Amicus Curiae Brief — Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. The Environmental Protection Commission of Hillsborough County, Florida, et al.

Supreme Court briefFeb 16, 2021

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No. 20-994

In the Supreme Court of the United States

VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION COMMISSION OF

HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA, AND SALT LAKE

COUNTY, UTAH,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR PRODUCT LIABILITY ADVISORY

COUNCIL, INC. AND MOTOR & EQUIPMENT

MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION AS AMICI

CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

NICOLE A. SAHARSKY

Counsel of Record

ERIC A. WHITE

Mayer Brown LLP

1999 K Street, NW

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 263-3000

nsaharsky@mayerbrown.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.,

preempts state and local governments from regulating

manufacturers’ post-sale, nationwide updates to vehicle emission software systems.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE .......................1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT ...............................................................3

ARGUMENT ...............................................................5

I. The Question Presented Is Important ..................5

II. The Decision Below Is Wrong ................................8

A. The Clean Air Act Expressly Preempts

State And Local Regulation Of PostSale Emission System Updates .......................8

B. The Clean Air Act Impliedly Preempts

State And Local Regulation Of PostSale Emission System Updates ..................... 11

III.If Left Uncorrected, The Decision Below

Would Create An Unworkable Patchwork

Of Regulations And Ultimately Would

Harm Consumers ................................................. 16

A. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Would

Create A Patchwork of Emissions

Regulations ..................................................... 16

B. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Would

Encourage Expensive And Needless

Litigation ........................................................ 17

C. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Would

Dramatically Raise Costs For

Manufacturers ................................................ 19

D. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision

Ultimately Would Harm Consumers ............. 21

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 24

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York,

340 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ................ 10, 13

Caplinger v. Medtronic, Inc.,

784 F.3d 1335 (10th Cir. 2015) ............................ 20

Center for Auto Safety v. Peck,

751 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ............................ 21

Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA,

88 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir 1996) ....................... passim

Environmental Prot. Comm’n of Hillsborough

Cty. v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC,

No. 20-cv-2238 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2020) .......... 18

Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,

529 U.S. 861 (2000) ........................................ 11, 12

Jensen Family Farms, Inc. v. Monterey

Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist.,

644 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2011) ................................ 14

Massachusetts v. EPA,

549 U.S. 497 (2007) .............................................. 12

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

504 U.S. 374 (1992) ................................................ 9

Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett,

570 U.S. 472 (2013) .............................................. 12

New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tr.,

462 U.S. 324 (1983) .............................................. 20

Purolator Prods., Inc. v. FTC,

352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965) ................................ 21

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Cases – continued

Page(s)

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,

331 U.S. 218 (1947) .............................................. 12

Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n,

552 U.S. 364 (2008) .............................................. 17

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,

463 U.S. 85 (1983) .................................................. 9

Sims v. Florida Dept. of Hwy. Safety & Motor

Vehicles, 862 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1989) .............. 8

United States v. Locke,

529 U.S. 89 (2000) ................................................ 12

Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n,

531 U.S. 457 (2001) .............................................. 14

Statute

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.:

42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(3) ............................................. 14

42 U.S.C. 7511...................................................... 14

42 U.S.C. 7511a.................................................... 14

42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1) ................................... 6, 13, 15

42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(4)(B) ........................................ 15

42 U.S.C. 7541...................................................... 14

42 U.S.C. 7541(c)(1) ............................................. 13

42 U.S.C. 7541(h)(2) ............................................. 14

42 U.S.C. 7543...................................................... 14

42 U.S.C. 7543(a) ......................................... 8, 9, 14

42 U.S.C. 7543(b) ................................................. 12

42 U.S.C. 7543(d) ................................................. 10

42 U.S.C. 7550(3) ................................................... 9

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Regulations and rules

Page(s)

40 C.F.R.:

85.1903(a) ............................................................. 13

86.1845-04 ............................................................ 13

59 Fed. Reg. 31,306 (Jun. 17, 1994).......................... 10

Sup. Ct. R.:

37.2(a) ..................................................................... 1

37.6 ......................................................................... 1

Other authorities

Press Release, BMW Group, BMW Group Rolls

Out Biggest Remote Software Upgrade In

Company History (Oct. 16, 2020),

https://perma.cc/4J8B-78NN ............................... 22

Congressional Research Service, Motor Vehicle

Safety: Issues for Congress (Jan. 26, 2021),

https://perma.cc/GC8Q-PTBU ............................. 23

EPA, 2014-2017 Vehicle Engine Compliance

Activities Progress Report (Apr. 2019),

https://perma.cc/5HKD-JKG4.......................... 5, 20

H.R. Rep. No. 728, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) ...... 16

Kim Hill et al., Contribution of the Auto

Industry to the Economies of All Fifty

States and the United States, Center for

Automotive Research (Jan. 2015),

https://perma.cc/TXT3-7NNU ............................ 7, 8

Doug Newcomb, The Upsides and Downside of

Over-the-Air Software Updates for Automobile

Dealers, WardsAuto (Nov. 6, 2020),

https://perma.cc/ZH8F-XASG .............................. 22

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Other authorities – continued

Page(s)

John R. Quain, With Benefits – and Risks –

Software Updates Are Coming to the Car,

Digital Trends (Oct. 29, 2018),

https://perma.cc/LVE6-VL5W .................... 6, 22, 23

S. Rep. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) ........... 11

Statista, Number of Motor Vehicles Registered in

the United States from 1990 to 2019 (Nov. 2020),

https://perma.cc/N9YJ-VWU7 ............................... 6

Statista, U.S. Automobile Registrations in 2018,

by State (Dec. 2019),

https://perma.cc/6UFW-VE7L ............................... 6

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Automotive

Industry: Employment, Earnings, and

Hours (Feb. 11, 2021),

https://perma.cc/37Q3-9HZU ................................. 7

U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, Bureau of

Transportation Statistics,

https://perma.cc/RVV9-QEWM ............................ 23

Bill Vlasic and Nick Bunkley, Obama Is Upbeat

for GM’s Future, N.Y. Times (Jun. 1, 2009),

https://perma.cc/8PB8-2SBF................................ 21

BRIEF OF PRODUCT LIABILITY ADVISORY

COUNCIL, INC. AND MOTOR &

EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS

ASSOCIATION AS AMICI CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE

Amici are the Product Liability Advisory Council,

Inc. (PLAC) and the Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA).1

PLAC is a non-profit professional association of

corporate members representing a broad cross-section

of

American

and

international

product

2

manufacturers. Those companies seek to contribute

to the improvement and reform of law in the United

States and elsewhere, with emphasis on the law

governing the liability of manufacturers of products

and those in the supply chain. PLAC’s perspective is

derived from the experiences of a corporate

membership that spans a diverse group of industries

in various facets of the manufacturing sector. In

addition, several hundred of the leading product

litigation defense attorneys are sustaining (nonvoting) members of PLAC. Since 1983, PLAC has filed

more than 1,100 briefs as amicus curiae in both state

and federal courts, including this Court, on behalf of

Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici state that no counsel for a

party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no person

other than amici and their counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. Counsel for all parties received notice of amici’s intention to file this brief at least 10 days

before its due date and consented to the filing of this brief. Sup.

Ct. R. 37.2(a).

1

See https://plac.com/PLAC/Membership/Corporate_Membership.aspx.

2

(1)

2

its members, while presenting the broad perspective

of product manufacturers seeking fairness and

balance in the application and development of the law

as it affects product risk management.

MEMA represents vehicle suppliers that manufacture and remanufacture components and systems

for use in passenger vehicles and heavy trucks. Those

suppliers provide original equipment to new vehicles

and aftermarket parts used to service, maintain, and

repair the over 275 million vehicles on the road today.

MEMA’s supplier members are the largest manufacturers in the United States. Together, they employ

907,000 Americans. And because of the economic activity that those members generate, they contribute to

4.26 million American jobs. MEMA regularly files

briefs as amicus curiae to address matters important

to the automotive industry.

The issue in this case is whether States and localities may prescribe or enforce rules for auto manufacturers’ nationwide post-sale updates to vehicle emissions control software. In amici’s view, the answer is

no. The Clean Air Act gives the EPA the exclusive

authority to regulate post-sale vehicle emission system updates, and its express preemption provision

bars States and their political subdivisions from setting or enforcing their own regulatory standards.

Even without the Act’s express preemption provision,

the Act impliedly preempts state and local regulation

of post-sale updates because that regulation interferes

with the Act’s objective of creating a comprehensive,

uniform scheme for regulating vehicle emissions.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision will invite a patchwork of state and local regulations that will harm

members of the auto industry and ultimately consumers. Amici urge this Court to grant review to confirm

3

that the federal government has the exclusive authority to regulate fleet-wide vehicle emissions.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Auto manufacturers regularly make updates to

the software in their vehicles after the vehicles are

sold to consumers. Those updates are needed to ensure that vehicles continue to perform as designed and

to resolve issues that arise as the manufacturer produces more vehicles. Here, petitioner Volkswagen

Group of America, Inc. (Volkswagen) installed in its

vehicles, and then updated, software designed to reduce emissions controls outside of emissions testing.

The use of that software to defeat federal emissions

regulations violated federal law; Volkswagen

acknowledged its wrongdoing and paid significant

amounts to the federal government and to consumers

in a nationwide class action.

But the Ninth Circuit took it a step further. It

held that respondents – an environmental protection

commission of a Florida county, and a Utah county –

also can regulate auto manufacturers’ post-sale updates to vehicle emissions control software. That was

despite the express terms of the Clean Air Act, which

give that authority exclusively to the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The court of appeals

thus allowed respondents to proceed with a lawsuit

against Volkswagen and its parts supplier, petitioner

Robert Bosch LLC (Bosch). The Ninth Circuit’s decision warrants this Court’s review.

The question presented is important. The Ninth

Circuit’s decision invites state and local scrutiny of

the millions of instances each year in which manufacturers provide post-sale updates to vehicle emission

4

control systems. Manufacturers do that to ensure

that the software in their vehicles stays up to date

even after the vehicles are sold, to keep the vehicles in

optimal working condition. Under the court of appeals’ decision, any one of those commonplace software updates potentially could be the basis for liability under state or local law. The potential liability

from public and private lawsuits is enormous.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision is wrong. Federal

law preempts all state and local efforts to regulate nationwide post-sale updates to vehicle emission systems. The plain language of the Clean Air Act expressly precludes state and local governments from

attempting to enforce against manufacturers any

standard related to emission systems. The court of

appeals failed to give effect to the Act’s broad language, and it drew an unwarranted distinction between pre-sale and post-sale system updates. Even

without the express preemption provision, state and

local authorities’ attempts to set or enforce standards

for those software updates are impliedly preempted by

federal law, because they interfere with the uniform

federal regime for regulating fleet-wide emissions.

If left uncorrected, the Ninth Circuit’s decision

would result in an unworkable patchwork of regulations. One predictable consequence of the court of appeals’ decision would be many additional lawsuits –

public and private – that would increase costs with no

corresponding benefit. Further, even the largest manufacturers and auto parts suppliers would struggle to

comply with the patchwork of state and local regulations. Consumers ultimately would pay for this new

regulatory regime – in the form of higher prices for

their vehicles and in less industry innovation in postsale updates.

5

ARGUMENT

The Ninth Circuit’s decision represents a significant departure from over 50 years of federal regulation of fleet-wide vehicle emissions. If left unchecked,

it would provide a roadmap for any number of state

and local governments to start adopting disparate

rules for vehicle emissions, contrary to the comprehensive federal regime. That, in turn, would lead to

more and more litigation, and would impose massive

costs on the automotive industry and on consumers.

This Court’s intervention is sorely needed.

I.

The Question Presented Is Important

The court of appeals’ decision implicates enormous potential liability because of the sheer number

of updates that manufacturers make to vehicles after

they are sold. Although the Ninth Circuit assumed

that post-sale updates to vehicle emissions software

are “rare,” Pet. App. 45a, they in fact happen all the

time.

Manufacturers apply post-sale software updates

to millions of light-vehicle emission systems each

year. See EPA, 2014-2017 Vehicle Engine Compliance

Activities Progress Report, at 7 (Apr. 2019), https://

perma.cc/5HKD-JKG4. In the period from 2014 to

2017, manufacturers applied updates to a total of 24

million vehicle emission systems. Ibid. It is the norm,

not the exception, for manufacturers to offer post-sale

updates on their vehicles, including to vehicle emission systems.

Those millions of updates affect millions of vehicles in every part of the United States. In 2019, for

instance, there were over 275 million vehicles registered in the United States. See Statista, Number of

Motor Vehicles Registered in the United States from

6

1990 to 2019 (Nov. 2020), https://perma.cc/N9YJVWU7. Over thirty States each have more than one

million registered vehicles. Statista, U.S. Automobile

Registrations in 2018, by State (Dec. 2019), https://

perma.cc/6UFW-VE7L.

Post-sale updates generally benefit consumers.

Manufacturers use post-sale updates to keep vehicles

in top working condition and to ensure that vehicles

continue to meet federal regulatory requirements.

See, e.g., John R. Quain, With Benefits – and Risks –

Software Updates Are Coming to the Car, Digital

Trends (Oct. 29, 2018) (Quain, Benefits), https://

perma.cc/LVE6-VL5W; see also Pet. App. 38a (“The

[Clean Air Act] requires manufacturers to ensure that

their vehicles’ emission control system remains functional for at least 10 years or 100,000 miles.”) (discussing 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1), (d)). Those updates extend

the life of vehicles by making sure that vehicles perform as designed and take advantage of technological

advances. See, e.g., Quain, Benefits. The factual circumstance in this case, where updates were used to

attempt to evade federal emissions requirements, is

not typical.

Under the Ninth Circuit’s rule, routine vehicle

emissions updates could be the basis for both public

and private lawsuits. A state or local government easily could take a different view from the EPA of how

emissions should be regulated and what tradeoffs

should be made. Then when a manufacturer updates

its emission system software to comply with the federal rules, the state or local government could file suit

under its own regulations. Further, once the government has sued or taken enforcement action, private

follow-on lawsuits (under products liability or other

laws) inevitably would follow.

7

The potential liability is enormous. In this case,

respondents brought suit under state and local antitampering laws authorizing penalties of up to $5,000

per offense – with each day after the update counting

as its own separate offense, multiplied by all of the

vehicles that received the update. Pet. App. 53a-54a.

On that basis, respondents sought to impose penalties

of $11.2 billion a year. And that is for one lawsuit,

filed by just two counties, involving only 6,100 vehicles.

If additional government entities and private

plaintiffs filed similar suits, the liability easily could

grow to trillions of dollars. And there is no reason to

believe that lawsuits would be limited to the atypical

facts of this case. Although this case involved evasion

of EPA emissions requirements, once state and local

governments are able to regulate manufacturers’ updates affecting vehicle emissions, they (or enterprising plaintiffs) could bring suit to enforce their own disparate requirements. The potential liability is enormous.

The court of appeals’ opinion thus hangs a cloud

of liability over the automotive industry. That industry is a major part of the U.S. economy. See Kim Hill

et al., Contribution of the Auto Industry to the Economies of All Fifty States and the United States 3, Center

for Automotive Research (Jan. 2015) (Hill, Auto Industry) (“[The auto industry] historically has contributed 3.0 – 3.5 percent to the overall Gross Domestic

Product

(GDP).”),

https://perma.cc/TXT3-7NNU.

Over 4 million Americans work directly for the industry. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Automotive

Industry: Employment, Earnings, and Hours (Feb. 11,

2021), https://perma.cc/37Q3-9HZU. And the auto industry as a whole indirectly supports over 7 million

8

private-sector jobs. See Hill, Auto Industry, at 1, 3.

The Court’s review is needed to ensure regulatory certainty for this vital industry.

II. The Decision Below Is Wrong

The exclusive federal authority to impose standards on manufacturers related to vehicle emission systems is clear and longstanding. The Clean Air Act’s

broad preemptive scope is set out in its text, and state

and local regulation of vehicle emissions software updates plainly interferes with the objectives of the Act.

A. The Clean Air Act Expressly Preempts

State And Local Regulation Of Post-Sale

Emission System Updates

This is a classic case of express preemption. The

Clean Air Act’s preemption clause is broad and unambiguous: “No State or any political subdivision thereof

shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part.”

42 U.S.C. 7543(a).

That provision applies expansively to any state or

local government that “adopt[s]” or “attempt[s] to enforce” any vehicle emissions standard, whether the

standard is the same as the EPA’s standard or different from the EPA’s standard. 42 U.S.C. 7543(a); see,

e.g., Sims v. Florida Dept. of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles, 862 F.2d 1449, 1455 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding

that Section 7543(a) bars States’ attempts to enforce

any emissions standards against manufacturers, even

federal standards). Further, the “relating to” language encompasses not only standards specifying permissible vehicle emissions, but also standards regarding software updates that are “related to” vehicle

emissions. See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines,

9

Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (“related to” “express[es]

a broad pre-emptive purpose”). Accordingly, respondents’ attempts to enforce state and local standards regarding vehicle emission system updates fall within

the text of Section 7543(a).

In the face of that broad plain language, the court

of appeals drew a line between software updates made

before vehicles are sold and those made after vehicles

are sold. See Pet. App. 24a-25a. The court focused on

the language “new motor vehicle” in Section 7543(a),

explaining that a “new motor vehicle” is a “pre-sale

vehicle.” Id. at 24a (citing 42 U.S.C. 7550(3)). The

problem with that approach is that it ignores the

broad “relating to” language. Standards about postsale updates to new vehicles after they have been sold

“relate[] to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles,” because they update the emission control systems in those new vehicles. See Morales, 504 U.S. at

383 (“relate to” means “concern”) (internal quotation

marks omitted); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463

U.S. 85, 96 (1983) (“relate to” means “has a connection

with”).

The statute does not limit federal preemption to

standards “for” new vehicles; it applies to any standards “relating to” new vehicles. The court of appeals’

rule would make no sense, because it would permit

States and local governments to begin regulating federal emissions the moment the vehicle is sold, even

though (as explained below) federal law gives the EPA

exclusive authority over vehicle emission systems.

The “new motor vehicle” language was not intended to permit all States and localities to regulate

manufacturers the moment their vehicles have been

sold. Indeed, the EPA has long recognized that post-

10

sale state regulation of vehicle emission control systems is preempted if it “relat[es] back to the original

design” by the manufacturer. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,306,

31,313 (Jun. 17, 1994) (discussing Allway Taxi, Inc. v.

City of New York, 340 F. Supp. 1120, 1124 (S.D.N.Y.),

aff’d, 468 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1972)). Here, the state and

local regulation at issue plainly relates to the original

vehicle emission system, because it updates that system’s software. Manufacturers apply updates to vehicle computer systems to ensure that vehicles continue

to perform as designed and to keep the vehicles in

sound working condition. The court of appeals’ exceedingly narrow reading of the Act’s express preemption provision cannot be squared with its language or

with common sense.

In addition to narrowly reading the Clean Air

Act’s preemption clause, the court of appeals took a

very broad reading of the Act’s savings clause. Pet.

App. 24a-25a, 32a-35a. According to the court, that

clause “appears to give states substantial authority to

enforce standards related to post-sale vehicles.” Id. at

33a. But that clause says nothing about post-sale vehicles or enforcing emissions standards against manufacturers. Rather, it provides that States and their

political subdivisions retain any existing rights “otherwise to control, regulate, or restrict the use, operation, or movement of registered or licensed motor vehicles.” 42 U.S.C. 7543(d). That language was designed to permit state regulation at the individual-vehicle level, such as state licensing and registration

requirements (including emissions inspections) and

local traffic-control measures. It does not give States

and localities some new power to set or enforce postsale vehicle emissions requirements.

11

B. The Clean Air Act Impliedly Preempts

State And Local Regulation Of Post-Sale

Emission System Updates

More broadly, state and local regulation of postsale emission system updates is preempted because it

“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861,

873 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1. In its implied preemption analysis, the court of

appeals erred at the outset by applying a presumption

against preemption. The court took the view that it

should presume that States and local governments

have the authority to regulate fleet-wide vehicle emissions unless Congress very clearly specified otherwise. Pet. App. 33a-36a. To support that view, the

court relied on “the presumption that the historic police powers of the States are not superseded unless

that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”

Id. at 32a (citation omitted). The court had it exactly

backward.

Regulation of fleet-wide vehicle emissions is not a

part of the historic police powers of the States. To the

contrary: Regulation of mobile source emissions has

been entrusted exclusively to the federal EPA for over

50 years. See Pet. App. 62a. States had not historically exercised that authority for fleet-wide vehicle

emissions; at the time Congress enacted the Clean Air

Act, only one State (California) “had adopted [vehicle]

emissions control standards.” Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v.

12

EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1079 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see, e.g.,

S. Rep. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33 (1967).3

Then in the Clean Air Act, Congress made clear

that regulation of mobile source emissions is exclusively the province of the federal government. As a

result, it is now well-settled that the authority to regulate motor vehicle emissions is “lodged in the Federal

Government.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,

519 (2007). In light of the lack of state regulation and

the longstanding federal regulation of vehicle emissions, no presumption against preemption applies.

See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 90

(2000).4

The Clean Air Act accounts for that practice; it gives California a waiver to adopt and enforce its own “standards relating

to control of emissions from new motor vehicles.” 42 U.S.C.

7543(b). The Act does not include that language for any other

State.

3

There is a serious question whether the presumption

against preemption ever applies in the conflict or obstacle

preemption context. The Supreme Court set out the presumption

against preemption in a field preemption decision. See Rice v.

Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (expressing for

the first time the notion that in “a field which the States have

traditionally occupied,” courts should “start with the assumption

that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest

purpose of Congress”). The presumption makes sense in the field

preemption context, because Congress presumably is aware of

the States’ historic powers within certain fields, and courts

should not lightly assume that Congress has precluded States

from regulating in those fields. The presumption makes less

sense in a conflict or obstacle preemption case, where the court

should focus on the nature of the conflict or obstacle presented

by the particular state or local law at issue. See, e.g., Mutual

Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 483-487 (2013); Geier, 529

U.S. at 881-882.

4

13

2. More broadly, the court of appeals failed to recognize that permitting state and local regulation of

manufacturers regarding motor vehicle emissions

would frustrate the purposes and objectives of the

Clean Air Act.

Congress’s primary purpose in enacting the Clean

Air Act was to regulate emissions nationwide. Maintaining uniform federal control of vehicle emissions

requirements is a key feature of the Act. That is because motor vehicles “readily move across state

boundaries,” and their emissions are not confined to

one State. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1079. An

automobile manufactured in Michigan might be sold

in Virginia, then be taken by its owner to Texas, and

so on. If all States were allowed to set their own vehicle emissions standards, that would “defeat the congressional purpose” in the Clean Air Act of “preventing obstruction to interstate commerce.” Id. at 1083

(quoting Allway, 340 F. Supp. at 1124).

Congress therefore authorized only the federal

government to regulate “the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or

new motor vehicle engines” that “cause, or contribute

to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated

to endanger public health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C.

7521(a)(1). The EPA’s authority under the Act extends to ensuring that manufacturers’ vehicles remain in compliance with federal emissions standards

for a vehicle’s “useful life.” 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1). For

example, the agency requires manufacturers to satisfy

“in-use verification testing requirements.” 40 C.F.R.

86.1845-04. If the testing shows that a manufacturers’ class of vehicles does not conform to federal emissions requirements, the EPA can order a recall. 42

14

U.S.C. 7541(c)(1). Similarly, manufacturers must report to the EPA any emissions-related defects that affect 25 or more vehicles in a model year. 40 C.F.R.

85.1903(a). In all events, the focus is on ensuring that

manufacturers’ fleets remain in compliance with federal emissions regulations.

The Act prescribes only a very limited role for

state regulation that touches on vehicle emissions. As

the district court explained, that regulation “operate[s] on an individual vehicle basis.” Pet. App. 71a.

For example, the Act permits States to have emissions

inspection programs as part of their vehicle registration requirements. See 42 U.S.C. 7511, 7511a, 7541,

7543. But the Act prohibits States from requiring

manufacturers to conduct those tests. See 42 U.S.C.

7541(h)(2). Further, the Act expressly bars States and

localities from attempting to “adopt” or “enforce” any

“standard” related to vehicle emissions. 42 U.S.C.

7543(a). Nowhere does the Act bestow upon States or

localities a broad authority to impose emissions-related liability on manufacturers for their fleets. Instead, the Act specifies the opposite.

To be sure, the Clean Air Act gives States some

authority to regulate other emissions. For example,

States have “initial and primary” authority for addressing emissions from stationary sources, meaning

buildings and other stationary structures that emit

air pollution. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n,

531 U.S. 457, 470 (2001); see 42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(3) (defining stationary sources). But although Congress has

permitted state regulation of stationary sources of

emissions, “the regulation of mobile source emissions

is a federal responsibility.” Jensen Family Farms, Inc.

v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist.,

644 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2011).

15

The Act requires the EPA to make complicated decisions about when and how to regulate vehicle emissions. In that role, the EPA often must make decisions about the levels of emissions allowed, including

making tradeoffs between different emissions, and

balancing the effects on manufacturers and on the

public. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1) (authorizing

EPA to use its “judgment” in regulating emissions); 42

U.S.C. 7521(a)(4)(B) (charging the EPA to balance

several factors when fashioning rules, including the

extent to which a device or system “increases, reduces,

or eliminates emissions,” any “available methods for

reducing or eliminating any risk to public health [or]

welfare,” and the availability of alternative devices

that might better “conform to requirements”). The

EPA considers all of the facts and draws upon its vast

experience to put in place rules that it believes workable and beneficial to consumers and the public.

Congress entrusted those decisions to the EPA.

Permitting state and local regulation of vehicle emissions would directly interfere with Congress’s decision

to give the EPA exclusive authority in this area. Some

state and local regulators no doubt would strike a different balance than the EPA did, and that would eviscerate the uniform nationwide system of emissions

regulation intended under the Act. The state and local regulation here thus is preempted because it obstructs Congress’s purposes and objectives in the

Clean Air Act.

16

III. If Left Uncorrected, The Decision Below

Would Create An Unworkable Patchwork Of

Regulations And Ultimately Would Harm

Consumers

A. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Would

Create A Patchwork of Emissions Regulations

The court of appeals’ decision opens the door to

state and local regulation of post-sale manufacturer

updates to vehicle emission systems. For decades, the

federal government has exclusively regulated vehicle

emission systems. Congress gave the EPA that authority in the Clean Air Act in part because it understood that a different regime would be unworkable.

Specifically, Congress “assert[ed] federal control in

this area” because the “possibility of 50 different state

regulatory regimes raised the spectre of an anarchic

patchwork of federal and state regulatory programs, a

prospect which threatened to create nightmares for

the manufacturers.” Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at

1079 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

Even if state and local governments merely

sought to enforce federal standards, as opposed to formulating their own standards, it “would be difficult

for the industry” to comply because “different administration could easily lead to different answers to identical questions.” H.R. Rep. No. 728, 90th Cong., 1st

Sess. 2 (1967). So Congress vested authority over vehicle emissions in the EPA.

Under the Ninth Circuit’s decision, state and local

governments would be free to regulate post-sale vehicle emissions software updates. As a result, if the

EPA puts in place a new emissions standard, and a

manufacturer pushes a software update to all of its

17

vehicles to comply with that standard, it could be held

liable under state and local laws. Any of the 50 States

or thousands of counties in the United States could

start regulating post-sale updates to emissions software. What might be perfectly acceptable under Nebraska law could be a violation under Kansas law.

The prospect of so many different regulatory regimes,

and the predictable chaos that would follow, is precisely why “[t]wo years after authorizing federal emissions regulations, * * * Congress preempted the states

from adopting their own emissions standards.” Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1079.

State and local governments may wish to adopt

their own regulatory regimes for any number of reasons. Some may believe that federal emissions standards are too lax; some may believe those same standards are too tough. Some may view regulation as a

potential source of revenue. Under the Ninth Circuit’s

decision, any state or local government potentially

could adopt its own regulatory regime. See Rowe v.

New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364,

373 (2008) (“To allow Maine to insist that the carriers

provide a special checking system would allow other

States to do the same. And to interpret the federal

law to permit these, and similar, state requirements

could easily lead to a patchwork of state service-determining laws, rules, and regulations.”). If even some

state and local governments adopt their own regulations in this area, it will impose massive costs on the

industry and ultimately will harm consumers.

B. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Would

Encourage Expensive And Needless Litigation

One predictable response to the court of appeals’

decision will be a flood of lawsuits – from States and

18

localities as well as from private parties. Under the

court of appeals’ decision, States and local governments not only could adopt new rules for post-sale

emissions software updates, but they also could enforce those rules through litigation. That is exactly

what happened here: Even though the EPA addressed petitioners’ conduct and negotiated a substantial financial settlement, respondents sued based on

the same conduct under their own anti-tampering

laws. They sought enormous amounts of money in

penalties – billions of dollars. Pet. App. 78a. The

Ninth Circuit recognized that this is “staggering liability.” Id. at 45a.

Those lawsuits are just the starting point. Once

the door has been opened, additional state and local

litigation no doubt would follow. Indeed, one respondent already has filed another lawsuit based on postsale software updates against Daimler and Bosch.

See Environmental Prot. Comm’n of Hillsborough Cty.

v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 20-cv-2238 (M.D.

Fla. Sept. 25, 2020).

Further, once a state or local government sued or

took enforcement action, private follow-on lawsuits inevitably would follow. That is because if each software update in each vehicle is a violation, the potential liability is enormous. And bringing a me-too suit

would be easy to do if a state or local government already had taken some enforcement action against an

auto manufacturer.

Those suits could be premised on any number of

existing state or local laws. Options include anti-tampering laws, unfair or deceptive trade practices laws,

products liability laws, and the common law of negligence. Most States have anti-tampering laws on the

books that could be the basis for public lawsuits. See

19

Pet. App. 33a n.19. Respondent Salt Lake County’s

claims in this case show how easily that could be done.

In addition to its anti-tampering claim, Salt Lake

County sued petitioners for common law fraud, common law nuisance, and violation of Utah’s Pattern of

Unlawful Activity Act. See id. at 54a. There is no

shortage of state statutes and common law causes of

action that creative counsel could employ.

Given the number of vehicles on the road and the

frequency of post-sale emission system updates, it

would be only a matter of time before enterprising

States, localities, and class action plaintiffs would target other manufacturers and auto part suppliers for

suit. That incredibly expensive litigation would have

little public benefit. Federal law already comprehensively regulates motor vehicle emissions. All the additional regulation would do is create confusion and

increase costs for manufacturers that ultimately

would be passed on to consumers.

C. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Would

Dramatically Raise Costs For Manufacturers

It would be difficult, if not impossible, for manufacturers to comply with a new patchwork regulatory

regime for post-sale updates to vehicle emission systems. Manufacturers sell their vehicles nationwide,

and vehicles often do not remain in the State of sale.

If every State and county were free to establish its

own rules for vehicle emissions software updates,

manufacturers would have to comply with each of

them before making any vehicle update. That might

even require state-specific updates to a vehicle when

the owner changes the place of registration, creating

yet another new requirement for manufacturers.

Given the millions of updates per year across the

20

country, that would be a tremendous burden. E.g.,

EPA, 2014-2017 Vehicle Engine Compliance Activities

Progress Report 7. In fact, it may be an “insurmountable task” to comply with that “patchwork” of different

requirements. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tr.,

462 U.S. 324, 339-340 (1983).

Even if it were logistically feasible for large manufacturers and auto parts suppliers to navigate such

a system, it would come at great cost. For example,

suppose a manufacturer wanted to ensure compliance

with state and local emissions regulations in advance

of making a software update, so as to not risk massive

liability. That would require significant work by both

the company’s in-house legal team and its technical

team. It would take a great deal of coordination, not

only for the company but also for the relevant government officials, to ensure regulatory compliance with a

variety of different, potentially conflicting rules.

Further, if a manufacturer attempts to ensure

compliance, it still could be risking significant liability

with each software update. That uncertainty could

lead the manufacturer to make only absolutely necessary updates, and to forego those that improve the vehicle’s performance or employ new technologies. See,

e.g., Caplinger v. Medtronic, Inc., 784 F.3d 1335, 1346

(10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J.) (observing that unpredictable liability might cause manufacturers to “delay

or abandon at least some number of * * * innovations”).

Some of the scarce resources that manufacturers

could have spent on continuing to research and develop new post-sale updates instead would be spent on

attempting to comply with state and local emissions

regulations. Auto manufacturers do not have limitless resources; the auto industry is cyclical and has

21

high overhead costs. See, e.g., Bill Vlasic and Nick

Bunkley, Obama Is Upbeat for GM’s Future, N.Y.

Times (Jun. 1, 2009), https://perma.cc/8PB8-2SBF.

The auto parts supply business, too, has long operated

on “small profit margins.” Purolator Prods., Inc. v.

FTC, 352 F.2d 874, 882 (7th Cir. 1965). Given finite

resources, a substantial increase in the cost and complexity of regulatory compliance would come at the expense of research and development efforts.

D. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Ultimately Would Harm Consumers

The end result would be that consumers lose out.

First, some of the increased compliance costs on manufacturers and auto parts suppliers ultimately would

fall on consumers. Just as manufacturer savings in

the automotive industry lead to lower consumer

prices, see, e.g., Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751

F.2d 1336, 1352 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1985), additional manufacturer expenditures would lead to higher prices.

Adding hundreds or thousands of new state and local

regulations necessarily would increase those passedon costs.

The court of appeals’ decision would impose costs

on consumers in other ways, too. A patchwork vehicle-emissions regulatory regime could, for example,

negatively impact the value of customers’ vehicles.

Americans move from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and

take their vehicles with them. See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n,

88 F.3d at 1079 (Vehicles “readily move across state

boundaries.”). A vehicle might comply with the emissions regulations in one State and not in another.

Consumers who move to States or localities with

stricter emissions regulations might be surprised to

learn that the value of their vehicles has decreased

substantially. And if States and localities were free to

22

set their own emissions standards on entire fleets of

vehicles, consumers who move to new jurisdictions

may not be able to register their vehicles there at all.

More fundamentally, consumers could lose the

benefit of receiving many post-sale emissions software

updates. Remote software updates have become more

frequent in recent years. See, e.g., Quain, Benefits.

That has “the potential to make software-based recall

repairs more convenient, quick and comprehensive for

car owners.” Doug Newcomb, The Upsides and Downside of Over-the-Air Software Updates for Automobile

Dealers, WardsAuto (Nov. 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/

ZH8F-XASG. Indeed, necessary functions like “recalls and updates of critical safety systems” now often

can be accomplished through remote updates – delivered wirelessly to vehicles through cellular or WiFi

connections – without “requir[ing] customers to bring

their vehicles to a dealership’s service department.”

Ibid.

Auto manufacturers have begun rolling out new

and innovative features through those post-sale software updates. Just last year, for example, BMW released a remote update that, among other things,

added an emissions functionality to its hybrid vehicles

that “automatically switches to pure electric drive

mode” when in designated green areas. Press Release, BMW Group, BMW Group Rolls Out Biggest Remote Software Upgrade In Company History (Oct. 16,

2020), https://perma.cc/4J8B-78NN. That provides

vehicle owners greater automated efficiency and provides the public the benefit of vehicles emitting fewer

pollutants in dense urban areas. Ibid.

The threat of state and local regulation would

jeopardize continued use of post-sale software updates

and continued innovation in this field. Ultimately,

23

fewer post-sale software updates means fewer cars on

the road maintained in optimal condition. The average vehicle on the road today is nearly 12 years old.

See U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, https://perma.cc/RVV9-QEWM. And

many consumers do not bring their vehicles in for regular maintenance. As a result, only about two thirds

of recalled cars ever get repaired – “even after owners

have been sent multiple notices.” Quain, Benefits; accord Congressional Research Service, Motor Vehicle

Safety: Issues for Congress 16 (Jan. 26, 2021), https://

perma.cc/GC8Q-PTBU.

Given those practical realities, post-sale software

updates are vital for consumers to get the most out of

their vehicles. Further industry innovation in remote

updates “could eliminate many of these compliance

problems” (and save consumers money) by allowing

remote repair of vehicle electronic systems. Quain,

Benefits. To continue to develop this field to its full

potential, manufacturers need to know that they are

not inviting lawsuits every time they send out a software update to vehicles.

24

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted.

NICOLE A. SAHARSKY

Counsel of Record

ERIC A. WHITE

Mayer Brown LLP

1999 K Street, NW

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 263-3000

nsaharsky@mayerbrown.com

FEBRUARY 2021

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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