Amicus Curiae Brief — Arizona, et al., Petitioners v. Navajo Nation, et al.
Supreme Court briefFeb 8, 2023
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Nos. 21-1484 and 22-51
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In The
Supreme Court of the United States
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------STATE OF ARIZONA, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
NAVAJO NATION, et al.,
Respondents.
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
NAVAJO NATION, et al.,
Respondents.
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------On Writs Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------BRIEF FOR DINÉ HATAAŁII ASSOCIATION, INC.
AS AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------PATRICIA FERGUSON-BOHNEE
Counsel of Record
DERRICK BEETSO
INDIAN LEGAL CLINIC
ASU PUBLIC INTEREST LAW FIRM
SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR COLLEGE OF LAW
111 E. Taylor Street, Mail Code 8820
Phoenix, Arizona 85004
(480) 727-0420
pafergus@asu.edu
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
================================================================================================================
COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964
WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................
iii
INTERESTS OF THE AMICUS CURIAE ...........
1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..............................
2
ARGUMENT ........................................................
3
I.
II.
THE NAVAJO NATION’S TREATIES MUST
BE INTERPRETED HOW THE NAVAJO
NATION WOULD HAVE UNDERSTOOD
THEM.........................................................
3
A. History of the Navajo Nation’s Treaties with the United States .................
5
B. The Navajo Nation’s Winters Rights.....
8
THE NAVAJO NATION’S UNDERSTANDING OF ITS TREATIES IS GOVERNED BY
PRE-EXISTING TRADITIONAL NAVAJO
LAW ........................................................... 10
A. Traditional Navajo Law Regarding
Balance and Disharmony, and the
1868 Treaty .......................................... 11
B. Diné Thinking and Planning in Finding Solutions ........................................ 15
C. Traditional Diné Thinking Continues to
Exist and Inform How Diné Conduct
Themselves ............................................ 19
D. The Relief Sought by the Navajo Nation
is Supported by Applying Traditional
Navajo Law and this Court’s Precedent... 21
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
III.
WINTERS DOCTRINAL RIGHTS AND
TRADITIONAL DINÉ WORLDVIEWS ..... 23
A. Diné Winters Rights under Federal
Law Must be Understood According to
Diné Rights to Tó (“Water”) and Nature’s Elements under Diné Natural
Laws..................................................... 25
B. The State and Federal Petitioners’
Proposed Indian Water Policy Results
in Disparate Treatment, as Applied, to
the Navajo Nation’s Reserved Property Interests ....................................... 28
CONCLUSION..................................................... 33
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546 (1963) ...................................................8
Arizona v. California,
460 U.S. 605 (1983) .................................................24
Arizona v. California,
547 U.S. 150 (2006) ........................................... 24, 25
Cappaert v. United States,
426 U.S. 128 (1976) ............................................. 8, 23
Choctaw Nation v. United States,
318 U.S. 423 (1943) ...................................................4
Herrera v. Wyoming,
139 S.Ct. 1686 (2019) ................................................4
Iina Ba, Inc. v. Navajo Business Regulatory,
11 Am. Tribal Law 447 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2014) ..........20
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians,
526 U.S. 172 (1999) ...................................................4
Navajo Nation v. Bedonie,
6 Am. Tribal Law 725 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2006) ............19
Navajo Nation v. Dep’t of Interior, et al.,
D.C. No. 3:03-cv-00507-GMS (9th Cir. 2021) ...... 8, 10
Off. of Navajo Lab. Rels., ex rel. Bailon v.
Cent. Consol. Sch. Dist. 22,
No. SC-CV-37-00, 5 Am. Tribal Law 412
(Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004) .................................................16
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Office of Navajo Nation President and
Vice-President v. Navajo Nation Council,
9 Am. Tribal Law 46 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2010) ..............15
Parravano v. Babbit,
70 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 1995) ......................................30
United States v. Adair,
723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983) ..................................24
United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375 (1986) .................................................27
United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe,
537 U.S. 565 (2003) ........................................... 26, 28
United States v. Winans,
198 U.S. 371 (1905) ................................. 4, 23, 24, 32
Washington State Department of Licensing v.
Cougar Den, Inc.,
139 S.Ct. 1000 (2019) .......................................... 5, 29
Washington v. Washington State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n,
443 U.S. 658 (1979) ........................................... 4, 5, 7
Winters v. United States,
207 U.S. 564 (1908) ..... 3, 4, 8, 9, 15, 23-26, 28-30, 32
CONSTITUTION, TREATIES, AND STATUTES
U.S. CONST. art. II .........................................................3
U.S. CONST. art. VI .............................................. 4, 8, 15
1 N.N.C. § 201 .............................................................22
1 N.N.C. § 202 .............................................................17
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
1 N.N.C. § 2 .................................................................20
1 N.N.C. § 7 .................................................................19
2 N.N.C. § 110 .............................................................16
Colorado River Compact of 1922, art. VII ...... 28, 29, 30
Navajo Nation Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon
One (1991) ...............................................................20
Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Navajo Tribe of Indians, With a
Record of the Discussions that Led to its
Signing, Aug. 12, 1868 (1968) ................. 9, 14, 22, 31
Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Navajo Tribe of Indians, Concluded
June 1, 1868, Ratification advised July 25,
1868, Proclaimed Aug. 12, 1868, 15 Stat. 668 ..........6
art. I .........................................................................27
art. V ..........................................................................6
art. XII .......................................................................6
art. XIII .....................................................................6
Treaty with the Navajos, Concluded Sept. 9,
1849, Ratified Sept. 9, 1850, Proclaimed Sept.
24, 1850, 9 Stat. 974 ............................................... 5
art. I ..................................................................... 5, 27
art. IX .................................................................. 5, 32
art. XI ........................................................................6
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Bernhard Michaelis, The Navajo Treaty of 1868
(Navajo Historical Ser. No. 4, 2014)..........................9
Brief for Respondents, Arizona v. Navajo Nation,
Nos. 21-1484 & 22-51 (2023) ...................................26
Brief for State Petitioners, Arizona v. Navajo
Nation, Nos. 21-1484 and 22-51 (2022) ..................24
Charles J. Kappler, Kappler’s Indian Affairs:
Laws and Treaties Compiled and Edited by
Charles J. Kappler. Vol II (1904) ...............................4
Declaration of Roman Bitsuie (Jan. 30, 2023),
http://bit.ly/romanbitsuie ...................... 11, 16, 17, 30
Department of the Interior, Criteria and Procedures for Indian Water Rights Settlements,
55 Fed. Reg. 9223 (Mar. 12, 1990) ...........................10
Final Environmental Impact Statement, Colorado
River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin
Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake
Powell and Lake Mead (Oct. 2007) ............... 10, 26, 29
Frances Stead Sellers, It’s Almost 2020, and 2
Million Americans Still Don’t Have Running
Water, According to New Report, Washington Post
(Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/its-almost-2020-and-2-million-americansstill-dont-have-running-water-new-report-says/
2019/12/10/a0720e8a-14b3-11ea-a659-7d69641c6ff7_
story.html ................................................................31
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Interview with Avery Denny, President, Diné
Hataałii Association, Inc. (Dec. 17, 2022) (on
file with the author) .................................... 14, 27, 28
John L. Kessell, General Sherman and the
Navajo Treaty of 1868: A Basic and Expedient
Misunderstanding, 12 W. Hist. Q. 251 (Jul.
1981) ...................................................................... 7, 8
Katherine Marie Birmingham Osburn, The
Navajo at the Bosque Redondo: Cooperation,
Resistance, and Initiative, 1864-1868, 60 N.M.
Hist. Rev. 399 (1985) ......................................... 13, 15
Marie Mitchell, The Navajo Peace Treaty 1868
(1973) .......................................................................12
Michelle Hale, Empowered Sovereignty for
Navajo Chapters Through Engagement in a
Community Planning Process, in Navajo
Sovereignty, Understandings and Visions of
the Diné People (Lloyd L. Lee ed. 2017) .................18
Miranda Warburton, We Don’t Own Nature,
Nature Owns Us: The Ceremonial and
Esoteric Nature of Water in the Little Colorado
River Basin and Diné Bikeyah (July 1, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) ............................................................... 22, 23
National Park Service, Policy Mem. No. 22-03
(Sept. 12, 2022), https://www.nps.gov/subjects/
policy/upload/PM_22-03.pdf......................................3
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Peacemaking Program of the Judicial Branch of
the Navajo Nation, PEACEMAKING PLAN OF
OPERATIONS (2012), https://courts.navajo-nsn.gov/
Peacemaking/Plan/PPPO2013-2-25.pdf .................21
Raymond D. Austin, Navajo Courts and Navajo
Common Law (2009) ....................................11, 13-15
Responding to Historic Drought and Ongoing
Dry Conditions in the Colorado River Basin:
Request for Input, 84 Fed. Reg. 2244 (Feb. 6,
2019) ........................................................................30
Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes From It”: Navajo
Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. Rev. 175 (1994)..... 11, 12
Robert Yazzie, Air Light/Fire, Water and
Earth/Pollen: Sacred Elements that Sustain
Life, 18 J. Env’t L. & Litig. 191 (2003).............. 27, 28
Robert Yazzie, Avery Denny, Lorene Legah,
Amber Crotty, James McKenzie, Diné Good
Governance and Leadership Framework,
(2014), https://www.aisc.ucla.edu/gng/posters/
amber.crotty.poster.pdf ............................................17
1
INTERESTS OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
Established in the 1970s, Amicus Diné Hataałii
Association, Inc.1 is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization,
comprised of over 200 Diné2 medicine men and women
from across the Navajo Reservation, that exists to protect, preserve, and promote the Diné cultural wisdom,
spiritual practice, and ceremonial knowledge for present and future generations. The Association is certified and incorporated under the auspices of the Navajo
Nation Division of Economic Development business
regulatory process and is overseen by a board of directors from each of the five geographic regions of the
Navajo Nation. Amicus is uniquely situated to inform
the Court about traditional Diné worldviews and laws,
particularly as related to interpreting treaties between
the United States and the Navajo Nation and how the
implicit promise of water in the Navajo Nation’s 1868
treaty with the United States compels the relief sought
in this case—the United States’ obligations to plan for
and protect the water for the treaty homelands.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
1
Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.6, counsel for amicus curiae certify that no person or entity other than amicus curiae and
their counsel authored this brief in whole or in part. No person
other than amicus curiae or their counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission of the brief.
2
Navajos refer to themselves as “Diné,” which means “the
people” in their language. Navajo and Diné will be used interchangeably throughout this brief.
2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Amicus endeavors to provide the Court with critical information about Diné worldviews and traditional
Navajo law, also known as Diné bi beehaz’áanii. An understanding of traditional Navajo law, which has existed since time immemorial and is still intact today,
will help inform how Navajo signatories would have
understood the Navajo Nation’s treaties with the
United States. Amicus will explain how traditional
Navajo law governs Diné relationships generally with
the surrounding elements—water, air, fire, and land,
and how traditional Navajo law generally seeks balance and harmony, while also addressing inevitable
conflict and resolution. Amicus will also explain the
importance of critical thinking and planning in traditional Diné culture.
An understanding of traditional Navajo law is necessary to comprehend, from a Navajo perspective, the
effects of the imprisonment of Navajo people by the
United States at Bosque Redondo between the years
1864 and 1868. Traditional Navajo law will help inform the Court on how the Navajo signatories would
have understood the sacred promises and responsibilities agreed to by the United States in signing the 1868
treaty.
Amicus will explain how these traditional Navajo
laws provide the foundation of modern day Diné bi beehaz’áanii (“Navajo law”) and have been in continuous
use since the time of signing the treaties. Amicus will
further explain how the Navajo Nation’s requested
3
relief sought in this case—affirmative and judicially
enforceable duties on the part of the United States to
plan for the Navajo Nation’s water needs—is consistent with traditional Navajo laws, whereas the result requested by Petitioners in this case would lead
to disharmony and disparate treatment under this
Court’s precedent.
Specific to the underlying element in this case, tó
(“water”), Amicus suggests that the United States’ obligations are clear under both traditional Navajo law
and under this Court’s Winters doctrine. Federal duties
that attach themselves to Navajo treaties and Winters
rights must be viewed through this traditional lens,
which is consistent with this Court’s unwavering precedent.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
ARGUMENT
I.
THE NAVAJO NATION’S TREATIES MUST
BE INTERPRETED HOW THE NAVAJO
NATION WOULD HAVE UNDERSTOOD
THEM.
In the mid-1800s, the United States exercised its
treaty powers, under Article II, Section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution, to enter into binding agreements with
numerous Indian tribes, including the Navajo Nation.
These treaties helped pave the way for non-Indian settlement across the western United States, and resulted
in large swaths of federal landholdings west of the
100th Meridian. See, e.g., National Park Service,
4
Policy Mem. No. 22-03, at 2 (Sept. 12, 2022),
https://www.nps.gov/subjects/policy/upload/PM_22-03.pdf.
Importantly, the Framers determined that “all Treaties made . . . under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 2. The United States bound itself to unique
promises and responsibilities in exchange for tribes
ceding extensive landholdings and remaining on
smaller land parcels (often, but not always known as
“Reservations”). See generally Charles J. Kappler,
Kappler’s Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties Compiled
and Edited by Charles J. Kappler, Vol. II (1904). In reviewing Indian treaties, this Court has said, “Treaty
analysis begins with the text, and treaty terms are
construed as ‘they would naturally be understood by
the Indians.’ ” Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S.Ct. 1686,
1701 (2019) (quoting Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n (“Fishing
Vessel”), 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979)).
In reviewing and interpreting Indian treaties, this
Court has said that treaties may best be understood by
the circumstances surrounding their negotiation and
execution. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381
(1905). This Court has also held consistently that Indian treaties “are to be interpreted liberally in favor of
the Indians,” Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 200 (1999) (citing Fishing
Vessel, 443 U.S. at 675–76; Choctaw Nation v. United
States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943)), and that “ambiguities
are to be resolved in their favor.” Id. (citing Winters v.
United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1908)). More
5
recently, in Washington State Department of Licensing
v. Cougar Den, Inc., this Court explained the Indian
treaty interpretation cases “base their reasoning in
part upon the fact that the treaty negotiations were
conducted in, and the treaty was written in, languages
that put the [Indians] at a significant disadvantage.”
139 S.Ct. 1000, 1012 (2019); see also Fishing Vessel, 443
U.S. at 666–67 (explaining “[t]here is no evidence of the
precise understanding the Indians had of any of the
specific English terms and phrases in the treaty . . . ”,
but they were interested in protecting their right to
fish, and that they “rel[ied] heavily on the good faith of
the United States to protect that right”). This Court’s
Indian treaty interpretation precedent must guide its
review of the Navajo Nation’s treaties with the United
States.
A. History of the Navajo Nation’s Treaties
with the United States.
Two treaties between the Navajo Nation and the
United States are pertinent to this case—one in 1849
and another in 1868. In 1849, the Navajo Nation entered into a treaty with the United States establishing
a robust trust responsibility “plac[ing] [the Navajo
Nation] under the exclusive jurisdiction and protection of the . . . United States[,] . . . forever.” See Treaty
with the Navajos, Concluded Sept. 9, 1849, Ratified
Sept. 9, 1850, Proclaimed Sept. 24, 1850, 9 Stat. 974,
art. I (“1849 Treaty”). The 1849 Treaty included a plan
to delineate future boundaries for the Navajo Nation’s
permanent homeland. Id. at art. IX (“it is agreed by the
6
aforesaid Navajoes that the government of the United
States shall, at its earliest convenience, designate, settle, and adjust their territorial boundaries, and pass
and execute in their territory such laws as may be
deemed conducive to the prosperity and happiness
of said Indians.”). The 1849 Treaty is “to receive a liberal construction, at all times and in all places, . . . and
that the government of the United States shall so legislate and act as to secure the permanent prosperity
and happiness of [the Navajo Nation].” Id. at art. XI.
In 1868, nearly two decades later, while imprisoned under deplorable conditions on the Bosque Redondo Reservation at Fort Sumner, New Mexico, the
Navajo Nation entered into another treaty with the
United States. Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Navajo Tribe of Indians, Concluded
June 1, 1868, Ratification advised July 25, 1868, Proclaimed Aug. 12, 1868, 15 Stat. 668 (“1868 Treaty”).
The 1868 Treaty delineated the Navajo Reservation’s
boundaries and was designed to entice farming by
Navajo families on plots of land “not [to exceed] one
hundred sixty acres,” and by individual adult Navajos
on plots of land “[not exceeding] eighty acres.” Id. at
art. V. The United States also agreed to purchase “fifteen thousand sheep and goats,” and “five hundred
beef cattle” to better encourage an agrarian lifestyle.
Id. at art. XII. Upon these promises, among others, the
Navajo Nation agreed “to make [the Navajo Reservation] their permanent home, and [that] they [would]
not as a tribe make any permanent settlement elsewhere.” Id. at art. XIII.
7
The 1868 Treaty was negotiated between the
United States and the Navajo Nation using two interpreters—one fluent in the Navajo language and Spanish, the other fluent in Spanish and English. John L.
Kessell, General Sherman and the Navajo Treaty of
1868: A Basic and Expedient Misunderstanding, 12 W.
Hist. Q. 251, 261–66 (Jul. 1981) (describing the dual
translation process of negotiating the Reservation
boundaries provisions of the 1868 Treaty, first from
English to Spanish with one interpreter, James C.
Sutherland; then from Spanish to Navajo via another
interpreter, Jesus Arviso.). Similar to the circumstances surrounding the Fishing Vessel decision, the
Navajo signatories lacked a “precise understanding . . .
of the specific English terms and phrases in the treaty,”
but it is clear from records of the negotiation that they
bargained for a return to their traditional homelands—to live within their four sacred mountains and
their rivers and streams.
This trilingual negotiation process resulted in a
colossal misunderstanding of the Reservation boundaries, with the United States relying on its description
of metes and bounds, and the Navajo relying on promises that they could return “home.” General Sherman
and the Navajo Treaty of 1868: A Basic and Expedient
Misunderstanding, 12 W. Hist. Q. at 261. As a result,
“[i]n 1869, the year after the Navajos’ return from the
Bosque, a concerned army officer estimated that half
of the tribe was outside treaty boundaries.” Id. at 271.
The Navajo had returned to their traditional homelands and continued their lifeways planting crops,
8
grazing cattle and sheep, and migrating within their
homelands. From this point, the federal government
consistently chose not to enforce the boundary lines for
several reasons, “because the government was able to
renege both treaty and trust obligations, to spend less
per capita on the Navajos than on practically any other
tribe, to save the tens of millions of dollars it would
have cost over the years to confine and to subsist them,
or to educate them (per Article VI) and wisely develop
the resources of the reservation.” Id. Congress finally
resolved the border question with legislation “defining
the exterior boundaries of the Navajo Reservation in
Utah and in Arizona.” in the 1930s. Id. at 272.
B. The Navajo Nation’s Winters Rights.
When the United States establishes an Indian reservation, “the Government, by implication, reserves
appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent
needed to accomplish the purpose of the Reservation.”
Navajo Nation v. Dep’t of Interior, et al., D.C. No. 3:03cv-00507-GMS at 10 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Cappaert v.
United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976); see also Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. at 576. This Court has
described the ancestral homelands of the Navajo people as “arid,” reasoning “[i]f the water necessary to sustain life is to be had, it must come from the Colorado
River or its tributaries.” Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546, 598–99 (1963).
The multiple provisions in the 1868 Treaty encouraging an agrarian society discussed above, coupled
9
with the forced farming activities Navajo people were
subjected to while imprisoned in Bosque Redondo
make clear that the United States intended to secure
ample water resources for the Navajo Nation’s permanent homeland. See, e.g., Bernhard Michaelis, The
Navajo Treaty of 1868, at 131 (Navajo Historical Ser.
No. 4, 2014) (Sept. 6, 1863 letter from Brigadier General James Carleton to Brigadier General Lorenzo
Thomas stating, “[t]he purpose had in view is to send
all captured Navajoes and Apaches to [Bosque Redondo], and there to feed and take care of them until
they have opened farms and become able to support
themselves, as the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico are
doing”). Indeed, the 1868 Treaty negotiations included
specific discussions about the poor water quality in
Bosque Redondo when compared to the Navajo peoples’ ancestral homelands. Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Navajo Tribe of Indians,
With a Record of the Discussions that Led to its Signing, 3, Aug. 12, 1868 (1968) [hereafter 1868 Treaty with
Record of the Discussions] (“I thought at one time the
whole world was the same as my own country but I got
fooled in it, outside my own country we cannot raise a
crop, but in it we can raise a crop almost anywhere, . . .
we know this land does not like us neither does the
water.”).
Moreover, the Department of the Interior recently
acknowledged that “under the Winters doctrine, the
federal government impliedly ‘reserved water in an
amount necessary to fulfill the purposes of [the Navajo
Reservation]’ ”, and that “[u]nquantified water rights
10
of the Navajo Nation are considered an ITA [(Indian
Trust Asset)].” Navajo Nation v. Dep’t of Interior, et al.,
D.C. No. 3:03-cv-00507-GMS, at 14 (citing Final Environmental Impact Statement, Colorado River Interim
Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead, 3-96
(Oct. 2007)) [hereinafter Shortage Guidelines FEIS].
Generally, the federal government considers Winters
rights as “vested property rights for which the United
States has a trust responsibility.” Department of the
Interior, Criteria and Procedures for Indian Water
Rights Settlements, 55 Fed. Reg. 9223 (Mar. 12, 1990).
Along with lands set aside under Indian treaties, “the
United States [holds] legal title to such water in trust
for the benefit of the Indians.” Id. To understand how
the Navajo would have understood these express
treaty provisions and the established implicit promise
of water that accompanies them, Amicus will next explain selected aspects of traditional Navajo law.
II.
THE NAVAJO NATION’S UNDERSTANDING OF ITS TREATIES IS GOVERNED BY
PRE-EXISTING TRADITIONAL NAVAJO
LAW.
Amicus will now discuss traditional laws regarding balance and disharmony, cultural perspectives
about the circumstances surrounding the signing of
the 1868 Treaty, and traditional Diné principles governing the importance of critical thinking and planning in Navajo culture. These principles are
paramount in discerning how the treaty signatories
11
would have viewed the 1868 Treaty and how the relief
sought by the Navajo Nation in this matter is consistent with those views as detailed further below.
A. Traditional Navajo Law Regarding Balance and Disharmony, and the 1868
Treaty.
The starting point to understand the Navajo way
of thinking is hózhǫ́, or Diné peoples’ balance with the
world around them. All Diné lifeways are governed by
hózhǫ́, described as “the perfect state.” Robert Yazzie,
“Life Comes From It”: Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M.
L. Rev. 175 (1994); see also Raymond D. Austin, Navajo
Courts and Navajo Common Law 54 (2009) [hereinafter Austin] (stating “hózhǫ́ describes a state . . . where
everything, tangible and intangible, is in its proper
place and functioning well with everything else, such
that the condition produced can be described as peace,
harmony, and balance”); Declaration of Roman Bitsuie,
¶5 (Jan. 30, 2023), http://bit.ly/romanbitsuie (describing hózhǫ́ as both “to achieve a state of beauty by attaining a state of balance,” and as “a holy condition to
be strived for and sought after for one’s entire life”).
Thus, Navajos are taught to live according to hózhǫ́,
“because it embodies everything that is considered
good.” Austin at 55.
At times, Diné encounter the opposite of hózhǫ́—
hóchxǫ’, or disharmony, caused by naayéé’ (“monsters”).
Naayéé’ can be “anything that causes disharmony, friction, or discord in life.” Id. at 60–61. By way of analogy,
12
the conflicts that underlie certain matters before this
Court often have their own naayéé’, and the parties involved in those matters often seek restoration of their
respective hózhǫ́ through this Court’s constitutional
jurisdiction. Importantly, Diné lifeways also provide
processes to eliminate naayéé’ through ceremonies intended to restore hózhǫ́. See Yazzie, Life Comes From
It, 24 N.M. L. Rev. at 181–82. Different ceremonies are
conducted to restore hózhǫ́ depending on the circumstances and the nature of the naayéé’. Id.
In 1864, “more than 7,000 Navajo men, women,
and children were driven like cattle across the barren,
mesquite-studded plains of New Mexico to Fort
Sumner, where a reservation held them prisoners for
. . . four years of hardships, disease, and near starvation.” Marie Mitchell, The Navajo Peace Treaty 1868 ix
(1973). This experience is collectively referred to
among the Diné as Hwéeldi (“a place of suffering and
fear”) and it was here that the 1868 Treaty was negotiated and signed.
The Navajo imprisonment at Hwéeldi was an environment of hóchxǫ’, or disharmony, embodied by the
worst naayéé’ (“monsters”) Navajo people have endured in modern times. The 1868 Treaty and the
United States’ promises therein are predicated, from a
Diné perspective, on efforts to restore hózhǫ́. Circumstances like Hwéeldi, where an abundance of naayéé’
contribute toward a state of hóchxǫ’, require a regimented corrective process under Diné bi beehaz’áanii
(“Navajo law”). The traditional problem-solving process is described as follows:
13
(1) the hózhǫ́ condition exists; (2) negative
forces called naayéé’ (“monsters”) disrupt the
hózhǫ́ condition, resulting in hóchxǫ’ (disharmony); (3) the negative forces (naayéé’) are
identified/isolated and then matched to a specific ceremony; (4) the ceremony expels or
neutralizes the negative forces; and (5) the
ceremony returns things and beings (humans
included) to hózhǫ́. . . . The end result is called
hózhǫ́ nahasdłii (hózhǫ́ restored).
Austin at 61. The historical record of activities preceding the signing of the 1868 Treaty evidence Diné leaders adhering to this process before agreeing to the 1868
Treaty.
In this instance, elements (1) and (2) are respectively pre-Hwéeldi and Hwéeldi. Predicting the devastation to come in Bosque Redondo, “[a]s early as 1865,
the Indians . . . warn[ed] that if they were forced to remain upon the reservation [at Bosque Redondo] they
would ‘all die very soon.’ They explained that they had
been instructed by their Holy People to remain within
the boundaries of three rivers, the Rio Grande, the Rio
San Juan, and the Rio Colorado, and that their violation of this restriction was responsible for their current suffering.” Katherine Marie Birmingham Osburn,
The Navajo at the Bosque Redondo: Cooperation, Resistance, and Initiative, 1864-1868, 60 N.M. Hist. Rev.
399, 407–08 (1985). Barboncito, a spiritual leader and
the Head Chief of the Navajos when the 1868 Treaty
was signed, attributed the despair inflicted on Navajo
people to the removal from their homeland which went
against their forefathers advice to not “cross[ ] the line
14
of my own country.” 1868 Treaty with Record of the
Discussions, at 1-3. He observed that the forced imprisonment and harsh conditions at Bosque Redondo resulted in death of both people and animals. “It seems
that whatever we do here causes death, some work at
the Acequias take sick and die, others die with the hoe
in their hands, they go to the river to their waists and
suddenly disappear, others have been struck and torn
to pieces by lightning.” Id. The impact of Hwéeldi continues to be felt today and is credited as the beginning
of many current social plagues within the Navajo community. Interview with Avery Denny, President, Diné
Hataałii Association, Inc. (“Denny Interview”) (Dec. 17,
2022) (on file with the author). With respect to elements (3) and (4), Navajo historians recount the performance of a Coyote Way ceremony after the first day
negotiating the 1868 Treaty. Austin, at 5 (describing
that “[a] group stood away from the [treaty] negotiations, and while the Coyote way chants were sung, a
coyote entered the circle. He ran around inside it, and
at one point during the chant, he broke the circle and
ran to the west. That was an indication that Navajos
would return west, back to Diné Bikeyah (Navajo country), rather than to the east and Indian Territory”). The
purpose of the Coyote Way ceremony was to restore
hózhǫ́ and effectuate the release of Navajo people back
to their homeland.
“Although some informants claimed that the ritual was divinatory, indicating that the government
was now ready to free the Navajo, other Navajos attributed their freedom to this ceremony” because their
15
request to leave was not granted until the Coyote Way
ceremony was performed. Osburn at 408 (Adding, “[t]o
this day, some Navajo believe that, ultimately, their
Holy People, not the United States government, returned them to their current reservation.”). The 1868
Treaty, from a Diné perspective, is therefore a sacred
document, referred to as Naaltsoos Sání (“the paper
that is aged”), which the treaty signatories believed
was intended to restore hózhǫ́. In fact, “[t]he Navajo
people see the [1868 Treaty] as equal to their covenant
with the Holy Beings: both are binding sacred agreements that must be respected and honored continuously and in perpetuity.” Austin at 6; see also Office of
Navajo Nation President and Vice-President v. Navajo
Nation Council, 9 Am. Tribal Law 46, 60 (Nav. Sup. Ct.
2010) (stating, “there is a Navajo higher law in fundamental customs and traditions, as well as substantive
rights found in the Treaty of 1868, the Navajo Nation
Bill of Rights, the Judicial Reform Act of 1985, and the
Title Two Amendments of 1989”) (emphasis added). It
follows that the Navajo 1868 Treaty signatories would
have believed the United States felt the same. Indeed,
as mentioned earlier, the U.S. Constitution deems the
1868 Treaty and other treaties, “the supreme Law of
the Land.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
B. Diné Thinking and Planning in Finding
Solutions.
In Diné culture, binding agreements between parties create implied directives—much like the Winters
doctrine recognizes an implied right to water for
16
federal reservations. Put another way, it is not enough
to promise something—“leaders are required to . . . [actively] seek solutions to problems,” Bitsuie Decl. ¶6,
such as securing water resources. Diné believe that
“every word is powerful, sacred, and never frivolous,”
and that every provision of an agreement must be
given force and effect. Off. of Navajo Lab. Rels., ex rel.
Bailon v. Cent. Consol. Sch. Dist. 22, No. SC-CV-37-00,
5 Am. Tribal Law 412, 415 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004). To
effectuate this, the traditional process for fulfilling obligations and/or finding solutions includes four steps:
(1) Nitsáhákees (“thinking”), (2) Nahat’a (“planning”),
(3) implementation, and (4) “reflection on the results
with improvements as necessary.” Bitsuie Decl. ¶6.
Nitsáhákees (“thinking”) and Nahat’a (“planning”), steps one and two, work together closely with
the former informing the latter. Id. (Describing
Nitsáhákees (“thinking”) as “the process of gathering
the insights of everyone involved in an issue or a problem.”). Importantly, in Nitsáhákees, “leaders seek to
facilitate a balanced solution that . . . [respects] . . . all
positions and needs, and is recognized by participants
as egalitarian.” Id. Nitsáhákees “involves critical
thinking, and more broadly, to give direction and
guidance to the issue at hand, in a constant cycle of
examining and analyzing issues for growth and development.” 2 Navajo Nation Code (“N.N.C.”) § 110(q).
Nahat’a (“planning”) is the result of Nitsáhákees
(“thinking”) and intended to “craft the details of a solution that puts a toe on every stone in the creek to get
across.” Bitsuie Decl. ¶6; see also 2 N.N.C. § 110(p)
17
(describing Nahat’a as “to strategically plan while utilizing Diné bi beehaz’áanii Bitsé Siléá (foundation of
Diné law), statutory laws, informed research and public input (through use of the Naabik’áyáti process) in a
constant cycle of examining and analyzing issues for
growth and development”).
The Navajo Nation’s government is built upon the
thinking and planning that derive from traditional
law, customary law, natural law, and common law. See,
e.g., 1 N.N.C. § 202 (“Diné bi nahat’a [(“Navajo planning”)] is the foundation of the Diné bi naat’á (Navajo
government)”); see also Robert Yazzie, Avery Denny,
Lorene Legah, Amber Crotty, James McKenzie, Diné
Good Governance and Leadership Framework (2014),
https://www.aisc.ucla.edu/gng/posters/amber.crotty.
poster.pdf. (stating, “Nahat’a Bibee Haz’áanii Bitsé
siléí Bee Na’anish,” or “the principles of Nahat’a
[(“Navajo planning”)] constitute the foundation of good
Navajo governance.”). Steps three and four, implementation and “reflection on the results with improvements as necessary,” Bitsuie Decl. ¶6, are intended to
ensure the planned solution remains fluid to account
for change in circumstances or unintended consequences that need to be addressed. This is because
“Participatory Democracy” is the foundation of “Navajo
Governance,” Bitsuie Decl. ¶4, and requires that “persons who have positions of authority through government roles, wealth, situational power, or other
circumstances, have an unequivocal duty to steward
the rights and needs of those who are not in the room.”
Id.
18
The Navajo Nation has used Nitsáhákees (“thinking”) and Nahat’a (“planning”) effectively to meet the
needs of its communities. Since the signing of the 1868
Treaty, “the BIA has been largely responsible for the
design, implementation, and maintenance of reservation infrastructure that includes roads, housing, utilities, and facilities.” Michelle Hale, Empowered
Sovereignty for Navajo Chapters Through Engagement
in a Community Planning Process, in Navajo Sovereignty, Understandings and Visions of the Diné People 135 (Lloyd L. Lee ed. 2017). In 1975, the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
(“ISDEAA”) authorized the Navajo Nation to contract
for the authority to plan and implement the use of certain federal funds, thus allowing the incorporation of
traditional thinking and planning into tribal infrastructure. An ISDEAA contract was used to plan and
help build the Tsehootsooi Medical Center in Fort Defiance as a result. Id. Cliff Johns, a Navajo architect
working under this ISDEAA contract, “consulted with
Navajo traditional leaders to create a patient-based
facility where healing benefits mind, body, and spirit.”
Id. The “$18 million dollar, 43,000 square-foot facility”
also includes a space where traditional ceremonies
may be conducted. Id. at 135–36. “The hope is that
Navajo patients and doctors will recognize their cultural identity in the facility, feel a sense of ownership
in the space and use it as a comfortable and powerful
place for healing.” Id. at 136. The Tsehootsooi Medical
Center reflects but one example of proper Nitsáhákees
(“thinking”) and Nahat’a (“planning”) in Navajo governance. Correlatively, Diné worldviews suggest that
19
the foundation of good federal governance is also
Nahat’a (“planning”), informed by robust Nitsáhákees
(“thinking”).
C. Traditional Diné Thinking Continues
to Exist and Inform How Diné Conduct
Themselves.
Traditional Diné worldviews guided Navajo leaders during the treaty-making era and continue to be
the foundation for the Navajo Nation’s governance system and philosophy. The Navajo Nation’s self-governance approach has incorporated traditional Diné
worldviews and Diné bi beehaz’áanii (“Navajo law”)
into all facets of its self-governance.
All branches of Navajo government reflect traditional principles. The Navajo Nation Code codifies
many of the traditional principles discussed above as
Diné bi beehaz’áanii (“Navajo law”). In turn, the Navajo Nation courts routinely apply Diné bi beehaz’áanii
(“Navajo law”) in court holdings. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. Bedonie, 6 Am. Tribal Law 725, 728 (Nav. Sup.
Ct. 2006) (Applying Diné bi beehaz’áanii (“Navajo law”)
in analyzing the “right to a speedy and public trial” under the Navajo Nation Bill of Rights.); 1 N.N.C. § 7. Title 1, Chapter 2.
Canon One of the Navajo Nation Code of Judicial
Conduct states, “judges, as Navajos, should apply Navajo concepts and procedures for justice, including the
principles of maintaining harmony, establishing order,
respecting freedom, and talking things out in free
20
discussion.” Navajo Nation Code of Judicial Conduct,
Canon One (1991). For instance, in reviewing whether
the Navajo Nation fulfilled its obligations to its people
with respect to providing economic opportunities under its own Bill of Rights, 1 N.N.C. § 2, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court invoked Diné bi beehaz’áanii in
reversing the government action. The Navajo Nation
Supreme Court explained that the Diné principle of
“self-sufficiency teaches that the obligation of Diné individuals to take care of themselves impacts the community, which relies on the survival of individuals in
order to continue to exist as a cohesive people.” Iina
Ba, Inc. v. Navajo Business Regulatory, 11 Am. Tribal
Law 447, 457-58 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2014). This also includes t’áá nihí ák’ineildzil dóó adiká’ adiilwol, or
“economic self-sufficiency,” to ensure you have essentials such as clothes, food, and housing for your family.
Id. This teaches that an individual must work hard
and sacrifice “(t’áá hwó ájít’éego t’éiyá) to learn the
skills necessary to sustain a prosperous life for an entire community.” Id. “It is up to our leaders to make
this possible, and it is within this teaching of Diné
self-sufficiency that our leaders created the [Navajo
Business Opportunity Act] and the [Navajo Nation
Procurement Act].” Id. The Iina Ba, Inc. Court added,
“Naata’aniis [“Leaders”] are required to be conscious
of their authority to find sacred solutions,” Id. at 458
(referencing the critical thinking and planning process
described above in Section II(B)).
21
This belief and traditional governance system continue today through the Navajo Traditional Peacemaking Program. The Peacemaker, or hózh̨ǫ́ójí naat’áanii
(“a combination of leader, teacher, and healer”), is
tasked with “bring[ing] the people out of chaos into
hózh̨̨ó by using stories and teachings to enable them to
resolve the problem and decide on mutual positive action.” Peacemaking Program of the Judicial Branch of
the Navajo Nation, PEACEMAKING PLAN OF OPERATIONS
9 (2012), https://courts.navajo-nsn.gov/Peacemaking/
Plan/PPPO2013-2-25.pdf. Importantly, the Program is
rooted in traditional worldviews “which does not label
individuals ‘offender’ and ‘victim,’ or as wrongdoer
and harmed party.” Id. at 12. Instead, the Program
acknowledges that “all who are embroiled in
hóóchx̨o’/anáhóót’i’ possess some qualities of causing
the offense or being the victim.” Id. Resolutions garnered from the Program may then be confirmed by the
Navajo Nation Judicial Branch. Id. at 4.
In these ways, modern Navajo governance reflects
traditional Diné bi beehaz’áanii (“Navajo law”) as described in the preceding sections of this brief describing responsibilities to think critically and plan for
solutions.
D. The Relief Sought by the Navajo Nation
is Supported by Applying Traditional
Navajo Law and this Court’s Precedent.
The Navajo Nation’s requested relief seeks an order determining the United States owes a fiduciary
22
duty to assess its water needs and develop a plan to
meet them. This is wholly consistent with traditional
Diné obligations to think critically and plan for solutions. In fact, given the federal obligations involve water, or “tó,” such fiduciary duties are arguably more
pronounced. Diné bi beehaz’áanii (“Navajo law”), as
codified in the Navajo Nation Code, states: “Tó dóó dził
diyinii nahat’á yił hadeidiilaa”, or “Water and the sacred mountains embody planning,” and “Nitsáhákees éí
nahat’á bitsé silá,” or “Thinking is the foundation of
planning.” 1 N.N.C. § 201. So planning is built upon
proper critical thinking and embodied in the sacred
mountains and water themselves—i.e., the Reservation itself, as described by Barboncito when negotiating the 1868 Treaty. 1868 Treaty with Record of the
Discussions at 2 (“When the Navajos were first created
four mountains and four rivers were pointed out to us,
inside of which we should live, that was to be our country.”).
Importantly, the Diné believe water must be discussed with caution, including avoiding arguments
about it. Miranda Warburton, We Don’t Own Nature,
Nature Owns Us: The Ceremonial and Esoteric Nature
of Water in the Little Colorado River Basin and Diné
Bikeyah 186 (July 1, 2020) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author). Arguing about water is disrespectful and not honorable and can cause negativity to
come back to the Navajo Nation and hurt its people. Id.
at 188. “No one can own it; No one can sell it; No one
can buy it.” Id. at 191. “Our ancestors told us to be
careful about how we use water—not to fight over it,
23
use it equally and collaboratively, it is sacred and important.” Id. at 187. Specifically, fighting about water
will tarnish traditional ceremonies. “For example, . . .
if someone . . . doesn’t have the water from [a] little
spring due to the adverse [e]ffect of water rights issues, it could force him to change his ways (he wouldn’t
have pure water or the plants/medicine)” to perform
the Waterway ceremony. Id. at 189. Thus, the Navajo
Nation, operating under these principles, asks the federal government to think critically and plan to meet its
water needs.
The Navajo Nation’s relief sought is consistent
with how the traditional Navajo signatories would
have understood the United States would meet its
treaty obligations generally. Such critical thinking and
strategic and inclusive planning provide a strong foundation for both traditional and modern Diné views on
governance and fulfilling obligations.
III. WINTERS DOCTRINAL RIGHTS AND
TRADITIONAL DINÉ WORLDVIEWS.
This Court established in Winans that a “treaty
was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of
right from them.” 198 U.S. at 381 (emphasis added).
This Court also held that when the United States sets
aside an Indian reservation as a permanent homeland,
it reserves the appurtenant water necessary to meet
that purpose. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577; Cappaert, 426
U.S. at 138.
24
Combining the Winans principles with the Winters
doctrine, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that reserved water rights, like the Navajo Nation’s, may
carry a priority date of “time immemorial” where the
Tribe would not have understood “such a reservation
of land to include a relinquishment of its right to use
the water as it had always used it on the land it had
reserved as a permanent home.” United States v. Adair,
723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1983). Nothing in the historic record suggests the Navajo Nation would have
understood the 1868 Treaty to relinquish their rights
to use water. Under those facts, the Adair Court reasoned a tribe’s water rights “were not created” by a
treaty, but instead “the treaty confirmed the continued
existence of these rights.” Id. The State Petitioners understand the weight of such a priority date, combined
with the size of the Navajo Reservation and its projected population growth. Consequently, they misconstrue this Court’s opinion in Arizona v. California, 460
U.S. 605, 616–18 (1983), to provide blanket pronouncements about Indian water rights. Brief for State Petitioners at 23–24, Arizona v. Navajo Nation, Nos. 211484 and 22-51 (2022).
Justice White’s Arizona v. California opinion is
meant to apply only to the State parties and the specifically-referenced federal and Indian Reservations in
the Court’s decree, as made clear by a plain reading of
Art. VIII(C) of the Consolidated Decree. 547 U.S. 150,
166 (2006) (“This decree shall not affect . . . The rights
or priorities, except as specific provision is made
herein, of any Indian Reservation, National Forest,
25
Park, Recreation Area, Monument or Memorial, or
other lands of the United States. . . .”). For good measure, Art. II(D) of the Consolidated Decree makes clear
that “nothing [in the Consolidated Decree] shall prohibit the United States from making future additional
reservations of mainstream water for use in any of
such States as may be authorized by law and subject
[to existing rights].” Id. at 157.
As detailed below, this Court’s Winters precedent
and traditional Diné laws are generally consistent
with one another, as are this Court’s precedent with
respect to fiduciary duties resulting from federal management of trust property interests and Diné philosophies on meeting duties and obligations. As such, the
magnitude of the water rights involved here and the
disparate impact western water policy has had on the
Navajo Nation—and therefore on Amicus and the communities Amicus serves—provide a firm basis for this
Court to uphold the decision below.
A. Diné Winters Rights under Federal Law
Must be Understood According to Diné
Rights to Tó (“Water”) and Nature’s
Elements under Diné Natural Laws.
In this instance, the Navajo Nation’s Winters
rights claims ripen through treaties, executive orders,
and statutes creating the boundaries of the Navajo
Nation, alongside strong federal policies designed to
contain Navajo people—permanently on the Navajo
Reservation as an agrarian society. Brief for
26
Respondents at 20–24, Arizona v. Navajo Nation, Nos.
21-1484 & 22-51 (2023). Without water, the Navajo
Reservation would not be able to support an agrarian
lifestyle contemplated in the 1868 Treaty. The United
States has acknowledged such rights and referred to
them as Indian Trust Assets, or “ITAs”, in public documents related to Colorado River water management.
See Shortage Guidelines FEIS, at 3-96. Notably, “[t]he
United States, as trustee, is responsible for protecting
rights reserved by, or granted to, Indian tribes or individual Indians by treaties, statutes, executive and
secretarial orders, and other federal actions.” Id. at
3-87.
In White Mountain Apache Tribe, this Court held
that when the United States holds a property interest
in trust status for an Indian tribe, there is a duty to
maintain such property interests—“a fiduciary actually administering trust property may not allow it to
fall into ruin on his watch.” United States v. White
Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 565, 575 (2003). The
Navajo Nation’s Winters rights are analogous to the
federal facilities administered by the Secretary in
White Mountain Apache Tribe. There, this Court found
it persuasive that the Secretary “enjoyed daily occupation” alongside “daily supervision” of the federal facility. Id. Here too, the federal government exercises daily
and exclusive control over the management of the
Colorado River, which it has determined the Navajo
Nation has Winters rights to despite failure to quantify
such rights. The duty described in White Mountain
Apache Tribe is analogous to Diné worldviews about
27
how Diné people care for obligations under their control. Subsequently, Diné people agree that such obligations cannot “fall into ruin” under their watch.
Diné natural laws interpret the treaties as preserving the entirety of Diné lifeways on Diné bi keyah
(Navajo land), under federal “jurisdiction and protection” in perpetuity. 1849 Treaty, art. I; 1868 Treaty, art.
I, see generally United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,
384–85 (1986) (upholding Congress’ authority to assert
federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations
based on the United States’ exclusive authority over
tribes and its duty to protect Indians). A key aspect of
those lifeways is the relationship between Navajo people and tó (“water”), ch’il (“plants”), níłch’i (“air”), and
jóhonaa’éí (“sun”)—which Amicus acknowledges as
nihiDyin dine’é, or “our Holy People.” Denny Interview;
see also Robert Yazzie, Air Light/Fire, Water and
Earth/Pollen: Sacred Elements that Sustain Life, 18 J.
Env’t L. & Litig. 191, 206 (2003) (stating that Diné natural law requires that “[t]he four sacred elements of
life, air, light/fire, water and earth/pollen in all their
forms must be respected, honored, and protected for
they sustain life”).
According to Diné bi beehaz’áanii (“Navajo law”),
imperfect beings, like humans, red ants, birds, and the
like, established laws in this world—the Glittering
World (the fourth world in Diné cosmology)—in order
to keep from destroying it. Denny Interview. Accordingly, Diné culture consistently seeks to balance and
appreciate the privilege to use all nature’s elements,
and through Diné bizaad (“the Navajo language”)
28
Navajo people communicate with the world around
them, providing offerings and prayers. Id. Indeed,
“[t]he Diné have a sacred obligation and duty to respect, preserve and protect all that was provided[,] for
[Navajo people] were designated as the steward of
these relatives through [their] use of the sacred gifts
of language and thinking.” Yazzie, Air Light/Fire, 18
J. Env’t L. & Litig. at 194.
In other words, Diné cultural practices are designed to ensure such elements do not “fall into ruin”
under Diné peoples’ watch. In traditional Diné communities, these traditional practices safeguard the land,
water, air, and fire analogous to the Clear Water Act or
the Clean Air Act. Like this Court’s holding protecting
the trust corpus in White Mountain Apache Tribe,
these traditional relationships with nature’s elements
ensure care for, and nurturing of, those obligations and
elements under Diné peoples’ daily purview: the water
used; the land tended to or traveled upon; the air
breathed; and the fire of a Navajo home—symbolic of
the Sun.
B. The State and Federal Petitioners’ Proposed Indian Water Policy Results in
Disparate Treatment, as Applied, to the
Navajo Nation’s Reserved Property Interests.
This Court’s Winters holding is consistent with
Diné laws and worldviews—the water is reserved with
the land. In addition, Article VII of the 1922 Colorado
29
River Compact, which binds the Petitioners, states,
“nothing in this compact shall be construed as affecting the obligations of the United States of America to
Indian tribes.” Colorado River Compact of 1922, art.
VII.
From this point, the sovereigns diverge. The
States assert this Court retains exclusive and preclusive jurisdiction over quantification, where they claim
all paths lead. The federal government asserts it has
no enforceable affirmative duty to protect the Navajo
Nation’s Winters rights, but admits they exist. Shortage Guidelines FEIS, at 3-96. These arguments advocate for a framework that results in absolute disparate
treatment, effectively and as applied, with respect to
the Navajo Nation’s water rights. See, e.g., Washington
State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S.Ct.
1000, 1026–27 (2019) (Kavanaugh, B., dissenting) (expressing concern on whether tax policies, as applied,
were effectively discriminatory to tribal treaty rights).
Under this approach, the Navajo Nation is left with no
recourse but quantification before this Court, which
the Navajo Nation does not seek. As a result, the Navajo Nation would be unable to prevent its reserved
property interests from dwindling away while under
exclusive federal control.
Instead, Amicus supports the Navajo Nation’s position—that a breach of trust claim, at a minimum, can
be remedied by a duty to plan for water needs under
the United States’ jurisdiction—and further asserts
that the United States’ exclusive control over the Colorado River imports sacred obligations which require
30
proper Nitsáhákees (“thinking”) and Nahat’a (“planning”). Bitsuie Decl. ¶6. With respect to hózhǫ́, and to
prevent disparate treatment under federal water policies and laws (as applied and implemented), the
United States’ discretion to manage the Colorado
River must be accomplished holistically, accounting for
quantified rights, but also considering unquantified reserved water rights it holds for the Navajo Nation. See,
e.g., Parravano v. Babbit, 70 F.3d 539, 546–47 (9th Cir.
1995) (upholding the Secretary of the Interior’s policy,
supported by the United States’ trust responsibility
and where the Tribe’s water rights were unquantified,
to regulate Klamath River salmon as they migrate in
the open ocean).
In addition, Article VII of the 1922 Colorado River
Compact was likely intended to safeguard Winters
rights like the Nation’s, which under Diné bi beehaz’áanii (“Navajo law”) cannot be severed from the
land—“it’s all the same.” Denny Interview (explaining
that you cannot sever the water, because the water is
your relative, a part of you, and also all around you;
and the same with the air, the plants, and the earth’s
fire, “the sun,” all of which must be in balance to sustain life). Succinctly, traditional Diné believe the treaties preserved the entirety of the Diné universe
between their four sacred mountains, and within the
bounds of the various streams that traverse through
and are contiguous to the Reservation. A century after
the Compact was ratified, the federal government has
yet to firm up these rights; the River itself is experiencing historic droughts, see, e.g., Responding to Historic Drought and Ongoing Dry Conditions in the
31
Colorado River Basin: Request for Input, 84 Fed. Reg.
2244 (Feb. 6, 2019), and the Navajo Nation and Amicus’
communities suffer from inadequate water infrastructure and scarcity of water itself, Frances Stead Sellers,
It’s Almost 2020, and 2 Million Americans Still Don’t
Have Running Water, According to New Report, Washington Post (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/its-almost-2020-and-2-million-americans-stilldont-have-running-water-new-report-says/2019/12/10/
a0720e8a-14b3-11ea-a659-7d69641c6ff7_story.html
(“In the Navajo Nation, . . . where water has long been
sacred, about one-third of the population of more than
300,000 does not have a tap or flushing toilet.”).
Navajo culture is complex. Amicus understands
this. But it is purposeful and life-driven. The Navajo
leaders that signed the Treaty of 1868, relying on the
United States’ promises of protection, understood that
they would be returning home. This includes “water.”
Barboncito described “home” as he understood it in the
treaty negotiations:
When the Navajos were first created four
mountains and four rivers were pointed out to
us, inside of which we should live, that was to
be our country and was given to us by the first
woman of the Navajo tribe. It was told to us
by our forefathers, that we were never to move
east of the Rio Grande or west of the San Juan
rivers and I think that our coming here has
been the cause of so much death among us and
our animals.
1868 Treaty with Record of the Discussions, at 2. Returning home also requires that the federal
32
government meet the federal obligations required to
make this land habitable and usable.
In 1849, the United States promised to “pass and
execute . . . such laws as may be deemed conducive to
the prosperity and happiness of [the Navajo people].”
1849 Treaty at art. IX. Upon this backdrop, the 1868
Treaty delineated boundaries and federal purposes for
the Navajo Reservation. Executing federal water law
and policy in a manner that thoughtfully considers
and plans for the Navajo Nation’s Winters rights to the
Colorado River is consistent with: these treaty promises to protect the Navajo people and their permanent
homelands; the Court’s precedent on federal treaty obligations, Winans, 198 U.S. at 380 (“[W]e will construe
a treaty with the Indians as [they] understood it, and
‘as justice and reason demand, in all cases where
power is exerted by the strong over those to whom they
owe care and protection.’ ”); and how the traditional
Navajo signatories would have understood the United
States’ duties to protect and preserve their rights and
their homelands under the negotiated treaties.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
33
CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, the Court should
affirm the decision below.
Respectfully submitted,
PATTY FERGUSON-BOHNEE
Counsel of Record
DERRICK BEETSO
INDIAN LEGAL CLINIC
ASU PUBLIC INTEREST LAW FIRM
SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR
COLLEGE OF LAW
111 E. Taylor Street,
Mail Code 8820
Phoenix, Arizona 85004
(480) 727-0420
pafergus@asu.edu
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.