Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Gregory Shawn Mercer, Applicant v. E. A. Vega

Supreme Court briefJun 28, 2020

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No. 20-

3fn Wlje

Supreme Court of tfje Uniteb States

GREGORYS. MERCER,

Petitioner,

vs.

E. A. Vega, et al.

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United

States Court Of Appeals for The Fourth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Gregory Shawn Mercer,

Petitioner, pro se

3114 Borge Street

Oakton, Virginia 22124

202-431-9401

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

SCOTUS Rule 10(a) - Whether or not a Circuit

Split has arisen between the Fourth Circuit and other

Circuits over the interpretation of whether crimes

allegedly “committed on occasions different from one

another” [See 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(l)] become

simultaneous crimes if the directly-associated arrest

warrants for those sequential alleged crimes were

sworn out and/or served simultaneously.

SCOTUS Rule 10(a) - Whether or not a Circuit

Split has arisen between the Fourth Circuit and both

this SCOTUS and the Fourth Circuit itself over the

Federal Court Practice (FRCP Rule 56; U.S.

Amendment VII Right to Trial by Jury) of viewing all

facts in a Summary Judgment Proceeding and

drawing any justifiable inferences from those facts in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party when

deciding if there exists genuine issues as to any

material fact requiring a Trial by Jury.

SCOTUS Rule 10(c) - [Petitioner] moves this

[SCOTUS] as he did the [VAED & Fourth Circuit] for

a Declaratory Judgment that Virginia is in violation of

the U.S. Guarantee Clause so [the U.S.] Congress

might act by applying the U.S. Guarantee Clause

against Virginia’s 1971 Constitution of Virginia,

Article VI which establishes an Unrepublican Form of

Government because Sections 1 & 2 are in violation of

the U.S. Supremacy Clause and Section 7 is in

violation of Duncan v. McCall. 139 U.S. 449, 461, 11

S.Ct. 573, 577 (1891).

SUBSIDIARY QUESTIONS FAIRLY INCLUDED

(FOURTH CIRCUIT DOCUMENT #10 - Pgs. 1, 3)

SCOTUS Rule 14.1(a) - Whether or not the [VAED]

Abused its Discretion in granting Summary Judgment

on the entire case after discussing Summary

Judgment on only one of the two police officers (YSP

Trooper Houtz & VSP Sergeant Allander] and only one

of the three [6/1/15 false] warrants.

SCOTUS Rule 14.1(a) - Whether or not an Evasive

Defendant State Police Officer is unlawful using the

County Criminal Justice System and his State Police

Force to effect an advantage in a Federal Civil Action

simply because [Plaintiff / Appellant] had him

privately served a Summons with Complaint [in a

3/6/15-filed VAED Civil Action].

SCOTUS Rule 14.1(a)- [Plaintiff / Appellant] moves

this [Fourth Circuit] as he did the [VAED] for a

Declaratory Judgment that Virginia is in violation of

the U.S. Guarantee Clause so [the U.S.] Congress

might act by applying the U.S. Guarantee Clause

against Virginia’s 1971 Constitution of Virginia,

Article VI which establishes an Unrepublican Form of

Government because Sections 1 & 2 are in violation of

the U.S. Supremacy Clause and Section 7 is in

violation of Duncan u. McCall. 139 U.S. 449, 461, 11

S.Ct. 573, 577 (1891).

SCOTUS Rule 14.1(a) - Whether or not the VAED’s

5/24/19 Order was Unconstitutional because it

annulled Appellant’s indefeasible Constitution of

iii

Virginia, Article I, Section 3 Right to reform, alter, or

abolish the Virginia Government(s).

(VAED DOCUMENT #35 - Pages 5-6, 49)

SCOTUS Rule 14.1(a) - Plaintiffs 4/16/18 First

Amended Complaint has two errors in Paragraph 16

which he moves this [VAED] for Leave to [C]orrect

through Amendment herein which, also by Leave of

[VAED], refers back to the original Complaint’s

3/28/18 filing date:

“16. Defendant knew that Plaintiffs attempts

to effect service on the elusive litigant in the

unrelated previous civil matter were not

violations of any law, nor could they reasonably

be construed as such, and thus Defendant did

not have probable cause to believe that Plaintiff

[not ‘Defendant’] committed any criminal

offense when Defendant [not ‘he’] made

statements that probable cause existed for

warrants on the above-referenced charges.”

SCOTUS Rule 14.1(a) - Plaintiff moves this [VAED]

for a Declaratory Judgment that Virginia is in

violation of the U.S. Guarantee Clause so [the U.S.]

Congress might act by applying the U.S. Guarantee

Clause against Virginia’s 1971 Constitution of

Virginia, Article VI which establishes an

Unrepublican Form of Government because Sections 1

& 2 are in violation of the U.S. Supremacy Clause and

Section 7 is in violation of Duncan v. McCall. 139 U.S.

449, 461, 11 S.Ct. 573, 577 (1891).

SCOTUS Rule 14.1(a) - Plaintiff moves this

[VAED] for Sanctions against defendant Vega in the

am ount of $145,505.48 (Virginia Taxes paid since

12/03) or $26,924.66 (Virginia Taxes paid since

6/1/15) at the [VAED’s] discretion [add to each

amount another year of Real Estate T axes since

5/22/19 or $5,887],

LIST OF PARTIES

1) Gregory Shawn Mercer, Petitioner, pro se, is a

citizen and resident of Virginia living at 3114

Borge Street, Oakton, Virginia, 22124,

gregorysmercer@gmail.com, 202-431-9401.

2) Eliezel A. Vega, Respondent, is a citizen and

resident of Virginia to the best information of

Petitioner on or about 4/16/18 and is

represented by the Virginia Attorney General.

Herein, E.A. Vega is referred to as

“Respondent” or “Respondent Vega.” E. A.

Vega is a Respondent in his individual capacity

based on serving as a Virginia State Police

(herein and hereafter “VSP”) Special Agent on

or about 6/1/15.

Respondent’s Attorney in the VAED

(after a 6/14/18 Appearance) and in the Fourth

Circuit was Sandra Snead Gregor, Esquire

(VSB No. 47421), Assistant Attorney General,

Office of the Virginia Attorney General, 202

North 9th Street, Richmond, Virginia, 23219,

;

sgregor@oag.state.va.us,

(804)-786-1586

(Telephone), (804)-371-2087 (Facsimile).

3) pa.W+S°n’ PX-C- ResPondent, is the firm

* *onercontracted With for rePresentation on

0/0/18 with what became VAED Case No. 1:18cy-346-LO-TCB on and after 3/28/18. Herein

paTW^°,nDRL-C- is referred to as “Dawson’

I'X.C. Petitioner paid SW Dawson who works

at Dawson, P.L.C. $22,500 on 3/6/18 for

Dawson, P.L.C. to “put forth its best effort for a

successful resolution of [Petitioner’s] pending

lega! matters.” Herein, SW Dawson is referred

to as SW Dawson.” The Appendix has in

79°U

D0CUMENT #1° on P^es 66M 311 „Affl^avit of APPellant Gregory Shawn

Mercer with attachments including the 3/6/18

Fee Agreement” which further explain that

“ TT’ u'L'C' through SW Dawson did not

put forth its best effort for successful

resolution of’ VAED Case No. l:18-cv-346-LOi CB.

After losing in a Summary Judgment

Proceeding on 4/24/19 where Petitioner’s

complete Disputed Statement of Facts was not

presently timely in the VAED by Dawson

Petitioner was forced to ask SW Dawson

t° withdraw on 5/22/19 in order that Petitioner

cou!d fiie his pro se FRCP Rule 59 Motion that

SW Dawson refused to file while representing

SW DaWS°n describ?d Petitioner’s

FRCP Rule 59 Motion as “rife with irrelevant

and demonstrably incorrect information” and

impeached it as “objectively frivolous” thus “not

a pleading counsel would be ethically permitted

to file.” SW Dawson encouraged Petitioner to

file his FRCP Rule 59 Motion on the 29th day

which would have been untimely by one day.

Petitioner s legal malpractice action against

Dawson, P.L.C. with vicarious liability or other

liability theory to reach SW Dawson accrues if

Petitioner wins this appeal in the SCOTUS.

Justice demands SW Dawson explain

himself to Petitioner or face Sanctions of some

sort. Petitioner herein moves this SCOTUS for

Sanctions against Dawson, P.L.C.. Petitioner

paid $7,000 (for a 7/5/07 Forensic Tape

Examination Expert’s Report), $2,625 (for a

5/4/16 Forensic Tape Examination Expert’s

Certified Report); plus $22,500 (for the 5/6/18

Fee Agreement); plus $505 (5/24/19 Fourth

Circuit fee); plus $1,762.50 (August of 2019

Professional Investigation of the 3/26/07 to

3/27/07 Jury for Fairfax County Circuit Court

Case No. MI-2006-2302); plus $300 (SCOTUS

fee); plus copying/printing fees still being

determined

(approximately

$2,500)

$37,192.50. During the delay, experts have

retired/died and been or might need to be

replaced.

SW Dawson’s office appears on VAED

DOCUMENT #27-1 as 999 Waterside Drive,

Suite 2525, Norfolk, Virginia 23510 but

DAWSON, P.L.C. has a P.O. Box, Norfolk,

Virginia,

23501,

swd@dawsonplc.com,

757.282.6601 (Telephone), and 757.282.6617

vii

(Fax). Petitioner will have or already has

served three copies of this Petition for Writ of

Certiorari on Dawson, P.L.C. by Private Process

Server on or about 7/2/20. If this SCOTUS

dismisses this Respondent, Petitioner moves

this SCOTUS dismiss “without prejudice” so

that Petitioner doesn’t have issues pursuing

any legal malpractice cause of action he has at

the conclusion of this appeal in lieu of

reasonable Sanctions herein moved which this

SCOTUS may or may not grant.

4) The Honorable Mark Herring, Respondent, 202

North 9th Street, Richmond, Virginia, 23219,

mailoag@oag.state.va.us, (804)-786-2071. In

accordance to SCOTUS Rules 14.1(e)(v) &

29.4(c), Petitioner states, “28 U.S.C. §2403(b)

may apply.” Petitioner states in accordance

with SCOTUS Rule 29.4(c) and the definition of

“any Court of the United States” from 28 U.S.C.

§451 that neither the U.S. District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia (herein and

hereafter <CVAED”) nor the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (herein and

hereafter “Fourth Circuit”) certified to the

Virginia Attorney General the fact that the

constitutionality

with

respect

the

Constitution of the United States of the 1971

Constitution of Virginia, Article VI, Sections 1,

2, & 7 were drawn into question previously in

either court for Mercer v. Vega. VAED, Case No.

l:18-cv-346-LO-TCB

(5/24/19);

Fourth

Circuit, Case No. 19-1584 (2/3/20).

viii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Petitioner’s previous DOCUMENT #12 filed

7/22/19 (Disclosure of Corporate Affiliations) in Mercer

v. Vesa. Fourth Circuit, Case No. 19-1584 (2/3/20)

stated that there is no parent corporation nor any

publicly held company that owns 10% of anything

associated with pro se Petitioner. But Petitioner has

a mortgage. Petitioner spoke with a SCOTUS Clerk on

4/20/20 for further direction. Since Petitioner is not a

corporation, he has no corporate disclosures to make.

DIRECTLY RELATED FEDERAL COURT

INFORMATION

(• - SEE APPENDIX FOR FULL TEXT)

Gregory S. Mercer v. E. A. Vesa, VAED,

CASE NO. l:18-cv-346-LO-TCB (5/24/19)

DOCUMENT #1 filed 3/28/18:

COMPLAINT

•DOCUMENT #3 filed 4/3/18:

ORDER (RE: Dismissed Dkt. #1 Without

Prejudice)

•DOCUMENT #4 filed 4/16/18:

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (Filed within

30 days after Dkt. #3)

•DOCUMENT #15 filed 7/16/18:

ORDER (Set Virginia Limitations Precedent)

DOCUMENT #19 filed 3/15/19:

MOTION for SUMMARY JUDGMENT (MS J)

DOCUMENT #20 filed 3/15/19:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MS J

•DOCUMENTS #27 filed 3/27/19:

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MSJ

•DOCUMENTS #27-1 filed 3/27/19:

12/12/18 DEPOSITION OF E.A. VEGA

DOCUMENT #28 filed 4/2/19:

REPLY BRIEF SUPPORTING MSJ

•DOCUMENT #29 filed 4/24/19:

MEMORANDUM OPINION (RE: MSJ)

•DOCUMENT #30 filed 4/24/19:

ORDER (RE: MSJ)

•DOCUMENT #31 filed 4/25/19:

JUDGMENT (RE: #30)

•DOCUMENT #34 filed 5/22/19:

ORDER GRANTING MOTION to WITHDRAW

DOCUMENTS #35, #35-1, #35-2, & #35-3 filed

5/22/19:

FRCP RULE 59 MOTION (RE: #29 to #31)

THREE ADDITIONAL MOTIONS

•CASE LAW CITED IN FRCP RULE 59

MOTION / THREE ADDITIONAL

MOTIONS

•DISPUTED STATEMENT OF FACTS

(VAED Dkt. #35 on PAGES H6-49)

•AFFIDAVITS AND OTHER VERIFIED

(iCERTIFIED) EVIDENCE

DOCUMENT #39 filed 5/24/19:

MOTION/ERRATA SHEET (RE: #35)

•DOCUMENT #40 filed 5/24/19:

ORDER (RE: #35)

DOCUMENT #41 filed 5/24/19:

NOTICE OF APPEAL (RE: #29 to #31)

DOCUMENT #48 filed 6/3/19:

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL (RE: #40)

Gresorv S. Mercer v. E. A. Vega, FOURTH

CIRCUIT. CASE NO. 19-1584 (2/3/20)

DOCUMENT #3 filed 5/31/19:

INFORMAL BRIEFING ORDER

DOCUMENT #8 filed 6/10/19:

MOTION to EXTEND DEADLINE / CLARIFY

IF ALL ISSUES IN VAED WERE COVERED

BY VAED’S FINAL ORDER (VAED Dkt. #40)

DOCUMENT #10 filed 7/15/19:

INFORMAL OPENING BRIEF & AFFIDAVIT

•CASE LAW USED FOR JUSTIFYING VAED

ORDER

AND

MEMORANDUM

OPINION (RE: VAED #29 to #31)

(PAGES J3-4, 17-18, 33-34, 36, 46-54,

62)

•AFFIDAVIT OF APPELLANT MERCER

(PAGES J66-73)

DOCUMENT #12 filed 7/22/19:

DISCLOSURE

AFFILIATIONS

CORPORATE

DOCUMENT #13 filed 7/24/19:

ERRATA SHEET (RE: #10)

DOCUMENT #14 filed 7/30/19:

INFORMAL RESPONSE BRIEF

DOCUMENT #15 filed 8/1/19:

OBJECTION / MOTION for ENLARGEMENT

OF TIME

DOCUMENT #17 filed 8/30/19:

INFORMAL REPLY BRIEF (Restricted ??)

•CASE LAW CITED IN BRIEF

•NEWLY DISCOVERED AUGUST-OF-2019

EVIDENCE THAT HUSBAND OF

JUROR IN FCCC CASE NO. MI-20062302 ON 3/26-27/2007 WAS A

CONGRESSIONALLY-RECOGNIZED

CIA SOURCE WORKING FOR THE

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

IN PARAPSYCHOLOGY AND MIND

CONTROL (PAGES L22-24)

•DISPUTED STATEMENT OF FACTS (From

VAED Dkt. #35 on PAGES L24-54)

•ARGUMENT THAT VIRGINIA DOES NOT

HAVE NEUTRAL NOR DETACHED

MAGISTRATES ISSUING WARRANTS

TO VIRGINIA POLICE BECAUSE

VIRGINIA HAS A CONFEDERATE

POLICE GOVERNMENT WHICH IS

xii

NOT A REPUBLICAN FORM OF

GOVERNMENT VIOLATING THE U.S.

GUARANTEE CLAUSE (PAGES L5461)

•ARGUMENT THAT VSP OFFICER’S HIGH

SCHOOL DIPLOMA REQUIREMENT

CLEARLY

ESTABLISHES

PETITIONER’S U.S. AMENDMENT IV

& XIV RIGHTS BASED ON NATIONAL

AND VIRGINIA HIGH SCHOOL

DIPLOMA STANDARDS DESPITE

VIRGINIA’S SYSTEMATIC LACK OF

ENFORCEMENT OF STATE AND

FEDERAL CITIZENS’ RIGHTS (PAGES

L62-77) INCLUDING:

America - Pathways to the Present bv

Andrew Cayton, Elisabeth Israels

Perry, Linda Reed, and Alan M.

Prentice Hall, Pages 12-13, 120121, 161-162

Government in America - People.

Politics, and Policy by George C.

Edwards,

III

Martin

Wattenberg, and Robert L.

Lineberry, AP Edition, Copyright

2011, Pearson Education, Inc.,

Pages 19, 32-33, 47-49

8/2/19 LETTER TO CONGRESS SEEKING

BILL SPONSORS TO VIRGINIA’S 13MEMBER

CONGRESSIONAL

xiii

DELEGATION OF SENATORS AND

REPRESENTATIVES (LAST 23 OF 24

PAGES

EXHIBITS

DOCUMENT L & See H49, LI 1, & L54)

•8/7/19 LETTER FROM CONGRESSMAN

DENVER

RIGGLEMAN

PETITIONER (LAST PAGE OF

EXHIBITS IN DOCUMENT L)

DOCUMENT #18 filed 9/10/19:

ERRATA SHEET (RE: #17)

DOCUMENT #19 filed 9/27/19:

INFORMAL REPLY BRIEF (Corrected)

•CASE LAW CITED IN BRIEF

•NEWLY DISCOVERED AUGUST-OF-2019

EVIDENCE THAT HUSBAND OF

JUROR IN FCCC CASE NO. MI-20062302 ON 3/26-27/2007 WAS A

CONGRESSIONALLY-RECOGNIZED

CIA SOURCE WORKING FOR THE

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

IN PARAPSYCHOLOGY AND MIND

CONTROL (CORRECTED PAGES L2224)

•DISPUTED STATEMENT OF FACTS (From

VAED Dkt. #35 on PAGES L24-54)

•ARGUMENT THAT VIRGINIA DOES NOT

HAVE NEUTRAL NOR DETACHED

MAGISTRATES ISSUING WARRANTS

TO VIRGINIA POLICE BECAUSE

VIRGINIA HAS A CONFEDERATE

xiv

POLICE GOVERNMENT WHICH IS

NOT A REPUBLICAN FORM OF

GOVERNMENT VIOLATING THE U.S.

GUARANTEE CLAUSE (PAGES L5461)

•ARGUMENT THAT VSP OFFICER’S HIGH

SCHOOL DIPLOMA REQUIREMENT

CLEARLY

ESTABLISHES

PETITIONER’S U.S. AMENDMENT IV

& XIV RIGHTS BASED ON NATIONAL

AND VIRGINIA HIGH SCHOOL

DIPLOMA STANDARDS DESPITE

VIRGINIA’S SYSTEMATIC LACK OF

ENFORCEMENT OF STATE AND

FEDERAL CITIZENS’ RIGHTS (PAGES

L62-77) INCLUDING:

America - Pathways to the Present bv

Andrew Cayton, Elisabeth Israels

Perry, Linda Reed, and Alan M.

Prentice Hall, Pages 12-13, 120121, 161-162

Government in America - People,

Politics, and Policy by George C.

Edwards,

Martin

HI,

Wattenberg, and Robert L.

Lineberry, AP Edition, Copyright

2011, Pearson Education, Inc.,

Pages 19, 32-33, 47-49

8/2/19 LETTER TO CONGRESS SEEKING

BILL SPONSORS TO VIRGINIA’S 13CONGRESSIONAL

MEMBER

DELEGATION OF SENATORS AND

REPRESENTATIVES (LAST 23 OF 24

EXHIBITS

PAGES

DOCUMENT L & See H49, Lll, & L54)

•8/7/19 LETTER FROM CONGRESSMAN

DENVER

RIGGLEMAN

PETITIONER (LAST PAGE OF

EXHIBITS IN DOCUMENT L)

DOCUMENT #20 filed 10/30/19:

INFORMAL SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

10/29/19 10-PAGE E-MAIL TO THE 13VIRGINIA

MEMBER

DELEGATION

CONGRESSIONAL

TITLED

“A

CASE

FOR

REAPPLICATION

THE

U.S.

CLAUSE AGAINST

GUARANTEE

VIRGINIA

•DOCUMENT #21 filed 11/21/19:

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIUM OPINION

•DOCUMENT #22-1 filed 11/21/19:

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

•DOCUMENT #22-2 filed 11/21/19:

JUDGMENT

DOCUMENT #23 filed 12/12/19:

PETITION FOR REHEARING (Restricted)

•CASE LAW USED FOR CONTRADICTING

xvi

VAED ORDER AND MEMORANDUM

OPINION (RE: VAED #29 to #31) (Dkt.

#26 on PAGES Oil, 17, 19-24, 27-29, 32,

35, 38-40, 46-50)

•CONGRESSIONAL APPLICATION OF THE

U.S.

GUARANTEE

CLAUSE

FOLLOWING THE U.S. CIVIL WAR

BETWEEN 1866 AND 1870 (Dkt. #26 on

PAGES 033-34)

•SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

STATES

CASELOADS,

1880-2015

GRAPH (LAST PAGE OF EXHIBITS

IN DOCUMENT O)

DOCUMENT #25 filed 12/16/19:

ERRATA SHEET (RE: #23)

DOCUMENT #26 filed 12/16/19:

PETITION FOR REHEARING (Corrected)

•CASE LAW USED FOR CONTRADICTING

VAED ORDER AND MEMORANDUM

OPINION (RE: VAED #29 to #31)

(PAGES Oil, 17, 19-24, 27-29, 32, 35,

38-40, 43, 46-50)

•CONGRESSIONAL APPLICATION OF THE

U.S.

GUARANTEE

CLAUSE

FOLLOWING THE U.S. CIVIL WAR

BETWEEN 1866 AND 1870 (PAGES

033-34)

•SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

xvii

STATES

CASELOADS,

1880-2015

GRAPH (PAGES 036-37 & LAST PAGE

OF EXHIBITS IN DOCUMENT O)

DOCUMENT #27 filed 12/26/19:

SUPPLEMENTAL ERRATA SHEET (RE: #26)

•DOCUMENT #28 filed 2/3/20:

ORDER (RE: #26 & #27)

DOCUMENT #29 filed 2/11/20:

MANDATE [SCOTUS Rule 13.1 begins 2/3/20]

SCOTUS COVID-19 EXTENSION (3/19/20):

[SCOTUS Rule 13.5 has 7/2/20 Deadline]

SCOTUS COVID-19 FILINGS UPDATE (4/15/20):

Use 8% x 11 inch Paper

TABLE OF CONTENTS

“A” means Appendix to this Petition for Writ of

Certiorari to the Fourth Circuit;

“B” means 4/16/18 VAED Document #4 - “First

Amended Complaint;”

“C” means 3/15/19 VAED Document #20 “Defendant E. A. Vega’s Memorandum in

Support of Motion for Summary Judgment;”

“D” means 3/27/19 VAED Document #27 “Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment;”

“E” means 3/27/19 VAED Document #27-1 “12/12/18 Deposition of E. A. Vega;”

xviii

“F’ means 4/2/19 VAED Document #28 - “Reply

Brief in Support of Defendant E. A. Vega’s

Motion for Summary Judgment;”

“G” means 4/24/19 VAED Document #29 “Memorandum Opinion;”

“H” means 5/22/19 VAED Document #35

corrected with Document #39 - “FRCP

Rule 59 Motion for New Trial; Altering or

Amending a Judgment / Three Additional

Motions on Pages 5-6 and Paragraphs 188 &

189;”

“I” means 5/24/19 VAED Document #40 - “Order;

“J” means 7/15/19 Fourth Circuit Document #10

corrected with Document #13 - “Informal

Opening Brief and Affidavit;”

“K” means 7/30/19 Fourth Circuit Document #14

- “Informal Response Brief of Appellee E. A.

Vega;”

“L” means 8/30/19 Fourth Circuit Document #17

corrected with Document #18 and

reprinted as Document #19 - “8/30/2019

Informal Reply Brief of Appellant to Response

Brief of Appellee E. A. Vega with Errata

Corrected for Congress on 9/26/2019;”

“M” means 10/30/19 Fourth Circuit Document

#20 — “Informal Supplement to Informal

Opening and Reply Briefs of Appellant:

Argument for Congressional Re-Application of

U.S. Guarantee Clause Against Virginia Being

xix

Distributed to 535 Members of the U.S.

Congress;”

“N” means 11/21/19 Fourth Circuit Document

#21 — “Unpublished Per Curium Opinion;”

“O” means 12/12/19 Fourth Circuit Document #23

corrected with Document #25 and

reprinted as Document #26 further

corrected with Document #27 —

“12/12/2019-Filed Informal Petition for

Rehearing with Errata Corrected;”

“P” means 2/3/20 Fourth Circuit Document #28 “Order.”

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

SUBSIDIARY QUESTIONS FAIRLY

INCLUDED

LIST OF PARTIES

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Vlll

DIRECTLY RELATED FEDERAL COURT

INFORMATION

Vlll

TABLE OF CONTENTS

XVII

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

XXX

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW

JURISDICTION

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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,

STATUTES, ORDINANCES,

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CONSICE STATEMENT OF THE CASE

As Petitioner did in his 7/15/19 “Informal

Opening Brief and Affidavit” on Page [J12], he adopts

by reference and incorporates herein as if rewritten

verbatim hereat the following attached Appendix

hereto in its entirety, U.S District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia (herein ‘VAED”)

Documents, and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit (herein “Fourth Circuit”) Documents.

VAED Documents: #1, #3, #4, #15, #19, #20, #27,

#27-1, #28, #29, #30, #31, #33, #34, #35, #35-1, #35-2,

#35-3, #39, #40; Fourth Circuit Documents: #3, #8,

#10, #12, #13, #14, #15, #17, #18, #19, #20, #21, #221, #22-2, #23, #25, #26, #27, #28, #29.

Petitioner assigns letter codes to 16 of these

VAED and Fourth Circuit Documents: VAED

Documents: #4 is “B,” #20 is “C,” #27 is “D,” #27-1 is

“E,” #28 is “F,” #29 is “G,” #35 is “H,” and #40 is “I.”

Fourth Circuit Documents: #10 is “J,” #14 is “K,”

#17-19 are “L,” #20 is “M,” #21 is “N,” #23, 26-27 are

“O,” and #28 is “P.” Petitioner thinks he only refers to

ten Documents: B, D, E, G, H, I, J, K, L, O, and P.

This is an appeal of a VAED Summary

Judgment Proceeding between 3/15/19 and 5/24/19

which ruled against Petitioner. The Fourth Circuit

affirmed the VAED Opinions and Orders on 2/3/20

[PI] creating two Circuit Splits (SCOTUS Rule

10(a)) over: 1) 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(l) — “committed on

occasions different from one another;” and 2) FRCP

Rule 56 and consistent with U.S. Amendment VII - In

reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court

must view all facts and draw any justifiable inferences

from those facts in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party when determining if there exists

genuine issues as to any material fact requiring a

Trial by Jury.

U.S. v. Hudspeth. 42 F.3d 1015, 1023-24 (7th

Cir., 1994); 1994 WL 592706, 10/28/1994 (“Hudspeth

committed three separate crimes, at three separate

times [over approximately 35 minutes], against three

separate victims, in three separate locations. Under

the plain language of § 924(e)(1) . . ., Hudspeth

committed his crimes on three ‘occasions different

from one another.’”) [A165-167, 06, 19-20, 26],

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49,

106 S.Ct 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (“A fact is

material when proof of its existence or nonexistence

would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is

genuine if a reasonable jury might return a verdict in

favor of the nonmoving party on the basis of such an

issue.”) [A58-59, D3, 024]. Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. v. Zenith Radio Coro., 475 U.S. 585-88 n. 10 & 11,

586-87, 106 S.Ct 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) “A party

moving for summary judgment has the initial burden

of establishing the basis for its motion and identifying

the evidence which demonstrates the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Id. Once the moving

party satisfies its initial burden, the opposite party

may show, by means of affidavits or other verified

evidence, that there exists a genuine dispute of

material fact.”) [A102-103, D3, G5, H5, J40, 023-24].

U.S. v. Carolina Transformer Co.. 978 F.2d 832, 835

(4th Cir., 1992) (“In reviewing a summary judgment

motion, the court must “draw all justifiable inferences

in favor of the nonmoving party”) [A157-158, G5-6,

H5, 32, 50, J40, L42, 024],

Normally, 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(l) is appealed by

convicted criminals alleging that the crimes of which

they were convicted and which were judged by a Court

to be sequential crimes three or more in number are

argued by the convicted criminals to really be

simultaneous or partially simultaneous crimes

less than three in number.

U.S. v. Brady. 988 F.2d 664, 668-69 (en banc),

cert, denied 510 U.S. 857, 114 S.Ct. 166, 126 L.Ed.2d

126 (1993)(from 6th Cir.) (“. . . Consistent with the

holdings of our sister circuits, we believe that offenses

committed by a defendant at different times and

places and against different victims, although

committed within less than an hour of each other, are

separate and distinct criminal episodes and that

convictions for those crimes should be counted as

separate predicate convictions under § 924(e)(1). . . .

Thus, seen from either an objective or subjective point

of view, defendant Brady's crimes were separate

episodes. Therefore, he was properly taxed with both

at his sentencing.”) [A154-157, 021], U.S. v. Elliott.

703 F.3d 378, 383-84, 388 (7th Cir., 2012) (“Therefore,

we concluded, a court's inquiry as to the timing of the

prior offenses ‘is simple: were the crimes simultaneous

or were they sequential?’ Id. at 1021 (emphasis in

original).”) [A158-161, 06, 20-21, 26], U.S. v. Petty.

828 F.2d 2 after remand from SCOTUS, 481 U.S. 1034,

107 S.Ct. 1968, 95 L.Ed.2d 810 (1987)(from 8th Cir.)

(“six counts of armed robbery in New York stemming

from his simultaneous robbery of six individuals at a

restaurant.. . . characterization of Petty's convictions

in New York as more than one conviction, for purposes

of the enhanced sentencing statute, was error.”)

[Al72-173, 020]. U.S. v. Tisdale. 921 F.2d 1095,1099

(10th Cir., 1990), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 986, 112 S.Ct.

596, 116 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991) (“Defendant contends

that his three burglary convictions arose out of a

single criminal episode ... burglarizing three separate

businesses inside the mall, on the same night, . . . we

find that the trial court properly enhanced the

defendant's penalty under Sec. 924(e) (1).”) [A177180,021]. U.S. v. Van. 543 F.3d 963, 966 (2008); 2008

WL 4445756, (8th Cir., 10/3/2008) (“... convictions for

separate drug transactions on separate days are

multiple ACCA predicate offenses, even if the

transactions were sales to the same victim or

informant. Id. at 1058 ...”) [A180, 06,19, 25-26].

Herein, these roles get reversed. Petitioner is

not a criminal and is/was suing Respondent Vega

individually but who works as a Virginia State Police

Officer in a 42 U.S.C. §1983 VAED Civil Action filed

on 3/28/18 for three U.S. Amendment IV & XIV Rights

violations. Upon Respondent’s whim, Respondent

swore out three 6/1/15 False Warrants against

Petitioner without any Probable Cause alleging three

sequential alleged crimes occurring 3/3/15, 5/15/15/ &

5/31/15 all which Petitioner was acquitted of on

3/31/16. Petitioner is arguing the three alleged

Charges associated with the 6/1/15 False Warrants

were sequential but were judged by the VAED to be

simultaneous simply because Respondent Vega’s

three 6/1/15 False Warrants against Petitioner were

sworn and/or served simultaneously. Consequently,

Petitioner’s three Jury Questions concerning U.S.

Amendment IV & XIV Rights violations were all

eliminated in a Summary Judgment Proceeding when

only one alleged Charge of the three simultaneous

alleged Charges was judged by the VAED to have

Probable Cause.

See Smith v. McCluskev. 126 F. App’x 89, 95

(4th Cir. 2005) {Simultaneous violation of a state

statute prohibiting pedestrians from walking in a

roadway where a sidewalk is provided and a Myrtle

Beach disorderly conduct ordinance [A137-140, G6-7,

J41, 46-47,55-56, 60, L5-9, 014]); Sturdivant v. Dale.

2016 WL 11410292, at *4 n.5 (D.S.C. May 31, 2016),

report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL

3514451 (D.S.C. June 28, 2016) (Simultaneous

violation of reckless driving, failure to give proper

signal, and resisting arrest [Al 41-144, G7, J41, 48-

49, 56-57, L6-9, 014]); McMillian v. LeConev. 2011

WL 2144628, at *8 (E.D.N.C. May 31, 2011), affd, 455

F. App’x 295 (4th Cir. 2011) (Simultaneous violation

of unlawful begging, being intoxicated and disruptive,

and unlawful resisting, delaying, or obstructing a

police officer [A105-110, G7, J41, 49-52, 57-58, L6-9,

014-15]); see also Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th

Cir. 1995) (Simultaneously not following the

directions of Officer Harris and resisting a search

[A181-185, G7, J41, 52-54, 58-59, L7-9, 015]).

Petitioner argues that the Probable Cause used

by the Respondent Vega was knowingly-Fraudulent

Probable Cause based on Respondent Vega’s prior

investigation with two of Petitioner’s Federal

Defendants (Houtz and Allander) in Petitioner’s

belated Disputed Statement of Facts filed on 5/22/19

Subsequently, Petitioner

[A319-323, E15-18],

discovered relevant New Evidence on 8/26-29/19 while

in the Fourth Circuit concerning this knowinglyFraudulent Probable Cause that was judged earlier by

the VAED to exist for the alleged Charge of Stalking

[A595-598, L22-24]. But if the three alleged Charges

had been judged to be sequential by the VAED, one

alleged Charge of the three sequential alleged

Charges judged to have Probable Cause would

eliminate one and only one of Petitioner’s three Jury

Questions. This would have left at least two Jury

Questions for a future VAED Trial so the grant of the

Summary Judgment Motion against Petitioner by the

VAED on 4/24/19 was inappropriate. See Cooley v.

Leung, 637 Fed. Appx 1005 (2/4/2016) (“Jury question

existed as to whether police officers reasonably

believed motorist, . . could have been armed and

dangerous, as would justify pat search, precluding

summary judgment in favor of officers on basis of

qualified immunity with respect to pat search in

motorist’s § 1983 action.”) [A83].

Attorney SW Dawson from Dawson, P.L.C.

failed to present Petitioner’s complete Disputed

Statement of Facts in the VAED [A286-293, Dl-8] on

3/27/19 then the VAED ruled against Petitioner [A3243, Gl-9] on 4/24/19 so Petitioner fired his attorney

and filed a pro se FRCP Rule 59 Motion for New Trial;

Altering or Amending a Judgment with four other

Motions on 5/22/19 [Hl-53 with affidavits and

other verified evidence in VAED Documents

#35-1, #35-2, & #35-3 - A337-575]. Petitioner’s

5/22/19 FRCP Rule 59 Motion was timely and

contained his belated but complete Disputed

Statement of Facts including a Question of

Exceptional Importance (Paragraph 188 — SCOTUS

Rule 10(c)) where Petitioner invoked his

Constitutional of Virginia, Article I, Section 3

indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible Right to

reform, alter, or abolish all Virginia Governments

[A397, H48, L53-54].

The VAED reviewed

Petitioner’s 5/22/19 FRCP Rule 59 Motion for New

Trial; Altering or Amending a Judgment with four

other Motions then denied it in a 5/24/19 Order

(VAED Document #40 - [II]). Apparently, only

Petitioner’s Motion for New Trial was denied [II].

Since this VAED Denial annulled Petitioner’s

indefeasible Right to reform, alter, or abolish Virginia

Governments, Petitioner argued in the Fourth Circuit

[J3] that VAED Document #40 [II] filed just before

Petitioner’s timely 5/24/19 Notice of Appeal was an

Unconstitutional VAED Order [J3].

Further, the VAED did not in a Summary

Judgment Proceeding view all Petitioner’s belated but

reviewed Disputed Facts and draw any justifiable

inferences from those belated but reviewed Disputed

Facts in the light most favorable to the Petitioner

when deciding if there exists genuine issues as to any

material fact requiring a Trial by Jury [A58-59, 102103, 157-158, D3, G5-6, H5, 32, 50, J40, L24, 02324], Because Petitioner has a U.S. Amendment VII

Right to a Jury Trial, in order for the VAED not to

violate Petitioner’s U.S. Amendment VII Right to a

Jury Trial the VAED must view Petitioner’s complete

Disputed Facts and draw any justifiable inferences

from those complete Disputed Facts in the light most

favorable to the Petitioner when deciding if there

could be a genuine issue of material fact for a Jury to

consider in a Trial. But the fact that Petitioner’s

Disputed Statement of Facts was belated was

reviewed by the Fourth Circuit and will be reviewed

by this SCOTUS.

Petitioner argued in the Fourth Circuit

beginning with his 7/15/19 ‘Informal Opening Brief

and Affidavit” that the VAED committed an ABUSE

OF DISCRETION [J55-62] when it ignored two of

the 6/1/15 False Warrants admittedly sworn without

Probable Cause by Respondent in his 12/12/18

Deposition Testimony [A116-118, 332-335, 600-603,

E27-30] and when the VAED concluded the third

simultaneous 6/1/15 Stalking Warrant had Probable

Cause by way of the Totality of the Circumstances

[G6, A39]. See VAED Document #29, Page 8, Note

1 [G8, A42]. After this ABUSE OF DISCRETION,

it was appropriate for and incumbent on the VAED to

review Petitioner’s FRCP Rule 59 Motion for New

Trial; Altering or Amending a Judgment with four

other Motions containing Petitioner’s belated but

complete Disputed Statement of Facts invoking

Petitioner’s Constitution of Virginia, Article I, Section

3 indefeasible Right [A339-399, H6-49]. Because the

VAED did not alter or amend its 4/24/19 rulings

against Petitioner [A32-45, Gl-9, VAED Documents

#30 & #31] after reviewing Petitioner’s belated but

complete Disputed Statement of Facts and because

the VAED annulled Petitioner’s indefeasible Right,

this became VAED CLEAR ERROR of law [J62-65]

as the VAED had not viewed Petitioner’s belated but

reviewed complete Disputed Facts and drawn any

justifiable inferences from those belated but reviewed

complete Disputed Facts in the light most favorable to

the Petitioner when deciding if there exists genuine

issues as to any material fact requiring a Trial by Jury

[A58-59,102-103,157-158, D3, G5-6, H5,32,50, J40,

L24, 023-24], The VAED reviewed Petitioner’s

belated Disputed Statement of Facts then issued a

5/24/19 Unconstitutional Order VAED Document

#40 [II] just before Petitioner read this Order and

filed his 5/24/19 Notice of Appeal (VAED Document

#41) 15 minutes before the VAED closed at 5:00 pm on

5/24/19. Petitioner paid his $505 fee for an appeal in

the Fourth Circuit as he filed VAED Document #41

on 5/24/19. Petitioner filed a 5/26/19, 6/3/19-Courtreceived “Motion for Leave of Court to File

Amendment to Timely Notice of Appeal” adding the

VAED’s last Order (VAED Document #40 - [II]) to

his Fourth circuit Appeal. In the Fourth Circuit,

Petitioner’s complete Disputed Statement of Facts

[A339-399, H6-49] was reprinted in his 8/30/19-filed,

9/10/19-corrected, & 9/27/19-reprinted “Informal

Reply Brief of Appellant ...” as [A339-399, L24-54].

See Petitioner’s 5/22/19-filed, (8/30/19 & 9/27/19)refiled complete Disputed Statement of Facts herein

at [A339-399],

According to Respondent Vega in his 7/30/19

Fourth Circuit “Informal Response Brief of Appellee

E.A. Vega” on page [K28]:

“A Rule 59(e) motion [the denial of which is

reviewed for abuse of discretion] may only be

granted in three situations: (1) to accommodate

an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to

account for new evidence not available at trial;

or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent

manifest injustice.” Melendez v. Sebelius, 611

Fed. App'x. 762 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting

Mayfield v. Natl Assn for Stock Car Auto

Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 2012)

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Rule 59(e)

motions “may not be used to relitigate old

matters, or to raise arguments or present

evidence that could have [been] raised prior to

the entry of judgment. Id. (quoting Exxon

Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n. 5

(2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)).”

Petitioner: 1) discovered relevant New

Evidence on 8/26-29/19 while in the Fourth Circuit

concerning more 3/26-27/07 fraud which was not

available in the VAED because fraud is designed to

deceive and Petitioner was deceived of the existence of

this New Evidence before filing his 5/24/19 Notice of

Appeal [A595-598, L22-24]; 2) found ABUSE OF

DISCRETION [J55-62] leading to CLEAR ERROR

of law [J62-65] committed by the VAED concerning

the two aforementioned Circuit Splits over 18 U.S.C.

§924(e)(l) and FRCP Rule 56 which FRCP Rule is

consistent with U.S. Amendment VII; and 3)

presented in the VAED [A398-399, H49] and in the

Fourth Circuit [A398-399, L54] his Question of

Exceptional Importance (Paragraph #188 SCOTUS Rule 10(c)) as a Motion for Declaratory

Judgment contained in Petitioner’s complete Disputed

Statement of Facts [A339-399, H6-49, L24-54] which

Disputed Statement of Facts explained the Manifest

Injustice created by Virginia’s current Confederate

Police Government [A381-399, H39-52, L46-54]. The

Virginia Governments are contrary to the U.S.

Guarantee Clause [A218]. Petitioner explains this

Manifest Injustice by paraphrasing his 189

Paragraphs/Sections of his complete Disputed

Statement of Fact to minimize going over his 9,000word Word Limit (SCOTUS Rule 33.1(g)) below.

But first, Petitioner fired his attorney SW

Dawson terminating representation by Dawson,

P.L.C. on 5/21/19 without receiving any of his Fee

Agreement’s $22,500 back [See 3/6/18 “Fee

Agreement” as the first Attachment to Document J]

nor other related legal costs back which are

jeopardized by the Judicial Delays of a Fourth Circuit

and a SCOTUS appeals. Petitioner filed his pro se

FRCP Rule 59 Motion for New Trial; Altering or

Amending a Judgment with four other Motions in the

VAED on 5/22/19. SW Dawson had refused to file

Petitioner’s FRCP Rule 59 Motion in the VAED

attacking it as: “rife with irrelevant and demonstrably

incorrect information;” and if it were filed “would be

objectively frivolous” and “thus not a pleading [SW

Dawson] would be ethically permitted to file.”

Petitioner disagreed and still does disagree with his

previous attorney believing SW Dawson was

committing and has committed Legal Malpractice.

Petitioner presented this belief of SW Dawson’s Legal

Malpractice in the Fourth Circuit. See “Affidavit of

Appellant... Mercer [J66-73, A578-590]” filed within

Petitioner’s Fourth Circuit “Informal Opening Brief

and Affidavit [Jl-76]” with 3/6/18 “Fee Agreement”

attached.

Herein, Petitioner has named Dawson, P.L.C.

as a Respondent. This makes sense to Petitioner

based on what happened between 4/24/19 and 5/24/19

in the VAED with SW Dawson and is in the interest of

However, 28 U.S.C.

both Justice and Closure.

§1367(a) (Supplemental jurisdiction) [A225] may be

required to effect this Joinder. Any legal malpractice

case accrues if and when the SCOTUS rules on this

Petition/Case. Petitioner just wants his money back

as outlined in the List of Parties above in order to

prepare and improve his townhouse for his elderly

Mother turning 90 on 7/3/2020; And COVID-19 is

uncontrolled in Tucson, Arizona where she lives

currently. Since 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) may be limited to

action of the District Court only, any Joinder of or

Sanctions against Dawson, P.L.C. might only be able

to be granted by the VAED upon remand where

Petitioner believes the VAED is still obligated to rule

on Petitioner’s remaining three 5/22/19 Motions: 1)

Leave of Court to Amend paragraph 16 [A290, B3-4]

of Petitioner’s 4/16/18 “First Amended Complaint”

[H5-6]; then 2 & 3) from Petitioner’s complete

Disputed Statement of Facts Paragraph 188 for a

Declaratory Judgment Petitioner would use to

convince Congress to reapply the U.S. Guarantee

Clause against Virginia [A218, 398-399, H49, L54] &

Paragraph 189 for Sanctions against Respondent

Vega [A399, H49, L54],

Petitioner’s Disputed Statement of Facts

[A339-399] from his “FRCP Rule 59 Motion for New

Trial; Altering or Amending a Judgment I ... I Three

Additional Motions on Page 5-6 and Paragraphs 188

& 189 [A337-399]” filed on 5/22/19 are adopted by

reference and incorporated herein as if fully rewritten

verbatim hereat again for certain consideration by

this SCOTUS. These Disputed Statement of Facts

[A339-399,

H6-49,

L24-54]

contain

189

Paragraphs/Sections which include Petitioner’s

“Affidavit of Plaintiff ... Mercer [A339-372]” written

within his 5/22/19 FRCP Rule 59 Motion. The 189

Paragraphs/Sections were first filed in the VAED on

5/22/19 [A339-399, H6-49] then filed in the Fourth

Circuit in Petitioner’s 8/30/19-filed, 9/10/19-corrected,

and 9/27/19-refiled “Informal Reply Brief of Appellant

... [A339-399, L24-54]” See A339 where it links H649 and L24-54 to A339-399 in the interest of

Preservation for this Court. There were three minor

corrections made to Petitioner’s Disputed Statement

of Facts as it moved through the Fourth Circuit and

arrived in the SCOTUS which are identified in

Paragraphs/Sections 33, 120, & 134. See [A347, 369,

& 374] for details.

Also “Posequied” became

P[r]osequied (Paragraph #38 on [A349]) and

“Sergeznt” became Serge[a]nt (Paragraph #137 on

[A374]).

Petitioner rewrites his Disputed Statement of

Facts again for brevity and in the interest of Justice

while concerned about the 9,000-word-limit Word

Count (SCOTUS Rule 33.1(g)) clarifying that the

following is not exactly what the VAED nor Fourth

Circuit considered. This Court ought to rely on [A339399] to resolve all ambiguities.

PARAPHRASED DISPUTED FACTS

On 6/9/06, Petitioner was “stopped” by Virginia

State Police Trooper Kenneth S. Houtz (hereafter

“Houtz” or “VSP Trooper Houtz”) for a routine

traffic stop three-car-lengths into the beginning of

HOV-2 (High Occupancy Vehicle 2) on the shoulder of

1-66 Eastbound in Fairfax County, Virginia.

Petitioner had voluntarily stopped earlier needing to

make an emergency phone call to the new babysitter

of his 18-month old daughter. Petitioner’s daughter’s

pediatrician had ordered a diet restriction for

Petitioner’s daughter. This thought had just occurred

to Petitioner. Traffic waiting to exit 1-66 Eastbound

on both the right and the left had blocked both

shoulders of 1-66 before HOV-2 began where

Petitioner found an open shoulder for his phone call.

After Petitioner stopped on the right shoulder of HOV2, he could not find the piece of paper with the

babysitter’s phone number finally concluding he had

left the piece of paper in his daughter’s diaper bag.

Petitioner’s emergency was over. Petitioner was

thereafter waiting behind other stopped/parked

vehicles without an emergency for the HOV-2

Restriction on 1-66 to lift in exactly three minutes after

his emergency had resolved itself [A340-341, H6-7,

L24-25].

During the course of the arrest, Petitioner

interrupted Houtz’s Summons Explanation asking if

his Summons was for a moving violation or was it for

a parking ticket. The Summons Explanation then

resumed to completion and while Petitioner was

literally signing his Summons, Houtz exclaimed that

Petitioner had “ripped the pen out of [Houtz’s] hand”

when Houtz had offered his pen and his Summons

Book to Petitioner for Petitioner to read then sign his

Summons “not as an admission of guilt but that

[Petitioner] was going to come to Court” [A341-343,

H7-8, L25-26].

Petitioner returned Houtz’s pen and Summons

Book after signing his Summons then exercised his

U.S. Amendment I Right non-violently without raising

his voice stating, “I think you are cruel, obnoxious, and

an asshole.” Eyewitness Jong P. Han (hereafter

“Eyewitness Han”) who was simultaneously

“stopped” on 6/9/06 in directly in front of Petitioner

testified in the Fairfax County Circuit Court (herein

“FCCC”) on 3/26/07 that he had been watching the

entire interaction between Houtz and Petitioner

through Eyewitness Han’s rearview mirror where he

was stopped/parked immediately in front of

Petitioner’s stopped vehicle and saw no physical

contact between Houtz and Petitioner [A343-344, H9,

L26],

Petitioner was immediately rearrested after

expressing his U.S. Amendment I opinion of Houtz on

the charge of Felony Assault and Battery of a Law

Enforcement Officer. Petitioner cooperated and was

removed from his car. Petitioner’s hands were then

continuously immobilized on first the roof of his

vehicle while he was frisked, second on the trunk of

his vehicle while Houtz gave out three other Summons

including one to Eyewitness Han, third on an 1-66

guardrail support, then fourth in handcuffs

continuously until Petitioner’s copy of his signed

Summons was separated from his Summons Packet in

the Sully Port of the Fairfax County Police Station by

Houtz while Petitioner still wore handcuffs. Houtz

had Petitioner wait at the guardrail while he

contacted his in-fact supervisor VSP Sergeant Kerry

S. Allander (hereafter “Allander” or “VSP Sergeant

Allander”) to see if it was okay for Houtz to arrest

Petitioner [A345, H10-11, L27].

Uninjured Houtz claimed Petitioner had struck

him during the Summons Explanation Interruption

about whether the Summons was a moving violation

or a parking ticket after which Houtz, who testified he

retained his pen and Summons Book “at all times,”

had backed up into a lane of 1-66 traffic, placed his

Summons Book on the ground, and ordered Petitioner .

out of his vehicle [A343-344, 346, H9,11-12, L26-28].

If one believes Houtz’s testimony, Petitioner

was never asked at the end of his first arrest to sign

his Summons. So when did Petitioner sign his

Summons? Houtz testified in the FCCC on 3/26/07

relative to when he backed up into the lane of 1-66

traffic where he allegedly placed the Summons Book

on the ground which was not run over (the Summons

Book was actually in Petitioner’s vehicle being signed)

that Petitioner had signed his Summons before or

after the point in time when Houtz had backed up into

the lane of 1-66 traffic [A344-345, H10, L26-27].

In the Fairfax County General District Court

(herein “FCGDC”) on 11/30/06, Petitioner with

Counsel was convicted of Misdemeanor Assault and

Battery. The alleged assault demonstration in the

FCGDC was with right-handed Houtz holding his

Summons Book in his right hand and horizontal from

Houtz’s left to his right. The testimony that Houtz

had kept control of his pen “at all times” disappeared

from the Court Reporter’s Transcript. A CD copy of

the FCGDC Court Reporter’s Back-Up Tape had been

edited with an approximately two-second repeat of the

Prosecutor’s words later in the Court testimony

indicative that a section of the original FCGDC

testimony had been moved forward to over-record the

“at all times” section. This created a repeat later in

the FCGDC testimony where the section of the

original FCGDC testimony ended [A346, Hll-12,

L27-28].

On appeal in the FCCC for a two-day trial on

3/26/07 to 3/27/07, Petitioner with Counsel was

convicted of Misdemeanor Assault and Battery again.

Earlier and on 1/26/07, Petitioner’s Brady Request

[A61] for Exculpatory Evidence (the 6/9/06 Police

Report) to compare with Houtz’s volunteered

Summary Notes had been denied using VA Code §2.23706(F)(1) which is now VA Code §2.2-3706(B)(l not

2) [A233-242].

Petitioner’s 5/22/19 Disputed

Statement of Facts Paragraph 33 or Section 33

misidentified the present VA Code as §2.2-3706(B)(2

not 1) [A347]. The alleged assault demonstration in

the FCCC was diagonally downward from Houtz’s

right to his left [A347-348, H12, L28].

Newly

discovered

Appellant

after

jurisdiction transferred from the VAED to the Fourth

Circuit, one of the 3/26/07 to 3/27/07 Jurors (Esther S.

Vorona) left the Courtroom on 3/26/07 with the names

of the other six Jurors most probably to her husband

(Dr. Jack Vorona) who worked for the Defense

Intelligence Agency (DIA) as a CIA Source for psychic

spying, psychokinesis, parapsychology, weapons

research, and mind control. Dr. Jack Vorona was

recognized by the U.S. House of Representatives on

10/11/2011 for “invaluable leadership in developing

scientific and technical intelligence programs during

the height of the Cold War [which] helped keep

Americans safe ... [d]uring a 25 years career at the

DIA.” Dr. Jack Vorona was described, “DIA, TSS

Head, Psi researcher, committee member managing

UFO disinfo., member of the do-called Aviary.” See

[A595-599, L22-24],

Jumping forward to 2020 momentarily, George

Floyd who was a 46-year-old black man in

Minneapolis, Minnesota had his neck pinned under

white Officer Derek Chauvin’s knee for seven minutes

46 seconds [A283-284]. George Floyd needlessly died

on 5/25/20 for no apparent reason due to Police

Misconduct. Rashard Brooks who was a 27-year-old

black man asleep in a Wendy’s parking lot was

confronted by curious Officers Garrett Rolfe and Devin

Brosnan. There was some struggle and Brooks

obtained an officer’s Taser then tried to flee. Pursued,

Brooks turned while fleeing and pointed the Taser at

the pursuing Officers. Officer Rolfe shot Brooks.

While Brooks lay dying from Rolfe’s bullet, Officer

Rolfe was videoed kicking Brooks and Officer Brosnan

was videoed stepping on Brooks [A284-286]. Riots

have occurred across the country because of these two

police misconduct incidents. The People protest for

Justice, defunding Police, and the end to the chokehold by Police. Petitioner personally witnessed

boarded up buildings on 16th Street NW, Washington,

D.C. immediately in front of the White House with

nighttime protesters mainly African American

protesting/loitering all around. “Black Lives Matter”

was painted in huge yellow letters on 16th Street. Will

there be a Dr. Jack Vorona or equivalent anywhere

near the Grand Juries or Juries that will judge Police

Officers Chauvin, Rolfe, and Brosnan?

These Jury Tampering Experts are the biggest

threat to the U.S. Guarantee Clause [A218, 381, H39,

L46] because they create Police Officers and Police

Forces throughout the United States whose

misconduct has minimal or no consequence. These

Jury Tampering cases will most likely not appear

before this SCOTUS at all or will not be “smoking gun”

cases because some doubt will linger due to the nature

of fraud inherent with Jury Tampering. However, if

this SCOTUS is rendered powerless by this doubt

associated with catching these Jury Tampering cases,

the Democracies or the Constitutional Republics of

and within the United States are doomed to

authoritarian

governments.

degenerate

into

Petitioner believes, when caught or when the

likelihood of the existence of one of these Jury

Tampered Police Misconduct cases arises, the

associated State Government should be abolished or

temporarily abolished (suspended) in order to remove

all State/County/City Judges and Magistrates then

retrain the Police at least from where the Jury

Tampering case originated in a containment manner.

Impeachment should not be an option as the

Government is infected and cannot cure itself but the

opportunity for Judges to resign should be extended.

In Virginia, the People have no direct connection to

electing/choosing State/County/City Judges [See

Duncan v. McCall, 139 U.S. 449, 461,11 S.Ct. 573, 577

(1891) & Constitution of Virginia, Article VI, Section

7 - A85, 211-212, 381-382, H39, L46].

These

State/County/City

Judges

and

Magistrates should be considered incompetent and not

be eligible to serve as a Judge again for a period of at

least five years. The State/County/City Police should

be only allowed to resume work after they memorize

verbatim both the U.S. Bill of Rights and all the State

Citizens’ Rights where they work then be orally

examined on the same without multiple choice

questions or any additional help. They could be

trained once per day until they memorize these State

and Federal Citizens’ Rights. Thereafter, the dated

“Oral Examination Certification of State and Federal

Citizens’ Rights Knowledge” needs to be filed with

Secretary of the Police Officer’s State to be a Public

Record available to anyone and everyone on demand,

no exceptions. This will reasonably limit Qualified

Immunity. Warrants sworn by Police Officers must

have all the words used by the Police Officer (all of

them) transcribed with the complete content of what

was sworn by the Police Officer along with the

Officer’s and Magistrate’s names reduced to a

document which document would then be served with

the Warrant on the Defendant, no exceptions. This

will reasonably limit Magistrates from shielding the

Police Officers from liability.

Virginia

must

have

Constitutional

Convention to rewrite Article VI, Sections 1, 2, & 7

consistent with the content of this Petition. The

Supreme Court of Virginia shall no longer be allowed

to interpret the U.S. Bill of Rights and must always

grant to a litigant who invokes a Federal Right that

Federal Right within reason, very few exceptions here

and these exceptions would be for clearly erroneous

invocation of a Right that did not pass the laugh test.

This is Petitioner’s Constitution of Virginia, Article I,

Section 3 indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible

Right to reform, alter, or abolish all Virginia

Governments [A397, H48, L53-54].

Continuing

with

Petitioner’s

Disputed

Statement of Facts, on 3/26/07 Eyewitness Han

testified there was no physical contact between

Petitioner and Houtz [A344, H9, L26]. Eyewitness

Han was then impeached because ten years earlier he

had been caught lying, cheating, or stealing in college

[A344, H9, J12, L26]. Forensic Document Examiner

Ronald Morris verified that Petitioner’s 6/9/06

Summons was signed:

“A[nswer

Forensic

Document

Examination Expert Ronald Morris] The

white document was presented to me as a

certified copy of a Virginia uniform summons

form as page 1. And I believe this particular

document, the original of this is retained by the

court system. I was ... asked to determine ... if

the signatures on these two forms were written

simultaneously. And by that I mean not as one

person writing those two signatures one right

after the other.

... But this particular

document, the yellow copy is what is called a

carbonless sheet, and the document that is

white, in this case, the original of this, I

I have seen the original

understand

document, which is also white - were those

documents packaged up so that the yellow copy

was under the original white copy and then the

signature that was signed in that block, did it

go through all the copies, and particularly did it

go through to the copy identified here as page 3.

...It was for these reasons and others that I

concluded that the two signatures were written

at the same time and that the packets were the packet was one piece at the time the writing

was done [A348, 491-492, 500, H12-13, J12,

L28, Q34-36].

Petitioner needs more letters for already

adopted and incorporated as if rewritten verbatim

VAED Documents (See Page 12 above):

“Q” means 5/22/19 VAED Document #35-1 —

“R” means 5/22/19 VAED Document #35-2 —

“S” means 5/22/19 VAED Document #35-3 These VAED Documents contain Attachments to

Petitioner’s FRCP Rule 59 Motion for New Trial;

Altering or Amending a Judgment with four other

Motions being VAED Documents with “affidavits

and other verified evidence, that there exists a

genuine dispute of material fact” [G5, H5] in

accordance with Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v, Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 n. 10 & 11 and

FRCP Rule 56(c) [A102-103, 263-265, G5, H5].

The 3/26-27/07 Jury convicted Petitioner of

Misdemeanor Simple Assault and Battery beyond a

reasonable doubt sentencing Petitioner to a $2,500

fine without any jail sentence (See Virginia Code

§17.1-410 (A)(1) and (B)) [A348, 649, H13, L28].

Petitioner has been unable to find a job for 14 years

due directly to his violent Criminal Record based on

this false conviction [A352, H15-16, L30].

Before 4/11/07, Petitioner went to the Maryland

Court Reporting Agency to retrieve transcripts of the

3/26-27/07 FCCC Trial (L.A.D. Reporting & Digital

Videography).

The 3/26/07 Transcript of Court

Reporter Janie G. Arriaga had been edited with an

unsigned Court Reporter’s Certificate where the Case

Number of the Transcript was not correctly MI-20062302 but the Nolle Prosequied MI-2006-2343 [A348349, 434-511, H13, J12, L28-29, Q21-38]. Petitioner

requested from the Court Reporting Agency that the

Court Reporter check the 3/26/07 Transcript over for

errors then sign the Court Reporter’s Certification.

Without any other changes to the 3/26/07 Transcript,

the signature “Janie Arriaga” was added to the Court

Reporter’s Certification dated 4/11/07 [A349, 511-512,

H13, J12, L29, Q39]. Petitioner requested and

received a CD copy of the Court Reporter’s Back-Up

Tape. There were approximately seven erasure

episodes almost exclusively during Voir Dire, the

Assault Demonstration, and Houtz’s testimony

(approximately 82% over-recorded with silence) but

where there was audio on the CD copy it did not match

the 3/26/07 Transcript [A350, H14, L29]. Petitioner

prepared an “Affidavit of Corrections” with 143

corrections for Court Reporter Janie G. Arriaga to

notarize documenting all the places where what was

left of her 3/26/07 Back-Up Tape audio did not match

the 3/26/07 Transcript. Petitioner received back from

the Vice-President of the Court Reporting Agency a

severely-shortened “Affidavit” with 60 corrections to

the 3/26/07 Transcript signed “Janie Arriaga” and

notarized by “Rebekah Jean Febus” on 6/8/07 [A349350, 512-518, H13-14, J12, L29, Q40-43], The VicePresident of the Maryland L.A.D. Reporting & Digital

Videography refused to allow Petitioner to meet

personally with Court Reporter Janie Arriaga [A349,

H14, L29],

With a destroyed appellate record and without

the support of Court Reporter Janie Arriaga,

Petitioner paid Forensic Tape Examiner Steve Cain

$7,000 to find and collect the original copy of Janie

Arriaga’s Back-Up Tape and write a 7/5/07 Expert

Report which was filed in the FCCC together with a

Motion to correct the Circuit Court Transcript.

Petitioner exited the FCCC on or about 7/16/07 with

all post-sentencing Motions denied. Petitioner was

estopped from further action with the Court

Reporter’s Certification that the 3/26/07 Transcript

was accurate [A350-351, 407-418, H14-15, J12, L2930, Q10-13], Petitioner’s appeal in the Court of

Appeals of Virginia (hereafter “COAV”), Record No.

0828-07-4 was denied on 10/30/08 with rehearing

denied on 2/18/09. Petitioner’s appeal in the Supreme

Court of Virginia (hereafter “SCV”), Record No.

090536 was dismissed via Virginia Code §17.1410(A)(1) and (B) [Ordinance is not in Appendix Placed at the End of Appendix in Appendix of

Injustice - A649] being a Misdemeanor without

incarceration on 5/6/09 with rehearing denied on

9/22/09. Petitioner’s appeal in the SCOTUS (Case No.

09-8206) was denied on 4/19/10 with rehearing denied

on 6/7/10 [A351, H15, L30], Husband of 3/26-27/07

Juror Esther S. Vorona from FCCC Case No. MI-20062302 being Dr. Jack Vorona was recognized in the U.S.

House of Representatives on 10/11/11 for his 25 years

at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) working as a

CIA Source with accomplishments in psychic spying,

psychokinesis, parapsychology, weapons research,

and mind control [A597, L23].

On 3/6/2014, the Fairfax County Board of

Supervisors (hereafter “FCBoS”) acting as the Fairfax

County Department of Code Compliance (hereafter

“FCDCC”) requested to inspect the inside of

Petitioner’s townhouse which Petitioner denied. The

FCDCC then used the Fairfax County Board of

Supervisors acting as the Fairfax County Child

Protective Services (hereafter “FCCPS”) to violate

Petitioner’s U.S. Amendment IV & XIV Rights

because Petitioner had denied the FCDCC Townhouse

Inspection of his townhouse. After the FCCPS

Inspection concluded without any problems identified,

the FCCPS shared the results of its Inspection with

the FCDCC unconstitutionally in a “grievous and

oppressive” manner contrary to the Constitution of

Virginia, Article I, Section 10 [A352, 208, H16, L32].

Petitioner went to the VSP Headquarters (Braddock

Road in Fairfax, Virginia) on 3/3/15 and spoke with

VSP Sergeant Kerry S. Allander claiming to be a

George Mason University student writing a paper

about previous events in order to learn Sergeant

Allander’s first name and middle initial. He was told

“Terry” but had doubts and found the correct name

“Kerry S. Allander” in a previous 11/28/07 COAV

Filing (Record No. 0828-07-4) [A352-355, H16-18,

L32-33]. Petitioner filed on 3/6/15 VAED Civil Action

l:15-cv-302 alleging a U.S. Amendment IV & XIV

Rights violation and Fraud against 1) FCDCC, 2)

FCCPS, 3) FCDCC employee #1; 4) FCDCC employee

#2; 5) FCDCC supervisor; 6) FCCPS employee; 7)

FCCPS supervisor; 8) FCCC Case No. MI-2006-2302

Judge; 9) COAV Judge #1; 10) COAV Judge #2; 11)

COAV Judge #3; 12) SCV Judge #1 (The deceased

previous Chief Justice); 13) SCV Judge #2; 14) SCV

Judge #3; 15) SCV Judge #4; 16) SCV Judge #5; 17)

SCV Judge #6; 18) SCV Judge #7; 19) VSP Trooper

Houtz; 20) VSP Sergeant Allander; 21) FCBoS

Chairman; and 22) FCBoS [A355, H18, L33],

Petitioner could obviously not serve the SCV

Judge #12 and was unsuccessful serving the FCCC

Case No. MI-2006-2302 Judge who was in Chicago, IL

[A358-359, H19, 21, L33-34, J12, R51]. The FCCPS

Supervisor #7 was served professionally an Amended

Summons in Washington State [A358-359, H19, 21,

L33-34, J12, R50]. The COAV and other SCV Judges

waived Service of Summons. Petitioner was terrified

trying to defend his Federal Rights in 2015.

Petitioner tried to serve everyone privately at

first with Summons [A356, H19, L33-34, J12, R1215]. That worked for Federal Defendants #1-6 & #2122. A Richmond Professional Process Server showed

up at the residence and talked with the wife of a SCV

Judge then Federal Defendants #9-11 &. #13-18

waived Service of Summons. Summonses for 19) VSP

Trooper Houtz and 20) VSP Sergeant Allander with

an Amended Summons on 5/22/15 [A, J12, R40-42]

and an Alias Second Amended Summons on 5/31/15

[A, J12, R34-39, 43-46] proceeded as follows.

All the following documents are Affidavits or

VAED Certified Documents and filed in VAED

Documents R and S. Petitioner hired Virginia

Process Servers, Inc. on 5/19/15 [A358, 556-557, H21,

J12, L34-35, R47-55] which ran “skip traces” on

Houtz and his 6/9/06 in-fact VSP Supervisor Allander

[A358, H21, J12, L34-35, R43, 52-53]. Petitioner had

the VAED issue 5/21/15 Amended Summonses using

the home addresses for Houtz and Allander [A358359, 524-527, 544-545, H21, L35, J12, R24-25, 40],

Houtz was served by Professional Process Server

Patricia Beard on 5/22/15 at 1:23 pm [A359, 531-534,

544-549, H21, J12, L35, R32-33, 40-42]: 1) a

Summons; 2) a VAED Case No. l:15-cv-302 Complaint

with Amendments alleging Fraud; and 3) a CD copy of

Court Reporter Janie G. Arriaga’s 3/26/07 Back-Up

Tape from FCCC Case No. MI-2006-2302 [A359, 533534, 546-549, H21, J12, L35, R33, 41-42], The

5/29/15 Proof of Service for Houtz had the erroneous

date “1/22/15” [A359, 533-534, H21, J12, L35, R33].

The two 6/15/15 Amended Proofs of Service for Houtz

[A359, 546-549, H22, J12, L35, R40-42] correctly

dated “5/22/15” differed in the Professional Process

Server Beard’s address [A359, 546-549, H22, J12,

L35, R41-42] and accompanied the 6/15/15 filing of

Patricia Beard’s Affidavit of Service [A359, 556-557,

H22, J12, L35, R47]. Allander evaded service by

Professional Process Server Patricia Beard on 5/27/15

pretending to be “Renter Greg” as documented in her

6/15/15 Affidavit [A359-360, 550-555, H22, J12, L3536, R43-46] violating the Virginia Code §18.2-409

and/or §18.2-186.3(Bl) [A245-248, 360, H22-23, L36].

Petitioner had the VAED issue an Alias Second

Amended Summons with Allander’s same home

address on 5/29/15 [A360, 527-531, H22, J12, L35-36,

R30-31]. Allander was served by Private Process

Server James N. Powers on 5/31/15 at 8:25 pm [A360,

535-538, H22-23, J12, L36, R34-35]: 1) a Summons;

2) a VAED Case No. l:15-cv-302 Complaint with

Amendments alleging Fraud; and 3) a CD copy of

Court Reporter Janie G. Arriaga’s 3/26/07 Back-Up

Tape from FCCC Case No. MI-2006-2302 [A360, 537538, H22-23, J12, L36, R35], The 6/2/15 Proof of

Service for Allander [A360, 535-538, H22-23, J12,

L36, R34-35] accompanied James N. Powers’ Affidavit

of Service [A360, 535-536, 538-544, H22-23, J12,

L36, R34, 36-39].

Petitioner had followed FRCP Rule 4(a-c & 1-m)

to serve now Federal Defendants 19) VSP Trooper

Houtz and 20) VSP Sergeant Allander [A360-361,

H23, L36]. Along the way, Respondent Vega points

out that Petitioner was in communication with VSP

Sergeant Jerry Fielder [K7], VSP First Sergeant

Daniel Wilson [K8], VSP Sergeant Alvin Blankenship

[K9], VSP Wesley Paul [K10], VSP First Sergeant J.C.

Miers [K10], but VSP Officers/Federal Defendants

Houtz and Allander never communicated with

Petitioner personally providing Petitioner with the

name(s) of Houtz’s and Allander’ attorney(s) despite

Petitioner’s e-mail attempt to extend to both Houtz

and Allander the opportunity to Waive Service of

Summons on 3/13/15 [K8]. FRCP 4(a-c & 1-m) does not

require Petitioner to listen to suggestions from other

VSP Officers of how to serve VSP Trooper Houtz nor

VSP Sergeant Allander. Petitioner believed all those

suggestions were likely misinformation.

On 5/15/15, Petitioner had accompanied Private

Process Server Ibrahim Fetterolf to attempt service on

Allander with Ibrahim Fetterolfs request for

Petitioner to help Fetterolf serve Allander. Petitioner

represented himself as Ibrahim Fetterolf in Mr.

Fetterolfs immediate presence without issue on

5/15/15 while Mr. Fetterolf had Court Documents in

hand to serve on Allander. On 5/15/15, Petitioner

learned that Allander was not actively working as a

VSP Officer which information is not sacred nor

related to the 6/1/15 alleged Identity Theft Charge

with Victim Ibrahim Fetterolf in accordance with

Virginia Code §18.2-186.3 (“It shall be unlawful for

any person, without the authorization or

permission of the person or persons who are the

subjects of the identifying information”) [A245248].

Respondent Vega who works as a VSP Special

Agent completed a hasty and incompetent

investigation on 6/1/15 with Federal Defendants

Houtz and Allander, their two Summonses, their two

VAED Case No. l:15-cv-302 Complaints with

Amendments alleging Fraud, and their two CD copies

of Court Reporter Janie G. Arriaga’s 3/26/07 Back-Up

Tape from FCCC Case No. MI-2006-2302 [A321-327,

El 7-22]. Petitioner alleges Respondent Vega made an

attempt to intercept and seize what would become the

6/2/15 Proof of Service paperwork documenting

Federal Defendant Allander’s successful 5/31/15

Service of a Summons with Complaint before that

VAED Proof of Service paperwork reached the VAED

as noted by Petitioner in his 6/19/15 Affidavit [A362,

557-572, H24, J12, L37, R56-58, Sl-8]. This Affidavit

was attached to Petitioner’s 6/16/15 VAED Motion for

Sanctions on attachment page four [A362, 564, H24,

J12, L37, S2]. This was a justifiable inference from

the Disputed Facts in a Summary Judgment

Proceeding [A361, 378-379, H23, 37, L36, 44-45] that

there existed a genuine issue as to a material fact

requiring a Trial by Jury concerning the 6/1/15 False

Warrants. Respondent Vega knowingly swore out the

three 6/1/15 False Warrants against Petitioner at

issue herein without Probable Cause [A116-118, 332335, 600-603, E27-30]. This was an unethical and

vindictive use of the Fairfax County Criminal Justice

System to effect an advantage in a Federal Civil

Action simply because Petitioner had successfully

served a VAED Summons with Complaint on VSP

Sergeant Allander on 5/31/15. Respondent Vega’s

12/12/18 Deposition Testimony documents that he had

no Probable Cause (Information Obtained nor

Financial Loss of Victim) concerning the two Identity

Theft Warrants for Victim Houtz nor Victim Private

Process Server Ibrahim Fetterolf [A116-118, 332-335,

600-603, E27-30]. Sergeant Allander was not the

alleged Victim of the Identity Theft Warrant with

Victim Ibrahim Fetterolf. Therefore, the knowledge

that Allander was not working on 5/15/15 was never

an alleged crime committed by Petitioner [A118, 333334, 602, E27-28]. See Virginia Code §18.2-186.3 as

noted on the previous page [A245-248].

Since

Respondent Vega’s hasty and incompetent

investigation involving Federal Defendants Houtz and

Allander with two copies of Petitioner’s VAED Case

No. l:15-cv-302 Complaint with Amendments alleging

Fraud by Houtz and Allander [A321-327, E17-22],

viewing all facts and drawing all justifiable inferences

in the light most favorable to Petitioner during a

Summary Judgment Proceeding informed Respondent

Vega of the Fraudulent Nature of the Probable Cause

he then used to knowingly swear out the 6/1/15

Stalking Warrant against Petitioner before Fairfax

County Magistrate Wilson Talavera [A3 7, G4-5].

But why Fairfax County Magistrate Wilson

Talavera issued the three 6/1/15 Warrants to VSP

Special Agent Vega when Respondent had no

knowledge of any Probable Cause for these False

Warrants is the gravamen of this appeal and proves

Virginia has a Confederate Police Government and

has since 1902 contrary to the U.S. Guarantee

Clause [A218].

Additionally, this appeal

distinguishes Messerschmidt v. Millender. 565 U.S.

535, 546-47, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 182 L.Ed.2d 47 (2012)

[Al 12-120, G8-9, H39-49, J3, 30-31,42, L53-57,01617, R6-11] (“[T]he fact that a neutral magistrate had

issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the

officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner.”).

The assumption is that a Virginia Magistrate’s

Allegiance is to the People not to the Virginia Police

Officer in a Virginia Confederate Police Government

with 1971 Constitution of Virginia, Article VI,

Sections 1, 2, & 7!

Petitioner filed a 6/28/20 Application to the

Circuit Justice for the Fourth Circuit (Chief Justice

John G. Roberts, Jr.) to exceed the Rule 33.1(g) 9,000word Word Limit by an estimated 1,200 words based

on Petitioner proceeding pro se in this SCOTUS after

having been abandoned by his attorney in the VAED,

having lost his $22,500 paid to his attorney who

abandoned him in the VAED, and having three

SCOTUS matters being two Circuit Splits with one

Question of Exceptional Importance.

In a Democracy or Constitutional Republic,

People are the Sovereign and they are protected from

Government with Rights [A383, H40, L47]. Judges

enforce these Rights so Judges’ Allegiance to the

People not to the Government (Police) is paramount in

a Democracy or Constitutional Republic [A383, H41,

L47], People’s right to choose their own Judges in a

Democracy or Constitutional Republic was recognized

in Duncan u. McCall, 139 U.S. 449, 461, 11 S.Ct. 573,

577 (1891) [A381-382, H39, L46], Of the seven

Constitutions of Virginia (hereafter “COV”), only the

1850-51 COV allowed the People to elect

State/County/City Judges. In all the of the other six

COVs, the Virginia General Assembly chose all

State/County/City Judges [A382, 392, H40, 46, L46,

51].

In a Confederacy, Government is the Sovereign

and it is protected from the People by Denying

Rights so Government tries to controls of the Judges

[A385, H42, L48]. During the Civil War in order to

remain in the Union, the 1863 West Virginia

Constitution, Article I, Section 1 emphasized that

West Virginia was unlike the Confederacy and

respected the U.S. Supremacy Clause [A383-384,

392, H43, 46, L48-49, 51]. After the Civil War was

lost by the Confederacy, Congress applied the U.S.

Guarantee Clause against the 11 previous

Confederate States changing at least “white male”

voters to “male” voters [A387, 392-393, 643-646, H43,

46, L49, 51]. See Hardeman v. Downer, 39 Ga. 425.

443 (1869) [A91, H43, J5, L49]. The unratified 1864

COV was replaced with the 1870 ratified COV with

Congressional Application of the U.S. Guarantee

Clause [A392-393, H46, L51] and that 1870 COV

contained a restatement of the U.S. Supremacy

Clause as Article I, section 3 [A392-393, H46, LSI52].

The Two Reconstructions, the Strussle for Black

Enfranchisement by Richard Valelly [A147, 393-396

H46-47, L51-53, 029, 35, 38-40] educates that

between 1885 and 1908, the African American was redisenfranchised in a color-blind way consistent with

U.S Amendments XIV & XV [A214-216] with Poll

Taxes against the Poor and Literacy Tests against the

Uneducated. But the 1902 unratified COV applied a

third Confederate Way to disenfranchise: It got rid of

the 1870 COV, Article I, Section 3 [A195] restatement

of the U.S. Supremacy Clause [A218] and allowed

the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia to interpret

the Constitution of the United States with its U.S. Bill

of Rights in 1902 COV, Article VI, Section 88 [A203205] contrary to that U.S. Supremacy Clause

[A218]. Since this SCOTUS has only reviewed such a

small percentage of the cases filed at the SCOTUS

(less than 1% currently [A647]), this made the

Supreme Court of Appeals the Gatekeeper of Federal

Rights in the U.S. Bill of Rights in Virginia [A390-391,

647, H45, L50-51]. With the Voter Registration drive

of the 1960’s, the new 1971 COV ended Poll Taxes and

Literacy Tests but the Supreme Court of Virginia was

still allowed to interpret the Constitution of the

United States with its U.S. Bill of Rights in Article VI,

Sections 1 & 2 [A209-211, 389-390, 397, H44-45, 48,

L50, 53]. This 1971 COV was racially-inspired

which may shed light on the venue for the Unite the

Right Rally in Charlottesville, Virginia on 8/11-12/17

[A281, 392, H46, L51, 052]. This new Virginia

Confederacy, at least today, allows the Virginia Police

to endorse in General Elections the Virginia General

Assembly Candidates as is evident from Virginia Chap

Petersen’s 2015 & 2019 Campaign Signs [A383-384,

572-574,

H41,

J12,

J(attachment),

L47,

L(attachment), S43-44]. This Virginia Practice of

the Virginia Police endorsing the Virginia General

Assembly members is contrary to the 1971 COV,

Article I, Section 5 Right to have a separate and

distinct Virginia Legislative, Executive, and judicial

Departments [A384, H41, L47-48].

The result is that in a Virginia County/City

Courtroom today, there are the Judge, the Defendant,

the Prosecution, and the Police Witness for the

Prosecution. The Judge wants to keep his/her seat on

his/her Bench or move up to a higher Bench. The

Police Witness indirectly and the Police Lobby directly

endorse that Judge’s Electorate being the Virginia

General Assembly Representatives by 1971 COV,

Article VI, Section 7 [A211-212]. Instead of the Judge

having an Allegiance to the People (Defendant)

enforcing Federal and/or Virginia Rights in

accordance with the 1971 COV, Article I, Section 2

(People the source of power) [A206-207], the Judge

has a Conflict of Interest creating an Allegiance to the

Police Witness for the Prosecution who, if upset or

angry, might report back to the Police Lobby which, in

turn, might influence Judicial Elections in the

Virginia General Assembly. And when a VSP Special

Agent requests Warrants sworn without Probable

Cause from a Fairfax County Magistrate, that

Magistrate will issue the False Warrants without

hesitation which distinguishes Messerschmidt v.

Millender. 565 U.S. 535, 546-47, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 182

L.Ed.2d 47 (2012) (“[T]he fact that a neutral

magistrate had issued a warrant is the clearest

indication that the officers acted in an objectively

reasonable manner.”) [A112-120, G8-9, H39-49, J3,

30-31, 42, L53-57, 016-17, R6-11]. Magistrates are

not neutral in Virginia!

So,

this Virginia

Confederate

Police

Government does not enforce Federal nor Virginia

Rights and Defendants have no “clearly established”

Constitutional Rights in the Virginia Case Law to use

to defeat a Virginia Police Officers Qualified

Immunity [A92,124-126, L61-77, 027-43]. Likewise,

Virginia Magistrates issue False Warrants to Police

Officers without consideration of the Rights of the

Defendants where it is assumed the Magistrates are

neutral having nothing but an Allegiance to the

Defendants with their Federal and Virginia Rights.

These Virginia Magistrates shield the Police Officers

from liability because they are biased for the Virginia

Police Officers [Al 12-120],

Picking up from Page 42 above, Petitioner ran

from the VSP from 6/1/15 to 6/6/15 after three VSP

Officers came to his front door while he was at Zinga

Frozen Yogurt in Oakton Shopping Center in Virginia

with his children [A361-362, H24, L36-37].

Petitioner’s roommate alerted him to the presence of

the three VSP Officers. After four and a half days

avoiding the VSP and on 6/6/15, Petitioner was

arrested AT GUNPOINT on the Washington, DC

Beltway (roughly at 1-395 & 1-495). Petitioner’s

Vehicle was Unconstitutionally Searched contrary to

U.S. Amendments IV & XIV [A213-216], his laptop

was seized contrary to U.S. Amendments V & XIV

[A213-216], he received no Inventory List which was

in a Police Report in accordance with Virginia Code

§2.2-3706(F)(l) [A233-237], The VSP stole his laptop

computer because he needed an Inventory List to

effect that laptop computer’s return later [A363, 367,

H25-28, L37, 39],

Petitioner was Unlawfully

Imprisoned for three and a half days in the Fairfax

County Adult Detention Center (hereafter “FCADC”)

in solitary confinement [Affidavit - A362, 559-572,

H24, J12, L37, R57-58, Sl-8] during which, on 6/8/15,

the VSP Unconstitutionally Searched his townhouse

contrary to U.S. Amendments IV & XIV seizing all the

rest of Petitioner’s and his roommate’s computer’s

which the VSP stole contrary to U.S. Amendments V

& XIV [A363, H25, L37-38].

Petitioner’s attorney cost $5,250, the Bail

Bondsman cost $800, releasing his vehicle from the

towing lot cost $560 [A363, H25, L37-38]. VAED Case

No. l:15-cv-302 was lost in a Summary Judgment

Proceeding on 12/17/15 while Petitioner was

overwhelmed with the FCGDC criminal charges,

Petitioner appealed to the Fourth Circuit Case No. 161138, and Petitioner was placed in a Supervised

Release Program [A363, H25, L37-38] which fact

prevented Petitioner from traveling to Spring, Texas

to find Court Reporter Janie Arriaga where a skip

trace indicated she lived [A353, 365, H16-17, 26, L32,

38]. This address turned out to be her son’s address.

After further research, Petitioner found Court

Reporter Janie Arriaga in Woodbridge, Virginia on

3/17/16 as the wife of Alan Beni. A meeting was set

up with the Court Reporter for 3/19/16 when

Petitioner could bring a copy of her FCCC MI-20062302 Transcript, which had been edited to read MI2006-2343 erroneously, for Court Reporter Janie

Arriaga to review [A364, H26, L38]. On 3/19/16,

Court Reporter Janie Arriaga excitedly uttered that

her signatures had been forged on both the 4/11/07

Certificate and 6/8/07 notarized Affidavit [of

Correction]. Court Reporter Janie Arriaga noted an

edit in her 3/26/07 Transcript where “No.” was used as

an abbreviation for “Number” which she never did in

order to avoid confusion with the opposite of “Yes.”

She qualified the forgeries by stating that she had

given written permission for the Court Reporting

Agency to sign on her behalf in certain situations

[A364-365, H26, L38]. Petitioner made Federal Rule

of Evidence, Rule 803(1 & 2) Hearsay Exception Notes

on 3/19/16 of Court Reporter Janie Arriaga’s Excited

Utterances [A365, H26-27, L38-39]. Petitioner found

where notary Rebekah Jean Febus worked and

confirmed she had forged Janie Arriaga’s names on

both the 4/11/07 Certificate and 6/8/07 Affidavit [of

Corrections] by the written agreement of Court

Reporter Janie Arriaga [A366, H27, L39]. Petitioner

had the FCGDC issue a Subpoena for Court Reporter

Janie Arriaga in time for his 3/31/16 Criminal Trial

when Petitioner was acquitted of all charges

associated with Respondent Vega’s 6/1/15 False

Warrants [A366, H27-28, L39]. Court Reporter Janie

Arriaga appeared but was not called to testify in

Petitioner’s Criminal Trial. However, outside the

Courtroom she examined the cassette tape Petitioner

showed her on 3/31/16 that Petitioner understood was

her 3/26/07 Back-Up Tape from FCCC Case No. MI2006-2302 to which she stated without a cassette tape

player available that it “could be” her 3/26/07 Back-Up

as opposed to definitely was not her 3/26/07 Back-Up

Tape which Petitioner noted on his 3/19/16 Federal

Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(1 & 2) Hearsay Exception

Notes [A366, H27, L39],

With the 3/19/16 Federal Hearsay Exception Evidence

where the Court Reporter had identified edits in her

Transcript, this new evidence of constructive fraud no

longer estopped Petitioner from pursuing a Fraud

claim against Houtz and Allander [A, H29, L40], See

In re: Patricia Susan Pfister, Debtor, Robert F.

Anderson, Plaintiff Appellant v. Architectural Glass

Construction, Inc., Debtor Appellee, Case No. 12-2465

(4th Cir. 2014) [A93-95]. Petitioner hired Forensic

Tape Examination Expert Barry G. Dickey, DABRE,

FACFE to document the edits to the FCCC 3/26/07

Case No. MI-2006-2302 Transcript based on the

audible portions of Court Reporter Janie Arriaga’s

3/26/07 Back-Up Tape. Expert Barry G. Dickey

DABRE, FACFE wrote a 4/27/16 Expert Report which

he certified on 5/4/16 and in which he identified

numerous significant edits to the FCCC 3/26/07 Case

No. MI-2006-2302 Transcript [A368-369, H29, L40].

Petitioner hired Dawson, P.L.C. on 3/6/18 to

represent him on or before 3/19/18 in the FCGDC

suing Houtz and Allander for Fraud and on or before

3/31/18 in the VAED suing Respondent Vega for U.S.

Amendment IV & XTV Violations. FCGDC Case No.

GV18005652 was filed 3/19/18 then non-suited on

7/12/18 on advice of Dawson, P.L.C. because there was

no evidence to link Houtz and/or Allander directly to

the edits in the FCCC 3/26/07 Case No. MI-2005-2302

Transcript. The VAED Case No. l:18-cv-346 was filed

3/28/18. Petitioner paid Dawson, P. L. C. $22,500 on

3/6/18 signing a Fee Agreement where “It [was] agreed

that the Firm will put forth its best efforts for a

successful resolution of Client’s pending legal

matters.” See [J(attachment)]. Petitioner awaits

this SCOTUS’s ruling on this Petition for Writ of

Certiorari to determine if Dawson, P.L.C. has put

forth its best effort.

DIRECT AND CONCISE ARGUMENT FOR

GRANTING WRIT

Petitioner adopts and incorporates the entire

previous Concise Statement of the Case Section herein

as if rewritten verbatim hereat. This case is complex

due to its length and VSP deception. Pro se Petitioner

struggles to properly separate the Statement of the

Case from the Argument which overlap in his mind.

Inexperience complicates Petitioner’s separation

efforts so this paragraph resolves Petitioner’s

concerns.

Rule 33.1(d) requires Petitioner to have “most

extraordinary circumstances” to exceed 9,000

words in this Petition. In addition to being forced into

pro se advocacy by Dawson. P.L.C. which took all

Petitioner’s funds for Competent Council then

abandoned him in the VAED, Petitioner has

experienced a Manifest Injustice as described above.

“Manifest” is defined by USLegal, Inc. as “readily

perceived by the senses and/or easily understood or

recognized by the mind; obvious.” This Manifest

Injustice

further

helps

Petitioner’s

“most

extraordinary circumstances” argument for more

than 9,000 words in this Petition plus further justifies

granting Petitioner’s VAED 5/22/19 FRCP Rule 59

Motion for New Trial; Altering or Amending a

Judgment with four other Motions after remand to the

VAED as Respondent Vega pointed out on page 21

above from [K28]. More concisely, Petitioner argues

the following Manifest Injustice:

Petitioner was accused of allegedly assaulting

and battering VSP Trooper Houtz on 6/9/06 which was

cruel and false, Petitioner was forced to rely for his

FCCC Defense on Houtz’s lies contained in Houtz’s

volunteered 6/9/06 Summary Notes without the ability

to compare those 6/9/06 Summary Notes with Houtz’s

6/9/06 Police Report withheld by Virginia Code §2.23706(F)(1). Houtz’s 6/9/06 Police Report had not been

turned over as Exculpatory Evidence on 1/26/07 nor in

Trial on 3/27/07.

Despite Petitioner having

Eyewitness Han seeing no physical contact and a

Forensic Document Expert’s testimony he signed his

Summons which Houtz could not explain assuming

the assault had actually occurred, Petitioner was

falsely convicted of Assault and Battery of Houtz on

3/27/07. Petitioner’s FCCC 3/26/07 Appellate Record

of his false conviction was maliciously edited and

destroyed. Petitioner’s subsequent three appeals to

the Virginia appellate courts then even to this

SCOTUS were denied. Petitioner could not secure a

job due to his false criminal record reporting him as a

violent criminal for the next 13 years.

The

Constructive Fraud of Court Reporter Janie Arriaga’s

4/11/07 & 6/8/07 certifying signatures estopped

Petitioner.

On 3/6/14, the FCBoS unconstitutionally

searched Petitioner’s townhouse so Petitioner filed a

3/6/15 VAED Civil Action alleging a U.S. Amendments

IV & XIV Rights Violation against the FCBoS and

sued Houtz and Allander for Fraud as well. After

successful May of 2015 service of Summonses with

Complaints on then Federal Defendants Houtz and

Allander in this VAED Civil Action for Fraud,

Petitioner (the Federal Plaintiff) was vindictively

arrested in retaliation on 6/6/15 using 6/1/15 False

Warrants sworn without Probable Cause. Respondent

Vega had unethically used the Fairfax County

Criminal Justice System to effect an advantage in a

VAED Civil Action. Petitioner was Unlawfully

Imprisoned in the FCADC for three and a half days

with all his computers stolen by the VSP. His 3/6/15

VAED Civil Action was defeated in a Summary

Judgment Proceeding on 12/17/15 while he fought

6/1/15 False Charges for Stalking and Identity Theft

in the FCGDC.

Nine years after his FCCC 3/27/07 False

Conviction, Court Reporter Janie Arriaga excitedly

exclaimed to Petitioner that her 3/26/07 TranscriptCertifying signatures were both forged and that there

were edits in her 3/26/07 Transcript. Petitioner was

no longer estopped. The 3/19/16 Federal Hearsay

Exception Evidence concerning Court Reporter Janie

Arriaga led to a 5/4/16 Certified Forensic Tape

Expert’s Report by Barry G. Dickey DABRE, FACFE

identifying the edits made to the 3/26/07 Transcript.

Petitioner is acquitted of the False Charges for

Stalking and Identity Theft in the FCGDC on 3/31/16.

Petitioner tried to sue Houtz and Allander in

the FCGDC on 3/19/18 with the New Evidence he had

discovered about Court Reporter Janie Arriaga’s

forged signatures and 3/26/07 Transcript edits then

abandoned that suit without enough evidence linking

Houtz and Allander to the 3/26/07 Transcript edits. ■

Petitioner sued Respondent Vega in a 3/28/18 VAED

Civil Action for U.S. Amendment IV & XTV Violations

associated with his 6/1/15 False Warrants against

Petitioner.

Petitioner’s expensive attorney from

Dawson, P.L.C. fails to present Petitioner’s complete

Disputed Statement of Facts in a' Summary Judgment

Proceeding then mysteriously abandoned Petitioner

when Petitioner lost the Summary Judgment on

5/24/19 in the VAED. Petitioner was forced to proceed

pro se through the Fourth Circuit. In the Fourth

Circuit, Petitioner discovered that the FCCC 3/2627/07 Case No. MI-2006-2302 Jury likely had been

influenced by a Jury Tampering Expert by the name

on Dr. Jack Vorona via his wife Esther S. Vorona who

was a Juror in FCCC Case No. MI-2006-2302 Trial.

Now Petitioner appeals to this SCOTUS for

Equal Justice Under Law about his timely-filed

5/22/19 FRCP Rule 59 Motion containing his belated

but complete Disputed Statement of Facts in the

3/15/19 to 5/24/19 VAED Summary Judgment

Proceeding that Petitioner lost. Petitioner had and

has invoked his Constitution of Virginia, Article I,

Section 3 indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible

right to reform, alter, or abolish Virginia Governments

having an appropriate Question of Exceptional

Importance for this SCOTUS. But, the VAED Judge

had treated three sequential alleged crimes

(allegedly committed 3/6/15, 5/15/15, & 5/31/15) with

served by simultaneous 6/1/15 Warrants as

simultaneous alleged crimes contrary to the way the

Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, & Tenth Circuits had

interpreted 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(l) or the Armed Career

Criminal Act (ACCA). This created a potential Circuit

Split. It was appropriate and incumbent on the VAED

Judge to alter or amend his 4/24/19 Opinion and Order

after reviewing Petitioner’s 5/22/19 FRCP Rule 59

Motion for New Trial; Altering or Amending a

Judgment with four other Motions. The VAED Judge

reviewed Petitioner’s FRCP Rule 59 Motion on 5/24/19

then denied apparently only the Motion for New Trial.

This created a second potential Circuit Split between

this SCOTUS and the Fourth Circuit itself because the

VAED had not viewed all Petitioner’s belated but

reviewed complete Disputed Facts drawing any

justifiable inferences from those belated but reviewed

complete Disputed Facts in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party being the Petitioner.

See above pages 13-15 for this SCOTUS’ and

the other Circuit’s earlier interpretation of 18 U.S.C.

§924(e)(l) being the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, & Tenth

Circuits: U.S. u. Hudspeth. 42 F.3d 1015, 1023-24

(7th Cir., 1994); 1994 WL 592706, 10/28/1994; U.S. v.

Brady. 988 F.2d 664, 668-69 (en banc), cert, denied

510 U.S. 857, 114 S.Ct. 166, 126 L.Ed.2d 126

(1993)(from 6th Cir.); U.S. v. Elliott. 703 F.3d 378,

383-84, 388 (7th Cir., 2012); U.S. v. Petty. 828 F.2d 2

after remand from SCOTUS, 481 U.S. 1034, 107 S.Ct.

1968, 95 L.Ed.2d 810 (1987); US. v. Tisdale. 921

F.2d 1095, 1099 (10th Cir., 1990), cert, denied, 502

U.S. 986, 112 S.Ct. 596, 116 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991); and

U.S. v. Van. 543 F.3d 963, 966 (2008); 2008 WL

4445756, (8th Cir., 10/3/2008).

See above pages 13-14 for this SCOTUS’ and the

Fourth Circuit’s earlier interpretation of FRCP Rule

56: Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. All U.S. 242,

248-49, 106 S.Ct 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986);

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. u. Zenith Radio Cory..

475 U.S. 585-88 n. 10 & 11, 586-87, 106 S.Ct 1348, 89

L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); and U.S. v. Carolina

Transformer Co.. 978 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir., 1992).

Petitioner argues the VAED has violated

Petitioner’s U.S. Amendment VII Right to a Jury Trial

and Unconstitutionally annulled his Constitution of

Virginia, Article I, section 3 indefeasible Right to

reform, alter, or abolish Virginia Governments since it

failed to consider Petitioner’s Question of Exceptional

Importance which in his Disputed Statement of Facts,

Paragraph 188. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the

VAED on 2/3/20 despite Respondent Vega’s use of

Fraudulent Probable Cause concerning the False

Stalking Charge. This Fourth Circuit Affirmation of

the VAED created two Circuit Splits over the “ACCA”

(18 U.S.C. §924(e)(l)) and FRCP Rule 56.

Petitioner’s argument about separate arrests

concerning sequential alleged crimes each with a

separate Jury Question and the ACCA’s (18 U.S.C.

§924(e)(l)) crimes “committed on occasions

different from one anotherwas raised by

Petitioner in the VAED on 3/27/19 in his “Plaintiffs

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment” on [D6-7]:

“As Defendant’s deposition clearly

shows, Defendant did not have any evidence at

the time he took warrants out against [Plaintiff]

that Plaintiff obtained, recorded, or accessed

an[y] identifying information of either alleged

victim which is not available to the general

public. Without such evidence, a prudent

person would not have believed that Plaintiff

had committed or was committing a violation of

18.2-186.3. Further, as Defendant’s deposition

also clearly shows, Defendant had no evidence

that at the time he took out a stalking, warrant

against Plaintiff that Plaintiff had ever been in

the presence of Sergeant Allander, save for one

occasion on which he was merely present as

Plaintiffs process server attempted to serve

Sergeant Allander with- a lawsuit. On this

evidence alone, [a] prudent person would not

have believed that Plaintiff had committed or

was committing a violation of 18.2-60.3, as this

code section clearly states that, “on more than

one occasion [one] engages in conduct directed

at another person with the intent to place, or

when he knows or reasonable should know that

the conduct places that other person in

reasonable fear of death, criminal sexual

assault, or bodily injury.” Va. Code Ann. 18.260.3.

The Court should deny Defendant’s

motion because the facts alleged by Plaintiff

show the Defendant violated Plaintiffs

constitutional rights to be free from

unreasonable seizure of his person when

Defendant took out criminal warrants against

Plaintiff without probable cause of criminal

wrongdoing.”

CONCLUSION

Due to: 1) a Circuit Split created between the

Fourth Circuit and other Circuit Courts over the

interpretation of sequential crimes (allegedly

committed on 3/6/15, 5/15/15, & 5/31/15) with

Warrants sworn and/or served simultaneously (on

6/1/15) as being simultaneous crimes contrary to the

language “committed on occasions different from one

another” found in 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(l); 2) a Circuit

Split created between the Fourth Circuit and both this

SCOTUS and the Fourth Circuit itself over the

Federal court Practice (FRCP Rule 56; U.S.

Amendment VII Right to Trial by Jury) of viewing all

facts and drawing any justifiable inferences from

those facts in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party when deciding if there exists

genuine issues as to any material fact requiring a

Trial by Jury during a Summary Judgment

Proceeding; 3) New Evidence discovered by Petitioner

while litigating in the Fourth Circuit (on 8/26-29/19)

concerning Jury Tampering or Potential Jury

Tampering in Virginia Courtrooms (and specifically

during FCCC Case No. MI-2006-2302 alleging Police

Misconduct); 4) Manifest Injustice occurring during

the prosecution of Virginia Criminal Cases (and

specifically FCCC Case No. MI-2006-2302); and 5) a

Question of Exceptional Importance concerning the

Virginia Government - Petitioner’s 5/22/19 “FRCP

Rule 59 Motion for New Trial; Altering or Amending a

Judgment / [Motion now Moot] / Three Additional

Motions on Page 5-6 and Paragraphs 188 & 189” ought

to be granted then remanded back to the VAED.

While at the VAED, if necessary, Dawson, P.L.C.

ought to be added as a party to this case using

Supplemental Jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. §1367(a)) and

ought to be ordered to pay Petitioner Sanctions.

Respondent Vega should be ordered to pay Petitioner

Sanctions, too.

Further, Petitioner’s Constitution of Virginia,

Article I, Section 3 indubitable, inalienable, and

indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish the

Virginia Government ought to be granted. All

Virginia State/County/City Judges should be extended

the opportunity to resign over the next six months in

lieu of abolishing the Virginia Government. A

Virginia Constitutional Convention ought to be

organized for the purpose of rewriting the

Constitution of Virginia, Article VI, Sections 1, 2, & 7

to allow the Virginia People to more directly elect all

Virginia State/County/City Judges perhaps by

Government

Appointment,

Virginia

Senate

Confirmation, then bi-annual Judicial Continuance in

Office

General

Elections.

Virginia

State/County/City Judge ought to interpret the

Constitution of the United States which is a violation

of the U.S. Supremacy Clause. This SCOTUS ought

to issue a Declaratory Judgment that Virginia is in

violation of the U.S. Guarantee Clause having a

Confederate Police Government as it did during the

U.S. Civil War suggesting to Congress that a Virginia

Constitutional Convention ought to be mandatory in

order to rewrite the 1971 Constitution of Virginia,

Article VI, Sections 1, 2, & 7.

The Virginia

Government should be abolished if any current

State/County/City Judge remains after six months

and any such Judge who resigns ought to be ineligible

to serve as a Virginia Judge for a period of five years.

All Virginia Police Officers over the next three

months ought to memorize the U.S. Bill of Rights and

all Rights of the Virginia Declaration of Rights

verbatim, submit themselves to an Oral Examination

of same, receive an annual Certificate of Verbatim

Rights Knowledge when they pass the examination

with a score of 95% or better, and have a copy of such

Certificate filed with the Secretary of the

Commonwealth to forever remain a free Public

Document . but for reasonable copying and certifying

costs. Police Officer ought to be retested

every year

and be recertified. After three months, no Police

Officer without

Certificate of Verbatim Rights

Knowledge ought to be permitted to serve the Public.

Anytime a Virginia Police Officer swears out a

Warrant, the verbatim content of what the Police

Officer swears must be reduced to a written document

and be attached in full to the copy of the Warrant

served on the Defendant. There cannot be any

exceptions to this Transparency.

Within reason, when a Federal Right of the U.S.

Bill of Rights is invoked/demanded by any person in

Virginia, it ought to be enforced. Petitioner’s Virginia

Criminal Record which is false and bogus ought to be

expunged so he can be employed.

28 U.S.C. §1746 DECLARATION / SIGNED

laws oVryTTUnde/ penalty of penury under the

foregoing is Leand co^cf ^

^ ^

Respectfully Submitted,

On the 1st day of July, 2020

Y S. MERCER, pro se

3114 Borge Street

Oakton, Virginia 22124

202-431-9401

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.