Reply Brief — Michael D. Ellis, Petitioner v. Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston
Supreme Court briefApr 8, 2021
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No. 20-953
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
MICHAEL D. ELLIS,
Petitioner,
v.
LIBERTY LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF BOSTON, a New
Hampshire corporation,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CERTIORARI
SHAWN E. MCDERMOTT
TIMOTHY M. GARVEY
McDermott Law, LLC
4600 S. Ulster Street
Suite 800
Denver, CO 80237
(303) 964-1800
MATTHEW W.H. WESSLER
JONATHAN E. TAYLOR
Counsel of Record
Gupta Wessler PLLC
1900 L Street NW
Suite 312
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 888-1741
jon@guptawessler.com
Counsel for Petitioner
April 8, 2021
-iTABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of authorities ............................................................ ii
Introduction ........................................................................ 1
Argument ............................................................................ 3
I.
Liberty fails to diminish the split’s
significance........................................................... 3
II.
This case squarely presents the Court
with an opportunity to resolve the split. .......... 5
III. Liberty’s merits arguments only
underscore the need for this Court’s
review. .................................................................. 8
Conclusion ........................................................................... 9
-iiTABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Boseman v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.,
301 U.S. 196 (1937) .......................................................... 9
DaimlerChrysler Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v.
Durden,
448 F.3d 918 (6th Cir. 2006) ....................................... 1, 3
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938) ............................................................ 9
UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America v. Ward,
526 U.S. 358 (1999) ...................................................... 1, 9
Statutes
C.R.S. § 10-3-1116(2) ............................................................. 7
C.R.S. § 10-3-1116(8) ............................................................. 7
Other authorities
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws
§ 6(1) (1971) ...................................................................... 7
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws
§ 187 cmt. c (1971) ....................................................... 4, 6
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
§ 187 cmt. g (1971) ........................................................... 8
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws
§ 187(1) (1971) .............................................................. 3, 4
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws
§ 188(1) (1971) .................................................................. 4
-iiiRestatement (Second) Conflict of Laws
§ 188(2) (1971) .................................................................. 4
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws
§ 192 (1971)....................................................................... 7
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws
§ 192 cmt. h (1971) ........................................................... 7
-1INTRODUCTION
The fundamental case for granting certiorari is largely
unchallenged by Liberty. The Tenth Circuit confronted a
preexisting circuit split on an ERISA question, found the
conflicting approaches to be “inadequate” as a matter of
“policy,” and plucked a new rule out of thin air. By the
court’s own admission, it did so to hand insurers a way to
avoid “patchwork regulation by a variety of states”—even
though its rule applies only to state laws that fall within
ERISA’s saving clause, where Congress wanted “varying
insurance regulations” to be able to apply to ERISA plans.
UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 376 n.6
(1999). And the court did so, further, in a case where the
underlying dispute—the standard of judicial review for
benefits determinations—has been the subject of multiple
decisions of this Court and is of independent importance.
The result is a clear multi-circuit split. And it is a split
that affects outcomes: As we explained in the petition (at
17–18), the Sixth Circuit’s decision in DaimlerChrysler
Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v. Durden, 448 F.3d 918
(6th Cir. 2006), would have come out the other way under
the Tenth Circuit’s test. We also explained that the district
court below applied the Sixth Circuit’s test, held that
Colorado’s ban on discretionary clauses governs, engaged
in de novo review, and ruled for Ellis. The Tenth Circuit
then made up its own test and disagreed at every step.
Liberty does not deny any of this. It concedes that the
Sixth Circuit applies a “different test” and that there is
“disagreement between the circuits.” BIO 12. It concedes
that the issue is recurring, even in the specific context of
state laws banning discretionary clauses, with multiple
circuits having decided that “precise issue.” BIO 18. It also
concedes that the district court below, which applied the
Sixth Circuit’s test, reached the opposite conclusion as the
-2Tenth Circuit, which did not apply that test. Nor does
Liberty dispute that the Tenth Circuit’s test would have
flipped the outcome in Durden if the Sixth Circuit applied
it. And Liberty even takes sides on the dispute in that
case, aligning itself with the “dissenting opinion.” BIO 24.
So why would certiorari be unwarranted here? Liberty
gives three reasons. The first two—about the question’s
importance and the suitability of this case as a vehicle—
are really the same reason. Both are predicated on
Liberty’s belief that it would prevail even under the Sixth
Circuit’s test, so little is at stake. But that is wrong. The
only court in this case that actually applied the Sixth
Circuit’s test rejected Liberty’s argument. Although the
Tenth Circuit reversed, it did so not because it disagreed
with the district court’s application of the Sixth Circuit’s
test, but because it felt the need to create a different test
altogether. There is nothing preventing this Court from
deciding whether that holding was correct, and to thereby
resolve the circuit conflict and bring uniformity to the law.
In any event, Liberty’s prediction about how the Tenth
Circuit would have decided the question under the Sixth
Circuit’s test is mistaken. Under the principles laid out in
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, Colorado’s
statutory bar on discretionary clauses applies to this case
and may not be displaced by a plan’s choice-of-law clause.
Finally, Liberty argues the merits. It doesn’t say much
about why the Restatement supplies the wrong test, or
why the Tenth Circuit was justified in creating its own.
Instead, Liberty defends the decision below as consistent
with ERISA because it does not allow insurers to nullify a
non-preempted state law by contract. But that is exactly
what it does. It is time for this Court to step in, resolve the
circuit conflict, and ensure that federal common law is
used to carry out Congress’s scheme—not contradict it.
-3ARGUMENT
I.
Liberty fails to diminish the split’s significance.
Liberty does not deny the existence of the split. To the
contrary, it acknowledges that there is a “disagreement
between the circuits,” and that the Sixth Circuit applies a
“different test than the other circuits.” BIO 12. Liberty
also acknowledges that these different circuit tests can
lead to different outcomes, at least in some cases. The
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Durden is itself an example of
that, and Liberty does not contend otherwise.
Rather than deny the split, Liberty tries to downplay
it. It does so in three ways, none of which is persuasive.
First, Liberty claims that the Tenth Circuit’s test is
“nearly identical” to the test that has been adopted by the
Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, so there is no threeway split, just a two-way split. BIO 13. But the Tenth
Circuit did not see it that way. The reason that it felt the
need to blaze its own trail is that it found the existing tests
to be “inadequate.” App. 27a. Regardless, even if Liberty
were right in this respect, that would hardly offer a reason
to deny review. This Court routinely grants certiorari to
resolve two-way splits under ERISA. See Pet. 19–20
(citing cases). It should do the same here.
Second, Liberty attempts to diminish the significance
of the split, arguing that the Sixth Circuit’s test yields a
different outcome only in “unusual circumstances.” BIO
15. Liberty bases this assertion on its reading of the “first
prong of the Restatement test” in section 187, id., which
asks whether “the particular issue is one which the parties
could have resolved by an explicit provision in their
agreement directed to that issue.” Restatement (Second)
Conflict of Laws § 187(1) (1971). Liberty argues that “the
forum state’s law is irrelevant” in answering this question
-4“because the test is whether ERISA permits the parties
to resolve the particular issue,” not state law. BIO 17.
Liberty says that there is no “support” for the proposition
that “courts would look to the forum state’s law” under
any circumstances in addressing this question. Id.
That assertion is easily refuted. Comment c to section
187, which we cited in the petition (at 15), provides:
“Whether the parties could have determined a particular
issue by explicit agreement directed to that issue is a
question to be determined by the local law of the state
selected by application of the rule of § 188.” Restatement
(Second) Conflict of Laws § 187 & cmt. c (1971). Section
188, in turn, sets forth a multi-factor test for determining
which state’s law would apply in the absence of a choiceof-law clause, and it provides that the listed factors “are to
be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.” Id. § 188(2). Under this
test, courts will apply “the local law of the state which,
with respect to that issue, has the most significant
relationship to the transaction and the parties.” Id.
§188(1). When it comes to the issue in this case, there is no
contest: Colorado has an undeniably strong interest in
enforcing a Colorado statute that expressly prohibits
discretionary clauses to protect a Colorado resident who
worked in Colorado, paid premiums in Colorado, and was
injured in Colorado. On the other side of the ledger, the
Pennsylvania legislature was silent on this question.
This is not to say that whether ERISA permits the
parties to resolve the particular issue is irrelevant. Of
course not. Because federal law applies in every state, if
the threshold question is to be decided under a particular
state’s law, that necessarily encompasses federal law. But
there is no basis for arguing, as Liberty does, that only
federal law may be considered in answering that question.
-5Third, Liberty tries to get mileage out of the fact that
three circuits—the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits—
have applied choice-of-law tests to a state discretionaryclause ban, and they reached the same conclusion. BIO 18.
But the recurring nature of this question, even in this
particular context, just points to the importance of the
issue. Equally important, the test that the Tenth Circuit
saw fit to create in this case, like the test applied by the
two other circuits in those cases, is not limited to ERISA
choice-of-law questions concerning the applicability of
state bans on discretionary clauses. Those tests apply to
all choice-of-law questions under ERISA. Nor is the Sixth
Circuit’s test limited to the particular kind of clause at
issue in that case. The conflict among the circuits, rather,
is broader: It concerns the correct methodology to apply
to any choice-of-law question under ERISA, irrespective
of the particular dispute in the case. That methodological
disagreement cries out for resolution by this Court.
II. This case squarely presents the Court with an
opportunity to resolve the split.
Liberty devotes much of its opposition to arguing that
this case does not present the Court with an opportunity
to resolve this split because “the full Durden/Restatement
analysis would not affect the outcome of this case.” BIO
19–24. That is wrong for two independent reasons.
It is wrong, first of all, because the Tenth Circuit did
not apply the Durden/Restatement analysis or suggest
that the district court’s application of that analysis was
incorrect. Instead, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district
court’s judgment based entirely on its determination that
this was not the correct test to apply at all. So the petition
cleanly presents this Court with an opportunity to resolve
the three-way conflict and decide the applicable test for
deciding choice-of-law questions under ERISA. Contrary
-6to Liberty’s assertion (at 12), doing so here would not be
“advisory.” If this Court agreed that the Restatement
provides the proper test, as the Sixth Circuit has held, it
could reverse the Tenth Circuit’s judgment and remand
for application of the correct test in the first instance.
Second, Liberty’s belief that it would prevail under
the Sixth Circuit’s test is premised on a misreading of the
Restatement. Liberty posits that “Sections 187 and 192
function together to confirm that the employer’s home
state law always applies.” BIO 20 (emphasis added). But,
as just noted, this reading of section 187 is contradicted by
comment c, which leaves no doubt that the employer’s
home state law will not “always” apply. This case is a
perfect example. Again, the balance of interests between
the two competing states on the particular question here
could not be more disproportionate. Colorado’s legislature
enacted a statute that, by its own express terms, covers
the contract in this case and forbids enforcement of the
discretionary clause notwithstanding the plan’s choice-oflaw provision. See Pet. 5. It is hard to imagine a clearer
expression of a state interest than that. And Colorado’s
interest is especially strong because this case was brought
by one of its residents, after working, paying premiums,
and being disabled in its state. Pennsylvania’s interest, by
contrast, is scant. Its legislature has said nothing about
this particular issue; it has simply declined to legislate.1
1
Liberty asserts (at 28) that this Court should not consider the
applicability of the clarifying amendment to Colorado’s law because
the Tenth Circuit did not do so below. But the clarifying amendment
is unambiguous, and the Tenth Circuit’s analysis did not turn on the
meaning of the statute. The Tenth Circuit would have decided the case
the same way regardless, which only highlights the problems with its
test. At any rate, to resolve the split, this Court need not consider any
issue “not analyzed by” the Tenth Circuit, including application of the
Restatement. BIO 28. Nor, for similar reasons, is Liberty’s waiver
-7Nor does section 192 of the Restatement provide that
“the employer’s home state law always applies.” BIO 20.
That section sets forth a general rule that disputes under
an insurance policy are to be decided by “the local law of
the state where the insured was domiciled . . . unless, with
respect to the particular issue, some other state has a
more significant relationship under the principles stated
in § 6 to the transaction and the parties, in which event the
local law of the other state will be applied.” Restatement
(Second) Conflict of Laws § 192. The section then includes
a comment saying that, for group insurance policies, the
general rule is that the “rights against the insurer are
usually governed by the law which governs the master
policy,” “at least as to most issues.” Id. cmt. h. But neither
of these rules is absolute. Nor do they do away with the
basic roadmap for a choice-of-law analysis, which includes
an analysis of which state has a greater interest (a
prevailing concern embodied in both sections 187 and 188).
Indeed, far from overriding that approach, section 192
expressly incorporates it. The section’s text requires a
balancing of interests guided by the principles in section
6, one of which is that a court “will follow a statutory
directive of its own state on choice of law.” Id. § 6(1).
Section 192 thus does not in any way preclude application
of Colorado law to the dispute here, where Colorado’s
legislature expressed a strong desire to target a particular
concern affecting its own residents, and to do so
“notwithstanding any contractual or statutory choice-oflaw provision to the contrary.” C.R.S. § 10-3-1116(2) & (8).
argument a barrier to review. It is Liberty—not the petitioner—who
is asking this Court to “review what the court below did not decide.”
BIO 15. All that the petition is asking the Court to decide is whether
the Tenth Circuit applied the correct test. The application of that test
could then be—but need not be—decided by this Court if it so chose.
-8III. Liberty’s merits arguments only underscore the
need for this Court’s review.
On the merits, Liberty has little to say about why the
Restatement’s test—the default approach for deciding
choice-of-law questions under federal common law—is the
wrong test here. Liberty includes a passing criticism, in
the course of embracing the Sixth Circuit’s dissent (at 24),
that the test is insufficiently rigid and should instead defer
to the plan terms no matter what state law has to say.
But the Restatement’s flexibility is a feature, not a
bug. It allows courts to take into consideration a state’s
sovereign interests over a particular issue. And for good
reason: “Fulfillment of the parties’ expectations is not the
only value in contract law; regard must also be had for
state interests and for state regulation.” Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 cmt. g (1971). That is all
the more true where, as here, the state regulation at issue
is one that Congress specifically wanted to remain in
effect. By eschewing this test and the flexibility built into
it, then, the Tenth Circuit did not just disrespect the
prerogatives of state legislatures, but the prerogative of
the federal legislature as well. Just as bad, it did so under
the banner of federal common law, which is supposed to be
used only to effectuate congressional intent, out of
recognition of the fact that it is the people’s
representatives who are given primarily lawmaking
powers, not Article III judges.
Liberty insists that “the Tenth Circuit’s decision does
not implicate the saving clause” that Congress wrote into
ERISA, nor this Court’s decision in UNUM, because the
Tenth Circuit’s test does not allow insurers to “displace
any state regulation simply by inserting a contrary term
in plan documents.” BIO 27. But that is exactly what it
does. The only reason that the Tenth Circuit held that
-9Colorado’s statute has no effect in this case is because of
the plan’s choice-of-law provision. In doing so, the Tenth
Circuit effectively “read the saving clause out of ERISA.”
UNUM, 526 U.S. at 376 (cleaned up).
In a final effort to avoid review, Liberty claims that a
1937 decision of this Court speaks directly to the choiceof-law question here. It even goes so far as to say that our
position “contravenes” that case. Pet. 25–26 (discussing
Boseman v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196 (1937)).
But that case has no bearing on the question presented. It
was decided a year before Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), and decades before ERISA. The Court
applied general common law to reach a conclusion about
state law that it acknowledged was contrary to the courts
of that state. Boseman, 301 U.S. at 203–04. The decision
has no applicability to this case, involving a Colorado
statute that expressly forbids the discretionary provision
that is at issue, and the only question is what the proper
test is under ERISA for determining whether a choice-oflaw clause may displace that law. What controls that
question is not a pre-ERISA, pre-Erie case that applies
general common law, but Congress’s decision to add a
saving clause in ERISA, and the Colorado legislature’s
decision to enact a broad statute prohibiting discretionary
clauses. The decision below is directly at odds with these
legislative judgments. This Court should not let it stand.
CONCLUSION
The petition for certiorari should be granted.
-10-
Respectfully submitted,
MATTHEW W.H. WESSLER
JONATHAN E. TAYLOR
Counsel of Record
Gupta Wessler PLLC
1900 L Street NW, Suite 312
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 888-1741
jon@guptawessler.com
SHAWN E. MCDERMOTT
TIMOTHY M. GARVEY
McDermott Law, LLC
4600 S. Ulster Street
Suite 800
Denver, CO 80237
(303) 964-1800
April 8, 2021
Counsel for Petitioner
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.