Reply Brief — Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. The Environmental Protection Commission of Hillsborough County, Florida, et al.

Supreme Court briefApr 6, 2021

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No. 20-994

In the Supreme Court of the United States

VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

v.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION COMMISSION OF

HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA, AND SALT LAKE

COUNTY, UTAH, RESPONDENTS.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

MICHAEL H. STEINBERG

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP

1888 Century Park East

Los Angeles, CA 90067

JUDSON O. LITTLETON

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP

1700 New York Ave., N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

ROBERT J. GIUFFRA, JR.

Counsel of Record

DAVID M.J. REIN

MATTHEW A. SCHWARTZ

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP

125 Broad Street

New York, NY 10004

(212) 558-4000

giuffrar@sullcrom.com

Counsel for Petitioners Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. and

Audi of America, LLC

[Additional parties and counsel listed on signature page]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A.

The square conflict among lower courts

warrants review .......................................................... 4

B.

The question presented is exceptionally

important ..................................................................... 6

C.

The decision below is incorrect ............................... 10

(I)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases:

Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York,

340 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ....................... 11

Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm.,

531 U.S. 341 (2001) ................................................... 7

DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia,

577 U.S. 47 (2015) ..................................................... 5

Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air

Quality Mgmt. Dist.,

541 U.S. 246 (2004) ............................................. 3, 10

Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. EPA,

88 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ................................ 10

English v. Gen. Elec. Co.,

496 U.S. 72 (1990) ..................................................... 5

Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,

529 U.S. 861 (2000) ................................................. 12

Hillman v. Maretta,

569 U.S. 483 (2013) ................................................... 5

Murphy v. Nat. Collegiate Athletic Assn.,

138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) ............................................... 5

Riley v. California,

573 U.S. 373 (2014) ................................................... 5

Sims v. Fla., Dept. of Hwy. Safety & Motor

Vehicles,

862 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1989) ................................ 8

(II)

III

Cases—Continued:

State ex rel. Slatery v. Volkswagen

Aktiengesellschaft,

2019 WL 1220836 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar.

13, 2019) ..................................................................... 4

Washington v. Gen. Motors Corp.,

406 U.S. 109 (1972) ................................................. 10

Statutes:

42 U.S.C. § 7543 ................................................... passim

49 U.S.C. § 30103 ............................................................ 8

Rules and Regulatory Materials:

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 4 ......................................................... 5

Miscellaneous:

Congressional Research Service,

Volkswagen, Defeat Devices, and the

Clean Air Act: Frequently Asked

Questions (Sept. 1, 2016) ......................................... 7

H.R. Rep. No. 90-728 (1967) .......................................... 9

S. Rep. No. 90-403 (1967)............................................. 10

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 20-994

VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

v.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION COMMISSION OF

HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA, AND SALT LAKE

COUNTY, UTAH, RESPONDENTS.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

The decision below upends a half-century of uniform

national regulation of automobile emissions. Under the

Ninth Circuit’s erroneous preemption analysis, all 50

states and thousands of localities can freely regulate,

without limitation, any changes that manufacturers make

to their vehicles’ emissions systems after sale. Having injected substantial uncertainty and disarray into EPA’s

regulation of auto emissions, particularly in the most populous Circuit, the decision below warrants this Court’s review.

First, respondents acknowledge the Ninth Circuit’s

square conflict with the Alabama Supreme Court and

Tennessee and Minnesota appellate courts, but speculate

(1)

2

that this conflict will resolve itself when those state courts

read the Ninth Circuit’s decision. But there is no reason

to expect those state courts will defer to the Ninth Circuit’s flawed preemption analysis. Fourteen courts have

now ruled on the precise question presented: 15 of the 26

judges on those courts have correctly found that the Clean

Air Act (“CAA”) preempts state and local tampering

claims against manufacturers.

Second, respondents try to rewrite the Ninth Circuit’s

decision to minimize its breadth and importance. Respondents claim that the decision below permits states

and localities to regulate only when a manufacturer “deceived” EPA. Opp. 19. But the decision contains no such

limitation: the Ninth Circuit held categorically that the

preemption provision in CAA § 209(a) “does not apply to

post-sale vehicles,” and that the savings clause in § 209(d)

preserves states’ and localities’ “authority to prohibit

tampering with emission control systems in post-sale vehicles.” Pet. App. 25a, 30a. Its sweeping decision did not

cite any CAA provision making EPA deception relevant

to preemption.

Numerous amici—seven organizations representing

U.S. and global automakers, part suppliers, dealers, and

other manufacturers, as well as four former senior EPA,

California Air Resources Board, and Department of Justice officials—urge this Court to grant review. Lower

courts have stayed other cases brought by states and

counties pending this Court’s ruling. 1 Even respondent

1

See Order, People v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, Appeal

No. 1-18-1382 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 16, 2021); Env. Prot. Comm’n of Hillsborough Cty. v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 20-cv-2238, Dkt. No.

81 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2021). Montana also moved to stay its case

pending this Court’s decision. Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay, Montana

Dept. of Env. Quality v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, Cause No.

DDV-2016-1045 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Mar. 19, 2021).

3

Hillsborough sought to stay its action against Daimler,

belying respondents’ claim that this petition is unimportant or limited to Volkswagen’s conduct.

The decision below has enormous implications for

manufacturers, which perform emissions updates on millions of cars annually. Under the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, manufacturers can avoid potentially “staggering liability” (Pet. App. 45a) only by first ensuring that no state

or locality deems such updates “tampering” under local

law—far from a straightforward determination given the

complexity of emissions controls. Alliance for Automotive

Innovation et al. Br. 16-17. The cost of doing so (or threat

of suit) will chill even beneficial updates. Respondents’

mantra that manufacturers can avoid state regulation

merely by following EPA standards is refuted by their argument below that “‘[a] vehicle does not have to exceed

emission standards for a tampering violation to occur.’”

Pet. App. 29a. If it has any doubt, this Court should request the Solicitor General’s views.

Third, like the Ninth Circuit, respondents ignore the

text and structure of the CAA and this Court’s instruction

in Engine Manufacturers Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality Management District, 541 U.S. 246, 253 (2004), that

courts look to EPA’s “standard-enforcement efforts” to

identify what is “proscribed by § 209.” Whether viewed

as express or implied preemption, multiple interrelated

CAA provisions grant EPA alone the authority to regulate manufacturers’ nationwide emissions-related conduct

throughout their vehicles’ “useful life,” including federal

emissions warranty obligations to vehicle owners. By allowing 50 states and thousands of localities to bring tampering lawsuits against automobile manufacturers, the

Ninth Circuit’s decision will prevent EPA from fulfilling

its congressionally mandated role to develop and enforce

4

uniform national emissions standards, including by securing quick and comprehensive resolution of environmental

harm.

A. The square conflict among lower courts warrants review.

Respondents admit that there is a square conflict but

downplay it by belittling the state appellate court decisions and speculating that the split will “resolve itself.”

Opp. 23-24.

1. State courts are fully competent to decide whether

federal law preempts their laws and routinely do so. The

Alabama, Tennessee, and Minnesota appellate courts did

so here, independently concluding that preemption applies.

That these courts found the district court’s analysis

persuasive does not mean that they will “revisit” their rulings now that the Ninth Circuit has disagreed. The decision below is not binding in Alabama, Tennessee, or Minnesota, nor is its flawed reasoning likely to persuade those

courts. These appellate courts did not blindly follow the

district court’s decision or treat it as binding. Rather, that

14 experienced judges and justices agreed with the district court’s conclusion confirms why this Court should resolve the conflict.

Respondents wrongfully urge the Court to ignore the

Tennessee and Minnesota decisions because they “do not

satisfy Rule 10.” Opp. 24-25. First, respondents misrepresent the Tennessee decision’s “precedential effect,”

Opp. 24; only decisions designated “Not for Citation” (unlike the Tennessee decision 2) have “no precedential

State ex rel. Slatery v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 2019

WL 1220836 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2019).

2

5

value,” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 4. In any event, this Court routinely grants certiorari to resolve conflicts involving intermediate appellate court decisions and unpublished decisions. See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U.S. 47,

53 (2015) (conflict between one state intermediate appellate court and Ninth Circuit); Riley v. California, 573 U.S.

373, 378-381 (2014) (conflict involving unpublished state

intermediate appellate decision); Hillman v. Maretta, 569

U.S. 483, 489-490 & n.2 (2013) (conflict involving state intermediate appellate decision).

Respondents cannot minimize the split by arguing

“there is no conflict” on express preemption. Opp. 23. All

forms of preemption “work in the same way,” Murphy v.

Nat. Collegiate Athletic Assn., 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1480

(2018): whether labeled “express” or “implied,” preemption “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent,”

English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990). There

is no dispute that whether Congress intended in the CAA

to preempt respondents’ claims has sharply divided

courts.

2. Nor is further percolation warranted. Respondents

suggest this Court should await rulings from, for instance,

the Middle District of Florida, which stayed the case at

respondent Hillsborough’s urging pending this Court’s

decision. See supra n.1. Awaiting decisions from additional courts will only exacerbate the current uncertainty

faced by one of this Nation’s most important manufacturing sectors over the regulation of vehicles that readily

cross state lines. 3

Respondents’ two-paragraph vehicle arguments (at 25) are

meritless. Their assertion that the question presented is “overbroad”

relies on their own recasting of the decision below. Nor is review

“premature” because respondents have not yet obtained penalties;

adjudication of a penalty in this case is not required to decide whether

3

6

B. The question presented is exceptionally important.

1. To try to avoid certiorari, respondents rewrite the

Ninth Circuit’s expansive holding as somehow limited to

permitting state and local tampering claims against manufacturers that “deceive” EPA. Opp. 1-2, 16-17, 22. But

nowhere in the Ninth Circuit’s legal analysis did it mention deception of EPA or identify any CAA provision suggesting that preemption turns on whether EPA was deceived. Instead, the Ninth Circuit held, without limitation, that § 209(a) “does not apply to post-sale vehicles,”

and that § 209(d) expressly preserves states’ and localities’ “authority to prohibit tampering with emission control systems in post-sale vehicles.” Pet. App. 25a, 30a.

The multiple amici briefs negate any suggestion that

the decision below “is important only to manufacturers

who cheat the EPA update process.” Opp. 17. Manufacturers update six million cars annually. Pet. 5. Emissions

controls are highly complex, and updates frequently involve tradeoffs: lowering emissions of one pollutant may

require slightly increasing another, and protecting the engine from damage may require briefly reducing the effectiveness of emissions controls. Alliance for Automotive

Innovation et al. Br. 16-17; Former Officials Br. 8. Thus,

particular states and localities can view any post-sale updates that increase some pollutant as “intentional tampering” to “increase air pollution” under their own local laws. 4

allowing thousands of states and localities to seek such penalties conflicts with the CAA scheme.

Respondents’ opposition (at 10 n.1) incorrectly asserts that

the updates here increased emissions, when EPA found the opposite.

Pet. 12. Respondents wrongly imply that the district court made a

factual finding that the updates increased emissions, when in fact the

4

7

See PLAC et al. Br. 17-19. Indeed, respondents’ own tampering laws do not require showing that EPA was misled.

Pet. App. 12a-13a. Respondents claim authority to prosecute “tampering” even when the “vehicle does not . . . exceed [federal] emission standards.” Id. at 29a.

Thus, petitioners did not “mischaracterize” the decision below (Opp. 2, 17)—the Ninth Circuit was wrong to

“assume” that claims of “intentional tampering with postsale vehicles to increase air pollution” will be “rare,” Pet.

App. 45a. Defeat device cases are far from “unprecedented.”

See Congressional Research Service,

Volkswagen, Defeat Devices, and the Clean Air Act: Frequently Asked Questions, at 12-14 (Sept. 1, 2016),

https://tinyurl.com/VWFAQs (identifying over a dozen

examples involving millions of vehicles).

Beyond being unsupported in the decision below, respondents’ attempt to make preemption turn on deception

of EPA is no meaningful limitation at all. Any state or

locality that dislikes an update—perhaps because it increases an emission problematic in its jurisdiction—could

embroil the manufacturer in litigation over whether its

disclosures to EPA were complete and accurate. For example, respondent Hillsborough has threatened claims

against GM, Pet. 21-22, even though EPA has not claimed

that GM violated the CAA or misled it. Requiring manufacturers to litigate against states and localities over the

sufficiency of their disclosures to EPA would be incompatible with § 209(a)’s sweeping language preempting

even “attempt[s]” to regulate by states.

Finally, respondents’ argument that preemption turns

on whether EPA was misled runs headlong into Buckman

Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 346-352

court was merely referring to one respondent’s (ambiguous) allegations. Pet. App. 65a.

8

(2001), which held preempted state-law claims based upon

misrepresentations to federal agencies. 5 Buckman recognized that federal agencies should address such conduct,

and EPA comprehensively addressed Volkswagen’s conduct here.

In short, to avoid “staggering” exposure, Pet. App.

45a, manufacturers seeking to implement any post-sale

update (even to comply with their obligations under CAAmandated warranties) would now need to seek pre-approval from 50 states and thousands of localities. The

threat of such lawsuits will chill manufacturers from performing even beneficial updates and hamper EPA’s ability to resolve enforcement actions and set penalties. See

Pet. 19-20, 32-34.

2. Respondents’ arguments that “‘conflicting regulation[s]’ . . . are not at issue here,” and that “the Counties’

anti-tampering rules prohibit ‘exactly what’ the Act forbids,” underscore the need for this Court’s review. Opp.

1-2, 18. Under respondents’ reading, the Ninth Circuit’s

decision directly conflicts with the Eleventh Circuit’s

holding in Sims v. Florida, Department of Highway

Safety & Motor Vehicles that “any standard” in § 209(a)

means any standard, “federal or state,” regardless of

whether it conflicts with a federal standard. 862 F.2d

1449, 1455 (11th Cir. 1989). The CAA does not preempt

only “different” standards, as Congress has done elsewhere. 6 Instead, Congress expansively preempted state

With their entire opposition claiming that their lawsuits are

justified because Volkswagen “cheat[ed]” or “deceive[d]” EPA, Opp.

passim, respondents’ three-sentence disclaimer of reliance on fraud

on EPA, id. at 35, rings hollow.

5

6

See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1) (“[A] State may prescribe or

continue in effect a standard . . . only if the standard is identical to

the standard prescribed under this chapter.” (emphasis added)).

9

enforcement of “any standard” because “identical Federal

and State standards, separately administered” could

“easily” lead to regulatory chaos resulting from “different

answers to identical questions.” H.R. Rep. No. 90-728, p.

22 (1967).

Respondent Hillsborough’s own claims against Daimler illustrate Congress’s concern. Hillsborough’s strawman attack—claiming that the Daimler consent decree

does not “express a judgment by EPA that it’s fine for

Daimler to keep polluting as long as it pays more money,”

Opp. 21—ignores that the relief that Hillsborough seeks

from Daimler (removing all non-conforming vehicles from

the road) directly conflicts with EPA’s judgment that nonconforming vehicles may remain on the road and penalties

be paid.

3. Respondents cannot credibly dispute that the decision below threatens EPA’s ability to achieve efficient and

beneficial settlements for emissions violations. Because

emissions systems are controlled by software that, like

any other software, frequently requires updates, states

and localities will often be able to find a post-sale hook in

any EPA defeat device case (which, as noted above, are

not “rare”). Respondents’ contention that overlapping

regulators will make no difference because Volkswagen

settled with EPA despite states and counties having sued

Volkswagen, Opp. 21-22, ignores that at the time of that

nationwide settlement, the only state or county claims

filed against Volkswagen were based on pre-sale actions.

Every court has agreed that the CAA preempts such original manufacturing claims. Now that the Ninth Circuit

has provided a path to escape preemption for post-sale

claims, “manufacturers will be far less willing to entertain

settlements with EPA.” Former Officials Br. 20.

4. The Ninth Circuit itself recognized the importance

of these issues when it invited the government to file an

10

amicus brief “addressing the[] significant questions” presented here. Pet. App. 4a n.4. In declining to express its

views “at this stage of the litigation,” the government

made clear that its decision was no “indication of [its]

views about the proper resolution of this case,” C.A. Dkt.

70, at 2, as respondents erroneously claim (at 17). In fact,

the government’s decision could just as easily indicate

that it did not expect the Ninth Circuit to deviate from

decades of exclusive EPA regulation and the well-reasoned earlier decisions.

C. The decision below is incorrect.

1. Respondents are wrong that post-sale tampering

claims against manufacturers are an exercise of states’

traditional police powers. 7 Because cars are mass-produced and readily cross state lines, Congress placed mobile-source emissions under EPA’s control in Title II of

the CAA more than 50 years ago. See Engine Mfrs. Assn.

v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (mobile emissions “a principally federal project”). Before the CAA,

“only California ha[d] actively engaged in” such regulation. S. Rep. No. 90-403, p. 33 (1967). Respondents’ tampering regulations post-date the CAA by years, and respondents tellingly do not identify a single tampering

case—ever—by any state or county against a manufacturer before Volkswagen.

2. Respondents (like the Ninth Circuit) ignore this

Court’s instruction to examine how EPA enforces the

CAA to identify the “standard-enforcement efforts that

are proscribed by § 209.” South Coast, 541 U.S. at 253.

7

Respondents rely on inapposite dicta from Washington v.

General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 115 n.4 (1972). “[B]road residual

power over used motor vehicles,” ibid., simply refers to states’ authority to regulate how people drive their cars. Pet. 28-31.

11

The CAA’s scheme confirms that Congress empowered

EPA alone to enforce CAA standards against manufacturers, including by regulating post-sale updates to their

vehicles. Pet. 8-10.

The Ninth Circuit’s bright-line rule that § 209(a) “does

not apply to post-sale vehicles,” Pet. App. 30a, renders the

expansive phrase “relating to” in § 209(a) a nullity. Pet.

24-25. As courts and EPA have long recognized, § 209(a)

extends to manufacturers’ post-sale conduct that relates

back to the original design of vehicle emissions systems—

such as a post-sale update changing how a factory-installed defeat device functions. Id. at 25-27. Like the

Ninth Circuit, respondents’ claim that § 209(a) preempts

only post-sale regulations “that would effectively require

new cars to be manufactured differently” (Opp. 28), finds

no basis in the analysis, endorsed by EPA, originally announced in Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York, which

instead turned on whether state regulation impermissibly

placed the “burden of compliance” on “manufacturers” instead of “individual owners.” 340 F. Supp. 1120, 1124

(S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff’d, 468 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1972).

Respondents are thus incorrect in claiming that Allway Taxi’s rule would preempt tampering claims against

mechanics and owners. Opp. 14. Such local claims do not

“relate to” new cars because they do not concern those

who must make “new motor vehicles” in compliance with

CAA useful-life standards. Pet. 27. Post-sale updates are

necessary for manufacturers to satisfy a number of their

CAA obligations, including mandatory new-car emissions

warranties. Attempts to regulate such updates thus relate to “the control of emissions from new motor vehicles”

under § 209(a); penalizing mechanics for removing a catalytic converter does not. Although EPA has encouraged

12

concurrent jurisdiction over tampering claims against mechanics, Opp. 30, respondents cite no similar EPA encouragement of state or local regulation of manufacturers.

3. Respondents’ halfhearted defense of the Ninth Circuit’s sweeping interpretation of “operation” in § 209(d)—

which no party advanced below—is unpersuasive. Rather

than try to justify the Ninth Circuit’s misreading of that

provision or address the petition’s arguments, respondents insist that this misreading was not the “sole[]” basis

for rejecting implied preemption. Opp. 32.

4. Nor can respondents rehabilitate the Ninth Circuit’s implied preemption analysis. Multiple interrelated

CAA provisions grant EPA alone authority to regulate

manufacturers’ emissions-related conduct both pre- and

post-sale. Pet. 8-10, 31. The decision below authorizes

every state and locality to decide for itself which manufacturer updates are “tampering.” Such patchwork regulation would seriously impair Congress’s “purposes and objectives” in giving EPA exclusive regulatory authority

over manufacturers in this area. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000).

Finally, respondents claim that the size of their potential penalties ($11 billion annually) is no basis for preemption. Opp. 33-35. But the CAA’s penalty regime reflects

Congress’s intent that EPA retain exclusive control over

manufacturers’ emissions-related conduct, including the

penalties manufacturers face for tampering through nationwide emissions updates. Pet. 32-33.

13

Respectfully submitted.

MICHAEL H. STEINBERG

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP

1888 Century Park East

Los Angeles, CA 90067

JUDSON O. LITTLETON

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP

1700 New York Ave., N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

ROBERT J. GIUFFRA, JR.

Counsel of Record

DAVID M.J. REIN

MATTHEW A. SCHWARTZ

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP

125 Broad Street

New York, NY 10004

(212) 558-4000

giuffrar@sullcrom.com

Counsel for Petitioners Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. and

Audi of America, LLC

CARI K. DAWSON

ALSTON & BIRD LLP

One Atlantic Center

1201 West Peachtree St.

Atlanta, Georgia 30309

CARMINE D. BOCCUZZI, JR.

CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN &

HAMILTON LLP

One Liberty Plaza

New York, NY 10006

Counsel for Petitioner Porsche Cars

North America, Inc.

MATTHEW D. SLATER

CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN &

HAMILTON LLP

2112 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, DC 20037

Counsel for Petitioner

Robert Bosch LLC

APRIL 2021

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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