Amicus Curiae Brief — Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. The Environmental Protection Commission of Hillsborough County, Florida, et al.
Supreme Court briefFeb 16, 2021
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No. 20-994
In the Supreme Court of the United States
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION COMMISSION OF
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA, AND SALT LAKE
COUNTY, UTAH,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF FOR PRODUCT LIABILITY ADVISORY
COUNCIL, INC. AND MOTOR & EQUIPMENT
MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION AS AMICI
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
NICOLE A. SAHARSKY
Counsel of Record
ERIC A. WHITE
Mayer Brown LLP
1999 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 263-3000
nsaharsky@mayerbrown.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.,
preempts state and local governments from regulating
manufacturers’ post-sale, nationwide updates to vehicle emission software systems.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE .......................1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF
ARGUMENT ...............................................................3
ARGUMENT ...............................................................5
I. The Question Presented Is Important ..................5
II. The Decision Below Is Wrong ................................8
A. The Clean Air Act Expressly Preempts
State And Local Regulation Of PostSale Emission System Updates .......................8
B. The Clean Air Act Impliedly Preempts
State And Local Regulation Of PostSale Emission System Updates ..................... 11
III.If Left Uncorrected, The Decision Below
Would Create An Unworkable Patchwork
Of Regulations And Ultimately Would
Harm Consumers ................................................. 16
A. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Would
Create A Patchwork of Emissions
Regulations ..................................................... 16
B. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Would
Encourage Expensive And Needless
Litigation ........................................................ 17
C. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Would
Dramatically Raise Costs For
Manufacturers ................................................ 19
D. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision
Ultimately Would Harm Consumers ............. 21
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 24
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page(s)
Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York,
340 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ................ 10, 13
Caplinger v. Medtronic, Inc.,
784 F.3d 1335 (10th Cir. 2015) ............................ 20
Center for Auto Safety v. Peck,
751 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ............................ 21
Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA,
88 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir 1996) ....................... passim
Environmental Prot. Comm’n of Hillsborough
Cty. v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC,
No. 20-cv-2238 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2020) .......... 18
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
529 U.S. 861 (2000) ........................................ 11, 12
Jensen Family Farms, Inc. v. Monterey
Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist.,
644 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2011) ................................ 14
Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497 (2007) .............................................. 12
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
504 U.S. 374 (1992) ................................................ 9
Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett,
570 U.S. 472 (2013) .............................................. 12
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tr.,
462 U.S. 324 (1983) .............................................. 20
Purolator Prods., Inc. v. FTC,
352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965) ................................ 21
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Cases – continued
Page(s)
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218 (1947) .............................................. 12
Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n,
552 U.S. 364 (2008) .............................................. 17
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
463 U.S. 85 (1983) .................................................. 9
Sims v. Florida Dept. of Hwy. Safety & Motor
Vehicles, 862 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1989) .............. 8
United States v. Locke,
529 U.S. 89 (2000) ................................................ 12
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n,
531 U.S. 457 (2001) .............................................. 14
Statute
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.:
42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(3) ............................................. 14
42 U.S.C. 7511...................................................... 14
42 U.S.C. 7511a.................................................... 14
42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1) ................................... 6, 13, 15
42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(4)(B) ........................................ 15
42 U.S.C. 7541...................................................... 14
42 U.S.C. 7541(c)(1) ............................................. 13
42 U.S.C. 7541(h)(2) ............................................. 14
42 U.S.C. 7543...................................................... 14
42 U.S.C. 7543(a) ......................................... 8, 9, 14
42 U.S.C. 7543(b) ................................................. 12
42 U.S.C. 7543(d) ................................................. 10
42 U.S.C. 7550(3) ................................................... 9
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Regulations and rules
Page(s)
40 C.F.R.:
85.1903(a) ............................................................. 13
86.1845-04 ............................................................ 13
59 Fed. Reg. 31,306 (Jun. 17, 1994).......................... 10
Sup. Ct. R.:
37.2(a) ..................................................................... 1
37.6 ......................................................................... 1
Other authorities
Press Release, BMW Group, BMW Group Rolls
Out Biggest Remote Software Upgrade In
Company History (Oct. 16, 2020),
https://perma.cc/4J8B-78NN ............................... 22
Congressional Research Service, Motor Vehicle
Safety: Issues for Congress (Jan. 26, 2021),
https://perma.cc/GC8Q-PTBU ............................. 23
EPA, 2014-2017 Vehicle Engine Compliance
Activities Progress Report (Apr. 2019),
https://perma.cc/5HKD-JKG4.......................... 5, 20
H.R. Rep. No. 728, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) ...... 16
Kim Hill et al., Contribution of the Auto
Industry to the Economies of All Fifty
States and the United States, Center for
Automotive Research (Jan. 2015),
https://perma.cc/TXT3-7NNU ............................ 7, 8
Doug Newcomb, The Upsides and Downside of
Over-the-Air Software Updates for Automobile
Dealers, WardsAuto (Nov. 6, 2020),
https://perma.cc/ZH8F-XASG .............................. 22
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Other authorities – continued
Page(s)
John R. Quain, With Benefits – and Risks –
Software Updates Are Coming to the Car,
Digital Trends (Oct. 29, 2018),
https://perma.cc/LVE6-VL5W .................... 6, 22, 23
S. Rep. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) ........... 11
Statista, Number of Motor Vehicles Registered in
the United States from 1990 to 2019 (Nov. 2020),
https://perma.cc/N9YJ-VWU7 ............................... 6
Statista, U.S. Automobile Registrations in 2018,
by State (Dec. 2019),
https://perma.cc/6UFW-VE7L ............................... 6
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Automotive
Industry: Employment, Earnings, and
Hours (Feb. 11, 2021),
https://perma.cc/37Q3-9HZU ................................. 7
U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, Bureau of
Transportation Statistics,
https://perma.cc/RVV9-QEWM ............................ 23
Bill Vlasic and Nick Bunkley, Obama Is Upbeat
for GM’s Future, N.Y. Times (Jun. 1, 2009),
https://perma.cc/8PB8-2SBF................................ 21
BRIEF OF PRODUCT LIABILITY ADVISORY
COUNCIL, INC. AND MOTOR &
EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS
ASSOCIATION AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE
Amici are the Product Liability Advisory Council,
Inc. (PLAC) and the Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA).1
PLAC is a non-profit professional association of
corporate members representing a broad cross-section
of
American
and
international
product
2
manufacturers. Those companies seek to contribute
to the improvement and reform of law in the United
States and elsewhere, with emphasis on the law
governing the liability of manufacturers of products
and those in the supply chain. PLAC’s perspective is
derived from the experiences of a corporate
membership that spans a diverse group of industries
in various facets of the manufacturing sector. In
addition, several hundred of the leading product
litigation defense attorneys are sustaining (nonvoting) members of PLAC. Since 1983, PLAC has filed
more than 1,100 briefs as amicus curiae in both state
and federal courts, including this Court, on behalf of
Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici state that no counsel for a
party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no person
other than amici and their counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. Counsel for all parties received notice of amici’s intention to file this brief at least 10 days
before its due date and consented to the filing of this brief. Sup.
Ct. R. 37.2(a).
1
See https://plac.com/PLAC/Membership/Corporate_Membership.aspx.
2
(1)
2
its members, while presenting the broad perspective
of product manufacturers seeking fairness and
balance in the application and development of the law
as it affects product risk management.
MEMA represents vehicle suppliers that manufacture and remanufacture components and systems
for use in passenger vehicles and heavy trucks. Those
suppliers provide original equipment to new vehicles
and aftermarket parts used to service, maintain, and
repair the over 275 million vehicles on the road today.
MEMA’s supplier members are the largest manufacturers in the United States. Together, they employ
907,000 Americans. And because of the economic activity that those members generate, they contribute to
4.26 million American jobs. MEMA regularly files
briefs as amicus curiae to address matters important
to the automotive industry.
The issue in this case is whether States and localities may prescribe or enforce rules for auto manufacturers’ nationwide post-sale updates to vehicle emissions control software. In amici’s view, the answer is
no. The Clean Air Act gives the EPA the exclusive
authority to regulate post-sale vehicle emission system updates, and its express preemption provision
bars States and their political subdivisions from setting or enforcing their own regulatory standards.
Even without the Act’s express preemption provision,
the Act impliedly preempts state and local regulation
of post-sale updates because that regulation interferes
with the Act’s objective of creating a comprehensive,
uniform scheme for regulating vehicle emissions.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision will invite a patchwork of state and local regulations that will harm
members of the auto industry and ultimately consumers. Amici urge this Court to grant review to confirm
3
that the federal government has the exclusive authority to regulate fleet-wide vehicle emissions.
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Auto manufacturers regularly make updates to
the software in their vehicles after the vehicles are
sold to consumers. Those updates are needed to ensure that vehicles continue to perform as designed and
to resolve issues that arise as the manufacturer produces more vehicles. Here, petitioner Volkswagen
Group of America, Inc. (Volkswagen) installed in its
vehicles, and then updated, software designed to reduce emissions controls outside of emissions testing.
The use of that software to defeat federal emissions
regulations violated federal law; Volkswagen
acknowledged its wrongdoing and paid significant
amounts to the federal government and to consumers
in a nationwide class action.
But the Ninth Circuit took it a step further. It
held that respondents – an environmental protection
commission of a Florida county, and a Utah county –
also can regulate auto manufacturers’ post-sale updates to vehicle emissions control software. That was
despite the express terms of the Clean Air Act, which
give that authority exclusively to the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The court of appeals
thus allowed respondents to proceed with a lawsuit
against Volkswagen and its parts supplier, petitioner
Robert Bosch LLC (Bosch). The Ninth Circuit’s decision warrants this Court’s review.
The question presented is important. The Ninth
Circuit’s decision invites state and local scrutiny of
the millions of instances each year in which manufacturers provide post-sale updates to vehicle emission
4
control systems. Manufacturers do that to ensure
that the software in their vehicles stays up to date
even after the vehicles are sold, to keep the vehicles in
optimal working condition. Under the court of appeals’ decision, any one of those commonplace software updates potentially could be the basis for liability under state or local law. The potential liability
from public and private lawsuits is enormous.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision is wrong. Federal
law preempts all state and local efforts to regulate nationwide post-sale updates to vehicle emission systems. The plain language of the Clean Air Act expressly precludes state and local governments from
attempting to enforce against manufacturers any
standard related to emission systems. The court of
appeals failed to give effect to the Act’s broad language, and it drew an unwarranted distinction between pre-sale and post-sale system updates. Even
without the express preemption provision, state and
local authorities’ attempts to set or enforce standards
for those software updates are impliedly preempted by
federal law, because they interfere with the uniform
federal regime for regulating fleet-wide emissions.
If left uncorrected, the Ninth Circuit’s decision
would result in an unworkable patchwork of regulations. One predictable consequence of the court of appeals’ decision would be many additional lawsuits –
public and private – that would increase costs with no
corresponding benefit. Further, even the largest manufacturers and auto parts suppliers would struggle to
comply with the patchwork of state and local regulations. Consumers ultimately would pay for this new
regulatory regime – in the form of higher prices for
their vehicles and in less industry innovation in postsale updates.
5
ARGUMENT
The Ninth Circuit’s decision represents a significant departure from over 50 years of federal regulation of fleet-wide vehicle emissions. If left unchecked,
it would provide a roadmap for any number of state
and local governments to start adopting disparate
rules for vehicle emissions, contrary to the comprehensive federal regime. That, in turn, would lead to
more and more litigation, and would impose massive
costs on the automotive industry and on consumers.
This Court’s intervention is sorely needed.
I.
The Question Presented Is Important
The court of appeals’ decision implicates enormous potential liability because of the sheer number
of updates that manufacturers make to vehicles after
they are sold. Although the Ninth Circuit assumed
that post-sale updates to vehicle emissions software
are “rare,” Pet. App. 45a, they in fact happen all the
time.
Manufacturers apply post-sale software updates
to millions of light-vehicle emission systems each
year. See EPA, 2014-2017 Vehicle Engine Compliance
Activities Progress Report, at 7 (Apr. 2019), https://
perma.cc/5HKD-JKG4. In the period from 2014 to
2017, manufacturers applied updates to a total of 24
million vehicle emission systems. Ibid. It is the norm,
not the exception, for manufacturers to offer post-sale
updates on their vehicles, including to vehicle emission systems.
Those millions of updates affect millions of vehicles in every part of the United States. In 2019, for
instance, there were over 275 million vehicles registered in the United States. See Statista, Number of
Motor Vehicles Registered in the United States from
6
1990 to 2019 (Nov. 2020), https://perma.cc/N9YJVWU7. Over thirty States each have more than one
million registered vehicles. Statista, U.S. Automobile
Registrations in 2018, by State (Dec. 2019), https://
perma.cc/6UFW-VE7L.
Post-sale updates generally benefit consumers.
Manufacturers use post-sale updates to keep vehicles
in top working condition and to ensure that vehicles
continue to meet federal regulatory requirements.
See, e.g., John R. Quain, With Benefits – and Risks –
Software Updates Are Coming to the Car, Digital
Trends (Oct. 29, 2018) (Quain, Benefits), https://
perma.cc/LVE6-VL5W; see also Pet. App. 38a (“The
[Clean Air Act] requires manufacturers to ensure that
their vehicles’ emission control system remains functional for at least 10 years or 100,000 miles.”) (discussing 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1), (d)). Those updates extend
the life of vehicles by making sure that vehicles perform as designed and take advantage of technological
advances. See, e.g., Quain, Benefits. The factual circumstance in this case, where updates were used to
attempt to evade federal emissions requirements, is
not typical.
Under the Ninth Circuit’s rule, routine vehicle
emissions updates could be the basis for both public
and private lawsuits. A state or local government easily could take a different view from the EPA of how
emissions should be regulated and what tradeoffs
should be made. Then when a manufacturer updates
its emission system software to comply with the federal rules, the state or local government could file suit
under its own regulations. Further, once the government has sued or taken enforcement action, private
follow-on lawsuits (under products liability or other
laws) inevitably would follow.
7
The potential liability is enormous. In this case,
respondents brought suit under state and local antitampering laws authorizing penalties of up to $5,000
per offense – with each day after the update counting
as its own separate offense, multiplied by all of the
vehicles that received the update. Pet. App. 53a-54a.
On that basis, respondents sought to impose penalties
of $11.2 billion a year. And that is for one lawsuit,
filed by just two counties, involving only 6,100 vehicles.
If additional government entities and private
plaintiffs filed similar suits, the liability easily could
grow to trillions of dollars. And there is no reason to
believe that lawsuits would be limited to the atypical
facts of this case. Although this case involved evasion
of EPA emissions requirements, once state and local
governments are able to regulate manufacturers’ updates affecting vehicle emissions, they (or enterprising plaintiffs) could bring suit to enforce their own disparate requirements. The potential liability is enormous.
The court of appeals’ opinion thus hangs a cloud
of liability over the automotive industry. That industry is a major part of the U.S. economy. See Kim Hill
et al., Contribution of the Auto Industry to the Economies of All Fifty States and the United States 3, Center
for Automotive Research (Jan. 2015) (Hill, Auto Industry) (“[The auto industry] historically has contributed 3.0 – 3.5 percent to the overall Gross Domestic
Product
(GDP).”),
https://perma.cc/TXT3-7NNU.
Over 4 million Americans work directly for the industry. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Automotive
Industry: Employment, Earnings, and Hours (Feb. 11,
2021), https://perma.cc/37Q3-9HZU. And the auto industry as a whole indirectly supports over 7 million
8
private-sector jobs. See Hill, Auto Industry, at 1, 3.
The Court’s review is needed to ensure regulatory certainty for this vital industry.
II. The Decision Below Is Wrong
The exclusive federal authority to impose standards on manufacturers related to vehicle emission systems is clear and longstanding. The Clean Air Act’s
broad preemptive scope is set out in its text, and state
and local regulation of vehicle emissions software updates plainly interferes with the objectives of the Act.
A. The Clean Air Act Expressly Preempts
State And Local Regulation Of Post-Sale
Emission System Updates
This is a classic case of express preemption. The
Clean Air Act’s preemption clause is broad and unambiguous: “No State or any political subdivision thereof
shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part.”
42 U.S.C. 7543(a).
That provision applies expansively to any state or
local government that “adopt[s]” or “attempt[s] to enforce” any vehicle emissions standard, whether the
standard is the same as the EPA’s standard or different from the EPA’s standard. 42 U.S.C. 7543(a); see,
e.g., Sims v. Florida Dept. of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles, 862 F.2d 1449, 1455 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding
that Section 7543(a) bars States’ attempts to enforce
any emissions standards against manufacturers, even
federal standards). Further, the “relating to” language encompasses not only standards specifying permissible vehicle emissions, but also standards regarding software updates that are “related to” vehicle
emissions. See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines,
9
Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (“related to” “express[es]
a broad pre-emptive purpose”). Accordingly, respondents’ attempts to enforce state and local standards regarding vehicle emission system updates fall within
the text of Section 7543(a).
In the face of that broad plain language, the court
of appeals drew a line between software updates made
before vehicles are sold and those made after vehicles
are sold. See Pet. App. 24a-25a. The court focused on
the language “new motor vehicle” in Section 7543(a),
explaining that a “new motor vehicle” is a “pre-sale
vehicle.” Id. at 24a (citing 42 U.S.C. 7550(3)). The
problem with that approach is that it ignores the
broad “relating to” language. Standards about postsale updates to new vehicles after they have been sold
“relate[] to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles,” because they update the emission control systems in those new vehicles. See Morales, 504 U.S. at
383 (“relate to” means “concern”) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463
U.S. 85, 96 (1983) (“relate to” means “has a connection
with”).
The statute does not limit federal preemption to
standards “for” new vehicles; it applies to any standards “relating to” new vehicles. The court of appeals’
rule would make no sense, because it would permit
States and local governments to begin regulating federal emissions the moment the vehicle is sold, even
though (as explained below) federal law gives the EPA
exclusive authority over vehicle emission systems.
The “new motor vehicle” language was not intended to permit all States and localities to regulate
manufacturers the moment their vehicles have been
sold. Indeed, the EPA has long recognized that post-
10
sale state regulation of vehicle emission control systems is preempted if it “relat[es] back to the original
design” by the manufacturer. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,306,
31,313 (Jun. 17, 1994) (discussing Allway Taxi, Inc. v.
City of New York, 340 F. Supp. 1120, 1124 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff’d, 468 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1972)). Here, the state and
local regulation at issue plainly relates to the original
vehicle emission system, because it updates that system’s software. Manufacturers apply updates to vehicle computer systems to ensure that vehicles continue
to perform as designed and to keep the vehicles in
sound working condition. The court of appeals’ exceedingly narrow reading of the Act’s express preemption provision cannot be squared with its language or
with common sense.
In addition to narrowly reading the Clean Air
Act’s preemption clause, the court of appeals took a
very broad reading of the Act’s savings clause. Pet.
App. 24a-25a, 32a-35a. According to the court, that
clause “appears to give states substantial authority to
enforce standards related to post-sale vehicles.” Id. at
33a. But that clause says nothing about post-sale vehicles or enforcing emissions standards against manufacturers. Rather, it provides that States and their
political subdivisions retain any existing rights “otherwise to control, regulate, or restrict the use, operation, or movement of registered or licensed motor vehicles.” 42 U.S.C. 7543(d). That language was designed to permit state regulation at the individual-vehicle level, such as state licensing and registration
requirements (including emissions inspections) and
local traffic-control measures. It does not give States
and localities some new power to set or enforce postsale vehicle emissions requirements.
11
B. The Clean Air Act Impliedly Preempts
State And Local Regulation Of Post-Sale
Emission System Updates
More broadly, state and local regulation of postsale emission system updates is preempted because it
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861,
873 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1. In its implied preemption analysis, the court of
appeals erred at the outset by applying a presumption
against preemption. The court took the view that it
should presume that States and local governments
have the authority to regulate fleet-wide vehicle emissions unless Congress very clearly specified otherwise. Pet. App. 33a-36a. To support that view, the
court relied on “the presumption that the historic police powers of the States are not superseded unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”
Id. at 32a (citation omitted). The court had it exactly
backward.
Regulation of fleet-wide vehicle emissions is not a
part of the historic police powers of the States. To the
contrary: Regulation of mobile source emissions has
been entrusted exclusively to the federal EPA for over
50 years. See Pet. App. 62a. States had not historically exercised that authority for fleet-wide vehicle
emissions; at the time Congress enacted the Clean Air
Act, only one State (California) “had adopted [vehicle]
emissions control standards.” Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v.
12
EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1079 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see, e.g.,
S. Rep. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33 (1967).3
Then in the Clean Air Act, Congress made clear
that regulation of mobile source emissions is exclusively the province of the federal government. As a
result, it is now well-settled that the authority to regulate motor vehicle emissions is “lodged in the Federal
Government.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,
519 (2007). In light of the lack of state regulation and
the longstanding federal regulation of vehicle emissions, no presumption against preemption applies.
See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 90
(2000).4
The Clean Air Act accounts for that practice; it gives California a waiver to adopt and enforce its own “standards relating
to control of emissions from new motor vehicles.” 42 U.S.C.
7543(b). The Act does not include that language for any other
State.
3
There is a serious question whether the presumption
against preemption ever applies in the conflict or obstacle
preemption context. The Supreme Court set out the presumption
against preemption in a field preemption decision. See Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (expressing for
the first time the notion that in “a field which the States have
traditionally occupied,” courts should “start with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress”). The presumption makes sense in the field
preemption context, because Congress presumably is aware of
the States’ historic powers within certain fields, and courts
should not lightly assume that Congress has precluded States
from regulating in those fields. The presumption makes less
sense in a conflict or obstacle preemption case, where the court
should focus on the nature of the conflict or obstacle presented
by the particular state or local law at issue. See, e.g., Mutual
Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 483-487 (2013); Geier, 529
U.S. at 881-882.
4
13
2. More broadly, the court of appeals failed to recognize that permitting state and local regulation of
manufacturers regarding motor vehicle emissions
would frustrate the purposes and objectives of the
Clean Air Act.
Congress’s primary purpose in enacting the Clean
Air Act was to regulate emissions nationwide. Maintaining uniform federal control of vehicle emissions
requirements is a key feature of the Act. That is because motor vehicles “readily move across state
boundaries,” and their emissions are not confined to
one State. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1079. An
automobile manufactured in Michigan might be sold
in Virginia, then be taken by its owner to Texas, and
so on. If all States were allowed to set their own vehicle emissions standards, that would “defeat the congressional purpose” in the Clean Air Act of “preventing obstruction to interstate commerce.” Id. at 1083
(quoting Allway, 340 F. Supp. at 1124).
Congress therefore authorized only the federal
government to regulate “the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or
new motor vehicle engines” that “cause, or contribute
to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C.
7521(a)(1). The EPA’s authority under the Act extends to ensuring that manufacturers’ vehicles remain in compliance with federal emissions standards
for a vehicle’s “useful life.” 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1). For
example, the agency requires manufacturers to satisfy
“in-use verification testing requirements.” 40 C.F.R.
86.1845-04. If the testing shows that a manufacturers’ class of vehicles does not conform to federal emissions requirements, the EPA can order a recall. 42
14
U.S.C. 7541(c)(1). Similarly, manufacturers must report to the EPA any emissions-related defects that affect 25 or more vehicles in a model year. 40 C.F.R.
85.1903(a). In all events, the focus is on ensuring that
manufacturers’ fleets remain in compliance with federal emissions regulations.
The Act prescribes only a very limited role for
state regulation that touches on vehicle emissions. As
the district court explained, that regulation “operate[s] on an individual vehicle basis.” Pet. App. 71a.
For example, the Act permits States to have emissions
inspection programs as part of their vehicle registration requirements. See 42 U.S.C. 7511, 7511a, 7541,
7543. But the Act prohibits States from requiring
manufacturers to conduct those tests. See 42 U.S.C.
7541(h)(2). Further, the Act expressly bars States and
localities from attempting to “adopt” or “enforce” any
“standard” related to vehicle emissions. 42 U.S.C.
7543(a). Nowhere does the Act bestow upon States or
localities a broad authority to impose emissions-related liability on manufacturers for their fleets. Instead, the Act specifies the opposite.
To be sure, the Clean Air Act gives States some
authority to regulate other emissions. For example,
States have “initial and primary” authority for addressing emissions from stationary sources, meaning
buildings and other stationary structures that emit
air pollution. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n,
531 U.S. 457, 470 (2001); see 42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(3) (defining stationary sources). But although Congress has
permitted state regulation of stationary sources of
emissions, “the regulation of mobile source emissions
is a federal responsibility.” Jensen Family Farms, Inc.
v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist.,
644 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2011).
15
The Act requires the EPA to make complicated decisions about when and how to regulate vehicle emissions. In that role, the EPA often must make decisions about the levels of emissions allowed, including
making tradeoffs between different emissions, and
balancing the effects on manufacturers and on the
public. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1) (authorizing
EPA to use its “judgment” in regulating emissions); 42
U.S.C. 7521(a)(4)(B) (charging the EPA to balance
several factors when fashioning rules, including the
extent to which a device or system “increases, reduces,
or eliminates emissions,” any “available methods for
reducing or eliminating any risk to public health [or]
welfare,” and the availability of alternative devices
that might better “conform to requirements”). The
EPA considers all of the facts and draws upon its vast
experience to put in place rules that it believes workable and beneficial to consumers and the public.
Congress entrusted those decisions to the EPA.
Permitting state and local regulation of vehicle emissions would directly interfere with Congress’s decision
to give the EPA exclusive authority in this area. Some
state and local regulators no doubt would strike a different balance than the EPA did, and that would eviscerate the uniform nationwide system of emissions
regulation intended under the Act. The state and local regulation here thus is preempted because it obstructs Congress’s purposes and objectives in the
Clean Air Act.
16
III. If Left Uncorrected, The Decision Below
Would Create An Unworkable Patchwork Of
Regulations And Ultimately Would Harm
Consumers
A. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Would
Create A Patchwork of Emissions Regulations
The court of appeals’ decision opens the door to
state and local regulation of post-sale manufacturer
updates to vehicle emission systems. For decades, the
federal government has exclusively regulated vehicle
emission systems. Congress gave the EPA that authority in the Clean Air Act in part because it understood that a different regime would be unworkable.
Specifically, Congress “assert[ed] federal control in
this area” because the “possibility of 50 different state
regulatory regimes raised the spectre of an anarchic
patchwork of federal and state regulatory programs, a
prospect which threatened to create nightmares for
the manufacturers.” Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at
1079 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Even if state and local governments merely
sought to enforce federal standards, as opposed to formulating their own standards, it “would be difficult
for the industry” to comply because “different administration could easily lead to different answers to identical questions.” H.R. Rep. No. 728, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1967). So Congress vested authority over vehicle emissions in the EPA.
Under the Ninth Circuit’s decision, state and local
governments would be free to regulate post-sale vehicle emissions software updates. As a result, if the
EPA puts in place a new emissions standard, and a
manufacturer pushes a software update to all of its
17
vehicles to comply with that standard, it could be held
liable under state and local laws. Any of the 50 States
or thousands of counties in the United States could
start regulating post-sale updates to emissions software. What might be perfectly acceptable under Nebraska law could be a violation under Kansas law.
The prospect of so many different regulatory regimes,
and the predictable chaos that would follow, is precisely why “[t]wo years after authorizing federal emissions regulations, * * * Congress preempted the states
from adopting their own emissions standards.” Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1079.
State and local governments may wish to adopt
their own regulatory regimes for any number of reasons. Some may believe that federal emissions standards are too lax; some may believe those same standards are too tough. Some may view regulation as a
potential source of revenue. Under the Ninth Circuit’s
decision, any state or local government potentially
could adopt its own regulatory regime. See Rowe v.
New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364,
373 (2008) (“To allow Maine to insist that the carriers
provide a special checking system would allow other
States to do the same. And to interpret the federal
law to permit these, and similar, state requirements
could easily lead to a patchwork of state service-determining laws, rules, and regulations.”). If even some
state and local governments adopt their own regulations in this area, it will impose massive costs on the
industry and ultimately will harm consumers.
B. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Would
Encourage Expensive And Needless Litigation
One predictable response to the court of appeals’
decision will be a flood of lawsuits – from States and
18
localities as well as from private parties. Under the
court of appeals’ decision, States and local governments not only could adopt new rules for post-sale
emissions software updates, but they also could enforce those rules through litigation. That is exactly
what happened here: Even though the EPA addressed petitioners’ conduct and negotiated a substantial financial settlement, respondents sued based on
the same conduct under their own anti-tampering
laws. They sought enormous amounts of money in
penalties – billions of dollars. Pet. App. 78a. The
Ninth Circuit recognized that this is “staggering liability.” Id. at 45a.
Those lawsuits are just the starting point. Once
the door has been opened, additional state and local
litigation no doubt would follow. Indeed, one respondent already has filed another lawsuit based on postsale software updates against Daimler and Bosch.
See Environmental Prot. Comm’n of Hillsborough Cty.
v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 20-cv-2238 (M.D.
Fla. Sept. 25, 2020).
Further, once a state or local government sued or
took enforcement action, private follow-on lawsuits inevitably would follow. That is because if each software update in each vehicle is a violation, the potential liability is enormous. And bringing a me-too suit
would be easy to do if a state or local government already had taken some enforcement action against an
auto manufacturer.
Those suits could be premised on any number of
existing state or local laws. Options include anti-tampering laws, unfair or deceptive trade practices laws,
products liability laws, and the common law of negligence. Most States have anti-tampering laws on the
books that could be the basis for public lawsuits. See
19
Pet. App. 33a n.19. Respondent Salt Lake County’s
claims in this case show how easily that could be done.
In addition to its anti-tampering claim, Salt Lake
County sued petitioners for common law fraud, common law nuisance, and violation of Utah’s Pattern of
Unlawful Activity Act. See id. at 54a. There is no
shortage of state statutes and common law causes of
action that creative counsel could employ.
Given the number of vehicles on the road and the
frequency of post-sale emission system updates, it
would be only a matter of time before enterprising
States, localities, and class action plaintiffs would target other manufacturers and auto part suppliers for
suit. That incredibly expensive litigation would have
little public benefit. Federal law already comprehensively regulates motor vehicle emissions. All the additional regulation would do is create confusion and
increase costs for manufacturers that ultimately
would be passed on to consumers.
C. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Would
Dramatically Raise Costs For Manufacturers
It would be difficult, if not impossible, for manufacturers to comply with a new patchwork regulatory
regime for post-sale updates to vehicle emission systems. Manufacturers sell their vehicles nationwide,
and vehicles often do not remain in the State of sale.
If every State and county were free to establish its
own rules for vehicle emissions software updates,
manufacturers would have to comply with each of
them before making any vehicle update. That might
even require state-specific updates to a vehicle when
the owner changes the place of registration, creating
yet another new requirement for manufacturers.
Given the millions of updates per year across the
20
country, that would be a tremendous burden. E.g.,
EPA, 2014-2017 Vehicle Engine Compliance Activities
Progress Report 7. In fact, it may be an “insurmountable task” to comply with that “patchwork” of different
requirements. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tr.,
462 U.S. 324, 339-340 (1983).
Even if it were logistically feasible for large manufacturers and auto parts suppliers to navigate such
a system, it would come at great cost. For example,
suppose a manufacturer wanted to ensure compliance
with state and local emissions regulations in advance
of making a software update, so as to not risk massive
liability. That would require significant work by both
the company’s in-house legal team and its technical
team. It would take a great deal of coordination, not
only for the company but also for the relevant government officials, to ensure regulatory compliance with a
variety of different, potentially conflicting rules.
Further, if a manufacturer attempts to ensure
compliance, it still could be risking significant liability
with each software update. That uncertainty could
lead the manufacturer to make only absolutely necessary updates, and to forego those that improve the vehicle’s performance or employ new technologies. See,
e.g., Caplinger v. Medtronic, Inc., 784 F.3d 1335, 1346
(10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J.) (observing that unpredictable liability might cause manufacturers to “delay
or abandon at least some number of * * * innovations”).
Some of the scarce resources that manufacturers
could have spent on continuing to research and develop new post-sale updates instead would be spent on
attempting to comply with state and local emissions
regulations. Auto manufacturers do not have limitless resources; the auto industry is cyclical and has
21
high overhead costs. See, e.g., Bill Vlasic and Nick
Bunkley, Obama Is Upbeat for GM’s Future, N.Y.
Times (Jun. 1, 2009), https://perma.cc/8PB8-2SBF.
The auto parts supply business, too, has long operated
on “small profit margins.” Purolator Prods., Inc. v.
FTC, 352 F.2d 874, 882 (7th Cir. 1965). Given finite
resources, a substantial increase in the cost and complexity of regulatory compliance would come at the expense of research and development efforts.
D. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Ultimately Would Harm Consumers
The end result would be that consumers lose out.
First, some of the increased compliance costs on manufacturers and auto parts suppliers ultimately would
fall on consumers. Just as manufacturer savings in
the automotive industry lead to lower consumer
prices, see, e.g., Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751
F.2d 1336, 1352 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1985), additional manufacturer expenditures would lead to higher prices.
Adding hundreds or thousands of new state and local
regulations necessarily would increase those passedon costs.
The court of appeals’ decision would impose costs
on consumers in other ways, too. A patchwork vehicle-emissions regulatory regime could, for example,
negatively impact the value of customers’ vehicles.
Americans move from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and
take their vehicles with them. See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n,
88 F.3d at 1079 (Vehicles “readily move across state
boundaries.”). A vehicle might comply with the emissions regulations in one State and not in another.
Consumers who move to States or localities with
stricter emissions regulations might be surprised to
learn that the value of their vehicles has decreased
substantially. And if States and localities were free to
22
set their own emissions standards on entire fleets of
vehicles, consumers who move to new jurisdictions
may not be able to register their vehicles there at all.
More fundamentally, consumers could lose the
benefit of receiving many post-sale emissions software
updates. Remote software updates have become more
frequent in recent years. See, e.g., Quain, Benefits.
That has “the potential to make software-based recall
repairs more convenient, quick and comprehensive for
car owners.” Doug Newcomb, The Upsides and Downside of Over-the-Air Software Updates for Automobile
Dealers, WardsAuto (Nov. 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/
ZH8F-XASG. Indeed, necessary functions like “recalls and updates of critical safety systems” now often
can be accomplished through remote updates – delivered wirelessly to vehicles through cellular or WiFi
connections – without “requir[ing] customers to bring
their vehicles to a dealership’s service department.”
Ibid.
Auto manufacturers have begun rolling out new
and innovative features through those post-sale software updates. Just last year, for example, BMW released a remote update that, among other things,
added an emissions functionality to its hybrid vehicles
that “automatically switches to pure electric drive
mode” when in designated green areas. Press Release, BMW Group, BMW Group Rolls Out Biggest Remote Software Upgrade In Company History (Oct. 16,
2020), https://perma.cc/4J8B-78NN. That provides
vehicle owners greater automated efficiency and provides the public the benefit of vehicles emitting fewer
pollutants in dense urban areas. Ibid.
The threat of state and local regulation would
jeopardize continued use of post-sale software updates
and continued innovation in this field. Ultimately,
23
fewer post-sale software updates means fewer cars on
the road maintained in optimal condition. The average vehicle on the road today is nearly 12 years old.
See U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, https://perma.cc/RVV9-QEWM. And
many consumers do not bring their vehicles in for regular maintenance. As a result, only about two thirds
of recalled cars ever get repaired – “even after owners
have been sent multiple notices.” Quain, Benefits; accord Congressional Research Service, Motor Vehicle
Safety: Issues for Congress 16 (Jan. 26, 2021), https://
perma.cc/GC8Q-PTBU.
Given those practical realities, post-sale software
updates are vital for consumers to get the most out of
their vehicles. Further industry innovation in remote
updates “could eliminate many of these compliance
problems” (and save consumers money) by allowing
remote repair of vehicle electronic systems. Quain,
Benefits. To continue to develop this field to its full
potential, manufacturers need to know that they are
not inviting lawsuits every time they send out a software update to vehicles.
24
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted.
NICOLE A. SAHARSKY
Counsel of Record
ERIC A. WHITE
Mayer Brown LLP
1999 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 263-3000
nsaharsky@mayerbrown.com
FEBRUARY 2021
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.