it was held ...

that Congress could not impose such [direct] taxes without

apportioning them among the states according to population, as

required

by Article

cl.

and

Article

§ 9, cl. 4, of the original Constitution.

Afterwards, and evidently in recognition of the limitation upon the

taxing power of Congress thus determined, the Sixteenth Amendment

was adopted, ... As repeatedly held, this did not extend the

taxing power to new subjects ... Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165

172 (1918)

"This court had decided in the Pollock Case that the income tax law of

1894 amounted in effect to a direct tax upon property, and was invalid

because not apportioned according to populations, as prescribed by the

Constitution. The act of 1909 avoided this difficulty by imposing not an

income tax, but an excise tax upon the conduct of business in a

corporate capacity, measuring, however, the amount of tax bv the

income of the corporation. ...” Flint u. Stone Tracy Co. 220 U.S. 107,

55 L. ed. 389, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 1312; McCoach v.

Minehill & S. H. R. Co. 228 U.S. 295, 57 L. ed. 842, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep.

419; United States v. Whitridge (decided at this term, 231 U.S. 144, 58

L. ed. —, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 24.” Stratton’s, supra at 414

"Moreover in addition the conclusion reached in the Pollock case did not

in any degree involve holding that income taxes generically and

necessarily came within the class of direct taxes on property, but on the

contrary recognized the fact that taxation on income was in its nature

an excise entitled to be enforced as such unless and until it was

concluded that to enforce it would amount to accomplishing the result

which the requirement as to apportionment of direct taxation was

adopted to prevent, in which case the duty would arise to disregard

form and consider substance alone and hence subject the tax to the

regulation as to apportionment which otherwise as an excise

would not apply to it." Brushaber, supra, at 16-17.

Therefore, since the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts to enforce a

deficiency for a direct tax on income under alleged authority of the 16th Amendment

is in question in this action - because of the lack of an enabling enforcement clause

in the 16th Amendment, the Petitioner still seeks on the record an explanation of how

the alleged subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts has been established and

taken in this case under the 16^ Amendment to allow the court-ordered enforcement

of the direct tax on income.

"However late this objection has been made or may be made in any

cause in an inferior or appellate court of the United States, it must be

considered and decided before any court can move one further step in

the cause, as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the subject matter in

controversy between parties to a suit, to adjudicate or exercise any

judicial power over them;” State of Rhode Island v. The State of

Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 709, 718 (1838)

“In a long and venerable line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that,

without proper jurisdiction, a court cannot proceed at all, but can only

note the jurisdictional defect and dismiss the suit. See, e.g., Capron v.

Van Noorden, 2 Cranch 126; Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,

520 U.S. 43, (1997). Bell v. Hood, supra; National Railroad Passenger

Corp. v. National Assn, of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 465, n.

13; Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 531; Secretary of Navy v. Avrech,

418 U.S. 676, 678 (per curiam); United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S.

348 ; Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 721; and Chandler v.

Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 86-88, distinguished. For

a court to pronounce upon a law's meaning or constitutionality when it

has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, an ultra vires act.”

Pp. 93-102. Steel Co., aka Chicago Steel & Pickling Co. v. Citizens for A

Better Environment, No. 96-643, 90 F.3d 1237 (1998).

ISSUE B

B. Is the graduated taxation of citizens unconstitutional class legislation

that unlawfully discriminates against them by classifying them

differently, rather than treating them uniformly?

Graduated taxation, that uses tax-brackets with non-uniform rates of tax that are

imposed on classes of American citizens as persons who are made class members of

different classes by the tax-brackets of IR Section 1, is not authorized under the

U.S. Constitution, and is unconstitutional when enforced upon the citizens as an

indirect tax without the uniformity limitation. Graduated taxation may only be

constitutionally enforced against the inanimate taxable commodities and articles of

commerce subject to tax, and the privileged corporate, licensed, and foreign “persons”

that Congress is empowered to discriminate against in law based on the different

amounts of “income” realized in return from the enjoyment of a taxable privilege2

that is possessed.

But the U.S. Congress cannot lawfully discriminate in law against the American

people themselves on any basis, including wealth or amounts of earnings, or even

income, to create or legislate into existence different classes of American citizens who

are subjected to different rates of non-uniform taxation, by the same tax imposed,

depending upon the particular class that they are each discriminatorily assigned

to by the taxing legislation.

The U.S. Constitution does not authorize graduated taxation. Under the U.S.

Constitution, every tax, if direct, must be apportioned and imposed proportionately

under the last census, regardless of the adoption of the 16th Amendment in 1913,

and, if indirect, must be uniform in operation on all persons, and cannot be

graduated in its enforced application against the American citizens.

Graduated

taxation of the American people is quite simply unconstitutional class legislation.

2 Like the privileges of incorporation and those possessed by license.

The graduated taxation of American citizens by class legislation, is absolutely

repugnant to the U.S. Constitution because it violates the central tenet of all

taxation in America, i.e.: that every American is treated the same under the law, and

is taxed the same as all other Americans are taxed.

“The inherent and fundamental nature and character of a tax is that of

a contribution to the support of the government, levied upon the

principle of equal and uniform apportionment among the persons

taxed, and any other exaction does not come within the legal definition

of a 'tax.'” Pollock u. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 599

(1895)

There is no such thing in the theory of our national government as

unlimited power of taxation in congress. There are limitations, as he

justly observes, of its powers arising out of the essential nature of all

free governments; there are reservations of individual rights, without

which society could not exist, and which are respected by every

government. The power of taxation is subject to these limitations.

Citizens' Savings Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, and Parkersburg

v. Brown, 106 U.S. 487, 1 Sup. Ct. 442.” Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan &

Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 599 (1895)

The creation, by I.R.C. Section 1, of different tax brackets, that allegedly create

different classes of American persons, depending upon the tax-bracket they are

assigned to by that law, is unconstitutional.

It is unconstitutional because the

differing classes of citizens created under the law, are then all treated differently

under that law because the different class members are taxed differently, at

different rates, and on different amounts of earnings, and without uniformity across

the “several states”, even within each tax-bracket. Under the unlimited SALT

deduction of the 1986 IR Section 1 tax imposed, which deduction varies in every

state, and is formulaically controlled in each state by three different state tax

variables (state property, sales, & income, taxes), instead of being controlled by one

uniform federal formula to calculate the taxable gross income of a person-, and thus,

the citizens of the different states are taxed at different rates of tax and on differing

amounts of earnings, depending upon the class [tax-bracket] assigned and the

differing amounts of state tax paid in the state where they reside; -which destroys

the required geographical uniformity of the tax across the several states. This is

unconstitutional because that system of using the three different state rates of tax

to calculate federal gross income, and based on that, the total tax owed, destroys the

geographical uniformity amongst the states that is required of all indirect taxation

under Article I, Section 8, clause 1. The Constitution does not authorize the U.S.

Congress to use tax-brackets and non-uniform rates of taxation to prejudicially

create, and then discriminate in law against, different classes of American citizens

as persons” within the tax code, on any basis, including race, color, religion,

gender, age, national origin, wealth (property), different levels of earnings, or even

“income”.

However, the corporate person, the foreign person, and the licensed

person, (as well as the inanimate commodities and articles of commerce subject to

tax), are constitutionally subject to this sort of discriminatory classification by

Congress based on the level of return (“income”) that is realized by them from the

possession of the taxable privilege enjoyed by the taxable person engaged in the

federally taxable activity subject to some impost, duty, or excise.

Congress, however, has no lawfully granted power what-so-ever to discriminate in

law against the individual American citizens themselves as “persons”, because the

citizens’ labor, fruits of labor, and right to work, are not lawfully or constitutionally

subject to the Excise taxation of a privilege” or the Impost taxation by tariff3 of a

“foreign” person’s activity in America.

To comply with the constitutionally required uniformity of taxation, Congress may

only discriminate in law with different rates of tax being imposed upon the

manufacture, sale, and consumption of commodities and Articles of Commerce

subject to tax, and upon the privileged (and therefore taxable) “persons” subject to

the indirect taxation of activities that are subject to some federal Impost, Duty, or

Excise tax, as was routinely recognized and well-settled by this court before the

3 As imposed by the Underwood-Simmons TariffAct of Oct. 3, 1913, - the original Act of Congress creating the

federal personal income tax.

adoption of the irrelevant 16th Amendment, which “conferred no new power of

taxation”. Baltic Mining, supra.

The only “persons” that the U.S. Congress may constitutionally discriminate in law

against, with non-uniform rates of taxation, are 1) the privileged corporate

persons” who have no God-given rights to work, to Life, to Liberty, to private

property, and to the pursuit of happiness, but who rather exist and operate only by

virtue of the government granted [and therefore federally taxable] “privilege” of

incorporation, and 2) persons not operating in America by right, but who hold a

license to deal in taxable commodities or Articles of Commerce subject to taxation; or

3) who are foreign to the United States of America, or are persons who are in a

foreign place (a territory, possession, or foreign country under a tax-treaty), and

therefore may be subjected to federal taxation by virtue of the privilege of the federal

protections provided under those circumstances and in those places.

Title 15 U.S.C. Section 17 specifically commands that: “The labor of a human being

is not a commodity or Article of Commerce”, and therefore, as such, the labors of the

American citizens, conducted by right, are completely removed from any

subjectivity to the indirect powers to tax, by Excise or otherwise.

The graduated direct taxation of the income of the American citizens as currently

operationally enforced by the IRS, without any indirect taxation basis, is patently

unconstitutional because the tax is neither apportioned nor uniform, as all

taxation is still required to be under the U.S. Constitution, regardless of the

adoption of the 16th Amendment.

Graduated direct taxation of the American people is not authorized by the U.S.

Constitution; - but it is demanded under the Communist Manifesto’s 2nd Plank. How

is it possible that the U.S. courts are enforcing a plank of the Communist Manifesto,

instead of the tax limitation clauses of the U.S. Constitution?

Hamilton says in one of his papers (the Continentalist): 'The genius of

liberty reprobates everything arbitrary or discretionary in

taxation. It exacts that every man, by a definite and general rule,

should know what proportion of his property the state

demands; ...” 1 Hamilton's Works (Ed. 1885) 270. Pollock u. Farmer’s

Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 596 (1895)

“The income tax law under consideration is marked by

discriminating features which affect the whole law. It

discriminates between those who receive an income of $4,000 and

those who do not. It thus vitiates, in my judgment, by this arbitrary

discrimination, the whole legislation. Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan &

Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 596 (1895)

“The legislation, in the discrimination it makes, is class

legislation. Whenever a distinction is made in the burdens a law

imposes or in the benefits it confers on any citizens by reason of their

birth, or wealth, or religion, it is class legislation, and leads

inevitably to oppression and abuses, and to general unrest and

disturbance in society. “Pollock u. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co. 157

U.S. 429, 596 (1895)

It was hoped and believed that the great amendments to the

constitution which followed the late Civil War had rendered such

legislation impossible for all future time. But the objectionable

legislation reappears in the act under consideration.” Pollock v.

Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 596 (1895)

The great Amendments to which Justice Fields refers to, are of course the 14th

Amendment containing the Equal Protection clause guaranteeing to all persons the

equal protection of the law.

The concern identified by Justice Fields is clear. ALL class legislation, taxing or

otherwise, violates the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment requiring

that all persons be provided with the equal protection of the law, equal opportunity,

equal rights, and equal treatment under the law. His concerns and warnings were

truly prophetic, as we are now confronted today with all of the same evil aspects of

the discriminatory and prejudicial, communistic class legislation of today’s income

tax laws, that he confronted, and that this court firmly rejected 125 years ago.

In conclusion, Justice Fields exposes the conflicted philosophical battle that was just

beginning in his day, but which is now consuming America with violence as we

arrive at the time of the fulfillment of Justice Fields’ prophecy:

“Here I close my opinion. I could not say less in view of questions of

such gravity that go down to the very foundation of the

government. If the provisions of the constitution can be set aside by

an act of congress, where is the course of usurpation to end? The

present assault upon capital is but the beginning. It will be but the

stepping-stone to others, larger and more sweeping, till our political

contests will become a war of the poor against the rich, -a war

constantly growing in intensity and bitterness. 'If the court sanctions

the power of discriminating taxation, and nullifies the

uniformity mandate of the constitution,’ as said by one who has

been all his life a student of our institutions, 'it will mark the

hour when the sure decadence of our present government will

commence.' If the purely arbitrary limitation of four thousand dollars

in the present law can be sustained, none having less than that amount

of income being assessed or taxed for the support of the government,

the limitation of future congresses may be fixed at a much larger sum,

at five or ten or twenty thousand dollars, parties possessing an income

of that amount alone being bound to bear the burdens of government;

or the limitation may be designated at such an amount as a board of

'walking delegates' may deem necessary. There is no safety in allowing

the limitation to be adjusted except in strict compliance with the

mandates of the constitution, which require its taxation, if imposed by

direct taxes, to be apportioned among the states according to their

representation, and, if imposed by indirect taxes, to be uniform in

operation and, so far as practicable, in proportion to their property,

equal upon all citizens. Unless the rule of the constitution governs, a

majority may fix the limitation at such rate as will not include any of

their own number.” Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S.

429, 607 (1895)

Today, all direct taxes must still be apportioned to the states for payment and

imposed proportionately to the last census, regardless of the adoption of the 16th

Amendment; and all indirect taxation must be uniform in their effect upon the

American citizens.

The tax-brackets of the federal personal income tax laws, with non-uniform

discriminatory and prejudicial rates of income tax imposed on the different classes of

citizens created by the tax-brackets defined within the class legislation of the income

tax law, are not constitutional when enforced upon the American citizens and their

right to work, as a direct tax without limitation, and (or) without any legitimate

indirect basis for the taxation that is properly based upon one of the three indirect

powers to tax, i.e.: by Impost, Duty, or Excise.

The Constitution provides that representatives and direct [p556] taxes

shall be apportioned among the several States according to numbers,

and that no direct tax shall be laid except according to the enumeration

provided for, and also that all duties, imposts, and excises shall be

uniform throughout the United States.

The tax must be uniform on the particular article, and it is uniform,

within the meaning of the constitutional requirement, if it is made to

bear the same percentage over all the United States.

That is manifestly the meaning of this word as used in this clause. The

framers of the Constitution could not have meant to sav that the

government, in raising its revenues, should not be allowed to

discriminate between the articles which it should tax.

The difficulties in the way of this construction have, however, been very

largely obviated by the meaning of the word [p595] "uniform" which has

been adopted, holding that the uniformity must refer to articles of the

same class. That is, different articles may be taxed at different

amounts, provided the rate is uniform on the same class everywhere,

with all people, and at all times. Pollock u. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,

157 U. S. 429, 157 U. S. 57

It is only the inanimate commodities and articles of commerce and the privileeed

persons conducting taxable activities, that are subject to some Impost, Duty, or

Excise taxation, that may lawfully be discriminated against in law, by a graduated

tax law.

The Constitution does not allow the discriminatory and prejudicial non-uniform

taxation of the American People through the classification of the American citizens

in the fifty States into different classes that are defined by the tax-brackets of the

income tax law, on any alleged basis for the discrimination effected, -including on

the basis of the amount of income earned.

Under the Constitution the U.S. Congress cannot write discriminatory and

prejudicial, class based, non-uniform direct tax law (that is also laid without

apportionment or proportionate imposition of the tax under the census), on the

American people simply because they exist, live, work, and earn money in America; nor may it be done because of the adoption of the 16th Amendment.

“The inherent and fundamental nature and character of a tax is that of

a contribution to the support of the government, levied upon the

principle of equal and uniform apportionment among the persons

taxed, and any other exaction does not come within the Wal definition

of a 'tax.

Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 599

(1895)

The tax-brackets of our income tax system are being unconstitutionally used to

separate and divide the American people into different classes of persons.

The

discriminatory, prejudicial, graduated taxation of income that is wrongfully pursued

in operational practice by the IRS, for enforcement of the tax on income as a direct

tax without limitation, is outside of, and a violation of, the Constitutions’ granted

limited taxing powers. It cannot be sustained on review by any honest court.

In order to preserve equal opportunity, equal rights, and equal protection in the

United States of America for all citizens under the 14th Amendment, there must be

no class legislation, like the IR Section 1 income tax, that is used to create an

unconstitutional system of communistically graduated taxation of different classes

of American citizens, at different rates of tax imposed than is borne by the other

classes, - resulting in the unconstitutional, non-uniform, arbitrary, discriminatory

and prejudicial taxation of the labors of the American people simply exercising a

right to work.

The American citizens are not inherently federally taxable "persons", unlike the

corporate, licensed, and foreign persons, regardless of the fact that they allegedly

have income. Indirect taxation, including the lawful taxation of income, may only be

lawfully based on the taxpayer’s participation in some certain activity that is subject

to the application of some indirect Impost, Duty or Excise tax, where “income” is the

yardstick that measures the amount of tax owed, and is not the actual “thing” or

activity (earning money) that is the subject of the tax.

ISSUE C

C. Does the graduated taxation of the American citizens destroy equal

protection under the 14**1 Amendment when imposed directly upon them

without uniformity?

Graduated direct taxation of classes of American citizens allegedly created under

law, violates the 14th Amendment because the non-uniform rates of tax imposed on

each of the different classes of persons created by the tax-brackets that are defined in

the tax law of IRC Section 1, destroys the equal protection of the law, and thus

also destroys equal opportunity and the equal rights of the American people, to all be

treated uniformly by any tax law, whether it be a direct or indirect tax that is

imposed. The federal courts are not authorized to enforce upon the American people

the class legislation of the graduated taxation of the

2nd Plank of the Communist Manifesto in place of the constitutionally authorized

federal taxation that is always controlled, still today, by either the Rule of

uniformity whenever the tax is indirect, or by the Rule of apportionment whenever

the tax is direct, regardless of the adoption of the 16th Amendment.

In Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14, 59 L.Ed. 441, L.R.A. 1915C, 960, 35 S.Ct.Rep.

240 (1915), Mr. Justice Pitney wrote:

"Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private

property - partaking of a nature of each- is the right to make

contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief among such

contracts is that of personal employment, by which labor and

other services are exchanged for money or other forms of property.

If this right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a

substantial impairment of liberty in the long-established

constitutional sense."

In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the Supreme Court, again, recognized

this fundamental right in declaring unconstitutional a statute that would force a

Chinese laundry businessman out of business, holding at 370:

"But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of

happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by those

maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments showing the

victorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of

civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the

famous language of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the government of

the commonwealth 'may be a government of laws and not of men.' For,

the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the

means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life,

at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country

where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself."

"It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living

in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of

the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the

[14th] Amendment to secure. Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co.,

Ill U.S. 746, 762; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31; Yick Wo v.

Hopkins, supra; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589, 590; Coppage

u. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14." Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915)

Many other precedential opinions exist supporting this understanding that an

American citizen’s right to work and earn money in the fifty states is not a federally

taxable activity.

"... Without doubt, it [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily

restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage

in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful

knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to

worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and

generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as

essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. SlaughterHouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., Ill

U.S. 746; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356; Minnesota v. Barber, 136

U.S. 313; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578; Lochner v. New York, 198

U.S. 45; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78; Chicago, Burlington &

Quincy R.R. Co. u. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33;

Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246

U.S. 357; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312; Adkins v. Children's

Hospital, 261 U.S. 525; Wyeth v. Cambridge Board of Health, 200 Mass.

474." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625 (1923)

"Whether "fundamental" or not, "'the right of the individual ... to

engage in any of the common occupations of life"’ has been repeatedly

recognized by this Court as falling within the concept of liberty

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Board of Regents v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972), quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399

(1923). As long ago as Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., Ill

U.S. 746 (1884), Mr. Justice Bradley wrote that this right 'is an

inalienable right; it was formulated as such under the phrase 'pursuit

of happiness’ in the Declaration of Independence .... This right is a

large ingredient in the civil liberty of the citizen.' Id., at 762 (concurring

opinion). And in Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630 (1914), in invalidating a

law that criminally penalized anyone who served as a freight train

conductor without having previously served as a brakeman, and that

thereby excluded numerous equally qualified employees from that

position, the Court recognized that 'all men are entitled to the equal

protection of the law in their right to work for the support of

themselves and families.' Id., at 641.

'In so far as a man is deprived of the right to labor his liberty is

restricted, his capacity to earn wages and acquire property is lessened,

and he is denied the protection which the law affords those who are

permitted to work. Liberty means more than freedom from servitude.

and the constitutional guarantee is an assurance that the citizen shall

be protected in the right to use his powers of mind and body in anv

lawful calling.’ Id., at 636." Massachusetts Bd. Of Retirement v. Murgia,

427 U.S. 307, 96 S.Ct. 2562 (1976)

The citizens’ labors, and simple exercise of the right to work, cannot lawfully be

taxed by Congress, neither directly, nor indirectly. See also In re Slaughter-House

Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 10 S.Ct. 862, 34

L. Ed. 455; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937, 3 Ann.Cas.

1133; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97; Wyeth v.

Cambridge Board of Health, 200 Mass. 474, 86 N.E. 925, 23 L.R.A., N.S., 147, 128

Am.St.Rep. 439; Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646;

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 39 A.L.R.

468; and Wysinger v. Crookshank, 82 Cal. 588, 23 P. 54.

There is no doubt that the right to work, and to pursue one's chosen common-law

occupation within the fifty states, is a basic and fundamental right of We the People

that the federal government, and, through the 14th Amendment, the States, may not

abridge.

This is a right that is not created, granted, or permitted by either the

federal or State governments; thus, it neither exists by any government’s authority,

nor is it introduced by its permission, and thus is not a federally taxable “thing” or

activity, but rather is constitutionally exempt because the American citizens’

exercise of rights, like the right to vote and the right to work, cannot be lawfully

taxed by Congress.

It is a fundamental duty and priority of the federal courts to protect the rights of the

American people.

"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no

rule making Or legislation which would abrogate them" Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966)

“All laws, rules and practices which are repugnant to the Constitution

are null and void." Marbury v. Madison, 5th US (2 Cranch) 137, (1803)

"It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the Constitutional rights

of the citizen and against any stealthy encroachments thereon" Boyd v.

United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)

ISSUE D

D. Is a deficiency under IRC Sections 6211 and 6212 based only upon the

Subtitle “A” tax laws as stated therein?

Deficiencies are defined in law by IRC Section 6211 and are only authorized therein

under Subtitle “A” tax law, not Subtitle “C”. The liability for tax that is imposed by

the statutes of Subtitle “A” is established under Section 1461, which is the only

statute in Subtitle A that identifies the statutory liability for the payment of the

personal income tax upon which a deficiency can be lawfully alleged under that

Subtitle.

§ 1461. Liability for withheld tax.

Every person required to deduct and withhold any tax under this

chapter is hereby made liable for such tax and is hereby indemnified

against the claims and demands of any person for the amount of any

payments made in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

The Petitioner in this case has no liability for the payment of any tax under this

statute, and therefore, no lawful deficiency (of a required payment of tax) can exist.

And Title 26 U.S.C. Section 6211 provides the statutory definition of an actual tax

“deficiency” under the law. It states:

§6211. Definition of deficiency

(a)

In general. For purposes of this title in the case of income,

estate, and gift taxes imposed by subtitles A and B and excise taxes

imposed by chapters 41, 42, 43, and 44, the term "deficiency" means

the amount by which the tax imposed by Subtitle “A” or B, or

chapter 41, 42, 43, or 44, exceeds the excess of -...

(1) the sum of

(A) the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his return, if a

return was made by the taxpayer and an amount was shown as the

tax by the taxpayer thereon, plus

(B) the amounts previously assessed (or collected without

assessment) as a deficiency, over (2) the amount of rebates, ...

This statute very clearly states that federal income tax deficiencies are only based

on taxes imposed by subtitles A and B and excise taxes imposed by chapters 41, 42,

43, and 44...”.

A deficiency for Federal income tax is not based on taxes imposed

by, or collected under, the Subtitle “C” laws, as has erroneously been done in this

case.

Title 26 U.S.C. Section 6212 — “Notice of deficiency” clearly repeats the limitation

imposed on the authority of the I.R.S. to assess a deficiency only under “subtitles A

or B or Chapters 41, 42, 43, or 44“.

In this case however, it was the Subtitle “C” earnings of the Petitioner that have

been improperly used as the alleged basis for the deficiency.

But the statutory

deficiency is only lawfully created under Subtitle “A” tax law, not Subtitle “C”.

As supporting statutory evidence for the argument that the Subtitle “C 5? « wages” of

the American Citizens, are not subject to the limited Subtitle “A” deficiency

authorities authorized under IRC Sections 6211 and 6212, we must examine the

“wages” that are explicitly identified in the statutes of Subtitle “A” as being made

subject to the collection of the tax and are thus subject to the deficiency authorities of

Sections 6211 and 6212.

I R C. Section 1441(b) identifies the “Income items” that were made the subject of

the income tax laws in 1913 by the original income tax legislation, and thus, may be

used today as the basis for the calculation of a deficiency for tax under the Subtitle

“A” statutes. It reads:

§ 1441. Withholding of tax on nonresident aliens

(b) Income items

The items of income referred to in subsection (a) are interest (other

than original issue discount as defined in section 1273), dividends, rent,

Salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations,

emoluments, or other fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains,

profits, and income, .... The items of income referred to in subsection (a)

from which tax shall be deducted and withheld at the rate of 14 percent

are amounts which are received bv a nonresident alien individual

who is temporarily present in the United States as a nonimmigrant

under subparagraph (F), (J), (M), or (Q) of section 101(a)(15) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act and which are— ....

Of course, the "subsection (a)", referred to in the first line of this statute, is IRC

Section 1441(a), which is titled, and only provides for the “Withholding of tax on

nonresident aliens”, as plainly stated in subsection (b).

Petitioner is not the “nonresident alien individual” (identified in the statute) whose

“wages” are subject to the collection of the tax under the Subtitle A laws, and thus

she earns no wages” subject by law to the Subtitle “A” deficiency procedures under

IRC Section 6211. This is true because her “wages” are not the “wages” specified as

being made subject in Subtitle “A” law (by Section 1441(b)), to the collection of the

tax. It is Subtitle “A” law that is required by Section 6211 and 6212 to be the basis

of a deficiency, not Subtitle “C” law.

The words “wages” and “salaries” appear

nowhere else in Subtitle “A” except in Section 1441(b). They simply do not exist in

any other statute of Subtitle “A” (Chapters 1 through 6) of Title 26 U.S.C. Therefore,

no other “wages” or “salaries” under Subtitle “C” law can lawfully be used as the

legal basis for the calculation of an alleged deficiency under authority of Subtitle A.

Petitioner is not the “non-resident alien” individual person described in IRC Section

1441(a), whose “salary” and “wages” are specifically made subject by law under IRC

Sections 1441(b) and 6211, to the deficiency procedures of Subtitle “A” law. The

alleged deficiency in this case is wrongfully based on “wages” that were earned and

reported only under the Subtitle “C” employment tax laws, not the Subtitle “A”

income tax laws. That Subtitle “C” basis was not a lawful basis for a claim of a

deficiency under Subtitle ‘A” law.

The federal personal income tax statutes of 1913 that were enacted by Congress

under the Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act of Oct. 3, 1913, only establish a statutory

liability for the payment of the Subtitle ‘A” income tax in the name of the federal

tax-collectors, - who are defined in law under IR Section 7701(a)(16), as “Withholding

Agents”.

§ 7701 Definitions.

(a) When used in this Title ...

(16). Withholding Agent. - The term "Withholding Agent" means

any person required to deduct and withhold any tax under the

provisions of sections 1441, 1442, 1443, or 1461.”

Of course, Section 1441, referenced here, is where the “wages” of the non-resident

alien were previously shown to be made subject to the collection of the tax imposed

under Subtitle “A” law, and thus, to the deficiency procedures of Section 6211 and

6212. Section 1461, supra, is the only statute in Subtitle “A” that makes any person

liable for the payment of the federal personal income tax.

“If any question of fact or liability be conclusively presumed against

him, this is not due process of law." [Black's Law Dictionary 500 (6th

ed. 1990); accord, U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Murry. 413 U.S.

508 [93 S.Ct. 2832, 37 L.Ed.2d 767] (1973); Stanley v. Illinois. 405 U.S.

645 [92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551] (1972)]

The Tax Court erred by ignoring the limited nature of the statutory liability that

exists in the written law of Subtitle A, under Section 1461, and instead, has enforced

an improperly assumed liability for tax that does not exist in statute to legally base

a deficiency upon under Subtitle “A” tax law, as required.

“Tax liability is a condition precedent to the demand. ...” Flora v. United

States, 362 U.S. 145, 176, 80 S.Ct. 630, 646-47, 4 L.Ed.2d 623 (1960),

Therefore, the Tax Court and Circuit Court both committed reversible error when

they failed to acknowledge the clearly written laws that exist under the Subtitle “A”

statutes of IRC Sections 1461, 1441(b), 6211, and 6212, that plainly and clearly

define and limit a deficiency for tax to the taxes imposed by Subtitles “A” (and “B”...)

and does not include the tax laws or other sources of earnings that are earned or

taxed instead under Subtitle “C” tax law.

There are no other individual persons, other than the non-resident alien individuals

of Section 1441, who are made subject to the collection of, and liable for the payment

of, the federal personal income tax under the Subtitle “A” tax laws of Title 26. The

inclusion of Petitioner's Subtitle “C” "wages" by the Commissioner in the calculation

of the deficiency alleged owed was erroneous because it improperly and unlawfully

extended the taxing authorities beyond that defined in law by Sections 6211 and

6212, under Subtitle “A” laws, to matters outside of that Subtitle. The standards of

statutory construction preclude the federal courts from expanding the force of law

beyond the stated statutory scope of the law as written by Congress.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In summary, it is therefore clear that both the U.S. Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals erred egregiously in their Opinions and Decisions taken in this case

because they accepted the erroneous argument that the 16th Amendment created a

new taxing power for Congress to exercise, i.e.: a power to tax directly and without

any limitation.

"The provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new

power of taxation but simply prohibited the previous complete and

plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the

beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to

which it inherently belonged ..

Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240

U.S. 103, pg. 112."

RELIEF REQUESTED

Petitioner now calls upon this Supreme Court to invoke and honor their

constitutional duty to reign in this violative open rebellion against the U.S.

Constitution that is occurring, and to uphold the Article I protections that are still

afforded and guaranteed the American People with respect to all direct taxation,

and: "hence subject the tax to the regulation as to apportionment which

otherwise as an excise would not apply to it", as called for in the controlling

Brushaber Opinion, supra, at 16-17.

PRAYER for JUSTICE

Petitioner now prays this honorable court will grant this Petition for Writ of

Certiorari, so that this court can collectively address these incredibly important

constitutional issues, and the matter of vital national importance of ending the

wrongful enforcement of the class legislation of the federal personal income tax as a

direct tax without constitutional limitation.

Respectfully,

Carrie Rae Eldridge, in propria persona

1247 Ramona Street

Ramona, California 92065

(858)663-5548

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.