Respondents Brief — Club One Casino, Inc., dba Club One Casino, et al., Petitioners v. Deb Haaland, Secretary of the Interior, et al.

Supreme Court briefMay 12, 2021

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 20-846

In the Supreme Court of the United States

CLUB ONE CASINO, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

DEB HAALAND, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,

ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR

Acting Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

JEAN E. WILLIAMS

Acting Assistant Attorney

General

WILLIAM B. LAZARUS

TAMARA ROUNTREE

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Section 5108 of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA),

25 U.S.C. 5101 et seq., “authorize[s]” the Secretary of

the Interior, “in his discretion, to acquire, through purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment,

any interest in lands * * * within or without existing

reservations, * * * for the purpose of providing land

for Indians.” 25 U.S.C. 5108. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., authorizes

the Secretary to determine whether a tribe may conduct

certain gaming on off-reservation trust land acquired

after October 17, 1988. 25 U.S.C. 2719(b)(1)(A). Class

III gaming, at issue here, is lawful under IGRA if

(among other conditions) it is conducted on “Indian

lands” and authorized by the Indian tribe “having jurisdiction over such lands.” 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(1)(A)(i).

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Secretary of the Interior’s acquisition of land in trust for the benefit of a tribe under Section 5108 of the IRA vests jurisdiction in the tribe (as

well as the federal government) for purposes of IGRA.

2. Whether, if the IRA vests federal and tribal jurisdiction over land so acquired, Congress had power to

enact the IRA under the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S.

Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinions below .............................................................................. 1

Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1

Statement ...................................................................................... 1

Argument..................................................................................... 10

Conclusion ................................................................................... 25

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t,

522 U.S. 520 (1998).........................................8, 11, 12, 14, 20

Blackfeet Tribe of Indians v. State of Montana,

729 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1984), aff ’d,

471 U.S. 759 (1985).............................................................. 13

Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211 (2011) .......................... 9

California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,

480 U.S. 202 (1987).............................................................. 22

Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15

(1st Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds,

555 U.S. 379 (2009)........................................................ 21, 23

Central N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n v. Zinke,

137 S. Ct. 2134 (2017) ......................................................... 10

Citizens Against Casino Gambling in Erie Cnty. v.

Chaudhuri, 136 S. Ct. 2387 (2016) .................................... 10

City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation,

544 U.S. 197 (2005)........................................................ 13, 20

Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. United States

Dep’t of the Interior, 228 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000),

cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1007 (2001) ..................................... 12

Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,

490 U.S. 163 (1989).............................................................. 19

(III)

IV

Cases—Continued:

Page

County of Charles Mix v. United States Dep’t of the

Interior, 674 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2012) ............................... 21

County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands

of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992) ........ 13

Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896) ..................... 22

Fisher v. District Court of Sixteenth Judicial

District, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) .............................................. 16

Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885) ........ 17

Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) .................................... 12

Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001) ....................... 23

Langley v. Ryder, 778 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1985) ................ 12

McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020) ...................... 15

Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty.,

572 U.S. 782 (2014).............................................................. 15

Michigan Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne,

525 F.3d 23 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied,

555 U.S. 1137 (2009)...................................................... 12, 21

Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993) ..................... 19, 22

Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) ............................ 17, 22

New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,

462 U.S. 324 (1983).............................................................. 16

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) .......... 10, 22

North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians v.

California, No. 15-cv-419, 2015 WL 11438206

(E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015) .................................................. 4, 5

Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band

Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991)... 11, 14, 15

Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation,

508 U.S. 114 (1993).............................................................. 11

Oneida Nation v. Village of Hobart, 968 F.3d 664

(7th Cir. 2020) ...................................................................... 12

Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963) ..................... 8, 17

V

Cases—Continued:

Page

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,

517 U.S. 44 (1996) ............................................................... 22

South Dakota v. United States Dep’t of the Interior,

423 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,

549 U.S. 813 (2006).............................................................. 21

Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of the

Interior, 959 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2020) ............................. 24

Stand Up for California! v. United States Dep’t of

the Interior, 879 F.3d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 2018),

cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 786 (2019) ....................................... 4

Stop the Casino 101 Coal. v. Brown,

575 U.S. 1027 (2015)............................................................ 10

Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (1930) ............. 17

United States v. John,

437 U.S. 634 (1978).......................................15, 20, 22, 23, 24

United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) ................... 19

United States v. Lara,

541 U.S. 193 (2004).......................................10, 16, 19, 22, 23

United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938) .......... 23, 24

United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125

(10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1108 (2000) ......... 21

United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913) ................... 19

Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc. v. United States:

841 F.3d 556 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied,

140 S. Ct. 2587 (2017) .......................7, 8, 13, 14, 17, 18

140 S. Ct. 2587 (2017) ...................................................... 10

Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the

Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979) ................... 19

Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) ............... 20

VI

Cases—Continued:

Page

Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) .................................. 16

Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Podhradsky,

606 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,

564 U.S. 1019 (2011)............................................ 7, 12, 13, 14

Constitution and statutes:

U.S. Const.:

Art. I:

§ 8, Cl. 3 (Indian Commerce Clause) ..... 19, 20, 21, 22

§ 8, Cl. 17 (Enclave Clause) ...................... 8, 17, 18, 21

Art. II, § 2, Cl. 2 (Treaty Clause)............................. 19, 22

Art. IV:

§ 3, Cl. 1 (Admissions Clause) .................................. 23

§ 4 (Guarantee Clause) .............................................. 21

Amend. X.......................................................6, 9, 21, 22, 23

Administrative Procedure Act,

5 U.S.C. 551 et seq................................................................. 6

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. ................................... 24

Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,

25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq. ............................................................ 2

25 U.S.C. 2702(1) ............................................................... 2

25 U.S.C. 2703(4)(B) ...................................................... 3, 8

25 U.S.C. 2703(7)-(8) ......................................................... 3

25 U.S.C. 2710 .................................................................... 3

25 U.S.C 2710(d) ................................................................ 3

25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(1)(A)(i) ................................................. 3

25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(1)(C) ..................................................... 5

25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(3)(A) ..................................................... 3

25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) ............................................. 3, 5

25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv) ............................................... 4

25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(B)(v)-(vi) ......................................... 4

VII

Statutes—Continued:

Page

25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(B)(vi) ............................................... 6

25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) .............................................. 6

25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii)(II) .................................... 3, 4

25 U.S.C. 2719(a) ............................................................... 2

25 U.S.C. 2719(b)(1) .......................................................... 2

25 U.S.C. 2719(b)(1)(A) ............................................. 3, 4, 5

Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. 5101 et seq. ............... 2

25 U.S.C. 5105 .............................................................. 2, 11

25 U.S.C. 5108 ....................................... 2, 11, 13, 17, 20, 21

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,

42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. .......................................................... 24

Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33,

1 Stat. 137 ............................................................................ 20

18 U.S.C. 1151 .................................................................. 11, 14

18 U.S.C. 1151(b) ..................................................................... 7

40 U.S.C. 3112 .....................................................8, 9, 17, 18, 19

40 U.S.C. 3112(b) ............................................................... 9, 18

Miscellaneous:

Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law

(Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds. 2012) ......................... 11, 20

78 Cong. Rec. 11,124 (1934) .................................................. 13

78 Fed. Reg. 62,649 (Oct. 22, 2013) ........................................ 5

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 20-846

CLUB ONE CASINO, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

DEB HAALAND, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,

ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1-25)

is reported at 959 F.3d 1142. The opinion of the district

court (Pet. App. 26-60) is reported at 328 F. Supp.3d

1033.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

May 27, 2020. A petition for rehearing was denied on

August 3, 2020 (Pet. App. 62-63). The petition for a writ

of certiorari was filed on December 18, 2020. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

This case concerns plans for a tribal gaming facility

on a parcel of land taken into trust by the Secretary of

the Interior (Secretary) for the North Fork Rancheria

of Mono Indians (Tribe), a federally recognized Indian

(1)

2

tribe. See Pet. App. 5. It involves both the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. 5101 et seq., and the

Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701

et seq.

1. a. The IRA confers discretion on the Secretary to

“acquire, through purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands, water

rights, or surface rights to lands, within or without existing reservations,” for the “purpose of providing land

for Indians.” 25 U.S.C. 5108. The Act provides that

“[t]itle to any lands or rights acquired pursuant to this

Act * * * shall be taken in the name of the United

States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian

for which the land is acquired, and such lands or rights

shall be exempt from State and local taxation.” Ibid.;

see 25 U.S.C. 5105 (“Title to lands or any interest

therein acquired pursuant to this Act for Indian use

shall be taken in the name of the United States of America in trust for the tribe or individual Indian for which

acquired.”).

b. IGRA provides a statutory basis for the “operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting

tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and

strong tribal governments.” 25 U.S.C. 2702(1). IGRA

generally prohibits gaming on lands taken into trust for

tribes after October 17, 1988, with certain exceptions.

See 25 U.S.C. 2719(a) and (b)(1). As relevant here, gaming is permitted on lands that are acquired in trust after

that date and are not contiguous to the tribe’s reservation if the Secretary determines that a gaming establishment on such lands “would be in the best interest of

the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community, but only if the

3

Governor” of the affected state “concurs in the Secretary’s determination.” 25 U.S.C. 2719(b)(1)(A).

IGRA divides gaming into three classes. See

25 U.S.C. 2710. Class III gaming, at issue here, includes slot machines and house banking games, including card games and casino-style games. See 25 U.S.C.

2703(7)-(8). IGRA provides that Class III gaming is

lawful only if it is conducted on “Indian lands” that are

located in a state that permits such gaming. 25 U.S.C

2710(d). In relevant part, IGRA defines “Indian lands”

as “any lands title to which is * * * held in trust by the

United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe * * *

and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental

power.” 25 U.S.C. 2703(4)(B). Class III gaming is “lawful on Indian lands” only if such gaming is authorized

by the “Indian tribe having jurisdiction over such

lands.” 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(1)(A)(i).

Class III gaming must be conducted in conformance

with a tribal-state compact entered into by the Indian

tribe and the state and approved by the Secretary, or,

if attempts to reach such a compact are unsuccessful,

under “procedures” prescribed by the Secretary under

IGRA’s remedial process, 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii)(II).

The Indian tribe must request that the state “enter into

negotiations for the purpose of entering into a tribalstate compact governing the conduct of gaming activities.” 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(3)(A). Upon receiving such a request, the state “shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in

good faith to enter into such a compact.” Ibid.

If negotiations are unsuccessful, the tribe may file

suit against the state in federal district court. 25 U.S.C.

2710(d)(7)(A)(i). If the court finds that the state did not

negotiate in good faith, the court must order the state

and the tribe to conclude a compact within 60 days and,

4

if they do not, the state and the tribe must each submit

their “last best offer for a compact” to a court-appointed

mediator. 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv). The mediator

must then select the proposed compact that best

comports with IGRA, and the state has 60 days to consent to the mediator’s choice of compact. 25 U.S.C.

2710(d)(7)(B)(v)-(vi). If the state does not consent

within that period, the mediator must notify the Secretary, who “shall prescribe * * * procedures”—known

as Secretarial Procedures—“under which class III gaming may be conducted.” 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii)(II).

2. a. In 2005, the Tribe applied to the Secretary to

have a 305-acre parcel of mostly undeveloped, private

fee lands in Madera County, California (the Parcel)

taken into trust for the Tribe’s benefit under the IRA.

Pet. App. 5. In 2013, the United States acquired the

Parcel in trust for the Tribe pursuant to the IRA. Pet

App. 31; North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians v. California, No. 15-cv-419, 2015 WL 11438206, at *2 (E.D.

Cal. Nov. 13, 2015).

“Facing high unemployment, inadequate public services, and an uncertain revenue stream,” the Tribe

sought to “stimulate economic development” by building a casino complex on the Parcel. Stand Up for California! v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 879 F.3d

1177, 1179-1180 (D.C. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.

786 (2019). The Tribe asked the Secretary to determine

whether the Parcel, once in trust, would be eligible for

Class III gaming. Id. at 1180. In September 2011, the

Secretary issued a Record of Decision determining that

the Parcel was eligible for gaming under IGRA’s exception for gaming on lands acquired in trust after October

17, 1988. Pet. App. 5-6; see 25 U.S.C. 2719(b)(1)(A). In

August 2012, the Governor of California concurred.

5

Pet. App. 6; see id. at 31. On the same day, the Governor and Tribe completed and executed a tribal-state

compact in accordance with IGRA, 25 U.S.C.

2710(d)(1)(C), to govern Class III gaming on the Parcel.

Pet. App. 6, 32. In 2013, the California Legislature ratified the compact, and the Governor signed it into law.

Id. at 6. The Secretary then published notice in the

Federal Register that a compact between the Tribe and

the State of California had been approved. 78 Fed. Reg.

62,649 (Oct. 22, 2013). 1

b. During the 2014 election, a referendum known as

Proposition 48 was placed on the state ballot, proposing

to void the California Legislature’s approval of the

tribal-state compact. Pet. App. 6. Proposition 48 passed,

nullifying the law that ratified the compact. Ibid.

In light of Proposition 48’s passage, the State no

longer recognized the compact as valid. North Fork

Rancheria of Mono Indians, 2015 WL 11438206, at *3.

In 2015, the Tribe requested that the State enter into

negotiations for a new compact for the Parcel. Pet. App.

6. The State refused, and the Tribe filed suit under

IGRA, seeking a declaration that the State failed to negotiate in good faith. Ibid.; see 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(A)(i);

North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians, 2015 WL

11438206, at *1. The district court agreed and ordered

the State and Tribe to conclude a compact within 60

days, but the parties failed to do so. Pet. App. 6-7. As

required by IGRA, the court then appointed a mediator,

who directed the parties to submit their “last best offers” for a compact. Id. at 7. The mediator selected the

The Secretary’s initial determination that the Parcel was eligible for gaming under Section 2719(b)(1)(A), and the Secretary’s approval of the compact, are separate final agency actions that petitioners do not challenge here.

1

6

Tribe’s proposal, and submitted it to the State for its

consent. Ibid. The State did not provide consent within

the statutorily required period.

Ibid.; see 25 U.S.C.

2710(d)(7)(B)(vi).

As required by IGRA, the mediator then submitted

the proposed compact to the Secretary. Pet. App. 7; see

25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii). In July 2016, the Secretary

prescribed Secretarial Procedures to regulate the

Tribe’s conducting of Class III gaming on the Parcel.

Pet. App. 7; see id. at 64-271.

3. Petitioners are state-licensed cardrooms located

in California. Pet. App. 5. Following the issuance of the

Secretarial Procedures, petitioners filed this suit in the

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, contending that the issuance of those procedures

violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551

et seq., on the theory that the Secretary inadequately

considered whether the Tribe had jurisdiction over the

Parcel for purposes of IGRA. Pet. App. 26-27.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary. Pet. App. 26-60. The court first

rejected petitioners’ argument that the Tribe lacked

“territorial jurisdiction” over the Parcel, as required by

IGRA. Id. at 45. The court determined that the United

States’ action in acquiring the lands in trust for the

Tribe under the IRA conferred jurisdiction on the

Tribe. Id. at 40-52. Petitioners argued in the alternative that tribal jurisdiction obtained by virtue of the

IRA violated the Tenth Amendment by providing for

the unilateral transfer of the State’s territorial jurisdiction. Id. at 40-41. The district court declined to address

that issue, however, on the ground that the relevant

agency action that purportedly violated the Tenth

Amendment—the Secretary’s acquisition of the Parcel

7

for the benefit of the Tribe under the IRA—was “not

challenged in this action.” Id. at 41.

4. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 1-25.

a. Like the district court, the court of appeals first

rejected petitioners’ argument that the Secretarial Procedures “were issued in violation of IGRA because the

Tribe purportedly lacked jurisdiction” over the Parcel.

Pet. App. 13. The court explained that “while there

[wa]s no Ninth Circuit precedent precisely on point,

other circuits have logically concluded that, as a matter

of law, the federal government confers tribal jurisdiction over lands it acquires in trust for the benefit of

tribes.” Id. at 14; see id. at 14-16 (citing Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc. v. United States, 841 F.3d 556

(2d Cir. 2016) (Upstate Citizens), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.

2587 (2017); and Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Podhradsky,

606 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1019

(2011)). The court “agree[d]” with those decisions. Id.

at 14. The court observed that “when Congress enacted

[IRA] ‘it doubtless intended and understood that the Indians for whom the land was acquired would be able to

use the land free from state or local regulation or interference as well as free from taxation.’ ” Id. at 15 (quoting Yankton Sioux, 606 F.3d at 1011 (brackets in original)); see id. at 14.

The court of appeals explained that “[a]s a general

matter * * * off-reservation trust land like the * * *

Parcel is ‘Indian country’ with all the jurisdictional consequences that attach to that status.” Pet. App. 16. The

court stated that “[o]ff-reservation trust land” is Indian

country because it is, “by definition, land set aside for

Indian use and subject to federal control.” Ibid. (citing

18 U.S.C. 1151(b)). “Generally speaking,” the court continued, “primary jurisdiction over land that is Indian

8

country rests with the Federal Government and the Indian tribe inhabiting it, and not with the States.” Ibid.

(quoting Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t,

522 U.S. 520, 527 n.1 (1998)). The court accordingly determined that “the federal government confers tribal

jurisdiction over lands it acquires in trust for the benefit

of tribes as a matter of law.” Ibid. The court clarified,

however, that “federal and Indian authority do not entirely displace state authority over land taken into

trust.” Id. at 15 n.4 (quoting Upstate Citizens, 841 F.3d

at 572). 2

The court of appeals rejected petitioners’ related

contention that state consent or cession was required

for the transfer of jurisdiction over the Parcel. Pet.

App. 19. Petitioners had relied on the Enclave Clause

of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, Cl. 17, as well as

40 U.S.C. 3112. The court explained that the Enclave

Clause applies when “the federal government takes ‘exclusive’ jurisdiction over land within a state,” Pet. 19 n.6

(citing Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263 (1963)),

but “[s]tate jurisdiction is . . . only reduced, and not

eliminated, when the federal government takes land

into trust for a tribe,” id. at 20 (quoting Upstate Citizens, 841 F.3d at 572). “Because federal and Indian authority do not wholly displace state authority over” such

lands, “the Enclave Clause poses no barrier to the entrustment that occurred here.” Ibid. (quoting Upstate

Citizens, 841 F.3d at 572).

The court of appeals also rejected petitioners’ argument that the

Tribe fails to “exercise[] governmental power” over the Parcel as

required by 25 U.S.C. 2703(4)(B). Pet. App. 17-19. Petitioners have

not challenged that determination in this Court.

2

9

The court of appeals likewise rejected petitioners’

reliance on 40 U.S.C. 3112. That statute provides certain conditions under which “the head of a department,

agency, or independent establishment of the Government * * * may accept or secure, from the State in

which land * * * that is under the immediate jurisdiction, custody, or control of the [government official] is

situated, consent to, or cession of, any jurisdiction over

the land or interest not previously obtained.” 40 U.S.C.

3112(b). The court explained that Section 3112 “[b]y its

own terms, * * * sets forth requirements for the federal government’s acceptance of jurisdiction over land.”

Pet. App. 20 (citing 40 U.S.C. 3112(b)). Here, however,

“the federal government is not accepting jurisdiction

‘from the State,’ ” because such jurisdiction “was created by operation of law.” Ibid.

b. The court of appeals also rejected petitioners’ argument that, if the Secretary’s acquisition of land in

trust for the benefit of the Tribe under the IRA conferred jurisdiction on the Tribe, the IRA exceeds Congress’s enumerated powers and violates the Tenth

Amendment. Pet. App. 21-23. 3

The court of appeals explained that the authority to

regulate Indian affairs is among the enumerated powers of the federal government, and that “Indian relations became the exclusive province of federal law”

upon the “adoption of the Constitution.” Pet. App. 22

Although the district court had determined, in the alternative,

that petitioners lacked standing to assert a Tenth Amendment challenge, the court of appeals found standing under this Court’s decision in Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 220-221 (2011). Pet.

App. 21 n.7; see Gov’t C.A. Br. 32 n.5 (declining to assert a standing

argument).

3

10

(citations omitted); see id. at 21 (noting the government’s “plenary and exclusive” power over Indian affairs) (quoting United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200

(2004)). The court further observed that, “[i]f a power

is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth

Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that

power to the States.” Id. at 22 (quoting New York v.

United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992)). Thus, the court

held, because “Congress has plenary authority to regulate Indian affairs, * * * [the] IRA does not offend the

Tenth Amendment.” Id. at 22; see id. at 22-23 (citing

authority).

The court of appeals denied rehearing and rehearing

en banc. Pet. App. 62-63.

ARGUMENT

Petitioners renew their contentions (Pet. 18-38) that

the government’s taking land into trust for the benefit

of a tribe under the IRA does not confer tribal jurisdiction over that land for purposes of IGRA, and that if it

does so, the IRA exceeds Congress’s powers. The court

of appeals correctly rejected those arguments, and the

decision below does not conflict with any decision of this

Court or of another court of appeals. This Court has

repeatedly denied petitions for certiorari raising similar constitutional challenges. See Upstate Citizens for

Equality, Inc. v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 2587 (2017)

(No. 16-1320); Central N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n v. Zinke,

137 S. Ct. 2134 (2017) (No. 16-1135); Citizens Against

Casino Gambling in Erie Cnty. v. Chaudhuri, 136 S. Ct.

2387 (2016) (No. 15-780); Stop the Casino 101 Coal. v.

Brown, 575 U.S. 1027 (2015) (No. 14-1236). The same

result is warranted here, particularly because the Secretarial Procedures remain under review in separate litigation.

11

1. The court of appeals correctly determined that

once the United States acquired the Parcel in trust for

the Tribe, the Tribe acquired jurisdiction over the Parcel for purposes of IGRA.

a. i. The IRA “authorize[s]” the Secretary, “in his

discretion, to acquire, through purchase, relinquishment,

gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands, water rights, or surface rights to lands, within or without

existing reservations,” for the “purpose of providing

land for Indians.” 25 U.S.C. 5108. The Act provides

that “[t]itle to any lands” acquired under the IRA “shall

be taken in the name of the United States in trust for

the Indian tribe.” Ibid.; see 25 U.S.C. 5105 (“Title to

lands or any interest therein acquired pursuant to this

Act for Indian use shall be taken in the name of the

United States of America in trust for the tribe or individual Indian for which acquired.”).

The court of appeals correctly determined that once

the federal government took the Parcel into trust for

the Tribe, it became “Indian country” under 18 U.S.C.

1151, “with all the jurisdictional consequences that attach to that status.” Pet. App. 16; see id. at 16 n.5 (noting that although Section 1151 “by its terms relates only

to criminal jurisdiction,” this Court has “recognized” its

general applicability to civil jurisdiction) (quoting

Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S.

520, 527 (1998) (Venetie)). As this Court has recognized,

trust lands qualify as Indian country because such lands

have been “validly set apart for the use of the Indians

as such, under the superintendence of the Government.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991) (citations

omitted); see Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 125 (1993); Cohen’s Handbook of

12

Federal Indian Law § 3.04[2][c][ii], at 190-193 (Nell

Jessup Newton et al. eds. 2012); see also, e.g., Langley

v. Ryder, 778 F.2d 1092, 1095 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[W]hether the lands are merely held in trust for the Indians or

whether the lands have been officially proclaimed a reservation, the lands are clearly Indian country.”). The

Secretary’s decision to take the Parcel into trust for the

Tribe—and thus to make the Parcel Indian country—

brings the Parcel within the general rule that “primary

jurisdiction over land that is Indian country rests with

the Federal Government and the Indian tribe inhabiting it, and not with the States.” Pet. App. 16a (quoting

Venetie, 522 U.S. at 527 n.1); see also, e.g., Yankton

Sioux Tribe v. Podhradsky, 606 F.3d 994, 1011 (8th Cir.

2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1019 (2011).

That holding is confirmed by the IRA’s history and

purposes. The IRA was enacted “against a backdrop of

great concern over economic and social challenges facing American Indians, and especially over the consequences of the federal government’s allotment policy,”

Michigan Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne,

525 F.3d 23, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1137 (2009), which had “proved disastrous

for the Indians,” Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 707

(1987). Congress passed the IRA “not only to stem the

loss of Indian land holdings brought on by allotment but

also to give tribes the opportunity to re-establish their

governments and land holdings.” Oneida Nation v. Village of Hobart, 968 F.3d 664, 671 (7th Cir. 2020). The

IRA “fundamentally restructured the relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government” and

“embod[ied] ‘principles of tribal self-determination and

self-governance.’ ” Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v.

United States Dep’t of the Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 85

13

(2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1007 (2001) (quoting County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands

of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 255 (1992)).

The IRA was thus intended to “promot[e] * * * a significant increase in tribal autonomy and authority and

the extension to the tribes of ‘an opportunity to take

over the control of their own resources.’ ” Blackfeet

Tribe of Indians v. State of Montana, 729 F.2d 1192,

1197 (9th Cir. 1984), aff ’d, 471 U.S. 759 (1985) (quoting

78 Cong. Rec. 11,124 (1934)).

As the court of appeals explained, “when Congress

enacted [the IRA] ‘it doubtless intended and understood that the Indians for whom the land was acquired

would be able to use the land free from state or local

regulation or interference as well as free from taxation.’ ” Pet. App. 14 (quoting Yankton Sioux, 606 F.3d

at 1011). Indeed, Congress expressly provided that

“any lands” taken into trust under the statute “shall be

exempt from State and local taxation.” 25 U.S.C 5108.

ii. Petitioners do not suggest (Br. 18-32) that the decision below conflicts with any decision of this Court or

of another court of appeals. To the contrary, this Court

has specifically identified Section 5108 as “provid[ing]

the proper avenue” for the federal government to assume control over tribal land. City of Sherrill v. Oneida

Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 221 (2005). And the court

of appeals in this case relied on the Second Circuit’s determination that “the federal government may, ‘by acquiring land for a tribe, divest a state of important aspects of its jurisdiction, even if a state previously exercised wholesale jurisdiction over the land.’ ” Pet. App.

15 (quoting Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc. v.

United States, 841 F.3d 556, 561 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. de-

14

nied, 140 S. Ct. 2587 (2017)). The court of appeals likewise relied (ibid.) on the Eighth Circuit’s decision in

Yankton Sioux Tribe, which rejected the argument that

“taking land into trust for the benefit of an Indian tribe

is insufficient to convert such land into Indian country.”

606 F.3d at 1011; see Pet. App. 15. As those decisions

recognize, once the Secretary takes land into trust for a

tribe, it is subject to federal and tribal jurisdiction,

though “federal and Indian authority do not entirely

displace state authority.” Pet. App. 15 n.4 (citing Upstate Citizens, 841 F.3d at 572).

b. Petitioners’ contrary arguments lack merit.

i. Petitioners suggest (Pet. 24-25, 27-28) that under

the IRA, the Secretary’s acquisition of land in trust for

the benefit of a tribe transfers only bare title to the federal government and the tribe. But as just discussed,

where Congress authorizes the Secretary to place land

in trust for an Indian tribe, such land qualifies as Indian

country. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 498 U.S. at

511; Venetie, 522 U.S. at 527. It is therefore subject to

federal and tribal jurisdiction.

Petitioners only briefly address the court of appeals’

determination that the Parcel qualifies as Indian country. Petitioners suggest (Br. 23) that “[t]here is no issue

here of tribal sovereignty over ‘Indian Country’ ” because the Parcel was previously privately owned, Indians have not historically lived on it, and it is separate

from the Tribe’s reservation. But the definition of Indian country includes no overarching requirement of

prior Indian ownership or habitation. See 18 U.S.C.

1151. And as this Court has explained, “the test for determining whether land is Indian country does not turn

upon whether that land is denominated ‘trust land’ or

‘reservation.’ ” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 498 U.S. at 511.

15

“Rather, [this Court] ask[s] whether the area has been

‘validly set apart for the use of Indians as such, under

the superintendence of the government.’ ” Ibid. (quoting United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648-649 (1978));

see pp. 11-13, supra.

ii. Contrary to petitioners’ contention (Pet. 28), the

decision below does not “create” an “inconsistency”

with McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).

McGirt did not concern the IRA or jurisdiction for purposes of IGRA; rather, it held that Congress did not disestablish the Muscogee Creek Reservation in Oklahoma. In reaching that determination, the Court explained that “Congress does not disestablish a reservation simply by allowing the transfer of individual plots,

whether to Native Americans or others.” Id. at 2464.

As petitioners observe (Pet. 27), the Court in McGirt

observed by way of analogy that the federal government once issued land patents to homesteaders in the

West, and that such action did not diminish the United

States’ sovereignty over that land. 140 S. Ct. at 2464.

The Court’s analogy, however (like McGirt itself ) concerned the transfer of title from a sovereign to individuals. Ibid. Nothing in that discussion suggests that the

Secretary’s action under the IRA in taking land into

trust for a tribe—a “domestic dependent nation[] that

exercise[s] inherent sovereign authority,” Michigan v.

Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788 (2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)—fails to

confer jurisdiction on the tribe.

iii. Petitioners also err in asserting that the court of

appeals was required to consider the jurisdictional issue

here by applying a presumption that the “historic police powers of the States” are not superseded by federal

law unless that is the “clear and manifest purpose of

16

Congress.” Pet. 28 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S.

555, 565 (2009)) (emphasis omitted). As this Court has

often recognized, see pp. 19-21, infra, the federal government has “plenary” power over Indian affairs. United

States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (citations omitted). The Wyeth presumption does not apply, because

there is no “historic presence of state law,” 555 U.S. at

566 n.3, over Indian affairs.

Indeed, this Court has long “emphasized the special

sense in which the doctrine of preemption is applied” in

the Indian law “context.” New Mexico v. Mescalero

Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333 (1983). As the Court

has explained, “[a]lthough a State will certainly be without jurisdiction if its authority is pre-empted under familiar principles of pre-emption,” its cases “d[o] not

limit pre-emption of State laws affecting Indian tribes

to only those circumstances.” Id. at 333-334. That is

because the “unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty and the federal commitment to tribal selfsufficiency and self-determination make it treacherous

to import notions of pre-emption that are properly applied to other contexts.” Id. at 334 (brackets, citation,

ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,

in the field of Indian affairs, “[s]tate jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law if it interferes or

is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the State interests at stake

are sufficient to justify the assertion of State authority.”

Ibid.; see Fisher v. District Court of Sixteenth Judicial

District, 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976) (per curiam) (finding

state law preempted where it “infringed on the right of

reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled

by them”) (citation omitted). Petitioners have not at-

17

tempted to demonstrate that all aspects of state jurisdiction survive the Secretary’s decision to take land into

trust for a tribe under the relevant standards.

c. The court of appeals also correctly rejected petitioners’ related assertion that, under the Enclave

Clause or 40 U.S.C. 3112, any transfer of jurisdiction

pursuant to the IRA requires state consent or cession.

Pet. App. 19-21.

i. As the court of appeals observed (Pet. App. 19-20

& n.6), the Enclave Clause provides a mechanism for

the United States to acquire exclusive jurisdiction over

land within a state. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 17; see

Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263 (1963); Fort

Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 538 (1885)

(State consent is necessary for the federal government

to obtain “the right of exclusive legislation within the

territorial limits of any State.”). But “[w]hen land is

taken into trust by the federal government for Indian

tribes, the federal government does not obtain such categorically exclusive jurisdiction over the entrusted

lands.” Upstate Citizens, 841 F.3d at 571. As this Court

has explained, Indian reservation lands do not fall

within the Enclave Clause because “the lands remain

part of [the state’s] territory and within the operation

of her laws,” particularly as applied to non-Indians.

Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 650 (1930);

see Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001) (“State

sovereignty does not end at a reservation’s border.”);

see also Hicks, 533 U.S. at 363-365 (upholding a state’s

right to enter a reservation to execute a search warrant

related to off-reservation conduct). Lands taken into

trust under Section 5108 likewise do not fall under “exclusive” federal jurisdiction in the sense contemplated

by the Enclave Clause. Paul, 371 U.S. at 263.

18

Although petitioners cite the Enclave Clause (Pet.

19, 22, 36), they do not grapple with the court of appeals’

reasoning. Nor do they suggest that the decision below

conflicts with any decision of this Court or of another

court of appeals. To the contrary, the Second Circuit in

Upstate Citizens rejected an Enclave Clause challenge

for the same reasons as the court of appeals here. See

841 F.3d at 572 (“Because federal and Indian authority

do not wholly displace state authority over land taken

into trust pursuant to § 5 of the IRA, the Enclave Clause

poses no barrier to the entrustment that occurred

here.”).

ii. The court of appeals also correctly rejected petitioners’ reliance on 40 U.S.C. 3112. Pet. App. 19-21 &

n.6. That statute provides certain conditions under

which “the head of a department, agency, or independent establishment of the Government * * * may accept

or secure, from the State in which land * * * that is

under the immediate jurisdiction, custody, or control of

the [government official] is situated, consent to, or cession of, any jurisdiction over the land or interest not

previously obtained.” 40 U.S.C. 3112(b). As the court

of appeals explained, Section 3112 does not apply because the federal government did not “accept[] jurisdiction ‘from the State.’ ” Pet. App. 20. Rather, the government exercised its power under the IRA to take the

Parcel into trust for the benefit of the Tribe. That

power “is derived from Congress’ broad general power,

pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause, to legislate

with respect to Indian tribes.” Id. at 21. The resulting

transfer of jurisdiction occurred “by operation of law.”

Id. at 20.

Petitioners suggest (Pet. 31) that the court of appeals erred by construing Section 3112 to focus on the

19

federal government’s acceptance of jurisdiction, rather

than on a state’s cession or consent. But the court focused on the federal government’s “acceptance” because that is the focus of Section 3112; indeed, the statute uses some form of the term “accept” six times. See

40 U.S.C. 3112. And petitioners provide no support for

the broad assertion that “Section 3112 covers any acquisition, in whole or in part, of jurisdiction,” and thus

mandates state cession or consent in every case. Pet.

31. Nor do petitioners suggest that any court has interpreted Section 3112 to apply in similar circumstances,

i.e., when the government takes land into trust for an

Indian tribe or Congress creates or expands a reservation. See Pet. 31-32.

2. Petitioners argue in the alternative (Pet. 33-38)

that, if the IRA confers tribal jurisdiction over trust

lands, then it exceeds Congress’s enumerated powers.

The court of appeals correctly rejected that argument,

and further review of this issue is not warranted.

a. “[T]he Constitution grants Congress broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes.”

Lara, 541 U.S. at 200. Those powers derive from the

Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3,

and the Treaty Clause, U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, Cl. 2,

among other sources. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 200-204;

see also, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46

(1913); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384

(1886). On numerous occasions, this Court has described Congress’s authority over Indian affairs “as

‘plenary and exclusive.’ ” Lara, 541 U.S. at 200 (citing

Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 103, (1993); Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima

Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470-471 (1979)); see also,

e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S.

20

163, 192 (1989) (reiterating that the Indian Commerce

Clause provides Congress with “plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs”); Worcester v. Georgia,

31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 535 (1832) (“By the constitution of

the United States, the establishment and regulation

of intercourse with the Indians belonged, exclusively, to

the government of the United States.”).

Congress’s constitutional authority with respect to

Indian tribes has, from the time of the Founding, consistently been understood to include power over the acquisition, sale, and regulation of Indian land. See City

of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 204 (describing the Trade and

Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137); see generally Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law

§§ 5.02[4], 15.03, at 394-395, 997-999. In Venetie, for example, the Court expressly recognized Congress’s constitutional power to create Indian country: “The federal

set-aside requirement * * * reflects the fact that because Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs,

see U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3, some explicit action by

Congress (or the Executive, acting under delegated authority) must be taken to create or to recognize Indian

country.” 522 U.S. at 531 n.6; see John, 437 U.S. at 652654 (upholding federal criminal jurisdiction over lands

that had been acquired through Acts of Congress and

held in trust for the Mississippi Choctaws). In 1934,

Congress exercised that power in the IRA by conferring

authority on the Secretary of the Interior to take land

into trust for Indian tribes. 25 U.S.C. 5108. And as

noted above, see p. 13, supra, this Court has identified

Section 5108 as “provid[ing] the proper avenue” for the

federal government to assume control over land for the

benefit of tribes. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 221.

21

In recognition of this long, unbroken history of federal supervision of tribal lands, the courts of appeals

have uniformly upheld Section 5108 against various constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Carcieri v. Kempthorne,

497 F.3d 15, 39-40 (1st Cir. 2007) (en banc) (rejecting

challenges under the Indian Commerce Clause, the

Tenth Amendment, and the Enclave Clause), rev’d on

other grounds, 555 U.S. 379 (2009); see also County of

Charles Mix v. United States Dep’t of the Interior,

674 F.3d 898, 902 (8th Cir. 2012) (rejecting challenge

under the Guarantee Clause); Michigan Gambling Opposition, 525 F.3d at 32-33 (rejecting challenge under

the non-delegation doctrine); South Dakota v. United

States Dep’t of the Interior, 423 F.3d 790, 797-798

(8th Cir. 2005) (same), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 813 (2006);

United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125, 1136-1137

(10th Cir. 1999) (same), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1108 (2000).

b. Petitioners do not contend that the decision below, which upheld Section 5108, conflicts with the decision of any other court of appeals. Instead, petitioners

offer two primary arguments as to why Section 5018 is

unconstitutional. Neither is persuasive. 4

i. Petitioners contend (Pet. 33-35) that because the

Indian Commerce Clause does not expressly state that

the federal government may acquire land in trust for a

tribe without state consent or cession, Congress lacked

the authority to provide for such acquisition in the IRA.

That is incorrect.

As an initial matter, this Court has located Congress’s “broad general powers to legislate in respect to

Petitioners also rely (Pet. 36) on the Enclave Clause of the Constitution. As previously discussed, see pp. 17-18, supra, however,

the Enclave Clause does not apply here.

4

22

Indian tribes,” Lara, 541 U.S. at 200, not only in the Indian Commerce Clause, but also in the Treaty Clause,

among other sources. See id. at 200-204. In addition,

this Court has made clear that “[t]he States’ inherent

jurisdiction” over Indian country within their borders

“can of course be stripped by Congress.” Hicks,

533 U.S. at 365 (addressing reservation lands) (citing

Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 242-243 (1896));

see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62

(1996) (“States * * * have been divested of virtually all

authority over Indian commerce and Indian tribes.”).

For instance, “[c]riminal jurisdiction over offenses committed in ‘Indian country’ ” is governed by a framework

of federal laws, and “Congress has plenary authority to

alter these jurisdictional guideposts.” Negonsott,

507 U.S. at 102-103 (citation omitted); see John,

437 U.S. at 652-653 (Congress may displace state criminal jurisdiction even where such jurisdiction previously

“went unchallenged” and “federal supervision over [a

tribe] has not been continuous”); cf. Pet. App. 15 n.4

(noting that “under Public Law 280, 18 U.S.C. 1162(a),

California retains ‘broad criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians within all Indian country within the State’ ”) (quoting California v.

Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207

(1987)).

Petitioners relatedly contend (Pet. 36-37) that notwithstanding Congress’s plenary authority in this area,

the IRA violates the Tenth Amendment. As the court

of appeals recognized, however, “[i]f a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power

to the States.” Pet. App. 22 (quoting New York v.

United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992)). Because the

23

Constitution grants Congress “broad general powers to

legislate in respect to Indian tribes,” Lara, 541 U.S. at

200, and Congress exercised such power in enacting the

IRA, the statute does not violate the Tenth Amendment. See Carcieri, 497 F.3d at 39-40 (so holding).

ii. Petitioners also contend (Pet. 34-35) that if the

Secretary’s action in taking land into trust under the

IRA confers jurisdiction on a tribe, then the statute

“would be at odds” with the Admissions Clause, which

provides that new states may not be formed within the

jurisdiction of existing states, “nor * * * by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without

the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned

as well as of Congress.” U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 3, Cl. 1.

But by taking land into trust for an Indian tribe, the

federal government does not create a new state; the Admissions Clause thus is not implicated. Nor does petitioners’ argument gain support from this Court’s decision in Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001),

which concerned title to submerged lands. The Court

there applied a “ ‘strong presumption against defeat of

a State’s title’ ” to “land beneath navigable waters,” id.

at 272-273 (citation omitted)—a presumption that has

no application here.

Petitioners also observe (Pet. 38-39) that the Parcel

was not reserved from California prior to statehood.

But for purposes of determining whether land is Indian

country, this Court has not “differentiated between

lands taken into trust prior to statehood of the State in

which the lands lie and those lands taken into trust after.” Pet. App. 50. For example, John, supra, and

United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938), involved Indian lands that were taken into trust (John)

24

and set aside (McGowan) for the tribes after the affected states entered the Union. See John, 437 U.S. at

639-640, 649; McGowan, 302 U.S. at 537-539. In both

cases, the Court held that tribal and federal jurisdiction

was established as a result of the lands being secured

for the tribes. John, 437 U.S. at 649; McGowan,

302 U.S. at 539. Petitioners point to no decision limiting

the federal government’s post-statehood authority to

take land into trust for an Indian tribe. Further review

is unwarranted.

3. Even if the questions presented otherwise warranted this Court’s review, this case would present an

unsuitable vehicle because of an ongoing challenge to

the Secretarial Procedures. In Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 959 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.

2020), plaintiffs challenged the Secretarial Procedures

alleging, among other things, that they violate the National

Environmental

Policy

Act

of

1969,

42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.

7401 et seq. Stand Up for California!, 959 F.3d at 11571158. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in

part, and remanded to the district court with regard to

the environmental claims. Id. at 1156-1157, 1165-1166.

That review is ongoing. See, e.g., 16-cv-2681 D. Ct. Doc.

83 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2021) (taking under submission

motions for summary judgment).

25

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR

Acting Solicitor General

JEAN E. WILLIAMS

Acting Assistant Attorney

General

WILLIAM B. LAZARUS

TAMARA ROUNTREE

Attorneys

MAY 2021

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.