Opposition Brief — Houston Byrd, Jr., Petitioner v. Christopher Cook, et al.

Supreme Court briefJul 1, 2022

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No. 21-1507

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

_________________________

HOUSTON BYRD, JR., PETITIONER

BRAD D. FARNSWORTH and

CHRISTOPHER COOK, RESPONDENTS

______________________________

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

________________________________

RESPONDENT BRAD D. FARNSWORTH’S

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

______________________________________

Brian D. Sullivan*

Brian P. Nally

Brianna M. Prislipsky

REMINGER CO., L.P.A.

101 West Prospect Avenue, Suite 1400

Cleveland, OH 44115-1093

(216) 687-1311

bsullivan@reminger.com

Counsel for Respondent Brad D. Farnsworth

*Counsel of Record

COUNTERSTATEMENT

OF QUESTION PRESENTED

This appeal arises out of claims Petitioner

Houston Byrd, Jr. (“Petitioner”) has brought against

Respondent Brad D. Farnsworth (Farnsworth), an

investment professional, who facilitated the sale of an

annuity contract to Petitioner in December 2012.

Petitioner did not file suit until April 7, 2021, in the

Court of Common Pleas in Licking County, Ohio.

Generally, Petitioner alleges that the sale of his

annuity violates state and federal criminal statutes,

state and federal annuities laws, and constituted

common law breaches of contract and fiduciary duty.

The case was then removed to federal court,

after which Farnsworth filed a motion to dismiss

Petitioner’s claims because the statutes cited in his

complaint did not afford private rights of action, and

his remaining claims were otherwise barred by the

statute of limitations. Farnsworth also filed a motion

to have Petitioner declared a vexatious litigator due to

his conduct in that action as well as in more than a

dozen other actions initiated by Petitioner. The

district court granted both motions, and Petitioner

appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which

affirmed. Left with no further avenue to pursue his

claims against Farnsworth and the other defendants,

Petitioner has now petitioned this Court for a Writ of

Certiorari.

Petitioner raises the following issues in his

Petition: 1) whether Petitioner has a private right of

action under the several state and federal criminal

statutes referenced in his complaint, and 2) whether

Petitioner’s claims are time-barred, and 3) whether

iii

the district court and circuit court properly had

jurisdiction over his claims.

Table of Contents

OPINIONS BELOW ................................................... 1

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ............................ 1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ................. 1

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE ................. 2

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ........... 6

I. The Southern District of Ohio and Sixth

Circuit both properly had jurisdiction over Byrd’s

claims. ...................................................................... 7

II. The criminal statutes invoked by Petitioner do

not afford a private right of action. ......................... 8

III. Petitioner’s claims are time-barred as a

matter of law. ......................................................... 10

CONCLUSION.......................................................... 12

Table of Authorities

Cases

Page(s)

Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc.,

549 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977) .............................. 10

Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson,

539 U.S. 1, 123 S. Ct. 2058, 156 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2003)

............................................................................... 7

Butler v. ONEWEST Bank, FSB,

No. 10-00300HG-KSC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

81100, 2010 WL 3156047 (D. Haw. Aug. 6, 2010)

............................................................................. 10

Byrd v. Cook, 6th Cir.

No. 21-3623, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 33204 (Nov. 8,

2021) ................................................................. 1, 6

Byrd v. Cook,

S.D.Ohio No. 2:21-cv-2288, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

101226 (May 28, 2021) ........................................ 1,

Byrd v. Cook,

S.D.Ohio No. 2:21-cv-2288, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

121883 (June 30, 2021) ........................... 1, 3, 5, 6

Campbell v. M&T Bank,

W.D.Pa. No. 3:16-cv-118, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

41041 (Mar. 22, 2017) ........................................ 10

Curtis v. BP America, Inc,

808 F.Supp. 2d 976 (S.D. Tex. 2011) ................... 8

Hairston v. Sun Belt Conference Inc.,

E.D.La. No. 21-2088, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

240219 (Dec. 16, 2021) ........................................ 8

Heath v. Root9B,

D.Colo. Civil Action No. 18-cv-01516-RBJ-KMT,

2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34391 (Mar. 4, 2019) ... 10

Investors REIT One v. Jacobs,

46 Ohio St. 3d 176, 546 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio 1989)

............................................................................. 11

Krupnick v. Union National Bank,

470 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Pa. 1979) .................... 10

Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor,

481 U.S. 58, 107 S. Ct. 1542, 95 L. Ed. 2d 55

(1987) .................................................................... 7

Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co.,

611 F.2d 1170 (6th Cir.1979) ......................... 9, 10

Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,

442 U.S. 560, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979) ..................... 9

U.S. ex rel. Nagy v. Patton,

No. MISC.A. 110267, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

70995, 2012 WL 1858983 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2012)

............................................................................. 10

United States v. Sisson,

399 U.S. 267, 90 S. Ct. 2117 (1970) ..................... 9

Warthman v. Genoa Township Bd. of Trustees,

549 F.3d 1055 (6th Cir. 2008) .............................. 7

Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States,

389 U.S. 191, 88 S. Ct. 379 (1967) ....................... 9

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 656 .......................................................... 9

18 U.S.C. § 1341 .............................................. 3, 7, 10

vii

18 U.S.C. § 1348 ...................................................... 10

28 U.S.C. § 1254 ........................................................ 1

28 U.S.C. § 1331 .......................................... 1, 7, 8, 12

28 U.S.C. § 1441 ........................................................ 1

28 U.S.C. § 1658 .................................................. 2, 11

Ohio Rev. Code § 1707.43 ................................... 2, 11

Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.09 ............................... 2, 3, 11

Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.02 ................................. 3, 4, 9

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is available

at Byrd v. Cook, S.D.Ohio No. 2:21-cv-2288, 2021 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 121883 (June 30, 2021). The opinion of

the District Court is available at Byrd v. Cook, 6th Cir.

No. 21-3623, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 33204 (Nov. 8,

2021).

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Sixth Circuit entered its judgment on

November 8, 2021 and denied a petition for rehearing

en banc on December 15, 2021. This Court’s

jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254.

Respondent denies that the case satisfies the standard

set forth in this Court’s Rule 10(a), (b) or (c).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Petitioner argues that his complaint was

improperly removed to the Southern District of Ohio

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2), which precludes

removal jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of

citizenship when a defendant is a resident of the state

in which the action is brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)

provides that a case may be properly removed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 when the cause of action

arises under the federal law.

Under both Ohio and federal law, a claim for

securities fraud must be brought within five years of

the sale of the security. See, 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b); Ohio

Rev. Code § 1707.43(B).

Common law claims for breach of fiduciary duty

and fraud are subject to a four-year statute of

limitations based upon when the alleged injury of

fraud is discovered or should have been discovered.

Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.09(C).

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner is a litigant with an extensive history

of pursuing frivolous and meritless claims. Outside of

this current suit, Petitioner has filed more than a

dozen lawsuits—all of which have been dismissed—

including two cases against the Supreme Court of

Ohio and one against the Chief Justice of the Supreme

Court of Ohio (the Honorable Judge Maureen

O’Connor) in both her official and private capacity.

Motion to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigator, RE

7-1 through 7-44, PageID # 203-630.

Other targets of Petitioner’s filings have

included the attorney who represented him in prior

family court proceedings, the judge who presided over

those proceedings, the Ohio Department of Job and

Family Services (twice), a Domestic Relations Office

in Florida, the Franklin County Child Support

Agency, the Ohio Attorney General, and the Ohio

Inspector General, among many others. Id. All of

these cases precede the current litigation. Id.

In December 2012, almost ten years ago,

Petitioner purchased an annuity from Farnsworth.

Complaint, RE 1-1, PageID # 34. In July 2015,

Petitioner began to express frustration that his

annuity was subject to what he called “excessive fees,”

and that the annuity did not grow. Complaint, RE 11, PageID # 15-16. That same month, Petitioner

attempted to cancel the annuity but did not manage

to do so until April 2017. (Id.) Petitioner escalated the

matter by seeking relief from the Financial Industry

Regulatory Authority (FINRA), and its Office of the

Ombudsman. Id., at PageID # 13.

In April 2021, Petitioner filed his complaint pro

se. RE 1-1. Petitioner named as defendants both

Farnsworth and Christopher Cook (“Cook”), the head

of the Office of the Ombudsman. As an initial point,

the exact nature of Petitioner’s precise claims is not

readily decipherable. Petitioner’s complaint is

sprawling, and it contains whole sections devoted to

legal analysis and email chains, which have been

spliced and directly inserted into the text of the

complaint. As the district court noted, Petitioner’s

complaint “is nearly incomprehensible *** [i]t lacks

organization and structure, which renders the content

difficult to interpret.” Byrd v. Cook, S.D.Ohio No. 2:21cv-2288, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121883, at *2 (June

30, 2021).

Though the particular form of Petitioner’s

claims is not wholly clear from the face of his

complaint, he appears to allege violations of both state

and federal criminal statutes, including 18 U.S.C. §

1341 (mail fraud) and Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.02

(theft), as well as alleged violations of state and

federal securities laws. RE 1-1, PageID # 24.

Petitioner also alleges common law claims for alleged

fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy. RE 11, PageID # 15. Generally, Petitioner’s primary

allegation appears to be that he was charged fees for

his annuity that he claims were excessive, and that

his annuity did not appear to grow. Id.

Shortly after Petitioner’s complaint was filed,

Cook filed a notice to remove the case to the Southern

District of Ohio on the basis of federal question

jurisdiction, as Petitioner’s claims relied heavily upon

federal securities law and thus presented a federal

question. Notice of Removal, RE 1. Farnsworth

thereafter filed a motion to dismiss Petitioner’s claims

because 1) the state and federal statutes cited by

Petitioner did not afford private rights of action, and

2) Petitioner’s securities and common law claims were

barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.

Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim RE 6.

Separately, Cook filed a motion to dismiss on the basis

that Petitioner had failed to state a claim upon which

relief could be granted. Motion to Dismiss, RE 5.

In addition to his motion to dismiss,

Farnsworth also filed a motion to have Petitioner

deemed a vexatious litigator due to his conduct in that

action, as well as his conduct in over a dozen other

actions, which were detailed at length in Farnsworth’s

motion. RE 7. In response, Petitioner filed several

“motions to strike” various filings by defendants,

numerous “objections” to decisions by the district

court, a request for the recusal of the magistrate

judge, and motions for sanctions against Farnsworth’s

counsel subsequent to the filing of Farnsworth’s

motion to dismiss, requesting $25,000 and later

$50,000 in compensatory damages, and later

objections to the denial of his motions for sanctions.

RE 8-9, 11, 13, 16-17, 24. Petitioner then filed his own

motion to dismiss, made under the mistaken belief

that a lack of diversity would preclude federal

question jurisdiction. RE 14.

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

subsequently issued a report and recommendation in

which she found removal was proper, which the Court

adopted. Byrd v. Cook, S.D.Ohio No. 2:21-cv-2288,

2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101226 (May 28, 2021). The

Southern District of Ohio then granted both

Farnsworth and Cook’s motions, dismissing

Petitioner’s claims against both Defendants. Byrd v.

Cook, S.D.Ohio No. 2:21-cv-2288, 2021 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 121883, at *11 (June 30, 2021). The district

court found that the criminal statutes cited by

Petitioner in his complaint did not afford private

rights of action, and that Petitioner’s securities and

common law claims were barred by their respective

statutes of limitations. Id.

The district court also acknowledged that

Petitioner had “demonstrated willingness to file

repetitive and baseless motions that strain judicial

bandwidth,” in both that action and numerous prior

ones and subsequently granted Farnsworth’s motion

to have Petitioner deemed a vexatious litigator. Byrd

v. Cook, S.D.Ohio No. 2:21-cv-2288, 2021 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 121883, at *13 (June 30, 2021). In designating

Petitioner a vexatious litigator, the district court

enjoined Petitioner from filing any further actions

without first seeking leave from the Court or

obtaining a good faith certificate from a licensed

attorney. Id. at 16. Petitioner was further required to

include the captions and case numbers of all prior

actions in any complaint subsequently filed “in this or

any other court.” Id.

Petitioner then filed a notice of appeal to the

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, addressing only the

issue of subject matter jurisdiction. RE 30, PageID #

758. Specifically, Petitioner alleged that, because

Defendants were Ohio residents, they were “forum

defendants” who were precluded from removing the

case to federal court. Id., PageID #758-59.

Petitioner continued to engage in vexatious

conduct during the Sixth Circuit proceedings. In the

course of his appeal, Petitioner filed another motion

for sanctions, a motion to have Farnsworth’s brief

stricken, and a motion for default judgment on his

motion for sanctions. Petitioner also filed a

preemptive document titled “Concerns and Issues for

Clarifications,” in which he restated his claims that

his complaint was improperly removed to federal

court, which the Southern District of Ohio “knowingly

condoned.” See Concerns and Issues for Clarification,

filed 7/22/2021. Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit

affirmed the district court’s ruling after determining

that removal was proper on the basis of federal

question jurisdiction. Byrd v. Cook, 6th Cir. No. 213623, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 33204, at *4 (Nov. 8,

2021).

After the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Southern

District of Ohio’s ruling, Petitioner filed a motion for

an en banc rehearing and a motion to recall the Sixth

Circuit’s mandate. After both of those motions were

denied, Petitioner then filed a motion to reconsider his

motion for a rehearing, which was also denied.

Having exhausted his objections below,

Petitioner filed his Writ for a Petition of Certiorari

asking this Court to review the lower courts’ rulings.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

The Southern District of Ohio and

Sixth Circuit both properly had

jurisdiction over Byrd’s claims.

As a threshold matter, both the Southern

District of Ohio and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

had jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims. Pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1331, district courts have original

jurisdiction over all civil actions that arise under the

Constitution or laws of the United States. Here,

Petitioner alleges that numerous federal laws,

including 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 1346, 1348, and self-styled

“federal securities statutes” were violated by the sale

of Petitioner’s annuity. Because those claims

subsequently arise under federal law, they invoke

federal question jurisdiction.

It is well settled that “[f]ederal question

jurisdiction can be established by showing either that

[1] federal law creates the cause of action or that [2]

the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on the

resolution of a substantial question of federal law.”

Warthman v. Genoa Township Bd. of Trustees, 549

F.3d 1055, 1060 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal citation and

quotation omitted). Whether a cause of action arises

under federal law must be apparent from the face of

the “well-pleaded complaint.” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.

Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 107 S. Ct. 1542, 95 L. Ed. 2d

55 (1987). For purposes of assessing whether federalquestion jurisdiction exists, federal courts ignore any

potential federal defenses that may arise in the course

of the litigation. Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson,

539 U.S. 1, 6, 123 S. Ct. 2058, 156 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2003).

Petitioner’s claims against Farnsworth arise

under federal securities law, which subsequently

triggers federal question jurisdiction. Specifically, as

best can be determined from the face of his complaint,

Petitioner’s claims arise from the alleged breach of

federal securities laws. Moreover, Petitioner’s “right

to relief” required the resolution of federal questions

of law, namely 1) whether the federal criminal

statutes cited by Petitioner afforded private rights of

action, and 2) whether Petitioner’s claims were

properly brought pursuant to their applicable statutes

of limitations. This was sufficient to grant the district

court jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims.

Petitioner alleges that removal was improper

pursuant to the “forum defendant rule,” under which

a defendant in a diversity action is prohibited from

removing a case when that defendant is a resident of

the state in which the case was filed. Because this case

does not arise under diversity jurisdiction, however,

the district court properly concluded that removal

jurisdiction was proper. See also, Hairston v. Sun Belt

Conference Inc., E.D.La. No. 21-2088, 2021 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 240219, at *17 (Dec. 16, 2021); Curtis v. BP

America, Inc, 808 F.Supp. 2d 976, 982 (S.D. Tex. 2011)

(“The forum-defendant rule does not apply to cases

arising under federal law”). As a result, both the

district court and Sixth Circuit had proper jurisdiction

over Petitioner’s claims, as Petitioner’s claims invoked

federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1331.

II.

The criminal statutes invoked by

Petitioner do not afford a private right

of action.

Petitioner’s claims were properly dismissed.

The criminal statutes Petitioner cites to in his

complaint and Petition to this Court do not provide

private causes of action. Generally, a criminal statute

that does not provide for an express private right of

action will not be interpreted as having provided for

one. Here, none of the statutes invoked by Petitioner

contain express provisions for private causes of action.

Accordingly, because none of the statutes cited by

Petitioner provide private rights of action, his claims

were properly dismissed by the district court.

In determining whether a criminal statute

provides a private right of action, the central inquiry

is whether Congress intended to create, either

expressly or by implication, a private cause of action.

Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170, 1177 (6th

Cir.1979), citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442

U.S. 560, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979). The provision of a

criminal penalty does not necessarily preclude

implication of a private cause of action for damages.

Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 389

U.S. 191, 201-202, 88 S. Ct. 379 (1967). However,

when there is nothing more than a “bare criminal

statute, with absolutely no indication that civil

enforcement of any kind” was meant to be provided, a

court may not infer a private right of action. Id.

“Where Congress has provided a specific provision,

the court should not expand the remedy beyond the

limits where Congress was prepared to go.” Ryan at

1177, citing United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 297,

90 S. Ct. 2117 (1970).

Petitioner invokes numerous criminal statutes

in his complaint and Petition, including 18 U.S.C. §§

656 (theft), 1341 (mail fraud), 1346 (“scheme or

artifice to fraud”), 1348 (securities and commodities

fraud), 1349 (attempt and conspiracy), and Ohio Rev.

Code § 2913.02 (theft). None of these statutes provide

for private causes of action. For example, 18 U.S.C. §

656 does not provide for a private right of action.

Campbell v. M&T Bank, W.D.Pa. No. 3:16-cv-118,

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41041, at *16 (Mar. 22, 2017),

citing U.S. ex rel. Nagy v. Patton, No. MISC.A. 110267,

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70995, 2012 WL 1858983, at *2

(E.D. Pa. May 22, 2012).

Numerous circuit courts have further held that

the mail fraud statute (§ 1341) provides no private

right of action. Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d

1170, 1178 (6th Cir.1979), citing Bell v. Health-Mor,

Inc., 549 F.2d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1977); Krupnick v.

Union National Bank, 470 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Pa.

1979). There is also “no question that 18 U.S.C. § 1348

is a criminal statute without a private right of action.”

Heath v. Root9B, D.Colo. Civil Action No. 18-cv-01516RBJ-KMT, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34391, at *17 (Mar.

4, 2019), citing Butler v. ONEWEST Bank, FSB, No.

10-00300HG-KSC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81100, 2010

WL 3156047, at *3 (D. Haw. Aug. 6, 2010).

Petitioner presents no explanation or exception

for the above holdings. Because the state and federal

criminal statutes cited by Petitioner in his complaint

offer no private right of action, the district court and

Sixth Circuit properly concluded that Petitioner had

failed to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted.

III.

Petitioner’s claims are time-barred as a

matter of law.

Even if Petitioner was entitled to private rights

of action for his claims, his claims are also barred due

to their applicable statutes of limitation. Under Ohio

law, securities claims are subject to a five-year statute

of limitations. Similarly, Petitioner’s state tort law

claims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary

duty are subject to four-year statutes of limitations.

Here, at the latest, Petitioner had notice of his claims

in July 2015, when he contacted Farnsworth and

asked to have his annuity cancelled. Because

Petitioner’s claims were not filed until April 7, 2021,

more than five years after Petitioner had notice of the

allegations underlying his complaint, Petitioner’s

claims are subsequently time-barred and were

properly dismissed by the courts below.

Under both Ohio and federal law, a claim for

securities fraud must be brought within five years of

the sale of the security. See, 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b); Ohio

Rev. Code § 1707.43(B). Similarly, common law claims

for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud are subject to a

four-year statute of limitations that begins to run

when the alleged injury of fraud is discovered or

should have been discovered. See Investors REIT One

v. Jacobs, 46 Ohio St. 3d 176, 546 N.E.2d 206, 207

(Ohio 1989) (syllabus); Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.09(C).

Petitioner initially purchased his annuity in

December 2012. Three years later, in July 2015,

Petitioner contacted Farnsworth and expressed

numerous frustrations about the annuity, including

allegations that the accompanying fees were too high,

and that the annuity was not growing at a sufficient

rate. That same month, Petitioner attempted to have

his annuity cancelled, though he did not succeed in

doing so until July 2017. Petitioner’s complaint was

not filed until April 2021, six years after he had

notice of his purported claims. Under both the fiveyear statute of limitations for securities fraud, and the

four-year statute of limitations for common law

negligence, Petitioner’s claims are time-barred.

Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to cite a

relevant conflict between circuit courts that would be

sufficient to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction under this

or any of the legal bases for dismissal cited by the

Southern District of Ohio or Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Petition should be

denied, as he has failed to demonstrate that his claims

were viable as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION

For all the above reasons, the Petition for a

Writ of Certiorari should be denied. First, the Sixth

Circuit’s decision does not bear upon any important

question of federal law that this Court should decide,

nor does it conflict with any relevant decision of this

Court. Further, there is no relevant conflict among

the Circuits as to whether removal is proper under 28

U.S.C. § 1331 when a plaintiff’s claim asserts causes

of action under federal statutes, subsequently

presenting a federal question. Finally, neither the

Southern District of Ohio nor the Sixth Circuit Court

of Appeals erred in dismissing and upholding the

dismissal of Petitioner’s complaint, as he had failed to

state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Dated: July 1, 2022

Respectfully submitted,