Opposition Brief — Dennis Wayne Hope, Petitioner v. Todd Harris, et al.
Supreme Court briefMay 9, 2022
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No. 21-1065
In the Supreme Court of the United States
DENNIS WAYNE HOPE, PETITIONER
v.
TODD HARRIS, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS
AND BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas
BRENT WEBSTER
First Assistant Attorney
General
JUDD E. STONE II
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
NATALIE D. THOMPSON
Assistant Solicitor General
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059)
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Judd.Stone@oag.texas.gov
(512) 936-1700
QU E S TIO NS PR E S E NTE D
Dennis Wayne Hope is serving an 80-year sentence
for a string of violent armed robberies. He has escaped
or attempted to escape from Texas prisons often enough
to inspire a television episode about his criminal exploits. 1 After a successful escape during which Hope shut
down the electricity to an entire maximum-security
prison, fled to another State, and committed additional
violent crimes—including carjacking an unarmed 83year-old man at knife point—Hope was placed in restrictive housing. He received periodic reviews to determine
whether it would be safe to move him to the general population. Several years ago, it was determined that staff
no longer needed a “flight risk” warning on Hope’s file,
but other safety concerns kept him in restrictive housing.
During Hope’s most recent review, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice determined that those additional concerns had been ameliorated, transferred him
out of restrictive housing, and began the process of transitioning him to the general population. The questions
presented are:
Whether a conditions-of-confinement claim under the
Eighth Amendment is moot when the challenged conditions of confinement no longer apply.
Whether a procedural-due-process claim challenging
a prison’s process for periodic review of solitary confinement is moot when the prisoner is released from solitary
confinement.
I (Almost) Got Away With It, Season 3, Episode 10 (first aired
June 28, 2011) (hereafter “Almost Got Away”).
1
(I)
Whether the duration of solitary confinement, considered in a vacuum, can violate the Eighth Amendment.
Whether petitioner plausibly alleged all the respondent prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the
Eighth Amendment violations he alleges.
Whether petitioner plausibly alleged he was deprived
of due process in connection with periodic reviews of his
continued placement in restrictive housing.
(II)
RE L ATE D P RO C E E D ING S
Hope v. Harris, No. 9:18-cv-27, U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas. Judgment entered
May 5, 2020.
Hope v. Harris, No. 20-40379, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. Judgment entered June 18, 2021.
(III)
TA BLE O F C O NTE N TS
Page
Questions Presented ......................................................... I
Related Proceedings ......................................................III
Table of Authorities ....................................................... IV
Introduction....................................................................... 1
Statement .......................................................................... 3
I. Background Facts ................................................. 3
II. Procedural History................................................ 8
III. Post-Petition Developments ............................... 11
Reasons to Deny the Petition ........................................ 12
I. The Claims That Form the Basis of Hope’s
Petition Are Moot ................................................ 12
II. The Interlocutory Nature of this Case
Makes It a Poor Vehicle to Address Hope’s
Remaining Claims ............................................... 14
III. On the Merits, Hope’s Claims Do Not
Warrant Review .................................................. 16
A. Eighth Amendment ....................................... 17
B. Due Process ................................................... 20
Conclusion ....................................................................... 22
TA BLE O F AU T HO R I TIE S
Page(s)
Cases:
Abbott v. Veasey,
137 S. Ct. 612 (2017) ......................................... 15
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater,
528 U.S. 216 (2000) (per curiam) ..................... 13
(IV)
V
Cases—Continued
Page(s)
Alvarez v. Smith,
558 U.S. 87 (2009) ............................................. 13
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) ..................................... 16, 20
Atkins v. Williams,
141 S. Ct. 2512 (2021) ......................................... 2
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007) ........................................... 20
Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen
v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co.,
389 U.S. 327 (1967) (per curiam) ..................... 15
Collins v. Yellen,
141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021) ................................. 12, 14
Deakins v. Monaghan,
484 U.S. 193 (1988) ........................................... 13
Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97 (1976) ............................................ 14
Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825 (1994) ............................... 10, 19, 20
Fussell v. Vannoy,
584 F. App’x 270 (5th Cir. 2014)
(per curiam) ....................................................... 17
Gates v. Collier,
501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974) ..................... 17, 18
Gilday v. Boone,
657 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981) ................................. 13
Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976) ........................................... 19
VI
Cases—Continued
Page(s)
Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co.,
240 U.S. 251 (1916) ........................................... 14
Hewitt v. Helms,
459 U.S. 460 (1983) ........................................... 21
Hope v. State,
No. 05-91-00245-CR, 1991 WL 290548
(Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 19, 1991, pet. ref ’d) ..... 4
Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678 (1978) ........................................... 18
Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.,
139 S. Ct. 634 (2019) ......................................... 15
Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.,
142 S. Ct. 857 (2022) ......................................... 15
Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95 (1983) ............................................. 12
Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976) ....................................... 9, 20
Mazurek v. Armstrong,
520 U.S. 968 (1997) (per curiam) ..................... 16
Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk,
567 U.S. 944 (2012) ........................................... 15
Nat’l Football League v. Ninth Inning, Inc.,
141 S. Ct. 56 (2020) ........................................... 15
Porter v. Clarke,
923 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2019) ............................. 19
Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337 (1981) ........................................... 19
VII
Cases—Continued
Page(s)
Rosebrock v. Mathis,
745 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2014) ............................. 13
Strain v. Regalado,
142 S. Ct. 312 (2021) ........................................... 2
Taylor v. Riojas,
141 S. Ct. 52 (2020) (per curiam) .............. 14, 18
United States v. Hope,
102 F.3d 114 (5th Cir. 1996) ................... 3, 4, 5, 6
Va. Mil. Inst. v. United States,
508 U.S. 946 (1993) ..................................... 14, 15
Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart,
563 U.S. 247 (2011) ........................................... 12
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
564 U.S. 338 (2011) ........................................... 16
Wilkinson v. Austin,
545 U.S. 209 (2005) ..................................... 19, 22
Will v. Hallock,
546 U.S. 345 (2006) ........................................... 16
Wrotten v. New York,
560 U.S. 959 (2010) ........................................... 15
Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1909) ........................................... 12
Constitutional Provisions and Rule:
U.S. Const.:
amend. VIII ................................................passim
amend. XIV.................................................... 3, 10
Sup. Ct. R. 10.................................................... 19, 20
VIII
Miscellaneous:
13C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure (3d
ed.) ..................................................................... 13
Robert Riggs Reporting, “Texas Prison
Escape Artist Dennis Wayne Hope”,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=myxF
5myFNhw (originally aired on various
dates in 1995 and 1996) ...................................... 4
Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court
Practice 283 (10th ed. 2013) ....................... 15, 16
Tex. Dept. of Crim. Justice, Offender
Orientation Handbook,
https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/documents/Offe
nder_Orientation_Handbook_English.pdf ......... 7
William J. Brennan, Jr., Some Thoughts on
the Supreme Court’s Workload,
66 JUDICATURE 230 (1983) ........................... 14-15
INT RO D U C TIO N
Dennis Wayne Hope asks this Court to grant review
to decide a legal question—whether solitary confinement
can violate the Eighth Amendment based on its duration
alone—that the Fifth Circuit did not resolve, that bears
no resemblance to his complaint, and that no longer affects him. This Court should decline that request.
Though Hope’s depicts his attack on the Fifth Circuit’s decision as a clean-cut challenge to the duration of
his stay in restrictive housing (also known as “solitary
confinement”) his challenge below is anything but. He
seeks both prospective and retrospective relief based on
all aspects of his detention, from the length of his confinement in restrictive housing to the level of noise in the
cellblock and the amount of personal belongings Hope
could keep in his cell. Since he filed his petition, Hope has
been released from restrictive housing pursuant to respondents’ ordinary-course review of his detention
there; and the Fifth Circuit remanded his retrospective
claims for discovery and trial. This Court does not ordinarily grant cases where the judgment to be reviewed is
one part moot and one part interlocutory. It should not
do so here.
Hope’s conditions-of-confinement claim does not warrant review in part because it is moot. This February,
following a regular review, Hope was transferred out of
restrictive housing. He is presently completing a fourmonth educational program to ease his transition to the
general population. His claims for prospective relief
based on the length of his confinement in restrictive
housing as well as the procedure used to periodically reassess that confinement—the only claims that he currently presents to this Court—are moot because he has
already received the relief he seeks.
(1)
2
Granting certiorari would be unwarranted even if
Hope’s primary claims for this Court’s intervention were
not moot. Apart from his mooted demand for a transfer
out of restrictive housing, most of Hope’s Eighth Amendment claims are in the very early stages of litigation. The
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded his individual-capacity claims for monetary damages, as well as his official-capacity claims against the prison official alleged to
have actual knowledge of the challenged conditions of
Hope’s confinement sufficient to support deliberate indifference. A case in this interlocutory posture is a poor
vehicle for this Court’s review.
But this Court’s review would be unwarranted even
absent mootness and the interlocutory nature of the
case. He misapprehends the Fifth Circuit’s holding, depicting it as a categorical refusal to consider the duration
of a prisoner’s detention in restrictive housing when performing the fact-intensive Eighth Amendment analysis
this Court requires. The Fifth Circuit did nothing of the
sort, instead concluding that Hope stated a claim that
one of the respondents “knew of and disregarded the excessive risks to Hope’s health and safety” allegedly
caused by his confinement in restrictive housing, Pet.
App. 20a, and recognizing that the length of that confinement “cannot be ignored,” Pet. App. 19a. That is precisely the sort of case-specific, fact-bound holding that
this Court frequently refuses to review. E.g., Strain v.
Regalado, 142 S. Ct. 312 (2021) (Mem.); Atkins v. Williams, 141 S. Ct. 2512 (2021) (Mem.).
Nor are any of Hope’s other Eighth Amendment
claims worthy of this Court’s review. Apart from his
mooted demand for a transfer out of restrictive housing,
most of Hope’s Eighth Amendment claims are in the
very early stages of litigation: the Fifth Circuit reversed
3
and remanded his individual-capacity claims for monetary damages, as well as his official-capacity claims
against the prison official alleged to have actual
knowledge of the challenged conditions of Hope’s confinement sufficient to support deliberate indifference. A
case in this interlocutory posture is a poor vehicle for this
Court’s review.
Finally, Hope’s Fourteenth Amendment proceduraldue-process claim does not call for this Court’s review.
Even if Hope had identified an error in the Fifth Circuit’s
conclusion, certiorari is unwarranted because his petition posits a dispute about the application of correctly
stated law to the pleadings in this case. That kind of
question does not warrant certiorari.
ST ATE ME N T
I. Background Facts
Following his conviction for aggravated robbery that
resulted in an 80-year prison sentence, Dennis Wayne
Hope made a name for himself as an escape artist.
A. Hope first escaped from custody in 1990. It was
during transport from pretrial detention to a court appearance in Dallas. As he later told the story for a documentary about his escape exploits, Hope had robbed numerous Albertsons grocery stores. Almost Got Away,
supra n.1, at 33:31-44; see United States v. Hope, 102
F.3d 114, 115 (5th Cir. 1996). During the first few robberies, Hope used a fake ID and uniform to pose as an
armored-vehicle guard; disguised, he deceived employees into handing over the store’s cash deposits. Almost
Got Away, at 1:09-5:45. He later switched his modus operandi and began robbing Albertsons cashiers and actual armored-vehicle guards at gunpoint. Id. at 6:38-8:31.
The Dallas County District Attorney charged Hope
with multiple counts of aggravated robbery with a deadly
4
weapon. To escape pretrial custody, Hope made a handcuff key out of the ink insert from a ballpoint pen. Id. at
12:57-13:03. He later bragged about the technique in an
exclusive interview with Dallas investigative reporter
Robert Riggs: “I could make about six [keys] out of
that.” 2 During transport to a court appearance, Hope
slipped his handcuffs and eluded guards, then stripped
down to his boxer shorts and jogged away through downtown Dallas. Almost Got Away at 12:57-13:38, 14:0015:00. Hope bragged that he evaded the suspicions of a
police officer who spotted him by saying that he was
wearing just light shorts because he was training for a
triathlon. Id. at 14:00-15:00.
It took Dallas police a week to track Hope down. Id.
at 16:26-46. When they did, he led them on a high-speed
car chase for over an hour, Hope said, before police disabled his car by shooting out the tires. Id. at 18:12-40. He
was tried for the robberies, convicted, and sentenced by
the jury to 80 years. Hope v. State, No. 05-91-00245-CR,
1991 WL 290548, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 19, 1991,
pet. ref ’d).
B. Hope was three years into the 80-year sentence for
the Albertsons robberies when he escaped from a maximum-security Texas prison. See Hope, 102 F.3d at 115.
Hope spent months training—he ran 10 miles a day
around the prison yard—and planning the escape. Almost Got Away at 20:00-05, 20:29-57. Hope planned his
escape for Thanksgiving weekend, he explained, because
only a skeleton crew would be on duty. Id. at 21:52-22:16.
Hope and two accomplices sabotaged a generator, shut
Robert Riggs Reporting, “Texas Prison Escape Artist Dennis
Wayne Hope” at 2:24-30, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
myxF5myFNhw (originally aired on various dates in 1995 and 1996)
(hereafter “Riggs Reporting”)
2
5
down the power to the entire prison, and cut through an
interior fence. Id. at 22:20-23:18, 23:35-38. They had to
climb a second fence, and Hope had prepared for the razor wire by padding his clothing with cardboard and bedding. Id. at 23:40-24:19.
The other escapees were quickly apprehended, but
Hope made it over the wire and eluded capture. Id. at
24:40-25:48, 27:06-37. He ran 14 miles to Pearland,
Texas, a town outside Houston, where he stole a truck
and drove north to Dallas. Id. at 27:37-28:10.
Hope then “stole a[nother] car at knife point from 83year-old Elvin Mitchell,” who he “severely cut” and left
bleeding on the side of the road. Hope, 102 F.3d at 115.
After robbing an Albertsons—one of those he had
robbed before—Hope fled the State. See id. “I knew I
was going to stay in Memphis,” Hope said, “so I didn’t
want to commit any crimes there. I decided I was going
back to Dallas to rob [the Albertsons stores I’d robbed
before] because I knew it didn’t require as much planning, and I wouldn’t have to stay there [in Dallas] very
long.” Almost Got Away at 33:31-44. “Between December 1, 1994 and January 16, 1995 Hope robbed four Albertson’s grocery stores in the Dallas area.” Hope, 102
F.3d at 115.
Hope has admitted he was prepared to kill to evade
recapture. In his March 1995 interview with reporter
Robert Riggs, Hope said he “didn’t plan on coming back”
to prison: “I planned on it being a shootout, either me
killing them or them killing me.” Riggs Reporting, at
7:08-15. On February 1, 1995, Memphis police pulled
Hope over on his way to a casino. Almost Got Away at
36:24-40. “As I pulled over, I had the 9mm with me,”
Hope told interviewers, “and I actually put it to my chest
where it was aimed over my left shoulder.” Id. at 36:43-
6
54. “If that officer walked up, I was gonna pull the trigger and take off.” Id. at 37:25-28. But, as Hope described
it, the officer instead directed Hope by intercom to step
out of the car, asked him about a case of beer sitting on
the seat, and sent him on his way. Id. at 37:28-38:11.
Texas law enforcement caught up with Hope the next
day. See Hope, 102 F.3d at 115. That night, along with
the FBI and Memphis police, Texas officers apprehended and arrested Hope in a nightclub. Id. Memphis
police found a handgun and a police scanner in the Jaguar Hope had driven to the club. Id. at 115-16.
C. When Hope stood trial for the carjacking, armed
robberies, and escape, the federal district judge ordered
him shackled in the courtroom. Id. at 117. As the Fifth
Circuit explained, the court’s reasons for doing so were
“readily apparent . . . from the record.” Id. at 118. “Hope
not only had been sentenced previously for aggravated
robbery, but he was an escapee from prison, thus posing
both the threat of injury to individuals in the courtroom
and the threat of escape.” Id.
During the trial, Hope tried another escape; he
snatched a handcuff key. See Riggs Reporting at 3:23-48.
Then he scuffled with guards before the verdict and
threatened to stab his lawyer “in the scull” with a pencil.
Id. at 7:45-50.
And while in detention awaiting his federal sentencing, Hope tried yet again. See id. at 9:10-58. He smuggled
hacksaw blades into the jail, beat a guard with a heavy
metal drain cover, and took over a control center. Id. at
9:44-52. “I could have come out of my cell whenever I
wanted to come out of that cell,” he bragged. Id. at 12:2023.
D. Not long after his arrest in Memphis, Hope told
reporter Robert Riggs he was already planning his next
7
escape. “I’m not gonna stop trying,” he bragged. Id. at
2:37-38. “They can put me in high security, but I was in
high security the last time I left.” Id. at 10:22-28.
After Hope’s federal conviction and sentencing, he
was returned to TDCJ custody and placed in restrictive
housing (then called “administrative segregation”). As
reflected in the public record, each unit’s Administrative
Segregation Committee is “responsible for the process
of reviewing offenders for placement in administrative
segregation and routine reviews of those offenders.” 3
This process is overseen by “[a] central administrative
classification committee,” known as the State Classification Committee or SCC, which “makes final decisions
with regards to agency-wide issues and unit classification committee recommendations. During the intake process, the SCC makes decisions concerning the initial assignment of an offender to a unit. The SCC also makes
final decisions regarding administrative segregation,
safekeeping, and requests for protection.” Id. Hope does
not dispute that these regular reviews have occurred and
continue to occur.
In July 2016, Hope initiated the grievance procedure
that led to this lawsuit. In his initial grievance, he asserted that the SCC process was a “meaningless review”
because he had been “repeatedly scheduled for a hearing
before someone [presumptively at the SCC] who doesn’t
have the authority to authorize my release from Ad.
Seg.” ROA.22. TDCJ staff explained in response that he
had been maintained in restrictive housing until December 2016 “on the basis of escape risk, staff assault[] and
weapons possession.” ROA.23. Hope did not dispute
Tex. Dept. of Crim. Justice, Offender Orientation Handbook
at 7, https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/documents/Offender_Orientation_Handbook_English.pdf.
3
8
these factual statements in his second-stage grievance.
ROA.24-25.
II. Procedural History
A. In 2018, Hope sued numerous TDCJ officials in
their individual and official capacities, alleging violations
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See ROA.625; Pet. App. 59a–61a. His amended complaint names
Todd Harris, the Senior Warden of the Polunsky Unit,
Chad Rehse, a Major at the Polunsky Unit, members of
the SCC, and two other administrative officials he alleges are responsible for his placement in administrative
segregation. Pet. App. 59a-61a. 4
Hope’s lawsuit seeks both prospective relief against
the defendants in their official capacities and monetary
damages from the defendants in their individual capacities. See Pet. App. 59a. He alleges the conditions of his
confinement at the Polunsky Unit violate the Eighth
Amendment because, among other things, he is served
meals in his cell on trays, many of which are “dirty and
unsanitary,” Pet. App. 62a, he is strip-searched before
leaving his cell, Pet. App. 62a-63a, he can keep only limited personal property in his cell, Pet. App. 63a, and he
is not allowed contact visits, Pet. App. 63a-64a. He alleges that “excessive amounts of noise can be heard
24/7,” Pet. App. 65a, that he has been exposed to pepper
spray “through no fault of his own,” Pet. App. 65a-66a,
and cells are not sanitized before he is moved in, Pet.
App. 69a. He alleges that in December 2017 he was
Hope also alleges First Amendment retaliation claims
against two of the respondents. See Pet. App. 68a-69a, 79a-80a. The
Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of those claims and remanded
them for further proceedings, Pet. App. 15a-17a, and—understandably—Hope does not raise them in his petition.
4
9
housed for thirteen days in a cell that had “black mold”
on one wall. Pet. App. 69a.
As to procedural due process, Hope alleges his file is
reviewed monthly by the Administrative Segregation
Committee, but he says these reviews are “a sham.” Pet.
App. 72a. An “‘escape risk’ designator” was removed
from his file in 2005, Hope alleges, but he is still held in
restrictive housing. Pet. App. 78a. 5 At least every 180
days, the State Classification Committee holds a hearing
at which Hope may appear and submit a statement. Pet.
App. 72a-73a. Hope says “he has gone before a number
of SCC members who saw no reason not to release him
to [general population],” but since 2010 “SCC members
have been told not to release” him by the committee
chair. Pet. App. 75a; see also id. 73a-74a. In one instance,
he alleges, the reviewing committee member told him
she would recommend he be released to a “transitional
program,” but that recommendation was not carried out.
Pet. App. 72a-73a. So he says these SCC hearings are
also “a sham.” Pet. App. 76a.
The district court dismissed Hope’s claims. Pet. App.
32a-58a.
B. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in
part. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of
Hope’s due process claims under Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976). Pet. App. 12a-15a. It also affirmed
dismissal of his Eighth Amendment claims against most
of the named defendants because the amended complaint
failed to plausibly allege they acted with deliberate indifference. Pet. App. 20a. But the Fifth Circuit reversed
TDCJ’s records reflect that the “escape risk” designator was
changed to “escape history” in 2015—not in 2005. As that is not in
the record at this stage, respondents will assume the truth of Hope’s
allegations.
5
10
and remanded on two other grounds relevant here: first,
the Fifth Circuit remanded Hope’s individual-capacity
claims seeking money damages, which the district
court’s decision had not addressed in any respect. Pet.
App. 11a-12a, 24a.
Second, the Fifth Circuit remanded Hope’s officialcapacity Eighth Amendment claims against Major
Rehse. Applying the two-part conditions-of-confinement
test set out in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994),
the court concluded Hope had plausibly alleged “(1) that
the prison conditions pose a ‘sufficiently serious’ threat
to his health, including his mental health, and (2) that
[Major Rehse] acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to
such threat.” Pet. App. 18a (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S at
834); see Pet. App. 17a-22a. The court found it “plausible
that Hope’s decades of solitary confinement alongside
such conditions of mold, urine, and feces have caused the
physical and psychological deterioration he alleges, and
it is clear that such an allegation is sufficiently serious to
invoke Eighth Amendment concerns.” Pet. App. 22a; see
also id. 22a-24a. And it concluded Hope had sufficiently
alleged that Major Rehse was aware of these conditions
as well as incidents of physical injury caused by pepper
spray. Pet. App. 23a. The Fifth Circuit explained that
“these allegations are made against the backdrop of
Hope’s allegation that he is no longer an escape risk. Accepting the allegations in Hope’s complaint as true, it is
at least plausible that Hope’s continued confinement in
these conditions is not a matter of reasonable policy
judgment but is instead deliberate indifference.” Pet.
App. 23a.
One judge dissented in part. Pet. App. 25a-31a. She
would have held that Hope sufficiently alleged Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment violations against all the
11
defendants, so all of his claims should be permitted to
proceed past the pleading stage. See Pet. App. 25a.
III. Post-Petition Developments
On February 7, 2022, following one of the reviews
that he derides as a “sham,” Hope was transferred from
restrictive housing in the Polunsky Unit to the Cognitive
Intervention Transition Program at the Ellis Unit. See
App. 1a-2a 6 Through the Cognitive Intervention Transition Program, Hope is completing a four-month educational program aimed at helping inmates successfully
make the change from restrictive housing to the general
population. App. 1a-2a. 7 Participants attend classes together each day, eat communal meals, and may congregate in the common area during their free time. App. 2a.
Mr. Hope is housed with a cellmate. App. 2a. In the
cellblock where participants are housed, cell doors are
made of bars and the view out each door looks across a
hallway and out a window. App. 2a. Participants in the
program are eligible for regular visitation and may use
the inmate telephone system. App. 2a. They will be returned to restrictive housing only if they commit misconduct serious enough to warrant restrictive housing in the
first instance. App. 2a.
Hope has had no disciplinary events since his transfer to the Ellis Unit and is actively participating in the
Cognitive Intervention Transition Program. App. 2a.
He is scheduled to complete the program on May 26,
Hope’s transfer to the Ellis Unit is a matter of public record
and may be viewed at inmate.tdcj.texas.gov/InmateSearch/start.action by searching for “Dennis Hope” or TDCJ number 00579097.
6
An overview of the program is provided in the public record
and
is
available
at
https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/divisions/rpd/citp.html.
7
12
2022, after which he will be assigned to the general population in minimum custody status with continued good
conduct. App. 2a.
RE A SO NS TO D E N Y THE PE T ITI O N
I. The Claims That Form the Basis of Hope’s
Petition Are Moot.
The primary relief Hope seeks in his lawsuit is transfer out of solitary confinement (at 15-16) or, short of that,
“that prison officials actually evaluate whether solitary
confinement is still warranted” (at 36). Both have already
happened. As a result of the review process Hope calls
(at i) a “sham,” Hope has been transferred out of restrictive housing at the Polunsky Unit to the Cognitive Intervention Transition Program at the Ellis Unit. Participants in the program, including Hope, have cellmates, attend classes as a group, and eat communal meals. See supra 11-12. In short, Hope is already out of solitary confinement, and—absent further misconduct on his part—
he is not going to be subject to the challenged review procedure again. Indeed, his complaint alleges he was
wrongfully denied the opportunity to participate in such
a transition program in 2016, see Pet. App. 73a; having
received the very relief he seeks, Hope cannot dispute
that his claims for prospective relief are moot. See, e.g.,
Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1780 (2021).
Because he is no longer housed in solitary confinement, Hope lacks standing to pursue prospective relief.
See id. at 1780; Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111
(1983). And prospective relief is the only relief available
in an official-capacity suit under Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1909). See Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v.
Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011). Hope’s moot claims will
have to be dismissed because federal courts lack jurisdiction to opine on a “dispute solely about the meaning of
13
a law, abstracted from any concrete actual or threatened
harm.” Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 93 (2009); see, e.g.,
Gilday v. Boone, 657 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1981) (claim for
injunctive relief was moot after plaintiff was released
from segregated detention).
To be sure, a defendant who voluntarily terminates
the challenged conduct bears the burden of showing it
“c[annot] reasonably be expected to recur.” Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 222 (2000) (per
curiam). But courts assume the government acts “in
good faith when it changes its policy.” Rosebrock v.
Mathis, 745 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 2014); see 13C
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3533.7 n. 16 (3d ed.). That presumption applies here: TDCJ transferred Hope out of restrictive housing and he will—absent serious misconduct on
his part—be housed in the general population within a
matter of weeks. App. 2a.
To be returned to restrictive housing, Hope would
have to commit a disciplinary violation serious enough
that it would warrant placement in restrictive housing in
the first instance. App. 2a. Even that would not implicate
his claims here, which are premised on the allegation
that he continued to be held in solitary confinement
solely due to his 1994 escape. See Pet. App. 76a. A new
transfer for different reasons would not implicate his
claims. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 201 n.4
(1988) (speculation that defendants could undertake the
same action based on “other events” in the future does
not avoid mootness).
14
II. The Interlocutory Nature of this Case Makes It a
Poor Vehicle to Address Hope’s Remaining
Claims.
A. Although Hope’s Eighth Amendment claims for
monetary damages are not moot, Collins, 141 S. Ct. at
1780, this is neither the proper time nor a good vehicle to
review them. The Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of
those claims and remanded them for further proceedings, see Pet. App. 11a-12a, 24a, and Hope does not invoke these claims in his petition. Indeed, he concedes (at
24) that “thorny questions about qualified immunity”
would complicate this Court’s review of his individual-capacity claims. Because no lower court has yet addressed
these issues, petitioner’s request for monetary damages
is not yet ripe for this Court’s review.
B. Hope’s Eighth Amendment claim against Major
Rehse has been remanded for discovery and trial. This
Court’s “normal practice” is to “den[y] interlocutory review.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 114-15 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Va. Mil. Inst. v. United
States, 508 U.S. 946, 946 (1993) (Scalia, J., respecting the
denial of certiorari) (“We generally await final judgment
in the lower courts before exercising our certiorari jurisdiction.”). Indeed, lack of finality “alone [can] furnish[]
sufficient ground for the denial of the application.” Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251,
258 (1916).
There are good reasons why this Court is “generally
hesitant to grant review of non-final decisions.” Taylor v.
Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 55 (2020) (per curiam) (Alito, J.,
concurring). Litigation is inherently unpredictable, and
later developments may change the character of—or entirely obviate the need to address—the question presented. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Some Thoughts on
15
the Supreme Court’s Workload, 66 JUDICATURE 230,
231-32 (1983). “[A]llowing the case to proceed to its final
disposition below might produce a result that makes it
unnecessary to address an important and difficult constitutional question.” Id. at 231.
Review is often premature even after there has been
factual development for a preliminary injunction. See,
e.g., Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634, 635
(2019) (Alito, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari);
Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct. 857 (2022)
(Mem.) (granting certiorari after summary judgment).
Much more so where (as here) the claims have been remanded at the pleading stage so that factual development can begin in the first place. See Nat’l Football
League v. Ninth Inning, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 56, 56 (2020)
(Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
The Court should adhere to the normal practice in
this case because the Fifth Circuit has remanded the
bulk of Hope’s Eighth Amendment claims for further
proceedings. See Pet. App. 24a. Denial is the usual result
in such a posture. See Abbott v. Veasey, 137 S. Ct. 612,
613 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., respecting the denial of certiorari); Wrotten v. New York, 560 U.S. 959 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., respecting the denial of certiorari); Va. Military Inst., 508 U.S. at 2432 (Scalia, J., respecting the denial of certiorari); Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk,
567 U.S. 944, 944 (2012) (Alito, J., respecting the denial
of certiorari); Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 389 U.S. 327, 32728 (1967) (per curiam).
This is not an “extraordinary case[]” that necessitates departure from this Court’s settled practice. Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice 283 (10th
ed. 2013). Those cases involve situations where “the
16
lower court’s decision is patently incorrect and the interlocutory decision . . . will have immediate consequences
for the petitioner.” Id. (emphasis added) (collecting
cases). That narrow test is met in situations where the
circuit court’s decision implicates a matter that is “effectively unreviewable” if the Court were to wait until final
judgment. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 351-52 (2006)
(addressing related collateral-order doctrine).
This is not such a case: Hope is seeking retrospective
damages for conduct dating back to 2017 along with,
against Major Rehse, prospective relief from his conditions of confinement. There is no suggestion that failure
to address his claims now will materially prejudice his
ability to litigate those claims. As a result, this case is
very different from other instances when this Court has
deemed interlocutory review appropriate—for example,
in cases involving a sovereign’s or public official’s immunity from suit, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 671-72
(2009), class certification, see, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), or where a burdensome
preliminary injunction will cause the petitioner concrete,
irreparable harm during the pendency of the litigation,
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 975-76 (1997) (per
curiam). For this reason too, the petition should be denied.
III. On the Merits, Hope’s Claims Do Not Warrant
Review.
Even if the Court were inclined to look beyond the
mootness of Hope’s claims for prospective relief and the
interlocutory nature of the case, neither of Hope’s remaining claims would warrant this Court’s review. Hope
misstates the Fifth Circuit’s ruling regarding his Eighth
Amendment claim. And his due-process claim presents a
17
fact-bound dispute regarding how to apply well-settled
law to his allegations.
A. Eighth Amendment.
1. Hope’s Eighth Amendment claim is premised on
a question not actually presented in the decision below.
Hope asks for this Court’s review because, he says (at 3),
the Fifth Circuit held that “solitary confinement never
violates the Eighth Amendment.” It held no such thing.
To the contrary, the Fifth Circuit applied the opposite
rule. See Pet. App. 17a-24a.
In analyzing Hope’s Eighth Amendment claim, the
Fifth Circuit acknowledged that “[t]here is a line where
solitary confinement conditions become so severe that its
use is converted from a viable prisoner disciplinary tool
to cruel and unusual punishment.” Pet. App. 18a (quoting
Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1304 (5th Cir. 1974)). And
it concluded Hope has plausibly alleged that Major
Rehse crossed that line, and thereby stated a claim
against Major Rehse that should proceed to discovery.
Pet. App. 20a-24a. It affirmed dismissal of Hope’s official-capacity claims against the other defendants because it concluded Hope had not plausibly alleged they
acted with deliberate indifference, Pet. App. 20a, and not
even Hope argues that conclusion is worthy of certiorari.
In short, Fifth Circuit doctrine already embodies the
rule Hope urges this Court (at 9) to adopt: “solitary confinement can violate the Eighth Amendment, depending
on its length, its impact on a prisoner’s mental and physical health, and its necessity.” Far from a categorical prohibition on Eighth Amendment violations arising from
solitary confinement, Fifth Circuit precedent aligns with
the flexible Eighth Amendment standard Hope urges (at
9). See Pet. App.17a-24a; Fussell v. Vannoy, 584 F. App’x
270, 271-72 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (reversing
18
dismissal of a prisoner’s complaint because it plausibly
alleged that after 25 years the prisoner’s “continued
lockdown is not a matter of reasonable policy judgment,
but is instead deliberate indifference”); Gates, 501 F.2d
at 1304; cf. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. at 53-54 (length of time, necessity, and the possibility of mitigation are all relevant
considerations). There is no reason for this Court to
grant certiorari.
Hope criticizes (at 23-24) the Fifth Circuit’s citation
to Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), because Finney
involved overcrowded conditions in isolation cells, not
solitary confinement. To be sure. But the Fifth Circuit
did not cite the case for its facts; it cited Finney for the
principle it represents. See Pet. App. 17a-19a. In Finney,
this Court observed: “It is perfectly obvious that every
decision to remove a particular inmate from the general
prison population for an indeterminate period could not
be characterized as cruel and unusual.” Finney, 437 U.S.
at 686; see Pet. App. 18a. The case stands for the proposition that the length of time a prisoner spends under the
challenged conditions of confinement is relevant but cannot be “considered in a vacuum.” Finney, 437 U.S. at 685.
That is why the Fifth Circuit cited it, explaining that “under the Eighth Amendment, ‘the length of confinement
cannot be ignored in deciding whether the confinement
meets constitutional standards.’” Pet. App. 19a (quoting
Finney, 437 U.S. at 686) (emphasis added). The court
also cited Finney to explain why “sheer length of . . . confinement” does not state a claim. Pet. App. 17a n.5.
Hope’s factual distinction likewise does not favor this
Court’s review.
At bottom, Hope’s quarrel with the Fifth Circuit goes
to how it applied the flexible Eighth Amendment standard in analyzing his complaint. The Fifth Circuit
19
concluded Hope has not plausibly alleged most of the defendant prison officials—all but Major Rehse—acted
with deliberate indifference to the alleged harmful effects of his conditions of confinement in restrictive housing. Pet. App. 20a. Hope insists (at 12) that he did indeed
sufficiently allege deliberate indifference. That kind of
fact-bound, case-specific disagreement about the pleadings does not call for this Court’s review. See Sup. Ct. R.
10.
2. In any event, Hope has not stated a claim under
the Eighth Amendment because his conditions of confinement are not “totally without penological justification.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (joint
opinion); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 852
(1994); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). As
the Fourth Circuit puts it, “a legitimate penological justification can support prolonged detention of an inmate
in segregated or solitary confinement” even if the conditions “create an objective risk of serious emotional and
psychological harm.” Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 362–
63 (4th Cir. 2019); cf. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,
227 (2005) (the State’s “first obligation must be to ensure
the safety of guards and prison personnel, the public, and
the prisoners themselves.”).
The record contradicts Hope’s premise (at 25) that
“there is no basis for his ongoing solitary confinement.”
Responding to Hope’s administrative grievance, TDCJ
officials explained the reasons the State Classification
Committee continued his placement in restrictive housing: “escape risk, staff assault[] and weapons possession.” ROA.23. In his follow-up grievance, Hope did not
deny that he was an escape risk or that concerns about
staff assault and weapons possession apply to him.
ROA.24. This undisputed evidence forecloses Hope’s
20
Eighth Amendment claim as a matter of law under
Farmer.
B. Due Process
Hope’s due process claim based on alleged defects in
TDCJ’s process for reviewing his continuance in restrictive housing is moot because he is no longer in restrictive
housing and subject to that review. But even if it were
not, this Court’s review would be unwarranted. The Fifth
Circuit applied the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), see Pet. App. 15a, which is
what Hope contends (at 32) should apply. So even under
Hope’s reading, the Fifth Circuit’s decision involves, at
most, “the misapplication of a properly stated rule of
law.” Sup. Ct. R. 10. Certiorari is not warranted on that
basis. Id.
And in any event, Hope’s pleadings do not state a
claim. He alleges in conclusory fashion that hearings
held to review his continued restrictive housing are “a
sham and meaningless.” E.g., Pet. App. 72a. But these
are just the sort of “labels and conclusions” that do not
suffice to state a plausible claim under Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
That Hope was not transferred out of restrictive
housing until this year does not mean TDCJ’s periodic
review processes were “a sham.” Hope characterizes the
review process as a sham because he had not been transferred even though some individual reviewers opined
that he could be. See Pet. App. 71a-73a. But his allegations are, at most, “merely consistent with” wrongdoing,
and that does not state a claim for relief. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 557; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It is equally
likely, taking his allegations as true, that the State Classification Committee ultimately disagreed with the
21
individual reviewers’ assessment and decided in each instance that Hope could not safely be removed from restrictive housing. And the record reflects that the committee’s decision turned on undisputed misconduct by
Hope, as TDCJ explained to Hope. See supra 7-8.
And in any event, contrary to Hope’s suggestion (at
36), this Court has never required prison administrators
to develop new evidence every time they reconsider a
prisoner’s solitary detention. Indeed, this Court has explained that the necessary “review will not necessarily
require that prison officials permit the submission of any
additional evidence or statements.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459
U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983) (emphasis added), overruled on
other grounds Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 479-84
(1995). Nor does clearly established law require reviewing officials to ignore past actions in determining
whether a prisoner needs to remain in restrictive housing. To the contrary, this Court has explained that prison
administrators will review continued solitary confinement based on “facts . . . ascertained when determining
to confine the inmate to restrictive segregation,” along
with “officials’ general knowledge of prison conditions
and tensions, which are singularly unsuited for ‘proof ’ in
any highly structured manner.” Id.
Hope repeatedly escaped from prison to commit
more—and increasingly violent—robberies, then he
bragged about his prowess as an escape artist and vowed
never to stop trying to escape. See supra at 3-7. There is
nothing suspect about prison officials determining restrictive housing remained necessary, even years later.
In this context, this Court’s precedent recognizes that
the State’s interest is “a dominant consideration,” given
the State’s “obligation . . . ensure the safety of guards
22
and prison personnel, the public, and the prisoners themselves.” Austin, 545 U.S. at 227.
C O NC LU SIO N
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas
BRENT WEBSTER
First Assistant Attorney
General
JUDD E. STONE II
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
NATALIE D. THOMPSON
Assistant Solicitor General
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059)
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Judd.Stone@oag.texas.gov
(512) 936-1700
MAY 2022
APPENDIX
AP PE ND IX
DECLARATION OF TIMOTHY R. FITZPATRICK
1. My name is TIMOTHY R. FITZPATRICK. I am
over the age of 21 years, of sound mind, capable of
making this declaration, and have personal knowledge of
the facts stated herein. I am currently employed with the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) as the
Director of Classification and Records and have served
in this capacity since November 15, 2021. I have held a
series of progressively responsible positions including
Correctional Officer, Sergeant, Lieutenant, Captain,
Major, Assistant Warden, Warden and this most recent
position. I have worked for the agency since 2005 and
have over 16 years of experience. As Director of
Classification and Records and the Mail System
Coordinators Panel, I oversee and am responsible for
statewide admissions, intake, time auditing, transfers,
Unit Classification, State Classification and Mailroom
System Coordinators Panel.
2. On February 4, 2022, the State Classification
Committee held a hearing to consider Dennis Wayne
Hope’s (TDCJ #579097) continued classification in
Restrictive Housing. The Committee determined that
Mr. Hope would be removed from Restrictive Housing
and would be transferred to the Cognitive Intervention
Transition Program (CITP) at the Ellis Unit. After
successful completion of this program, Mr. Hope will be
housed in the general population in G2 (minimum)
custody status. The Committee reached this decision
after extensive consideration of all prior criminogenic
history, institutional adjustment, the recommendations
of Polunsky Unit Administration concerning current
2a
behavior, and in consultation with the leadership of
TDCJ. Mr. Hope was transferred to the Ellis Unit on
February 7, 2022.
3. Participants in the Cognitive Intervention
Transition Program at the Ellis Unit attend classes
together each day, eat communal meals, and may
congregate in the common area during their free time.
Most participants, including Mr. Hope, are housed with
a cellmate. In the cellblock where participants are
housed, cell doors are made of bars and the view out each
door looks across a hallway and out a window.
Participants are eligible for regular visitation and may
use the inmate telephone system.
4. Participants in the Cognitive Intervention Transition
Program will be returned to restrictive housing only if
they commit misconduct serious enough to warrant
restrictive housing in the first instance. In contrast,
lesser infractions will affect the participant’s security
classification level within the general population. The
Cognitive Intervention Transition Program lasts four
months. At the conclusion of the program, graduates are
transferred to housing in the general population. Mr.
Hope is scheduled to complete the program on May 26,
2022 and will be assigned to the general population in G2
(minimum) custody status with continued good conduct.
5. Mr. Hope has had no disciplinary events since his
transfer to the Ellis Unit and is actively participating in
the Cognitive Intervention Transition Program.
3a
Pursuant to 27 U.S.C. section 1746, I declare under
penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on May 4, 2022, in Huntsville, Texas.
/s/ Timothy R. Fitzpatrick
Timothy R. Fitzpatrick
Director of Classification and Records
Texas Department of Criminal Justice
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.