Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Annick Roy, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Jean-Guy Veilleux, Deceased, et al., Petitioners v. Canadian Pacific Railway Company

No. 21-____

In the Supreme Court of the United States

ANNICK ROY, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY CO.,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TED A. MEYERS

PETER J. FLOWERS

CRAIG D. BROWN

MEYERS & FLOWERS LLC

3 N. 2nd Street

St. Charles, IL 60174

(603) 232-6333

MITCHELL A. TOUPS

WELLER, GREEN, TOUPS

& TERRELL, LLP

P.O. Box 350

Beaumont, TX 77704

(409) 838-0101

January 24, 2022

MATTHEW W.H. WESSLER

Counsel of Record

GREGORY A. BECK

GUPTA WESSLER, PLLC

2001 K Street, NW

Suite 850 North

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 888-1741

matt@guptawessler.com

JASON C. WEBSTER

THE WEBSTER LAW FIRM

6200 Savoy, Suite 515

Houston, TX 77036

(713) 581-3900

Counsel for Petitioners

-iQUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure govern

procedure in “cases under title 11 of the United States

Code.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1001. Does the term “cases under

title 11” extend to cases in district court that are merely

“related to a case under title 11,” such that the bankruptcy

rules govern in all civil cases that could conceivably affect

a bankruptcy?

2. The bankruptcy rules provide that, to toll the

fourteen-day period in which to appeal the judgment “of a

bankruptcy court,” a motion to reconsider the judgment

under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9023 must

be filed “in the bankruptcy court” within fourteen days.

Assuming the bankruptcy rules apply in district court, do

the rules likewise require a motion to reconsider a district

court’s judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

59(e) to be filed within 14 days?

-iiLIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The following petitioners were plaintiffs in the district

court and appellants in the court of appeals: Annick Roy,

as special administrator of the estate of Jean-Guy Veilleux,

deceased; individually and as next friend of minor, F.R.V.;

Samuel Audet; Beland Audet; Emanuel Baillargeon;

Sandra Baillargeon; Jean Boyle Barrett Beaudoin; Gabriel

Beaudoin; Jocelyn Beaudoin; Raymond Beaudoin; Yves

Bernier; Gerard Bolduc; Marie Claude Bouchard; Michel

Bouchard; Suzie Bouchard; Pierrette Boucher Lafontaine;

Rouville Boucher; Michel Boulanger; Daniel Boule; Pierre

Boulet; Pierrette Boulet; Helene Bourgeois; Ghislain

Champagne; Line Champagne; Denis Charest; Pascal

Charest; Daniel Charrier; Sylvain Cote; Annette Doyon;

Denise Dubois; Martial Dupiuis; Serge Faucher; Yves

Faucher; Lea Favreau; France Fortier; Yannick Gagne;

Daniel Gendron; Melanie Gerhard; Gravure Megantic;

Mario Grimard; Group Exca Inc.; Nancy Guay; Eric

Joubert; Jeannot Labrecque; Danielle Lachance; Lucille

Lachance; Pierrette Lachance; Sylvie Lacroix; Angelique

Lafontaine; Anna Lafontaine; Christian Lafontaine;

Clement Lafontaine; Exca Lafontaine; Jonathan

Lafontaine; Josie Lafontaine; Lisa Lafontaine; Luc

Lafontaine; Marilou Lafontaine; Rosemary Lafontaine;

Louise Lajeunesse; Guillaume Lapierre; Henriette

Latulippe; Marcel Lavoie; Mayla; Marche Valiquette Ltee;

Josee Morin; Clement Pepin; Yannick Pepin; France

Picard; Louisette Picard; Mathieu Picard; Claude Plante;

Manon Rodrigue; Doris Roy; Garage Jean Roy; Jean-Guy

Roy; Ginette Roy; Julie Roy; Services Esthtiques Malya;

Bernard St-Hilaire; Billy Turcotte; Celine Turcotte; Marc

Vachon; Louise Valiquette; Philippe Valiquette; Rene

Boutin; Sophie Boutin; Roxanne Boutin; Caroline

Tremblay, individually and as representative of the estate

-iiiof Guy Bolduc, Deceased; As Next Friend Of S.B., a minor;

And As Next Friend Of A-C.B., a minor; Jacques Bolduc;

Solange Gaudreault; Mario Bolduc; Cynthia Boule,

individually and as representative of the estate of sylvie

charron, deceased; and as next friend of A.B., a minor;

Jean-Guy Boule; Therese Pouliot, individually and as

representative of the estate of real custeau, deceased;

Simon Custeau, individually and as next friend of J.C., a

minor; Sonia Pepin; Richard Custeau; Sylvie Custeau,

individually and as representative of the estate of Suzanne

Custeau, deceased; Michael Custeau; Karine Lafontaine;

Rejean Custeau; Claude Turmel; Kathleen Bedard; Kim

Turmel, individually and as next friend of A.L., a minor; as

next friend of M.L., a minor; as next friend of L-A.N., a

minor and as next friend of E.N., a minor; Josee Bolduc;

Vincent Nadeau; Guylaine St-Laurent, as representative

of the estate of Natachat Gaudreau, deceased; Joanie

Turmel; Chantal Gaudreau; Francois Poulin, individually

and as representative of the estate of Lucie Vadnais,

deceased; Estel Blanchet; Sylvie Vadnais; Pauline

Theberge; Elisabeth Vadnais; Diane Giroux Rodrigue, as

representative of the estate of Jacques Giroux, Deceased;

Marie-Eve Poulin; Andre Giroux; Serge Morin,

individually and as co-representative of the estate of Kaven

Morin, deceased; Raymond Lapointe; Nancy Ducharme,

individually and as co-representative of the estate of Kaven

Morin, deceased; Joannie Lapointe; Kathleen Morin; Lucie

Boutin; Michael Vallerand; Genevieve Breton; Ginette

Dostie; Taxi Megantic Enr; Fiducie Familiale Francois

Jacques, individually and on behalf of the estate of

Dominik Leblanc; Societe De Gestion Jean-Pierre Jacques

Inc.; Dube Equipment De Bureau Inc.; 9020-1468 Quebec

Inc.; Via Beaute Sante Enr; Bolduc Chaussures Lte;

Clinique Dentaire Marie-Pier Dube Inc.; Michel Charland;

-ivSociete En Commandite Projet Shier; Jean Vadnais;

Isabelle Beaudry; Clermont Pepin, as special

administrator of the estate of Eric Pepin-Lajeunesse,

deceased; Pascal Lafontaine, as special administrator of

the estate of Karine Lafontaine, deceased; Louise Couture;

Mario Sevigny; Marc-Antoine Sevigny; Louise Breton;

Ginette Cameron; Manon Bolduc; Sandy Bedard, as

special administrator of the estate of Michel Guertin, Jr.;

Herbert Ratsch, as special administrator of the estate of

Willfried Heinz Ratsch, deceased; Genevieve Dube;

Michelle Gaboury, as special administrator of the estate of

kevin roy, deceased; Gaston Begnoche, as special

administrator of the estate of Talitha Coumi Begnoche,

deceased; Dave Lapierre; Marie-Eve Lapierre; Lisette

Bolduc; Steve Bolduc; Maude Faucher; Karine Paquet;

Guy Paquet, as special administrators of the estate of

Roger Paquet, deceased; Jacques Martin; Solange

Belanger, as special administrator of the estate of Jimmy

Sirois, deceased; Guy Boulet; Elise Dubois-Couture, as

special administrator of the estate of David LacroixBeaudoin, deceased; Lily Rodrigue; Rejean Roy, as special

administrator of the estate of Mlissa Roy, deceased; Alexia

Dumas-Chaput, as special administrator of the estate of

Mathieu Pelletier, deceased; Theresa Poulan Dubois, as

special administrator of the estate of Denise Dubois,

deceased; Christiane Mercier, as special administrator of

the estate of Marianne Poulin, deceased; Robert Picard;

Justine Lapointe; Eric Bilodeau, as special administrator

of the estate of Karine Champagne, deceased; Micheline

Veilleux; Richard Turcotte, as special administrator of the

estate of Elodie Turcotte, deceased; Marie-Josee Grimard,

as special administrator of the estate of Henriette

Latulippe, deceased; Alaine Bizier, individually and as

representative of the estate of Diane Bizier, deceased;

-vSteve Roy, individually and on the behalf of minor Y.R.;

Isabelle Boulanger, individually and as representative of

the estate of Frederic Boutin, deceased; Colette Lacroix

Boulet; Joanne Proteau, as special administrator of the

estate of Maxime Dubois, deceased; Gabrielle Lapointe;

Helen Lynn Barrett Beaudoin; Malya; Pierre Picard; and

Boutique De La Gare Inc.

The following parties were plaintiffs in the district

court: Maurice Gagne; Jacques Grenier; Bar Laitier; Josee

Lajeunesse; Lambrequin; Lisa Fleury Larange; Logi-Bel;

Marche Metro; Andre Martin; Melissa Robert,

individually and as next friend of Elyka Richard and

Megane Richard; Musi-Cafe; Nettoyeur Moderne Senc;

Melanie Poirer; Poulet Frit Ideal; Patrick Rodrigue; Jean

Tanguay; The Heritage Building; Jean-Yves Fortin; Eric

Lavallee; Annie-Julie Blais; Jacques Dube; Gerald

Rodrigue; Claudette Rodrigue; Julie Hamel, individually

and as next friend of Nathan Fouquet; Frederic Fouquet;

Lorraine Beaudoin-Langlois; 9219-0610 Quebec Inc, d/b/a

Ariko Restorant & Bar; Mirko Couture; Jean-Francois

Drouin; Marie-Claude Pepin-Verdo; Sylvain Rancourt;

Clemente Rancourt; Nicole Lapierre; Antoine Leclerc;

Claude Charron; Pharmaciens Inc.; Variete Claude

Charron Inc; Variete Claude Charron; Centre Funeraire

Jacques Et Fils Inc.; Jean-Pierre Jacques; Francois

Jacques; Carol Begin; Jean Dube; Andre Fluet Dube;

Pascal Halle; Angele Godbout; Denise Poulin; Denis

Bolduc; Marie-Pier Dube, individually and as next friend

of L.C., a minor, and as next friend of X.C., a minor;

Jacques Laprise; Steven Halle; Gesner Blenkhorn; Andre

Valiquette; Pascale Lacroix; Gordon Beaudoin; and Force

Action Nutrition.

-viRespondent Canadian Pacific Railway Company was a

defendant in the district court and appellee in the court of

appeals.

The following parties were also defendants in the

district court: Soo Line Railroad Company, d/b/a Canadian

Pacific Railway; Delaware And Hudson Railroad Company

Inc., d/b/a Canadian Pacific Railway; Dakota Minnesota

and Eastern Railroad Corporation, d/b/a Canadian Pacific

Railway; and Canadian Pacific Railway Limited.

-viiRELATED PROCEEDINGS

This case arises from the following proceedings:

In re: Lac Megantic Train Derailment Litig., No.

16- 1001 (D. Maine Sept. 28, 2016)

In re Lac-Megantic Train Derailment Litig., 999

F.3d 72 (1st Cir. June 2, 2021)

There are no other proceedings in state or federal trial

or appellate courts, or in this Court, directly related to this

case within the meaning of this Court’s Rule 14.1(b)(iii).

-viiiTABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions presented ................................................................ i

List of parties to the proceeding .......................................... ii

Related proceedings ............................................................. vii

Table of authorities ............................................................... xi

Introduction ............................................................................ 1

Opinions below ........................................................................ 5

Jurisdiction .............................................................................. 5

Statutory provisions and rules involved .............................. 5

Statement ................................................................................ 7

Reasons for granting the petition ...................................... 12

I.

This case cleanly presents a circuit split on the

meaning of a key term of art in the

Bankruptcy Code, with far-reaching and

recurring consequences. .............................................. 12

A. The First Circuit’s reading of “cases under

title 11” exacerbates an existing circuit

split on the phrase’s scope .................................... 12

B. The First Circuit’s holding risks

significant confusion and unpredictable

harm to one of the nation’s most important

and complex statutory schemes ........................... 17

-ixC. The First Circuit’s policy rationale is no

reason to set aside the text’s established

meaning ................................................................... 22

II. This case presents a second circuit split on the

bankruptcy rules’ applicability to appeals from

a district court to a court of appeals ........................... 25

Conclusion ............................................................................. 27

-xAppendix A Opinion of the United States Court

of Appeals for the First Circuit

(May 2, 2021) ...................................... App. 1a

Appendix B Order of the United States District

Court for the District of Maine

(September 28, 2016) ...................... App. 21a

Appendix C Judgment of the United States District

Court for the District of Maine

(September 28, 2016) ...................... App. 28a

Appendix D Order of the United States District

Court for the District of Maine

(January 9, 2017) ............................. App. 29a

Appendix E Order denying petition for

rehearing and rehearing en banc

by the United States Court of

Appeals for the First Circuit

(September 8, 2021) ........................ App. 30a

-xiTABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,

486 U.S. 196 (1988) ................................................... 19

Christo v. Padgett,

223 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2000) .......................... 12, 13

Diamond Mortgage Corp. of Illinois v. Sugar,

913 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1990) ............................ 11, 14

English-Speaking Union v. Johnson,

353 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ...................... 4, 25, 26

Hall v. United States,

566 U.S. 506 (2012) ......................................... 3, 20, 21

Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. v.

Union Planters Bank, N.A.,

530 U.S. 1 (2000) ....................................................... 25

In re Bli Farms, Partnership,

465 F.3d 654 (6th Cir. 2006) ................................ 4, 25

In re Boston Regional Medical Center, Inc.,

410 F.3d 100 (1st Cir. 2005) ..................................... 17

In re Brady, Texas, Municipal Gas Corp.,

936 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1991) .................................... 13

In re Butler, Inc.,

2 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 1993) .................................... 4, 25

-xiiIn re Caldor Corp.,

303 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2002) .......................... 12, 13, 21

In re Canion,

196 F.3d 579 (5th Cir. 1999) .................................... 18

In re Cassidy Land & Cattle Co., Inc.,

836 F.2d 1130 (8th Cir. 1988) .................................. 13

In re Celotex Corp.,

124 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 1997) .............................. 11, 14

In re Eastport Associates,

935 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1991) .................................. 22

In re G.S.F. Corp.,

938 F.2d 1467 (1st Cir. 1991) ................................... 17

In re Middlesex Power Equipment & Marine, Inc.,

292 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2002) ....................................... 13

In re Seven Fields Development Corp.,

505 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2007) ........................................ 2

In re Wolverine Radio Co.,

930 F.2d 1132 (6th Cir. 1991) ............................ 12, 13

In re Wood,

825 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1987) .................... 12, 13, 20, 22

Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Coopers Lybrand,

22 F.3d 1228 (3d Cir. 1994) .......................... 10, 11, 14

Securities & Exchange Commission v. Smyth,

420 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2005) ................................ 18

-xiiiStern v. Marshall,

564 U.S. 462 (2011) ....................................... 20, 22, 23

United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises,

489 U.S. 235 (1989) ................................................... 25

Wallace v. Robinson,

914 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1990) .................................... 18

Statutes

11 U.S.C. § 101 ................................................................ 12, 21

11 U.S.C. § 541 ...................................................................... 21

18 U.S.C. § 152 .................................................................. 4, 21

28 U.S.C. § 157 ............................................................. passim

28 U.S.C. § 1334 ........................................................... passim

28 U.S.C. § 2075 ...................................................... 1, 5, 12, 15

Other Authorities

Collier on Bankruptcy (16th ed. 2010) ............................... 18

Rules

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 6 ....................... 26, 27

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1001 ....... 2, 5, 9, 12

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1002 ................... 12

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004 ................... 19

-xivFederal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012 ................... 19

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056 ................... 19

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8001 ................... 26

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8002 ................... 26

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9015 ................... 19

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9023 ........... 4, 6, 27

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 ........................................ 6

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 .................................... 18

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 .................................... 19

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 .................................... 19

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81 ...................................... 7

-1INTRODUCTION

Fairness demands that procedural rules, especially

jurisdictional ones, be knowable in advance. At the very

least, it must be clear to everyone which body of rules will

govern a case. Confusion on that score is intolerable.

In this case, the district court and the parties all

understood the ordinary rules of civil procedure to apply.

Yet the First Circuit held, for the first time on appeal, that

the plaintiffs’ state-law wrongful-death claims were governed in the district court by the federal bankruptcy rules.

Although this is not a bankruptcy case, it was “related to”

one because the outcome could have affected an insurance

policy held by a debtor in a different case. On that basis,

the First Circuit retroactively applied the Federal Rules

of Bankruptcy Procedure to the plaintiffs’ district-court

filings and concluded that the plaintiffs’ post-judgment

motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e)—though it

would have been timely filed under that rule—was late

under the shorter deadline that the bankruptcy rules

provided. The result was a “domino effect,” App. 3a, that

rendered the plaintiffs’ appeal untimely, deprived the

court of appellate jurisdiction, and ended the plaintiffs’

case.

The First Circuit justified that surprising outcome as

necessary to avoid a circuit split on the applicability of the

bankruptcy rules in district court and to “facilitate[] the

efficient disposition” of bankruptcy claims. App. 15a. But

in doing so, the court exacerbated existing confusion on

the meaning of a key statutory phrase and created a split

much more serious than the one it sought to avoid.

The Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of

Bankruptcy Procedure provide that the bankruptcy rules

govern only in “cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 2075;

-2Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1001. A majority of circuits have held

that the phrase “cases under title 11,” as used in the

Bankruptcy Code, is a term of art that “refers merely to

the bankruptcy petition itself.” In re Seven Fields Dev.

Corp., 505 F.3d 237, 250 (3d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks

omitted). Even the First Circuit has, in the past,

recognized that well-established meaning.

But in extending the bankruptcy rules to this case, the

First Circuit diverged from that authority, and from its

own precedent, by holding that the statutory phrase

“should be read more broadly.” App. 13a. “Cases under

title 11,” the court held, also include any proceedings

subject to federal bankruptcy jurisdiction because they

are “related to a case under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)

(emphasis added); see App. 20a. “‘Related to jurisdiction,”

it wrote, “is designed to … facilitate[] the efficient

disposition of claims.” App. 15a (cleaned up). And it

reasoned that applying “the same set of procedural rules

in all proceedings having a nexus to a bankruptcy case” is

“the best way to effectuate this goal.” Id. In so holding, the

court followed decisions of three other circuits that

employed the same policy-based rationale in extending

the bankruptcy rules to proceedings “related to” a

bankruptcy.

The First Circuit’s decision to link the choice of rules

to the existence of “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction

subjects parties to procedural rules that are unpredictable

and subject to unexpected change. The question whether

a case falls under a district court’s “related to” jurisdiction

is a notoriously difficult and frequently contested issue, to

which the right answer is often far from clear. Indeed, by

far the largest number of reported cases on questions of

bankruptcy jurisdiction are about whether a proceeding is

-3“related to” a case under title 11. Because district courts

do not have the final word on those questions, parties and

judges under the First Circuit’s rule may not learn with

certainty which set of rules govern a case until it is decided

on appeal—when it’s already too late. That risks pulling

the rug out from under district judges who have already

taken a case through final judgment under an entirely

wrong set of rules. It creates numerous traps for counsel

and parties who risk permanently losing their claims, as

the plaintiffs did here, by inadvertently misapplying a rule

with jurisdictional consequences. And it invites abuse,

creating an incentive, for example, to sandbag an opposing

party by arguing for different rules only after it is too late

to comply with them.

The First Circuit reached that result rashly, by

redefining “cases under title 11”—one of the most

important and frequently recurring phrases in the

Bankruptcy Code that itself serves to define other core

concepts like the “debtor” and the “estate.” This Court has

warned against judicial rewriting of the Bankruptcy

Code’s “complex” and “interconnected provisions,” which

“threatens ripple effects” within “the broader bankruptcy

scheme.” Hall v. United States, 566 U.S. 506, 523 (2012).

But the First Circuit did exactly that, casting into

uncertainty hundreds of provisions in the Bankruptcy

Code and the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure that turn on

the meaning of the phrase “cases under title 11.” The First

Circuit’s holding would, for example, collapse Congress’s

distinction between a district court’s exclusive bankruptcy

jurisdiction in “cases under title 11” under section 1334(a)

and its concurrent jurisdiction in “related” proceedings

under section 1334(b). It would eliminate the division of

authority between district and bankruptcy courts by

authorizing bankruptcy judges to enter judgments in

-4proceedings that are merely “related to” a bankruptcy.

See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). It would have unexpected

procedural consequences, such as authorizing nationwide

service of process by mail in ordinary civil cases. And it

could even create new federal crimes by expanding the

definition of bankruptcy fraud to cover false statements

made in related civil litigation. See 18 U.S.C. § 152(7).

On top of all that, the First Circuit misread the

bankruptcy rules—and created another circuit split—

when it held that Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure

9023 foreclosed the plaintiffs’ appeal. Every other circuit

to have addressed the question has held that Rules 9023

and 9024—the bankruptcy analogues to Rules of Civil

Procedure 59 and 60—“appl[y] only to appeals from the

bankruptcy court to the district court, and not to appeals

from the district court to the court of appeals.” In re

Butler, Inc., 2 F.3d 154, 155 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Bli

Farms, P’ship, 465 F.3d 654, 658 (6th Cir. 2006); see also

English-Speaking Union v. Johnson, 353 F.3d 1013, 1019

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (explaining that Rule 9024 is designed to

apply “only to bankruptcy court proceedings”). That

conclusion is the only one consistent with the bankruptcy

rules’ plain language, which provide that Rule 9023

motions toll the time to appeal the judgment “of a

bankruptcy court.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8001(a) (emphasis

added).

These issues cry out for this Court’s immediate

review. Even setting aside the two concrete circuit splits

and the ripple effects in a critical statutory scheme, the

case implicates this Court’s supervisory interest in

establishing clear rules of the road in the lower courts.

Awaiting further percolation makes little sense when the

parties in those cases cannot know in advance the rules

-5governing the litigation. Only a decision by this Court can

end the uncertainty by definitively setting forth the

ground rules that apply in district and bankruptcy courts.

The Court should grant certiorari to do so here.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at 999

F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2021) and is reproduced at App. 1a. The

district court’s order granting Canadian Pacific’s motion

to dismiss is reported at 210 F. Supp. 3d 218 (D. Me. 2016).

The district court’s order denying the plaintiffs’ motion for

leave to file a second-amended complaint is unreported

but available at 2016 WL 5416943, and is reproduced at

App. 21a.

JURISDICTION

The First Circuit issued its opinion on June 2, 2021,

and denied the plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing on

September 8, 2021. On November 30, 2021, Justice Breyer

extended the time for filing a petition for a writ of

certiorari until January 24, 2022. This Court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

AND RULES INVOLVED

28 U.S.C § 2075 provides:

The Supreme Court shall have the power to

prescribe by general rules, the forms of process,

writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice

and procedure in cases under title 11. Such rules

shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any

substantive right.

Federal

provides:

Rule

of

Bankruptcy

Procedure

1001

-6The Bankruptcy Rules and Forms govern

procedure in cases under title 11 of the United

States Code. The rules shall be cited as the

Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and the

forms as the Official Bankruptcy Forms. These

rules shall be construed, administered, and

employed by the court and the parties to secure

the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination

of every case and proceeding.

Federal

provides:

Rule

of

Bankruptcy

Procedure

9023

Except as provided in this rule and Rule 3008,

Rule 59 F.R.Civ.P. applies in cases under the

Code. A motion for a new trial or to alter or amend

a judgment shall be filed, and a court may on its

own order a new trial, no later than 14 days after

entry of judgment. In some circumstances, Rule

8008 governs post-judgment motion practice

after an appeal has been docketed and is pending.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 provides:

These rules govern the procedure in all civil

actions and proceedings in the United States

district courts, except as stated in Rule 81. They

should be construed, administered, and employed

by the court and the parties to secure the just,

speedy, and inexpensive determination of every

action and proceeding.

-7Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(a)(2) provides:

These rules apply to bankruptcy proceedings to

the extent provided by the Federal Rules of

Bankruptcy Procedure.

STATEMENT

1. Forty-seven people in the town of Lac-Mégantic,

Québec, died when an unattended train carrying volatile

crude oil derailed and erupted outside their homes in the

middle of the night. JA1186.1 More than a million gallons

of oil spilled into the town’s streets, homes, and businesses

before going up in flames, leveling a significant portion of

the town. Id.

The families of those killed filed wrongful-death

claims in Illinois and Texas state courts seeking to hold

the railroads responsible for the disaster accountable for

their negligence. App. 4a. Right off the bat, the railroads

removed all the cases to federal district courts under the

courts’ bankruptcy jurisdiction. JA1489–1528. Although

no party in this case was in bankruptcy and none of the

plaintiffs’ state-law claims relied on the Bankruptcy Code,

the defendants invoked the federal courts’ broad

jurisdiction over proceedings “related to a case under title

11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). “Related to” bankruptcy

jurisdiction was satisfied, they argued, because some

defendants shared insurance with a non-party debtor in a

separate bankruptcy case, which might be affected by an

adverse judgment. JA1000. After removal, all the cases

were stayed and transferred to the United States District

Court for the District of Maine under 28 U.S.C.

§ 157(b)(5), which confers discretion on “the district court

1

All references to the record below are from the Joint Appendix

filed with the First Circuit.

-8in which the bankruptcy case is pending” to “order that

personal injury tort and wrongful death cases shall be

tried” in that district. JA1489, 1498. The cases remained

under a stay until the district court lifted it at the

conclusion of the bankruptcy proceeding.

Throughout the ensuing litigation in the district court,

the parties and the district judge exclusively applied the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not the Federal Rules

of Bankruptcy Procedure, to filings in the case. See, e.g.,

JA1420 (dismissing released parties “pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)”); JA1425 (consolidating

cases “pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

42(a)”). The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint

under (under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12),

asserting among other things insufficient service of

process (under Rule 4). JA40–41. In response, the

plaintiffs moved for leave to amend their complaint (under

Rule 15(a)) to include as defendants three of Canadian

Pacific’s United States subsidiaries. JA388. But they

never got the chance: The district court simultaneously

granted the railroad’s motion to dismiss (employing Rule

12’s standard) and denied leave to amend (employing Rule

15) based on a technical defect in the amended pleading

(under Rule 8). See App. 21–27a. On the same day, the

court entered a final judgment against the plaintiffs—

effectively foreclosing relief. JA1136–61.

The plaintiffs sought to correct the technical pleading

problem by moving for reconsideration under Rule 59(e)

“for the limited purpose” of allowing a revised amended

complaint. JA1162–69. Only then did Canadian Pacific

argue—for the first time—that the case was governed by

the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Although Rule 59(e)

permits a motion for reconsideration of a judgment to be

-9filed up to twenty-eight days from the date the judgment

is entered, Canadian Pacific argued that Bankruptcy Rule

9023, which allows only fourteen days, instead governed

the case and rendered the plaintiffs’ motion untimely.

The district court summarily denied the plaintiffs’

motion without ruling on Canadian Pacific’s new position.

App. 29a.

2. The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s denial of

their motion to amend to the First Circuit. JA1283–85.

Canadian Pacific moved to dismiss, arguing that the

plaintiffs’ failure to timely file their motion under the

bankruptcy rules deprived the court of appellate

jurisdiction. The First Circuit agreed with Canadian

Pacific, holding that the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy

Procedure governed the plaintiffs’ case and, therefore,

their appeal was untimely.

“By their own terms,” the court noted, the bankruptcy

rules “govern procedure in cases under title 11 of the

United States Code.” App. 12a (quoting Fed. R. Bankr. P.

1001). Whether the bankruptcy rules apply to this case, it

explained, thus turns on whether the phrase “cases under

title 11” includes proceedings—like this one—that are

merely “related to cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334;

see App. 3a. The court quickly concluded that Rule 1001’s

language was “not dispositive” on that question, holding

that, “[r]ead in isolation,” the rule did “not compel either

a broad or a narrow reading.” App. 12a. The court reached

that conclusion without attempting to define the rule’s key

phrase—“cases under title 11”—either under its ordinary

meaning or under the Bankruptcy Code.

Instead, the court found “support for a broad reading

of Rule 1001” in the language of 28 U.S.C. § 157, which

delimits the authority of bankruptcy judges in “core” and

-10“non-core” proceedings. App. 13a. The court thought it

“important” that “the drafters of the rule must have been

aware of the core/non-core dichotomy that Congress

created.” App. 12a. Section 157, it observed, permits a

bankruptcy judge to “enter appropriate orders and

judgments” in bankruptcy matters, including: (1) “cases

under title 11” and (2) “core proceedings arising under

title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). The court reasoned that

Congress’s inclusion of both “cases under title 11” and

“core proceedings arising under title 11” “lends credence

to the view that these are two distinct (albeit overlapping)

categories of cases.” App. 13a. Without looking to

established definitions of those terms of art, and without

further explanation, it held that this language “strongly

suggest[ed] that the procedural aspects of non-core,

‘related to’ cases adjudicated in federal district courts” are

“cases under title 11” that “are governed by the

Bankruptcy Rules.” App. 14a.

What settled the matter for the court was what it saw

as “the practicalities attendant to the efficient operation of

the modern bankruptcy system.” App. 14a. “‘Related to

jurisdiction,” it wrote, “is designed to put everything in

the same place and, thus, facilitates the efficient

disposition of claims.” App. 15a (cleaned up). The court

found it “obvious … that the best way to effectuate this

goal is for both the bankruptcy judges and the district

court judges to apply the same set of procedural rules in

all proceedings having a nexus to a bankruptcy case.” Id.

(quoting Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Coopers Lybrand, 22 F.3d

1228, 1237 (3d Cir. 1994)). Considering the text in light of

that efficiency rationale, the First Circuit found it

“pellucid that the Bankruptcy Rules apply to non-core,

‘related to’ cases adjudicated in federal district courts

under section 1334(b)’s ‘related to’ jurisdiction.” App. 20a.

-11The court found further support for that conclusion in

the decisions of three other circuits, which likewise

concluded “that it would be ‘anomalous’ for different rules

to govern claims in the same court, given ‘the bankruptcy

scheme’s emphasis on centralization and efficiency.’” App.

15a (quoting Diamond Mortg. Corp. of Illinois v. Sugar,

913 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1990)); see also Phar-Mor, Inc., 22

F.3d at 1237; In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619 (4th Cir.

1997). “To rule otherwise,” it wrote, would “create a split

in the circuits.” App. 20a.

Because the plaintiffs’ motion “was timely if the Civil

Rules controlled but untimely if the Bankruptcy Rules

controlled,” its holding on that issue was “outcomedeterminative” here. App. 7a. Application of the

bankruptcy rules triggered a “domino effect” leading to

dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of jurisdiction.

App. 3a. The shorter time for post-judgment motions

under the bankruptcy rules made the plaintiffs’ motion

retroactively untimely. And because an “untimely motion

for reconsideration lacked tolling effect,” their appeal was

also late. App. 6a. Hence, no jurisdiction.

The First Circuit recognized that the district court

had never applied the bankruptcy rules, but thought that

this “lack of clarity on the district court’s part” did not

“vitiate [its] obligation to determine which set of rules

applies in this case.” App. 19a. “[T]here is no room for an

equitable exception,” it held, “to the quintessentially legal

determination of which set of rules applies to a particular

case.” Id. Accordingly, it dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal.

-12REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

This case cleanly presents a circuit split on the

meaning of a key term of art in the Bankruptcy

Code, with far-reaching and recurring

consequences.

A. The First Circuit’s reading of “cases under

title 11” exacerbates an existing circuit split

on the phrase’s scope.

1. The Bankruptcy Code and Federal Rule of

Bankruptcy Procedure 1001 provide that the bankruptcy

rules govern “procedure in cases under title 11.” Fed. R.

Bankr. P. 1001 (emphasis added); see 28 U.S.C. § 2075.

The term “cases under title 11” has a “well-understood”

meaning. In re Caldor Corp., 303 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir.

2002). For decades, courts have held that the word “case”

in the Bankruptcy Code is a “term of art” that “refers to

litigation ‘commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy

court of a petition’ under the appropriate chapter of Title

11.” Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302, 303(b), 304(a)). In

other words, it “refers merely to the bankruptcy petition

itself, over which district courts (and their bankruptcy

units) have original and exclusive jurisdiction.” In re

Wood, 825 F.2d 90, 92 (5th Cir. 1987); see also, e.g., In re

Wolverine Radio Co., 930 F.2d 1132, 1141 (6th Cir. 1991).

As these courts have recognized, the Bankruptcy

Code “consistently … denotes the original bankruptcy

case filed under Title 11 as ‘case’ and applies other terms,

such as ‘proceedings’ or ‘actions,’ to other causes of

action.” Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th Cir.

2000); see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 101(42) (defining “petition” as

a “petition … commencing a case under this title”); Fed.

R. Bankr. P. 1002(a) (“A petition commencing a case under

the Code shall be filed with the clerk.”). In 28 U.S.C.

-13§ 1334, for example, Congress relied on this distinction

between “cases” and “proceedings” to delineate the scope

of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. Section 1334(a) grants

the federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over

“cases under title 11,” while section 1334(b) gives them

only concurrent jurisdiction over “proceedings.” Under

that scheme, “the only aspect of the bankruptcy

proceeding over which the district courts … have

exclusive jurisdiction is ‘the bankruptcy petition itself.’”

In re Brady, Tex., Mun. Gas Corp., 936 F.2d 212, 218 (5th

Cir. 1991).

All told, seven circuits—the Second, Third, Fifth,

Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh—have held that

section 1334 incorporates that settled understanding of

“cases under title 11.” See In re Caldor Corp., 303 F.3d at

168 (2d Cir.); Donaldson, 104 F.3d 547, 552 (3d Cir. 1997);

In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 97 (5th Cir.); In re Wolverine

Radio Co., 930 F.2d at 1141 (6th Cir.); In re Cassidy Land

& Cattle Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 1130, 1132 (8th Cir. 1988); In

re Republic Trust Sav. Co., 897 F.2d 1041, 1044 (10th Cir.

1990); Christo, 223 F.3d at 1332. Indeed, even the First

Circuit previously recognized that a “case under title 11 is

the bankruptcy petition itself, such as a Chapter 11

reorganization.” In re Middlesex Power Equip. &

Marine, Inc., 292 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 2002).

2. In applying the bankruptcy rules to this case, the

First Circuit radically diverged from that established

meaning. Relying on the text of the Bankruptcy Code and

the “efficiency goals of the bankruptcy system,” the court

adopted a “broad construction” under which “cases under

title 11” includes any proceedings subject to federal

bankruptcy jurisdiction as “related to a case under title

11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b); see App. 15–17a. Because the

-14plaintiffs’ wrongful-death claims could “conceivably”

affect a bankruptcy, their case was “related to a case

under title 11” and thus—under the court’s logic—was

also itself “a case under title 11” to which the bankruptcy

rules applied.

The court justified this conclusion as necessary to

avoid creating a different circuit split with decisions of the

Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, which had read

“cases under title 11” in Bankruptcy Rule 1001 as

encompassing “related to” cases in district court. See

Diamond Mortg. Corp., 913 F.2d 1233; Phar-Mor, Inc., 22

F.3d 1228; In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619. In the first of

these cases, the Seventh Circuit in Diamond Mortgage

held that plaintiffs in a state-law malpractice case in

federal district court could rely on the bankruptcy rules’

provision for nationwide service of process to subject outof-state defendants to personal jurisdiction in Illinois. 913

F.2d at 1243; see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004(d) (authorizing

service “anywhere in the United States”). The court saw

“nothing in the literal terms” of Rule 1001 that “even

remotely suggests” that it applies “differently in core and

non-core proceedings.” 913 F.2d at 1243. The court also

relied on a policy rationale, concluding that “it would seem

anomalous for different sets of procedural rules to govern

related proceedings in the same court, given the

bankruptcy scheme’s emphasis on centralization and

efficiency.” Id. It concluded that application of the

bankruptcy rules was consistent with both “these goals

and the language of the rules.” Id.

Likewise, the Fourth Circuit in Celotex Corp. applied

the same service-of-process rule to commercial litigation,

relying on Diamond Mortgage in holding that, “when a

case is properly in federal district court on ‘related to’

-15jurisdiction” under section 1334(b), the “entire body of

Bankruptcy Rules” applies.” 124 F.3d at 629.

These courts’ broad reading of “cases under title 11”

in Bankruptcy Rule 1001 is, at the very least, in serious

tension with the decisions of other circuits that have read

the same phrase in the Bankruptcy Code as limited to “the

bankruptcy petition itself.” See, e.g., In re Wood, 825 F.2d

at 92. Given “the interlocking nature of the bankruptcy

code,” its provisions must be “read to be consistent

whenever possible.” In re Bateman, 331 F.3d 821, 825

(11th Cir. 2003). And as the First Circuit noted here, “the

drafters of the rule must have been aware” of how

Congress used the phrase. App. 12a. Indeed, Rule 1001

just repeats verbatim the language Congress used in

authorizing the Supreme Court to prescribe “practice and

procedure in cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 2075. It

would exceed that grant of authority to give the phrase

“cases under title 11” a meaning under the bankruptcy

rules broader than the one Congress attributed to it.

Unlike the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, the Third

Circuit in Phar-Mor understood that statutory meaning.

In a separate section of its opinion, the court recognized

that the “term ‘case’ refers to the general administrative

proceedings in bankruptcy—that is, the actual

bankruptcy case filed under the Bankruptcy Code.” 22

F.3d at 1232 n.5. Despite that, the court held the

bankruptcy rules applicable to “related to” proceedings

“largely because” it saw the contrary result as

“incompatible with the policies” of the Bankruptcy Code.

Id. at 1236.

The Eleventh Circuit has questioned the Third

Circuit’s extra-textual approach, noting that the “related

to” proceedings at issue in Phar-Mor did “not arise

-16directly under the substantive rules of title 11, and,

therefore, may lie outside the language” the rule.

Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XIV, LLC, 818 F.3d 1283,

1288 (11th Cir. 2016). Rosenberg involved a core

bankruptcy claim, so the Eleventh Circuit did not need to

resolve the question. Id. at 1289. But it recognized that

such “proceedings offer, perhaps, the most likely

circumstance for applying the Federal Civil Rules.” Id. at

1288. And it suggested, contrary to Phar-Mor, that

application of the bankruptcy rules to such “essentially

collateral matters” is appropriate only “when the case

itself is a bankruptcy proceeding.” Id. at 1288-89. At a

minimum, the Third Circuit’s inconsistent application in

different contexts of an identical word of art creates

uncertainty about the key term’s meaning in the Third

Circuit and its application in future cases.

Here, however, the First Circuit went further than

the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits by finding

“support for a broad reading of Rule 1001” in the language

of 28 U.S.C. § 157, a key provision of the Bankruptcy Code

that sets forth the authority of bankruptcy judges in

“core” and “non-core” proceedings. App. 13a. That

language, it held, “strongly suggests that the procedural

aspects of non-core, “related to” cases adjudicated in

federal district courts are governed by the Bankruptcy

Rules.” App. 14a. And the drafters of Bankruptcy Rule

1001 “must have been aware” of that statutory meaning.

App. 12a.

That holding is flatly at odds with the circuit decisions

recognizing “cases under title 11” under the Bankruptcy

Code as a term of art. This case is “not a ‘case under title

11,’” as those courts have read the term, because it is not

“the bankruptcy petition itself.” Wolverine Radio Co., 930

-17F.2d at 1141. The case was not commenced by filing a

petition in a bankruptcy court. See In re Caldor Corp., 303

F.3d at 168. And it does not invoke any provision of title

11. See id. Far from it: The case is “simply a state [law]

action that, had there been no bankruptcy, could have

proceeded in state court.” In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 97. A

case raising state-law claims and removed from state

court is “clearly not a ‘case under title 11’ within the

meaning of section 1334(a).” Robinson v. Michigan

Consol. Gas Co. Inc., 918 F.2d 579, 583 (6th Cir. 1990).

B. The First Circuit’s holding risks significant

confusion and unpredictable harm to one of

the nation’s most important and complex

statutory schemes.

1. The core of the First Circuit’s holding is that the

bankruptcy rules apply to proceedings “within the federal

district court’s jurisdiction” under section 1334(b) “as

cases ‘related to’ a pending bankruptcy.” App. 3a. By

hinging the choice of rules on the existence of “related to”

jurisdiction, the opinion makes the rules’ application

unpredictable. The scope of that jurisdiction “is protean,

and what is ‘related to’ a proceeding under title 11 in one

context may be unrelated in another.” In re Boston Reg’l

Med. Ctr., Inc., 410 F.3d 100, 107 (1st Cir. 2005). The

jurisdiction is also extraordinarily broad, requiring only

that the proceeding “could conceivably have any effect on

the estate being administered in bankruptcy.” In re G.S.F.

Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1475 (1st Cir. 1991) (emphasis

added). This case is an example: Although the bankruptcy

debtor was not a party to the case, and although there was

“no possibility of recovery” against the debtor’s estate, the

district court found “related to” jurisdiction because the

-18debtor and some of the defendants shared an insurance

policy. JA100.

The difficulty of determining “related to” jurisdiction,

and thus the procedural rules that apply, is demonstrated

by the fact that “[b]y far the largest number of reported

cases dealing with bankruptcy jurisdiction over civil

proceedings are concerned with whether a particular

proceeding is ‘related to’ a title 11 case.” 1 Collier on

Bankruptcy ¶ 3.01[e][ii] (16th ed. 2010). Even if the parties

and the district judge agree about which rules apply, “the

subject matter jurisdiction of a federal court can be

challenged at any stage of the litigation (including for the

first time on appeal), even by the party who first invoked

it.” In re Canion, 196 F.3d 579, 585 (5th Cir. 1999). And

under the First Circuit’s opinion, there is “no room for an

equitable exception to … which set of rules applies.” App.

19a. The rule thus invites abuse, giving parties an

incentive to sandbag opponents by sitting on their hands

in the district court and arguing for a different set of rules

for the first time on appeal.

“Rules, especially procedural rules, must be knowable

in advance.” Wallace v. Robinson, 914 F.2d 869, 880 (7th

Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). “Basic notions of

due process underpin this requirement,” because the

“right to be heard is of little value unless the party has

some point of reference in established procedural rules to

guide … participation in the proceedings.” Sec. & Exch.

Comm’n v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2005).

The potential for surprise application of the bankruptcy

rules, however, creates numerous traps for the unwary.

The civil rules, for example, calculate the deadline for

answering the complaint based on the date of service, Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12, while the bankruptcy rules calculate it from

-19the date the clerk issues the summons, Fed. R. Bankr. P.

7012. The civil rules require motions for summary

judgment to be filed 30 days after the close of discovery,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, while the bankruptcy rules require the

motion to be filed 30 days before the first scheduled

evidentiary hearing, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056. And the civil

rules require motions for a new trial to be filed 28 days

from entry of judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, while the bankruptcy rules require them to be filed within 14 days. See

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9015.

“The time of appealability, having jurisdictional

consequences, should above all be clear.” Budinich v.

Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202 (1988). The

First Circuit’s rule fails to provide that clarity, thus

risking the imposition of new, jurisdictional deadlines

without notice. Bankruptcy Rules 9023 and 9024 halve the

time for filing post-judgment motions under Rules 59 and

60, and the First Circuit’s retroactive application of that

shorter period here ended the plaintiffs’ claims. And

similar applications of different rules could create other

jurisdictional problems. If a party takes advantage of the

bankruptcy rules’ provision for nationwide service of

process, for example, that service (and resulting personal

jurisdiction) could be destroyed by a later determination

that the district court should have applied the civil rules.

See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004(d).

2. The Fourth Circuit’s opinion also risks significant

confusion and unpredictable harm to Congress’s carefully

calibrated bankruptcy scheme by changing the meaning

of “cases under title 11”—a key term of art used

throughout the bankruptcy statutes and rules.

The term is central, for example, to federal

bankruptcy jurisdiction. Congress granted the federal

-20district courts exclusive bankruptcy jurisdiction in “cases

under title 11,” and assigned jurisdiction over a debtor’s

property to the district court in the district where the

“case under title 11” is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (e). In

contrast, it gave the district courts only concurrent

jurisdiction over proceedings “related to cases under title

11.” Id. § 1334(b). But the First Circuit interpreted section

1334 to say that a proceeding “related to a case under title

11” under section 1334(b) is a kind of “case under title 11”

under section 1334(a). That obliterates Congress’s

jurisdictional scheme.

The term plays a key role, too, in Congress’s allocation

of authority between district and bankruptcy courts under

section 157. Under that section, “cases under title 11” are

“core” matters, which bankruptcy judges have authority

to “hear and determine.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).

Proceedings “related to a case under title 11,” however,

are “non-core” matters that only a district judge may

decide. Id. § 157(c)(1). But in interpreting section 157

here, the First Circuit held that a “related to” proceeding

(a non-core matter) is a kind of “case under title 11” (a core

matter). That, of course, is a “contradiction in terms.”

Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 477 (2011). If that were

right, “the entire range of proceedings under bankruptcy

jurisdiction would fall within the scope of core

proceedings, a result contrary to the ostensible purpose of

the 1984 Act.” In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 95. A reading that

merges those concepts, “despite Congress’ longstanding

efforts to distinguish” them, “is not a natural construction

of the statute.” Hall, 566 U.S. at 520.

But that is just the beginning of the confusion created

by the decision below. The “case under title 11”—that is,

“the bankruptcy petition itself”—is part of the definitional

-21scaffolding on which the whole Bankruptcy Code is built.

The bankruptcy “case” is, among many other things, “the

basis for taking control of all pertinent interests in

property, dealing with that property, determining

entitlements to distributions, establishing the procedures

for administering the mechanism, and discharging the

debtor.” In re Caldor Corp., 303 F.3d at 168 (cleaned up).

It is part of the Code’s definitions of fundamental

bankruptcy concepts like the “debtor,” 11 U.S.C. §

101(13), and the “estate,” 11 U.S.C. § 541. Hundreds of

other provisions in the Bankruptcy Code and Rules of

Bankruptcy Procedure rely on the term. For example, the

Code defines criminal bankruptcy fraud as knowingly

making fraudulent statements in a “case under title 11.”

18 U.S.C. § 152(7). Under the decision below, that includes

this case.

This Court has warned that redefining bankruptcy

law’s “complex terrain of interconnected provisions and

exceptions” threatens “ripple effects” within the “broader

bankruptcy scheme.” Hall, 566 U.S. at 523. Even

“compelling policy reasons,” the Court held, cannot justify

that result. Id. The First Circuit here, however, did

exactly what this Court warned against. The court

sweepingly redefined a core term of art in bankruptcy

without any attempt to assess the collateral consequences.

And it did so while frankly acknowledging that this result

was not compelled by the rules’ text, but rather was driven

by the court’s view that expansive application of the

bankruptcy rules would be more “efficient.”

-22C. The First Circuit’s policy rationale is no

reason to set aside the text’s established

meaning.

The First Circuit gave no persuasive textual basis for

reading “cases under title 11” to include proceedings that

are merely “related to a case under title 11.” The court

correctly observed that Congress used the phrases “cases

under title 11” and “core proceedings arising under title

11” in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) to mean different things. But that

does not support the court’s broad reading of the

Bankruptcy Code. As explained above, the Code

consistently distinguishes “cases under title 11” (meaning

bankruptcy petitions) from “proceedings.” “Core

proceedings arising under title 11” is another “term[] of

art,” which “‘Congress used … to describe those

proceedings that involve a cause of action created or

determined by a statutory provision of title 11.’” In re

Eastport Assocs., 935 F.2d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 1991)

(quoting In re Wood, 825 F.2d 96–97). Congress’s use of

both “cases under title 11” and “core proceedings arising

under title 11” together in section 157(b) gives bankruptcy

judges authority to decide matters core to the federal

bankruptcy power—the bankruptcy case itself and

proceedings “that arise in a bankruptcy case

or under Title 11.” Stern, 564 U.S. at 476. But it does not

remotely suggest that either phrase extends to non-core

matters arising under state law.

The First Circuit did not account for these established

meanings. Nor did it offer any ordinary meaning of “cases

under title 11” that could reasonably encompass state-law

claims arising from a train accident. Even as a matter of

logic, the First Circuit’s reading fails. A case cannot both

be a “case under title 11” and merely “related to a case

-23under title 11” at the same time. See Stern, 564 U.S. at 477

(holding that it “does not make sense to describe a ‘core’

bankruptcy proceeding as merely ‘related to’ the

bankruptcy case”). “[O]xymoron is not a typical feature of

congressional drafting.” Id.

That leaves, as the remaining support for the First

Circuit’s holding, its view that a “broad” interpretation is

“the best way to effectuate” the “efficiency goals of the

bankruptcy system.” App. 15a; see App. 14a (calling this

the “sockdolager”). The court explained that, unless the

bankruptcy rules apply to all cases in bankruptcy

jurisdiction, “a district court adjudicating both core and

non-core cases … would need to apply two different sets

of rules simultaneously.” App. 14a “Such a convoluted

procedural scheme,” it reasoned, “would be in marked

tension with the bankruptcy system’s goal of resolving

claims efficiently.” Id.

But there is nothing “convoluted”—much less “RubeGoldberg-like,” App. 13a—about district courts applying

the Rules of Civil Procedure to a class of cases that, by

definition, involve no bankruptcy claims. The cases that

fall under “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction are civil

cases in which, absent the bankruptcy, nobody could

object to application of the civil rules. The fortuity that the

case might have some effect on a bankruptcy debtor does

not make applying those rules more difficult or

convoluted. The case is still fundamentally civil, and the

district courts are well accustomed to applying the civil

rules to civil cases and the bankruptcy rules to bankruptcy

ones.

The court’s view that Congress wanted “the same set

of procedural rules in all proceedings having a nexus to a

bankruptcy case,” id., ignores the reality that Congress

-24itself chose to require different procedures in core and

non-core proceedings. Under section 157, bankruptcy

judges may “hear and determine all cases under title 11”

and “all core proceedings,” entering “orders and

judgments” subject only to appellate review in the district

court. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). But although bankruptcy judges

may “hear” most non-core cases, they cannot decide them.

In a proceeding “related to a case under title 11,” only the

district court may enter a “final order or judgment.” Id.

§ 157(c)(1). The bankruptcy judge’s authority is limited to

submitting “proposed findings of fact and conclusions of

law,” subject to the district court’s de novo review. Id.

In a personal injury or wrongful death case, a

bankruptcy judge cannot even do that much. Such

proceedings must “be tried in the district court,” either in

the district where “the bankruptcy case is pending” or in

the district where “the claim arose.” Id. § 157(b)(5).

Congress thus chose to allow this category of “related to”

claims—of which this case is a part—to proceed

independently of the core bankruptcy case. Often, such

claims cannot be heard in federal court at all. In “related

to” proceedings based on state law, federal district

courts—absent a separate basis for federal jurisdiction—

are required to abstain in favor of state courts. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1334(c)(2). It makes little sense to read a statute that

prohibits referral of a case to bankruptcy court, and that

allows trial in another district or in state court, as

signaling Congress’s intent to mandate that the same

rules always apply.

In any event, the First Circuit’s views on the “best

way to effectuate” the goals of the Bankruptcy Code are

no reason to set aside Rule 1001’s plain language. The

federal courts “do not sit to assess the relative merits of

-25different approaches to various bankruptcy problems.”

Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank,

N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 13 (2000). Where the bankruptcy laws are

“coherent and consistent, there generally is no need for a

court to inquire beyond the plain language.” United States

v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1989). Given the

well-established meaning of the phrase “cases under title

11,” the court erred by relying on policy rationales to

derive a different meaning. Even assuming the First

Circuit is correct that efficiency concerns support a

broader application of bankruptcy rules, Congress is

better positioned than the courts to accomplish that end.

Congress could do that by saying so directly, without the

need to judicially redefine a bankruptcy term of art.

II. This case presents a second circuit split on the

bankruptcy rules’ applicability to appeals from a

district court to a court of appeals.

Even if the First Circuit were correct that the

bankruptcy rules, as a general matter, apply to civil cases

like this one, it erred—and created a second circuit split—

by interpreting the bankruptcy rules to foreclose the

plaintiffs’ appeal. Every other circuit to have addressed

the question has held that Federal Rules of Bankruptcy

Procedure 9023 and 9024—the bankruptcy analogues to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60—”appl[y] only

to appeals from the bankruptcy court to the district court,

and not to appeals from the district court to the court of

appeals.” In re Butler, Inc., 2 F.3d at 155; see In re Bli

Farms, P’ship, 465 F.3d at 658; see also English-Speaking

Union, 353 F.3d at 1019 (explaining that Rule 9024 is

designed to apply “only to bankruptcy court

proceedings”). The First Circuit here held the opposite—

that Rule 9023 controls in an appeal from a district court.

-26That circuit split independently warrants this Court’s

review.

In holding that “only a timely motion” under Rule

9023 “tolls the running of the appeal period,” the First

Circuit relied on Bankruptcy Rule 8002. App. 8a. But that

rule, by its plain language, does not apply in district court.

It provides that a Rule 9023 motion tolls the appeal period

if timely filed “in the bankruptcy court.” Fed. R. Bankr.

Proc. 8002(b)(1) (emphasis added); see also id. 8002(a)

(specifying the deadline for a notice of appeal “filed with

the bankruptcy clerk”). That is because Part VIII of the

rules, including Rule 8002, “governs the procedure … on

appeal from a judgment, order, or decree of a bankruptcy

court” to a district court in its capacity as a bankruptcy

court of appeals. Fed. R. Bankr. Proc. 8001(a) (emphasis

added); see English-Speaking Union, 353 F.3d at 1019

(Rule 8002 governs “the time for appealing from the

bankruptcy court to the district court”).

Just as the bankruptcy rules thus “apply to appeals …

from bankruptcy courts to district courts,” the “Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure generally govern

bankruptcy appeals to courts of appeals.” Fed. R. Bankr.

P. 8001, Advisory Comm. Note. The First Circuit

implicitly recognized as much when it applied the 30-day

appeal period under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

4 rather than the 14-day period under the bankruptcy

rules. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide

that an “appeal to a court of appeals from a final judgment,

order, or decree of a district court” under its bankruptcy

jurisdiction “is taken as any other civil appeal under these

rules.” Fed. R. App. P. 6(a) (emphasis added). And in “any

other civil appeal,” Rule 4 provides that a motion for

reconsideration under Rule 59 or 60 tolls the time to

-27appeal if the motion is filed “within the time allowed by

those rules.” Id. R. 4(a)(4)(A). Here, the relevant “time

allowed” by Rule 59(e) is 28 days—not the 14 days

provided by the bankruptcy rules.

That Rule 9023 governs only appeals from bankruptcy

courts explains its shortened 14-day deadline. As the

Advisory Committee’s notes explain, Rule 8002’s

“deadline for filing a notice of appeal is 14 days.” Fed. R.

Bankr. P. 9023, 2009 Advisory Comm. Notes. Because

application of Rule 59(e)’s 28-day deadline “would

effectively override” that abbreviated appeal period, Rule

9023 applies the shortened period to mirror the 14 days to

appeal. The First Circuit’s imposition in this case of a

deadline designed for bankruptcy appeals is illogical, does

not accomplish the rule’s purpose, and serves only to trap

litigants.

CONCLUSION

The petition for certiorari should be granted.

-28Respectfully submitted,

MATTHEW W.H. WESSLER

Counsel of Record

GREGORY A. BECK

GUPTA WESSLER, PLLC

2001 K Street, NW

Suite 850 North

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 888-1741

matt@guptawessler.com

TED A. MEYERS

PETER J. FLOWERS

CRAIG D. BROWN

MEYERS & FLOWERS LLC

3 N. 2nd Street

St. Charles, IL 60174

(603) 232-6333

MITCHELL A. TOUPS

WELLER, GREEN, TOUPS &

TERRELL, LLP

P.O. Box 350

Beaumont, TX 77704

(409) 838-0101

JASON C. WEBSTER

THE WEBSTER LAW FIRM

6200 Savoy, Suite 515

Houston, TX 77036

(713) 581-3900

January 24, 2022

Counsel for Petitioners