Reply Brief — Michael D. Ellis, Petitioner v. Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston

Supreme Court briefApr 8, 2021

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No. 20-953

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

MICHAEL D. ELLIS,

Petitioner,

v.

LIBERTY LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF BOSTON, a New

Hampshire corporation,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CERTIORARI

SHAWN E. MCDERMOTT

TIMOTHY M. GARVEY

McDermott Law, LLC

4600 S. Ulster Street

Suite 800

Denver, CO 80237

(303) 964-1800

MATTHEW W.H. WESSLER

JONATHAN E. TAYLOR

Counsel of Record

Gupta Wessler PLLC

1900 L Street NW

Suite 312

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 888-1741

jon@guptawessler.com

Counsel for Petitioner

April 8, 2021

-iTABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of authorities ............................................................ ii

Introduction ........................................................................ 1

Argument ............................................................................ 3

I.

Liberty fails to diminish the split’s

significance........................................................... 3

II.

This case squarely presents the Court

with an opportunity to resolve the split. .......... 5

III. Liberty’s merits arguments only

underscore the need for this Court’s

review. .................................................................. 8

Conclusion ........................................................................... 9

-iiTABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Boseman v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.,

301 U.S. 196 (1937) .......................................................... 9

DaimlerChrysler Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v.

Durden,

448 F.3d 918 (6th Cir. 2006) ....................................... 1, 3

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,

304 U.S. 64 (1938) ............................................................ 9

UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America v. Ward,

526 U.S. 358 (1999) ...................................................... 1, 9

Statutes

C.R.S. § 10-3-1116(2) ............................................................. 7

C.R.S. § 10-3-1116(8) ............................................................. 7

Other authorities

Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws

§ 6(1) (1971) ...................................................................... 7

Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws

§ 187 cmt. c (1971) ....................................................... 4, 6

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws

§ 187 cmt. g (1971) ........................................................... 8

Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws

§ 187(1) (1971) .............................................................. 3, 4

Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws

§ 188(1) (1971) .................................................................. 4

-iiiRestatement (Second) Conflict of Laws

§ 188(2) (1971) .................................................................. 4

Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws

§ 192 (1971)....................................................................... 7

Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws

§ 192 cmt. h (1971) ........................................................... 7

-1INTRODUCTION

The fundamental case for granting certiorari is largely

unchallenged by Liberty. The Tenth Circuit confronted a

preexisting circuit split on an ERISA question, found the

conflicting approaches to be “inadequate” as a matter of

“policy,” and plucked a new rule out of thin air. By the

court’s own admission, it did so to hand insurers a way to

avoid “patchwork regulation by a variety of states”—even

though its rule applies only to state laws that fall within

ERISA’s saving clause, where Congress wanted “varying

insurance regulations” to be able to apply to ERISA plans.

UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 376 n.6

(1999). And the court did so, further, in a case where the

underlying dispute—the standard of judicial review for

benefits determinations—has been the subject of multiple

decisions of this Court and is of independent importance.

The result is a clear multi-circuit split. And it is a split

that affects outcomes: As we explained in the petition (at

17–18), the Sixth Circuit’s decision in DaimlerChrysler

Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v. Durden, 448 F.3d 918

(6th Cir. 2006), would have come out the other way under

the Tenth Circuit’s test. We also explained that the district

court below applied the Sixth Circuit’s test, held that

Colorado’s ban on discretionary clauses governs, engaged

in de novo review, and ruled for Ellis. The Tenth Circuit

then made up its own test and disagreed at every step.

Liberty does not deny any of this. It concedes that the

Sixth Circuit applies a “different test” and that there is

“disagreement between the circuits.” BIO 12. It concedes

that the issue is recurring, even in the specific context of

state laws banning discretionary clauses, with multiple

circuits having decided that “precise issue.” BIO 18. It also

concedes that the district court below, which applied the

Sixth Circuit’s test, reached the opposite conclusion as the

-2Tenth Circuit, which did not apply that test. Nor does

Liberty dispute that the Tenth Circuit’s test would have

flipped the outcome in Durden if the Sixth Circuit applied

it. And Liberty even takes sides on the dispute in that

case, aligning itself with the “dissenting opinion.” BIO 24.

So why would certiorari be unwarranted here? Liberty

gives three reasons. The first two—about the question’s

importance and the suitability of this case as a vehicle—

are really the same reason. Both are predicated on

Liberty’s belief that it would prevail even under the Sixth

Circuit’s test, so little is at stake. But that is wrong. The

only court in this case that actually applied the Sixth

Circuit’s test rejected Liberty’s argument. Although the

Tenth Circuit reversed, it did so not because it disagreed

with the district court’s application of the Sixth Circuit’s

test, but because it felt the need to create a different test

altogether. There is nothing preventing this Court from

deciding whether that holding was correct, and to thereby

resolve the circuit conflict and bring uniformity to the law.

In any event, Liberty’s prediction about how the Tenth

Circuit would have decided the question under the Sixth

Circuit’s test is mistaken. Under the principles laid out in

the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, Colorado’s

statutory bar on discretionary clauses applies to this case

and may not be displaced by a plan’s choice-of-law clause.

Finally, Liberty argues the merits. It doesn’t say much

about why the Restatement supplies the wrong test, or

why the Tenth Circuit was justified in creating its own.

Instead, Liberty defends the decision below as consistent

with ERISA because it does not allow insurers to nullify a

non-preempted state law by contract. But that is exactly

what it does. It is time for this Court to step in, resolve the

circuit conflict, and ensure that federal common law is

used to carry out Congress’s scheme—not contradict it.

-3ARGUMENT

I.

Liberty fails to diminish the split’s significance.

Liberty does not deny the existence of the split. To the

contrary, it acknowledges that there is a “disagreement

between the circuits,” and that the Sixth Circuit applies a

“different test than the other circuits.” BIO 12. Liberty

also acknowledges that these different circuit tests can

lead to different outcomes, at least in some cases. The

Sixth Circuit’s decision in Durden is itself an example of

that, and Liberty does not contend otherwise.

Rather than deny the split, Liberty tries to downplay

it. It does so in three ways, none of which is persuasive.

First, Liberty claims that the Tenth Circuit’s test is

“nearly identical” to the test that has been adopted by the

Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, so there is no threeway split, just a two-way split. BIO 13. But the Tenth

Circuit did not see it that way. The reason that it felt the

need to blaze its own trail is that it found the existing tests

to be “inadequate.” App. 27a. Regardless, even if Liberty

were right in this respect, that would hardly offer a reason

to deny review. This Court routinely grants certiorari to

resolve two-way splits under ERISA. See Pet. 19–20

(citing cases). It should do the same here.

Second, Liberty attempts to diminish the significance

of the split, arguing that the Sixth Circuit’s test yields a

different outcome only in “unusual circumstances.” BIO

15. Liberty bases this assertion on its reading of the “first

prong of the Restatement test” in section 187, id., which

asks whether “the particular issue is one which the parties

could have resolved by an explicit provision in their

agreement directed to that issue.” Restatement (Second)

Conflict of Laws § 187(1) (1971). Liberty argues that “the

forum state’s law is irrelevant” in answering this question

-4“because the test is whether ERISA permits the parties

to resolve the particular issue,” not state law. BIO 17.

Liberty says that there is no “support” for the proposition

that “courts would look to the forum state’s law” under

any circumstances in addressing this question. Id.

That assertion is easily refuted. Comment c to section

187, which we cited in the petition (at 15), provides:

“Whether the parties could have determined a particular

issue by explicit agreement directed to that issue is a

question to be determined by the local law of the state

selected by application of the rule of § 188.” Restatement

(Second) Conflict of Laws § 187 & cmt. c (1971). Section

188, in turn, sets forth a multi-factor test for determining

which state’s law would apply in the absence of a choiceof-law clause, and it provides that the listed factors “are to

be evaluated according to their relative importance with

respect to the particular issue.” Id. § 188(2). Under this

test, courts will apply “the local law of the state which,

with respect to that issue, has the most significant

relationship to the transaction and the parties.” Id.

§188(1). When it comes to the issue in this case, there is no

contest: Colorado has an undeniably strong interest in

enforcing a Colorado statute that expressly prohibits

discretionary clauses to protect a Colorado resident who

worked in Colorado, paid premiums in Colorado, and was

injured in Colorado. On the other side of the ledger, the

Pennsylvania legislature was silent on this question.

This is not to say that whether ERISA permits the

parties to resolve the particular issue is irrelevant. Of

course not. Because federal law applies in every state, if

the threshold question is to be decided under a particular

state’s law, that necessarily encompasses federal law. But

there is no basis for arguing, as Liberty does, that only

federal law may be considered in answering that question.

-5Third, Liberty tries to get mileage out of the fact that

three circuits—the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits—

have applied choice-of-law tests to a state discretionaryclause ban, and they reached the same conclusion. BIO 18.

But the recurring nature of this question, even in this

particular context, just points to the importance of the

issue. Equally important, the test that the Tenth Circuit

saw fit to create in this case, like the test applied by the

two other circuits in those cases, is not limited to ERISA

choice-of-law questions concerning the applicability of

state bans on discretionary clauses. Those tests apply to

all choice-of-law questions under ERISA. Nor is the Sixth

Circuit’s test limited to the particular kind of clause at

issue in that case. The conflict among the circuits, rather,

is broader: It concerns the correct methodology to apply

to any choice-of-law question under ERISA, irrespective

of the particular dispute in the case. That methodological

disagreement cries out for resolution by this Court.

II. This case squarely presents the Court with an

opportunity to resolve the split.

Liberty devotes much of its opposition to arguing that

this case does not present the Court with an opportunity

to resolve this split because “the full Durden/Restatement

analysis would not affect the outcome of this case.” BIO

19–24. That is wrong for two independent reasons.

It is wrong, first of all, because the Tenth Circuit did

not apply the Durden/Restatement analysis or suggest

that the district court’s application of that analysis was

incorrect. Instead, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district

court’s judgment based entirely on its determination that

this was not the correct test to apply at all. So the petition

cleanly presents this Court with an opportunity to resolve

the three-way conflict and decide the applicable test for

deciding choice-of-law questions under ERISA. Contrary

-6to Liberty’s assertion (at 12), doing so here would not be

“advisory.” If this Court agreed that the Restatement

provides the proper test, as the Sixth Circuit has held, it

could reverse the Tenth Circuit’s judgment and remand

for application of the correct test in the first instance.

Second, Liberty’s belief that it would prevail under

the Sixth Circuit’s test is premised on a misreading of the

Restatement. Liberty posits that “Sections 187 and 192

function together to confirm that the employer’s home

state law always applies.” BIO 20 (emphasis added). But,

as just noted, this reading of section 187 is contradicted by

comment c, which leaves no doubt that the employer’s

home state law will not “always” apply. This case is a

perfect example. Again, the balance of interests between

the two competing states on the particular question here

could not be more disproportionate. Colorado’s legislature

enacted a statute that, by its own express terms, covers

the contract in this case and forbids enforcement of the

discretionary clause notwithstanding the plan’s choice-oflaw provision. See Pet. 5. It is hard to imagine a clearer

expression of a state interest than that. And Colorado’s

interest is especially strong because this case was brought

by one of its residents, after working, paying premiums,

and being disabled in its state. Pennsylvania’s interest, by

contrast, is scant. Its legislature has said nothing about

this particular issue; it has simply declined to legislate.1

1

Liberty asserts (at 28) that this Court should not consider the

applicability of the clarifying amendment to Colorado’s law because

the Tenth Circuit did not do so below. But the clarifying amendment

is unambiguous, and the Tenth Circuit’s analysis did not turn on the

meaning of the statute. The Tenth Circuit would have decided the case

the same way regardless, which only highlights the problems with its

test. At any rate, to resolve the split, this Court need not consider any

issue “not analyzed by” the Tenth Circuit, including application of the

Restatement. BIO 28. Nor, for similar reasons, is Liberty’s waiver

-7Nor does section 192 of the Restatement provide that

“the employer’s home state law always applies.” BIO 20.

That section sets forth a general rule that disputes under

an insurance policy are to be decided by “the local law of

the state where the insured was domiciled . . . unless, with

respect to the particular issue, some other state has a

more significant relationship under the principles stated

in § 6 to the transaction and the parties, in which event the

local law of the other state will be applied.” Restatement

(Second) Conflict of Laws § 192. The section then includes

a comment saying that, for group insurance policies, the

general rule is that the “rights against the insurer are

usually governed by the law which governs the master

policy,” “at least as to most issues.” Id. cmt. h. But neither

of these rules is absolute. Nor do they do away with the

basic roadmap for a choice-of-law analysis, which includes

an analysis of which state has a greater interest (a

prevailing concern embodied in both sections 187 and 188).

Indeed, far from overriding that approach, section 192

expressly incorporates it. The section’s text requires a

balancing of interests guided by the principles in section

6, one of which is that a court “will follow a statutory

directive of its own state on choice of law.” Id. § 6(1).

Section 192 thus does not in any way preclude application

of Colorado law to the dispute here, where Colorado’s

legislature expressed a strong desire to target a particular

concern affecting its own residents, and to do so

“notwithstanding any contractual or statutory choice-oflaw provision to the contrary.” C.R.S. § 10-3-1116(2) & (8).

argument a barrier to review. It is Liberty—not the petitioner—who

is asking this Court to “review what the court below did not decide.”

BIO 15. All that the petition is asking the Court to decide is whether

the Tenth Circuit applied the correct test. The application of that test

could then be—but need not be—decided by this Court if it so chose.

-8III. Liberty’s merits arguments only underscore the

need for this Court’s review.

On the merits, Liberty has little to say about why the

Restatement’s test—the default approach for deciding

choice-of-law questions under federal common law—is the

wrong test here. Liberty includes a passing criticism, in

the course of embracing the Sixth Circuit’s dissent (at 24),

that the test is insufficiently rigid and should instead defer

to the plan terms no matter what state law has to say.

But the Restatement’s flexibility is a feature, not a

bug. It allows courts to take into consideration a state’s

sovereign interests over a particular issue. And for good

reason: “Fulfillment of the parties’ expectations is not the

only value in contract law; regard must also be had for

state interests and for state regulation.” Restatement

(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 cmt. g (1971). That is all

the more true where, as here, the state regulation at issue

is one that Congress specifically wanted to remain in

effect. By eschewing this test and the flexibility built into

it, then, the Tenth Circuit did not just disrespect the

prerogatives of state legislatures, but the prerogative of

the federal legislature as well. Just as bad, it did so under

the banner of federal common law, which is supposed to be

used only to effectuate congressional intent, out of

recognition of the fact that it is the people’s

representatives who are given primarily lawmaking

powers, not Article III judges.

Liberty insists that “the Tenth Circuit’s decision does

not implicate the saving clause” that Congress wrote into

ERISA, nor this Court’s decision in UNUM, because the

Tenth Circuit’s test does not allow insurers to “displace

any state regulation simply by inserting a contrary term

in plan documents.” BIO 27. But that is exactly what it

does. The only reason that the Tenth Circuit held that

-9Colorado’s statute has no effect in this case is because of

the plan’s choice-of-law provision. In doing so, the Tenth

Circuit effectively “read the saving clause out of ERISA.”

UNUM, 526 U.S. at 376 (cleaned up).

In a final effort to avoid review, Liberty claims that a

1937 decision of this Court speaks directly to the choiceof-law question here. It even goes so far as to say that our

position “contravenes” that case. Pet. 25–26 (discussing

Boseman v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196 (1937)).

But that case has no bearing on the question presented. It

was decided a year before Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,

304 U.S. 64 (1938), and decades before ERISA. The Court

applied general common law to reach a conclusion about

state law that it acknowledged was contrary to the courts

of that state. Boseman, 301 U.S. at 203–04. The decision

has no applicability to this case, involving a Colorado

statute that expressly forbids the discretionary provision

that is at issue, and the only question is what the proper

test is under ERISA for determining whether a choice-oflaw clause may displace that law. What controls that

question is not a pre-ERISA, pre-Erie case that applies

general common law, but Congress’s decision to add a

saving clause in ERISA, and the Colorado legislature’s

decision to enact a broad statute prohibiting discretionary

clauses. The decision below is directly at odds with these

legislative judgments. This Court should not let it stand.

CONCLUSION

The petition for certiorari should be granted.

-10-

Respectfully submitted,

MATTHEW W.H. WESSLER

JONATHAN E. TAYLOR

Counsel of Record

Gupta Wessler PLLC

1900 L Street NW, Suite 312

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 888-1741

jon@guptawessler.com

SHAWN E. MCDERMOTT

TIMOTHY M. GARVEY

McDermott Law, LLC

4600 S. Ulster Street

Suite 800

Denver, CO 80237

(303) 964-1800

April 8, 2021

Counsel for Petitioner

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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