Opposition Brief — Dennis Wayne Hope, Petitioner v. Todd Harris, et al.

Supreme Court briefMay 9, 2022

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No. 21-1065

In the Supreme Court of the United States

DENNIS WAYNE HOPE, PETITIONER

v.

TODD HARRIS, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS

AND BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of Texas

BRENT WEBSTER

First Assistant Attorney

General

JUDD E. STONE II

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

NATALIE D. THOMPSON

Assistant Solicitor General

OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL

P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059)

Austin, Texas 78711-2548

Judd.Stone@oag.texas.gov

(512) 936-1700

QU E S TIO NS PR E S E NTE D

Dennis Wayne Hope is serving an 80-year sentence

for a string of violent armed robberies. He has escaped

or attempted to escape from Texas prisons often enough

to inspire a television episode about his criminal exploits. 1 After a successful escape during which Hope shut

down the electricity to an entire maximum-security

prison, fled to another State, and committed additional

violent crimes—including carjacking an unarmed 83year-old man at knife point—Hope was placed in restrictive housing. He received periodic reviews to determine

whether it would be safe to move him to the general population. Several years ago, it was determined that staff

no longer needed a “flight risk” warning on Hope’s file,

but other safety concerns kept him in restrictive housing.

During Hope’s most recent review, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice determined that those additional concerns had been ameliorated, transferred him

out of restrictive housing, and began the process of transitioning him to the general population. The questions

presented are:

Whether a conditions-of-confinement claim under the

Eighth Amendment is moot when the challenged conditions of confinement no longer apply.

Whether a procedural-due-process claim challenging

a prison’s process for periodic review of solitary confinement is moot when the prisoner is released from solitary

confinement.

I (Almost) Got Away With It, Season 3, Episode 10 (first aired

June 28, 2011) (hereafter “Almost Got Away”).

1

(I)

Whether the duration of solitary confinement, considered in a vacuum, can violate the Eighth Amendment.

Whether petitioner plausibly alleged all the respondent prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the

Eighth Amendment violations he alleges.

Whether petitioner plausibly alleged he was deprived

of due process in connection with periodic reviews of his

continued placement in restrictive housing.

(II)

RE L ATE D P RO C E E D ING S

Hope v. Harris, No. 9:18-cv-27, U.S. District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas. Judgment entered

May 5, 2020.

Hope v. Harris, No. 20-40379, U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit. Judgment entered June 18, 2021.

(III)

TA BLE O F C O NTE N TS

Page

Questions Presented ......................................................... I

Related Proceedings ......................................................III

Table of Authorities ....................................................... IV

Introduction....................................................................... 1

Statement .......................................................................... 3

I. Background Facts ................................................. 3

II. Procedural History................................................ 8

III. Post-Petition Developments ............................... 11

Reasons to Deny the Petition ........................................ 12

I. The Claims That Form the Basis of Hope’s

Petition Are Moot ................................................ 12

II. The Interlocutory Nature of this Case

Makes It a Poor Vehicle to Address Hope’s

Remaining Claims ............................................... 14

III. On the Merits, Hope’s Claims Do Not

Warrant Review .................................................. 16

A. Eighth Amendment ....................................... 17

B. Due Process ................................................... 20

Conclusion ....................................................................... 22

TA BLE O F AU T HO R I TIE S

Page(s)

Cases:

Abbott v. Veasey,

137 S. Ct. 612 (2017) ......................................... 15

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater,

528 U.S. 216 (2000) (per curiam) ..................... 13

(IV)

V

Cases—Continued

Page(s)

Alvarez v. Smith,

558 U.S. 87 (2009) ............................................. 13

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009) ..................................... 16, 20

Atkins v. Williams,

141 S. Ct. 2512 (2021) ......................................... 2

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007) ........................................... 20

Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen

v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co.,

389 U.S. 327 (1967) (per curiam) ..................... 15

Collins v. Yellen,

141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021) ................................. 12, 14

Deakins v. Monaghan,

484 U.S. 193 (1988) ........................................... 13

Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 97 (1976) ............................................ 14

Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825 (1994) ............................... 10, 19, 20

Fussell v. Vannoy,

584 F. App’x 270 (5th Cir. 2014)

(per curiam) ....................................................... 17

Gates v. Collier,

501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974) ..................... 17, 18

Gilday v. Boone,

657 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981) ................................. 13

Gregg v. Georgia,

428 U.S. 153 (1976) ........................................... 19

VI

Cases—Continued

Page(s)

Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co.,

240 U.S. 251 (1916) ........................................... 14

Hewitt v. Helms,

459 U.S. 460 (1983) ........................................... 21

Hope v. State,

No. 05-91-00245-CR, 1991 WL 290548

(Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 19, 1991, pet. ref ’d) ..... 4

Hutto v. Finney,

437 U.S. 678 (1978) ........................................... 18

Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.,

139 S. Ct. 634 (2019) ......................................... 15

Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.,

142 S. Ct. 857 (2022) ......................................... 15

Los Angeles v. Lyons,

461 U.S. 95 (1983) ............................................. 12

Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319 (1976) ....................................... 9, 20

Mazurek v. Armstrong,

520 U.S. 968 (1997) (per curiam) ..................... 16

Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk,

567 U.S. 944 (2012) ........................................... 15

Nat’l Football League v. Ninth Inning, Inc.,

141 S. Ct. 56 (2020) ........................................... 15

Porter v. Clarke,

923 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2019) ............................. 19

Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337 (1981) ........................................... 19

VII

Cases—Continued

Page(s)

Rosebrock v. Mathis,

745 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2014) ............................. 13

Strain v. Regalado,

142 S. Ct. 312 (2021) ........................................... 2

Taylor v. Riojas,

141 S. Ct. 52 (2020) (per curiam) .............. 14, 18

United States v. Hope,

102 F.3d 114 (5th Cir. 1996) ................... 3, 4, 5, 6

Va. Mil. Inst. v. United States,

508 U.S. 946 (1993) ..................................... 14, 15

Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart,

563 U.S. 247 (2011) ........................................... 12

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,

564 U.S. 338 (2011) ........................................... 16

Wilkinson v. Austin,

545 U.S. 209 (2005) ..................................... 19, 22

Will v. Hallock,

546 U.S. 345 (2006) ........................................... 16

Wrotten v. New York,

560 U.S. 959 (2010) ........................................... 15

Ex parte Young,

209 U.S. 123 (1909) ........................................... 12

Constitutional Provisions and Rule:

U.S. Const.:

amend. VIII ................................................passim

amend. XIV.................................................... 3, 10

Sup. Ct. R. 10.................................................... 19, 20

VIII

Miscellaneous:

13C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.

Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure (3d

ed.) ..................................................................... 13

Robert Riggs Reporting, “Texas Prison

Escape Artist Dennis Wayne Hope”,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=myxF

5myFNhw (originally aired on various

dates in 1995 and 1996) ...................................... 4

Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court

Practice 283 (10th ed. 2013) ....................... 15, 16

Tex. Dept. of Crim. Justice, Offender

Orientation Handbook,

https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/documents/Offe

nder_Orientation_Handbook_English.pdf ......... 7

William J. Brennan, Jr., Some Thoughts on

the Supreme Court’s Workload,

66 JUDICATURE 230 (1983) ........................... 14-15

INT RO D U C TIO N

Dennis Wayne Hope asks this Court to grant review

to decide a legal question—whether solitary confinement

can violate the Eighth Amendment based on its duration

alone—that the Fifth Circuit did not resolve, that bears

no resemblance to his complaint, and that no longer affects him. This Court should decline that request.

Though Hope’s depicts his attack on the Fifth Circuit’s decision as a clean-cut challenge to the duration of

his stay in restrictive housing (also known as “solitary

confinement”) his challenge below is anything but. He

seeks both prospective and retrospective relief based on

all aspects of his detention, from the length of his confinement in restrictive housing to the level of noise in the

cellblock and the amount of personal belongings Hope

could keep in his cell. Since he filed his petition, Hope has

been released from restrictive housing pursuant to respondents’ ordinary-course review of his detention

there; and the Fifth Circuit remanded his retrospective

claims for discovery and trial. This Court does not ordinarily grant cases where the judgment to be reviewed is

one part moot and one part interlocutory. It should not

do so here.

Hope’s conditions-of-confinement claim does not warrant review in part because it is moot. This February,

following a regular review, Hope was transferred out of

restrictive housing. He is presently completing a fourmonth educational program to ease his transition to the

general population. His claims for prospective relief

based on the length of his confinement in restrictive

housing as well as the procedure used to periodically reassess that confinement—the only claims that he currently presents to this Court—are moot because he has

already received the relief he seeks.

(1)

2

Granting certiorari would be unwarranted even if

Hope’s primary claims for this Court’s intervention were

not moot. Apart from his mooted demand for a transfer

out of restrictive housing, most of Hope’s Eighth Amendment claims are in the very early stages of litigation. The

Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded his individual-capacity claims for monetary damages, as well as his official-capacity claims against the prison official alleged to

have actual knowledge of the challenged conditions of

Hope’s confinement sufficient to support deliberate indifference. A case in this interlocutory posture is a poor

vehicle for this Court’s review.

But this Court’s review would be unwarranted even

absent mootness and the interlocutory nature of the

case. He misapprehends the Fifth Circuit’s holding, depicting it as a categorical refusal to consider the duration

of a prisoner’s detention in restrictive housing when performing the fact-intensive Eighth Amendment analysis

this Court requires. The Fifth Circuit did nothing of the

sort, instead concluding that Hope stated a claim that

one of the respondents “knew of and disregarded the excessive risks to Hope’s health and safety” allegedly

caused by his confinement in restrictive housing, Pet.

App. 20a, and recognizing that the length of that confinement “cannot be ignored,” Pet. App. 19a. That is precisely the sort of case-specific, fact-bound holding that

this Court frequently refuses to review. E.g., Strain v.

Regalado, 142 S. Ct. 312 (2021) (Mem.); Atkins v. Williams, 141 S. Ct. 2512 (2021) (Mem.).

Nor are any of Hope’s other Eighth Amendment

claims worthy of this Court’s review. Apart from his

mooted demand for a transfer out of restrictive housing,

most of Hope’s Eighth Amendment claims are in the

very early stages of litigation: the Fifth Circuit reversed

3

and remanded his individual-capacity claims for monetary damages, as well as his official-capacity claims

against the prison official alleged to have actual

knowledge of the challenged conditions of Hope’s confinement sufficient to support deliberate indifference. A

case in this interlocutory posture is a poor vehicle for this

Court’s review.

Finally, Hope’s Fourteenth Amendment proceduraldue-process claim does not call for this Court’s review.

Even if Hope had identified an error in the Fifth Circuit’s

conclusion, certiorari is unwarranted because his petition posits a dispute about the application of correctly

stated law to the pleadings in this case. That kind of

question does not warrant certiorari.

ST ATE ME N T

I. Background Facts

Following his conviction for aggravated robbery that

resulted in an 80-year prison sentence, Dennis Wayne

Hope made a name for himself as an escape artist.

A. Hope first escaped from custody in 1990. It was

during transport from pretrial detention to a court appearance in Dallas. As he later told the story for a documentary about his escape exploits, Hope had robbed numerous Albertsons grocery stores. Almost Got Away,

supra n.1, at 33:31-44; see United States v. Hope, 102

F.3d 114, 115 (5th Cir. 1996). During the first few robberies, Hope used a fake ID and uniform to pose as an

armored-vehicle guard; disguised, he deceived employees into handing over the store’s cash deposits. Almost

Got Away, at 1:09-5:45. He later switched his modus operandi and began robbing Albertsons cashiers and actual armored-vehicle guards at gunpoint. Id. at 6:38-8:31.

The Dallas County District Attorney charged Hope

with multiple counts of aggravated robbery with a deadly

4

weapon. To escape pretrial custody, Hope made a handcuff key out of the ink insert from a ballpoint pen. Id. at

12:57-13:03. He later bragged about the technique in an

exclusive interview with Dallas investigative reporter

Robert Riggs: “I could make about six [keys] out of

that.” 2 During transport to a court appearance, Hope

slipped his handcuffs and eluded guards, then stripped

down to his boxer shorts and jogged away through downtown Dallas. Almost Got Away at 12:57-13:38, 14:0015:00. Hope bragged that he evaded the suspicions of a

police officer who spotted him by saying that he was

wearing just light shorts because he was training for a

triathlon. Id. at 14:00-15:00.

It took Dallas police a week to track Hope down. Id.

at 16:26-46. When they did, he led them on a high-speed

car chase for over an hour, Hope said, before police disabled his car by shooting out the tires. Id. at 18:12-40. He

was tried for the robberies, convicted, and sentenced by

the jury to 80 years. Hope v. State, No. 05-91-00245-CR,

1991 WL 290548, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 19, 1991,

pet. ref ’d).

B. Hope was three years into the 80-year sentence for

the Albertsons robberies when he escaped from a maximum-security Texas prison. See Hope, 102 F.3d at 115.

Hope spent months training—he ran 10 miles a day

around the prison yard—and planning the escape. Almost Got Away at 20:00-05, 20:29-57. Hope planned his

escape for Thanksgiving weekend, he explained, because

only a skeleton crew would be on duty. Id. at 21:52-22:16.

Hope and two accomplices sabotaged a generator, shut

Robert Riggs Reporting, “Texas Prison Escape Artist Dennis

Wayne Hope” at 2:24-30, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=

myxF5myFNhw (originally aired on various dates in 1995 and 1996)

(hereafter “Riggs Reporting”)

2

5

down the power to the entire prison, and cut through an

interior fence. Id. at 22:20-23:18, 23:35-38. They had to

climb a second fence, and Hope had prepared for the razor wire by padding his clothing with cardboard and bedding. Id. at 23:40-24:19.

The other escapees were quickly apprehended, but

Hope made it over the wire and eluded capture. Id. at

24:40-25:48, 27:06-37. He ran 14 miles to Pearland,

Texas, a town outside Houston, where he stole a truck

and drove north to Dallas. Id. at 27:37-28:10.

Hope then “stole a[nother] car at knife point from 83year-old Elvin Mitchell,” who he “severely cut” and left

bleeding on the side of the road. Hope, 102 F.3d at 115.

After robbing an Albertsons—one of those he had

robbed before—Hope fled the State. See id. “I knew I

was going to stay in Memphis,” Hope said, “so I didn’t

want to commit any crimes there. I decided I was going

back to Dallas to rob [the Albertsons stores I’d robbed

before] because I knew it didn’t require as much planning, and I wouldn’t have to stay there [in Dallas] very

long.” Almost Got Away at 33:31-44. “Between December 1, 1994 and January 16, 1995 Hope robbed four Albertson’s grocery stores in the Dallas area.” Hope, 102

F.3d at 115.

Hope has admitted he was prepared to kill to evade

recapture. In his March 1995 interview with reporter

Robert Riggs, Hope said he “didn’t plan on coming back”

to prison: “I planned on it being a shootout, either me

killing them or them killing me.” Riggs Reporting, at

7:08-15. On February 1, 1995, Memphis police pulled

Hope over on his way to a casino. Almost Got Away at

36:24-40. “As I pulled over, I had the 9mm with me,”

Hope told interviewers, “and I actually put it to my chest

where it was aimed over my left shoulder.” Id. at 36:43-

6

54. “If that officer walked up, I was gonna pull the trigger and take off.” Id. at 37:25-28. But, as Hope described

it, the officer instead directed Hope by intercom to step

out of the car, asked him about a case of beer sitting on

the seat, and sent him on his way. Id. at 37:28-38:11.

Texas law enforcement caught up with Hope the next

day. See Hope, 102 F.3d at 115. That night, along with

the FBI and Memphis police, Texas officers apprehended and arrested Hope in a nightclub. Id. Memphis

police found a handgun and a police scanner in the Jaguar Hope had driven to the club. Id. at 115-16.

C. When Hope stood trial for the carjacking, armed

robberies, and escape, the federal district judge ordered

him shackled in the courtroom. Id. at 117. As the Fifth

Circuit explained, the court’s reasons for doing so were

“readily apparent . . . from the record.” Id. at 118. “Hope

not only had been sentenced previously for aggravated

robbery, but he was an escapee from prison, thus posing

both the threat of injury to individuals in the courtroom

and the threat of escape.” Id.

During the trial, Hope tried another escape; he

snatched a handcuff key. See Riggs Reporting at 3:23-48.

Then he scuffled with guards before the verdict and

threatened to stab his lawyer “in the scull” with a pencil.

Id. at 7:45-50.

And while in detention awaiting his federal sentencing, Hope tried yet again. See id. at 9:10-58. He smuggled

hacksaw blades into the jail, beat a guard with a heavy

metal drain cover, and took over a control center. Id. at

9:44-52. “I could have come out of my cell whenever I

wanted to come out of that cell,” he bragged. Id. at 12:2023.

D. Not long after his arrest in Memphis, Hope told

reporter Robert Riggs he was already planning his next

7

escape. “I’m not gonna stop trying,” he bragged. Id. at

2:37-38. “They can put me in high security, but I was in

high security the last time I left.” Id. at 10:22-28.

After Hope’s federal conviction and sentencing, he

was returned to TDCJ custody and placed in restrictive

housing (then called “administrative segregation”). As

reflected in the public record, each unit’s Administrative

Segregation Committee is “responsible for the process

of reviewing offenders for placement in administrative

segregation and routine reviews of those offenders.” 3

This process is overseen by “[a] central administrative

classification committee,” known as the State Classification Committee or SCC, which “makes final decisions

with regards to agency-wide issues and unit classification committee recommendations. During the intake process, the SCC makes decisions concerning the initial assignment of an offender to a unit. The SCC also makes

final decisions regarding administrative segregation,

safekeeping, and requests for protection.” Id. Hope does

not dispute that these regular reviews have occurred and

continue to occur.

In July 2016, Hope initiated the grievance procedure

that led to this lawsuit. In his initial grievance, he asserted that the SCC process was a “meaningless review”

because he had been “repeatedly scheduled for a hearing

before someone [presumptively at the SCC] who doesn’t

have the authority to authorize my release from Ad.

Seg.” ROA.22. TDCJ staff explained in response that he

had been maintained in restrictive housing until December 2016 “on the basis of escape risk, staff assault[] and

weapons possession.” ROA.23. Hope did not dispute

Tex. Dept. of Crim. Justice, Offender Orientation Handbook

at 7, https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/documents/Offender_Orientation_Handbook_English.pdf.

3

8

these factual statements in his second-stage grievance.

ROA.24-25.

II. Procedural History

A. In 2018, Hope sued numerous TDCJ officials in

their individual and official capacities, alleging violations

of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See ROA.625; Pet. App. 59a–61a. His amended complaint names

Todd Harris, the Senior Warden of the Polunsky Unit,

Chad Rehse, a Major at the Polunsky Unit, members of

the SCC, and two other administrative officials he alleges are responsible for his placement in administrative

segregation. Pet. App. 59a-61a. 4

Hope’s lawsuit seeks both prospective relief against

the defendants in their official capacities and monetary

damages from the defendants in their individual capacities. See Pet. App. 59a. He alleges the conditions of his

confinement at the Polunsky Unit violate the Eighth

Amendment because, among other things, he is served

meals in his cell on trays, many of which are “dirty and

unsanitary,” Pet. App. 62a, he is strip-searched before

leaving his cell, Pet. App. 62a-63a, he can keep only limited personal property in his cell, Pet. App. 63a, and he

is not allowed contact visits, Pet. App. 63a-64a. He alleges that “excessive amounts of noise can be heard

24/7,” Pet. App. 65a, that he has been exposed to pepper

spray “through no fault of his own,” Pet. App. 65a-66a,

and cells are not sanitized before he is moved in, Pet.

App. 69a. He alleges that in December 2017 he was

Hope also alleges First Amendment retaliation claims

against two of the respondents. See Pet. App. 68a-69a, 79a-80a. The

Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of those claims and remanded

them for further proceedings, Pet. App. 15a-17a, and—understandably—Hope does not raise them in his petition.

4

9

housed for thirteen days in a cell that had “black mold”

on one wall. Pet. App. 69a.

As to procedural due process, Hope alleges his file is

reviewed monthly by the Administrative Segregation

Committee, but he says these reviews are “a sham.” Pet.

App. 72a. An “‘escape risk’ designator” was removed

from his file in 2005, Hope alleges, but he is still held in

restrictive housing. Pet. App. 78a. 5 At least every 180

days, the State Classification Committee holds a hearing

at which Hope may appear and submit a statement. Pet.

App. 72a-73a. Hope says “he has gone before a number

of SCC members who saw no reason not to release him

to [general population],” but since 2010 “SCC members

have been told not to release” him by the committee

chair. Pet. App. 75a; see also id. 73a-74a. In one instance,

he alleges, the reviewing committee member told him

she would recommend he be released to a “transitional

program,” but that recommendation was not carried out.

Pet. App. 72a-73a. So he says these SCC hearings are

also “a sham.” Pet. App. 76a.

The district court dismissed Hope’s claims. Pet. App.

32a-58a.

B. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in

part. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of

Hope’s due process claims under Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319 (1976). Pet. App. 12a-15a. It also affirmed

dismissal of his Eighth Amendment claims against most

of the named defendants because the amended complaint

failed to plausibly allege they acted with deliberate indifference. Pet. App. 20a. But the Fifth Circuit reversed

TDCJ’s records reflect that the “escape risk” designator was

changed to “escape history” in 2015—not in 2005. As that is not in

the record at this stage, respondents will assume the truth of Hope’s

allegations.

5

10

and remanded on two other grounds relevant here: first,

the Fifth Circuit remanded Hope’s individual-capacity

claims seeking money damages, which the district

court’s decision had not addressed in any respect. Pet.

App. 11a-12a, 24a.

Second, the Fifth Circuit remanded Hope’s officialcapacity Eighth Amendment claims against Major

Rehse. Applying the two-part conditions-of-confinement

test set out in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994),

the court concluded Hope had plausibly alleged “(1) that

the prison conditions pose a ‘sufficiently serious’ threat

to his health, including his mental health, and (2) that

[Major Rehse] acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to

such threat.” Pet. App. 18a (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S at

834); see Pet. App. 17a-22a. The court found it “plausible

that Hope’s decades of solitary confinement alongside

such conditions of mold, urine, and feces have caused the

physical and psychological deterioration he alleges, and

it is clear that such an allegation is sufficiently serious to

invoke Eighth Amendment concerns.” Pet. App. 22a; see

also id. 22a-24a. And it concluded Hope had sufficiently

alleged that Major Rehse was aware of these conditions

as well as incidents of physical injury caused by pepper

spray. Pet. App. 23a. The Fifth Circuit explained that

“these allegations are made against the backdrop of

Hope’s allegation that he is no longer an escape risk. Accepting the allegations in Hope’s complaint as true, it is

at least plausible that Hope’s continued confinement in

these conditions is not a matter of reasonable policy

judgment but is instead deliberate indifference.” Pet.

App. 23a.

One judge dissented in part. Pet. App. 25a-31a. She

would have held that Hope sufficiently alleged Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendment violations against all the

11

defendants, so all of his claims should be permitted to

proceed past the pleading stage. See Pet. App. 25a.

III. Post-Petition Developments

On February 7, 2022, following one of the reviews

that he derides as a “sham,” Hope was transferred from

restrictive housing in the Polunsky Unit to the Cognitive

Intervention Transition Program at the Ellis Unit. See

App. 1a-2a 6 Through the Cognitive Intervention Transition Program, Hope is completing a four-month educational program aimed at helping inmates successfully

make the change from restrictive housing to the general

population. App. 1a-2a. 7 Participants attend classes together each day, eat communal meals, and may congregate in the common area during their free time. App. 2a.

Mr. Hope is housed with a cellmate. App. 2a. In the

cellblock where participants are housed, cell doors are

made of bars and the view out each door looks across a

hallway and out a window. App. 2a. Participants in the

program are eligible for regular visitation and may use

the inmate telephone system. App. 2a. They will be returned to restrictive housing only if they commit misconduct serious enough to warrant restrictive housing in the

first instance. App. 2a.

Hope has had no disciplinary events since his transfer to the Ellis Unit and is actively participating in the

Cognitive Intervention Transition Program. App. 2a.

He is scheduled to complete the program on May 26,

Hope’s transfer to the Ellis Unit is a matter of public record

and may be viewed at inmate.tdcj.texas.gov/InmateSearch/start.action by searching for “Dennis Hope” or TDCJ number 00579097.

6

An overview of the program is provided in the public record

and

is

available

at

https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/divisions/rpd/citp.html.

7

12

2022, after which he will be assigned to the general population in minimum custody status with continued good

conduct. App. 2a.

RE A SO NS TO D E N Y THE PE T ITI O N

I. The Claims That Form the Basis of Hope’s

Petition Are Moot.

The primary relief Hope seeks in his lawsuit is transfer out of solitary confinement (at 15-16) or, short of that,

“that prison officials actually evaluate whether solitary

confinement is still warranted” (at 36). Both have already

happened. As a result of the review process Hope calls

(at i) a “sham,” Hope has been transferred out of restrictive housing at the Polunsky Unit to the Cognitive Intervention Transition Program at the Ellis Unit. Participants in the program, including Hope, have cellmates, attend classes as a group, and eat communal meals. See supra 11-12. In short, Hope is already out of solitary confinement, and—absent further misconduct on his part—

he is not going to be subject to the challenged review procedure again. Indeed, his complaint alleges he was

wrongfully denied the opportunity to participate in such

a transition program in 2016, see Pet. App. 73a; having

received the very relief he seeks, Hope cannot dispute

that his claims for prospective relief are moot. See, e.g.,

Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1780 (2021).

Because he is no longer housed in solitary confinement, Hope lacks standing to pursue prospective relief.

See id. at 1780; Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111

(1983). And prospective relief is the only relief available

in an official-capacity suit under Ex parte Young, 209

U.S. 123 (1909). See Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v.

Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011). Hope’s moot claims will

have to be dismissed because federal courts lack jurisdiction to opine on a “dispute solely about the meaning of

13

a law, abstracted from any concrete actual or threatened

harm.” Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 93 (2009); see, e.g.,

Gilday v. Boone, 657 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1981) (claim for

injunctive relief was moot after plaintiff was released

from segregated detention).

To be sure, a defendant who voluntarily terminates

the challenged conduct bears the burden of showing it

“c[annot] reasonably be expected to recur.” Adarand

Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 222 (2000) (per

curiam). But courts assume the government acts “in

good faith when it changes its policy.” Rosebrock v.

Mathis, 745 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 2014); see 13C

Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3533.7 n. 16 (3d ed.). That presumption applies here: TDCJ transferred Hope out of restrictive housing and he will—absent serious misconduct on

his part—be housed in the general population within a

matter of weeks. App. 2a.

To be returned to restrictive housing, Hope would

have to commit a disciplinary violation serious enough

that it would warrant placement in restrictive housing in

the first instance. App. 2a. Even that would not implicate

his claims here, which are premised on the allegation

that he continued to be held in solitary confinement

solely due to his 1994 escape. See Pet. App. 76a. A new

transfer for different reasons would not implicate his

claims. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 201 n.4

(1988) (speculation that defendants could undertake the

same action based on “other events” in the future does

not avoid mootness).

14

II. The Interlocutory Nature of this Case Makes It a

Poor Vehicle to Address Hope’s Remaining

Claims.

A. Although Hope’s Eighth Amendment claims for

monetary damages are not moot, Collins, 141 S. Ct. at

1780, this is neither the proper time nor a good vehicle to

review them. The Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of

those claims and remanded them for further proceedings, see Pet. App. 11a-12a, 24a, and Hope does not invoke these claims in his petition. Indeed, he concedes (at

24) that “thorny questions about qualified immunity”

would complicate this Court’s review of his individual-capacity claims. Because no lower court has yet addressed

these issues, petitioner’s request for monetary damages

is not yet ripe for this Court’s review.

B. Hope’s Eighth Amendment claim against Major

Rehse has been remanded for discovery and trial. This

Court’s “normal practice” is to “den[y] interlocutory review.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 114-15 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Va. Mil. Inst. v. United

States, 508 U.S. 946, 946 (1993) (Scalia, J., respecting the

denial of certiorari) (“We generally await final judgment

in the lower courts before exercising our certiorari jurisdiction.”). Indeed, lack of finality “alone [can] furnish[]

sufficient ground for the denial of the application.” Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251,

258 (1916).

There are good reasons why this Court is “generally

hesitant to grant review of non-final decisions.” Taylor v.

Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 55 (2020) (per curiam) (Alito, J.,

concurring). Litigation is inherently unpredictable, and

later developments may change the character of—or entirely obviate the need to address—the question presented. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Some Thoughts on

15

the Supreme Court’s Workload, 66 JUDICATURE 230,

231-32 (1983). “[A]llowing the case to proceed to its final

disposition below might produce a result that makes it

unnecessary to address an important and difficult constitutional question.” Id. at 231.

Review is often premature even after there has been

factual development for a preliminary injunction. See,

e.g., Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634, 635

(2019) (Alito, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari);

Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct. 857 (2022)

(Mem.) (granting certiorari after summary judgment).

Much more so where (as here) the claims have been remanded at the pleading stage so that factual development can begin in the first place. See Nat’l Football

League v. Ninth Inning, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 56, 56 (2020)

(Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).

The Court should adhere to the normal practice in

this case because the Fifth Circuit has remanded the

bulk of Hope’s Eighth Amendment claims for further

proceedings. See Pet. App. 24a. Denial is the usual result

in such a posture. See Abbott v. Veasey, 137 S. Ct. 612,

613 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., respecting the denial of certiorari); Wrotten v. New York, 560 U.S. 959 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., respecting the denial of certiorari); Va. Military Inst., 508 U.S. at 2432 (Scalia, J., respecting the denial of certiorari); Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk,

567 U.S. 944, 944 (2012) (Alito, J., respecting the denial

of certiorari); Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 389 U.S. 327, 32728 (1967) (per curiam).

This is not an “extraordinary case[]” that necessitates departure from this Court’s settled practice. Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice 283 (10th

ed. 2013). Those cases involve situations where “the

16

lower court’s decision is patently incorrect and the interlocutory decision . . . will have immediate consequences

for the petitioner.” Id. (emphasis added) (collecting

cases). That narrow test is met in situations where the

circuit court’s decision implicates a matter that is “effectively unreviewable” if the Court were to wait until final

judgment. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 351-52 (2006)

(addressing related collateral-order doctrine).

This is not such a case: Hope is seeking retrospective

damages for conduct dating back to 2017 along with,

against Major Rehse, prospective relief from his conditions of confinement. There is no suggestion that failure

to address his claims now will materially prejudice his

ability to litigate those claims. As a result, this case is

very different from other instances when this Court has

deemed interlocutory review appropriate—for example,

in cases involving a sovereign’s or public official’s immunity from suit, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 671-72

(2009), class certification, see, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), or where a burdensome

preliminary injunction will cause the petitioner concrete,

irreparable harm during the pendency of the litigation,

Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 975-76 (1997) (per

curiam). For this reason too, the petition should be denied.

III. On the Merits, Hope’s Claims Do Not Warrant

Review.

Even if the Court were inclined to look beyond the

mootness of Hope’s claims for prospective relief and the

interlocutory nature of the case, neither of Hope’s remaining claims would warrant this Court’s review. Hope

misstates the Fifth Circuit’s ruling regarding his Eighth

Amendment claim. And his due-process claim presents a

17

fact-bound dispute regarding how to apply well-settled

law to his allegations.

A. Eighth Amendment.

1. Hope’s Eighth Amendment claim is premised on

a question not actually presented in the decision below.

Hope asks for this Court’s review because, he says (at 3),

the Fifth Circuit held that “solitary confinement never

violates the Eighth Amendment.” It held no such thing.

To the contrary, the Fifth Circuit applied the opposite

rule. See Pet. App. 17a-24a.

In analyzing Hope’s Eighth Amendment claim, the

Fifth Circuit acknowledged that “[t]here is a line where

solitary confinement conditions become so severe that its

use is converted from a viable prisoner disciplinary tool

to cruel and unusual punishment.” Pet. App. 18a (quoting

Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1304 (5th Cir. 1974)). And

it concluded Hope has plausibly alleged that Major

Rehse crossed that line, and thereby stated a claim

against Major Rehse that should proceed to discovery.

Pet. App. 20a-24a. It affirmed dismissal of Hope’s official-capacity claims against the other defendants because it concluded Hope had not plausibly alleged they

acted with deliberate indifference, Pet. App. 20a, and not

even Hope argues that conclusion is worthy of certiorari.

In short, Fifth Circuit doctrine already embodies the

rule Hope urges this Court (at 9) to adopt: “solitary confinement can violate the Eighth Amendment, depending

on its length, its impact on a prisoner’s mental and physical health, and its necessity.” Far from a categorical prohibition on Eighth Amendment violations arising from

solitary confinement, Fifth Circuit precedent aligns with

the flexible Eighth Amendment standard Hope urges (at

9). See Pet. App.17a-24a; Fussell v. Vannoy, 584 F. App’x

270, 271-72 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (reversing

18

dismissal of a prisoner’s complaint because it plausibly

alleged that after 25 years the prisoner’s “continued

lockdown is not a matter of reasonable policy judgment,

but is instead deliberate indifference”); Gates, 501 F.2d

at 1304; cf. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. at 53-54 (length of time, necessity, and the possibility of mitigation are all relevant

considerations). There is no reason for this Court to

grant certiorari.

Hope criticizes (at 23-24) the Fifth Circuit’s citation

to Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), because Finney

involved overcrowded conditions in isolation cells, not

solitary confinement. To be sure. But the Fifth Circuit

did not cite the case for its facts; it cited Finney for the

principle it represents. See Pet. App. 17a-19a. In Finney,

this Court observed: “It is perfectly obvious that every

decision to remove a particular inmate from the general

prison population for an indeterminate period could not

be characterized as cruel and unusual.” Finney, 437 U.S.

at 686; see Pet. App. 18a. The case stands for the proposition that the length of time a prisoner spends under the

challenged conditions of confinement is relevant but cannot be “considered in a vacuum.” Finney, 437 U.S. at 685.

That is why the Fifth Circuit cited it, explaining that “under the Eighth Amendment, ‘the length of confinement

cannot be ignored in deciding whether the confinement

meets constitutional standards.’” Pet. App. 19a (quoting

Finney, 437 U.S. at 686) (emphasis added). The court

also cited Finney to explain why “sheer length of . . . confinement” does not state a claim. Pet. App. 17a n.5.

Hope’s factual distinction likewise does not favor this

Court’s review.

At bottom, Hope’s quarrel with the Fifth Circuit goes

to how it applied the flexible Eighth Amendment standard in analyzing his complaint. The Fifth Circuit

19

concluded Hope has not plausibly alleged most of the defendant prison officials—all but Major Rehse—acted

with deliberate indifference to the alleged harmful effects of his conditions of confinement in restrictive housing. Pet. App. 20a. Hope insists (at 12) that he did indeed

sufficiently allege deliberate indifference. That kind of

fact-bound, case-specific disagreement about the pleadings does not call for this Court’s review. See Sup. Ct. R.

10.

2. In any event, Hope has not stated a claim under

the Eighth Amendment because his conditions of confinement are not “totally without penological justification.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (joint

opinion); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 852

(1994); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). As

the Fourth Circuit puts it, “a legitimate penological justification can support prolonged detention of an inmate

in segregated or solitary confinement” even if the conditions “create an objective risk of serious emotional and

psychological harm.” Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 362–

63 (4th Cir. 2019); cf. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,

227 (2005) (the State’s “first obligation must be to ensure

the safety of guards and prison personnel, the public, and

the prisoners themselves.”).

The record contradicts Hope’s premise (at 25) that

“there is no basis for his ongoing solitary confinement.”

Responding to Hope’s administrative grievance, TDCJ

officials explained the reasons the State Classification

Committee continued his placement in restrictive housing: “escape risk, staff assault[] and weapons possession.” ROA.23. In his follow-up grievance, Hope did not

deny that he was an escape risk or that concerns about

staff assault and weapons possession apply to him.

ROA.24. This undisputed evidence forecloses Hope’s

20

Eighth Amendment claim as a matter of law under

Farmer.

B. Due Process

Hope’s due process claim based on alleged defects in

TDCJ’s process for reviewing his continuance in restrictive housing is moot because he is no longer in restrictive

housing and subject to that review. But even if it were

not, this Court’s review would be unwarranted. The Fifth

Circuit applied the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), see Pet. App. 15a, which is

what Hope contends (at 32) should apply. So even under

Hope’s reading, the Fifth Circuit’s decision involves, at

most, “the misapplication of a properly stated rule of

law.” Sup. Ct. R. 10. Certiorari is not warranted on that

basis. Id.

And in any event, Hope’s pleadings do not state a

claim. He alleges in conclusory fashion that hearings

held to review his continued restrictive housing are “a

sham and meaningless.” E.g., Pet. App. 72a. But these

are just the sort of “labels and conclusions” that do not

suffice to state a plausible claim under Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544 (2007). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

That Hope was not transferred out of restrictive

housing until this year does not mean TDCJ’s periodic

review processes were “a sham.” Hope characterizes the

review process as a sham because he had not been transferred even though some individual reviewers opined

that he could be. See Pet. App. 71a-73a. But his allegations are, at most, “merely consistent with” wrongdoing,

and that does not state a claim for relief. Twombly, 550

U.S. at 557; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It is equally

likely, taking his allegations as true, that the State Classification Committee ultimately disagreed with the

21

individual reviewers’ assessment and decided in each instance that Hope could not safely be removed from restrictive housing. And the record reflects that the committee’s decision turned on undisputed misconduct by

Hope, as TDCJ explained to Hope. See supra 7-8.

And in any event, contrary to Hope’s suggestion (at

36), this Court has never required prison administrators

to develop new evidence every time they reconsider a

prisoner’s solitary detention. Indeed, this Court has explained that the necessary “review will not necessarily

require that prison officials permit the submission of any

additional evidence or statements.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459

U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983) (emphasis added), overruled on

other grounds Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 479-84

(1995). Nor does clearly established law require reviewing officials to ignore past actions in determining

whether a prisoner needs to remain in restrictive housing. To the contrary, this Court has explained that prison

administrators will review continued solitary confinement based on “facts . . . ascertained when determining

to confine the inmate to restrictive segregation,” along

with “officials’ general knowledge of prison conditions

and tensions, which are singularly unsuited for ‘proof ’ in

any highly structured manner.” Id.

Hope repeatedly escaped from prison to commit

more—and increasingly violent—robberies, then he

bragged about his prowess as an escape artist and vowed

never to stop trying to escape. See supra at 3-7. There is

nothing suspect about prison officials determining restrictive housing remained necessary, even years later.

In this context, this Court’s precedent recognizes that

the State’s interest is “a dominant consideration,” given

the State’s “obligation . . . ensure the safety of guards

22

and prison personnel, the public, and the prisoners themselves.” Austin, 545 U.S. at 227.

C O NC LU SIO N

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of Texas

BRENT WEBSTER

First Assistant Attorney

General

JUDD E. STONE II

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

NATALIE D. THOMPSON

Assistant Solicitor General

OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL

P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059)

Austin, Texas 78711-2548

Judd.Stone@oag.texas.gov

(512) 936-1700

MAY 2022

APPENDIX

AP PE ND IX

DECLARATION OF TIMOTHY R. FITZPATRICK

1. My name is TIMOTHY R. FITZPATRICK. I am

over the age of 21 years, of sound mind, capable of

making this declaration, and have personal knowledge of

the facts stated herein. I am currently employed with the

Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) as the

Director of Classification and Records and have served

in this capacity since November 15, 2021. I have held a

series of progressively responsible positions including

Correctional Officer, Sergeant, Lieutenant, Captain,

Major, Assistant Warden, Warden and this most recent

position. I have worked for the agency since 2005 and

have over 16 years of experience. As Director of

Classification and Records and the Mail System

Coordinators Panel, I oversee and am responsible for

statewide admissions, intake, time auditing, transfers,

Unit Classification, State Classification and Mailroom

System Coordinators Panel.

2. On February 4, 2022, the State Classification

Committee held a hearing to consider Dennis Wayne

Hope’s (TDCJ #579097) continued classification in

Restrictive Housing. The Committee determined that

Mr. Hope would be removed from Restrictive Housing

and would be transferred to the Cognitive Intervention

Transition Program (CITP) at the Ellis Unit. After

successful completion of this program, Mr. Hope will be

housed in the general population in G2 (minimum)

custody status. The Committee reached this decision

after extensive consideration of all prior criminogenic

history, institutional adjustment, the recommendations

of Polunsky Unit Administration concerning current

2a

behavior, and in consultation with the leadership of

TDCJ. Mr. Hope was transferred to the Ellis Unit on

February 7, 2022.

3. Participants in the Cognitive Intervention

Transition Program at the Ellis Unit attend classes

together each day, eat communal meals, and may

congregate in the common area during their free time.

Most participants, including Mr. Hope, are housed with

a cellmate. In the cellblock where participants are

housed, cell doors are made of bars and the view out each

door looks across a hallway and out a window.

Participants are eligible for regular visitation and may

use the inmate telephone system.

4. Participants in the Cognitive Intervention Transition

Program will be returned to restrictive housing only if

they commit misconduct serious enough to warrant

restrictive housing in the first instance. In contrast,

lesser infractions will affect the participant’s security

classification level within the general population. The

Cognitive Intervention Transition Program lasts four

months. At the conclusion of the program, graduates are

transferred to housing in the general population. Mr.

Hope is scheduled to complete the program on May 26,

2022 and will be assigned to the general population in G2

(minimum) custody status with continued good conduct.

5. Mr. Hope has had no disciplinary events since his

transfer to the Ellis Unit and is actively participating in

the Cognitive Intervention Transition Program.

3a

Pursuant to 27 U.S.C. section 1746, I declare under

penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on May 4, 2022, in Huntsville, Texas.

/s/ Timothy R. Fitzpatrick

Timothy R. Fitzpatrick

Director of Classification and Records

Texas Department of Criminal Justice

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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