Respondents Brief — Club One Casino, Inc., dba Club One Casino, et al., Petitioners v. Deb Haaland, Secretary of the Interior, et al.
Supreme Court briefMay 12, 2021
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No. 20-846
In the Supreme Court of the United States
CLUB ONE CASINO, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
DEB HAALAND, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,
ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Acting Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
JEAN E. WILLIAMS
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
WILLIAM B. LAZARUS
TAMARA ROUNTREE
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Section 5108 of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA),
25 U.S.C. 5101 et seq., “authorize[s]” the Secretary of
the Interior, “in his discretion, to acquire, through purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment,
any interest in lands * * * within or without existing
reservations, * * * for the purpose of providing land
for Indians.” 25 U.S.C. 5108. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., authorizes
the Secretary to determine whether a tribe may conduct
certain gaming on off-reservation trust land acquired
after October 17, 1988. 25 U.S.C. 2719(b)(1)(A). Class
III gaming, at issue here, is lawful under IGRA if
(among other conditions) it is conducted on “Indian
lands” and authorized by the Indian tribe “having jurisdiction over such lands.” 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(1)(A)(i).
The questions presented are:
1. Whether the Secretary of the Interior’s acquisition of land in trust for the benefit of a tribe under Section 5108 of the IRA vests jurisdiction in the tribe (as
well as the federal government) for purposes of IGRA.
2. Whether, if the IRA vests federal and tribal jurisdiction over land so acquired, Congress had power to
enact the IRA under the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S.
Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Opinions below .............................................................................. 1
Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1
Statement ...................................................................................... 1
Argument..................................................................................... 10
Conclusion ................................................................................... 25
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t,
522 U.S. 520 (1998).........................................8, 11, 12, 14, 20
Blackfeet Tribe of Indians v. State of Montana,
729 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1984), aff ’d,
471 U.S. 759 (1985).............................................................. 13
Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211 (2011) .......................... 9
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,
480 U.S. 202 (1987).............................................................. 22
Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15
(1st Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds,
555 U.S. 379 (2009)........................................................ 21, 23
Central N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n v. Zinke,
137 S. Ct. 2134 (2017) ......................................................... 10
Citizens Against Casino Gambling in Erie Cnty. v.
Chaudhuri, 136 S. Ct. 2387 (2016) .................................... 10
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation,
544 U.S. 197 (2005)........................................................ 13, 20
Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. United States
Dep’t of the Interior, 228 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1007 (2001) ..................................... 12
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,
490 U.S. 163 (1989).............................................................. 19
(III)
IV
Cases—Continued:
Page
County of Charles Mix v. United States Dep’t of the
Interior, 674 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2012) ............................... 21
County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992) ........ 13
Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896) ..................... 22
Fisher v. District Court of Sixteenth Judicial
District, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) .............................................. 16
Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885) ........ 17
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) .................................... 12
Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001) ....................... 23
Langley v. Ryder, 778 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1985) ................ 12
McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020) ...................... 15
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty.,
572 U.S. 782 (2014).............................................................. 15
Michigan Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne,
525 F.3d 23 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
555 U.S. 1137 (2009)...................................................... 12, 21
Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993) ..................... 19, 22
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) ............................ 17, 22
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,
462 U.S. 324 (1983).............................................................. 16
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) .......... 10, 22
North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians v.
California, No. 15-cv-419, 2015 WL 11438206
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015) .................................................. 4, 5
Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991)... 11, 14, 15
Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation,
508 U.S. 114 (1993).............................................................. 11
Oneida Nation v. Village of Hobart, 968 F.3d 664
(7th Cir. 2020) ...................................................................... 12
Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963) ..................... 8, 17
V
Cases—Continued:
Page
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996) ............................................................... 22
South Dakota v. United States Dep’t of the Interior,
423 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
549 U.S. 813 (2006).............................................................. 21
Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, 959 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2020) ............................. 24
Stand Up for California! v. United States Dep’t of
the Interior, 879 F.3d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 2018),
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 786 (2019) ....................................... 4
Stop the Casino 101 Coal. v. Brown,
575 U.S. 1027 (2015)............................................................ 10
Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (1930) ............. 17
United States v. John,
437 U.S. 634 (1978).......................................15, 20, 22, 23, 24
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) ................... 19
United States v. Lara,
541 U.S. 193 (2004).......................................10, 16, 19, 22, 23
United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938) .......... 23, 24
United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125
(10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1108 (2000) ......... 21
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913) ................... 19
Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc. v. United States:
841 F.3d 556 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied,
140 S. Ct. 2587 (2017) .......................7, 8, 13, 14, 17, 18
140 S. Ct. 2587 (2017) ...................................................... 10
Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979) ................... 19
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) ............... 20
VI
Cases—Continued:
Page
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) .................................. 16
Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Podhradsky,
606 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
564 U.S. 1019 (2011)............................................ 7, 12, 13, 14
Constitution and statutes:
U.S. Const.:
Art. I:
§ 8, Cl. 3 (Indian Commerce Clause) ..... 19, 20, 21, 22
§ 8, Cl. 17 (Enclave Clause) ...................... 8, 17, 18, 21
Art. II, § 2, Cl. 2 (Treaty Clause)............................. 19, 22
Art. IV:
§ 3, Cl. 1 (Admissions Clause) .................................. 23
§ 4 (Guarantee Clause) .............................................. 21
Amend. X.......................................................6, 9, 21, 22, 23
Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. 551 et seq................................................................. 6
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. ................................... 24
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,
25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq. ............................................................ 2
25 U.S.C. 2702(1) ............................................................... 2
25 U.S.C. 2703(4)(B) ...................................................... 3, 8
25 U.S.C. 2703(7)-(8) ......................................................... 3
25 U.S.C. 2710 .................................................................... 3
25 U.S.C 2710(d) ................................................................ 3
25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(1)(A)(i) ................................................. 3
25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(1)(C) ..................................................... 5
25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(3)(A) ..................................................... 3
25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) ............................................. 3, 5
25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv) ............................................... 4
25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(B)(v)-(vi) ......................................... 4
VII
Statutes—Continued:
Page
25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(B)(vi) ............................................... 6
25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) .............................................. 6
25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii)(II) .................................... 3, 4
25 U.S.C. 2719(a) ............................................................... 2
25 U.S.C. 2719(b)(1) .......................................................... 2
25 U.S.C. 2719(b)(1)(A) ............................................. 3, 4, 5
Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. 5101 et seq. ............... 2
25 U.S.C. 5105 .............................................................. 2, 11
25 U.S.C. 5108 ....................................... 2, 11, 13, 17, 20, 21
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. .......................................................... 24
Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33,
1 Stat. 137 ............................................................................ 20
18 U.S.C. 1151 .................................................................. 11, 14
18 U.S.C. 1151(b) ..................................................................... 7
40 U.S.C. 3112 .....................................................8, 9, 17, 18, 19
40 U.S.C. 3112(b) ............................................................... 9, 18
Miscellaneous:
Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law
(Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds. 2012) ......................... 11, 20
78 Cong. Rec. 11,124 (1934) .................................................. 13
78 Fed. Reg. 62,649 (Oct. 22, 2013) ........................................ 5
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 20-846
CLUB ONE CASINO, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
DEB HAALAND, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,
ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1-25)
is reported at 959 F.3d 1142. The opinion of the district
court (Pet. App. 26-60) is reported at 328 F. Supp.3d
1033.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
May 27, 2020. A petition for rehearing was denied on
August 3, 2020 (Pet. App. 62-63). The petition for a writ
of certiorari was filed on December 18, 2020. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
This case concerns plans for a tribal gaming facility
on a parcel of land taken into trust by the Secretary of
the Interior (Secretary) for the North Fork Rancheria
of Mono Indians (Tribe), a federally recognized Indian
(1)
2
tribe. See Pet. App. 5. It involves both the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. 5101 et seq., and the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701
et seq.
1. a. The IRA confers discretion on the Secretary to
“acquire, through purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands, water
rights, or surface rights to lands, within or without existing reservations,” for the “purpose of providing land
for Indians.” 25 U.S.C. 5108. The Act provides that
“[t]itle to any lands or rights acquired pursuant to this
Act * * * shall be taken in the name of the United
States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian
for which the land is acquired, and such lands or rights
shall be exempt from State and local taxation.” Ibid.;
see 25 U.S.C. 5105 (“Title to lands or any interest
therein acquired pursuant to this Act for Indian use
shall be taken in the name of the United States of America in trust for the tribe or individual Indian for which
acquired.”).
b. IGRA provides a statutory basis for the “operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting
tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and
strong tribal governments.” 25 U.S.C. 2702(1). IGRA
generally prohibits gaming on lands taken into trust for
tribes after October 17, 1988, with certain exceptions.
See 25 U.S.C. 2719(a) and (b)(1). As relevant here, gaming is permitted on lands that are acquired in trust after
that date and are not contiguous to the tribe’s reservation if the Secretary determines that a gaming establishment on such lands “would be in the best interest of
the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community, but only if the
3
Governor” of the affected state “concurs in the Secretary’s determination.” 25 U.S.C. 2719(b)(1)(A).
IGRA divides gaming into three classes. See
25 U.S.C. 2710. Class III gaming, at issue here, includes slot machines and house banking games, including card games and casino-style games. See 25 U.S.C.
2703(7)-(8). IGRA provides that Class III gaming is
lawful only if it is conducted on “Indian lands” that are
located in a state that permits such gaming. 25 U.S.C
2710(d). In relevant part, IGRA defines “Indian lands”
as “any lands title to which is * * * held in trust by the
United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe * * *
and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental
power.” 25 U.S.C. 2703(4)(B). Class III gaming is “lawful on Indian lands” only if such gaming is authorized
by the “Indian tribe having jurisdiction over such
lands.” 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(1)(A)(i).
Class III gaming must be conducted in conformance
with a tribal-state compact entered into by the Indian
tribe and the state and approved by the Secretary, or,
if attempts to reach such a compact are unsuccessful,
under “procedures” prescribed by the Secretary under
IGRA’s remedial process, 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii)(II).
The Indian tribe must request that the state “enter into
negotiations for the purpose of entering into a tribalstate compact governing the conduct of gaming activities.” 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(3)(A). Upon receiving such a request, the state “shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in
good faith to enter into such a compact.” Ibid.
If negotiations are unsuccessful, the tribe may file
suit against the state in federal district court. 25 U.S.C.
2710(d)(7)(A)(i). If the court finds that the state did not
negotiate in good faith, the court must order the state
and the tribe to conclude a compact within 60 days and,
4
if they do not, the state and the tribe must each submit
their “last best offer for a compact” to a court-appointed
mediator. 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv). The mediator
must then select the proposed compact that best
comports with IGRA, and the state has 60 days to consent to the mediator’s choice of compact. 25 U.S.C.
2710(d)(7)(B)(v)-(vi). If the state does not consent
within that period, the mediator must notify the Secretary, who “shall prescribe * * * procedures”—known
as Secretarial Procedures—“under which class III gaming may be conducted.” 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii)(II).
2. a. In 2005, the Tribe applied to the Secretary to
have a 305-acre parcel of mostly undeveloped, private
fee lands in Madera County, California (the Parcel)
taken into trust for the Tribe’s benefit under the IRA.
Pet. App. 5. In 2013, the United States acquired the
Parcel in trust for the Tribe pursuant to the IRA. Pet
App. 31; North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians v. California, No. 15-cv-419, 2015 WL 11438206, at *2 (E.D.
Cal. Nov. 13, 2015).
“Facing high unemployment, inadequate public services, and an uncertain revenue stream,” the Tribe
sought to “stimulate economic development” by building a casino complex on the Parcel. Stand Up for California! v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 879 F.3d
1177, 1179-1180 (D.C. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.
786 (2019). The Tribe asked the Secretary to determine
whether the Parcel, once in trust, would be eligible for
Class III gaming. Id. at 1180. In September 2011, the
Secretary issued a Record of Decision determining that
the Parcel was eligible for gaming under IGRA’s exception for gaming on lands acquired in trust after October
17, 1988. Pet. App. 5-6; see 25 U.S.C. 2719(b)(1)(A). In
August 2012, the Governor of California concurred.
5
Pet. App. 6; see id. at 31. On the same day, the Governor and Tribe completed and executed a tribal-state
compact in accordance with IGRA, 25 U.S.C.
2710(d)(1)(C), to govern Class III gaming on the Parcel.
Pet. App. 6, 32. In 2013, the California Legislature ratified the compact, and the Governor signed it into law.
Id. at 6. The Secretary then published notice in the
Federal Register that a compact between the Tribe and
the State of California had been approved. 78 Fed. Reg.
62,649 (Oct. 22, 2013). 1
b. During the 2014 election, a referendum known as
Proposition 48 was placed on the state ballot, proposing
to void the California Legislature’s approval of the
tribal-state compact. Pet. App. 6. Proposition 48 passed,
nullifying the law that ratified the compact. Ibid.
In light of Proposition 48’s passage, the State no
longer recognized the compact as valid. North Fork
Rancheria of Mono Indians, 2015 WL 11438206, at *3.
In 2015, the Tribe requested that the State enter into
negotiations for a new compact for the Parcel. Pet. App.
6. The State refused, and the Tribe filed suit under
IGRA, seeking a declaration that the State failed to negotiate in good faith. Ibid.; see 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(A)(i);
North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians, 2015 WL
11438206, at *1. The district court agreed and ordered
the State and Tribe to conclude a compact within 60
days, but the parties failed to do so. Pet. App. 6-7. As
required by IGRA, the court then appointed a mediator,
who directed the parties to submit their “last best offers” for a compact. Id. at 7. The mediator selected the
The Secretary’s initial determination that the Parcel was eligible for gaming under Section 2719(b)(1)(A), and the Secretary’s approval of the compact, are separate final agency actions that petitioners do not challenge here.
1
6
Tribe’s proposal, and submitted it to the State for its
consent. Ibid. The State did not provide consent within
the statutorily required period.
Ibid.; see 25 U.S.C.
2710(d)(7)(B)(vi).
As required by IGRA, the mediator then submitted
the proposed compact to the Secretary. Pet. App. 7; see
25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii). In July 2016, the Secretary
prescribed Secretarial Procedures to regulate the
Tribe’s conducting of Class III gaming on the Parcel.
Pet. App. 7; see id. at 64-271.
3. Petitioners are state-licensed cardrooms located
in California. Pet. App. 5. Following the issuance of the
Secretarial Procedures, petitioners filed this suit in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, contending that the issuance of those procedures
violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551
et seq., on the theory that the Secretary inadequately
considered whether the Tribe had jurisdiction over the
Parcel for purposes of IGRA. Pet. App. 26-27.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary. Pet. App. 26-60. The court first
rejected petitioners’ argument that the Tribe lacked
“territorial jurisdiction” over the Parcel, as required by
IGRA. Id. at 45. The court determined that the United
States’ action in acquiring the lands in trust for the
Tribe under the IRA conferred jurisdiction on the
Tribe. Id. at 40-52. Petitioners argued in the alternative that tribal jurisdiction obtained by virtue of the
IRA violated the Tenth Amendment by providing for
the unilateral transfer of the State’s territorial jurisdiction. Id. at 40-41. The district court declined to address
that issue, however, on the ground that the relevant
agency action that purportedly violated the Tenth
Amendment—the Secretary’s acquisition of the Parcel
7
for the benefit of the Tribe under the IRA—was “not
challenged in this action.” Id. at 41.
4. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 1-25.
a. Like the district court, the court of appeals first
rejected petitioners’ argument that the Secretarial Procedures “were issued in violation of IGRA because the
Tribe purportedly lacked jurisdiction” over the Parcel.
Pet. App. 13. The court explained that “while there
[wa]s no Ninth Circuit precedent precisely on point,
other circuits have logically concluded that, as a matter
of law, the federal government confers tribal jurisdiction over lands it acquires in trust for the benefit of
tribes.” Id. at 14; see id. at 14-16 (citing Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc. v. United States, 841 F.3d 556
(2d Cir. 2016) (Upstate Citizens), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.
2587 (2017); and Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Podhradsky,
606 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1019
(2011)). The court “agree[d]” with those decisions. Id.
at 14. The court observed that “when Congress enacted
[IRA] ‘it doubtless intended and understood that the Indians for whom the land was acquired would be able to
use the land free from state or local regulation or interference as well as free from taxation.’ ” Id. at 15 (quoting Yankton Sioux, 606 F.3d at 1011 (brackets in original)); see id. at 14.
The court of appeals explained that “[a]s a general
matter * * * off-reservation trust land like the * * *
Parcel is ‘Indian country’ with all the jurisdictional consequences that attach to that status.” Pet. App. 16. The
court stated that “[o]ff-reservation trust land” is Indian
country because it is, “by definition, land set aside for
Indian use and subject to federal control.” Ibid. (citing
18 U.S.C. 1151(b)). “Generally speaking,” the court continued, “primary jurisdiction over land that is Indian
8
country rests with the Federal Government and the Indian tribe inhabiting it, and not with the States.” Ibid.
(quoting Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t,
522 U.S. 520, 527 n.1 (1998)). The court accordingly determined that “the federal government confers tribal
jurisdiction over lands it acquires in trust for the benefit
of tribes as a matter of law.” Ibid. The court clarified,
however, that “federal and Indian authority do not entirely displace state authority over land taken into
trust.” Id. at 15 n.4 (quoting Upstate Citizens, 841 F.3d
at 572). 2
The court of appeals rejected petitioners’ related
contention that state consent or cession was required
for the transfer of jurisdiction over the Parcel. Pet.
App. 19. Petitioners had relied on the Enclave Clause
of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, Cl. 17, as well as
40 U.S.C. 3112. The court explained that the Enclave
Clause applies when “the federal government takes ‘exclusive’ jurisdiction over land within a state,” Pet. 19 n.6
(citing Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263 (1963)),
but “[s]tate jurisdiction is . . . only reduced, and not
eliminated, when the federal government takes land
into trust for a tribe,” id. at 20 (quoting Upstate Citizens, 841 F.3d at 572). “Because federal and Indian authority do not wholly displace state authority over” such
lands, “the Enclave Clause poses no barrier to the entrustment that occurred here.” Ibid. (quoting Upstate
Citizens, 841 F.3d at 572).
The court of appeals also rejected petitioners’ argument that the
Tribe fails to “exercise[] governmental power” over the Parcel as
required by 25 U.S.C. 2703(4)(B). Pet. App. 17-19. Petitioners have
not challenged that determination in this Court.
2
9
The court of appeals likewise rejected petitioners’
reliance on 40 U.S.C. 3112. That statute provides certain conditions under which “the head of a department,
agency, or independent establishment of the Government * * * may accept or secure, from the State in
which land * * * that is under the immediate jurisdiction, custody, or control of the [government official] is
situated, consent to, or cession of, any jurisdiction over
the land or interest not previously obtained.” 40 U.S.C.
3112(b). The court explained that Section 3112 “[b]y its
own terms, * * * sets forth requirements for the federal government’s acceptance of jurisdiction over land.”
Pet. App. 20 (citing 40 U.S.C. 3112(b)). Here, however,
“the federal government is not accepting jurisdiction
‘from the State,’ ” because such jurisdiction “was created by operation of law.” Ibid.
b. The court of appeals also rejected petitioners’ argument that, if the Secretary’s acquisition of land in
trust for the benefit of the Tribe under the IRA conferred jurisdiction on the Tribe, the IRA exceeds Congress’s enumerated powers and violates the Tenth
Amendment. Pet. App. 21-23. 3
The court of appeals explained that the authority to
regulate Indian affairs is among the enumerated powers of the federal government, and that “Indian relations became the exclusive province of federal law”
upon the “adoption of the Constitution.” Pet. App. 22
Although the district court had determined, in the alternative,
that petitioners lacked standing to assert a Tenth Amendment challenge, the court of appeals found standing under this Court’s decision in Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 220-221 (2011). Pet.
App. 21 n.7; see Gov’t C.A. Br. 32 n.5 (declining to assert a standing
argument).
3
10
(citations omitted); see id. at 21 (noting the government’s “plenary and exclusive” power over Indian affairs) (quoting United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200
(2004)). The court further observed that, “[i]f a power
is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth
Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that
power to the States.” Id. at 22 (quoting New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992)). Thus, the court
held, because “Congress has plenary authority to regulate Indian affairs, * * * [the] IRA does not offend the
Tenth Amendment.” Id. at 22; see id. at 22-23 (citing
authority).
The court of appeals denied rehearing and rehearing
en banc. Pet. App. 62-63.
ARGUMENT
Petitioners renew their contentions (Pet. 18-38) that
the government’s taking land into trust for the benefit
of a tribe under the IRA does not confer tribal jurisdiction over that land for purposes of IGRA, and that if it
does so, the IRA exceeds Congress’s powers. The court
of appeals correctly rejected those arguments, and the
decision below does not conflict with any decision of this
Court or of another court of appeals. This Court has
repeatedly denied petitions for certiorari raising similar constitutional challenges. See Upstate Citizens for
Equality, Inc. v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 2587 (2017)
(No. 16-1320); Central N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n v. Zinke,
137 S. Ct. 2134 (2017) (No. 16-1135); Citizens Against
Casino Gambling in Erie Cnty. v. Chaudhuri, 136 S. Ct.
2387 (2016) (No. 15-780); Stop the Casino 101 Coal. v.
Brown, 575 U.S. 1027 (2015) (No. 14-1236). The same
result is warranted here, particularly because the Secretarial Procedures remain under review in separate litigation.
11
1. The court of appeals correctly determined that
once the United States acquired the Parcel in trust for
the Tribe, the Tribe acquired jurisdiction over the Parcel for purposes of IGRA.
a. i. The IRA “authorize[s]” the Secretary, “in his
discretion, to acquire, through purchase, relinquishment,
gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands, water rights, or surface rights to lands, within or without
existing reservations,” for the “purpose of providing
land for Indians.” 25 U.S.C. 5108. The Act provides
that “[t]itle to any lands” acquired under the IRA “shall
be taken in the name of the United States in trust for
the Indian tribe.” Ibid.; see 25 U.S.C. 5105 (“Title to
lands or any interest therein acquired pursuant to this
Act for Indian use shall be taken in the name of the
United States of America in trust for the tribe or individual Indian for which acquired.”).
The court of appeals correctly determined that once
the federal government took the Parcel into trust for
the Tribe, it became “Indian country” under 18 U.S.C.
1151, “with all the jurisdictional consequences that attach to that status.” Pet. App. 16; see id. at 16 n.5 (noting that although Section 1151 “by its terms relates only
to criminal jurisdiction,” this Court has “recognized” its
general applicability to civil jurisdiction) (quoting
Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S.
520, 527 (1998) (Venetie)). As this Court has recognized,
trust lands qualify as Indian country because such lands
have been “validly set apart for the use of the Indians
as such, under the superintendence of the Government.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991) (citations
omitted); see Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 125 (1993); Cohen’s Handbook of
12
Federal Indian Law § 3.04[2][c][ii], at 190-193 (Nell
Jessup Newton et al. eds. 2012); see also, e.g., Langley
v. Ryder, 778 F.2d 1092, 1095 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[W]hether the lands are merely held in trust for the Indians or
whether the lands have been officially proclaimed a reservation, the lands are clearly Indian country.”). The
Secretary’s decision to take the Parcel into trust for the
Tribe—and thus to make the Parcel Indian country—
brings the Parcel within the general rule that “primary
jurisdiction over land that is Indian country rests with
the Federal Government and the Indian tribe inhabiting it, and not with the States.” Pet. App. 16a (quoting
Venetie, 522 U.S. at 527 n.1); see also, e.g., Yankton
Sioux Tribe v. Podhradsky, 606 F.3d 994, 1011 (8th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1019 (2011).
That holding is confirmed by the IRA’s history and
purposes. The IRA was enacted “against a backdrop of
great concern over economic and social challenges facing American Indians, and especially over the consequences of the federal government’s allotment policy,”
Michigan Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne,
525 F.3d 23, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1137 (2009), which had “proved disastrous
for the Indians,” Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 707
(1987). Congress passed the IRA “not only to stem the
loss of Indian land holdings brought on by allotment but
also to give tribes the opportunity to re-establish their
governments and land holdings.” Oneida Nation v. Village of Hobart, 968 F.3d 664, 671 (7th Cir. 2020). The
IRA “fundamentally restructured the relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government” and
“embod[ied] ‘principles of tribal self-determination and
self-governance.’ ” Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v.
United States Dep’t of the Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 85
13
(2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1007 (2001) (quoting County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 255 (1992)).
The IRA was thus intended to “promot[e] * * * a significant increase in tribal autonomy and authority and
the extension to the tribes of ‘an opportunity to take
over the control of their own resources.’ ” Blackfeet
Tribe of Indians v. State of Montana, 729 F.2d 1192,
1197 (9th Cir. 1984), aff ’d, 471 U.S. 759 (1985) (quoting
78 Cong. Rec. 11,124 (1934)).
As the court of appeals explained, “when Congress
enacted [the IRA] ‘it doubtless intended and understood that the Indians for whom the land was acquired
would be able to use the land free from state or local
regulation or interference as well as free from taxation.’ ” Pet. App. 14 (quoting Yankton Sioux, 606 F.3d
at 1011). Indeed, Congress expressly provided that
“any lands” taken into trust under the statute “shall be
exempt from State and local taxation.” 25 U.S.C 5108.
ii. Petitioners do not suggest (Br. 18-32) that the decision below conflicts with any decision of this Court or
of another court of appeals. To the contrary, this Court
has specifically identified Section 5108 as “provid[ing]
the proper avenue” for the federal government to assume control over tribal land. City of Sherrill v. Oneida
Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 221 (2005). And the court
of appeals in this case relied on the Second Circuit’s determination that “the federal government may, ‘by acquiring land for a tribe, divest a state of important aspects of its jurisdiction, even if a state previously exercised wholesale jurisdiction over the land.’ ” Pet. App.
15 (quoting Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc. v.
United States, 841 F.3d 556, 561 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. de-
14
nied, 140 S. Ct. 2587 (2017)). The court of appeals likewise relied (ibid.) on the Eighth Circuit’s decision in
Yankton Sioux Tribe, which rejected the argument that
“taking land into trust for the benefit of an Indian tribe
is insufficient to convert such land into Indian country.”
606 F.3d at 1011; see Pet. App. 15. As those decisions
recognize, once the Secretary takes land into trust for a
tribe, it is subject to federal and tribal jurisdiction,
though “federal and Indian authority do not entirely
displace state authority.” Pet. App. 15 n.4 (citing Upstate Citizens, 841 F.3d at 572).
b. Petitioners’ contrary arguments lack merit.
i. Petitioners suggest (Pet. 24-25, 27-28) that under
the IRA, the Secretary’s acquisition of land in trust for
the benefit of a tribe transfers only bare title to the federal government and the tribe. But as just discussed,
where Congress authorizes the Secretary to place land
in trust for an Indian tribe, such land qualifies as Indian
country. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 498 U.S. at
511; Venetie, 522 U.S. at 527. It is therefore subject to
federal and tribal jurisdiction.
Petitioners only briefly address the court of appeals’
determination that the Parcel qualifies as Indian country. Petitioners suggest (Br. 23) that “[t]here is no issue
here of tribal sovereignty over ‘Indian Country’ ” because the Parcel was previously privately owned, Indians have not historically lived on it, and it is separate
from the Tribe’s reservation. But the definition of Indian country includes no overarching requirement of
prior Indian ownership or habitation. See 18 U.S.C.
1151. And as this Court has explained, “the test for determining whether land is Indian country does not turn
upon whether that land is denominated ‘trust land’ or
‘reservation.’ ” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 498 U.S. at 511.
15
“Rather, [this Court] ask[s] whether the area has been
‘validly set apart for the use of Indians as such, under
the superintendence of the government.’ ” Ibid. (quoting United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648-649 (1978));
see pp. 11-13, supra.
ii. Contrary to petitioners’ contention (Pet. 28), the
decision below does not “create” an “inconsistency”
with McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).
McGirt did not concern the IRA or jurisdiction for purposes of IGRA; rather, it held that Congress did not disestablish the Muscogee Creek Reservation in Oklahoma. In reaching that determination, the Court explained that “Congress does not disestablish a reservation simply by allowing the transfer of individual plots,
whether to Native Americans or others.” Id. at 2464.
As petitioners observe (Pet. 27), the Court in McGirt
observed by way of analogy that the federal government once issued land patents to homesteaders in the
West, and that such action did not diminish the United
States’ sovereignty over that land. 140 S. Ct. at 2464.
The Court’s analogy, however (like McGirt itself ) concerned the transfer of title from a sovereign to individuals. Ibid. Nothing in that discussion suggests that the
Secretary’s action under the IRA in taking land into
trust for a tribe—a “domestic dependent nation[] that
exercise[s] inherent sovereign authority,” Michigan v.
Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788 (2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)—fails to
confer jurisdiction on the tribe.
iii. Petitioners also err in asserting that the court of
appeals was required to consider the jurisdictional issue
here by applying a presumption that the “historic police powers of the States” are not superseded by federal
law unless that is the “clear and manifest purpose of
16
Congress.” Pet. 28 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S.
555, 565 (2009)) (emphasis omitted). As this Court has
often recognized, see pp. 19-21, infra, the federal government has “plenary” power over Indian affairs. United
States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (citations omitted). The Wyeth presumption does not apply, because
there is no “historic presence of state law,” 555 U.S. at
566 n.3, over Indian affairs.
Indeed, this Court has long “emphasized the special
sense in which the doctrine of preemption is applied” in
the Indian law “context.” New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333 (1983). As the Court
has explained, “[a]lthough a State will certainly be without jurisdiction if its authority is pre-empted under familiar principles of pre-emption,” its cases “d[o] not
limit pre-emption of State laws affecting Indian tribes
to only those circumstances.” Id. at 333-334. That is
because the “unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty and the federal commitment to tribal selfsufficiency and self-determination make it treacherous
to import notions of pre-emption that are properly applied to other contexts.” Id. at 334 (brackets, citation,
ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
in the field of Indian affairs, “[s]tate jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law if it interferes or
is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the State interests at stake
are sufficient to justify the assertion of State authority.”
Ibid.; see Fisher v. District Court of Sixteenth Judicial
District, 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976) (per curiam) (finding
state law preempted where it “infringed on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled
by them”) (citation omitted). Petitioners have not at-
17
tempted to demonstrate that all aspects of state jurisdiction survive the Secretary’s decision to take land into
trust for a tribe under the relevant standards.
c. The court of appeals also correctly rejected petitioners’ related assertion that, under the Enclave
Clause or 40 U.S.C. 3112, any transfer of jurisdiction
pursuant to the IRA requires state consent or cession.
Pet. App. 19-21.
i. As the court of appeals observed (Pet. App. 19-20
& n.6), the Enclave Clause provides a mechanism for
the United States to acquire exclusive jurisdiction over
land within a state. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 17; see
Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263 (1963); Fort
Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 538 (1885)
(State consent is necessary for the federal government
to obtain “the right of exclusive legislation within the
territorial limits of any State.”). But “[w]hen land is
taken into trust by the federal government for Indian
tribes, the federal government does not obtain such categorically exclusive jurisdiction over the entrusted
lands.” Upstate Citizens, 841 F.3d at 571. As this Court
has explained, Indian reservation lands do not fall
within the Enclave Clause because “the lands remain
part of [the state’s] territory and within the operation
of her laws,” particularly as applied to non-Indians.
Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 650 (1930);
see Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001) (“State
sovereignty does not end at a reservation’s border.”);
see also Hicks, 533 U.S. at 363-365 (upholding a state’s
right to enter a reservation to execute a search warrant
related to off-reservation conduct). Lands taken into
trust under Section 5108 likewise do not fall under “exclusive” federal jurisdiction in the sense contemplated
by the Enclave Clause. Paul, 371 U.S. at 263.
18
Although petitioners cite the Enclave Clause (Pet.
19, 22, 36), they do not grapple with the court of appeals’
reasoning. Nor do they suggest that the decision below
conflicts with any decision of this Court or of another
court of appeals. To the contrary, the Second Circuit in
Upstate Citizens rejected an Enclave Clause challenge
for the same reasons as the court of appeals here. See
841 F.3d at 572 (“Because federal and Indian authority
do not wholly displace state authority over land taken
into trust pursuant to § 5 of the IRA, the Enclave Clause
poses no barrier to the entrustment that occurred
here.”).
ii. The court of appeals also correctly rejected petitioners’ reliance on 40 U.S.C. 3112. Pet. App. 19-21 &
n.6. That statute provides certain conditions under
which “the head of a department, agency, or independent establishment of the Government * * * may accept
or secure, from the State in which land * * * that is
under the immediate jurisdiction, custody, or control of
the [government official] is situated, consent to, or cession of, any jurisdiction over the land or interest not
previously obtained.” 40 U.S.C. 3112(b). As the court
of appeals explained, Section 3112 does not apply because the federal government did not “accept[] jurisdiction ‘from the State.’ ” Pet. App. 20. Rather, the government exercised its power under the IRA to take the
Parcel into trust for the benefit of the Tribe. That
power “is derived from Congress’ broad general power,
pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause, to legislate
with respect to Indian tribes.” Id. at 21. The resulting
transfer of jurisdiction occurred “by operation of law.”
Id. at 20.
Petitioners suggest (Pet. 31) that the court of appeals erred by construing Section 3112 to focus on the
19
federal government’s acceptance of jurisdiction, rather
than on a state’s cession or consent. But the court focused on the federal government’s “acceptance” because that is the focus of Section 3112; indeed, the statute uses some form of the term “accept” six times. See
40 U.S.C. 3112. And petitioners provide no support for
the broad assertion that “Section 3112 covers any acquisition, in whole or in part, of jurisdiction,” and thus
mandates state cession or consent in every case. Pet.
31. Nor do petitioners suggest that any court has interpreted Section 3112 to apply in similar circumstances,
i.e., when the government takes land into trust for an
Indian tribe or Congress creates or expands a reservation. See Pet. 31-32.
2. Petitioners argue in the alternative (Pet. 33-38)
that, if the IRA confers tribal jurisdiction over trust
lands, then it exceeds Congress’s enumerated powers.
The court of appeals correctly rejected that argument,
and further review of this issue is not warranted.
a. “[T]he Constitution grants Congress broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes.”
Lara, 541 U.S. at 200. Those powers derive from the
Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3,
and the Treaty Clause, U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, Cl. 2,
among other sources. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 200-204;
see also, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46
(1913); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384
(1886). On numerous occasions, this Court has described Congress’s authority over Indian affairs “as
‘plenary and exclusive.’ ” Lara, 541 U.S. at 200 (citing
Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 103, (1993); Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima
Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470-471 (1979)); see also,
e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S.
20
163, 192 (1989) (reiterating that the Indian Commerce
Clause provides Congress with “plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs”); Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 535 (1832) (“By the constitution of
the United States, the establishment and regulation
of intercourse with the Indians belonged, exclusively, to
the government of the United States.”).
Congress’s constitutional authority with respect to
Indian tribes has, from the time of the Founding, consistently been understood to include power over the acquisition, sale, and regulation of Indian land. See City
of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 204 (describing the Trade and
Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137); see generally Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law
§§ 5.02[4], 15.03, at 394-395, 997-999. In Venetie, for example, the Court expressly recognized Congress’s constitutional power to create Indian country: “The federal
set-aside requirement * * * reflects the fact that because Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs,
see U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3, some explicit action by
Congress (or the Executive, acting under delegated authority) must be taken to create or to recognize Indian
country.” 522 U.S. at 531 n.6; see John, 437 U.S. at 652654 (upholding federal criminal jurisdiction over lands
that had been acquired through Acts of Congress and
held in trust for the Mississippi Choctaws). In 1934,
Congress exercised that power in the IRA by conferring
authority on the Secretary of the Interior to take land
into trust for Indian tribes. 25 U.S.C. 5108. And as
noted above, see p. 13, supra, this Court has identified
Section 5108 as “provid[ing] the proper avenue” for the
federal government to assume control over land for the
benefit of tribes. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 221.
21
In recognition of this long, unbroken history of federal supervision of tribal lands, the courts of appeals
have uniformly upheld Section 5108 against various constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Carcieri v. Kempthorne,
497 F.3d 15, 39-40 (1st Cir. 2007) (en banc) (rejecting
challenges under the Indian Commerce Clause, the
Tenth Amendment, and the Enclave Clause), rev’d on
other grounds, 555 U.S. 379 (2009); see also County of
Charles Mix v. United States Dep’t of the Interior,
674 F.3d 898, 902 (8th Cir. 2012) (rejecting challenge
under the Guarantee Clause); Michigan Gambling Opposition, 525 F.3d at 32-33 (rejecting challenge under
the non-delegation doctrine); South Dakota v. United
States Dep’t of the Interior, 423 F.3d 790, 797-798
(8th Cir. 2005) (same), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 813 (2006);
United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125, 1136-1137
(10th Cir. 1999) (same), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1108 (2000).
b. Petitioners do not contend that the decision below, which upheld Section 5108, conflicts with the decision of any other court of appeals. Instead, petitioners
offer two primary arguments as to why Section 5018 is
unconstitutional. Neither is persuasive. 4
i. Petitioners contend (Pet. 33-35) that because the
Indian Commerce Clause does not expressly state that
the federal government may acquire land in trust for a
tribe without state consent or cession, Congress lacked
the authority to provide for such acquisition in the IRA.
That is incorrect.
As an initial matter, this Court has located Congress’s “broad general powers to legislate in respect to
Petitioners also rely (Pet. 36) on the Enclave Clause of the Constitution. As previously discussed, see pp. 17-18, supra, however,
the Enclave Clause does not apply here.
4
22
Indian tribes,” Lara, 541 U.S. at 200, not only in the Indian Commerce Clause, but also in the Treaty Clause,
among other sources. See id. at 200-204. In addition,
this Court has made clear that “[t]he States’ inherent
jurisdiction” over Indian country within their borders
“can of course be stripped by Congress.” Hicks,
533 U.S. at 365 (addressing reservation lands) (citing
Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 242-243 (1896));
see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62
(1996) (“States * * * have been divested of virtually all
authority over Indian commerce and Indian tribes.”).
For instance, “[c]riminal jurisdiction over offenses committed in ‘Indian country’ ” is governed by a framework
of federal laws, and “Congress has plenary authority to
alter these jurisdictional guideposts.” Negonsott,
507 U.S. at 102-103 (citation omitted); see John,
437 U.S. at 652-653 (Congress may displace state criminal jurisdiction even where such jurisdiction previously
“went unchallenged” and “federal supervision over [a
tribe] has not been continuous”); cf. Pet. App. 15 n.4
(noting that “under Public Law 280, 18 U.S.C. 1162(a),
California retains ‘broad criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians within all Indian country within the State’ ”) (quoting California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207
(1987)).
Petitioners relatedly contend (Pet. 36-37) that notwithstanding Congress’s plenary authority in this area,
the IRA violates the Tenth Amendment. As the court
of appeals recognized, however, “[i]f a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power
to the States.” Pet. App. 22 (quoting New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992)). Because the
23
Constitution grants Congress “broad general powers to
legislate in respect to Indian tribes,” Lara, 541 U.S. at
200, and Congress exercised such power in enacting the
IRA, the statute does not violate the Tenth Amendment. See Carcieri, 497 F.3d at 39-40 (so holding).
ii. Petitioners also contend (Pet. 34-35) that if the
Secretary’s action in taking land into trust under the
IRA confers jurisdiction on a tribe, then the statute
“would be at odds” with the Admissions Clause, which
provides that new states may not be formed within the
jurisdiction of existing states, “nor * * * by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without
the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned
as well as of Congress.” U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 3, Cl. 1.
But by taking land into trust for an Indian tribe, the
federal government does not create a new state; the Admissions Clause thus is not implicated. Nor does petitioners’ argument gain support from this Court’s decision in Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001),
which concerned title to submerged lands. The Court
there applied a “ ‘strong presumption against defeat of
a State’s title’ ” to “land beneath navigable waters,” id.
at 272-273 (citation omitted)—a presumption that has
no application here.
Petitioners also observe (Pet. 38-39) that the Parcel
was not reserved from California prior to statehood.
But for purposes of determining whether land is Indian
country, this Court has not “differentiated between
lands taken into trust prior to statehood of the State in
which the lands lie and those lands taken into trust after.” Pet. App. 50. For example, John, supra, and
United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938), involved Indian lands that were taken into trust (John)
24
and set aside (McGowan) for the tribes after the affected states entered the Union. See John, 437 U.S. at
639-640, 649; McGowan, 302 U.S. at 537-539. In both
cases, the Court held that tribal and federal jurisdiction
was established as a result of the lands being secured
for the tribes. John, 437 U.S. at 649; McGowan,
302 U.S. at 539. Petitioners point to no decision limiting
the federal government’s post-statehood authority to
take land into trust for an Indian tribe. Further review
is unwarranted.
3. Even if the questions presented otherwise warranted this Court’s review, this case would present an
unsuitable vehicle because of an ongoing challenge to
the Secretarial Procedures. In Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 959 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.
2020), plaintiffs challenged the Secretarial Procedures
alleging, among other things, that they violate the National
Environmental
Policy
Act
of
1969,
42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
7401 et seq. Stand Up for California!, 959 F.3d at 11571158. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in
part, and remanded to the district court with regard to
the environmental claims. Id. at 1156-1157, 1165-1166.
That review is ongoing. See, e.g., 16-cv-2681 D. Ct. Doc.
83 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2021) (taking under submission
motions for summary judgment).
25
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Acting Solicitor General
JEAN E. WILLIAMS
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
WILLIAM B. LAZARUS
TAMARA ROUNTREE
Attorneys
MAY 2021
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.