Supplemental Brief — Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Board of County Commissioners of Boulder County, et al.

Supreme Court briefApr 5, 2023

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No. 21-1550

In the Supreme Court of the United States

SUNCOR ENERGY (U.S.A.) INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

OF BOULDER COUNTY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

HUGH QUAN GOTTSCHALK

ERIC L. ROBERTSON

WHEELER TRIGG

O’DONNELL LLP

370 Seventeenth Street,

Suite 4500

Denver, CO 80202

COLIN G. HARRIS

FAEGRE BAKER

DANIELS LLP

1470 Walnut Street,

Suite 300

Boulder, CO 80302

KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

Counsel of Record

WILLIAM T. MARKS

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

2001 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 223-7300

kshanmugam@paulweiss.com

THEODORE V. WELLS, JR.

DANIEL J. TOAL

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

1285 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A. The decision below implicates conflicts among

the courts of appeals on both questions presented............. 3

B. The decision below is incorrect ............................................. 7

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,

564 U.S. 410 (2011) ............................................................ 9

BP p.l.c. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,

141 S. Ct. 1532 (2021) ................................................ 1, 2, 8

City of Hoboken v. Chevron Corp.,

45 F.4th 699 (3d Cir. 2022),

pet. for cert. filed, No. 22-821 (Feb. 27, 2023) ................ 7

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) ............. 9

City of New York v. Chevron Corp.,

993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021) ............................... 2, 4, 5, 6, 10

City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c.,

969 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2020) ............................................. 2

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee:

406 U.S. 91 (1972) .............................................................. 9

731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984) ............................................. 5

International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,

479 U.S. 481 (1987) .................................................... 10, 11

Minnesota v. American Petroleum Institute,

No. 21-1752, ___ F.4th ___,

2023 WL 2607545 (8th Cir. Mar. 23, 2023) ... 3, 4, 8, 9, 11

Otter Tail Power Co., In re,

116 F.3d 1207 (8th Cir. 1997) ........................................... 6

Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc.,

117 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1997) ......................................... 6, 7

Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009) ....................... 9

Statutes:

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q ..........1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 10

28 U.S.C. 1441(a) .................................................................... 7

(I)

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 21-1550

SUNCOR ENERGY (U.S.A.) INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

OF BOULDER COUNTY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

Just two years ago, the United States told this Court

that claims seeking redress for injuries allegedly caused

by the effect of interstate greenhouse-gas emissions on

the global climate are “inherently federal in nature,” even

when labeled as arising under state law. Oral Arg. Tr. at

31, BP p.l.c. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 141

S. Ct. 1532 (2021). The government explained that, despite the Clean Air Act’s displacement of any remedy under federal common law, “[a]ny putative tort claims that

seek to apply the law of an affected State to conduct in

another State * * * continue to arise under federal, not

state law, for jurisdictional purposes.” U.S. Br. at 27, BP,

supra (internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis

(1)

2

omitted). The government added that the well-pleaded

complaint rule presented no obstacle to removal. See id.

at 28. And the government took the same position in the

lower courts, explaining that it would be “irreconcilable”

with the “structure of the Constitution” for state law, rather than federal law, to govern such claims. U.S. Br. at

3-12, City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c., 969 F.3d 895 (9th Cir.

2020).

Now, the government has casually junked that position. With an all-too-familiar citation to the “change in

Administration,” it argues that the well-pleaded complaint rule precludes removal and that, in the wake of the

Clean Air Act, federal law no longer exclusively governs

claims alleging injury from interstate emissions. See Br.

7-16. Perhaps the current administration genuinely does

have a different view on questions of federal jurisdiction

than the last one. But given the federal government’s institutional interest in taking a broad view of federal jurisdiction, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the change

in position is being driven by the fact that the questions

are arising in the context of climate-change lawsuits—and

by a desire to signal virtue to political bedfellows who are

behind these lawsuits.

Given that apparent motivation, it is difficult to take

anything the government says here at face value. But

even so, the government’s arguments against review wilt

under scrutiny. The government argues that no genuine

circuit conflict exists, but it does so only by ignoring the

Second Circuit’s reasoning in City of New York v. Chevron

Corp., 993 F.3d 81 (2021), and the decisions of other circuits expressly rejecting that reasoning. On the merits,

the government parrots respondents’ arguments, yet it

makes no effort to grapple with petitioners’ responses. At

a minimum, the very fact that the last two administrations

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have taken contrary positions confirms that there are substantial legal arguments on both sides.

And for all of its flip-flopping on the merits, the government does not dispute that the questions presented

here are exceedingly important ones worthy of this

Court’s review. There are now six petitions pending before the Court arising from similar climate-change cases

that present the same basic questions. Nor does the government dispute that this case is an ideal vehicle for addressing those questions, particularly because it is less

likely than the other pending cases to present recusal issues.

After the government filed its brief, a prominent judge

wrote that cases such as this one should give rise to federal jurisdiction and urged the Court definitively to resolve whether they do. See Minnesota v. American Petroleum Institute, No. 21-1752, ___ F.4th ___, 2023 WL

2607545, at *8-*11 (8th Cir. Mar. 23, 2023) (Stras, J., concurring). It is preposterous to suggest that the fate of

these cases—with their potentially enormous consequences for an entire sector of the global economy—

should be left to handpicked state courts without a decision by this Court sanctioning that outcome. Given the

importance of the questions presented, the circuit conflicts on each question, the substantial arguments on both

sides, and the prudential reasons for review in this particular case, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

A. The Decision Below Implicates Conflicts Among The

Courts Of Appeals On Both Questions Presented

The courts of appeals are divided on both questions

presented: whether federal law necessarily and exclusively governs climate-change claims and whether a federal district court has federal-question jurisdiction over

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such claims, even when the plaintiff labels them as arising

under state law. See Pet. 11-24; Reply Br. 2-6. The government attempts to diminish those conflicts (Br. 16-22),

but it merely regurgitates the arguments respondents

made last summer in their brief in opposition. Those arguments are no more persuasive now than they were then.

1. On the first question presented: like respondents,

the government addresses only the conflict between the

decision below and the Second Circuit’s decision in City of

New York. See Br. 17-20. But two other circuits, the First

and Fourth, expressly rejected the Second Circuit’s holding that federal common law governs materially identical

climate-change claims. See Pet. 16-17.

As for the decision below, the government’s attempt to

reconcile it with the Second Circuit’s decision falls flat.

The government understands the Second Circuit to have

held only that “the prior applicability of federal common

law [is] relevant in determining the post-Clean Air Act viability of state-law claims.” Br. 19. But the Second Circuit expressly concluded that, although the plaintiff used

state-law labels, it had brought “federal claims” that must

arise “under federal common law”; indeed, the court

viewed the case as “simply beyond the limits of state law.”

City of New York, 993 F.3d at 92, 95; see Minnesota, 2023

WL 2607545, at *9-*10 (Stras, J., concurring). The Second Circuit further held that the displacement of any remedy under federal common law did not affect the analysis,

because state law is not “competent to address issues that

demand a unified federal standard.” 993 F.3d at 98.

What is more, the Second Circuit concluded that federal common law is “still require[d]” to govern extraterritorial aspects of claims challenging undifferentiated

global emissions, because the Clean Air Act “does not regulate foreign emissions.” 993 F.3d at 95 n.7; see id. at 101.

City of New York can thus only be understood to hold that

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federal law continues to govern in this area, even after the

enactment of the Clean Air Act.

The Second Circuit’s reliance on the Seventh Circuit’s

decision in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403

(1984), confirms that understanding. There, the Seventh

Circuit considered the question whether state law could

govern claims for interstate water pollution after the

Clean Water Act displaced any remedy available under

federal common law. See id. at 406.

The Seventh Circuit held that state law remained unavailable. See 731 F.3d at 406-411. The court reasoned

that “[t]he very reasons th[is] Court gave for resorting to

federal common law” in cases involving interstate pollution are “the same reasons why the [S]tate claiming injury

cannot apply its own state law to out-of-state discharges

now.” Id. at 410. The court explained that the statutory

displacement of any remedy under federal common law

“did nothing to undermine that result”; the pollution of interstate waters remained a “problem of uniquely federal

dimensions requiring the application of uniform federal

standards.” Id. at 410-411. The Seventh Circuit thus concluded that “federal law must govern in this situation except to the extent that [Congress] authorizes resort to

state law.” Id. at 411.

In City of New York, the Second Circuit similarly held

that federal law continues to govern claims founded on interstate emissions even after the statutory displacement

of any remedy under federal common law. See 993 F.3d

at 98. And while the court below may not have addressed

the merits question “whether the Clean Air Act authorized or preempted respondents’ claims,” U.S. Br. 19, it did

squarely hold that the Clean Air Act’s displacement of any

federal-common-law remedy allows a plaintiff to assert

“only state-law claims” in this area. Pet. App. 30a. That

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holding is irreconcilable with City of New York, and the

resulting conflict warrants this Court’s review.

2. On the second question presented: the government attempts to distinguish In re Otter Tail Power Co.,

116 F.3d 1207 (8th Cir. 1997), and Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc., 117 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1997). See Br. 2022. That effort also fails.

The government first argues that Otter Tail “rested

not on the artful-pleading doctrine” but instead on the fact

that “the allegations actually set forth in the plaintiff’s

complaint” demonstrated the presence of a substantial

federal question. Br. 20. But the government has no explanation for the Eighth Circuit’s statement that “[a]

plaintiff ’s characterization of a claim as based solely on

state law is not dispositive of whether federal question jurisdiction exists.” 116 F.3d at 1213 (citation omitted).

More broadly, the complaint in Otter Tail sought to enforce a right under state law, see id. at 1211; the need to

apply federal common law was evident because the complaint itself discussed an earlier federal judgment concerning principles of tribal sovereignty, see id. at 12131214.

The complaint here similarly alleges facts that demonstrate the need to apply federal law: namely, the allegations of injury caused by the effect of interstate greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate. See Pet. 24-25.

Even analyzed as a case involving the “substantial federal

question” doctrine, therefore, Otter Tail supports removal. See Reply Br. 5. *

The government notes that the court below stated that petitioners

had “waived” any argument that federal common law provided a basis

for removal under the “substantial federal question” doctrine. See

Br. 10, 20-21. Petitioners have already explained why that is incorrect. See Reply Br. 5. In addition, it would be particularly odd for

*

7

The government’s attempt to distinguish Sam L. Majors is similarly flawed. See Br. 21. Regardless of

whether the Fifth Circuit “framed its ruling” as an application of the “well-pleaded complaint rule” as opposed to

the “artful-pleading doctrine,” ibid., the court upheld the

removal of putative state-law claims on the ground that

they were governed by federal common law. See 117 F.3d

at 924. The government also argues that Congress “preserv[ed]” the relevant common law in Sam L. Majors,

whereas Congress “displaced” it here. Br. 21-22. But that

is a distinction without a difference, because several

courts of appeals have held that federal common law is

never an independent ground to remove a putative statelaw claim. See Pet. 20-23.

Notably, in one of the other climate-change cases now

pending before this Court, the Third Circuit acknowledged that Sam L. Majors supports removal and expressly declined to follow it. See City of Hoboken v. Chevron Corp., 45 F.4th 699, 708 (2022), pet. for cert. filed, No.

22-821 (Feb. 27, 2023). The Court’s guidance is badly

needed to resolve the conflicts on both questions presented.

B. The Decision Below Is Incorrect

The government devotes much of its brief to the merits (Br. 7-16), repudiating its previous position that claims

such as respondents’ “arise under federal, not state law

for jurisdictional purposes” and “may be removable under

28 U.S.C. 1441(a) on the ground that, although nominally

the Court to ignore the “substantial federal question” doctrine if it

granted review here, when the petitioners in some of the other climate-change cases now pending before this Court (which may present recusal issues not present here) indisputably made that argument. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. City of Hoboken, No. 22-821; Sunoco

LP v. City & County of Honolulu, No. 22-523.

8

couched as state-law claims, they are inherently and necessarily federal in nature.” U.S. Br. at 26, 27, BP, supra.

The government’s previous position was right; its current

position is wrong.

1. The government heavily relies on the well-pleaded

complaint rule (Br. 9-11), but its understanding of the rule

is internally incoherent. The government initially argues

that, under the rule, federal jurisdiction depends on the

“plaintiff’s own statement” of the cause of action. Br. 9.

The government apparently means that the complaint

must expressly invoke federal law, either as creating the

cause of action or as governing a particular issue. See

ibid. Federal jurisdiction would thus turn on a magicwords requirement: did the plaintiff expressly invoke federal law in the complaint?

Two pages later, however, the government acknowledges that “[a] federal court may uphold removal even

though no federal question appears on the face of the

plaintiff’s complaint if the court concludes that the plaintiff has artfully pleaded claims by omitting to plead necessary federal questions.” Br. 11 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). But the artful-pleading doctrine is

the opposite of a magic-words approach: it requires consideration of the substance of the allegations in the complaint in order to determine the presence of federal jurisdiction.

“Artful pleading comes in many forms,” and “[t]his is

one of them.” Minnesota, 2023 WL 2607545, at *8 (Stras,

J., concurring). And analyzing the substance of the complaint, rather than the mere labels used by the plaintiff,

comports with this Court’s precedent. When the Court

has stated that a “plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of

action” must show that it is “based upon federal law,” it

has contrasted such a case with one in which federal law

9

is relevant only because of an “actual or anticipated defense.” Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009)

(citation omitted). Where, as here, the facts pleaded in

support of the plaintiff’s claim demonstrate that it is necessarily and exclusively governed by federal law, the federal character of the suit arises from the asserted cause of

action, not from any federal defense.

The exercise of federal jurisdiction over such cases is

thus consistent with a proper understanding of the wellpleaded complaint rule. Were it otherwise, a plaintiff

could confine an inherently federal cause of action to state

court simply by labeling the claim a state-law claim.

“There is no reason for the removal rules to operate in

such a confounding way.” Minnesota, 2023 WL 2607545,

at *11 (Stras, J., concurring).

2. The government further argues (Br. 11-15) that

federal common law does not necessarily and exclusively

govern respondents’ claims because any such common law

has been “displaced” by the Clean Air Act. That argument conflates the jurisdictional question (whether a

claim arises under federal law) with the merits question

(whether the claimant has a valid cause of action under

federal law)—questions this Court has made clear are distinct. See, e.g., American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 422 (2011).

In so arguing, the government fundamentally mischaracterizes petitioners’ position. This Court’s precedents establish that the structure of the Constitution itself

precludes the application of state law to claims seeking redress for harms allegedly caused by interstate pollution.

In such disputes, “[t]he rule of decision [must] be[] federal,” Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 108 n.10

(1972), and “state law cannot be used” at all, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 n.7 (1981).

10

The fact that Congress acted to displace any remedy

otherwise available under federal common law does nothing to alter the exclusively federal nature of this area of

law. As the Second Circuit explained, “state law does not

suddenly become presumptively competent to address issues that demand a unified federal standard simply because Congress saw fit to displace a federal court-made

standard with a legislative one.” City of New York, 993

F.3d at 98.

The government reads this Court’s decision in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), as

demonstrating that, “[n]ow that the Clean Air Act has displaced the prior federal-common-law regime,” “ordinarypreemption principles” apply to determine “the viability

of state-law claims” in this area. Br. 14. That is incorrect.

In Ouellette, the question was whether a suit for injury

allegedly caused by interstate water pollution could proceed under the law of the State of injury, rather than the

law of the source State, after the Clean Water Act displaced the remedy previously available under federal

common law. See 479 U.S. at 483-484. The Court held

that the suit could not proceed under the law of the State

of injury. See id. at 497. The Court noted that, while the

Act sought to “establish an all-encompassing program of

water pollution regulation,” they contained a saving

clause that “negate[d] the inference that Congress left no

room for state causes of action.” Id. at 492. Still, the

Court concluded that Congress’s “pervasive regulation”

of interstate water pollution, and “the fact that the control

of interstate pollution is primarily a matter of federal

law,” meant that “the only state suits that remain available are those specifically preserved by the Act.” Ibid.

Even if the Ouellette Court framed its analysis in

terms of ordinary preemption, therefore, it expressly re-

11

lied not only on the displacing statute but also on the inherently federal character of suits concerning interstate

pollution. Ouellette is thus consistent with the principle

that federal law continues exclusively to govern actions

concerning interstate pollution, even after a statute has

displaced any remedy under federal common law.

*

*

*

*

*

Rarely has this Court seen a more cynical change in

position. The current administration’s view of this case is

shot through with flaws. The well-pleaded complaint rule

does not allow a plaintiff to block federal courts from adjudicating a cause of action necessarily and exclusively

governed by federal law. And the statutory displacement

of any remedy previously available under federal common

law does not alter the inherently federal character of such

a cause of action. Those questions have now divided the

courts of appeals, as well as two consecutive administrations. And the answer to them will dictate whether the

numerous climate-change lawsuits pending in courts

across the country—lawsuits that “seek[] a global remedy

for a global issue,” Minnesota, 2023 WL 2607545, at *9

(Stras, J., concurring)—should proceed in federal or state

court. As one judge recently wrote, “only * * * [this]

Court gets to make that call.” Id. at *11. Given the consequential questions presented and the enormous stakes,

no objective observer could dispute that the Court’s guidance is urgently needed.

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*

*

*

*

*

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

HUGH QUAN GOTTSCHALK

ERIC L. ROBERTSON

WHEELER TRIGG

O’DONNELL LLP

370 Seventeenth Street,

Suite 4500

Denver, CO 80202

Counsel for Petitioners

Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc.,

Suncor Energy Sales Inc.,

and Suncor Energy Inc.

KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

WILLIAM T. MARKS

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

2001 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 223-7300

kshanmugam@paulweiss.com

THEODORE V. WELLS, JR.

DANIEL J. TOAL

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

1285 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019

COLIN G. HARRIS

FAEGRE BAKER

DANIELS LLP

1470 Walnut Street,

Suite 300

Boulder, CO 80302

Counsel for Petitioner

Exxon Mobil Corporation

APRIL 2023

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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