Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Joel D. Klenck, Petitioner v. Liberty University, et al.

Supreme Court briefDec 21, 2021

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No. 21-

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Supreme Court of tfje QEnttcb States!

FILED

DEC 2 1 2021

SUPREEMEfrnlmT|Lnf<

JOEL DAVID KLENCK,

Petitioner,

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY, JOHN RANDALL PRICE,

MICHAEL S. HEISER, and DON ROSS PATTON,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Joel D. Klenck

Petitioner Pro Se

1665 BROOKSIDE CIRCLE EAST

Jacksonville, FL 32207

(904) 405-8618

KLENCKJD@GMAIL.COM

February 28,2022

SUPREME COURT PRESS

♦

(888) 958-5705

♦

Boston, Massachusetts

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The questions presented are:

1. Whether and to what degree does this Court

have the ability to review final judgments of state

courts when the case involves international treaties

regarding historic preservation and terrorism?

2. Whether and to what degree does this Court

define what is arbitrary and capricious to modify

final judgments of state courts?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner

Petitioner is Joel David Klenck.

He was the plaintiff in the Fourth Judicial Circuit

Court of Florida, appellant in the First District

Court of Appeal of Florida, and petitioner in the

Supreme Court of Florida.

Respondents

•

Liberty University

•

John Randall Price

•

Michael S. Heiser

•

Don Ross Patton

Respondents were defendants in the Fourth Judi

cial Circuit Court of Florida, appellees in the

First District Court of Appeal of Florida, and

respondents in the Supreme Court of Florida.

Ill

LIST OF PROCEEDINGS

Supreme Court of Florida

No. SC21-1338

Klenck v. Liberty University, et al.

Date of Judgment: September 22, 2021

First District Court of Appeal, State of Florida

No. 1D20-1924

Klenck v. Liberty University, et al.

Date of Judgment: July 8, 2021

Fourth Judicial Circuit Court,

in and for Duval County, Florida

No. 16-2015-CA-005978

Klenck v. Liberty University, et al.

Date of Judgment: April 20, 2020

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED..............................

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS...............

LIST OF PROCEEDINGS.................................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..............................

Vll

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI....

OPINIONS BELOW..........................................

JURISDICTION..................................................

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED.........................

STATEMENT OF THE CASE...........................

A. Statutory Background.............................

B. Factual & Procedural Background........

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION...... 10

LT Erred By Dismissing All Counts

When Respondents Did Not Mention or

Defend Against Specific Counts............. 16

II. LT Erred When It Held It Had No

Jurisdiction.................................................. 16

III. LT Erred When It Held Venue Was

Impropper Because Departing Jackson

ville Defendant Was No Longer in the

Cause.............................................................. 23

IV. LT Erred By Dismissing Case When

§ 770.01 Notices Were Not Required for

Non-Media Appellees................................. 24

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

V. LT Erred By Dismissing Case Due to

Single Action and Publication Rules

Because Appellees Committed Numerous

Different Tortious Acts and Publica

tions ............................................................... 27

VI. LT Erred When It Ruled Against Mul

tiple Theories of Recovery Permitted

for Invasions of Privacy............................ 31

VII. LT Erred in Dismissing the Negligence

Counts in Petitioner’s Third Amended

Complaint Against Price Because It Did

Not Require Precedence.......................... 32

VIII. LT Erred When It Considered Disputes

of Fact During a Dismissal Hearing...... 38

CONCLUSION

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinions and Orders

Order of the Supreme Court of Florida

(September 22, 2021)......................................... la

Per Curiam Affirmed Decision of the State of

Florida First District Court of Appeal

(July 8,2021)...................................................... 3a

Order of the State of Florida First District Court

of Appeal Denying Motion for Issuance of a

Written Opinion (August 16, 2021).................. 4a

Amended Order of the Florida Fourth Judicial

District Dismissing Case with Prejudice

(April 20, 2020)................................................... 6a

Other Documents

Petitioner’s Brief Filed in the Florida Supreme

Court (September 27, 2021).............................. 8a

Appellant’s Notice to the Florida Supreme Court

Invoking Discretionary Jurisdiction

(September 15, 2021)........................................ 17a

Appellant’s Reply Brief Filed in the Florida First

DCA (January 21, 2021)................................... 19a

Appellant’s Initial Brief Filed in the Florida First

DCA (October 6, 2020)...................................... 33a

Plaintiffs Fourth Amended Complaint

(August 14, 2019)...................................... 79a

Vll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES

Atl. Richfield Co. v. Christian,

140 S. Ct. 1335 (2020)............. ........................ 10

Fisher v. District Court of Sixteenth Judicial

Dist. of Mont., 424 U.S. 382, 96 S.Ct. 943,

47 L.Ed.2d 106 (1976)...................................... 10

Gunn v. Minton,

568 U.S. 251, 133 S.Ct. 1059,

185 L.Ed.2d 72 (2013)........................................ 10

Hanson v. Denckla,

357 U.S. 235 (1958)........................................... 18

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,

561 U.S. 1 (2010).............................................. 13

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,

326 U.S. 310 (1945).......................................... 18

Jefferson v. City of Tarrant,

522 U.S. 75, 118 S.Ct. 481,

139 L.Ed.2d 433 (1997).................................... 10

McKesson Corp. u. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages

& Tobacco, Dept, of Bus. Regulation of

Florida, 496 U.S. 18 (1990).............................. 11

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,

444 U.S. 286 (1980)...................................... 18

FEDERAL CASES

Cobb Coin Co. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked

and Abandoned Sailing Vessel,

549 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. Fla. 1982).........

34, 36

Vlll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Columbus Am. Discovery Group v. Atl. Mut.

Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1992)....... 36, 37

Comolli u. Huntington Learning Centers, Inc.,

117 F. Supp. 3d 343 (S.D. N.Y. 2015).......

Coton v. Televised Visual X-Ography, Inc.,

740 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (M.D. Fla. 2010)....

Epic Metals Corp. v. CONDEC, Inc.,

867 F. Supp. 1009 (M.D. Fla. 1994)............

Etheredge-Brown v. Am. Media, Inc.,

13 F. Supp. 3d 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).......

Firth v. State,

306 A.D. 2d 666, 761 N.Y.S. 2d 361

(3d Dep’t 2003)..............................................

Geller v. Von Hagens,

08:10-CV-01688-EAK, 2011 WL 2434217

(M.D. Fla. June 13, 2011)............................

Int’l Aircraft Recovery, L.L.C. v. The

Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned

Aircraft, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1172

(S.D. Fla. 1999)..............................................

34, 35

Kertesz v. Net Transactions, Ltd.,

635 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2009)......

Kinsman v. Winston,

615CV6960-RL22GJK, 2015 WL

12839267 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2015)........

Klein v. The Unidentified Wrecked and

Abandoned Sailing Vessel,

758 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1985).................. 34, 35

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Lindsay v. The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel

R.M.S. Titanic, No. 97 Civ. 9248 (HB),

1998 WL 557591 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 1998)..

Marex Inti, Inc. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked

and Abandoned Vessel,

952 F. Supp. 825 (S.D. Ga. 1997)................. 36, 37

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.

United States EPA,

966 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1992)......................

Ortega Trujillo v. Banco Central Del Ecuador,

17 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (S.D. Fla. 1998)..........

R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked and

Abandoned Vessel,

924 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Va. 1996).................

Woodhull v. Meinel,

145 N.M. 533, 2009-NMCA-015,

202 P.3d 126 (Ct. App. 2008)........................

FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

Acquadro v. Bergeron,

851 So.2d 665 (Fla. 2003).........................

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ginsberg,

863 So.2d 156 (Fla. 2003)..........................

Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Hillsborough

County Aviation Authority,

153 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1963).......................

Cape Publications, Inc. v. Hitchner,

549 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 1989)......................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Clay Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Johnson,

873 So.2d 1182 (Fla. 2003).......

Connolly v. Sebeco, Inc.,

89 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1956)...........

Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC,

39 So.3d 1216 (Fla. 2010).........

Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall,

39 So.3d 1201 (Fla. 2010)..........

Jews For Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp,

997 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 2008).......

Kaisner v. Kolb,

543 So.2d 732 (Fla. 1989).........

33, 37

McCain v. Fla. Power Corp.,

593 So.2d 500 (Fla. 1992).........

33, 37, 38

Ralph v. City of Daytona Beach,

471 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1983).............

Venetian Salami Co. u. Parthenais,

554 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1989)..........

20,21, 23

Wendt v. Horowitz,

822 So.2d 1252 (Fla. 2002).......

17, 20

Whitt v. Silverman,

788 So.2d 210 (Fla. 2001)....... .

33, 38

FLORIDA DISTRICT COURTS OF APPEAL

Aguila v. Hilton, Inc.,

878 So.2d 392 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)...............

Becker v. Hooshmand,

841 So.2d 561 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)..............

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Bridges v. Williamson,

449 So.2d 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)............

24, 26

Brodie v. Foley & Lardner,

932 So.2d 440 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)...............

Caiazzo v. Am. Royal Arts Corp.,

73 So.3d 245 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)............

17, 18

Callaway Land & Cattle Co., Inc. u. Banyon

Lakes C. Corp.,

831 So.2d 204 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)..........

Casita, L.P. v. Maplewood Equity Partners, L.P.,

960 So.2d 854

(Fla. 3d DCA 2007)........................................

Comins v. Van Voorhis,

135 So.3d 545 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)..........

Cummings v. Dawson,

444 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)...........

Daytona Beach News Journal Corp. v.

Firstamerica Dev. Corp.,

181 So.2d 565 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)...............

Easton u. Weir,

167 So.2d 245 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964).............

Elmore v. Fla. Power & Light Co.,

895 So.2d 475 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)...........

Estate of Tippett v. City of Miami,

645 So.2d 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).............

Gannett Florida Corp. v. Montesano,

308 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)................

Xll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Gross v. Sand & Sea Homeowners Assoc., Inc.,

756 So.2d 1073 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).........

33'

Hevey v. News-Journal Corp.,

148 So.2d 543 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)............

Hilliard v. Speedway Superamerica LLC,

766 So.2d 1153 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).........

Jenkins v. W.L. Roberts, Inc.,

851 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)............

Johnson v. State Dept, of Health & Rehab.

Svcs, 695 So.2d 927

(Fla. 2d DCA 1997)........................................

Loft v. Fuller,

408 So.2d 619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)...........

Mancini v. Personalized Air Conditioning &

Heating, Inc., 702 So.2d 1376

(Fla. 4th DCA 1997)......................................

Maybin v. Thompson,

514 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)...........

Mazur v. Ospina Baraya,

275 So.3d 812 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)

25, 26, 27

Metropolitan Dade County v. P.J. Birds, Inc.,

654 So.2d 170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)....

10, 34, 35

Musto v Bell South Telecomms. Corp.,

748 So.2d 296 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) .,

Ovadia v. Bloom,

756 So.2d 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)...

Plant Food Sys., Inc. v. Prey,

165 So.3d. 859 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)

Xlll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Price v. Kronenberger,

24 So.3d 775 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)............... 17, 19

Rausch-Livingston Real Estate v. Dixon,

260 So.2d 290 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)...............

Saul v. Basse,

399 So.2d 130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)...............

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. u. Compupay, Inc.,

654 So.2d 944 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)................

Stokes v. Fla.,

948 So.2d 75 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)................

Stone’s Throw Condo. Assoc., Inc. v. Sand Cove

Apartments, Inc.,

749 So.2d 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)............... 34, 38

Stranahan House, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale,

927 So.2d 1068 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).......... 11, 34

Testa v. S. Escrow & Title, LLC,

36 So.3d 713 (Fla. 1st DCA 201)..................

Thomas v. Patton,

2005 WL 3048033

(Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 21, 2005)...........................

Tobacco Merchants Assn of U.S. v. Brain,

657 So.2d 939 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)...............

Vance v. Minton,

444 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)............

Zelinka v. Americare Healthscan, Inc.,

763 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)..............

XIV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Mont. Const., Art. VII, § 2(1)................

U.S. Const, amend. XIV.........................

U.S. Const., Art. VI................................

2,11

FEDERAL STATUTES

5 U.S.C. § 706...............................................

2, 14

Archaeological Resources Protection Act,

16 U.S.C. §470kk...............................

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).....................................

2, 10

Historic Preservation Act,

54 U.S.C. § 300101 et seq..................

STATE STATUTES

Fla. Stat. § 48.193..........................

17, 19, 20, 21

Fla. Stat. § 48.193(l)(a)................

Fla. Stat. § 48.193(l)(b)................

Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2).....................

Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(a)..................

Fla. Stat. § 540.08......‘...................

............ 19, 31

Fla. Stat. § 770.01..........................

24, 25, 26, 27

Fla. Stat. § 770.07..........................

............ 28, 29

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 267.061(l)(a)(3)

(

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

JUDICIAL RULES

Sup. Ct. R. 13.1......................

Sup. Ct. R. 33.1......................

Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(g).........

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g)..........

Mont. Rules App. Proc. 14(1)

Mont. Rules App. Proc. 14(3).

Mont. Rules App. Proc. 6(6)..

FEDERAL REGULATIONS

U.S. National Register for Historic Places

Criteria, 36 C.F.R. § 60.4.....................

11, 34

OTHER AUTHORITIES

1970 UNESCO Convention.................................

2001 UNESCO Convention.................................

3 Fla. PI. & Pr. Forms § 25:4..............................

Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)...........

Nawi Ukabiala,

Autocatalytic Regime Theory and Un

Spawned Cooperative Counterterrorism

Part II: Addressing the Apprehension,

5 U. Miami Nat’l Sec. & Armed Conflict

L. Rev. 63(2015).............................................

XVI

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Paul Hailwood & Thomas J. Miceli,

Murky Waters: The Law and Economics of

Salvaging Historic Shipwrecks,

35 J. Legal Studies 285 (2006)..................

U.S. Dep’t. St.,

United States and Turkey Work Together

to Protect Cultural Heritage, (Jan. 19,

2021), https://eca.state.gov/highlight/

united-states-and-turkey-work-togetherprotect-cultural-heritage..............................

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Joel David Klenck petitions this Court for a writ

of certiorari to review the judgments of the Florida

Supreme Court and First District Court of Appeal of

Florida.

♦

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the Florida Supreme Court dismiss

ing the case is included at App.la. The per curiam

affirmed opinion of the Florida First District Court of

Appeals is included at App.3a, and its order denying a

motion for issuance of a written petition is included at

App.4a. The amended order of the Florida Fourth

Judicial District dismissing the case with prejudice is

included at App.6a. No written opinions were provided

by the Fourth Judicial Circuit Court of Florida, First

District Court of Appeal of Florida, and Supreme

Court of Florida.

JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court of Florida entered judgment

on September 22, 2021. App.la. On December 29, 2021,

the Clerk of Court provided Petitioner an additional

60 days to file a brief in compliance with Rule 33.1.

This petition is timely filed pursuant to Supreme

Court Rule 13.1. This Court has jurisdiction under

28U.S.C. § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, in relevant part:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United

States which shall be made in pursuance

thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be

made, under the Authority of the United States,

shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the

Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,

any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any

state to the contrary notwithstanding.

The Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended

(54 U.S.C. § 300101 et seq.), in relevant part:

It is the policy of the Federal Government, in

cooperation with other nations and in

partnership with States, local governments,

Indian tribes, Native Hawaiian organizations,

and private organizations and individuals, to—

(2) provide leadership in the preservation of

the historic property of the United States

and of the international community of

nations and in the administration of the

national preservation program

5 U.S.C. § 706

To the extent necessary to decision and when

presented, the reviewing court shall decide all

relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional

and statutory provisions, and determine the

meaning or applicability of the terms of an

agency action. The reviewing court shall—

(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld

or unreasonably delayed; and

(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action,

findings, and conclusions found to be—

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre

tion, or otherwise not in accordance with

law;

(B) contrary to constitutional right, power,

privilege, or immunity;

authority, or limitations, or short of

statutory right;

(D) without observance of procedure required

by law;

(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in

a case subject to sections 556 and 557

of this title or otherwise reviewed on

the record of an agency hearing provided

by statute; or

(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent

that the facts are subject to trial de

novo by the reviewing court.

In making the foregoing determinations, the

court shall review the whole record or those

parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall

be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Statutory Background

This appeal arises from a civil case from the

Fourth Judicial Circuit, in Duval County, Florida, from

the final orders of Judge Eric C. Roberson, rendered

on April 7, 2019, and April 20, 2019, dismissing the

case with prejudice. R.3507-09.

Factual & Procedural Background

Petitioner, a professional archaeologist, with MA

and PhD degrees from Harvard University in anthro

pological archaeology, confirmed the antiquity and

authenticity of Noah’s Ark, an ancient, maritime barge,

constructed of wood, in the southern gorge of greater

Mount Ararat, in eastern Turkey. R.336-586, 335456.1 The Ark is more than 150 meters in length, in two

general areas, fragmented into 10 larger features, thus

far exhibiting 14 distinct loci, at elevations between

3,900 and 4,700 meters, and accessed by tunnels 4 to

11 meters beneath the gorge’s surface. App.9a-10a,

20a, 38a, 81a-85a. The vessel’s origin dates to the

Late Epipaleolithic Period (13,100-9,600 BC) and

earlier and represents the progenitor site for the

Neolithic or farming revolution. App.9a-10a, 20a, 38a39a, 82a. Due to Petitioner’s efforts, the Turkish

government has initiated curation and conservation

of the site. App.lOa, 20a, 39a, 84a-85a.

1 References to “R” denote the appellate record from the First

District Court of Appeal of Florida.

The structure is a maritime barge as evidenced

by the angled hulls, maritime carpentry methods

such as coak-and-dowel and mortise-and-tenon joinery

(R.353-55), thousands of cages of different sizes, some

with wood prongs to feed larger animals, sloping ramps,

three decks, ballast features, walls and features covered

with pitch coatings of bitumen and resin (R.346-47),

marine crustaceans on the exterior of the hull, floors

covered with cyrodessicated animal dung (R.362-63),

furniture fixed to the walls of the vessel, and large

cargo holds with a prehistoric diet of bitter vetch,

pea, and chickpea seeds (R.360-61). App. 9a-10a, 20a,

81a-82a.

The maritime barge shows veneration for thou

sands of years and a unique placement of artifacts,

where later cultures left ceramic containers (R.351-52),

stone carvings (R.348-49), and other offerings near

entrances to the vessel. The Ark’s wood architecture

is shaped by stone tools (R.342-43) and its interior

has stone artifacts (R.358-59), vegetal baskets (R.36465), textiles and cords (R.356-57), bone and wood arti

facts (R.344-45), and botanical remains of grape and

pre-domesticated cereals that were frozen and cryodesiccated causing enhanced preservation for millennia.

R.519-24; App.9a-10a, 20a, 81a-85a.

Conversely, Respondents Liberty University, John

Randall Price, Michael S. Heiser and Don Ross Pat

ton perpetrated a multi-year fraud, beginning around

2008, raising funds for a faux Noah’s Ark excavation

on Mount Ararat, in eastern Turkey, by digging a

hole in the ice near the summit. R.87-91, 3355-56. Here,

Respondents made a film entitled “Finding Noah”

despite not finding a single cultural artifact. R.3007;

App.38a.

Around the same time, another person, Ahmet

Ertegrul, rediscovered the monumental prehistoric

barge in the southern gorge of greater Mount Ararat

with thousands of ancient artifacts. R.3354-55. Ertegrul

learned the approximate location of the site from his

Armenian grandmother, who married a Kurdish man to

escape Turkish persecution in the early 1900s. R.3355.

After the Turkish government and others supported

the site as Noah’s Ark, the Petitioner was the first

westerner to confirm and advocate for the protection,

preservation, research of this archaeological site. R.

2396-2415, 3356; App.38a-39a, 83a-85a.

Respondents hired Murat §ahin, the co-owner of

Murat Kamping, who was released from prison in April,

2010, after murdering Yavuz Tasdemir; cutting the ear

off of Cetin Tasdemir, the handicapped son of Yavuz;

and shooting the jaw off of Mehmet Cetin Kaya, with a

shotgun. R.8-9, 61-75, 3004, 3356.2>3 Respondents also

hired Amy Louise Beam, an advocate for a Marxist

terrorist organization, Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane

(“PKK”). R.177-80. During this cause, the Republic of

2 A defendant outside this petition, Richard C. Bright, confirmed

that Murat §ahin was convicted by a Turkish court for killing

“an innocent bystander.” R. 592-593.

3 Petitioner alleges that Murat §ahin murdered Donald

Mackenzie, a Scottish man wanting to verify the Ark discovery

who disappeared near Mt. Ararat. §ahin had an extensive criminal

history including murder and the motive to dispatch Mackenzie

because the latter’s verification of Ertegrul’s discovery would

impact the monies §ahin acquired from the Respondents. Also,

Sahin was released from prison five months before Mackenzie

vanished, had regular contact with Mackenzie, and possessed

Mackenzie’s personal effects after Mackenzie’s disappearance,

facts confirmed by Donald’s brother, Derick Mackenzie. E.g.,

R.8-9, 16-17, 61-75, 727, 1149-50.

Turkey expelled Beam for associations with terrorism.

R.97-112, 3004-7, 3356. Respondents also worked with

another felon, Richard C. Bright. R.825, 835, 3003;

App.lOa, 38a, 84a-85a.

After Petitioner advocated for the protection, pre

servation, and research the archaeological site and

shrine, Respondents and other defendants outside this

appeal, including Amy Beam and Richard Bright,

posted on internet doxing websites, web pages, and

video platforms, Petitioner’s U.S. Passport, financial

documents, a personal diary, travel documents, and

malicious and defamatory statements such as Petition

er was engaged in fraud. R.3357-89, 3427-36, 3445-58;

App.lOa, 39a, 86a-140a.

Respondents modified their publications against

the Petitioner, used different web platforms, pub

lished new materials, published in different languages

including traditional Chinese, simplified Chinese, and

French, augmented and edited their publications, with

different advertisements, and linked their publications

and search engine associations together to increase

the internet exposure of these doxing and defamatory

websites to harm the Petitioner. R.3172-270, 3357-89,

3427-36, 3445-58; App.lO-lla, 39a, 86a-140a. Respond

ents’ hundreds of web pages, web sites, videos, and

links to defamatory and private invasion data against

the Petitioner, were read by third parties in Florida,

harming the Petitioner’s reputation and livelihood.

R.3172-270, 3357-89, 3427-36, 3445-58; App.lOa-lla,

39a, 86a-140a.

During this time, four persons submitted declara

tions, under the penalty of perjury, that Petitioner’s

verification of the archaeological discovery on Mount

Ararat was truthful and the Respondents were lying.

R.2367-86, 2447-51.

When the Petitioner filed his suit in the Fourth

Judicial Circuit, on September 20, 2015, Judge Kevin

Blazs was assigned to the case, the only judge in the

Fourth Circuit, who is a graduate of Liberty Univer

sity. R.762-72. Respondents filed dismissal motions.

R.635-47, 732-61, 1847-57, 2756-65, 3316-20. Patton

answered the initial complaint but then joined the

Respondents in filing dismissal motions for amended

complaints. R.610-25, 3326-29. Petitioner filed

responses and replies to Respondents’ dismissal

motions. R.823-35, 1090-176, 2332-40, 2387-92, 291847, 3330-39. Hearings were conducted by Judge Kevin

Blazs, who dismissed the complaints without prejudice

R.1431-2, 2471-4, 2995-7. For the third amended com

plaint, Judge Blaze dismissed the negligence count with

prejudice and the remaining counts without prejudice.

R.3348-50. Petitioner filed amended complaints after

each dismissal. R.1448-811, 2483-674, 2998-3298;

App.lla, 37a-38a.

Petitioner filed his fourth amended complaint on

August 14, 2019. R.3353-460; App.79a-141a. Respond

ents filed their dismissal motion on August 26, 2019.

R.3465-73. Petitioner filed his reply on March 29,

2020. R.3480-91. Judge Eric C. Roberson presided

over the last hearing in April, 2020, and dismissed

the case with prejudice, rendering orders on April 7

and April 20, 2020, the latter due to a scrivener’s

error. R.3507-9; App.6a-7a. After Petitioner filed a

motion for rehearing, reconsideration, and clarification

on April 22, 2020 (R.3510-25), Respondents responded

(R.3589-98), and Petitioner replied (R.3599-613). Judge

Roberson denied the motion on May 21, 2020 (R.3614),

and Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the First

District Court of Appeal of Florida on June 20, 2020.

R.3615-20; App.38a.

Petitioner submitted timely initial and reply

briefs to the First District Court of Appeal of Florida

on October 6 and January 21, 2021, respectively.

App.l9a-78a. First District Court of Appeal affirmed

the lower tribunal decision per curiam on July 8,

2021. App.3a. Petitioner submitted a Motion for a

Written Opinion on July 23, 2021, which was denied

August 16, 2021. App.4a-5a. Petitioner submitted a

timely Notice for Discretionary Jurisdiction to the

Supreme Court of Florida on September 15, 2021,

and a Brief on Jurisdiction on September 27, 2021.

App.8a-18a. The Florida Supreme Court dismissed the

cause allowing no motions for rehearing or reinstate

ment on September 22, 2021. App.la-2a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review

decisions of state courts. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Christian,

140 S.Ct. 1335, 1342 (2020). To qualify as a final

judgment subject to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a),

a state court judgment must be “an effective determina

tion of the litigation and not of merely interlocutory

or intermediate steps therein.” Jefferson v. City of

Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75, 81, 118 S.Ct. 481, 139 L.Ed.2d

433. In Richfield, under Montana law, a supervisory

writ proceeding was a self-contained case, not an

interlocutory appeal. Mont. Const., Art. VII, §§ 2(l)-(2);

Mont. Rules App. Proc. 6(6), 14(1), 14(3). There, the

writ issued was the “final judgment” within this

Court’s jurisdiction. Fisher u. District Court of Sixteenth

Judicial Dist. of Mont., 424 U.S. 382, 385, n. 7, 96

S.Ct. 943, 47 L.Ed.2d 106. P. 1349; Richfield, 140 S.

Ct. 1335, at 1342.

There is a “special and small category of cases”

that originate in state law yet still arise under federal

law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction. Gunn

v.. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 185

L.Ed.2d 72 (2013). To qualify for this narrow exception,

a state law claim must “necessarily raisef ]” a federal

issue, among other requirements. Richfield, 140 S. Ct.

1335, at 1350.

Florida case law supports preservation actions

by agencies for historic sites more than 50 years of

age specifically citing U.S. Federal statutes. Metro

politan Dade County u. P.J. Birds, Inc., 654 So.2d 170,

175 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). Cf, Archaeological Resources

Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470kk, 470kk(b) (Citing

100 years of age to define criminal liability); UNESCO

Convention 2001 (Noting 100-year threshold to identify

cultural heritage); U.S. National Register criteria for

historic properties, 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (Holding 50-year

rule of thumb for “historic property5). Further, within

Florida jurisprudence there is a ministerial duty to

process historic preservation applications based on

Federal guidelines even when these applications are

deemed futile. Stranahan House, Inc. v. City of Fort

Lauderdale, 927 So.2d 1068,1069 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

One category of cases that still arise under federal

law are international treaties. McKesson Corp. v.

Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Dept, of Bus.

Regulation of Florida, 496 U.S. 18, 31 (1990).

Article VI of the U.S. Constitution states:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United

States which shall be made in pursuance

thereof; and all Treaties made, or which

shall be made, under the Authority of the

United States, shall be the supreme Law of

the Land; and the Judges in every State

shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the

Constitution or Laws of any state to the

contrary notwithstanding.

U.S. Const., art. VT, cl. 2.

On January 19, 2021, the United States and

Turkey signed a new bilateral cultural property agree

ment that solidified their shared commitment to

combat looting and trafficking of cultural artifacts.

This cooperation helps prevent terrorist financing from

trafficking, combats transnational crime, strengthens

law enforcement cooperation, protects cultural heritage

in Turkey, promotes a clean U.S. market, builds respect

for the cultural heritage of minority communities,

increases museum exhibitions and research oppor

tunities for the American public. U.S. Dep’t. St. (Jan.

19, 2021), https://eca.state.gov/highlight/united-statesand-turkey-work-together-protect-cultural-heritage.

This cultural property agreement was negotiated

by the State Department under the U.S. law imple

menting the 1970 Convention on the Means of Pro

hibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and

Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property. Here,

Turkey ratified the treaty on April 21, 1981. The 1970

Convention gives a central role to preservation efforts,

specifically the fight against illicit trafficking of

cultural property, regular establishment of inventories,

establishment of export certificates, application of

controls and approval of traders, application of criminal

or administrative sanctions, organization of informa

tion and education campaigns, and restitution. Pub.L.

97-446, Title III, § 302, Jan. 12, 1983, 96 Stat. 2351;

19 U.S.C.A. § 2601 (West).

Articles 7 and 13 of the 1970 convention provide

the provisions for restitution. For objects inventoried

and stolen from a museum, public or religious monu

ment, or a similar institution, article 7 paragraph (b)

(ii), provides that States Parties should undertake

appropriate measures to seize and return any cultural

property stolen and imported. Article 13, states that

parties are responsible at the national level in term

of restitution and cooperation. Id.

The latter treaty was accepted by the U.S. on

September 2, 1983, decades before the initiation of

Petitioner’s complaint, amended complaints, or appel

late submissions. Id., E.g., App.79a.

Further, numerous treaties between the U.S. and

Turkey have been implemented since 1947 in efforts

to combat terrorism. Recently, Global Counterterrorism

Forum (GCTF) was launched by the US and Turkey

in 2011, has 30 founding members (29 countries and

the EU). The primary aim of the forum is “to help

countries around the world enhance their capacitiesand especially those of their civilian institutions—to

meet the terrorist threats within their borders and

regions.” Nawi Ukabiala, Autocatalytic Regime Theory

and Un Spawned Cooperative Counterterrorism Part

II: Addressing the Apprehension, 5 U. MIAMI Nat’l

Sec. & Akmed Conflict L. Rev. 63, 80-81 (2015). This

Court considered U.S. individuals and groups providing

material support to terrorism, specifically the PKK

in eastern Turkey, and held material-support statute

was not vague as applied to activities plaintiffs wished

to pursue, and did not, as applied to plaintiffs, violate

freedom of speech or freedom of association. Holder

v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 36 (2010).

Further, this Supreme Court may reverse the

final order of a lower tribunal based on the following

criteria:

To the extent necessary to decision and when

presented,' the reviewing court shall decide

all relevant questions of law, interpret con

stitutional and statutory provisions, and

determine the meaning or applicability of

the terms of an agency action. The reviewing

court shall—

(l) compel agency action unlawfully with

held or unreasonably delayed; and

(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action,

findings, and conclusions found to be—

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accor

dance with law;

(B) contrary to constitutional right,

power, privilege, or immunity;

authority, or limitations, or short of

statutory right;

(D) without observance

required by law;

of procedure

(E) unsupported by substantial evidence

in a case subject to sections 556 and

557 of this title or otherwise reviewed

on the record of an agency hearing

provided by statute; or

(F) unwarranted by the facts to the

extent that the facts are subject to

trial de novo by the reviewing court.

In making the foregoing determinations, the

court shall review the whole record or those

parts of it cited by a party, and due account

shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.

5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (West)

Further, a court that makes a ruling without rea

sonable grounds or adequate consideration of the

circumstances, is said to be arbitrary and capricious

and can be invalidated by an appellate court on that

ground. There should no rational connection between

the facts found and the choice made. There should be

a clear error of judgment; an action not based upon

consideration of relevant factors and so is arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not

in accordance with law or if it was taken without

observance of procedure required by law. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States ERA,

966 F.2d 1292, 1297 (9th Cir. 1992).

As such, every aspect this case in the lower

tribunals falls squarely within the review of this Court

as it arose from Petitioner’s efforts to protect, preserve,

and research an important archaeological site and

religious shrine in eastern Turkey, namely Noah’s

Ark. Here, Respondents’ tortious activity in this cause

was related to their efforts to conspire together and

act individually to defame, commit privacy invasions,

tortiously interfere with business relationships, and

practice negligence against the Petitioner because of

his efforts to preserve an ancient archaeological site,

As such, Respondents’ acts violated U.S. treaties with

Turkey, specifically the establishment of cultural

inventories, controls, information, and education

campaigns related to Noah’s Ark, an archaeological

cultural property and religious monument. App.9a-10a,

20a, 38a-39a, 81a-85a.

Moreover, Respondents’ involvement with terror

ism abound in the complaint, specifically their constant

interaction with Amy Louise Beam, a defendant

outside this appeal. Amy Beam was expelled from the

Republic of Turkey, by Turkish counter-terrorism,

because of Beam’s material support, namely her

associations and advocacy for the Partiya Karkeren

Kurdistane (“PKK”), exposing Noah’s Ark to looting

and terrorist financing from trafficking its artifacts.

R.97-112, 177-180, 3004-7, 3356. App.10, 38a, 85a.

As such, the Petitioner’s amended complaint and

appellate arguments in the First District Court of

Appeal and Supreme Court of Florida are subject to

review. App.la-142a.

LT4 Erred By Dismissing All Counts When

Respondents Did Not Mention or Defend

Against Specific Counts

Petitioner’s counts included Tortious Interference

with a Business Relationship (Count V) and Negligent

Hiring and Supervision (Count VI) for Price; and

Negligent Hiring and Supervision (Count VI) for

Liberty U., in his fourth amended complaint. R.3366-8,

3379-81; App.99a-102a, 116a-118a. Respondents made

no defenses, arguments, or mention of these counts

in their dismissal motion (R.3465-73). Still, the court

dismissed these counts with prejudice. R.3507-9.

Because the LT erred when it dismissed with pre

judice counts, where Respondents provided no defenses,

arguments, or mention, this Court should reverse the

final orders for Counts V and VI for Price and VI for

Liberty U.

II. LT Erred When It Held It Had No

Jurisdiction.

The court erred when it held it had no jurisdiction:

THE COURT: Just because you can pull a web

page up in Duval County-just because you

can pull a web page up in Duval County,

I’ve not seen anything that says that gives

4 LT denotes lower tribunal, namely the Fourth Judicial Circuit

Court of Florida, and by extension the First District Court of

Appeal of Florida, and Supreme Court of Florida, which per curiam

affirmed or denied to invoke discretionary review, respectively.

you jurisdiction, venue, anything like that

in Duval County.

RT.27:12-17.5

. . . But I’ve not gathered anything else as

far as what happened to create the defama

tory statements in Duval County or in the

State of Florida.

RT.33:17-20.

First, a Florida court has specific or general pers

onal jurisdiction if defendant’s act is within Florida’s

Long-Arm statute. Caiazzo v. Am. Royal Arts Corp.,

73 So.3d 245, 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); Fla. Stat.

§ 48.193. Specific personal jurisdiction occurs, among

other criteria, when the defendant is “1. Operating,

conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or

business venture in this state or having an office or

agency in this state. 2. Committing a tortious act

within this state.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193(l)(a)l & 2.

In order to commit a tortious act within Florida, a

defendant’s physical presence in Florida is not required.

Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So.2d 1252, 1260 (Fla. 2002).

(“[Tjelephonic, electronic, or written communications

into Florida may form the basis for personal juris

diction under section § 48.193(l)(b) if the alleged cause

of action arises from the communications....“); Becker

v. Hooshmand, 841 So.2d 561 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)

(Noting defendant’s tortious conduct on the internet

in Florida originated from outside Florida); Price v.

Kronenberger, 24 So.3d 775, 776 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).

5 RT denotes recorded transcript of proceeding (R.3528-88).

The second step for a Florida court to establish

personal jurisdiction over a defendant comprises a dueprocess analysis with divided requirements between

specific and general jurisdiction. Caiazzo, 73 So.3d at

251. For specific jurisdiction, the defendant must have

“minimum contacts” with the state by having “pur- .

posefully avail[ed] [himself or herself] of the privilege

of conducting activities within the forum State, thus

invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”

Inti Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945);

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Further,

the factor of foreseeability must be met when “the

defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum

State are such that he should reasonably anticipate

being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen

Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).

For general personal jurisdiction, “continuous and

systematic general business contacts” in Florida are

necessary to satisfy the due process “minimum con

tacts” requirement under general jurisdiction even if

the cause of action is unrelated to the activity within

the State. Caiazzo, 73 So.3d at 252. The ‘substantial

and not isolated activity’ requirement of the Florida

long-arm statute [Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2)] is equated

with “continuous and systematic contact” of the Four

teenth Amendment Due Process Clause by Florida

courts. Kertesz v. Net Transactions, Ltd., 635 F. Supp.

2d 1339, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2009).

Publication is the key element of most of the

counts in the suit. For example, the invasion of privacy

by public disclosure of private facts comprise (1) the

publication, (2) of private facts, (3) that are offensive,

and (4) are not of public nature. Cape PubVns, Inc. u.

Hitchner, 549 So.2d 1374, 1377 (Fla. 1989). Similarly,

a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion require

the allegation and proof of publication to a third

person of personal matter.” State Farm Fire & Cas.

Co. v. Compupay, Inc., 654 So.2d 944, 948-49 (Fla. 3d

DCA 1995). “The intrusion to which this [count] refers

is into a ‘place’ in which there is a reasonable expec

tation of privacy and is not referring to a body part

. . . this is a tort in which the focus is the right of a

private person to be free from public gaze.” Allstate Ins.

Co. v. Ginsberg, 863 So.2d 156, 160 (Fla. 2003). Finally,

regarding appropriation, Florida Statute § 540.08

provides, “(1) No person shall publish, print, display

or otherwise publicly use for purposes of trade or for

any commercial or advertising purpose the name,

portrait, photograph, or other likeness of any natural

person without express written or oral consent. . . . ”

Appropriation is “the unauthorized use of a person’s

name or likeness to obtain some benefit.” Allstate,

863 So.2d 156 at 162. “Section 540.08 ... is designed

to prevent the unauthorized use of a name to directly

promote the product or service of the publisher.” Loft

v. Fuller, 408 So.2d 619, 622-23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).

Similarly, a nonresident defendant commits the

tortious act of defamation in Florida when the non

resident makes allegedly defamatory statements about

a Florida resident by posting those statements on a

website, provided that the website posts containing the

statements are accessible in Florida and accessed in

Florida. Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d

1201, 1216 (Fla. 2010). Further, “[a] complaint that

alleges a nonresident committed a tortious act based

on communications directed into Florida telephonically, electronically, or in writing sufficiently alleges

personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(l)(b).” Price

u. Kronenberger, 24 So.3d 775, 776 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)

(Citing Acquadro v. Bergeron, 851 So.2d 665, 670 (Fla.

2003); Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1260. Further, defamation

is committed in the place where the defamatory

material is published. Casita, L.P. v. Maplewood Equity

Partners, L.P., 960 So.2d 854, 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)

(Holding: “A telephonic, electronic, or written commu

nication is deemed ‘published’ in Florida, subjecting

the publisher to long-arm jurisdiction under section

48.193(l)(b) of the Florida Statutes if the commu

nication was made into this state by a person outside

the state, even if that person has no other contacts

with the state.”

The Florida Supreme Court outlined the two-prong

test to be applied by Florida trial courts in determining

whether personal jurisdiction may properly be exer

cised over a defendant. Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d, 499 (Fla. 1989). The Court held a court

must initially determine whether the complaint alleges

sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action

within the ambit of Florida’s long-arm statute, Florida

Statute Section 48.193, and second, if the complaint

does allege sufficient jurisdictional facts: “the next

inquiry is whether sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ are

demonstrated to satisfy due process requirements.”

Id. at 502. “A defendant wishing to contest the alleg

ations of the complaint concerning jurisdiction or to

raise a contention of minimum contacts must file

affidavits in support of his position. The burden is

then placed upon the plaintiff to prove by affidavit

the basis upon which jurisdiction may be obtained.”

Id. Where the affidavits cannot be reconciled, the

trial court is required to hold a limited evidentiary

hearing to determine the jurisdictional issue. Id. at

503.

Florida courts hold that a verified complaint may

substitute with sufficiency for an affidavit to support

the allegations as to jurisdiction. Tobacco Merchants

Ass’n of U.S. v. Brain, 657 So.2d 939, 941 (Fla. 3d

DCA 1995) (“Other competent sworn proof, such as

... a verified complaint or documents, may substitute

for the affidavit to support the parties’ allegations as

to jurisdiction.”).

In Venetian, both parties submitted affidavits

regarding jurisdiction. 554 So.2d at 502-03. Here,

only the Petitioner submitted affidavits (R.1153-76) and

a verified complaint (R.3353-442) to support Peti

tioner’s allegations as to jurisdiction. There, the trial

court ruled an evidentiary hearing was necessary. Id.

at 504. Here, the court did not hold any evidentiary

hearings. There, the defendant cited the affirmative

defense of jurisdiction. Id. at 504. Here, Respondents

cited no defenses regarding jurisdiction after Petitioner

served Respondents his fourth amended complaint.

Further, like Venetian, Petitioner previously asser

ted LT’s jurisdiction in his prior filings (R.1153-76),

verified fourth amended complaint (R.3353-442),

response in opposition to Respondents’ dismissal motion

(R.3480-91), and hearing with Judge Roberson (R.352888):

Respondents’ counts track and follow Florida

Statute Section 48.193 alleging jurisdiction

for each defendant. R.3357, 3369, 3381, 3427;

App.86a, 102a, 118a-119a, 128a-129a.

Respondents worked together for Ark Search,

LLC, with its nerve center in Dunedin,

Florida. R.3357, 3369, 3381, 3427. Liberty U.

has an online university for Florida students

taught by Heiser and Price. R.3369. Res

pondents sold goods and services in Florida

through Liberty U., World of the Bible

Ministries (Price), Logos Software (Heiser),

and Ark Search, LLC (Patton). R.3357, 3369,

3381, 3427; App.49a.

Respondents published in Florida defamatory

and privacy invasion material against the

Petitioner. R.3357-65, 3369-78, 3381-89, 342835; RT.3533, 3544-5; App.A; App.49a.

Respondents conspired to publish defamatory

and privacy invasion material against the

Petitioner in Florida. R.3360-1, 3365-6, 33723, 3378-9, 3383-5, 3388-9, 3431-2, 3435-6;

App.49a.

Respondents defamatory and privacy invasion

materials were read by third-parties in Duval

County. R.3358-9, 3364, 3370-1, 3376, 3382,

3386, 3429, 3435; App.50a.

Respondents defamatory and privacy invasion

torts occurred within the statute of limitations

for each count. R.3358, 3369-70, 3381-2, 34289; App.50a.

Jurisdiction and venue in Duval County,

Florida, is proper because the action is for

damages over $75,000.00, defendants Ark

Search, LLC, Bright, and Fouchecourt resided

in Florida, and because both the Petitioner

and defendant Fouchecourt have residences

in Duval County. R.2, 3353-4; App.50a.

Court committed error by following Respondents’

arguments regarding jurisdiction when it failed to

hold an evidentiary hearing regarding jurisdiction

or follow the two-prong test required by the Florida

Supreme Court. Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais,

554 So.2d, 499, 502-503 (Fla. 1989).

Therefore, Petitioner asks this Court to reverse

the final orders of the lower courts because they (1)

overlooked or failed to consider procedural matters

regarding jurisdiction; (2) the final order conflicted

with Florida statutes and case law regarding jurisdic

tion analysis; and (3) the lower tribunal is simply

incorrect on the merits of this cause regarding

jurisdiction.

III. LT Erred When It Held Venue Was

Improper Because Departing Jacksonville

Defendant Was No Longer in the Cause

The lower tribunal committed error regarding

venue when it stated that because Duval County

defendant Fouchecourt was no longer a defendant,

the court no longer had venue.

THE COURT: You’ll need to—especially once—

well, once Ms. Fouchecourt is out of the

case, I don’t know that there’s a basis to have

it in Duval County anymore. And then,

again, part of my ruling, I made it—I did it

during our questioning and during argument.

Part of the dismissal also is I think there’s

such a tenuous connection to Duval County

and the State of Florida in general that I

don’t believe the resources of our courts

here in Duval County should be—should be

. called upon to decide this, where it’s—again,

has very, very tenuous connection to Duval

County. That’s just part of the ruling.

RT.48:13-18, 49:1.

The court’s holding exhibits error as Florida case

law is clear that the departure of an original defendant

does not stop venue in the original court. Vance u.

Minton, 444 So.2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)

(Holding an alternate conclusion would create “unjusti

fied chaos.”); Brodie v. Foley & Lardner, 932 So.2d

440, 441 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (Holding: “Proper venue of

an action is determined at the time the initial action

is filed, regardless of subsequent events.”). App.52a.

Because the LT erred, when it ruled venue was

no longer possible in Duval County because of the

departure of one of the defendants in the cause via

settlement, which does not stop venue in the original

court, this Court should reverse the final orders.

IV. LT Erred By Dismissing Case When § 770.01

Notices Were Not Required for Non-Media

Appellees

Regarding Counts I (Defamation) and II (Con

spiracy to Commit Defamation), Petitioner was not

required to submit § 770.01 pre-suit notices because

Respondents are non-media entities. Fla. Stat. § 770.01;

3 Fla. Pl. & Pr. Forms § 25:4, Footnote 1 (Noting up

dated references through May, 2018, “§ 770.01 . . .

applies solely to media defendants, i.e. newspapers,

periodicals, and television and radio broadcasting

stations ... It has no application to nonmedia defend

ants, . . . ”); Bridges v. Williamson, 449 So.2d 400, 401

(Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (Stating notice requirement “does

not apply to nonmedia defendants even when alleged

defamatory statements made by a nonmedia defendant

are republished by the media” and “‘other medium’

refers to television and radio broadcasting stations.”);

Zelinka v. Americare Healthscan, Inc., 763 So.2d

1173, 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (Holding [770.01] pre

suit notice requirement applies only to “media

defendants,” not private individuals.”); Mancini v.

Personalized Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 702

So.2d 1376, 1380 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (Holding the

terms media and non-media defendants are meant to

distinguish between “third parties who are not engaged

in the dissemination of news and information through

the news and broadcast media from those who are so

engaged.”); Ortega Trujillo v. Banco Central Del

Ecuador, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 1998);

(Holding § 770.01 applies to news organizations

that (1) “impartially disseminate information;” (2)

“issue unsolicited, disinterested and neutral commen

tary as to matters of public interest”; [or] (3) “editor

ialize as to matters of public interest without being

commissioned to do so by its clients.”).

Further, some defamatory materials were not

internet publications and acquired via discovery, and

defendants were involved in a conspiracy to defame

the Petitioner (Cf. Comins v. Van Voorhis, 135 So.3d

545, 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014); Plant Food Sys., Inc. v.

Irey, 165 So.3d. 859, 859 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)).

In Mazur v. Ospina Baraya, plaintiff sued eleven

(11) defendants including film studios, authors, and

production companies for defamation. There, defend

ants filed a motion to dismiss because plaintiff did

not provide § 770.01 notices. Mazur v. Ospina Baraya,

275 So.3d 812, 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). The Sixth

Judicial Circuit Court denied the motion and defen

dants petitioned for writs of certiorari. In July, 2019,

the Second District Court of Appeal denied the petitions

and held:

Florida courts have consistently interpreted

section 770.01 to apply only to news media,

i.e., the press . . .

So even though the “other medium” language

expanded section 770.01 to cover new

technologies used to disseminate the news,

such as internet publishers and blogs, it did

not expand the reach of the statute beyond

the news media. . . .

[as they represent] . . . primarily an informa

tional purpose. . . .

This interpretation is confirmed by applying

canons of statutory construction . . . Reading

sections 770.01 and 770.02 in harmony, it

becomes clear that .the “other medium”

language is not meant to expand the scope

of section 770.01 beyond the news media . . .

Because the circuit court was bound to follow

the existing case law interpreting section

770.01, including Ross from the Florida

Supreme Court and Bridges from this court,

the Petitioners/Defendants cannot show a

departure from the essential requirements

of the law and we must deny the petitions

for writ of certiorari.

Mazur v. Ospina Baraya, 275 So.3d 812, 817-818

(Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (Emphasis added)

Here, like Mazur, Respondents’ primary purpose

was not “informational” but to harm the Petitioner,

who attempted to preserve an archaeological site,

denigrating Petitioner as engaging in a fraud, as a

liar and lunatic, and the site as a hoax. R. 3357-60,

3369-72, 3381-83, 3427-30; App.86a-90a, 102a-106a,

119a-122a, 129a-133a. Here, like Mazur, Respondents

did not represent news media. Here, like Mazur,

Petitioner did not deliver pre-suit notices because the

defendants were not news media. And here, like

Mazur, the Florida Supreme Court and First District

Court of Appeal require § 770.01 pre-suit notices for

only news media defendants. Jews For Jesus, Inc. v.

Rapp, 997 So.2d 1098, 1112 (Fla. 2008); Cummings v.

Dawson, 444 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (Holding

§ 770.01 notice required for traditional news

organization “in other medium,” the local television

station, for Channel 12 News); Gannett Florida Corp.

v. Montesano, 308 So.2d 599, 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)

(Citing pre-suit notice for the newspaper “Today”);

Heuey u. News-Journal Corp., 148 So.2d 543, 544

(Fla. 1st DCA 1963) (Noting pre-suit notices for

Daytona Beach Evening News and Daytona Beach

Morning Journal).

Because the LT erred when it when it dismissed

with prejudice the defamation counts when Respond

ents were not media and did not require § 770.01

pre-suit notices, this Court should reverse the final

orders.

LT Erred By Dismissing Case Due to Single

Action and Publication Rules Because

Appellees Committed Numerous Different

Tortious Acts and Publications

Respondents argued that the single-action and

single-publication rules apply to this cause citing

case law that only involves one tortious act or one

publication. Daytona Beach News Journal Corp. v.

Firstamerica Dev. Corp., 181 So.2d 565, 569 (Fla. 3d

DCA 1966) (Noting communication of a single defama

tory article); Callaway Land & Cattle Co., Inc. v.

Banyon Lakes C. Corp., 831 So.2d 204, 206 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2002) (Citing one disparagement of title claim);

Easton v. Weir, 167 So.2d 245 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)

(Citing repairs to one roof of one furniture store);

Ovadia v. Bloom, 756 So.2d 137, 141 (Fla. 3d DCA

2000) (Describing “same publication,” a television

broadcast); Thomas v. Patton, 2005 WL 3048033 (Fla.

Cir. Ct. Oct. 21, 2005) (Reporting one issue: a single

statement of removing feeding tubes from ailing

spouse).

Conversely, multiple actions and publications

negate the single-action and single-publication rules.

Kinsman v. Winston, 615CV6960-RL22GJK, 2015 WL

12839267, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2015) (Denying

motion to dismiss because multiple publications are

an exception to the single-publication rule); Geller v.

Von Hagens, 08:10-CV-01688-EAK, 2011 WL 2434217,

at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 13, 2011) (Denying summary

judgement per Fla. Stat. § 770.07 as accrual begins

after publication “in this state” [of Florida]; Epic

Metals Corp. v. CONDEC, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 1009, 1016

(M.D. Fla. 1994) (Noting subsequent publications of

the same material, such as a new edition of a news

paper or book, are republications that “trigger a new

cause of action and commence a new limitations

period.”); Woodhull v. Meinel, 145 N.M. 533, 2009NMCA-015, 202 P.3d 126 (Ct. App. 2008) (Citing

exception to single-publication rule when republished

material is intended to expand the scope of the original

distribution); Comolli v. Huntington Learning Centers,

Inc., 117 F. Supp. 3d 343 (S.D. N.Y. 2015) (Holding if

republication is intended to reach a new audience,

such republication will refresh the limitation period

for bringing an invasion of privacy claim.”); Firth v.

State, 306 A.D. 2d 666, 667, 761 N.Y.S. 2d 361, 362

(3d Dep’t 2003) (Holding that a defamatory report

“moved to a different Internet address” was sufficient

to state a claim for republication and restarted statute

of limitations); Etheredge-Brown v. Am. Media, Inc.,

13 F. Supp. 3d 303, 306-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Denying

summary judgement because online publication of

the article on the National Enquirer’s website, after

the paper edition was distributed, comprised a repub

lication and refreshed statute of limitations); cf.

Musto v Bell South Telecomms. Corp., 748 So.2d 296,

298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (Holding single publication

rule does not apply in the statute of limitations for

credit slander claims because defamation begins anew,

and a new cause of action accrues each time a credit

report is disseminated to a potential creditor).

Here, the cause against the Respondents involves

different circumstances, periods, and publications. For

example, Count VI: Negligent Hiring & Supervision,

for Price and Liberty University, originated with

circumstances before Petitioner arrived in Turkey,

with the hiring of Murat §ahin, a convicted murderer,

and defendant Amy Louise Beam, an advocate for

the PKK, a terrorist organization, who was eventually

expelled from Turkey by the Turkish government.

R.3367-8, 3379-81; App.l00a-102a; 116a-118a.

Counts I and IIIA-C, for all the Respondents,

involves different publications-some defamatory, others

involving invasions of privacy, published at different

times in Florida after Petitioner returned from Turkey.

Fla. Stat. § 770.07 (Noting publications must occur in

Florida). App.86a-90a, 102a-106a, 119a-122a, 129a133a (I); 92a-97a, 108a-114a, 123a-127a,135a-139a

(IIIA-C). Counts II and IV, for all Respondents,

entailed agreements between Respondents, to act

together to defame (II) or commit invasions of privacy

(IV) against the Petitioner. App.90a-92a, 106a-108a,

122a-123a, 133a-135a (II); 98a-99a, 114a-116a, 127a128a, 139a-140a (IV).

Count V entails Prices’ tortious interference with

Petitioner’s contract in his applied archaeology efforts.

App.99a-100a. In addition, Respondents changed their

publications, used different web platforms, published

new materials, published in different languages

including traditional Chinese, simplified Chinese, and

French, augmented and edited their publications, with

different advertisements, and linked their publications

and search engine associations together to increase

the harm for the Petitioner. App.58a-59a, 86a-99a,

102a-116a, 119a-128a, 129a-140a.

To sum, Petitioner’s cause involved statutes and

caselaw that are distinguishable from the single-action/

publication rule citations noted by the Respondents

and involve different wrongful actions, at different

times, diverse publications, outside and inside Florida,

on different internet platforms, in different languages,

involving different agreements among Respondents,

resulting in different harms and damages for the

Petitioner.

Because the LT erred when it dismissed with

prejudice the Petitioner’s cause over the single-action

and single-publication rules, when the Respondents

engaged in multiple torts and publications against

the Petitioner, this Court should reverse the final

orders.

VI. LT Erred When It Ruled Against Multiple

Theories of Recovery Permitted for

Invasions of Privacy

Florida Statute § 540.08(7) “allows a plaintiff to

assert statutory and common law claims for invasion

of privacy in the same action without abridging the

types of remedies available under the common law.”

Coton v. Televised Visual X-Ography, Inc., 740 F. Supp.

2d 1299, 1313 (M.D. Fla. 2010).

Here, each claim: (1) Public Disclosure of Private

Facts; (2) Intrusion upon Seclusion; and (3) Wrongful

Appropriation, is adequately separated by an embold

ened headline and letter: A., B., and C., respectively.

App.92a-94a, 109a-110a, 123a-124a, 135a-136a (Count

IIIA); App.94a-95a, 110a-112a, 124a-125a, 137a-138a

(Count IIIB); App.96a-97a, 112a-113a, 125a-126a

(Count IIIC). Each section has its own consecutively

numbered paragraphs, which track each element of

the separated violations, with factual allegations,

and there is no commingling of the Respondents or

claims. E.g., App.92a-97a.

The Oxford Dictionary defines “wherefore” as “as

a result of which.” Here, the damages and specific

relief are appropriate for each violation. “As a result

of which” damages for public disclosure of public

facts (IIIA.) and intrusion upon seclusion (III.B.) are

different and separated from statute-based wrongful

appropriation (III.C.) damages. E.g., App.92a-97a.

Also, plaintiffs may assert inconsistent claims in

the same complaint even when claims are mutually

exclusive. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g); Rausch-Livingston

Real Estate v. Dixon, 260 So.2d 290 (Fla. 2d DCA

1972); Maybin v. Thompson, 514 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 2d

DCA 1987); Johnson v. State Dept. of Health &

Rehab. Sues, 695 So.2d 927, 930 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).

Because the LT erred when it dismissed with

prejudice the Petitioner’s cause, when multiple theories

of recovery are permitted for invasions of privacy,

this Court should reverse the final orders.

VII. LT Erred in Dismissing the Negligence

Counts in Petitioner’s Third Amended

Complaint Against Price Because It Did Not

Require Precedence

An appeal from a final order calls up for review

all necessary interlocutory steps leading to that final

order, whether they were separately appealable or

not. Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Hillsborough County

Aviation Authority, 153 So.2d 722, 724 (Fla. 1963).

Failure to utilize the right to take an interlocutory

appeal does not restrict the scope of appellate review

when the final order is appealed. Fla. R. App. P. 9.130

(g) (1977); Saul v. Basse, 399 So.2d 130, 133 (Fla. 2d

DCA 1981). As such, Petitioner requests this Court

review Judge Blazs’ dismissal of the negligence count

against Price with prejudice in his Third Amended

Complaint. R.3034-6. App.69a-75a.

The four elements of a negligence count are (1) a

duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring

the defendant to conform to a certain standard of

conduct; (2) a failure on the defendant’s part to conform

to the required standard: a breach of the duty; (3) a

reasonably close causal connection between the conduct

and the resulting injury: “legal cause” or “proximate

cause,” which includes the notion of cause-in-fact,

and (4) actual loss or damage. Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer,

LLC, 39 So.3d 1216 (Fla. 2010); Jenkins v. W.L.

Roberts, Inc., 851 So.2d 781, 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

The Restatement (Second) of Torts identifies four

sources of duty: (1) legislative enactments or admin

istration regulations; (2) judicial interpretations of such

enactments or regulations; (3) other judicial precedent;

and (4) a duty arising from the general facts of the

case. McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So.2d 500, 503

(Fla. 1992); Clay Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Johnson, 873

So.2d 1182, 1185 (Fla. 2003); Aguila v. Hilton, Inc.,

878 So.2d 392, 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

Florida law recognizes (1) a legal duty arises

whenever a human endeavor creates a generalized

and foreseeable risk of harming others; (2) a defendant’s

duty to lessen the risk or see that sufficient precautions

are taken to protect others from the harm that the

risk imposes. Id.; Gross v. Sand & Sea Homeowners

Assoc., Inc., 756 So.2d 1073, 1075 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

Further, if a defendant’s conduct creates a “fore

seeable zone of risk” or likelihood that defendant’s

conduct would result in the type of injury suffered by

the plaintiff, Florida courts will generally recognize a

duty placed upon the defendant to lessen the risk or

protect others from the harm posed by the risk.

McCain, 593 So.2d at 503 (citing Kaisner v. Kolb, 543

So.2d 732, 735 (Fla. 1989).

Whether injury was foreseeable must be left to

the fact-finder. Whitt v. Silverman, 788 So.2d 210, 216

(Fla. 2001). In addition, a breach of industry standards

is evidence of negligence. Hilliard v. Speedway Superamerica LLC, 766 So.2d 1153 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

Also, Florida recognizes a common law cause of

action against professionals based on their acts of

negligence despite the lack of a direct contract between

the professional and the aggrieved party. Stone’s

Throw Condo. Assoc., Inc. u. Sand Cove Apartments,

Inc., 749 So.2d 520, 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). The

statute of limitations for negligence is four years.

Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(a); Elmore v. Fla. Power & Light

Co., 895 So.2d 475, 478 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

Florida case law supports preservation actions

by agencies for historic sites more than 50 years of

age. Metropolitan Dade County v. P.J. Birds, Inc.,

654 So.2d 170, 175 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). The U.S.

National Register criteria for historic properties, 36

C.F.R. § 60.4 (Holding 50-year rule of thumb for

“historic property”). Further, there is a ministerial

duty to process historic preservation applications even

when these applications are deemed futile. Stranahan

House, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 927 So.2d

1068, 1069 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

Federal courts in Florida have recognized an

archaeological duty of care to preserve historic and

archaeological sites. In Klein, the Eleventh Circuit

Court denied a salvage award because the salvor

made no effort to record archaeological provenance

data and his activities placed a historic site in

greater peril. Klein v. The Unidentified Wrecked and

Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 758 F.2d 1511, 1515 (11th

Cir. 1985). In Cobb Coin, the court held “an ‘essential

element’ is the documentation and preservation of

archaeological data.” Cobb Coin Co. v. The Unidenti

fied, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 549 F.

Supp. 540, 559-60 n. 20 (S.D. Fla. 1982). Further, in

Int’l Aircraft, the court held the stabilization and

preservation of the site was required with the recovery

of the craft. Int’l Aircraft Recovery, L.L.C. v. The

Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Aircraft, 54 F.

Supp. 2d 1172, 1181-82 (S.D. Fla. 1999).

This archaeological duty of care in salvage is

comparable to the same duty in tort law. Paul

Hailwood & Thomas J. Miceli, Murky Waters: The

Law and Economics of Salvaging Historic Shipwrecks,

35 J. Legal Studies 285, 292 (2006) (Noting, “[L]ike a

negligence rule in tort law,” an “archaeological duty of

care” ensures the documentation and retrieval of

remains in a “socially responsible manner.”).

Here, working with Ark Search, LLC, with its

nerve center in Florida, Price had a duty to follow

professional standards within the field of historic

preservation noted by Florida statutes and policy

(Metro. Dade City v.PJ Birds, 654 So.2d 170, 176 (Fla.

3d DCA 1995) (Noting, “As a matter of state policy,

Florida follows the objectives of the National Historic

Preservation Act.”); § 267.061(l)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. Ann.

(Stating, Florida aims to “Contribute to the preser

vation of non-state-owned historic resources and to

give encouragement to organizations and individuals

undertaking preservation by private means;...”). In

Tippitt, the court noted the importance of historic pre

servation in Florida: “ ... conserve the unique heritage

of our past in order to enrich the quality of life for

our present and future generations.” Estate of Tippett

v. City of Miami, 645 So.2d 533, 538 (Fla. 3d DCA

1994).

Here, like in Klein, Respondent Price made no

effort to protect and facilitate research at archaeolog

ical sites, encourage the transmission of archaeological

information, but engaged in activity that would harm

other archaeologists advocating for an archaeological

site. R.3034-5. Here, Price purposefully acted to

suppress or inhibit preservation efforts at the site

causing harm to the Petitioner, a professional archaeo

logist, and harm to an archaeological site subjected to

looting, melting permafrost, and warming conditions.

R.3035-6.

Here, Respondent Price, the “Distinguished

Research Professor” and “archaeologist and scholar”

of Liberty University—unlike the salvor in Cobb Coin

with no or limited academic qualifications in archaeo

logy—breached his fundamental duty in the documen

tation of protection and preservation efforts of a

historic site by willfully and purposefully harming the

Petitioner and others, who were trying to preserve

the archaeological site on Mount Ararat. R.756-758

(Price’s Affidavit,

5, 11). Moreover, Price accom

plished these acts after Murat Sahin was released

from prison for homicide, while Price attempted to

conceal his (and other respondents’) fraudulent Noah’s

ark dig. R.3167 (Exhibit 11, K 2: “NOTE: Please do

not post this expedition report to any website. This is

for our email subscriber list only!”). App.73a.

The Southern District Court of Georgia ruled

courts may impose an archaeological duty of care at

sites of historic or archaeological value. Marex Int’l,

Inc. u. The Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned

Vessel, 952 F. Supp. 825, 829 (S.D. Ga. 1997).

Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit held that a salvor met the

archaeological duty of care because of its efforts to

protect the shipwreck’s historical and archaeological

value. Columbus Am. Discovery Group v. Atl. Mut.

Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 1992). Also, the

Federal Southern District Court of New York noted

the importance of preserving historic sites finding

that the photographs and films taken of the Titanic

aided in its preservation by capturing the wreck in a

permanent manner. Lindsay v. The Wrecked and Aban

doned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, No. 97 Civ. 9248 (HB),

1998 WL 557591, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 1998).

Further, when a site is of historic importance, courts

consider the time, effort, and money that parties have

invested and archaeological preservation efforts. R.M.S.

Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 924

F. Supp. 714, 721 (E.D. Va. 1996).

Here, unlike Marex and Columbus, Respondent

Price breached his archaeological duty of care because

Price purposefully acted against and coordinated with

others to denigrate and defame an archaeological site

and the Petitioner, a professional archaeologist,

attempting to protect, preserve, and initiate research

at this site. Moreover, Price the “Distinguished

Research Professor” and “archaeologist and scholar”

ignored archaeological data from an actual archaeo

logical site and instead relied on the advice of a

shepherd, a convicted felon, and the felon’s employees

and relatives, to dig a hole in the ice, year-after-year,

without finding any cultural remains, which Price

advertised as excavations for Noah’s ark. R.756-758

(Price’s Affidavit, TfH 5, 11), 2487 1 24, 3034-6, 3159

K 3: “ . . . meet a Kurdish shepherd who claimed to

have seen the Ark.”); App.74a.

If a defendant’s conduct creates a “foreseeable

zone of risk” or likelihood that defendant’s conduct

would result in the type of injury suffered by the

plaintiff, Florida courts will generally recognize a

duty placed upon the defendant to lessen the risk or

protect others from the harm posed by the risk.

McCain, 593 So.2d at 503 (citing Kaisner v. Kolb, 543

So.2d 732, 735 (Fla. 1989). Whether injury was

foreseeable must be left to the trier of fact. Whitt v.

Silverman, 788 So.2d 210, 216 (Fla. 2001).

In McCain, an area was marked safe when it

was unsafe. 593 So.2d at 503. In Stone’s Throw, a

professional contractor breached construction stan

dards. 749 So.2d at 522. Similarly, here, Price marked

a factual archaeological site as a hoax while breaching

all historic preservation and archaeological standards.

Price’s conduct created a foreseeable zone of risk

because the Petitioner was working in the same area,

to protect and preserve the prehistoric site, threatened

by decomposition caused by melting glacial ice. R.30346; App.75a, 81a-85a.

Price’s breach of duty as an archaeologist caused

harm to the Petitioner, who was attempting to protect,

map, and report a prehistoric site to Turkish author

ities, which resulted in damages. R.3035-6. As such,

Petitioner’s negligence count in the third amended

complaint was sufficient against Price.

Because the LT erred, when it dismissed with

prejudice Petitioner’s negligence count against Price

in the Third Amended Complaint, when the count did

not require judicial precedence in Florida but followed

each elements of negligence akin to other professions

in Florida, this Court should reverse the final order.

VIII. LT Erred When It Considered Disputes of

Fact During a Dismissal Hearing

Motions to dismiss must be decided on questions

of law only. Connolly v. Sebeco, Inc., 89 So.2d 482,

484 (Fla. 1956). Further, a court accepts as true all

allegations in an amended complaint and draws all

reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader. Testa v.

s:Escrow & Title, LLC, 36 So.3d 713, 714 (Fla. 1st DCA

2010); Ralph v. City of Daytona Beach, 471 So.2d 1, 2

(Fla. 1983). Pro se pleadings should be given liberal

construction. Stokes v. Fla., 948 So.2d 75, 77 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2007).

During the hearing in April of 2020, Judge Rober

son considered numerous disputes of fact from

Respondents’ counsel. Several examples:

Whether Respondents’ defamatory publica

tions were within the statute of limitations,

two years from filing the suit. RT.7:16-20; 8:16. Petitioner had to cite facts that Respond

ents published defamatory publications with

in 2 years of the filing of Petitioner’s original

suit. R.3358 KK 6-9 (Price); 3368 KK 6-9

(Liberty U.); 3381-2 KK 3-4 (Heiser); 3428-9

KK 6-9 (Patton); App.76a.

Whether facts existed to show connection

between Respondents and defamatory mate

rial. RT.7:21-25. Petitioner had to cite facts

linking defamatory material to the Respon

dents including their signatures, admissions,

circumstantial links, links on each other’s

websites, and trademarks. R.3357 K 3; 33601 Ilf 24-26; 3608 (Ex. B) (Price); 3369 H 3;

3362-3 UK 24-26 (Liberty U.); 3381 | 3; 3384

UK 19-20 (Heiser); 3429 KK 3, 5; 3431 KK 2426; 3457 (Patton); App.76a-77a.

Because the LT erred, when it considered factual

disputes in a dismissal motion reserved for disputes

of law only, this Court should reverse the final order.

♦

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant

this petition for certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

JoelD. Klenck

Petitioner Pro Se

1665 BROOKSIDE CIRCLE EAST

Jacksonville, FL 32207

(904) 405-8618

KLENCKJD@GMAIL.COM

February 28,2022

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.