Amicus Curiae Brief — Zhang Jingrong, et al., Petitioners v. Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance, Inc., et al.
Supreme Court briefJun 9, 2022
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No. 21-1429
In the Supreme Court of the United States
ZHANG JINGRONG, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
V.
CHINESE ANTI-CULT WORLD ALLIANCE, INC., ET AL.,
Respondents.
——————
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE STATE OF
WEST VIRGINIA AND 23 OTHER STATES
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
PATRICK MORRISEY
Attorney General
OFFICE OF THE
WEST VIRGINIA
ATTORNEY GENERAL
State Capitol Complex
Building 1, Room E-26
Charleston, WV 25305
lindsay.s.see@wvago.gov
(304) 558-2021
LINDSAY S. SEE
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
MICHAEL R. WILLIAMS
Senior Deputy Solicitor
General
CALEB A. SECKMAN
Assistant Solicitor General
Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of West Virginia
[additional counsel listed after signature page]
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the statutory text and First Amendment
permit the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act’s
protections from violence at a “place of religious worship”
to apply only to places religious adherents collectively
recognize or religious leadership designates as a place
primarily to gather for or to hold religious worship
activities.
II
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Question Presented .............................................................. I
Introduction And Interests of Amici Curiae .................... 1
Summary of Argument ........................................................ 4
Reasons for Granting the Petition...................................... 6
I.
The Second Circuit’s Construction
Flouts America’s History Of Religious
Liberty, Which Informs The Access Act’s
Meaning .......................................................................... 6
A. The Founding and Before ....................................... 7
B. Religious Freedom In This Court .......................... 9
C. Other Congressional Acts ..................................... 11
D. State-Level Developments .................................... 13
E. The Second Circuit’s Wrong Turn ....................... 15
II. The Second Circuit’s Construction Creates
Serious Constitutional Concerns ............................... 16
Conclusion ........................................................................... 22
III
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n,
139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) ................................................... 16
Bond v. Bond,
109 S.E.2d 16 (W. Va. 1959) ......................................... 15
Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of
Phoenix,
448 P.3d 890 (Ariz. 2019) .............................................. 15
Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940) ................................................... 9, 10
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520 (1993) ................................................... 1, 10
City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997) ................................................. 7, 8, 9
Civ. Aeronautics Bd. v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc.,
367 U.S. 316 (1961) ......................................................... 6
Clark v. Martinez,
543 U.S. 371 (2005) ................................................. 16, 17
Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327 (1987) ....................................................... 17
Coulee Cath. Sch. v. Lab. & Indust. Rev.
Comm’n,
768 N.W.2d 868 (Wis. 2009) ......................................... 14
IV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles,
321 U.S. 144 (1944) ....................................................... 13
Dep’t of Com. v. U.S. House of
Representatives,
525 U.S. 316 (1999) ......................................................... 6
Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Twp.,
330 U.S. 1 (1947) ..................................................... 1, 2, 8
Follett v. Town of McCormick,
321 U.S. 573 (1944) ................................................. 10, 19
Haight v. Thompson,
763 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2014) ......................................... 18
Hernandez v. Comm’r,
490 U.S. 680 (1989) ....................................................... 19
Holden v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Elizabeth,
216 A.2d 387 (N.J. 1966) .............................................. 15
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of
Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am.,
344 U.S. 94 (1952) ........................................................... 3
Kokoszka v. Belford,
417 U.S. 642 (1974) ....................................................... 11
Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228 (1982) ....................................................... 20
Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946) ....................................................... 10
V
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ.
Rts. Comm’n,
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) ....................................... 10, 11, 18
Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God
v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc.,
396 U.S. 367 (1970) ....................................................... 18
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi.,
440 U.S. 490 (1979) ....................................................... 17
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch.
v. Morrissey-Berru,
140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020) ................................................... 20
Phoenix Container, L.P. v. Sokoloff,
235 F.3d 352 (7th Cir. 2000) ......................................... 15
Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440 (1969) ....................................................... 18
Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1878) ................................................... 10, 11
Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v.
Cuomo,
141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) ........................................................ 1
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ.
of Virginia,
515 U.S. 819 (1995) ......................................................... 3
Salazar v. Buono,
559 U.S. 700 (2010) ......................................................... 4
VI
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147 (1939) ....................................................... 10
Smith v. Wade,
461 U.S. 30 (1983) ........................................................ 11
Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707 (1981) ......................................... 4, 5, 10, 19
Trustees of New Life in Christ Church v.
City of Fredericksburg,
142 S. Ct. 678 (2022) ................................................... 1, 4
United States v. Jefferson Elec. Mfg. Co.,
291 U.S. 386 (1934) ....................................................... 11
United States v. Palomar-Santiago,
141 S. Ct. 1615 (2021) ............................................. 11, 16
United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163 (1965) ................................................. 18, 19
United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. 649 (1898) ................................................... 6, 11
United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIOCLC v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979) ......................................................... 6
Vinning-El v. Evans,
657 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011) ......................................... 19
Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263 (1981) ....................................................... 18
Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972) ....................................................... 11
VII
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Constitutional Provisions
ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 3.01 .................................................. 14
N.H. CONST. art. 5 .............................................................. 14
OH. CONST. art. I, § 7 .......................................................... 14
U.S. CONST. amend. I ........................................................... 9
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ................................................... 9
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 ................................................ 9
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ...................................................... 9
W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 15 .................................................. 14
Federal Statutes
18 U.S.C. § 247 ...................................................................... 2
18 U.S.C. § 248 ...................................................................... 2
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb............................................................ 12
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 ........................................................ 12
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-4 ........................................................ 12
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc .............................................................. 12
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5 ........................................................... 12
42 U.S.C. § 5172 .................................................................... 2
Pub. L. No. 104-155, 110 Stat. 1392 (1996)....................... 13
Pub. L. No. 105-183, 112 Stat. 517 (1998) ........................ 13
Pub. L. No. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2787 (1998)....................... 13
VIII
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
State Statutes
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1493.01.............................................. 14
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-401 ............................................. 14
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571b ................................................ 14
Fla. Stat. § 761.01 ............................................................... 14
Idaho Code § 73-402 ........................................................... 14
Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 775, § 35/1 ............................................. 14
Ind. Code § 34-13-9 ............................................................. 14
Kan. Stat. § 60-5301............................................................ 14
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 446.350 ..................................................... 14
La. Rev. Stat. § 13:5231 ..................................................... 14
Miss. Code § 11-61-1........................................................... 14
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.302......................................................... 14
N.M. Stat. § 28-22-1............................................................ 14
Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 251 ...................................................... 14
Pa. Stat. § 2403 ................................................................... 14
R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-80.1-1 ................................................. 14
S.C. Code § 1-32-10............................................................. 14
Tenn. Code § 4-1-407 .......................................................... 14
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Remedies Code § 110.001 .................... 14
Va. Code § 57-2.02 .............................................................. 14
IX
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Regulation
49 C.F.R. § 192.903 ............................................................... 2
Other Authorities
Carl Hollan, A Broken System: Failures of
the Religious Regulatory System in the
People’s Republic of China,
B.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2014) ........................................ 2, 20
Carl Zollman, Religious Liberty in the
American Law,
17 MICH. L. REV. 355 (1919) .......................................... 9
Charles E. Hummel, The Church at Home:
The House Church Movement,
CHRISTIANITY TODAY (1986) ....................................... 17
Danielle Mueller, Cherryville Baptist
Holds Riverside Baptism, NJ.COM
(July 28, 2016) ............................................................... 21
H.R. 1308 (103rd): Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, GOVTRACK
(Oct. 27, 1993) ................................................................ 12
H.R. REP. NO. 103-488 (1994) .............................................. 2
Jill Altman, Sukkot: Why It’s The Favorite
Holiday At Our House,
INTERMOUNTAIN JEWISH NEWS (Sept.
17, 2021) ......................................................................... 21
X
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
John Witte, Jr., Joel A. Nichols, “Come
Now Let Us Reason Together”:
Restoring Religious Freedom in
America and Abroad,
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427 (2016) ............................. 8
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and
Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990) .................................. 7, 8
Mike Maslanik, Wife Fights for Husband
Jailed in China,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2003) ............................................. 3
Orrin G. Hatch, Religious Liberty at Home
and Abroad: Reflections on Protecting
This Fundamental Freedom,
B.Y.U. L. REV. 413 (2001) .............................................. 6
Pauline Bartolone, Sacramento Muslims
Celebrate Eid — Outside And Six Feet
Apart, CAPRADIO (Aug. 3, 2020) ................................. 21
Protecting Religious Exercise: The First
Amendment and Legislative Responses
to Religious Vandalism,
97 HARV. L. REV. 547 (1983). ....................................... 16
Rewilding Christianity,
PROGRESSIVECHRISTIANITY.ORG............................... 21
XI
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Richard Albert, American Separationism
and Liberal Democracy: The
Establishment Clause in Historical
and Comparative Perspective,
88 MARQ. L. REV. 867 (2005) ......................................... 7
Sophie Goodman, A Country Burning for
Religious Freedom: The New Draft
Law on Freedom of Religion in
Vietnam,
26 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 159 (2017) ...................... 20
U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL
REPORT (Apr. 2022) .................................................... 2, 3
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE
TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT
(Sept. 22, 2020) ........................................................ 12, 13
Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and
Religious Liberty: Seven Questions
from Madison’s Memorial and
Remonstrance,
87 CORNELL L. REV. 783 (2002) .................................. 21
WILLIAM WARREN SWEET, RELIGION IN
COLONIAL AMERICA (1965) ........................................... 8
INTRODUCTION AND INTERESTS
OF AMICI CURIAE1
America’s commitment to religious freedom is
“essential.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993). It constitutes
“one of our most treasured and jealously guarded
constitutional rights.” Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn
v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 81 (2020) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting). And the amici States—West Virginia,
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, and Virginia—are deeply concerned with
protecting “our first freedom.” Id. at 70 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
Our nation’s tradition of free exercise stems in part
from a history of religious violence inflicted elsewhere.
“Torrents of blood have been spilt in the old world,” wrote
James Madison, “by vain attempts of the secular arm to
extinguish Religious discord, by proscribing all difference
in Religious opinions.” Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing
Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 69 (1947) (cleaned up). Madison and the
other “Framers of our Constitution were acutely aware
how governments in Europe had sought to control and
manipulate religious practices and churches,” often
through violence. Trustees of New Life in Christ Church
v. City of Fredericksburg, 142 S. Ct. 678, 679 (2022)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). So
“[t]hey resolved that America would be different.” Id.
Madison, for instance, led the Virginia Assembly to pass
Under Supreme Court Rule 37.2(a), amici timely notified counsel
of record of their intent to file this brief.
1
2
Thomas Jefferson’s 1786 Virginia Bill for Religious
Liberty, which provided that “no man … shall otherwise
suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief.”
Everson, 330 U.S. at 13. And Madison and Jefferson
didn’t stop there. They also helped ensure that the
Religion Clauses ultimately enshrined in the federal
Constitution “ha[ve] the same objective and … provide the
same protection.” Id.
In the “Access Act”—a statute that state Attorneys
General are expressly empowered to enforce, see 18
U.S.C. § 248(c)(3)—Congress reaffirmed our country’s
broad protections for religious worship by targeting
violence directed at religious practices.
The law
prescribes criminal penalties and civil remedies for acts or
threats of violence aimed at those “exercising or seeking
to exercise the First Amendment right of religious
freedom at a place of religious worship.” Id. § 248(a)(2).
In referring to a “place of religious worship,” Congress
used an intentionally broad term. It chose not to tie
liability to “religious real property,” id. § 247, “house[s] of
worship,” 42 U.S.C. § 5172(a)(3)(C), “religious facilities,”
49 C.F.R. § 192.903, or the like. It instead drafted a
comprehensive statute to reflect its “profound concern …
over private intrusions on religious worship.” H.R. REP.
NO. 103-488, at 9 (1994).
Petitioners are exactly the sort of worshippers one
might expect to find safety in a statute like this. They
practice Falun Gong, which places them in “the thirdlargest group” of those suffering freedom-of-religion or
freedom-of-belief restrictions worldwide.
U.S.
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
(“USCIF”), ANNUAL REPORT 78 (Apr. 2022). The group
started in China under a Communist regime hostile to
religious pluralism. See, e.g., Carl Hollan, A Broken
3
System: Failures of the Religious Regulatory System in
the People’s Republic of China, 2014 B.Y.U. L. REV. 733,
735 (2014) (describing how Chinese Communist policy has
“vacillated between attempts to control religious
organizations and attempts to eradicate religion”). Under
that regime, “adherents of groups with perceived foreign
influence”—like the Falun Gong—“are especially
vulnerable to persecution.” USCIF, supra, at 16-17; see
also, e.g., Mike Maslanik, Wife Fights for Husband Jailed
in China, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2003), https://nyti.ms/
3zbtRxy (describing China’s “secret police force designed
to root out practitioners of Falun Gong”). Many Falun
Gong practitioners have thus fled to America. Yet even
after coming here, Petitioners allegedly continue to face
persecution and abuse from Communist sympathizers. So
taking Congress at its word and believing that the Access
Act defended them from violence at their places of
worship, they sued.
The Second Circuit denied Petitioners the statute’s
protection by interpreting it to reach only places
“primarily” devoted to religious worship. Pet.App.23a. In
doing so, it unduly narrowed a statute meant to bar the
worst acts of violence in many of America’s sacred places.
This construction compels victims of religious violence to
prove their activity was religious enough, and it enmeshes
courts in deciding what constitutes true worship
warranting protection.
None of that is right. The Second Circuit’s approach
offends several aspects of American religious freedom.
The “prohibition on governmental preferences for some
religious faiths over others” is one; now only religions with
designated buildings for worship benefit from the Act.
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515
U.S. 819, 855 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). Individual
4
believers’ rights to “decide for themselves, free from state
interference, matters of ... faith and doctrine” is another;
what locations are “primary” to their religious practice are
now open for judicial second-guessing. Kedroff v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N.
Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). And the rule against judicial
“efforts to ‘subject’ religious beliefs to ‘verification’” is
another still; judges are now tasked with deciding whether
a place is sufficiently worshipful to warrant protection.
Trustees of New Life in Christ Church, 142 S. Ct. at 679
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
The amici States urge this Court to remedy the Second
Circuit’s anti-religion decision and restore the promise of
our “Nation[’s] unparalleled pluralism and religious
tolerance.” Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 723 (2010).
Properly construed, the Access Act does not ask judges to
leave their lanes of “function and [] competence,” Thomas
v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981),
nor entangle themselves with quintessentially religious
assessments. And its broad text is fully consistent with
the nation’s history of free exercise. But the Second
Circuit rewrote it into something else. Particularly when
grappling with a statute that takes matters of religious
freedom head on, the Second Circuit was wrong to set our
history of liberty aside. Religious liberty is fundamental
to our federal regime and to day-to-day life in every State.
The Court should take this case and reverse.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court should grant the Petition for the reasons
Petitioners urge: The decision below is wrong on an issue
of national importance that stands at the center of our
constitutional tradition. The States highlight two aspects
of the lower court’s serious errors here. Uncorrected, that
5
court’s interpretation could unjustifiably leave our
residents at risk when they practice the many faiths their
consciences dictate.
I. The Second Circuit’s opinion contradicts our
country’s history of religious liberty—a history that
necessarily informs any understanding of the Access Act.
That history instead confirms Petitioners’ plain-text
construction. Even before the Founding, Americans
sought to protect each other when they engaged in
religious worship. This long-running embrace of broad
religious freedom continues in the modern day. It
resonates throughout our state and federal constitutions,
state and federal statute books, and state and federal case
reporters. Yet the Second Circuit ignored all that and
construed the Access Act in one of the narrowest possible
ways. The Court should grant certiorari to remove that
stain on our tradition of freedom.
II. Further, even though the Access Act was designed
to protect constitutional liberties, the Second Circuit’s
opinion actually creates constitutional problems under the
Religion Clauses. The bounds of “judicial function and
judicial competence,” Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716, exclude
the sort of inquiries into religious practice that the Second
Circuit’s extra-textual reading requires.
Individual
believers should not have to show that a religious leader
or collective would consider their “place of religious
worship” a “primary” location. And the Second Circuit
has read the statute to require courts to assess religions
in ways they cannot and ought not. Quite simply, the
lower court’s decision invites the type of entanglement
that courts usually—rightly—avoid.
6
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I.
The Second Circuit’s Construction Flouts
America’s History Of Religious Liberty, Which
Informs The Access Act’s Meaning.
The Court should grant review to correct the Second
Circuit’s missteps in statutory construction for all the
reasons Petitioners explain. See Pet. 13-18. But beyond
that, the Court should also take up this case because the
Second Circuit forgot that “statutory language
necessarily derives much of its meaning from the
surrounding circumstances.” Civ. Aeronautics Bd. v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 323 (1961).
When “construing any act of legislation,” the Court
accounts for “the condition and … the history of the law as
previously existing … in the light of which the new act
must be read and interpreted.” United States v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 653-54 (1898). All the more when
it comes to matters of religious liberty; even the author of
the provision here has recognized that legislative
“answers” in this area are “a function of [America’s] own
unique history and culture.” Orrin G. Hatch, Religious
Liberty at Home and Abroad: Reflections on Protecting
This Fundamental Freedom, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 413,
428 (2001). And indeed, the “historical context from which
the Act arose” confirms that Petitioners have the right
reading of this law. United Steelworkers of Am., AFLCIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979). In other
words, even if Petitioners’ plain-text analysis left any
doubt over the statute’s meaning, that backdrop—the
context in which Congress acted—would resolve it
against the lower court’s narrow read. See Dep’t of Com.
v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 339-40
(1999) (invoking 200 years of “historical context” and
7
“background” in refusing to construe a statute narrowly).
The Court should repair the Second Circuit’s unjustified
break from our centuries-old tradition of protecting all
manner of religious exercise.
A. The Founding and Before
Religious freedom traces to the roots of our Republic.
Many of the colonies embraced religious liberty’s
virtues over a hundred years before the Framers
conceived the Constitution. See City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 551-52 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(discussing the history of free exercise of religion in the
colonies). As early as 1648, for instance, Lord Baltimore—
who had attracted settlers from Boston by promising “free
liberty of religion”—secured a promise from Maryland’s
governor not to disturb Christians in the “free exercise”
of their religion. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1425 (1990). Massachusetts
Governor John Winthrop, seemingly indignant at the
suggestion that his land was a bastion of intolerance,
responded that none “of our people … had a temptation
that way.” Id. Maryland’s Assembly echoed those
sentiments a year later, passing a formal Act Concerning
Religion. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 551. That statute
ensured that no Christian sect would be “troubled,
Molested or discountenanced” for its beliefs. Id.
This example wasn’t an outlier, and the pattern
continued over the decades. Quaker colonies in New
Jersey and Pennsylvania and the Dutch colony in New
York embraced notions of religious liberty and tolerance
throughout much of the mid- to late-1600s. See Richard
Albert, American Separationism and Liberal
Democracy: The Establishment Clause in Historical and
8
Comparative Perspective, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 867, 883
(2005) (summarizing “the impressive range and intensity
of religious convictions” preceding the Founding). Rhode
Island even included the “liberty of conscience” in its
founding Charter of 1663. McConnell, supra, at 1425. The
colony’s founder, Roger Williams, wrote “frequently,
eloquently, and vituperatively in defense of freedom of
conscience.” Id. As a result, Rhode Island became an
intentionally “livelie experiment … with a full libertie in
religious concernements.” Id. at 1426. The other colonies
followed suit after independence: “[T]he substance of
[Rhode Island’s] early provisions” became “the most
common pattern in the constitutions adopted by the states
after the Revolution.” Id. at 1427. And Virginians in 1785
and 1786 witnessed the “movement[’s] … “dramatic
climax,” when Jefferson and Madison pressed for an act to
ensure no one would be “enforced, restrained, molested or
burdened … on account of his religious opinions or belief.”
Everson, 330 U.S. at 11-13.
By 1789, every State except Connecticut protected
religious freedom in its constitution. See McConnell,
supra, at 1455. So by that time, “[f]reedom of religion was
universally said to be an unalienable right.” Id. at 1456;
see also John Witte, Jr., Joel A. Nichols, “Come Now Let
Us Reason Together”: Restoring Religious Freedom in
America and Abroad, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 436
(2016) (“[T]he founding generation … defend[ed] religious
freedom for all peaceable faiths, and wove multiple
principles of religious freedom into the new state and
federal constitutions of 1776 to 1791”).
In truth, “the embodiment” of religious liberty in these
constitutions “was simply writing colonial experience into
the fundamental law of the land.” WILLIAM WARREN
SWEET, RELIGION IN COLONIAL AMERICA 339 (1965). The
9
colonies had long “acknowledged that freedom to pursue
one’s chosen religious beliefs was an essential liberty.”
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 552. And when “religious
beliefs conflicted with civil law,” early colonists insisted
that “religion prevailed unless important state interests
militated otherwise.” Id. In short, the tone had been set
well before the Founding.
Unsurprisingly, then, the federal Constitution
prioritized religious freedom, too. Before the States
ratified the Bill of Rights, the Constitution in the main
held that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any office or public Trust under the
United States.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. Like the early
colonists, the Framers did not include this provision as an
afterthought: It deliberately affirms that religious
freedom is vital. See Carl Zollman, Religious Liberty in
the American Law, 17 MICH. L. REV. 355, 355-56 (1919);
see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; art. II, § 1, cl. 8; and
art. VI, cl. 3 (provisions allowing for affirmations instead
of oaths). The Bill of Rights brought an even more
powerful reminder of religious freedom’s importance
through the First Amendment’s key prescription:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S.
CONST. amend. I. With this brief statement, the Founders
enshrined religious liberty as one of our most fundamental
freedoms.
B. Religious Freedom In This Court
Since then, this Court has repeatedly emphasized the
ways our laws pursue genuinely free religious exercise.
As the country recovered from the Civil War and
continued to expand, for example, the Court reiterated
that “[r]eligious freedom is guaranteed everywhere
10
throughout the United States.” Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878).
Later precedent
established that the Fourteenth Amendment extends free
exercise protections to the laws of the States as well. See
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). So
whether dealing with federal or state law, “[f]reedom of
conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious
organization or form of worship as the individual may
choose cannot be restricted.” Id. at 303. This freedom
even “occup[ies] a preferred position” over others, such as
property rights. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509
(1946). And all Americans enjoy the right. “Whether
needy or affluent,” “itinerant” or fixed, “profession[al]” or
“casual,” the First Amendment protects all religious
practitioners wherever they “proclaim their faith.” Follett
v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577 (1944).
Free exercise is so important that the Court
approaches laws cautiously whenever they might interfere
with it. “[U]pon even slight suspicion that” government
action “stem[s] from animosity to religion or distrust of its
practices, all officials must pause to remember their own
high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it secures.”
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 547. The
Court has stressed the “importance of preventing the
restriction of enjoyment of these [religious] liberties.”
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 151 (1939). And no
arm of the government may “act in a manner that passes
judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of
religious beliefs and practices.” Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731
(2018). Religious beliefs “need not be acceptable, logical,
consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit
First Amendment protection.” Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714.
An “honest conviction” will do. Id. at 716.
11
In the end, this Court repeatedly returns to the first
principle that the “Constitution commits government
itself to religious tolerance.” Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138
S. Ct. at 1731 (citation omitted). With this constitutionally
enshrined safeguard, “only those interests of the highest
order and those not otherwise served can overbalance
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). And when it
comes to statutory construction, courts confronted with
multiple allowable readings of a statute will prefer those
consistent with “the history of the law,” Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. at 653-64, and reject those in tension with
essential liberties like religious freedom, United States v.
Palomar-Santiago, 141 S. Ct. 1615, 1622 (2021); cf.
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 162 (explaining that the Court looks
to “the history of the times in the midst of which the
provision was adopted” to determine the meaning of
“religion” in the Constitution).
C. Other Congressional Acts
Statutes similar to the Access Act also should have put
the Second Circuit on notice that it might be going astray.
Courts generally assume that new statutes are “intended
to fit into the existing system and to be carried into effect
conformably to it.” United States v. Jefferson Elec. Mfg.
Co., 291 U.S. 386, 396 (1934); see also, e.g., Kokoszka v.
Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (explaining that courts
“take in connection with [the statute at issue] the whole
statute (or statutes on the same subject) and the objects
and policy of the law”). And indeed, Congress passed the
Access Act in 1994 among a raft of laws that re-entrenched
a broad conception of religious freedom. See, e.g., Smith
v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 85 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(drawing inferences about Congress’s intent from other
12
laws “roughly contemporaneous” with the statute to be
construed).
In 1993, just one year before the Access Act, Congress
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4. Congress sought
through RFRA to enhance religious liberty by providing
that “[g]overnment may substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion” only if the measure can satisfy strict
scrutiny. Id. § 2000bb-1(b). That demanding standard
applies “even if the burden result[ed] from a rule of
general applicability.” Id. § 2000bb-1(a). Although this
Court later held that applying RFRA to the States
exceeded Congress’s powers, enacting it in the first place
was a telling signal of Congress’s commitment to religious
freedom: Congress came together to pass the massive bill
in fewer than three years. And it was no close vote. The
House of Representatives passed it unanimously, and only
three Senators opposed it. See H.R. 1308 (103rd):
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, GOVTRACK
(Oct. 27, 1993), https://bit.ly/3sWzfB2.
A few short years later in 2000, Congress passed the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”). In another extraordinary showing of unity,
RLUIPA passed both houses unanimously. U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED
PERSONS ACT 5 (Sept. 22, 2020), available at
https://bit.ly/3wP4Re0. That law advances freedom of
religion by singling out for protection religious land use
and the religious practices of institutionalized persons.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5. When President Bill
Clinton signed RLUIPA into law, he praised the way it
guarded “a constitutional value of the highest order” that
13
played a role of central “importance … in our democratic
society.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra, at 5.
Between these two bookends, Congress enacted other
broad religious-freedom protecting measures with
similarly impressive bipartisan support. The Religious
Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998
allowed taxpayers to deduct religious contributions, and
the Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996 barred acts of
destruction targeted at religious property; both passed
the House and Senate unanimously. See Pub. L. No. 105183, 112 Stat. 517 (1998); Pub. L. No. 104-155, 110 Stat.
1392 (1996). The International Religious Freedom Act of
1998 was still another example, this time targeting
activities abroad. It too passed without a single objection.
See Pub. L. No. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2787 (1998).
Taken together, this contemporary congressional
history rebuffs the suggestion that the Congress that
passed the Access Act likely intended it to have a narrow
reach.
The Congress of that era repeatedly and
emphatically passed broad acts designed to enshrine
religious liberty throughout the U.S. Code. Thus,
legislative context confirms that the Second Circuit should
have taken the Access Act’s broad text at face value.
D. State-Level Developments
If any ambiguity in the Access Act’s text exists, more
recent developments in state law could also inform the
Court’s reading of its religious-liberty protections. An
“old” and “diversified” practice of “resorting” to state law
helps “give meaning and content to federal statutes.”
Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155-56
(1944). And the States’ consistent emphasis on religious
freedom and free exercise underscores the importance of
the issues at stake here.
14
Most modern state constitutions incorporate broad
protections for religious practice. After declaring that
“[a]ll men have a natural and indefeasible right to
worship … according to the dictates of their own
conscience,” the Ohio Constitution directs the General
Assembly to “pass suitable laws to protect every religious
denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode
of public worship.” OH. CONST. art. I, § 7. New Hampshire
guarantees that no religious practitioners “shall be hurt,
molested, or restrained, in [their] person, liberty, or
estate, for worshipping … in the manner” they see fit so
long as they do not “disturb the public peace or disturb
others in their religious worship.” N.H. CONST. art. 5.
West Virginia’s constitution similarly says that no person
may be “enforced, restrained, molested or burthened, in
his body or goods, or otherwise suffer,” because of his or
her “religious opinions or belief.” W. VA. CONST. art. 3,
§ 15. Other examples abound. And recent developments
show how States continue to cherish religious liberty. For
example, 21 States have passed laws or amendments that
resemble RFRA.2
Thus, “religious freedom is accorded a special status in
both our state and federal constitutions,” Coulee Cath.
Sch. v. Lab. & Indust. Rev. Comm’n, 768 N.W.2d 868, 89192 (Wis. 2009), and in both our state and federal statute
books. Even at the state level, that freedom “extend[s] to
See ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 3.01; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1493.01; Ark.
Code Ann. § 16-123-401; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571b; Fla. Stat.
§ 761.01, et seq.; Idaho Code § 73-402; Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 775, § 35/1, et
seq.; Ind. Code § 34-13-9; Kan. Stat. § 60-5301, et seq.; Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 446.350; La. Rev. Stat. § 13:5231, et seq.; Miss. Code § 11-61-1; Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 1.302; N.M. Stat. § 28-22-1, et seq.; Okla. Stat. tit. 51,
§ 251, et seq.; 71 Pa. Stat. § 2403; R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-80.1-1, et seq.;
S.C. Code § 1-32-10, et seq.; Tenn. Code § 4-1-407; Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Remedies Code § 110.001, et seq.; Va. Code § 57-2.02.
2
15
persons of all creeds and religious beliefs or disbeliefs,”
not just “orthodox religious practices.” Bond v. Bond, 109
S.E.2d 16, 24 (W. Va. 1959); accord Brush & Nib Studio,
LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 896 (Ariz. 2019)
(describing how religious freedom is for all, “not only for
those who are deemed sufficiently enlightened, advanced,
or progressive”); Holden v. Bd. of Educ. of City of
Elizabeth, 216 A.2d 387, 391 (N.J. 1966) (explaining that
unless a practitioner “present[s] a clear and present
danger to the peace, welfare, and security of the people,
they [are to] suffer no testing against human dicta, no
matter how unreasonable [their beliefs] may seem”). The
States’ traditions are also part of the national fabric of
religious liberty that Congress and the courts preserve.
E. The Second Circuit’s Wrong Turn
The Second Circuit’s decision is a jarring break from
this long line of diverse, pro-religious-freedom authority.
“No part of the judicial code is” “self-contained”—the
meaning of most statutory terms to some extent
“depend[s] … on external norms.” Phoenix Container,
L.P. v. Sokoloff, 235 F.3d 352, 354-55 (7th Cir. 2000)
(Easterbrook, J.). But when construing the phrase “place
of worship,” the Second Circuit lost sight of the American
norms and values of religious freedom. Even the Second
Circuit recognized that the text easily could have borne an
expansive reading. See Pet.App.24a (noting how the
words following “place of” can “merely describe an
incidental feature of the location”). But it resisted that
reading anyway.
Rather than acting with an eye toward America’s
history of religious respect, the Second Circuit seemed to
search for a way to narrow a statute that would otherwise
fit comfortably within that tradition. The Access Act
16
reflects a truth Congress has known for a long time:
increased penalties and protections are sometimes
“needed to deter future violence and to demonstrate
governmental commitment to protecting free exercise.”
Protecting Religious Exercise: The First Amendment
and Legislative Responses to Religious Vandalism, 97
HARV. L. REV. 547, 555 (1983). The lower court’s approach
is thus not only atextual as Petitioners explain—a fatal
flaw on its own—but is at odds with Congress’s efforts to
render the right to worship meaningful against the
backdrop of other constitutional and statutory religious
protections.
The Court should grant certiorari to set the statute
right and show “respect for this Nation’s pluralism, and
the values of neutrality and inclusion that the First
Amendment demands.” Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist
Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2094 (2019) (Kagan, J., concurring).
II.
The Second Circuit’s Construction Creates
Serious Constitutional Concerns.
The Court should also intervene because the Second
Circuit construed a statute intended to protect religious
practice in a way that invites entanglement and free
exercise concerns. Even spotting the lower court that the
term “place of worship” has more than one fair reading, it
should have applied the construction that “avoid[ed] not
only the conclusion that [it is] unconstitutional, but also
grave doubts upon that score.” Palomar-Santiago, 141 S.
Ct. at 1622 (cleaned up). This constitutional avoidance
canon “is a tool for choosing between competing plausible
interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the
reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the
alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts.”
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381-82 (2005). In this
17
way, it is “a means of giving effect to congressional intent,
not of subverting it.” Id. But the Second Circuit’s
approach discounted constitutional concerns for the sake
of preserving its narrower course.
In effectively redrafting the statute, the Second Circuit
ran headlong into multiple, serious constitutional doubts.
“[T]he very process of inquiry” into religious doctrine and
dogma “may impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion
Clauses.” NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490,
502 (1979). Here, the Second Circuit tried to avoid this
problem by purportedly not “imposing any particular
conceptual, physical, or temporal requirements” on what
counts as a “place of religious worship.” Pet.App.28a. But
asking whether a protected site has a “primary” religious
purpose endorsed by “leadership” or some unspecified
“collective[],” id. at 28a-29a, is a “conceptual”
requirement. Holding as a blanket matter that certain
places are not covered—“such as one’s home”—is likewise
a “physical” requirement. Id. at 28a; contrast with
Charles E. Hummel, The Church at Home: The House
Church Movement, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (1986),
available at https://bit.ly/3zf94cL (last visited June 6,
2022) (“Yet in every century Christians have met in homes
in small groups to supplement their more formal church
life.”). And rejecting sites of worship unless (it seems) the
worship is regularly scheduled is a “temporal”
requirement. See Pet.App.33a-34a (contrasting a religion
that holds “daily or weekly church services” with the
Falun Gong’s purportedly more “sporadic instances of
worship at the tables”). These new requirements create
no fewer than three substantial issues.
First, the Second Circuit applied its newfound
“primary” requirement in a way that forced the court to
categorize religious practices based on the court’s
18
subjective of assessment of “primary” versus “incidental”
religious practices. The First Amendment does not
“permit[] governments or courts to inquire into the
centrality to a faith of certain religious practices—
dignifying some, disapproving others.”
Haight v.
Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 566 (6th Cir. 2014); see also
Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987) (“[I]t
is a significant burden on a religious organization to
require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict which
of its activities a secular court will consider religious.”).
Likewise, courts have no role “in deciding or even
suggesting” whether acts that take place at a given site
are “legitimate or illegitimate” acts of worship.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731. Courts should
instead ask only whether “a given belief that is sincere and
meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.”
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965).
Problem is, the Second Circuit never mentioned
sincerity.
Instead, the court below drew an
“[un]intelligible” line, Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
270 n.6 (1981), dismissing Petitioners’ conduct as
unprotected “political and social action [that] may be
rooted in religious belief,” Pet.App.35a. Because it
marched into the “forbidden process of interpreting and
weighing church doctrine,” Presbyterian Church in U.S.
v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 451 (1969), this Court should haul it back.
The Court should intervene to make clear that essential
principles like those Seeger and Masterpiece Cakeshop
described apply when construing the Access Act, too. The
First Amendment is “plainly jeopardized” when courts
deign to weigh into “controversies over religious doctrine
and practice.” Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God v.
19
Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Second, the decision below improperly downgrades
individual religious practitioners. Remember: Under the
Second Circuit’s interpretation, it is not enough that the
alleged intimidation and violence occur at a place of
religious worship the believer herself considers
“primary.” The religion’s adherents must “collectively
recognize” it that way, or else some “religious leadership”
must “designate” it so. Pet.App.4a. It seems the only one
whose “sincere and meaningful” beliefs do not matter are
the practitioner’s—that is, the person suffering the
violence and intimidation Congress meant to prevent.
Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165-66.
Nothing is right about insisting on an “official stamp of
approval” for an individual believer’s religious practice.
It’s outside “the judicial ken to question the centrality of
particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of
particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”
Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (emphasis
added). So too for “inquir[ing] whether the petitioner or
his fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands
of their common faith.” Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716. More
generally, “[a] personal religious faith is entitled to as
much protection as one espoused by an organized
group”—no government may insist that members of a
faith tradition “espouse all, and only, those beliefs that
have the support of the sect’s leadership.” Vinning-El v.
Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 593 (7th Cir. 2011) (Easterbrook, J.);
see also Follett, 321 U.S. at 577 (“The protection of the
First Amendment is not restricted to orthodox religious
practices.”). But that’s what the Second Circuit did, and
what judges in other Circuits will likely do if this decision
stands.
20
This approach is even more troubling—and thus calls
more urgently for review—given a cold reality: In places
where religious freedom is weakest, giving veto power to
a religious leader or collective is how governments
persecute and control individual practitioners. This threat
is a real one for religions like Falun Gong. The Chinese
Communist Party has capitalized on the lack of “strong
hierarchical structures” in Buddhism and Daoism to
“establish[] an oversight organization to control religious
believers … by selecting and promoting leadership that
was loyal to the Communist cause.” Hollan, supra, at 74041; see also, e.g., Sophie Goodman, A Country Burning for
Religious Freedom: The New Draft Law on Freedom of
Religion in Vietnam, 26 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 159, 16465 (2017) (“[T]he [Vietnamese Communist Party]
supervises the training and education of church leadership
of every religious organization.”). Yet the decision below
forces worshippers at risk of violence and intimidation to
barter statutory protection for centralized religious
control. In our tradition, religious liberty has always
meant more.
Third, the Second Circuit’s extra-textual reading
unduly “privilege[s] religious traditions with formal
organizational structures over those that are less formal.”
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.
Ct. 2049, 2064 (2020). As Petitioners point out and the
district court recognized, Pet.3-4; Pet.App.51a, the
decision below stands in tension with the Establishment
Clause’s “clearest command … that one religious
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). “Falun Gong
does not have many formal physical or organizational
structures” at all, Pet.App.66a, so this isn’t a case of
individual believers out-of-step with leadership or
choosing to worship in unorthodox locations. At a
21
minimum, the Second Circuit’s decision to read the Access
Act “to protect religions differently based on whether the
religion has fixed temples or prayer takes place in
transitory locations” raises serious constitutional
concerns. Pet.App.124a-125a.
And the decision below reflects more than a one-time
problem for this one religion; other sects practice in much
the same way. Quakerism, for instance, historically “did
not erect edifices for worship and did not have clergy.”
Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty:
Seven Questions from Madison’s Memorial and
Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 804 (2002).
Other Christian groups, such as the Wild Church
Network, continue to “question the wisdom and
consequences of regarding ‘church’ as a building where
you gather away from the rest of the world for a couple
hours on Sundays.”
Rewilding Christianity,
PROGRESSIVECHRISTIANITY.ORG, https://bit.ly/3xa2JfU
(last visited June 7, 2022).
Even those religions that have traditional buildings
often worship and praise outside those ordinary places.
Christians might gather riverside to celebrate and
worship through baptism. See, e.g., Danielle Mueller,
Cherryville Baptist Holds Riverside Baptism, NJ.COM
(July 28, 2016), https://bit.ly/3GTzxhI.
Jewish
worshippers might meet in their backyard, in a sukkah, to
celebrate Sukkot. See Jill Altman, Sukkot: Why It’s The
Favorite Holiday At Our House, INTERMOUNTAIN
JEWISH NEWS (Sept. 17, 2021), https://bit.ly/3NZ86oP.
Muslim worshippers might pray and worship on outdoor
sidewalks to prevent the spread of COVID-19. See
Pauline Bartolone, Sacramento Muslims Celebrate Eid
— Outside And Six Feet Apart, CAPRADIO (Aug. 3, 2020),
22
https://bit.ly/3Q1vWSQ. Yet worshippers like these and
others will go selectively unprotected, too.
In short order, the decision below managed to:
exclude entire categories of religious practice that
fail to occur at a “primary” place of worship;
remove the practitioners themselves from the
equation in favor of a larger collective and
leadership that may not even exist; and
prefer some religions over others by requiring
discernable practices, leadership, and physical
structures.
The decision below was wrong—very. Its consequences
are troublingly broad. And on its own facts it withholds
our country’s robust tradition of religious protection from
adherents of the third-largest group in the world
currently facing religious persecution. The Court should
grant review before the damage can get worse.
CONCLUSION
The Court should grant the petition for a writ of
certiorari and reverse.
23
Respectfully submitted.
PATRICK MORRISEY
Attorney General
OFFICE OF THE
WEST VIRGINIA
ATTORNEY GENERAL
State Capitol Complex
Building 1, Room E-26
Charleston, WV 25305
lindsay.s.see@wvago.gov
(304) 558-2021
LINDSAY S. SEE
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
MICHAEL R. WILLIAMS
Senior Deputy Solicitor
General
CALEB A. SECKMAN
Assistant Solicitor General
Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of West Virginia
24
ADDITIONAL COUNSEL
STEVE MARSHALL
Attorney General
State of Alabama
LYNN FITCH
Attorney General
State of Mississippi
MARK BRNOVICH
Attorney General
State of Arizona
ERIC S. SCHMITT
Attorney General
State of Missouri
LESLIE RUTLEDGE
Attorney General
State of Arkansas
AUSTIN KNUDSEN
Attorney General
State of Montana
ASHLEY MOODY
Attorney General
State of Florida
DOUGLAS J. PETERSON
Attorney General
State of Nebraska
THEODORE E. ROKITA
Attorney General
State of Indiana
JOHN FORMELLA
Attorney General
State of New Hampshire
DEREK SCHMIDT
Attorney General
State of Kansas
DREW WRIGLEY
Attorney General
State of North Dakota
DANIEL CAMERON
Attorney General
State of Kentucky
DAVE YOST
Attorney General
State of Ohio
JEFF LANDRY
Attorney General
State of Louisiana
JOHN O’CONNOR
Attorney General
State of Oklahoma
25
ALAN WILSON
Attorney General
State of South Carolina
JASON RAVNSBORG
Attorney General
State of South Dakota
HERBERT SLATERY
Attorney General
State of Tennessee
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General
State of Texas
SEAN D. REYES
Attorney General
State of Utah
JASON MIYARES
Attorney General
State of Virginia
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.