Reply Brief — Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. The Environmental Protection Commission of Hillsborough County, Florida, et al.
Supreme Court briefApr 6, 2021
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No. 20-994
In the Supreme Court of the United States
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION COMMISSION OF
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA, AND SALT LAKE
COUNTY, UTAH, RESPONDENTS.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
MICHAEL H. STEINBERG
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
1888 Century Park East
Los Angeles, CA 90067
JUDSON O. LITTLETON
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
1700 New York Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
ROBERT J. GIUFFRA, JR.
Counsel of Record
DAVID M.J. REIN
MATTHEW A. SCHWARTZ
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
125 Broad Street
New York, NY 10004
(212) 558-4000
giuffrar@sullcrom.com
Counsel for Petitioners Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. and
Audi of America, LLC
[Additional parties and counsel listed on signature page]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A.
The square conflict among lower courts
warrants review .......................................................... 4
B.
The question presented is exceptionally
important ..................................................................... 6
C.
The decision below is incorrect ............................... 10
(I)
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases:
Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York,
340 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ....................... 11
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm.,
531 U.S. 341 (2001) ................................................... 7
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia,
577 U.S. 47 (2015) ..................................................... 5
Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air
Quality Mgmt. Dist.,
541 U.S. 246 (2004) ............................................. 3, 10
Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. EPA,
88 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ................................ 10
English v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
496 U.S. 72 (1990) ..................................................... 5
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
529 U.S. 861 (2000) ................................................. 12
Hillman v. Maretta,
569 U.S. 483 (2013) ................................................... 5
Murphy v. Nat. Collegiate Athletic Assn.,
138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) ............................................... 5
Riley v. California,
573 U.S. 373 (2014) ................................................... 5
Sims v. Fla., Dept. of Hwy. Safety & Motor
Vehicles,
862 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1989) ................................ 8
(II)
III
Cases—Continued:
State ex rel. Slatery v. Volkswagen
Aktiengesellschaft,
2019 WL 1220836 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar.
13, 2019) ..................................................................... 4
Washington v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
406 U.S. 109 (1972) ................................................. 10
Statutes:
42 U.S.C. § 7543 ................................................... passim
49 U.S.C. § 30103 ............................................................ 8
Rules and Regulatory Materials:
Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 4 ......................................................... 5
Miscellaneous:
Congressional Research Service,
Volkswagen, Defeat Devices, and the
Clean Air Act: Frequently Asked
Questions (Sept. 1, 2016) ......................................... 7
H.R. Rep. No. 90-728 (1967) .......................................... 9
S. Rep. No. 90-403 (1967)............................................. 10
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 20-994
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION COMMISSION OF
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA, AND SALT LAKE
COUNTY, UTAH, RESPONDENTS.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
The decision below upends a half-century of uniform
national regulation of automobile emissions. Under the
Ninth Circuit’s erroneous preemption analysis, all 50
states and thousands of localities can freely regulate,
without limitation, any changes that manufacturers make
to their vehicles’ emissions systems after sale. Having injected substantial uncertainty and disarray into EPA’s
regulation of auto emissions, particularly in the most populous Circuit, the decision below warrants this Court’s review.
First, respondents acknowledge the Ninth Circuit’s
square conflict with the Alabama Supreme Court and
Tennessee and Minnesota appellate courts, but speculate
(1)
2
that this conflict will resolve itself when those state courts
read the Ninth Circuit’s decision. But there is no reason
to expect those state courts will defer to the Ninth Circuit’s flawed preemption analysis. Fourteen courts have
now ruled on the precise question presented: 15 of the 26
judges on those courts have correctly found that the Clean
Air Act (“CAA”) preempts state and local tampering
claims against manufacturers.
Second, respondents try to rewrite the Ninth Circuit’s
decision to minimize its breadth and importance. Respondents claim that the decision below permits states
and localities to regulate only when a manufacturer “deceived” EPA. Opp. 19. But the decision contains no such
limitation: the Ninth Circuit held categorically that the
preemption provision in CAA § 209(a) “does not apply to
post-sale vehicles,” and that the savings clause in § 209(d)
preserves states’ and localities’ “authority to prohibit
tampering with emission control systems in post-sale vehicles.” Pet. App. 25a, 30a. Its sweeping decision did not
cite any CAA provision making EPA deception relevant
to preemption.
Numerous amici—seven organizations representing
U.S. and global automakers, part suppliers, dealers, and
other manufacturers, as well as four former senior EPA,
California Air Resources Board, and Department of Justice officials—urge this Court to grant review. Lower
courts have stayed other cases brought by states and
counties pending this Court’s ruling. 1 Even respondent
1
See Order, People v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, Appeal
No. 1-18-1382 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 16, 2021); Env. Prot. Comm’n of Hillsborough Cty. v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 20-cv-2238, Dkt. No.
81 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2021). Montana also moved to stay its case
pending this Court’s decision. Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay, Montana
Dept. of Env. Quality v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, Cause No.
DDV-2016-1045 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Mar. 19, 2021).
3
Hillsborough sought to stay its action against Daimler,
belying respondents’ claim that this petition is unimportant or limited to Volkswagen’s conduct.
The decision below has enormous implications for
manufacturers, which perform emissions updates on millions of cars annually. Under the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, manufacturers can avoid potentially “staggering liability” (Pet. App. 45a) only by first ensuring that no state
or locality deems such updates “tampering” under local
law—far from a straightforward determination given the
complexity of emissions controls. Alliance for Automotive
Innovation et al. Br. 16-17. The cost of doing so (or threat
of suit) will chill even beneficial updates. Respondents’
mantra that manufacturers can avoid state regulation
merely by following EPA standards is refuted by their argument below that “‘[a] vehicle does not have to exceed
emission standards for a tampering violation to occur.’”
Pet. App. 29a. If it has any doubt, this Court should request the Solicitor General’s views.
Third, like the Ninth Circuit, respondents ignore the
text and structure of the CAA and this Court’s instruction
in Engine Manufacturers Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality Management District, 541 U.S. 246, 253 (2004), that
courts look to EPA’s “standard-enforcement efforts” to
identify what is “proscribed by § 209.” Whether viewed
as express or implied preemption, multiple interrelated
CAA provisions grant EPA alone the authority to regulate manufacturers’ nationwide emissions-related conduct
throughout their vehicles’ “useful life,” including federal
emissions warranty obligations to vehicle owners. By allowing 50 states and thousands of localities to bring tampering lawsuits against automobile manufacturers, the
Ninth Circuit’s decision will prevent EPA from fulfilling
its congressionally mandated role to develop and enforce
4
uniform national emissions standards, including by securing quick and comprehensive resolution of environmental
harm.
A. The square conflict among lower courts warrants review.
Respondents admit that there is a square conflict but
downplay it by belittling the state appellate court decisions and speculating that the split will “resolve itself.”
Opp. 23-24.
1. State courts are fully competent to decide whether
federal law preempts their laws and routinely do so. The
Alabama, Tennessee, and Minnesota appellate courts did
so here, independently concluding that preemption applies.
That these courts found the district court’s analysis
persuasive does not mean that they will “revisit” their rulings now that the Ninth Circuit has disagreed. The decision below is not binding in Alabama, Tennessee, or Minnesota, nor is its flawed reasoning likely to persuade those
courts. These appellate courts did not blindly follow the
district court’s decision or treat it as binding. Rather, that
14 experienced judges and justices agreed with the district court’s conclusion confirms why this Court should resolve the conflict.
Respondents wrongfully urge the Court to ignore the
Tennessee and Minnesota decisions because they “do not
satisfy Rule 10.” Opp. 24-25. First, respondents misrepresent the Tennessee decision’s “precedential effect,”
Opp. 24; only decisions designated “Not for Citation” (unlike the Tennessee decision 2) have “no precedential
State ex rel. Slatery v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 2019
WL 1220836 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2019).
2
5
value,” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 4. In any event, this Court routinely grants certiorari to resolve conflicts involving intermediate appellate court decisions and unpublished decisions. See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U.S. 47,
53 (2015) (conflict between one state intermediate appellate court and Ninth Circuit); Riley v. California, 573 U.S.
373, 378-381 (2014) (conflict involving unpublished state
intermediate appellate decision); Hillman v. Maretta, 569
U.S. 483, 489-490 & n.2 (2013) (conflict involving state intermediate appellate decision).
Respondents cannot minimize the split by arguing
“there is no conflict” on express preemption. Opp. 23. All
forms of preemption “work in the same way,” Murphy v.
Nat. Collegiate Athletic Assn., 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1480
(2018): whether labeled “express” or “implied,” preemption “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent,”
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990). There
is no dispute that whether Congress intended in the CAA
to preempt respondents’ claims has sharply divided
courts.
2. Nor is further percolation warranted. Respondents
suggest this Court should await rulings from, for instance,
the Middle District of Florida, which stayed the case at
respondent Hillsborough’s urging pending this Court’s
decision. See supra n.1. Awaiting decisions from additional courts will only exacerbate the current uncertainty
faced by one of this Nation’s most important manufacturing sectors over the regulation of vehicles that readily
cross state lines. 3
Respondents’ two-paragraph vehicle arguments (at 25) are
meritless. Their assertion that the question presented is “overbroad”
relies on their own recasting of the decision below. Nor is review
“premature” because respondents have not yet obtained penalties;
adjudication of a penalty in this case is not required to decide whether
3
6
B. The question presented is exceptionally important.
1. To try to avoid certiorari, respondents rewrite the
Ninth Circuit’s expansive holding as somehow limited to
permitting state and local tampering claims against manufacturers that “deceive” EPA. Opp. 1-2, 16-17, 22. But
nowhere in the Ninth Circuit’s legal analysis did it mention deception of EPA or identify any CAA provision suggesting that preemption turns on whether EPA was deceived. Instead, the Ninth Circuit held, without limitation, that § 209(a) “does not apply to post-sale vehicles,”
and that § 209(d) expressly preserves states’ and localities’ “authority to prohibit tampering with emission control systems in post-sale vehicles.” Pet. App. 25a, 30a.
The multiple amici briefs negate any suggestion that
the decision below “is important only to manufacturers
who cheat the EPA update process.” Opp. 17. Manufacturers update six million cars annually. Pet. 5. Emissions
controls are highly complex, and updates frequently involve tradeoffs: lowering emissions of one pollutant may
require slightly increasing another, and protecting the engine from damage may require briefly reducing the effectiveness of emissions controls. Alliance for Automotive
Innovation et al. Br. 16-17; Former Officials Br. 8. Thus,
particular states and localities can view any post-sale updates that increase some pollutant as “intentional tampering” to “increase air pollution” under their own local laws. 4
allowing thousands of states and localities to seek such penalties conflicts with the CAA scheme.
Respondents’ opposition (at 10 n.1) incorrectly asserts that
the updates here increased emissions, when EPA found the opposite.
Pet. 12. Respondents wrongly imply that the district court made a
factual finding that the updates increased emissions, when in fact the
4
7
See PLAC et al. Br. 17-19. Indeed, respondents’ own tampering laws do not require showing that EPA was misled.
Pet. App. 12a-13a. Respondents claim authority to prosecute “tampering” even when the “vehicle does not . . . exceed [federal] emission standards.” Id. at 29a.
Thus, petitioners did not “mischaracterize” the decision below (Opp. 2, 17)—the Ninth Circuit was wrong to
“assume” that claims of “intentional tampering with postsale vehicles to increase air pollution” will be “rare,” Pet.
App. 45a. Defeat device cases are far from “unprecedented.”
See Congressional Research Service,
Volkswagen, Defeat Devices, and the Clean Air Act: Frequently Asked Questions, at 12-14 (Sept. 1, 2016),
https://tinyurl.com/VWFAQs (identifying over a dozen
examples involving millions of vehicles).
Beyond being unsupported in the decision below, respondents’ attempt to make preemption turn on deception
of EPA is no meaningful limitation at all. Any state or
locality that dislikes an update—perhaps because it increases an emission problematic in its jurisdiction—could
embroil the manufacturer in litigation over whether its
disclosures to EPA were complete and accurate. For example, respondent Hillsborough has threatened claims
against GM, Pet. 21-22, even though EPA has not claimed
that GM violated the CAA or misled it. Requiring manufacturers to litigate against states and localities over the
sufficiency of their disclosures to EPA would be incompatible with § 209(a)’s sweeping language preempting
even “attempt[s]” to regulate by states.
Finally, respondents’ argument that preemption turns
on whether EPA was misled runs headlong into Buckman
Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 346-352
court was merely referring to one respondent’s (ambiguous) allegations. Pet. App. 65a.
8
(2001), which held preempted state-law claims based upon
misrepresentations to federal agencies. 5 Buckman recognized that federal agencies should address such conduct,
and EPA comprehensively addressed Volkswagen’s conduct here.
In short, to avoid “staggering” exposure, Pet. App.
45a, manufacturers seeking to implement any post-sale
update (even to comply with their obligations under CAAmandated warranties) would now need to seek pre-approval from 50 states and thousands of localities. The
threat of such lawsuits will chill manufacturers from performing even beneficial updates and hamper EPA’s ability to resolve enforcement actions and set penalties. See
Pet. 19-20, 32-34.
2. Respondents’ arguments that “‘conflicting regulation[s]’ . . . are not at issue here,” and that “the Counties’
anti-tampering rules prohibit ‘exactly what’ the Act forbids,” underscore the need for this Court’s review. Opp.
1-2, 18. Under respondents’ reading, the Ninth Circuit’s
decision directly conflicts with the Eleventh Circuit’s
holding in Sims v. Florida, Department of Highway
Safety & Motor Vehicles that “any standard” in § 209(a)
means any standard, “federal or state,” regardless of
whether it conflicts with a federal standard. 862 F.2d
1449, 1455 (11th Cir. 1989). The CAA does not preempt
only “different” standards, as Congress has done elsewhere. 6 Instead, Congress expansively preempted state
With their entire opposition claiming that their lawsuits are
justified because Volkswagen “cheat[ed]” or “deceive[d]” EPA, Opp.
passim, respondents’ three-sentence disclaimer of reliance on fraud
on EPA, id. at 35, rings hollow.
5
6
See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1) (“[A] State may prescribe or
continue in effect a standard . . . only if the standard is identical to
the standard prescribed under this chapter.” (emphasis added)).
9
enforcement of “any standard” because “identical Federal
and State standards, separately administered” could
“easily” lead to regulatory chaos resulting from “different
answers to identical questions.” H.R. Rep. No. 90-728, p.
22 (1967).
Respondent Hillsborough’s own claims against Daimler illustrate Congress’s concern. Hillsborough’s strawman attack—claiming that the Daimler consent decree
does not “express a judgment by EPA that it’s fine for
Daimler to keep polluting as long as it pays more money,”
Opp. 21—ignores that the relief that Hillsborough seeks
from Daimler (removing all non-conforming vehicles from
the road) directly conflicts with EPA’s judgment that nonconforming vehicles may remain on the road and penalties
be paid.
3. Respondents cannot credibly dispute that the decision below threatens EPA’s ability to achieve efficient and
beneficial settlements for emissions violations. Because
emissions systems are controlled by software that, like
any other software, frequently requires updates, states
and localities will often be able to find a post-sale hook in
any EPA defeat device case (which, as noted above, are
not “rare”). Respondents’ contention that overlapping
regulators will make no difference because Volkswagen
settled with EPA despite states and counties having sued
Volkswagen, Opp. 21-22, ignores that at the time of that
nationwide settlement, the only state or county claims
filed against Volkswagen were based on pre-sale actions.
Every court has agreed that the CAA preempts such original manufacturing claims. Now that the Ninth Circuit
has provided a path to escape preemption for post-sale
claims, “manufacturers will be far less willing to entertain
settlements with EPA.” Former Officials Br. 20.
4. The Ninth Circuit itself recognized the importance
of these issues when it invited the government to file an
10
amicus brief “addressing the[] significant questions” presented here. Pet. App. 4a n.4. In declining to express its
views “at this stage of the litigation,” the government
made clear that its decision was no “indication of [its]
views about the proper resolution of this case,” C.A. Dkt.
70, at 2, as respondents erroneously claim (at 17). In fact,
the government’s decision could just as easily indicate
that it did not expect the Ninth Circuit to deviate from
decades of exclusive EPA regulation and the well-reasoned earlier decisions.
C. The decision below is incorrect.
1. Respondents are wrong that post-sale tampering
claims against manufacturers are an exercise of states’
traditional police powers. 7 Because cars are mass-produced and readily cross state lines, Congress placed mobile-source emissions under EPA’s control in Title II of
the CAA more than 50 years ago. See Engine Mfrs. Assn.
v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (mobile emissions “a principally federal project”). Before the CAA,
“only California ha[d] actively engaged in” such regulation. S. Rep. No. 90-403, p. 33 (1967). Respondents’ tampering regulations post-date the CAA by years, and respondents tellingly do not identify a single tampering
case—ever—by any state or county against a manufacturer before Volkswagen.
2. Respondents (like the Ninth Circuit) ignore this
Court’s instruction to examine how EPA enforces the
CAA to identify the “standard-enforcement efforts that
are proscribed by § 209.” South Coast, 541 U.S. at 253.
7
Respondents rely on inapposite dicta from Washington v.
General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 115 n.4 (1972). “[B]road residual
power over used motor vehicles,” ibid., simply refers to states’ authority to regulate how people drive their cars. Pet. 28-31.
11
The CAA’s scheme confirms that Congress empowered
EPA alone to enforce CAA standards against manufacturers, including by regulating post-sale updates to their
vehicles. Pet. 8-10.
The Ninth Circuit’s bright-line rule that § 209(a) “does
not apply to post-sale vehicles,” Pet. App. 30a, renders the
expansive phrase “relating to” in § 209(a) a nullity. Pet.
24-25. As courts and EPA have long recognized, § 209(a)
extends to manufacturers’ post-sale conduct that relates
back to the original design of vehicle emissions systems—
such as a post-sale update changing how a factory-installed defeat device functions. Id. at 25-27. Like the
Ninth Circuit, respondents’ claim that § 209(a) preempts
only post-sale regulations “that would effectively require
new cars to be manufactured differently” (Opp. 28), finds
no basis in the analysis, endorsed by EPA, originally announced in Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York, which
instead turned on whether state regulation impermissibly
placed the “burden of compliance” on “manufacturers” instead of “individual owners.” 340 F. Supp. 1120, 1124
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff’d, 468 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1972).
Respondents are thus incorrect in claiming that Allway Taxi’s rule would preempt tampering claims against
mechanics and owners. Opp. 14. Such local claims do not
“relate to” new cars because they do not concern those
who must make “new motor vehicles” in compliance with
CAA useful-life standards. Pet. 27. Post-sale updates are
necessary for manufacturers to satisfy a number of their
CAA obligations, including mandatory new-car emissions
warranties. Attempts to regulate such updates thus relate to “the control of emissions from new motor vehicles”
under § 209(a); penalizing mechanics for removing a catalytic converter does not. Although EPA has encouraged
12
concurrent jurisdiction over tampering claims against mechanics, Opp. 30, respondents cite no similar EPA encouragement of state or local regulation of manufacturers.
3. Respondents’ halfhearted defense of the Ninth Circuit’s sweeping interpretation of “operation” in § 209(d)—
which no party advanced below—is unpersuasive. Rather
than try to justify the Ninth Circuit’s misreading of that
provision or address the petition’s arguments, respondents insist that this misreading was not the “sole[]” basis
for rejecting implied preemption. Opp. 32.
4. Nor can respondents rehabilitate the Ninth Circuit’s implied preemption analysis. Multiple interrelated
CAA provisions grant EPA alone authority to regulate
manufacturers’ emissions-related conduct both pre- and
post-sale. Pet. 8-10, 31. The decision below authorizes
every state and locality to decide for itself which manufacturer updates are “tampering.” Such patchwork regulation would seriously impair Congress’s “purposes and objectives” in giving EPA exclusive regulatory authority
over manufacturers in this area. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000).
Finally, respondents claim that the size of their potential penalties ($11 billion annually) is no basis for preemption. Opp. 33-35. But the CAA’s penalty regime reflects
Congress’s intent that EPA retain exclusive control over
manufacturers’ emissions-related conduct, including the
penalties manufacturers face for tampering through nationwide emissions updates. Pet. 32-33.
13
Respectfully submitted.
MICHAEL H. STEINBERG
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
1888 Century Park East
Los Angeles, CA 90067
JUDSON O. LITTLETON
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
1700 New York Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
ROBERT J. GIUFFRA, JR.
Counsel of Record
DAVID M.J. REIN
MATTHEW A. SCHWARTZ
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
125 Broad Street
New York, NY 10004
(212) 558-4000
giuffrar@sullcrom.com
Counsel for Petitioners Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. and
Audi of America, LLC
CARI K. DAWSON
ALSTON & BIRD LLP
One Atlantic Center
1201 West Peachtree St.
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
CARMINE D. BOCCUZZI, JR.
CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN &
HAMILTON LLP
One Liberty Plaza
New York, NY 10006
Counsel for Petitioner Porsche Cars
North America, Inc.
MATTHEW D. SLATER
CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN &
HAMILTON LLP
2112 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20037
Counsel for Petitioner
Robert Bosch LLC
APRIL 2021
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