Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Alice Guan, Petitioner v. Ellingsworth Residential Community Association, Inc.

39

Petitioner is currently facing of losing their rights to

the reckless and irresponsible courts and judges.

January 24, 2022

Respectfully yours,

Alice Guan or Yue Guan, pro se

#286

11654 Plaza America Drive

Reston, VA 20190

617-304-9279

AliceGuan2021@gmail.com

App. 1

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-12965-AA

In re: ELLINGSWORTH RESIDENTIAL

COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Debtor.

ALICE GUAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ELLINGSWORTH RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY

ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

(Filed Oct. 26, 2021)

Before: WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

This appeal is DISMISSED, sua sponte, for lack of

jurisdiction. Alice Guan, proceeding pro se, initially ap­

pealed to the district court from the bankruptcy court’s

“Case Management Order on Objection to Ms. Guan’s

App. 2

Claims,” entered on September 14, 2020. In that case

management order, the bankruptcy court 1) provided

that Guan could not further amend her proof of claims;

2) directed the debtor to file an objection to Guan’s

amended claims; 3) addressed discovery issues; and 4)

established a schedule for resolving Guan’s claims.

Eventually, the district court dismissed Guan’s appeal

from the case management order for lack of jurisdic­

tion, reasoning that the order was a non-final bank­

ruptcy court order. The district court further declined

to exercise its discretion to the extent Guan requested

interlocutory review of the non-final bankruptcy court

order. Guan now appeals that order here.

Because the case management order did not “com­

pletely resolve all of the issues pertaining to a discrete

claim, including issues as to the proper relief,” we

agree that the case management order is a non-final

bankruptcy court order. See Barben v. Donovan (In re

Donovan), 532 F.3d 1134, 1136-37 (11th Cir. 2008)

(quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we lack juris­

diction to review the district court’s order dismissing

Guan’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 158(d)(1); Mich. State Univ. v. Asbestos Settlement Tr.

(In re Celotex Corp.), 700 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir.

2012) (“Although a district court, at its discretion, may

review interlocutory judgments and orders of a bank­

ruptcy court, a court of appeals has jurisdiction over

only final judgments and orders entered by a district

court. . . sitting in review of a bankruptcy court.” (quo­

tation marks and citations omitted)). Accordingly, we

DISMISS this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

App. 3

All pending motions are DENIED as moot. No mo­

tion for reconsideration may be filed unless it complies

with the timing and other requirements of 11th Cir. R.

27-2 and all other applicable rules.

App. 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

In Re: Ellingsworth Residential

Community Association, Inc.

ALICE GUAN,

Appellant,

v.

Case No:

6:20-cv-1734-WWB

ELLINGSWORTH RESIDENTIAL

COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Appellee.

ORDER ON APPEAL

(Filed Aug. 19, 2021)

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on appeal from

the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle

District of Florida’s Case Management Order on Ob­

jection to Ms. Guan’s Claims (“Case Management

Order,” Doc. 7-153). Appellant filed her Initial Brief

(Doc. 24) on November 23, 2020,1 to which Appellee

filed an Answer Brief (Doc. 33), and Appellant filed a

Reply (Doc. 42). This appeal is now ripe for review.

1 Appellant filed a Motion and a Letter to the Court (Doc. 25)

wherein she requests that this Court accept her Initial Brief as

timely filed on November 23, 2020. Because the Initial Brief is

timely by operation of the rules of procedure governing this case,

the Court need not address Appellant’s request.

App. 5

Appellee, Ellingsworth Residential Community

Association, Inc., is a Florida not-for-profit corporation

that operates a homeowner’s association consisting of

approximately eighty homes in three subdivisions in

Seminole County, Florida. (Doc. 33 at 6). Appellant,

Alice Guan, owns a home within one of the subdivi­

sions and is a member of the homeowner’s association.

(Doc. 24 at 17; Doc. 33 at 6). In February 2016, Appellee

filed a lawsuit against Appellant in state court related

to landscaping alterations she made to her property, to

which Appellant made a counterclaim. (Doc. 24 at 1718). Appellant successfully defended Appellee’s lawsuit

and it was determined by the state court that she is

entitled to recover her reasonable attorney’s fees and

costs in an amount to be determined. {Id. at 19; Doc. 33

at 6).

On March 3,2020, Appellee filed a voluntary bank­

ruptcy petition under Chapter 11, Subchapter V of the

Bankruptcy Code. (Doc. 7-3 at 2). Appellee listed Ap­

pellant as an unsecured creditor with a contingent,

unliquidated, and disputed claim for $500,000.00 aris­

ing out of her attorney’s fees, costs, and counterclaim.

(Doc. 7-4 at 7; Doc. 7-6 at 14). Appellant submitted

proofs of claims, to which Appellee filed an Omnibus

Objection to Allowance of Claims 4-1 and 5-1 Filed

by Alice Guan. (Doc. 7-14 at 1-9; Doc. 7-153 at 1).

Thereafter, Appellant filed a Response in Opposition

to Debtor’s Omnibus Objection, a Supplemental Re­

sponse to the Objection, and amended proofs of claim.

(Doc. 7-40 at 1-22; Doc. 7-153 at 1). As a result, the

Bankruptcy Court issued the Case Management Order

App. 6

setting forth a date for Appellee to respond to Appel­

lant’s amended proofs of claim and setting a trial date

on the amended objections. (Doc. 7-153 at 1-2).

“The district courts of the United States shall have

jurisdiction to hear appeals . . . from final judgments,

orders, and decrees . . . of bankruptcy judges.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 158(a)(1). “[T]o be final, a bankruptcy court order

must completely resolve all of the issues pertaining to

a discrete claim, including issues as to the proper re­

lief.” Barben v. Donovan (In re Donovan), 532 F.3d

1134, 1136-37 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).

“[A]ppeals from nonfinal bankruptcy court orders may

be taken only ‘with leave’ of the district court.” Musselman v. Stanonik (In re Seminole Walls & Ceilings

CorpX 388 B.R. 386, 390 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)).

In its appellate capacity, a district court reviews

legal conclusions of the bankruptcy court de novo and

findings of fact for clear error. Claremont McKenna

Coll. v. Asbestos Settlement Fund (In re Celotex Corp.),

613 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2010). A bankruptcy

court’s evidentiary and discretionary rulings are re­

viewed only for an abuse of discretion. See Curtis v.

Perkins (In re Inti Mgmt. Assocs., LLC)> 781 F.3d 1262,

1265 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curium); Lorenzo v. Wells

Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Lorenzo), 518 B.R. 92, 94 (S.D.

Fla. 2014).

In her Notice of Appeal (Doc. 1), Appellant argues

that the Case Management Order is a final order be­

cause “it determines on a final basis ... in which court

App. 7

Ms. Guan’s claims are to be litigated.” {Id. at 1). In the

alternative, Appellant asks this Court to exercise its

discretion to hear her appeal if the Case Management

Order is determined to be interlocutory in nature. {Id.).

In her Initial Brief, Appellant argues the merits of Ap­

pellee’s objections to her proofs of claim or argues that

the Case Management Order is a disguised ruling on

the merits of her request to lift the automatic stay.

Contrary to Appellant’s arguments, the Case Man­

agement Order did not act as a ruling on the merits of

any pending motion or otherwise “completely resolve

all of the issues pertaining to a discrete claim, includ­

ing issues as to the proper relief” In re Donovan, 532

F.3d at 1136-37. Instead, the Case Management Order

merely set a briefing schedule and a hearing date for

the parties to litigate the merits of their positions, in­

cluding whether the Bankruptcy Court has jurisdic­

tion to consider the merits or if Appellee’s objections

were timely. As such, the Case Management Order is,

unquestionably, not a final order that is appealable as

a matter of right.

To the extent that Appellant asks this Court for

leave to appeal a non-final order, such leave will be de­

nied. “The decision to grant or deny leave to appeal a

bankruptcy court’s interlocutory order is committed to

the district court’s discretion.” Stumpfv. McGee {In re

O’Connor), 258 F.3d 392,399-400 (5th Cir. 2001). in ex­

ercising that discretion, “a district court will look to the

standards which govern interlocutory appeals from the

district court to the court of appeals pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b).” Celotex Corp. u AIU Ins. Co. {In re

App. 8

Celotex Corp.), 187 B.R. 746, 749 (M.D. Fla. 1995). “Un­

der these standards, a court will permit an interlocu­

tory appeal of an order if (1) the order presents a

controlling question of law (2) over which there is sub­

stantial ground for difference of opinion among courts,

and (3) the immediate resolution of the issue would

materially advance the ultimate termination of the lit­

igation ” Id. The party seeking interlocutory review

“bears the burden of persuading the court that excep­

tional circumstances justify a departure from the basic

policy of postponing appellate review until after the

entry of a final judgment.” Flying Cow Ranch HC, LLC

v. McCarthy, No. 19-cv-80230, 2019 WL 1258780, at *3

(S.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2019) (quotation omitted).

As an initial matter, Appellant has failed to com­

ply with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8004,

which requires the party seeking leave to appeal from

an interlocutory order to file a motion seeking such re­

lief and setting forth “the facts necessary to under­

stand the question presented”; “the question itself”;

“the relief sought”; “the reasons why leave to appeal

should be granted”; and “a copy of the interlocutory or­

der or decree and any related opinion or memoran­

dum.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004(a)(2), (b). Appellant's

Notice of Appeal was neither accompanied by a motion

for leave to appeal an interlocutory order nor did it con­

tain all of the information set forth in the Rule. Addi­

tionally, Appellant has not stated any controlling

question of law presented by the Case Management

Order, let alone any substantial difference of opinion

on the issue or why immediate resolution of such issue

App. 9

is necessary. Therefore, Appellant has not met her bur­

den in showing that interlocutory appeal of a schedul­

ing order is warranted in this case.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED

that this appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdic­

tion. All pending motions are DENIED as moot. The

Clerk is directed to terminate all pending motions and

close this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on

August 19, 2021.

/s/ Wendy W. Berger______

WENDY W. BERGER

UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Party

App. 10

ORDERED.

Dated: September 11,2020

/s/ Karen S. Jennemann__________

Karen S. Jennemann

United States Bankruptcy Judge

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

www.flmb.uscourts.gov

In re

)

Ellingsworth Residential

>

Community Association, Inc., '

S'o-btoiSde-KSJ

^ ^ ^

Debtor(s).

CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER ON

OBJECTION TO MS. GUAN’S CLAIMS

(Filed Sep. 14, 2020)

This case came on for hearing on September 10,

2020 for a status conference on the Debtor’s Omnibus

Objection to Allowance of Claims 4-1 and 5-1 filed by

Alice Guan (Doc. No. 55) (“Objection”), Ms. Guan’s Re­

sponse in Opposition to the Objection (Doc. No. 108)

and Ms. Guan’s Supplemental Response to the Ob­

jection (Doc. No. 122). After the Objection, Ms. Guan

amended her claims, which are now Claim 4-3 and

Claim 5-2. After reviewing the pleadings and consider­

ing the position of all parties in interest, it is

ORDERED:

App. 11

1. Ms. Guan shall not further amend her proofs

of claim.

2. Debtor is directed to file an Amended Objec­

tion to address Claim 4-3 and Claim 5-2 by Septem­

ber 18, 2020.

3. Ms. Guan is directed to fully and completely

respond to Debtor’s Interrogatories and Request to

Produce Documents served in July 2020 no later than

October 2, 2020.

4. All discovery shall be completed by January

29 2021.

5. A continued pretrial conference by video is

scheduled for 1:00 p.m. on November 17, 2020, in

Courtroom A, Sixth Floor, 400 West Washington Street,

Orlando, Florida 32801.

6. A trial on the Debtor’s Amended Objection to

Ms. Guan’s claims is scheduled for 9:30 a.m. on Feb­

ruary 25, 2021, at the United States Bankruptcy

Court, Sixth Floor, Courtroom A, 400 West Washington

Street, Orlando, Florida, 32801, unless otherwise or­

dered due to health and safety concerns arising from

the COVID-19 pandemic.

###

The Clerk is directed to serve a copy of this Order on

all interested parties.

App. 12

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-12965-AA

In re: ELLINGSWORTH RESIDENTIAL

COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Debtor.

ALICE GUAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ELLINGSWORTH RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY

ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

(Filed Dec. 8, 2021)

Before: WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

Alice Guan’s motion for reconsideration of our

October 26, 2021 order dismissing this appeal for lack

of jurisdiction is DENIED.

App. 13

CASE NO. 21-12965

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

ALICE GUAN

Appellant

v.

ELLINGSWORTH RESIDENTIAL

COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION INC

Appellee

Motion for Reconsideration of 10/26/2021 Order by

the UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT Regarding the

Appeal of the August 19, 2021 Order of the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION Case No. 6:20-cv-1734

(Hon. Wendy Berger)

(from Bankruptcy Case No.: 6:20-bk-01346-KSJ,

Hon. Karen Jennemann)

Motion for Reconsideration of This

Court’s 10/26/2021 Order to Dismiss Appeal

(Filed Nov. 16, 2021)

Alice Guan, pro se Appellant

4250 Alafaya Trail, #212-163

Oviedo, FL 32765

T: 407-402-8178

App. 14

AliceGuanRopeJumper2020@

gmail.com

AliceGuan2016@gmail.com

AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF

INTERESTED PERSONS (CIP)

Appellant, Alice Guan, certifies that, to the best of

her knowledge, the following persons and entities have

an interest in the outcome of this appeal:

Abualsamid Ahmad

Acero Arlyne A

Ankur Deshmukh P

Ba Yonghong

Balasundaram Babu

Ballou Steven E

Batarseh Issa E

Benitez Felix A

Berger (Hon.) Wendy

Bhagavatheeswaran Sreedhar

Cai Weidong

Carrion Janelle N

Casals Jose L Jr

Castellano Miguel A

Citty Dixie

Coccia Megan

App. 15

Collins Martin

Cui Wei

Da Silva Enio C Soares

Dockham Maria A

ELLINGSWORTH RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY

ASSOCIATION, INC.

Finch Daniel C

Gatten David M

Gilbert Multida

Greenier Alexis K

Guan Alice

Hagan David

Hall Jeffrey B

Hameed Adnan A

Hamilton Louis J

Hansen Alicia

Hopkins Michael V

Iglesias Armando E

Itani Mohamad

Jajoo Ajay

Jennemann (Hon.) Karen

Joshi Mayuresh S

Kersten Rene

App. 16

Kincaid Chip H

Kobus Reinier A

Kroger Lisa

Kullu Hesna M

Lange Erik

LATHAM, LUNA, EDEN & BEAUDINE, LLP

Liu Dapeng

Liu Haiying

Liu Ming

Lu Hsein Yi

Luna Justin M.

Maldonado Idania

Marino Joseph P

Markman Jeremy

Marrero Yvette C

McLaughlin Derek

Miller Steven M

Mogle Vikas T

Morris Christina N

Nguyen Dung Van

Nguyen Ngoc V

Novick Jared E

Overbaugh Susan

App. 17

Panko Michael E

Patel Amit R

Patel Urvish K

Percival Robin K

Ramos Gabriel V

Ran Bing

Ravani Nilay

Shah Krunal J

Shah Purvesh V

Sharma Devanand

Song Haifeng

Spencer Stacey

Sprague Robert

Sun Qiyu

Taylor Christina

Teixeira Eduardo V O

Thomas Anne

Tran Tam

Velasquez Daniel A.

Verstrate Christina

Vicente Jorge F Reyes

Wemert Jennifer C

Wilson Deanna S

App. 18

Wood Kenisha T

Yao Song

Yooseph Shibu

Zdralic Hans

Corporate Disclosure Statement

Appellant is an individual. Appellee is the Debtor and

is a Nongovernmental Corporation as described in the

district court’s order on appeal.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Appellant, Alice Guan, pro se, believes that oral ar­

gument would be beneficial to this Court’s resolution

of the issues presented by this appeal. She accordingly

requests oral argument.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Bdoc# is the Document # in the bankruptcy court

docket. Ddoc# is the Document # in the district court

docket.

Motion for Reconsideration

Appellant Alice Guan, pro se, per 11th Cir. R. 271(a), 11th Cir. R. 27-2, FRAP 27, FRAP 26.1, FRAP

32(a)(5) and 32(a)(6). (11), 11th Cir. R. 28-5, respect­

fully presents this motion with particularity the

grounds for the motion, the relief sought, the legal

App. 19

argument necessary to support it, as stated in the fol­

lowing:

Topic 1: 3 Orders Being Considered — See Exhibits A.

B and C

Topic 2: A Brief Recitation of Prior Actions (see dockets:

6:20-cv-1734. 6:20-bk01346) and Laws

As shown on page 1-7 of the CASE NO. 21-12971’s

Appellant’s Initial Brief, Alice Guan’s new home that

was constructed by Meritage Homes, Florida Inc.

(“Meritage”) had standing water and dead grass and

dead plants for which Meritage and Meritage con­

trolled Appellee suggested Alice Guan install inground sump pumps to continuously pipe the standing

water out, use pebbles instead of grass as ground cover,

use planting box or pots to elevate the plant roots so

they do not rot, etc. Later, after surveyor discovered

Appellant’s house was built 18 inches too low, Appellee

demanded Appellant immediately issue a Florida 558

Construction Defect Demand letter to Meritage by

February 3, 2016, which Appellant complied. Then im­

mediately after Feb. 3,2016, Appellee included this de­

mand letter in the formal mediation negotiation with

the Appellant and insisted Appellant in the mediation

settlement agreement waive all her claims against

Meritage, which Appellant could not agree. Appellee

then terminated their participation of the mediation,

and in March 2016, it knowingly violated the Cove­

nant by serving Appellant a lawsuit to demand land­

scape returned into its original condition (Meritage

paid the fees to fund the Appellee’s 2 of its 6 lawyers in

App. 20

that litigation, return landscape into the original con­

dition will eliminate all the mitigating effort done to

the water issue and will likely void the contract be­

tween Meritage and Alice Guan so Meritage can claim

not liable for the defect).

79 homeowners continued the lawsuit after Appel­

lee was turned over to be controlled by the homeown­

ers. In February 2019, majority of the 79 homeowners

voted and passed a $100K special assessment to be

paid in 7 months to pay Appellee attorneys to continue

the lawsuit. In the summer of 2019, 5th DCA ruled

Appellee violated the Covenant and lost the complaint

case and Appellant is entitled to her fees and cost. 79

homeowners eventually agreed in the state court that

Alice Guan is entitled to her fees and cost thus state

court issued an Agreed Order for fee entitlement and

set a 4-hour final trial to determine the amount of fees

in April 2020. Appellant filed a counterclaim1 which

has been defended by the Appellee’s insurance com­

pany Liberty Mutual2, which will be liable to continue

the defense and pay for damages in the counterclaim.

1 79 homeowners in the summer of 2018 filed a motion in the

state court seeking to bifurcate the trial of the complaint from the

trial of the counterclaim and moved the court to advance the trial

of the complaint ahead of the jury trial of the counterclaim and

stated that whoever wins the complaint case will “determinatively” win each count of the counterclaim. Court granted that

motion.

2 Trial for counterclaim would be set soon and can commence

after the deposition of Alice Guan’s medical doctor Dr. Scott

Farmer is taken. Thus, the total cost to the Appellee in the state

litigation is only the fees to attend a 4-hours final trial.

App. 21

In July 2019, Alice Guan demanded arbitration on

construction defect with Meritage and Meritage hired

Latham, Luna, Eden & Beaudine, LLP (“Luna Firm”).

In December 2019, lawyer Justin Luna from Luna

Firm met with 80 homeowners and stated he can take

$25K as fees to bankrupt the homeowners so that 79

homeowners do not have to pay anything to Appellant.

In Feb. 2020, 79 homeowners voted to pass a $25K

special assessment to pay Luna Firm to bankrupt

themselves. On March 3, 2020, Luna Firm filed the

bankruptcy case 6:20-bk-01346 and as a result of that,

State court litigation was automatically stayed. Alice

Guan was forced to file claims in 6:20-bk-01346 be­

cause if she did not file, she would have lost all her

right to recover any damages from the state litigation,

Ritzen Grp.. Inc, v. Jackson Masonry. LLC. 140 S. Ct.

582, 205 L. Ed. 2d 419 (2020). On 7/14 and 7/15/2020,

Alice Guan filed Bdocl47 and 151, the Motion for Re­

lief from the Automatic Stay as to the Complaints and

Counterclaim, in which, Alice Guan requested the

bankruptcy court not hear and not adjudicate the com­

plaint and the counterclaim but return them back to

the state court where they were originated and liti­

gated for about 4 years. The Motion for Relief from

Stay matter was fully briefed (Bdoc252) by 08/14/2020

and the matter was heard on 08/21/2020 and during

that hearing, bankruptcy court took the matter under

advisement. Then: about 3 weeks later, on 09/14/2020,

bankruptcy court issued an order (BDoc308, “CMO”,

Exhibit C) to set trial date as Feb 25, 2021 to adju­

dicate in the bankruptcy court a purported objection

to Alice Guan’s amended claims and set a discovery

App. 22

deadline (items 3, 4, 6 on page 2 of BDoc308) to adju­

dicate the state court’s complaint and counterclaim.

After Alice Guan filed her original claims, Appellee

objected to Alice Guan’s claim. Alice Guan then

amended her claims (which are the state Complaint

and Counterclaim cases plus additional claims) prior

to CMO. Alice Guan’s Amended Claims rendered Ap­

pellee’s objections moot. At the time when BDoc308

was issued, Appellee did not file any objection to Alice

Guan’s amended claims. Thus, BDoc308 set a trial date

and specified a discovery deadline in complete void of

any controversy, and it ordered to try Alice Guan in a

trial where there was no Plaintiff for the trial.

When Appellee eventually filed an objection to Al­

ice Guan’s Amended Claims, that objection was filed

past the deadline specified by the Rules and proce­

dures, thus that objection was not a valid objection.

Alice Guan appealed CMO. That appeal was fully

briefed on 01/05/2021 by DDoc42 when Alice Guan

filed her Reply Brief, but district court waited more

than 8 months until 08/19/2021 to deem “This appeal

is now ripe for review” (DDoc59 page 1, Exhibit B) and

ruled to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction

(DDoc59 page 5). In the meantime, bankruptcy court

forced Alice Guan to attend a trial on February 25,

2021 and ruled in August 2021 for about $377K fees

for the Complaint and dismissed the Counterclaim,

Alice Guan appealed these orders. Before Alice Guan

could file her Initial Brief in this court in this appeal

App. 23

case, this court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdic­

tion (page 2, Exhibit A).

CMO is not a simple case management order as

stated in Exhibits A, B, C. It is a final order to try Alice

Guan on a firm trial date when there was no and there

is no controversy, when there was no and there is no

plaintiff, and it was an order issued after Alice Guan

has requested the court to return those cases back to

the state court so that state court can finished them

and then send the judgement back to the bankruptcy

court to implement the judgement thus this order of

CMO denied Alice Guan’s such motion for such relief.

If Alice Guan did not appeal the CMO, the bankruptcy

court would have delayed the ruling specifically titled

to deny motion to lift the automatic stay and let the

trial go on thus leaving Alice Guan no remedy to ap­

peal at all.

In the bankruptcy court, Appellee did not disclose

it had $136,000 in 2018 and $236,000 in 2019 as in­

come collected from assessments contributed by 80

homeowners but instead it disclosed only $4 for 2018

and only $418 for 2019. its bank account balance

showed it had enough money to pay all other creditors

(except Appellant) prior to March 3, 2020 but it re­

tained those debts so it can have more than 1 creditor

in order to qualify to file bankruptcy; 79 homeowners

did not want to pay any debt, they bankrupt them­

selves but refuse to disclose their income and assets or

any financial information to the bankruptcy court; Ap­

pellee not only did not close all of the pre-bankruptcy

bank account as required by the bankruptcy law, it also

App. 24

obtained permission from the court to keep up to

$250,000 in a pre-bankruptcy account so US Trustee

Office cannot monitor this account in a bank that is not

approved by the US Trustee; Appellee elected to pro­

ceed its Chapter 11 bankruptcy under a special Sub­

chapter V so Appellant’s rights that would have been

provided under a traditional Chapter 11 case are lost;

it filed a Subchapter V reorganization plan which is not

able to contribute any fund into paying any debt as

stated by the US Trustee in her opposition to the plan:

$0; Appellee filed Objection to Appellant’s original

claims to try to erase all of Appellant’s claims in their

entirety. In this Brief Recitation of Prior Actions, it is

crucial to note that Exhibits A, B, C avoided to present

Motion to Lift Stay and the Actions and the Timings of

the related court decisions. This section continues:

Topic 3: CMO Is an Order Conclusively Denying

Motion to Lift the Automatic Stay and It Violated Al­

ice Guan’s Federally and Constitutionally Protected

Rights

Given the timings and sequences of the above true

events that occurred in the courts, CMO set a trial date

to adjudicate the Complaint and the Counterclaim af­

ter Motion to Lift Automatic Stay has been fully

briefed and heard. Thus, CMO Is an Order Conclu­

sively Denying Motion to Lift the Automatic Stay and

as is shown below, it is a final order and It Violated

Alice Guan’s Rights.

It is crystal clear that if bankruptcy court con­

clusively decide to return the complaint and the

App. 25

counterclaim back to the state court, it would not have

issued CMO to set a trial date and a discovery deadline

for the complaint and the counterclaim. When it issued

CMO to affirmatively, assertively, unconditionally, and

unreservingly set the trial date and the discovery

deadline, that CMO order is also an order affirma­

tively, assertively, unconditionally, unreservingly, and

conclusively denied motion to lift automatic stay.

Topic 4: It Has Been Well-Established That Orders

Denying Motion to Lift the Automatic Stay Is a Final

Order Thus So Are Orders in Exhibits A. B. C

In civil litigation generally, a court’s decision ordi­

narily becomes “final,” for purposes of appeal, only

upon completion of the entire case, that is, when the

decision terminates the action or ends the litigation on

the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but

execute the judgment. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291. Ritzen

Grp.. Inc, v. Jackson Masonry. LLC. 140 S. Ct. 582, 205

L. Ed. 2d 419 (2020).

For purposes of determining “finality” in the con­

text of appeals, the regime in bankruptcy is different

than in civil litigation generally, as a bankruptcy case

embraces an aggregation of individual controversies.

28 U.S.C.A. §§ 158(a), 1291. Ritzen Grp.. Inc, v. Jackson

Masonry. LLC. 140 S. Ct. 582, 205 L. Ed. 2d 419 (2020).

McDow v. Dudley. 662 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2011).

Concept of what is “final” order for purposes of ap­

peal is applied more flexibly in bankruptcy cases;

standard is more liberal, and approach is more prag­

matic. In re Gen. Carriers Corp.. 258 B.R. 181 (B.A.R

App. 26

9th Cir. 2001). Bankruptcy court’s order is “final” and

appealable where it 1) resolves and seriously affects

substantive rights; and 2) finally determines discrete

issue to which it is addressed. In re Gen. Carriers

Corp-. 258 B.R. 181 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001). The usual

judicial unit for analyzing “finality” in ordinary civil

litigation is the case, but in bankruptcy, it is often the

proceeding. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 158(a), 1291. Ritzen Grp..

Inc, v. Jackson Masonry. LLC. 140 S. Ct. 582, 205

L. Ed. 2d 419 (2020). The “appropriate “proceeding” in

this case is the adjudication of the motion for relief

from the automatic stay. Ritzen Grp.. Inc, v. Jackson

Masonry. LLC. 140 S. Ct. 582, 592, 205 L. Ed. 2d 419

(2020).". As a summary: bankruptcy court’s CM() order

denying motion to lift the automatic stay and district

court’s order dismissing the appeal for lack ofjurisdic­

tion and 11th Circuit’s order dismissing the appeal for

lack of jurisdiction all seriously affects Alice Guan’s

substantive rights as outlined below and all these or­

ders finally determined the discrete issue to which it is

addressed thus they are all final orders (see RBG on

Ritzen Grp.. Inc, v. Jackson Masonry. LLC. 140 S. Ct.

582, 592, 205 L. Ed. 2d 419 (2020).

To further clarify this, CMO legally, literally, fac­

tually, effectively affirmatively, assertively, uncondi­

tionally, and unreservingly ended any possibility for

Alice Guan to receive her relief sought in the motion to

lift the automatic stay, and CMO left nothing more for

the bankruptcy court to do in that proceeding, in the

same way “The court’s order” that “ended the stayrelief adjudication and left nothing more for the .. court

App. 27

to do in that proceeding” Ritzen Grp.. Inc, v. Jackson

Masonry. LLC. 140 S. Ct. 582, 592, 205 L. Ed. 2d 419

(2020) thus CMO is a final order.

Similarly, district court’s order3 dismissing the

appeal for lack of jurisdiction is also appealable as

the final order, because district court ruled such and

left nothing more for the district court to do in that

proceeding. Because “In civil litigation generally, a

party may appeal to a Court of Appeals as of right

from final decisions of the district courts. 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 1291. Ritzen Grp.. Inc, v. Jackson Masonry. LLC. 140

S. Ct. 582, 205 L. Ed. 2d 419 (2020), therefore, both

bankruptcy court’s and district court’s orders are fi­

nal orders, 11th Circuit Has Jurisdiction over District

Court’s order, in addition to the bankruptcy court’s or­

der, to review the whole appeal case.

Furthermore, by the time Appellant Alice Guan

appealed the district court’s order on August 25, 2021,

it is after bankruptcy court has issued its order on the

complaint and the counterclaim, thus appeal was filed

after all appealed orders (even if they were not final at

the time of signing, which is not the situation) have

seasoned into finality regardless if those orders were

final when they were issued.

3 District court’s order erred because “The district courts of

the United States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals .. . from

final judgments, orders, and decrees . . . of bankruptcyjudges.” 28

U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). Because CMO is a final order, District court

should not have dismissed the appeal of CMO.

App. 28

Topic 5: CMO Is a Final Order Because It Ordered to

Prosecute Without Cause and Without Objection to

Alice Guan’s Claims and Without Complaint Against

Alice Guan and It Set to Trv Alice Guan for a Pur­

ported Controversy that Did Not and Does Not Exist

Thus It Violated Alice Guan’s Federally Constitution­

ally Protected Rights

Topic 6: CMO Is a Final Order Because It Is an Order

to Set a Trial Date to Trv Alice Guan Without Due Pro­

cess and It Violated Alice Guan’s Federally and Consti­

tutionally Protected Rights

CMO Is a Final Order and CMO Denied Motion to Lift

Automatic Stay and CMO Is Contrary to Those Laws

and CMO Deprived and Denied Alice Guan’s Those

Rights as Further Stated in the Following:

Topic 7: CMO Denied Motion to Lift Automatic Stay

and Denied Ms. Guan Requested Jury Trial

The right to a jury trial is governed by the Seventh

Amendment of the United States Constitution, which

provides, in pertinent part: In Suits at common law,

where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty

dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. The

United States Supreme Court has long recognized

that, as a general rule, monetary relief is legal in na­

ture, and that claims for such relief give rise to a right

to trial by jury. See Feltner u. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 352, 118 S.Ct. 1279, 140

L.Ed.2d 438 (1998). Here, Alice Guan has a Seventh

Amendment right to trial by jury on the counterclaim.

Even if both parties agree to bankruptcy court hear the

Counterclaim which Ms. Guan persistently did not

App. 29

agree, little useful purpose would be served if the Fed­

eral lower courts were to make findings of fact and con­

clusions of law concurrently with a jury trial. In re

Shafer & Miller Indus.. Inc.. 66 B.R. 578, 581-82 (S.D.

Fla. 1986).

Topic 8: CMO Denied Motion to Lift Automatic Stay

and CMO Ordered Bankruptcy Judge Adjudicating

Private Right Matters Which Is Contrary to the Con­

stitution

State case Complaint and Counterclaim arose un­

der state common law and was between two private

parties, also, they did not flow from federal bankruptcy

statutory scheme. Bankruptcy court cannot retain

state case Complaint and Counterclaim because it does

not have the authority from the congress to do so, even

if it feels it is more efficient to do so than the State

Court (which is also not the situation) or the proceed­

ing may have some bearing on a bankruptcy case. Even

if fact shows a given law or procedure is efficient, con­

venient, and useful in facilitating functions of govern­

ment (which is not the situation in this case), standing

alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitu­

tion (U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq. Stern v. Mar­

shall. 564 U.S. 462, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 180 L. Ed. 2d 475

(2011)). CMO is against the inseparable element of the

constitutional system of checks and balances (North­

ern Pipeline, 458 U.S., at 58,102 S.Ct. 2858).

In bankruptcy court, judges adjudicate issues re­

lated to public right, it is the issues between the Debtor

and the United States. Private rights relate to between

App. 30

debtor and creditor. Private rights cases are noncore

proceedings to bankruptcy court. Northern Pipeline Co.

u. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858,

73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982). Furthermore, the fact that Ms.

Guan filed proof of claims in the bankruptcy proceed­

ings did not give the bankruptcy court any authority

to adjudicate her private right claims. Ms. Guan was

forced to file her proof of claims, a state-created right

for her to recover damages from the state case Com­

plaint and Counterclaim did not transform what is es­

sentially a private right into a public right. The clear

mandate of Marathon is that private rights cannot be

adjudicated by Article I judges. In re Shafer & Miller

Indus.. Inc.. 66 B.R. 578, 580 (S.D. Fla. 1986). Stern V.

Marshall, Supreme Court of the United States June 23,

2011 564 U.S. 462 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2595, 2596 180

L. Ed. 2d 475 (2011), GOVERNMENT - Separation of

Powers.

Topic 9: CMO Denied Motion to Lift Automatic Stay

and CMO Denied Adequate Protection

Pursuant to § 362(d), “on request of a party,” the

bankruptcy court may grant relief from the automatic

stay even for “ . . . for cause, including the lack of ade­

quate protection ...” 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). See also

Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court ofPa. v. Allen

L. Feingold (In re Feingold), 730 F.3d 1268,1276 (11th

Cir. 2013). “The whole purpose in providing adequate

protection for a creditor is to insure that the creditor

receives the value for which the creditor bargained

prebankruptcy.” In re TeVoortwis Dairy, LLC, 605 B.R.

833, 839 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2019) (quoting Mhank

App. 31

Dallas, N.A. v. O’Connor (In re O’Connor), 808 F.2d

1393, 1396 (10th Cir. 1987)). Adequate protection may

take the form of cash payments ... 11 U.S.C. § 361. In

re Moore. No. 20-40309-EJC, 2020 WL 5633081, at *6

(Bankr. S.D. Ga. Aug. 27,2020). Debt owed to Ms. Guan

by the debtor are to be paid by special assessment (in

cash) imposed on all equity holders,

Just solely by Debtor’s objection to the entirety of

Ms. Guan’s claim, it makes the single cause to forbit

CMO because here, debtor not only introduced no evi­

dence on the issue of adequate protection, but it also

actually actively pursued to destroy any and all protec­

tion of Ms. Guan’s interest. CMO erred because Ms.

Guan’s claim are sufficiently plausible to allow its

prosecution in state court and her interests is not ade­

quately protected by the debtor. Ms. Guan has rights

to her interest to entitle her fees and cost and damages,

CMO not only remove any protection of Ms. Guan’s in­

terest but also has impermissibly alter those right of

Ms. Guan. See also In re Evans, 786 F.Supp.2d 347, 355

(D.D.C.2011). In re Richards. No. 09-69716-WLH, 2012

WL 2357672, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. June 8, 2012). In

re Moore. No. 20-40309-EJC, 2020 WL 5633081, at *6

(Bankr. S.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2020).

Topic 10: CMO Denied Motion to Lift Automatic Stay

and CMO Ordered Bankruptcy Judge Adjudicate

Complaint and Counterclaim Which are Non-Core

Matters/Proceedings

State case Complaint and Counterclaim are “non­

core” proceedings which are synonymous with those

App. 32

“otherwise related” to the bankruptcy estate; they do

not invoke a substantial right created by the federal

bankruptcy law and is one that could exist outside of

bankruptcy; they may be related to the bankruptcy be­

cause of its potential effect, but under 157(c)(1) it is

“otherwise related” or a non-core proceeding. (quoting

Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 97 (5th

Cir.1987). Conti Natl Bank v. Sanchez (In re Toledo),

170 F.3d 1340,1349 (11th Cir.1999) (interpreting sub­

section (b)(1) and (c)(1) of 28 U.S.C. § 157). CMO is con­

trary to laws because mandatory abstention required

for non-core state law claims related to a bankruptcy

case if an action is commenced, and can be timely ad­

judicated, in a state forum applied to removed proceed­

ings. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1334(c)(2), 1452(b). Mt. McKinley

Ins. Co. v. Coming Inc.. 399 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2005).

RICO, Abuse of Process, Breach of Contract, Negli­

gence, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in

the Counterclaim are indeed independent of bank­

ruptcy code or any other federal law, those proceedings

are not ones which could arise only in the context of a

bankruptcy proceeding, if 79 homeowner equity hold­

ers did not choose to bankrupt, the state case Com­

plaint and Counterclaim actions would have proceeded

in state court with the Complaint to be completed in a

4-hour final trial and Counterclaim in a soon to be con­

ducted Jury Trial, therefore Complaint and Counter­

claim are noncore matters that bankruptcy court

shall not hear them or enter judgement, those are

matters shall be returned to state court where their

litigation record has been longstanding. See Key Bank,

U.S.A. v. First Union Natl Bank, 234 B.R. 827, 832

App. 33

(M.D.Fla.1999) (recognizing that suits based on Fla.

Stat. ch. 673 and 674 are state created rights, and

therefore, not core proceedings); CMO setting for trial

has erred. Marill Alarm Systems, Inc., v. Equity Fund­

ing Corporation (In re Marill Alarm Systems, Inc.), 81

B.R. 119, 122-123 (S.D.Fla.1987), aff’d without op.,

861 F.2d 725 (11th Cir.1988); First Florida Building

Corp. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau (In re Shafer &

Miller Indus., Inc.), 66 B.R. 578, 580 (S.D.Fla.1986);

Naturally Beautiful Nails, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

(In re Naturally Beautiful Nails, Inc.), 252 B.R. 574

(Bankr.M.D.Fla.2000); Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825

F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir.1987); Control Ctr.. L.L.C. v. Lauer.

288 B.R. 269, 275-77 (M.D. Fla. 2002).

Topic 11: CMO Denied Motion to Lift Automatic Stay

and CMO Ordered a Trial While Alice Guan Did Not

Consent to the Bankruptcy Court’s Resolution of the

State Case Complaint and Counterclaim

State case Complaint and Counterclaim are

clearly none core proceedings, in which there is no use

for the bankruptcy court to hear the cases because it

may not enter final judgments without the consent of

the parties. In re Shafer & Miller Indus.. Inc.. 66 B.R.

578, 579 (S.D. Fla. 1986). Alice Guan never give con­

sent.

Topic 12: CMO Denied Motion to Lift Automatic Stay

and CMO Rewarded Appellee’s Bad Faith Conduct to

Benefit from the Automatic Stay

CMO erred because Petition filed in bad faith

justifies relief from stay and warrant court abstain.

App. 34

Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(d)(1). In re Dixie

Broad.. Inc.. 871 F.2d 1023 (11th Cir. 1989) - as shown

above, debtor acted in “bad faith” prefiling and in fil­

ing and during the Chapter 11 Subchapter V petition.

Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 201, 28 U.S.C.A. In re Steelev. 243

B.R. 421 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999). Bad faith on equity

holders debtor justify lifting automatic stay and justify

court abstain to clear way for continuation of state

court litigation. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(d)(1). In

re Dixie Broad.. Inc.. 871 F.2d 1023 (11th Cir. 1989).

Bankr.Code,ll U.S.C.A. § 362(d)(1). In re Steelev. 243

B.R. 421 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999). Natural Land, 825

F.2d at 298. In re Waldron, 785 F.2d 936, 939 (11th

Cir.), cert, dismissed sub nom. Waldron v. Shell Oil Co.,

478 U.S. 1028, 106 S.Ct. 3343, 92 L.Ed.2d 763 (1986);

Holtkamp, 669 F.2d at 508; Waldron, 785 F.2d at 93941. See also Furness v. Lilienfield, 35 B.R. 1006

(D.Md.1983), In re Wally Findlay Galleries (New York),

Inc., 36 B.R. 849 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1984); In re Smith, 58

B.R. 448 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1986). In re Dixie Broad.. Inc..

871 F.2d 1023, 1026-27 (11th Cir. 1989). In re Fielder,

799 F.2d 656 (11th Cir.1986).

Furthermore, any objection of Ms. Guan’s claim is

moot because: 1). Debtor did not file a timely objection

to Ms. Guan’s amended claims, 2). Debtor itself agreed

in the state court to Ms. Guan’s entitlement of fees and

cost and it also listed approximately the same amount

as well as the same two litigation cases on its debtor

schedule; 3) Debtor also conceded and promoted the po­

sition that whoever wins the complaint also wins the

counterclaim. See also In re Kirkland, 379 B.R. 341, 59

App. 35

Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1991 (B.A.P. 10th Cir.

2007), judgment rev’d, 2009 WL 2021158 (10th Cir.

2009). Thus CMO erred.

Topic 13: CMO Is Against $ 1334(c)(2) and Other Laws

because federal court shall abstain from hearing such

proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be

timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate -ju­

risdiction. 28 U-S-C. § 1334(c)(2) (West Supp.1996) Accordingly, under this statute, courts must abstain

from hearing a state law claim if: (1) The claim has no

independent basis for federal jurisdiction, other than

§ 1334(b): (2) the claim is a non-core proceeding, i.e.. it

is related to a case under title 11 but does not arise

under or in a case under title 11: (3) an action has been

commenced in state court: and (4) the action could be

adjudicated timely in state court. See Gober v. Terra +

Com. (In re Gober). 100 F,3d 1195. 1206 (5th Cir.1996):

28 U.S.C.1334(c)(2). 157(b)(1). Matter of Rupp & Bow­

man Co.. 109 F.3d 237. 239 (5th Cir. 1997). State case

Complaint and Counterclaim meet all these 4 criteria

- Also, under the “first-filed rule.” when parties have

instituted competing or parallel litigation in separate

courts, the court initially seized of the controversy

should hear the case in the absence of compelling cir­

cumstances. Sini v. Citibank. N.A.. 990 F. Supp. 2d

1370 (S.D. Fla. 2014)

Topic 14: CMO Prevented State Court Adjudicating in

Year 2020 and 2021 the Complaint and Counterclaim

thus in so far it created inconsistency with the require­

ments of “mandatory abstention is required” (Mt. Mc­

Kinley Ins. Co. v. Corning Inc.. 399 F.3d 436. 450 (2d

Cir. 2005))

App. 36

Topic 15: CMO Went Against Bankruptcy Law’s Spirit

and Increased Cost to the Debtor Because in State

Court Litigation Appellee’s Cost Is Only for a 4-hour

Final Trial However litigating in federal court require

Debtor incur fees and cost Which Impacting Appellee’s

Final Ability to Pav Debts to Alice Guan

Topic 16: CMO Erred Because Bankruptcy Court Does

Not Have the Authority and Jurisdiction to Adjudicate

the State Case Complaint and Counterclaim Thus the

Bankruptcy Court Is Not Authorized to Issue Such

CMO

Topic 17: As Stated Above, facts and litigation history

explained in Exhibits A. B. C are not supported by the

Records

Topic 18: DDoc 1 and Documents in District Dockets

Adequately Pled for Leave If District Court Insists on

Bankruptcy Court Order Is Not Final In Whole or In

Part

Notice of Appeal (DDoc. 1) specified that the order

on appeal is a final order that is appealable as a matter

of right, and in the event if district court insists that it

is not a final order in whole or in part (which insistence

would be in error to begin with), then appeal should

still be heard and reviewed. A review of the docket eas­

ily reveals that District court has been fully informed

of the controlling question of law presented by the

CMO, the substantial difference of opinion on the issue

and the reasons that immediate resolution of such is­

sue is necessary. Record on appeal in the district court

have met the requirements outlined in Federal Rule of

Bankruptcy Procedure 8004 such that the district

App. 37

court has been well informed of the order on appeal,

the questions, the facts necessary to understand the

question presented, the relief sought, and the im­

portance why district court should review the appeal

and vacate the order below, if district court insists on

the order on appeal to the district court is not a final

order. Even if order on appeal to the district court is an

interlocutory order (which is not the situation), Alice

Guan has demonstrated to the district court that there

has never been a valid objection to her amended claims

thus there was no basis for the bankruptcy court to set

for trial on non-existing controversies, and even if

there was a controversy (which there was none) bank­

ruptcy court setting a trial to resolve the controversy

is contrary to federal laws and constitutional laws as

well as the laws established in the state and federal

circuits, thus the review of the appeal is a review of

“exceptional circumstances” that “ justify a departure

from the basic policy of postponing appellate review

until after the entry of a final judgment.” Flying Cow

Ranch HC, LLC v. McCarthy, No. 19-cv-80230,2019 WL

1258780, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2019) (quotation

omitted). Celotex Corp. v. AIU Ins. Co. (In re Celotex

Corp.), 187 B.R. 746, 749 (M.D. Fla. 1995).

District court thus has abused its discretion by

denying leave to appeal bankruptcy court such order

that district court itself deemed as interlocutory.

Stumpf v. McGee (In re O’Connor), 258 F.3d 392, 399400 (5th Cir. 2001).

App. 38

CONCLUSION AND PRAY

Exhibits A, B, C are contrary to the aforemen­

tioned laws and have deprived Alice Guan’s abovementioned rights and her rights protected by U.S.

Const, amend. XIV, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), U.S. Const, art.

Ill and they erred in the same manner as CMO itself

as stated above, by dismissing the appeal and not allow

appeal to go on. Alice Guan prays this court vacate this

court’s 10/26/2021 order and permit Alice Guan pro­

ceed with her appeal in this case in this court; or as an

alternative, Alice Guan prays this court vacate its

10/26/2021 order and merge this case with case 2113213.

November 16, 2021, respectfully submitted by,

/s/ Alice Guan

Alice Guan, pro se

4250 Alafaya Trail, #212-163

Oviedo, FL 32765

T: 407-402-8178

AliceGuanRopeJumper2020

@gm ail.com

AliceGuan2016(&gm ail.com

App. 39

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The undersigned hereby certifies that this motion

(pages 1-20) complies with the type-volume limitation

of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure. It is 20 pages

and employed font 14 of Times New Roman with 5200

words and 433 lines.

Respectfully Yours,

Is/ Alice Guan

Alice Guan, pro se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on November 16,2021, a true

and accurate copy of the foregoing has been served via

Emails and mail postage paid to:

Counsels to Ellingsworth Residential Community,

Inc., Justin M. Luna, Esquire, et. al. at Latham, Luna,

Eden & Beaudine, LLP, Post Office Box 3353, Orlando,

FL 32802-3353, via emails to: jluna@lathamluna.com.

dvelasquez@lathamluna.com.

lvanderweide@lathamluna.com.

wthomas@lathamluna.com.

ctavlor@lathamluna. com

Per direction of Ellingsworth Residential Community,

Inc., c/o Community Management Specialists and per

directions of Mr. Justin Luna, this document was NOT

emailed to:

App. 40

Ellingsworth Residential Community, Inc., c/o Com­

munity Management Specialists, 71 S. Central Ave.,

Oviedo, FL 32765 to Kevin Davis, Manager for the

Debtor and general email box via email address at

Kevin@cmsorlando.com, and also to: info@cmsorlando.com.

Per direction of L. Todd Budgen, this document was

NOT emailed to:

L. Todd Budgen, Subchapter V Trustee, P.O. Box

520546, Longwood, FL 32752, via email at:

Todd@C 1 ITrustee. com

Per direction of The U.S. Trustee, c/o Audrey M.

Aleskovsky, this document was NOT emailed to:

The U.S. Trustee, c/o Audrey M. Aleskovsky, 400 W.

Washington Street, Suite 1100, Orlando, Florida 32801,

vis email at: audrev.m.aleskovskv@usdoi.gov.

Note: all parties entitled to receive electronic noticing

via CM/ECF will receive those documents when these

documents are dockets by the court.

November 16, 2021

Respectfully Yours,

/s/ Alice Guan

Alice Guan, pro se