Respondents Brief — Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al., Petitioners v. Yassir Fazaga, et al.
Supreme Court briefSep 21, 2021
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No. 20-828
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
d
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION , et al.,
Petitioners,
—v.—
YASSIR FAZAGA , et al.,
Respondents.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS
PETER BIBRING
MOHAMMAD TAJSAR
ACLU FOUNDATION OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
1313 West Eighth Street
Los Angeles, CA 90017
AMR SHABAIK
DINA CHEHATA
CAIR-LOS ANGELES
2180 W. Crescent Avenue,
Suite F
Anaheim, CA 92801
PATRICK TOOMEY
ASHLEY GORSKI
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION FOUNDATION
125 Broad Street
New York, NY 10004
AHILAN ARULANANTHAM
Counsel of Record
UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW
385 Charles E. Young Drive East
Los Angeles, CA 90095
(310) 825-1029
arulanantham@law.ucla.edu
DAN STORMER
SHALEEN SHANBHAG
HADSELL STORMER RENICK
& DAI LLP
128 North Fair Oaks Avenue
Pasadena, CA 91103
DAVID D. COLE
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION FOUNDATION
915 15th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... iv
INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 1
STATEMENT............................................................... 3
I.
Legal Background ........................................... 3
A. State Secrets .............................................. 3
B. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ...... 4
II.
The FBI’s Surveillance Program:
Operation Flex ................................................ 7
III. Procedural History ........................................ 13
A. District Court ........................................... 13
B. Court of Appeals ...................................... 16
C. Proceedings on Remand .......................... 18
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................... 19
ARGUMENT .............................................................. 24
I.
The State-Secrets Privilege Does Not
Permit Dismissal Here ................................. 24
A. This Court’s State-Secrets Cases Do
Not Permit Dismissal Here ..................... 24
B. The Pre-Reynolds Common Law Does
Not Permit Dismissal Here ..................... 28
ii
PAGE
C. The Few Lower Court Cases
Permitting Dismissal Where
Defendants Seek to Use Privileged
Evidence to Defend Themselves
Precede General Dynamics, and Are
Wrong or Inapplicable ............................. 30
II.
If the State-Secrets Privilege Otherwise
Authorizes Dismissal, FISA Displaces It,
and Requires Ex Parte, In Camera Review
Rather Than Dismissal ................................. 33
A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Triggers FISA’s Special Review
Procedures Under Sections 1806(c)
and (f) ....................................................... 35
B. Plaintiffs’ Prayer for Relief
Independently Triggers FISA’s Special
Review Procedures Under Section
1806(f) ...................................................... 39
C. Defendants’ Objections Are Meritless .... 40
1. Defendants’ Interpretation of “Use”
Contravenes Its Ordinary Meaning .. 40
2. Defendants’ Non-Textual Limitation
on Section 1806(f) Cannot Be
Squared With Its Plain Text .............. 41
3. Defendants’ Limiting Construction
Would Eviscerate the Civil Remedy
Congress Created in Section 1810 ..... 48
iii
PAGE
III. FISA Speaks Clearly to Displace Any
“Dismissal Remedy” That the StateSecrets Privilege Might Otherwise
Authorize ....................................................... 52
A. Section 1806(f)’s Review Procedures
Displace the State-Secrets Privilege in
Cases Involving Domestic Electronic
Surveillance ............................................. 53
B. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance
Does Not Support Defendants’
Interpretation .......................................... 58
1. FISA’s Ex Parte, In Camera Review
Procedures Present No Article II
Concerns ............................................. 58
2. The Agent Defendants’ Speculative
Due Process and Seventh
Amendment Concerns Do Not
Support Their Interpretation ............ 63
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 67
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE(S)
Cases
ACLU Found. of So. Cal. v. Barr,
952 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1991) .................... 7, 46, 47
Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165 (1969) .................................. 45, 52, 53
Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut,
564 U.S. 410 (2011) .............................................. 52
Bank Line Ltd. v. United States,
68 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) .......................... 29
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.,
534 U.S. 438 (2002) .............................................. 44
Black v. United States,
62 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 1995) ................................ 31
Bostock v. Clayton County,
140 S Ct. 1731 (2020) ........................................... 42
Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
333 U.S. 103 (1948) .............................................. 60
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan,
451 U.S. 304 (1981) .............................................. 52
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l,
568 U.S. 398 (2013) .............................................. 60
Clark v. Martinez,
543 U.S. 371 (2005) .............................................. 64
Cogen v. United States,
278 U.S. 221 (1929) .............................................. 43
v
PAGE(S)
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833 (1986) .............................................. 37
Cooke v. Maxwell,
[1817] 2 Stark. 183 ............................................... 25
Cresmer v. United States,
9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) ............................... 29
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Alabama Dep’t of Revenue,
562 U.S. 277 (2011) .............................................. 44
Dellums v. Powell,
561 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977) .............................. 54
Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518 (1988) ........................................ 59, 60
Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co.,
[1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.)..................................... 30, 33
El-Masri v. United States,
479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) ......................... 30, 32
Emp’t Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990) .............................................. 64
Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
478 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1973) .................................. 54
Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co.,
199 F. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912) ................................... 28
General Dynamics Corp. v. United States,
563 U.S. 478 (2011) ....................................... passim
Grant Brothers Constr. Co. v. United States,
232 U.S. 647 (1914) .............................................. 43
In re Grove,
180 F. 62 (3d Cir. 1910) ........................................ 29
vi
PAGE(S)
H.M.S. Bellerophon,
[1875] 44 LJR 5 .................................................... 29
Halpern v. United States,
258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958) .................................... 57
Jabara v. Kelley,
75 F.R.D. 475 (E.D. Mich. 1977) .......................... 57
Jabara v. Webster,
691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982) .......................... 56, 57
Jennings v. Rodriguez,
138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) ............................................ 38
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,
436 U.S. 618 (1978) .............................................. 49
Mohamed v. Jeppesen,
614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010)
(en banc)........................................ 14, 15, 16, 30, 32
Molerio v. FBI,
749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984) .................. 31, 32, 65
N.L.R.B. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.,
437 U.S. 214 (1978) .............................................. 60
Nielsen v. Preap,
139 S. Ct. 954 (2019) ............................................ 58
Olson Rug Co. v. NLRB,
291 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1961) ................................ 54
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
523 U.S. 75 (1998) ................................................ 42
Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co.,
26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) .......................... 28
vii
PAGE(S)
Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
491 U.S. 440 (1989) .............................................. 63
Rex v. Watson,
2 Stark. 116 (1817) ............................................... 29
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
138 S. Ct. 816 (2018) ............................................ 37
In re Sealed Case,
494 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ........................ 31, 32
Tenenbaum v. Simonini,
372 F.3d 776 (6th Cir. 2004) ................................ 31
Tenet v. Doe,
544 U.S. 1 (2005) ........................................ 4, 25, 26
Totten v. United States,
92 U.S. 105 (1875) ......................................... passim
United States v. Aguilar,
515 U.S. 593 (1995) .............................................. 45
United States v. Belfield,
692 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ....................... 55, 56
United States v. Burr,
25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) ......................... 62
United States v. Coplon,
185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950) .................................. 32
United States v. Lyon,
567 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1977) ................................ 54
United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974) .................................. 53, 59, 62
United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. 1 (1953) ........................................... passim
viii
PAGE(S)
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians,
448 U.S. 371 (1980) .............................................. 38
United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460 (2010) .............................................. 44
United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith),
407 U.S. 297 (1972) .................................. 23, 59, 62
Vance v. Terrazas,
444 U.S. 252 (1980) .............................................. 59
Webster v. Doe,
486 U.S. 592 (1988) ........................................ 25, 26
Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency,
__ F.4th __, No. 20-1191, slip op.
(4th Cir. Sept. 15, 2021) ................................. 44, 45
Worthington v. Scribner,
109 Mass. 487 (1872) ............................................ 29
Wyatt v. Gore,
[1816] Holt N.P.C. 299 ................................... 25, 30
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952) .......................................... 5, 59
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry,
576 U.S. 1 (2015) .................................................. 59
Statutes
18 U.S.C. 2712 ........................................................... 51
18 U.S.C. 2712(b)(4) ................................................... 51
18 U.S.C. App. III § 6(c)(1), Classified Information
Procedures Act (“CIPA”)................................. 47, 65
ix
PAGE(S)
42 U.S.C. ch. 21B § 2000bb et seq.,
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ..................... 13
42 U.S.C. 1985(3) ....................................................... 13
50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq., Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (“FISA”) .............................. passim
50 U.S.C. 1802(a)(3) ............................................. 60
50 U.S.C. 1803 ...................................................... 60
50 U.S.C. 1806 ............................................... passim
50 U.S.C. 1806(c) ........................................... passim
50 U.S.C. 1806(e) .................................................. 45
50 U.S.C. 1806(f) ........................................... passim
50 U.S.C. 1806(g) ........................................... passim
50 U.S.C. 1806(h) ................................................. 44
50 U.S.C. 1809 ........................................................ 7
50 U.S.C. 1809(a)(1) ............................................. 50
50 U.S.C. 1810 ............................................... passim
50 U.S.C. 1812 ...................................................... 50
Federal Tort Claims Act ............................................ 13
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) ....................... 60
Invention Secrecy Act ................................................ 56
Privacy Act ........................................................... 13, 31
x
PAGE(S)
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 5 ................................. 61
U.S. Constitution, Article II .................... 58, 59, 60, 61
U.S. Constitution, Article III..................................... 62
U.S. Constitution, First Amendment ...... 13, 20, 31, 65
U.S. Constitution, Fourth Amendment ............. passim
U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment........................ 63
U.S. Constitution, Sixth Amendment ....................... 65
U.S. Constitution, Seventh Amendment ............ 63, 65
Legislative Materials
H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283 (1978) .................... 5, 34, 48, 50
H.R. Rep. No. 95-1720 (1978) ............................ 5, 7, 48
S. Rep. No. 94-755, Church Report, Book II (1976) .... 5
S. Rep. No. 95-604 (1977) ...................................... 4, 51
S. Rep. No. 95-701 (1978) ................................ 5, 48, 62
Other Authorities
Raoul Berger, Executive Privilege: A Constitutional
Myth, 50 Indiana L.J. 193 (1974)......................... 62
Black’s Law Dictionary .............................................. 39
Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of
National Security Litigation, 75 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 1249 (2007) ............................................... 55
xi
PAGE(S)
Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Division, “Guidance
Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law
Enforcement Authorities,” (June 2003),
https://www.scribd.com/document/22092319/
DOJ-Guidance-Regarding-the-Use-of-Race-byFederal-Law-Enforcement-Agencies-June-2003 . 64
The Federalist No. 64 (John Jay) .............................. 61
The Federalist No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) .......... 61
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Critical Comment
on the Constitutionality of Executive Privilege,
83 Minn. L. Rev. 1143 (1999) ............................... 62
William Sanford, Evidentiary Privileges Against
the Production of Data Within the Control
of Executive Departments, 3 Vanderbilt
L. Rev. 73 (1949) ................................................... 29
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 176
(2012) ........................................................ 36, 45, 48
Abraham D. Sofaer, Executive Power and the Control
of Information: Practice Under the Framers,
16 Duke L.J. 1, 46 (1977) ..................................... 61
The Convert, THIS AMERICAN LIFE
(Aug. 10, 2012) ...................................................... 12
Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions,
85 Geo. L.J. 1945 (1997) ....................................... 63
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary
(1977) ........................................................ 36, 38, 43
xii
PAGE(S)
John Henry Wigmore, Treatise on the System of
Evidence in Trials at Common Law (1905) ......... 55
1
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs are three Americans who allege that,
fifteen years ago, the FBI sent an informant to spy on
them and others in their community because of their
religion. The Government acknowledges that it
employed the informant and possesses recordings he
made. The informant himself submitted sworn
declarations testifying that FBI agents directed him
to spy on Plaintiffs and hundreds of other members of
Southern
California’s
Muslim
communities,
instructed him to collect information on these lawabiding Americans simply because of their faith, and
told him Islam itself is a threat. Eventually, the
informant tried to incite community members to
violence, scaring them enough that they reported
him—to the FBI.
These acts caused deep harm to Plaintiffs and
many other members of their communities. Plaintiff
Fazaga, a religious leader and licensed therapist, was
forced to restrict the counseling he provided to his
congregants for fear it was no longer private.
Plaintiffs Malik and AbdelRahim grew afraid to
practice their faith openly and to attend the mosques
the informant had infiltrated.
The question presented is whether Plaintiffs’ claim
that
Defendants
violated
the
Constitution’s
protection for freedom of religion will ever receive its
day in court. Defendants maintain that no judge can
decide whether they violated the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses because they need to use
certain evidence to defend themselves, but
introducing it would reveal “state secrets.”
Defendants do not contend that the very subject
matter of this case is secret; they have not sought to
dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims on
2
privilege grounds. Defendants seek to dismiss just
the religion claims on state secrets—even though
Plaintiffs need no secret information to prove them.
Defendants are wrong for two reasons. First, the
state-secrets privilege does not permit dismissal of
the religion claims based on Defendants’ need to rely
on secret information. Like all other privileges, the
state-secrets privilege authorizes the exclusion of
privileged evidence. But Defendants do not need to
assert the privilege to keep the information out of
this case. Only they possess the information they
seek to keep secret, and Plaintiffs have not sought it
to establish their entitlement to relief. Defendants
instead seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ religion claims,
based on their own need to use the information to
defend themselves. But dismissal for that reason has
no basis in the common-law state-secrets privilege or
this Court’s precedent. The decision below should be
affirmed on that basis alone.
Second, because the secret information on which
Defendants rely came from the electronic surveillance
of U.S. persons on U.S. soil conducted in the name of
national security, the procedures for litigating it are
governed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(“FISA”), 50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq., not common law.
Under 50 U.S.C. 1806, whenever the Government
seeks to use information from FISA surveillance or
Americans seek to obtain it for a suit against their
government, and the Attorney General asserts that
disclosing that information could threaten national
security, the court “shall” review it ex parte and in
camera to determine whether the underlying
surveillance was lawful. These procedures apply
“notwithstanding any other law,” “whenever” the
statute’s conditions are met. They govern this case.
Thus, even if the state-secrets privilege would
3
otherwise permit dismissal of Plaintiffs’ religion
claims, FISA’s procedures displace it here.1
STATEMENT
I.
Legal Background
A. State Secrets
The concept of state secrets encompasses two “quite
different” doctrines. General Dynamics Corp. v.
United States, 563 U.S. 478, 485 (2011). The one
involved here is a common-law privilege “in the law of
evidence,” concerning “military and state secrets.”
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1953).
When the Government successfully invokes this
privilege, “[t]he privileged information is excluded
and the trial goes on without it. . . . [T]he Court [does]
not order judgment in favor of the Government.”
General Dynamics, 563 U.S. at 485. Under Reynolds,
dismissals occur only when plaintiffs cannot prove
their case without the secret evidence. Brief of
Professor Laura K. Donahue As Amicuc Curiae In
Support of Neither Party (“Donohue Amicus”) at 4–17
(collecting cases).
The other state-secrets doctrine, not presented
here, is a justiciability bar this Court created from its
“authority to fashion contractual remedies in
Government-contracting disputes.” General Dynamics,
Because some Defendants are petitioners and some
respondents in this Court, Plaintiffs use “Plaintiffs” and
“Defendants” throughout. The “Government” refers to the
official capacity Defendants. “Agent Defendants” refers to FBI
agents sued in their individual capacities. When citing to the
Government’s opening brief, Plaintiffs use the abbreviation “Br.”
1
4
563 U.S. at 485. That doctrine requires dismissal of
government-contracting lawsuits “where the very
subject matter of the action . . . [i]s a matter of state
secret.” Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (discussing
Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875)) (cleaned
up); Tenet, 544 U.S. at 12 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“the bar of Totten is a jurisdictional one”). The
authority for such dismissals is “something quite
different from a mere evidentiary point,” and the
“state-secrets jurisprudence bearing upon that
authority is not Reynolds, but two cases dealing with
alleged contracts to spy.” General Dynamics, 563
U.S. at 485–86 (citing Tenet and Totten). Individuals
who enter into such secret contracts “assume[] the
risk that state secrets would prevent the
adjudication of” any disputes that may arise from
them. Id. at 491. “The secrecy which such contracts
impose precludes any action for their enforcement.”
Totten, 92 U.S. at 107.
While a few lower court cases conflated these two
doctrines prior to General Dynamics, this Court has
never done so. Reynolds itself makes clear that Totten
rests on a “broader holding that lawsuits premised on
alleged espionage agreements are altogether
forbidden.” Tenet, 544 U.S. at 9. Only Totten permits
“dismiss[al] on the pleadings without ever reaching
the question of evidence.” Id. (quoting Reynolds,
emphasis in Tenet).
B. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
Congress enacted FISA in 1978 to establish “an
exclusive charter for the conduct of electronic
surveillance in the United States” in the name of
national security, S. Rep. No. 95-604, at 15 (1977).
5
Through
FISA,
Congress
“eliminat[ed]
any
congressional recognition or suggestion of inherent
Presidential power with respect to electronic
surveillance.” S. Rep. No. 95-701, at 72 (1978). The
statute provides substantive rules governing when
such surveillance can occur, rules for judges to
authorize it, procedures for litigating cases involving
such surveillance, and a civil remedy to provide
redress to Americans who are unlawfully surveilled.
In the years before FISA’s passage, a congressional
committee led by Senator Frank Church investigated
claims of abusive surveillance practices. It discovered
the government had, in the name of national security,
surveilled an enormous number of innocent Americans
without warrants—including Martin Luther King, Jr.
and other civil rights leaders, journalists, antiwar
groups, a law firm, and a member of Congress.
Church Report, Book II, S. Rep. No. 94-755, at 6–13
(1976). President Nixon even authorized a wiretap
program that obtained “information about a Supreme
Court justice.” Id. at 10. These abuses “demonstrate[d]
the inappropriateness of relying solely on executive
branch discretion to safeguard civil liberties.” H.R.
Rep. No. 95-1283, at 21 (1978).
FISA “embodies a legislative judgment that court
orders and other procedural safeguards are necessary
to insure that electronic surveillance by the U.S.
Government within this country conforms to the
fundamental principles of the fourth amendment.” S.
Rep. No. 95-701 at 13; see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-1720,
at 35 (1978) (invoking Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
The FISA provisions relevant here are 50 U.S.C.
1806 and 1810. Section 1806(c) requires the
Government to notify the court and those surveilled
6
(“aggrieved persons”) whenever it intends to use
information obtained or derived from electronic
surveillance
in
litigation:
“[w]henever
the
Government intends to enter into evidence or
otherwise use or disclose in any trial . . . against an
aggrieved person, any information obtained or
derived from an electronic surveillance of that
aggrieved person . . . the Government shall . . . notify
the aggrieved person and the court . . . that the
Government intends to so disclose or so use such
information.”
Section 1806(f) mandates special procedures for
judicial review of secret information. Whenever the
Government seeks to use information under
subsection (c), “if the Attorney General files an
affidavit . . . that disclosure [of information obtained
or derived from electronic surveillance] or an
adversary hearing would harm the national security
of the United States,” the “district court . . . shall,
notwithstanding any other law, . . . review in camera
and ex parte the application, order, and such other
materials relating to the surveillance as may be
necessary to determine whether the surveillance of
the aggrieved person was lawfully authorized and
conducted.”
Section 1806(f) also contains a catch-all provision
that requires district courts to use the same review
procedures “whenever any motion or request is made
by an aggrieved person pursuant to any other statute
or rule . . . to discover or obtain . . . materials relating
to electronic surveillance” or “information obtained or
derived from electronic surveillance.”
If the court finds the surveillance unlawful after
conducting its ex parte, in camera review, Section
1806(g) directs that it “shall, in accordance with the
7
requirements of law, suppress the evidence” or
“otherwise grant the motion of the aggrieved person.”
Section 1810 establishes a civil damages remedy
for U.S. persons subjected to unlawful surveillance. It
makes federal officials who “intentionally engage[] in
electronic surveillance under color of law” (as defined
in Section 1809) liable for damages if their
surveillance was not authorized. As the D.C. Circuit
has recognized, courts dealing with secret
information relating to electronic surveillance arising
in civil litigation, including in Section 1810 suits,
must use Section 1806(f)’s procedures when
considering requests to discover or obtain such
information. ACLU Found. of So. Cal. v. Barr, 952
F.2d 457, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also H.R. Rep. No.
95-1720, at 32 (courts will use statute’s special review
procedures “in both criminal and civil cases”).
II. The FBI’s Surveillance Program: Operation
Flex
Plaintiff Sheikh Yassir Fazaga is a U.S. citizen who
has lived in the United States for more than 30 years.
J.A. 83. He has earned a national reputation for his
progressive teachings about Islam. J.A. 83–84. In
2007, the State Department sponsored him to travel
to Romania to speak at a conference. He has been
interviewed for print, television, and radio, including
by NBC’s Today Show and the New York Times. J.A.
84. He was the imam of the Orange County Islamic
Foundation at the time the events here occurred. J.A.
84.
Plaintiff Ali Malik is also a U.S. citizen, born and
raised in Orange County, California. J.A. 65. He
regularly attended services at the Islamic Center of
Irvine, California. J.A. 65. Malik started a young
8
Republicans club in high school, and in college
founded the Olive Tree Initiative, a peace-building
program in which students from diverse religious
backgrounds conduct fact-finding missions in Israel
and Palestine—for which he was recognized by the
University of California and the State Department.
J.A. 86.
Plaintiff Yasser AbdelRahim is an immigrant from
Egypt and long-time lawful permanent resident. He
attended business school in Arizona before
completing his degree in Southern California. J.A. 65.
At the time the events here occurred, he lived in a
house with other young immigrants. J.A. 90. In his
free time, he watched TV, talked politics with his
housemates, and played video games with them on
Xbox. J.A. 214. He also attended services at the
Islamic Center of Irvine. J.A. 65.
None of the Plaintiffs were ever charged with or
convicted of any crime. Nonetheless, the FBI spied on
them, along with hundreds of other law-abiding
Southern California residents, because of their faith.
Plaintiffs filed suit on February 22, 2011. Drawing
exclusively on publicly available sources, including
Defendants’ own public statements, detailed
declarations from the FBI’s informant, J.A. 165–219,
and documents obtained through the Freedom of
Information Act, their complaint paints a detailed
picture of the FBI’s 14-month-long investigation.
In the years after September 11, 2001, the FBI
investigated many Americans because of their
Muslim faith. J.A. 69–70. These investigations took
different forms, including detentions, interrogations,
broad efforts to “count” mosques and Muslims in each
jurisdiction, and surveillance of communities
throughout the country. J.A. 69–70. After 2003,
9
official FBI policy permitted agents to conduct
“assessments” of people without any factual basis for
believing they were engaged in criminal activity or
even presented a security threat. J.A. 72–75. And in
national security investigations, the FBI’s own policy
did not prohibit religious profiling. J.A. 74.
When this suit was filed, approximately 500,000
people practiced Islam in Southern California. J.A.
79. The FBI spied on thousands of them. Between
2001 and 2006, it gathered lists of mosques in the
area, collected names of local religious leaders,
amassed membership lists of religious organizations,
interrogated hundreds of people in the area, and
planted bugs and cameras in mosques.
In June 2006, Defendant Tidwell, the Los Angeles
FBI Assistant Director, told an audience at the
Islamic Center of Irvine that the FBI would not send
informants into mosques to monitor community
members. J.A. 81. This was false. In fact, he had
already approved a plan for an informant to infiltrate
mosques, and two of his agents, Defendants Allen
and Armstrong, had already started training Craig
Monteilh for the job. J.A. 81–82 & n.28.2
Less than a month after Tidwell’s public address,
Defendants sent Monteilh to introduce himself to
congregants at the very mosque where Tidwell had
spoken. J.A. 82. Monteilh told them he was ready to
convert to Islam. J.A. 82. After he participated in a
ceremonial declaration of faith, congregants talked
with him about the tenets of the religion, showed him
Defendants would later confirm that the FBI “utilized
Monteilh as a confidential human source,” and that it possesses
his notes and the audio and video recordings he made. J.A. 49–
50.
2
10
how to pray, and socialized with him. J.A. 83. Under
the direction of Defendants Allen and Armstrong,
Monteilh used that access to surveil and record
community members. J.A. 168–70. Defendant Rose
supervised and directed Allen and Armstrong’s
handling of Monteilh, while Defendant Walls worked
below Tidwell to manage Armstrong, Allen, and Rose.
J.A. 68–69, 109.
As Monteilh’s declarations explain, the explicit
purpose of Operation Flex was to gather information
on people who practice Islam in Orange County—not
terrorists, spies, or even ordinary criminals. See, e.g.,
J.A. 173–75. Defendants did not identify specific
targets, instead instructing Monteilh “to gather as
much information on as many people in the Muslim
community as possible.” J.A. 174. The FBI discarded
information Monteilh gathered on non-Muslims.
J.A. 182. Defendants told him to focus on people who
appeared more devout because they were “more
suspicious.” J.A. 184.
The Agents told Monteilh, “Islam is a threat to our
national security.” J.A. 194. They instructed him to:
Collect contact information on at least “ten
new Muslims per day,” J.A. 174;
Obtain the names and license plates of
individuals who attended dawn and late
evening prayers, because they were more
devout, J.A. 184;
Gather compromising information (whether
marital, business, or petty criminal issues)
they hoped to leverage to recruit other
informants, J.A. 180, 187, 191, 209; and
Report on all charitable giving, travel plans,
and fundraising activities, J.A. 178–79, 216, as
11
well as any lectures, classes, or any other
events held at mosques, J.A. 179–80, 182, 217.
Through Monteilh, Defendants gathered “hundreds
of phone numbers and thousands of email addresses;”
“hundreds of hours of video recordings that captured
the interiors of mosques, homes, businesses, and the
associations of hundreds of people;” and “thousands of
hours of audio recordings of conversations . . . as well
as recordings of public discussion groups, classes, and
lectures.” J.A. 194.
Monteilh repeatedly recorded conversations to
which he was not a party, including religious prayer
groups in the mosque sanctuary. He did so by leaving
behind a secret recording device hidden in his car key
fob. J.A. 178, 192–93, 211. With it he recorded private
religious conversations and study groups, including
ones in which Malik and AbdelRahim participated.
J.A. 192–93, 211, 217–18. Monteilh also videorecorded sensitive locations, including mosques,
homes, and businesses using a hidden camera. J.A.
192–93, 202–03, 205. His handlers told him they were
conducting electronic surveillance in at least eight
area mosques, including Fazaga’s office, and
indicated there was no warrant for that surveillance.
J.A. 177; see also J.A. 193.
By early 2007, Plaintiffs Malik, AbdelRahim, and
other community members became frightened when
Monteilh began expressing interest in violence, as
Agents Armstrong and Allen had instructed him to
do. J.A. 89, 91–92, 98, 112–13, 195–96. Monteilh also
encouraged his “friends” to visit websites the Agents
deemed “jihadist,” so the FBI could document these
site visits and use them as leverage to pressure more
congregants to become informants. J.A. 182–83. In
May 2007, Monteilh told several community members
12
that he had access to weapons and wanted to take
violent action. J.A. 112–13. Alarmed, those
individuals told a community leader, who reported
Monteilh to the FBI. J.A. 112–13. Members of one
mosque obtained a restraining order against him.
J.A. 112–13. By October 2007, the FBI ended its work
with Monteilh. J.A. 113, 198.
The FBI revealed Monteilh’s identity as an
informant during a public court hearing in a different
case, in February 2009. J.A. 49, 114–16, 198. Once
the news spread, national news media covered it
extensively.3
Operation Flex severely harmed the religious
practice of Plaintiffs and many other people in
Southern California. Malik stopped attending the
mosque for fear of seeing Monteilh and altered his
practice to appear less religious. J.A. 90, 127.
AbdelRahim also reduced his attendance at mosques
and decreased his charitable giving to religious
organizations for fear of additional surveillance.
J.A. 133–34. Fazaga stopped offering therapist
services to community members for fear their
conversations would not be confidential. J.A. 123. All
three were subjected to repeated interrogations,
searches, and delays when traveling internationally.
J.A. 123, 127, 130, 133.
Despite the scale of this dragnet surveillance
program, Operation Flex yielded only a single
criminal prosecution of any kind: an immigration
fraud case dismissed on the Government’s motion.
J.A. 49 n.3, 62, 114–15.
See, e.g., The Convert, THIS AMERICAN LIFE (Aug. 10, 2012),
available at https://www.thisamericanlife.org/471/the-convert.
3
13
III. Procedural History
A. District Court
Plaintiffs sued the United States, the FBI, and five
individual officers who oversaw Monteilh’s actions,
alleging two types of unlawful conduct: illegal
searches under the Fourth Amendment, 50 U.S.C.
1810 (FISA), and the Federal Tort Claims Act
(“search claims”); and unlawful targeting of religion
under the First and Fifth Amendments, 42 U.S.C.
1985(3), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and
the Privacy Act (“religion claims”). J.A. 137–145.
They sought damages, declaratory relief, and
expungement or disclosure of the records of unlawful
surveillance. J.A. 146.
Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ religion
claims under the state-secrets privilege. J.A. 157–64.
Defendants did not invoke state secrets as to the
search claims, explaining that “[t]he Government
does not seek dismissal of all claims at the outset
based on the privilege assertion, nor to bar disclosure
of all information concerning Operation Flex or
Monteilh’s activities.” J.A. 160. The Government
submitted a public declaration from then-Attorney
General Eric Holder, J.A. 26–40, and both public and
classified declarations from Mark Giuliano, the
Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism
Division. J.A. 41–60 (public declaration).
Attorney General Holder asserted privilege over:
(1) evidence identifying whether anyone “was or was
not the subject of an FBI counterterrorism
investigation,” (2) the “reasons for” and “results” of
any FBI counterterrorism investigation, and (3)
information “that could tend to reveal whether
particular sources and methods were used in a
14
counterterrorism investigation.” J.A. 28–29. He
stated that disclosure of such information “could
reasonably be expected to cause significant harm to
the national security.” J.A. 27.
The Giuliano Declaration stated that “[a]ddressing
plaintiffs’ allegations in this case will risk or require
the disclosure of certain sensitive information
concerning counterterrorism investigative activity in
Southern California.” J.A. 45. It also made clear that
all the secret information at issue is in the FBI’s
possession. See, e.g., J.A. 50 (“the FBI cannot publicly
disclose” identities, reasons, and sources).
In their motion to dismiss, the Government
emphasized its privilege assertion was “limited” in
two ways. J.A. 160. First, it did not assert privilege
over much of the information Monteilh collected, as
they had previously produced some of it in other
proceedings, and “expect[ed] that the majority of the
audio and video will be available in connection with
further proceedings” relating to Plaintiffs’ search
claims. J.A. 161–62.
Second, the Government sought to dismiss only the
religion claims based on the state-secrets privilege,
not the search claims. J.A. 161–62. As to the search
claims, the Government stated “At least at this stage
of the proceedings, sufficient non-privileged evidence
may be available to litigate these claims should they
otherwise survive motions to dismiss on non-privilege
grounds.” J.A. 162.
The Government’s motion seeking dismissal of
Plaintiffs’ religion claims asserted that “full and
effective litigation of” them “would risk or require the
disclosure of privileged information.” Mot. to Dismiss
(“MTD”) at 47, Fazaga, No. 8:11-cv-0031-CJC, ECF
No. 55 (citing Mohamed v. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d 1070,
15
1083 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)). It claimed “even if
plaintiffs could make a prima facie case with
nonprivileged evidence,” the evidence Defendants
required “to mount a full and effective defense . . .
would create an unjustifiable risk of revealing state
secrets.” Id. at 49 (cleaned up); see also id. at 5 (“any
rebuttal of” Plaintiffs’ religion claims would risk
disclosure of secret information). Alternatively, the
Government argued the court should order Plaintiffs
to proffer “precisely what discovery [they] intend[] to
seek against the Government.” Id. at 52.
In response, Plaintiffs disclaimed any need for
secret evidence to establish their religion claims.
Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, at 21–22, Fazaga, No. 8:11cv-0031-CJC, ECF No. 64 (hereinafter “Opp’n to
MTD”). They publicly filed four declarations from
Monteilh describing in detail the Government’s
surveillance program and how it involved Plaintiffs.
J.A. 165–219. He stated “my handlers did not give me
any specific targets, but instead told me to gather as
much information on as many people in the Muslim
community as possible,” J.A. 173, and that “when my
handlers asked me to identify individuals from
photographs, . . . when I indicated . . . that the
individual was not a Muslim, the picture was
discarded.” J.A. 182 (cleaned up). Plaintiffs also
argued dismissal would be premature, and that the
privilege was inapplicable. Opp’n to MTD at 31–40.
The district court granted the Government’s motion
to dismiss the religion claims on state-secrets
grounds, and went further, dismissing search claims
the Government had not moved to dismiss. It
dismissed all claims except for Plaintiffs’ FISA claim
under Section 1810. Pet. App. 166a.
16
Based on the Government’s classified declaration
and classified supplemental memorandum, the
district court concluded that “the Government will
inevitably need the privileged information to defend”
against Plaintiffs’ claims. Pet. App. 164–66a. In the
court’s view, this warranted dismissal for two reasons
under Ninth Circuit precedent. First, “privileged
information
provides
essential
evidence
for
Defendants’ full and effective defense against
Plaintiffs’ claims.” Pet. App. 173a–74a (emphasis in
original). Second, the court found “privileged and
nonprivileged
information
are
inextricably
intertwined,” Pet. App. 175a, and therefore “cannot
be separated as a practical matter.” Pet. App. 176a.
B. Court of Appeals
The court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded. As to state secrets, the court
first ruled the district court erred in dismissing the
claims Defendants had not sought to dismiss on
privilege grounds. Pet. App. 42a–44a. Defendants
have not challenged that ruling; the search claims
remain to be litigated below.
The court of appeals also reversed the district
court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ religion claims, holding
FISA’s special review procedures displaced the
“dismissal remedy” that accompanies the statesecrets privilege under circuit precedent, at least at
this preliminary stage. Pet. App. 46a–67a.4 Instead,
FISA requires the court to undertake ex parte, in
camera review to determine whether the surveillance
The Ninth Circuit had previously held dismissal was
permissible in state-secrets privilege cases. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d
1070. Plaintiffs contend Jeppesen is wrong. See Section I, infra.
4
17
was lawfully authorized and conducted. Pet. App.
40a, 48a. FISA “speaks directly to the question
otherwise answered by federal common law”
concerning how a court should proceed in electronic
surveillance cases where the Attorney General
declares information too sensitive to disclose on
national security grounds. The court emphasized that
Plaintiffs would not be permitted to examine the
secret evidence; but that FISA required the court to
conduct ex parte, in camera review. Pet. App. 38a–
39a.
The court held that, under 50 U.S.C. 1806, FISA’s
review procedures were triggered here for two
independent reasons: (1) the Government sought to
enter into evidence or otherwise use the information
“obtained or derived from electronic surveillance” in
its defense; and (2) Plaintiffs’ Prayer for Relief
seeking expungement or return of unlawfully
obtained surveillance records “requested . . . to
‘obtain’ information gathered during or derived from
electronic surveillance.” Pet. App. 57a–58a.
The court found that “all of Plaintiffs’ legal causes
of action relate to electronic surveillance, at least for
the most part, and in nearly all instances entirely,
and thus require a determination as to the lawfulness
of the surveillance.” Pet. App. 93a (emphasis
omitted). Moreover, “1806(f) provides that the district
court may consider ‘other materials relating to the
surveillance’” as necessary to determine if it “was
lawfully authorized and conducted.” Pet. App. 94a.
And, “it is far from clear” that even the claims that
might require consideration of evidence not derived
from electronic surveillance would, “as actually
litigated . . . involve more than the electronic
surveillance that is otherwise the focus of the
lawsuit.” Pet. App. 94a. The court therefore held the
18
district court may be able to assess the lawfulness of
all the conduct Plaintiffs challenge using Section
1806(f)’s ex parte, in camera procedures.
The court therefore held that FISA displaced the
“dismissal remedy” available under circuit precedent.
It emphasized that Defendants could reassert the
privilege either if Plaintiffs seek to apply FISA’s
procedures to secret information not relating to
electronic surveillance, or if electronic surveillance
“drop[s] out of consideration” from the case. Pet. App.
95a–96a.5
The court denied Defendants’ requests for
rehearing en banc over a dissent. Pet. App. 3a. In
doing so, two members of the panel reiterated that
their decision does not require disclosure to Plaintiffs
of any secret evidence. They noted that “in the
unprecedented event that a district court does order
disclosure,” the government could reassert the
privilege “as a backstop.” Pet. App. 100a n.1 (Gould
and Berzon, JJ., concurring in denial of rehearing en
banc) (emphasis in original).
C. Proceedings on Remand
On remand, the district court ordered the parties to
address how proceedings should go forward. Resp’t
Supp. App. 1a. Plaintiffs stated their intent to seek
discovery on their search claims, including the
informant’s audio recordings of conversations to
which he was not a party, and video recordings inside
mosques and homes. Resp’t Supp. App. at 6a–8a.
5 In the event that occurred, the court of appeals instructed the
district court to apply the D.C. Circuit’s definition of “valid
defense.” Pet. App. 96a–97a. Defendants do not challenge that
aspect of the decision below.
19
Plaintiffs also stated they would move for summary
judgment on their religion claims based entirely on
publicly available information. Resp’t Supp. App. at
9a–10a, 14a–15a. The district court stayed all
proceedings.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs have asserted—and documented with
declarations from Defendants’ own informant—that
FBI agents violated their religious freedom rights by
spying on them because of their religion. In response,
Defendants rely on the state-secrets privilege to
argue for dismissal of those claims without any
adjudication of whether the Defendants’ surveillance
was unlawful. Both this Court’s state-secrets
jurisprudence and the law governing domestic
electronic surveillance prohibit that result.
1. The district court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’
religion claims under the state-secrets privilege. Like
all other privileges, the common-law state-secrets
privilege authorizes the exclusion of evidence. It
deprives all parties of the evidence withheld. As with
any privilege, its application may lead to dismissal
where the plaintiffs cannot prove their claims
without the excluded evidence, but plaintiffs must be
given the opportunity to make their case, as they
were in Reynolds itself.
The privilege does not support dismissal here.
Defendants have not sought to exclude evidence from
this case. They do not need to; only Defendants
possess the secret information at issue, and Plaintiffs
have disclaimed any intent to use it for their religious
freedom claims. Defendants instead assert that
Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed because
Defendants need to use secret information in their
20
own defense. But while the state-secrets privilege,
when properly asserted, can justify keeping
privileged information out of a case, it does not
authorize a party to win dismissal because it wants
both to keep the information secret and to use it in in
its own defense. Like other privileges, state secrets
authorizes only the exclusion of evidence, not the use
of secret evidence to dismiss claims.
Defendants’ attempt to win dismissal erroneously
conflates the evidentiary privilege recognized in
Reynolds with the distinct state-secrets justiciability
bar recognized in Totten. That bar supports
dismissal, but only for government-contracting
lawsuits where the “very subject matter” of the suit is
secret. Defendants have acknowledged that “the very
subject matter” of this case is not a secret.
Moreover, Totten’s bar derives from federal courts’
authority to fashion contractual remedies in cases
where the parties assume the risk that there may be
no judicial recourse to enforce a secret government
contract. Plaintiffs never contracted with the
Government, and never assumed the risk they would
forfeit their First Amendment rights simply by
practicing their faith. No doctrine of this Court
permits the Government to extinguish Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights under these circumstances.
Accordingly, the district court had no authority to
dismiss Plaintiffs’ religion claims at the pleading
stage. Under the common-law rule, “the privileged
information is excluded and the trial goes on without
it,” General Dynamics, 563 U.S. at 485. Plaintiffs are
entitled to the opportunity “to adduce the essential
facts . . . without resort to material touching upon”
state secrets. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11. The decision
below should be affirmed on this ground alone.
21
2. Even if the state-secrets privilege would
otherwise support dismissal here, Congress has
displaced that remedy in cases involving electronic
surveillance. FISA’s comprehensive provisions govern
all aspects of domestic electronic surveillance of U.S.
persons conducted for national security purposes.
Section 1806 requires courts to conduct ex parte, in
camera review to determine whether government
officials complied with the law in two situations
applicable here: (1) where the Government seeks to
use information obtained or derived from electronic
surveillance, see 1806(c); and (2) where U.S. persons
sue the Government plausibly alleging that they were
unlawfully surveilled, and request information
related to that surveillance, see 1806(f). In both
situations, if the Attorney General files a declaration
attesting that disclosure of the information would
threaten national security, Section 1806(f) requires
the court to review the information ex parte and in
camera to determine whether the underlying
surveillance was lawful.
Section 1806(c) applies here because the
Government says it has secret information it would
like to “use” in its defense, and has sought dismissal
of the religion claims on that basis. In support, it filed
a declaration from the Attorney General stating
disclosure of the information could threaten national
security, and also a classified declaration. Under
those circumstances, FISA requires a court to review
the information ex parte and in camera to determine
whether the underlying surveillance was lawful. It
does not permit the Government to win dismissal
without a judge determining whether it broke the
law. Allowing such dismissals would permit the
Government to escape civil liability even if it engages
22
in precisely the conduct that Congress enacted FISA
to prevent. FISA forecloses that result.
Section 1806(f) independently triggers application
of FISA’s review procedures because Plaintiffs are
“aggrieved persons”—i.e., U.S. persons whom the
Government surveilled—who have requested to
“obtain” the information the Government illegally
gathered about them. Section 1806(f) requires that,
where an American seeks to “obtain” such
information, the court must employ the same ex
parte, in camera procedure. Plaintiffs’ Prayer for
Relief, which seeks destruction or return of the
records Defendants illegally obtained, constitutes a
“request” to “obtain” “information obtained or derived
from electronic surveillance” under Section 1806(f).
Defendants propose a non-textual limitation on
Section 1806, contending that courts can use its ex
parte, in camera procedures only for “procedural
motions,” such as motions to suppress, and not to
adjudicate “the merits.” But the text contains no such
distinction, and all textual signals refute it. Courts
“shall” use Section 1806’s procedures “whenever”
their conditions are met, “notwithstanding any other
law,” in response to “any motion or request” under
“any other statute or rule,” irrespective of whether
the motion could be described as “procedural”—a
word that never appears in the statute.
Defendants’ limitation also cannot be reconciled
with Congress’s decision to create a damages remedy
for individuals subject to unlawful electronic
surveillance in Section 1810. Defendants concede they
could invoke Section 1806(f)’s procedures to defend
themselves with secret information in such a lawsuit,
but inexplicably maintain that the same is not true
for a plaintiff bringing such a suit. That is not what
23
Congress wrote. Defendants’ argument would leave
the government free to win dismissal of virtually any
Section 1810 suit simply by asserting that the
underlying conduct was secret—whether or not it was
lawful—thus nullifying the civil damages remedy
Congress created to ensure surveillance remains
constrained by law.
3. Where FISA applies, it speaks more than clearly
enough to displace the dismissal remedy of the statesecrets privilege. FISA speaks directly to the precise
concerns addressed by the privilege. The fact that it
does not explicitly use the words “state secrets” is
hardly surprising; prior to 1978, this Court and
others often referred to “national security” rather
than “state secrets” to describe the Reynolds
privilege. Accordingly, Section 1806(f) applies where
the Attorney General attests that disclosure would
harm “national security.” And it requires in camera
review rather than dismissal, “notwithstanding any
other law.”
Defendants argue applying the statute as the court
of appeals directed would give rise to constitutional
problems related to the executive’s constitutional
authority to control national security information,
but Congress clearly has authority to regulate
surveillance affecting Americans, and to establish
evidentiary rules governing civil litigation regarding
that surveillance. United States v. U.S. District Court
(Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 323–24 (1972).
Nor does FISA give rise to serious constitutional
problems for the Agent Defendants. Judges routinely
resolve many dispositive issues in national security
cases using ex parte, in camera review. And the
statute expressly accommodates any constitutional
concerns by specifying that any remedies must be “in
24
accordance with the requirements of law.” 1806(g). If
a particular remedy would be unconstitutional, the
statute itself bars it.
Finally, Defendants’ interpretation gives rise to
serious constitutional problems. They read the
statute to permit the Government to both assert that
information is secret and use it to dismiss a suit
alleging serious constitutional violations, without any
judicial determination of whether the Government
broke the law. Congress enacted FISA to constrain
precisely such assertions of unchecked Executive
power.
ARGUMENT
I.
The State-Secrets Privilege
Permit Dismissal Here
Does
Not
The court of appeals’ decision can be affirmed
without addressing the FISA issues because the
state-secrets privilege the Government asserted
authorizes only exclusion of privileged evidence, not
dismissal on the pleadings based on defendants’ need
for evidence. This Court’s cases establish two “quite
different” state-secrets doctrines. General Dynamics,
563 U.S. at 485. Defendants conflate these doctrines
throughout their brief. Neither provides the dismissal
remedy Defendants advocate here.
A. This Court’s State-Secrets Cases Do Not
Permit Dismissal Here
Reynolds recognized a common-law privilege “in
the law of evidence.” 345 U.S. at 6–7. Where it
applies, it operates like other evidentiary privileges:
“[t]he privileged information is excluded and the trial
goes on without it. . . . [T]he Court [does] not order
25
judgment in favor of the Government.” General
Dynamics, 563 U.S. at 485.
Under Reynolds, if the district court excludes secret
information, it must give Plaintiffs the opportunity to
make their case without it. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
The common law has always required that approach;
plaintiffs occasionally succeeded on the merits
despite losing on privilege. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Gore,
[1816] Holt N.P.C. 299, 305 (plaintiff won even after
privileged material was excluded); Cooke v. Maxwell,
[1817] 2 Stark. 183, 185–86 (same); see Donohue
Amicus at 8–12.
The other state-secrets doctrine, reflected in Totten,
also does not support dismissal here. It establishes a
distinct justiciability bar for government-contracting
lawsuits “where the very subject matter of the
action . . . [i]s a matter of state secret.” Tenet, 544
U.S. at 9. As this Court’s most recent Totten decision
explained, individuals entering into such contracts
“assume[] the risk that state secrets would prevent
the adjudication of” any disputes arising from their
contracts, given their highly secret nature. General
Dynamics, 563 U.S. at 491; see also Tenet, 544 U.S. at
8 (claim barred because “success depend[ed] upon the
existence of [plaintiff’s] secret espionage relationship
with the Government”) (citing Totten).6
Where it applies, the Totten bar supports dismissal
on the pleadings, but it does not apply here.
Defendants never argued this is a nonjusticiable spycontracting case, or that its very subject matter is
secret. On the contrary, Defendants said, “The
Government does not seek dismissal of all claims at
6 Not every case involving a contract to spy necessarily requires
dismissal. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
26
the outset based on the privilege assertion, nor to bar
disclosure of all information concerning Operation
Flex or Monteilh’s activities.” J.A. 160.
Even if Defendants had not disclaimed such
arguments, they would be meritless. The “very
subject matter” of this case is not a state secret.
Defendants have acknowledged their informant
worked for the FBI, J.A. 49–50, and represented that
they could likely make large portions of the
informant’s recordings and notes available without
threatening national security. J.A. 49. The
complaint’s allegations rest on what Plaintiffs and
others saw the informant do, as well as other
information made publicly available more than a
decade ago, including the informant’s own detailed
declarations. J.A. 165–219.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs never entered into secret
contracts with the government, and never “assumed
the risk” they would lose the right to vindicate their
Free Exercise rights just by practicing their faith.
Nor is there any risk of “graymail” presented, because
Plaintiffs have no access to any state secrets to use as
leverage. Tenet, 544 U.S. at 11. Denying them a
forum in which to present their constitutional claims
under these circumstances, absent any such implicit
waiver, poses serious constitutional problems. Cf.
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (noting “the
‘serious constitutional question’ that would arise if a
federal statute were construed to deny any judicial
forum for a colorable constitutional claim”).
For these reasons, Defendants’ assertion that they
possess information relevant to this case would at
most support exclusion of that evidence, not
dismissal—and certainly not dismissal on the
pleadings. Plaintiffs must have the opportunity to
27
make their case without the secret information.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
The district court order contravenes this Court’s
state-secrets doctrine. It ordered dismissal based
specifically on Defendants’ need for the privileged
information “to defend” themselves, and the risk that
their doing so could lead to inadvertent disclosure.
Pet. App. 166a, 172a–76a; J.A. 163. Moreover,
because the district court dismissed at the pleading
stage, it never allowed Plaintiffs to make their case
using nonprivileged evidence, as Reynolds requires,
despite Plaintiffs’ repeated assertions they could do
so. Opp’n to MTD at 21–22; Resp’t Supp. App. 14a–
15a. Thus, contrary to Defendants’ claim, the district
court’s dismissal was not the “result” of excluding
evidence. Br. 26.
Defendants argue the district court found dismissal
warranted because litigating the religion claims
would present an unacceptable risk of disclosing
secret
information
“even
without
privileged
evidence,” Br. 46, but the district court made no such
finding. It found that “the Government will inevitably
need the privileged information to defend against
Plaintiffs’ [religion claims].” Pet. App. 166a. While
the district court noted that secret and non-secret
information were “inextricably intertwined,” Pet.
App. 158a, 175a, it was referring to the Government’s
evidence; its rationale was that “any rebuttal against”
Plaintiffs’ allegations would create the risk of
disclosure. Pet. App. 158a (emphasis added); 172a–
74a (same).
In any event, this Court’s cases do not support
dismissal based on an “unacceptable risk” that
litigation will disclose secret information even where
Plaintiffs intend neither to seek nor submit it.
28
Rather, the privilege permits the court to eliminate
any such risk by simply excluding all the privileged
evidence
and
any
non-privileged
evidence
“intertwined” with it. Here, that process would be
straightforward, as neither Plaintiffs nor the
informant possesses any state secrets, let alone the
particular secret information over which the
Government asserts privilege. Only the FBI holds the
secrets here; there is no risk that Plaintiffs will
disclose them. J.A. 50 (“the FBI cannot publicly
disclose” identities, reasons, and sources); J.A. 52
(“The FBI seeks to protect . . . information that would
confirm or deny” those facts); J.A. 59 (same as to
sources and methods).
B. The Pre-Reynolds Common Law Does
Not Permit Dismissal Here
Comprehensive review of the common-law statesecrets authorities, including every authority cited in
Reynolds, confirms they would not permit dismissal
here. 345 U.S. at 7 n.11, 15. With the exception of
Totten—which rests on a distinct doctrine, as both
Tenet and General Dynamics explained—in every
state-secrets case Reynolds cites, and every case on
which those cases rely, if the privilege is sustained
the evidence is excluded and the case proceeds
without it. Dismissals occur only when the plaintiffs
cannot make their case without the excluded
evidence; never because the defendant needs to use
the evidence or because there is an “unacceptable
risk” of inadvertent disclosure.
The American cases Reynolds cites confirm this.
See Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co.,
199 F. 353, 356 (E.D. Pa. 1912) (court ordered
“expunging the exhibits in question from the record,”
29
not dismissal); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F.
Supp. 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) (motion to compel
denied, no dismissal); Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.
R. D. 203, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (court conducted ex
parte, in camera review in response to privilege
assertion, granted motion to compel); Bank Line Ltd.
v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 587, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1946)
(court reaffirmed prior order granting motion to
compel production of Navy record); In re Grove, 180
F. 62, 70 (3d Cir. 1910) (reversing contempt order
where witness had refused to produce documents
deemed secret by the Navy, without regard to
underlying litigation).
The secondary sources cited in Reynolds also
confirm Plaintiffs’ understanding. William Sanford
described the privilege as applicable where “[a] public
interest demands that such matters be beyond the
reach of court processes for production or disclosure,”
without mentioning a remedy permitting defendants
to seek dismissal based on their need to use their own
privileged information. William Sanford, Evidentiary
Privileges Against the Production of Data Within the
Control of Executive Departments, 3 Vanderbilt L.
Rev. 73, 75 (1949) (emphasis added). And no example
cited in Sanford, Wigmore, or Greenleaf involves
dismissal even where the plaintiff could make their
case without privileged evidence. See, e.g., H.M.S.
Bellerophon, [1875] 44 LJR 5–9 (cited in Wigmore)
(excluding evidence and then resolving the merits for
defendants); Rex v. Watson, [1817] 2 Stark. 116, 148,
159 (excluding evidence defendant sought; defendant
ultimately acquitted); Worthington v. Scribner, 109
Mass. 487 (1872) (cited in Greenleaf) (extensively
reviewing English and American privilege cases
without ever mentioning dismissal, and concluding
30
that reports of potential criminal activity could not be
sought by interrogatory).
The British cases Reynolds referenced (in footnote
15) are in accord. Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co.,
[1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.), upholds a privilege claim
against a subpoena for documents in a private party
suit, without dismissal. Duncan cites many other
cases, none of which support dismissal on
Defendants’ theory. See, e.g., Wyatt, supra.
C. The Few Lower Court Cases Permitting
Dismissal Where Defendants Seek to Use
Privileged Evidence to Defend Themselves Precede General Dynamics, and
Are Wrong or Inapplicable
Defendants rely on a few lower court decisions that
conflated Reynolds and Totten prior to General
Dynamics. Br. 26 (citing, inter alia, El-Masri v.
United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); Jeppesen,
614 F.3d 1070). But as General Dynamics makes
clear, those cases were wrongly decided. El-Masri and
Jeppesen held the Government could win dismissal at
the pleading stage in cases not involving government
contracts where either the defendants needed secret
evidence to defend themselves, or where secret and
non-secret evidence were so “inseparable” as to create
an “unacceptable risk” that state secrets would be
revealed through discovery. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at
1083 (citing El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 308). While those
rationales might have made sense as further
exercises of courts’ “common-law authority to fashion
contractual remedies in Government-contracting
disputes,” General Dynamics, 563 U.S. at 485, they
have no basis in Reynolds or any other privilege law,
31
and therefore no application outside the contracting
context.7
Although the D.C. Circuit has also dismissed cases
following an invocation of the state-secrets privilege
where the Government asserts a need for secret
information to defend itself, it has required
defendants to show they have a “meritorious”
defense, not merely a “possible” or “plausible” one. In
re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 149–50 (D.C. Cir.
2007)). As a result, such dismissals do not occur at
the pleading stage, but only after the court
undertakes ex parte, in camera review to resolve
whether the defendant acted lawfully in light of
plaintiff’s claims. For example, Molerio v. FBI
reviewed secret materials to determine, after “in
camera consideration of the state-secrets privilege,”
that plaintiff’s First Amendment and Privacy Act
claims were “properly dismissed” on the merits. 749
F.2d 815, 822, 825–26 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.).
The court held it would be a “mockery of justice for
the court—knowing the erroneousness” of plaintiff’s
claims, to nonetheless rule for plaintiff. Id. at 825.8
Defendants cite two other circuit cases, but they offer little
support for Defendants’ approach. Black v. United States upheld
a state-secrets dismissal with minimal explanation. It appears
the court may have found sufficient the district court’s
conclusion that, without the privileged evidence, the plaintiff
could not make a prima facie case. 62 F.3d 1115, 1118–19 (8th
Cir. 1995). This is standard privilege procedure. Tenenbaum v.
Simonini conclusorily states that the court “reviewed the
materials Defendants produced under seal” and determined that
their exclusion “deprived Defendants of a valid defense.” It
therefore appears to have determined that plaintiffs’ claim
failed on the merits. 372 F.3d 776, 777 (6th Cir. 2004).
8 These cases do not explain why their rationale would not apply
to other privileges, where the traditional rule requires exclusion
7
32
This Court need not decide if the common law
permits the D.C. Circuit’s innovation, because
Defendants have not asserted the secret information
would exonerate them—i.e., prove that religion
played no motivating part in their decision to surveil
Plaintiffs, or that their use of a religious classification
was sufficiently tailored to satisfy strict scrutiny. The
court of appeals instructed the district court to permit
the Government to do so on remand, should it reassert the state-secrets privilege. Pet. App. 96a–97a.
Finally, even were this Court to take the
unprecedented step of ratifying El-Masri and
Jeppesen’s transmogrified “privilege” doctrine, the
district court acted prematurely in applying it here.
Given Defendants’ acknowledgment that “the
majority” of Monteilh’s audio and video recordings
likely need not remain secret, J.A. 162, the court
should have permitted the case to proceed. Indeed,
the Government suggested this as an alternative
remedy in its own dismissal motion. J.A. 163–64
(arguing that the court should dismiss the Agent
Defendants while allowing Plaintiffs to propose
discovery against the Government).
A district court cannot apply Reynolds without
knowing what secret information could be disclosed.
The Government’s speculative assertion that certain
kinds of information may eventually be relevant to its
defense is no substitute for the court’s consideration
irrespective of which side benefits. As Judge Learned Hand
explained, the “grievous hardship” that sometimes follows the
exclusion of evidence is “a consequence of any evidentiary
privilege.” United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir.
1950). It may be relevant that both Sealed Case and Molerio
involve individuals who either worked for or sought to work for
the government in positions involving sensitive information.
33
of the actual information the Government would seek
to use—whether through a specific description of it or
review of the actual evidence. The Attorney General’s
declaration confirms dismissal was premature, as it
does not state that he personally examined the
allegedly secret information the Government would
have to use, as opposed to just “the matter.” See J.A.
27. Compare Duncan, A.C. at 625 (head of
department “should have seen and considered the
contents of the documents”) (emphasis added).
The state-secrets privilege is concerned with
preventing the disclosure of secret information. Here,
because Plaintiffs disclaimed any intention to seek
secret information, the Government has complete
control over any risk of disclosure. Neither law nor
logic permit it to win dismissal at the pleading stage
based on the risk that its own actions could disclose
state secrets.9
II. If the State-Secrets Privilege Otherwise
Authorizes Dismissal, FISA Displaces It,
and Requires Ex Parte, In Camera Review
Rather Than Dismissal
Even if the state-secrets privilege would otherwise
provide for dismissal here, the decision below
correctly concluded that FISA has displaced that
remedy through its comprehensive, exclusive
framework for litigation concerning domestic
electronic surveillance undertaken for national
security purposes.
Plaintiffs preserved this ground for affirmance. See Opp’n.
Cert at 3. It is also encompassed within the question presented,
which does not define the “state-secrets privilege.”
9
34
Congress might have simply deprived all parties of
the use of secret information in surveillance cases—
as under common law—or it might have allowed
courts to dismiss suits where the Government
claimed it needed secret information to defend itself,
as Defendants seek here. However, having uncovered
widespread “abuses of domestic national security
surveillance[]”
that
“demonstrate[d]
the
inappropriateness of relying solely on executive
branch discretion to safeguard civil liberties,” H.R.
Rep. No. 95-1283, at 21, Congress rejected those
options in favor of a middle path that would protect
national security while giving courts ultimate
responsibility to ensure surveillance remained
constrained by law.
That path included a civil damages remedy. See 50
U.S.C. 1810. Congress recognized the statute’s rules
for litigation included “[r]equirements to disclose
certain information . . . [that] might force the
Government to dismiss the case (or concede the case,
if it were a civil suit against it) to avoid disclosure,”
but nonetheless enacted those procedures to ensure
that challenges to surveillance conducted in violation
of FISA could go forward. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, at
94.
FISA requires district courts to use its ex parte, in
camera review procedures whenever (1) the
Government claims it needs to enter into evidence or
otherwise use information that the Attorney General
asserts must remain secret to protect national
security, or (2) a civil litigant seeks to obtain such
secret information as part of a suit plausibly alleging
unlawful surveillance. Because both conditions apply
here, the district court should have conducted ex
parte review, rather than granting dismissal.
35
A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Triggers
FISA’s Special Review Procedures Under
Sections 1806(c) and (f)
Defendants’ motion to dismiss triggers FISA’s ex
parte, in camera review procedures because
Defendants seek to “enter into evidence or otherwise
use” secret information obtained through electronic
surveillance to dismiss Plaintiffs’ religion claims. 50
U.S.C. 1806(c).
The statute’s terms are clear and mandatory.
Section 1806(c) requires the Government to notify the
court and the aggrieved person “whenever” it intends
to “enter into evidence or otherwise use” information
obtained or derived from electronic surveillance.
Section 1806(f) requires that “whenever a court . . . is
notified,” and “the Attorney General [has] file[d] an
affidavit . . . that disclosure or an adversary hearing
would harm the national security of the United
States,” the “district court . . . shall, notwithstanding
any other law . . . review in camera and ex parte the
application, order, and such other materials relating
to the surveillance as may be necessary to determine
whether the surveillance of the aggrieved person was
lawfully authorized and conducted.”
Here, Defendants stated they would need to “enter
into evidence or otherwise use” such information. Pet.
App. 56a–58a; see also MTD at 49. And the Holder
Declaration states that “disclosure of [the secret]
information . . . could reasonably be expected to cause
significant harm to the national security,” J.A. 27.
Therefore, Section 1806(f) requires that the court
review the information ex parte and in camera to
determine “whether the surveillance . . . was lawfully
authorized and conducted.”
36
Defendants’ motion seeking dismissal based on
their need to rely on secret information—including
the submission of a classified declaration to support
that request—notified the court of their intent to use
and was itself a use of that information. “Use” means
“to put into action or service.” Use, Webster’s New
Collegiate Dictionary 1288 (1977) (hereinafter
“Webster’s”). By relying on secret information to
support their motion to dismiss, Defendants “put[] [it]
into service” to win dismissal.
That Section 1806(c) adds the word “otherwise”
before “use” underscores that Congress meant “use”
capaciously. “Otherwise” is a catch-all, enlarging the
actions to which “use” refers. Otherwise, Webster’s
813 (defining “otherwise” as including “a different
way or manner,” “in different circumstances,” and “in
other respects”).
The statute’s separation of “otherwise use” from
both “enter into evidence” and “disclose” also
supports a broad understanding of “use.” “If a
provision is susceptible of (1) a meaning that gives it
an effect already achieved by another provision, or
that deprives another provision of all independent
effect, and (2) another meaning that leaves both
provisions with some independent operation, the
latter should be preferred.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan
A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts (hereinafter “Reading Law”) 176 (2012). FISA
expressly contemplates that the Government may
“use” secret information even without “enter[ing] it
into evidence” or “disclos[ing]” that information. That
is precisely what Defendants have done here: they
are “using” the information to secure dismissal by
relying on it as the factual predicate for their motion.
Defendants’ contrary interpretation of the statute
fails to give “use” distinct meaning. Br. 36 (conflating
37
“use” of evidence with “introducing” it); Br. 37
(conflating “use” with “disclose”).
By the same token, Defendants’ motion expresses
intent to “enter [the secret information] into
evidence,” as their motion to dismiss is predicated on
their own need to rely on secret information to defend
themselves. J.A. 163 (“any rebuttal of [Plaintiffs’
religion] claim would risk or require disclosure of
[secret information]”); J.A. 163–64 (arguing Agent
Defendants could not litigate Bivens and qualified
immunity defenses absent privileged information).
FISA speaks directly to that scenario by requiring the
court to conduct ex parte, in camera review to
determine whether the surveillance from which the
secret information derives was lawful, rather than
simply dismissing in order to keep the information
secret.
Defendants assert they merely seek to prevent
introduction or disclosure of the information. Br. 18,
25. But because only Defendants possess the
information, they do not need to assert privilege to
keep it secret. They can simply choose not to rely on
it. Their reliance on the information to seek
dismissal, even where Plaintiffs have stated their
own case rests wholly on public information,
constitutes more than mere exclusion.
Where, as here, the Government triggers FISA’s
procedures, they are mandatory, and displace all
options otherwise available to the court. Section
1806(f) applies “notwithstanding any other law.” The
common law is “other law.” See, e.g., Rubin v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816, 824 (2018)
(“notwithstanding any other provision of law”
abrogates
common-law
sovereign
immunity);
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478
38
U.S. 833, 846–47 (1986) (“notwithstanding” clause
encompasses common-law debt claims); United States
v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 390–91
(1980) (“notwithstanding” clause abrogates commonlaw res judicata).
In addition, Section 1806(f) commands that courts
“shall” use its procedures. “Shall” means “must”— it
imposes an “unequivocal mandate,” Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 834, 835 (2018), and
precludes “further refinement” through common-law
adjudication. General Dynamics, 563 U.S. at 491. And
both Sections 1806(c) and (f) apply “whenever”—i.e.,
“at any or every time that”—their conditions are met.
Whenever, Webster’s 1333.
Thus, because Defendants’ motion to dismiss rests
on their own asserted need to “enter into evidence or
otherwise use” secret information, FISA requires that
the district court “shall” conduct ex parte, in camera
review.10
10 Nothing in the decision below requires the Government to
produce information on which it chooses not to rely. Pet. App.
57a (FISA procedures triggered because “the Government would
like to use this information to defend itself”). Defendants’
assertion that they would be forced to disclose secret
information if Plaintiffs prevail also misreads the decision
below. Br. 47. Plaintiffs have requested destruction or return of
the illegally obtained records. Compelled disclosure would only
occur if Defendants declined to destroy the evidence, and even
then Defendants would have a further opportunity to object to
public disclosure on state-secrets grounds. Pet. App. 100a n.1.
39
B. Plaintiffs’
Prayer
for
Relief
Independently Triggers FISA’s Special
Review Procedures Under Section
1806(f)
The court of appeals also correctly held that
Section 1806(f)’s catch-all provision independently
requires ex parte, in camera review here because
Plaintiffs requested return of the illegally obtained
surveillance in their Prayer for Relief.
Section 1806(f) requires that courts employ its ex
parte, in camera review procedures not just when the
Government provides notice of intent to use secret
information under 1806(c), or a litigant files a motion
to suppress such information under 1806(e), but also
“whenever . . . any motion or request is made by an
aggrieved
person
...
to
obtain
...
information . . . derived from electronic surveillance,”
and the Attorney General responds with a
declaration seeking to shield it. Plaintiffs’ Prayer for
Relief seeking “destr[uction] or return [of] any
information
gathered
through
the
unlawful
surveillance program” constitutes a “request”
triggering Section 1806(f)’s procedures. Pet. App. 58a.
Plaintiffs’ Prayer is, literally, a “request” that seeks
to “obtain” information “obtained or derived from”
electronic surveillance. Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “prayer for relief” as “[a] request addressed to
the court . . . esp. . . . for specific relief.” Prayer for
Relief, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968).
Defendants do not dispute that if Plaintiffs were to
prevail on their claim that the surveillance was
40
unlawful, their Prayer would entitle them to seek
destruction or return of the evidence.11
Thus, Plaintiffs’ Prayer independently requires
ex parte, in camera review to determine whether the
surveillance at issue was lawful.
C. Defendants’ Objections Are Meritless
In the face of Section 1806’s clear and mandatory
textual directive, Defendants argue that its
procedures do not apply, and that they should
therefore win outright dismissal under the statesecrets privilege. But their argument ignores the
broad meaning of “use” and relies on non-textual
limitations they would superimpose on the statute’s
plain language. Their position also cannot be
reconciled with other provisions of the statute, in
particular Section 1810. Having established a
comprehensive system for judicial oversight of
domestic electronic surveillance undertaken for
national security purposes, Congress did not then
allow the government to evade that system simply by
invoking state secrets.
1. Defendants’ Interpretation of “Use”
Contravenes Its Ordinary Meaning
Defendants object that they do not seek to “use” the
secret information to win dismissal, but their
arguments fail. They first contend their invocation of
the state-secrets privilege does not “use” secret
information by analogizing to the assertion of other
privileges, such as the attorney-client or marital11 Defendants have not challenged the court of appeals’ holding
that expungement remains available “to vindicate constitutional
rights.” Pet. App. 67a.
41
communications privilege. Br. 25. But defendants
who assert attorney-client privilege in a lawsuit
cannot obtain dismissal because they need to use
their own privileged communications to defend
themselves, or might disclose them by accident. As
explained above, Defendants do not merely seek to
exclude the evidence; they seek to use it to win
dismissal.
Defendants next argue they asserted the privilege
“not as a litigant” against aggrieved persons, but
instead “to safeguard the public interest,” Br. 27. But,
as explained above, Defendants could keep the
information secret without asserting the privilege.
They chose instead to seek dismissal precisely so they
could, “as a litigant,” use that information to prevail
against Plaintiffs’ religious freedom claims. In any
event, Section 1806(c) refers only to use by “the
Government,” not to “litigants,” and Defendants have
assuredly used the information to assert the privilege
“against” Plaintiffs, as they sought dismissal of
Plaintiffs’ religion claims.
Defendants next argue that seeking dismissal “at
most” constitutes a use of the privilege, rather than
the information, Br. 27, but this fails for the same
reason: they are using the information to win
dismissal, not just trying to keep it secret. And the
fact that the Government requested dismissal of
claims to which it was not initially a party changes
nothing. Br. 26. Its motion puts secret information
“into service” to win their dismissal.
2. Defendants’ Non-Textual Limitation
on Section 1806(f) Cannot Be
Squared With Its Plain Text
Defendants next propose a non-textual limitation
on Section 1806(f): they ask the Court to interpret its
42
review procedures to apply only to “procedural”
motions related to “admissibility and suppression of
evidence.” Br. 21, 23. On their view, Congress did not
intend courts to use Section 1806(f)’s ex parte, in
camera review procedures to determine whether the
government’s surveillance was lawfully authorized
and conducted where that question goes to “the
merits” of whether the government violated federal
law.
Defendants never define “procedural” or explain
why neither their motion to dismiss nor Plaintiffs’
Prayer qualifies, but their argument fails for a more
basic reason: the text must govern, not what
Defendants believe Congress contemplated. Statutory
text governs even where Congress indisputably did
not contemplate a particular application. “The fact
that a statute has been applied in situations not
expressly anticipated by Congress does not
demonstrate ambiguity, but rather the breadth of a
legislative command.” Bostock v. Clayton County, 140
S Ct. 1731, 1749 (2020) (cleaned up). Thus, even if
Congress did not contemplate that motions to dismiss
based on state secrets would trigger Section 1806(c),
or that requests for return of illegally obtained
evidence would trigger Section 1806(f), that would
not justify ignoring the words Congress wrote.
“[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond the
principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils,
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather
than the principal concerns of our legislators by
which we are governed.” Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
Section 1806(f) simply does not distinguish
between “procedural motions” and the “merits.” It
mandates ex parte, in camera review “whenever” the
Government seeks to “use” secret information or any
43
aggrieved person “requests” it. And it requires the
court to determine whether surveillance was
“lawfully authorized and conducted” “whenever”
those conditions apply, not just when the question
affects admissibility. Its terms foreclose the nontextual limitation the Government proposes.
Nor does any other provision support Defendants’
view. On the contrary, Section 1806(g) confirms
Section 1806(f)’s breadth. If the court finds the
surveillance unlawful, it “shall, in accordance with
the requirements of law, suppress the evidence . . . or
otherwise grant the motion of the aggrieved person.”
50 U.S.C. 1806(g). Thus, if the Court finds the
surveillance here unlawful, it must “suppress” the
evidence on which the Government says it needs to
rely, thereby prohibiting its use for any purpose—not
reward the Government with dismissal of claims
because it acted in secret when it broke the law. See
Suppress, Webster’s 1171 (defining “suppress” as,
inter alia, “to exclude from consciousness”).12
Similarly, when Plaintiffs move for summary
judgment, if Defendants decide to rely on their secret
information for their defense by submitting it for ex
parte, in camera review, the court will decide if the
surveillance was lawful. If it was not, then the court
shall, “in accordance with the requirements of law,”
grant Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion and other
12 While suppression is most often discussed in criminal cases,
the term has long also applied in civil contexts, including to
motions to suppress evidence gathered in discovery. See, e.g.,
Cogen v. United States, 278 U.S. 221, 223–24 (1929) (referencing
civil motions “to secure or to suppress evidence”); Grant
Brothers Constr. Co. v. United States, 232 U.S. 647, 662 (1914)
(affirming denial of “motion to suppress certain depositions”
read into evidence in civil case).
44
appropriate relief. 50 U.S.C. 1806(g). The flexible
remedial authority in Section 1806(g) confirms
Section 1806(f)’s breadth.13
Defendants invoke two canons—noscitur a sociis
and ejusdem generis, Br. 29–31—to support their
proposed limitation of Section 1806(f) to procedural
motions. But neither applies absent ambiguity.
“When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then,
this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is
complete.” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S.
438, 462 (2002) (cleaned up).
In any event, the canons do not support
Defendants’ non-textual limitation. Defendants cite
noscitur a sociis and Section 1806(g)’s use of “motion”
to argue that “request” must be similar to “motion,”
which they further limit to “procedural” motions. Br.
29. But the statute refers capaciously to “any” motion
or request pursuant to “any other statute or rule,” not
just to “procedural” motions. The canon cannot limit
such unambiguous catch-all language. Compare
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 474 (2010)
(rejecting noscitur where statute was unambiguous)
with Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, __ F.4th
__, No. 20-1191, slip op. at 37–38 (4th Cir. Sept. 15,
2021) (invoking noscitur to limit “any,” while ignoring
“other”).
Ejusdem generis is also inapplicable. There is no
need “to ensure that a general word will not render
specific words meaningless” in Section 1806(f),
because it expressly uses the words “any” and “other”
to make clear that it is a catch-all. CSX Transp., Inc.
v. Alabama Dep’t of Revenue, 562 U.S. 277, 295
13 Orders granting such relief are final and therefore appealable.
See 50 U.S.C. 1806(h).
45
(2011). Moreover, the canon does not limit the fourth
of the four long, separate paragraphs at 1806(c)–(f).
Every example of ejusdem generis Defendants cite,
and every example in Reading Law, involves a list of
words or phrases, not separate lengthy paragraphs.
Cf. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 615 (1995)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(ejusdem generis applies to “a general or collective
term following a list of specific items to which a
particular statutory command is applicable”);
Reading Law, at 199–206.14
Defendants raise several practical concerns they
say warrant adopting their non-textual limitation.
First, they argue that FISA’s text cannot govern
because it would require district courts to conduct
secret trials. Br. 32. But the statute merely requires
that district courts determine the legality of
surveillance ex parte and in camera, as they have for
decades under FISA. In some cases, the district
court’s determination will require suppression, while
in others it might justify discovery, cf. Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 181–82 (1969),
destruction of illegally obtained evidence, or some
other relief. The statute’s text contains no limitation
14 Wikimedia recently misused ejusdem generis to narrow
Section 1806(f)’s catch-all provision, holding that it applies only
when an aggrieved person makes a request in response to the
government’s attempt to use FISA evidence. Wikimedia, slip op.
at 38. The court believed a broader reading would render the
second clause of Section 1806(f)—which refers to motions to
suppress pursuant to Section 1806(e)—meaningless. See id. But
construing the catch-all provision to encompass requests by
plaintiffs in civil litigation, including Plaintiffs’ Prayer for
Relief, would not render 1806(e) meaningless. The catch-all
contains the word “other,” and therefore applies to motions or
requests pursuant to any statute or rule “other” than Section
1806(e).
46
on the types of motions courts must resolve using
Section 1806(f)’s procedures and limits the relief only
insofar as it must be in “accordance with . . . law.”
Second, Defendants contend applying the statute
as written requires district courts to use Section
1806(f) to “award judgment,” Br. 32, but it does not.
Just as a finding that the only probative evidence
against a criminal defendant must be suppressed
does not by itself “award judgment” for the defense,
so FISA simply requires that the court determine
whether the surveillance was lawful, and then grant
any relief “in accordance with the requirements of
law,” as the context of the particular case demands.15
Defendants next characterize as novel the court of
appeals’ view that FISA could be used to adjudicate
the lawfulness of government surveillance in civil
litigation. Br. 21. But that was the Government’s
position when the ACLU sued the Attorney General
under Section 1810 for allegedly unlawful
surveillance. ACLU Found. of So. Cal. v. Barr, 952
F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The Government’s brief in
Barr maintained that courts should use Section
1806(f)’s review procedures to resolve questions
concerning “the legality of the surveillance” “in
administrative, civil, or criminal proceedings” where
FISA-derived evidence is sought for use. Br. of
Appellees at 15, No. 90-5261 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 24, 1991).
The Government never suggested Section 1806(f) was
limited to cases where the government sought to
introduce FISA-derived evidence against the
15 Proposing still another non-textual limit, Defendants argue
that Section 1806’s title, “Use of Information,” should be
interpreted to cover only the Government’s intended use. Br. 29–
30. But the plain meaning of “use” without further limitation
includes use by any party.
47
plaintiffs. Rather, it stated “Section 1806(f) provides
that district courts are to determine if surveillance
was lawfully authorized and conducted whenever any
person who was overheard moves or requests before
any authority of the United States to discover or
obtain materials relating to electronic surveillance
under the FISA.” Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
Agreeing with the Government, the D.C. Circuit
found Section 1806(f)’s procedures applicable in
constitutional challenges to unlawful surveillance:
“Congress also anticipated that issues regarding the
legality of FISA-authorized surveillance would arise
in civil proceedings and . . . empowered federal
district courts to resolve those issues, ex parte and in
camera whenever the Attorney General files an
appropriate affidavit under § 1806(f) . . . .” 952 F.2d
at 470. As Barr recognized, “the normal rules
regarding discovery must be harmonized with . . .
§ 1806(f).” Id. at 469.
Defendants also cite the Classified Information
Procedures Act (CIPA), by way of contrast, to argue
that Congress would have provided more guidance if
it intended FISA’s special procedures to be used in
civil litigation. Br. 32–33. But this Court cannot
ignore the statute’s plain text because of a perceived
deficiency in the level of detail it provides. Moreover,
this argument proves too much, as CIPA provides
more detail than FISA even for criminal cases, where
Defendants concede FISA applies.
The notion that Congress did not intend for its
evidentiary procedures to be used by plaintiffs in civil
litigation is also directly refuted in the legislative
history. Defendants cherry-pick quotes from Senate
reports to suggest Section 1806(f) was intended only
48
for suppression, so the government could always
avoid ex parte, in camera review by choosing to “forgo
the use of the surveillance-based evidence.” Br. 31,
40. But Congress did not enact the Senate’s version of
Section 1806. The House passed a different version,
and when the conference committee reconciled the
bills, it “agree[d] that an in camera and ex parte
proceeding is appropriate . . . in both criminal and
civil cases.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-1720, at 31–32
(emphasis added). The conferees also amended the
Senate’s version of Section 1806(g) to add that if a
court finds surveillance unlawful, it must either
suppress evidence “or otherwise grant the motion of
the aggrieved person.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-1720, at 14
(emphasis added). Thus, they adopted the House’s
understanding that “[r]equirements to disclose
certain information . . . might force the Government
to dismiss the case (or concede the case, if it were a
civil suit against it) to avoid disclosure.” H.R. Rep.
No. 95-1283, at 94 (emphasis added). The legislative
history thus confirms that Section 1806(f) applies
where civil plaintiffs challenge unlawful surveillance
and seek secret information in furtherance of their
claims. Compare S. Rep. No. 95-701, at 88–89 with
H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, at 10–11 and 50 U.S.C. 1806(g)
(adopting House language).
3. Defendants’ Limiting Construction
Would Eviscerate the Civil Remedy
Congress Created in Section 1810
Defendants’ construction also cannot be reconciled
with a key feature of FISA’s structure: the civil
damages remedy in Section 1810. Cf. Reading Law,
at 167 (courts should “consider the entire text, in
view of . . . [the] logical relation of its many parts”).
Defendants acknowledge that Congress meant to
“creat[e] a private cause of action for damages” in
49
1810 to remedy unlawful electronic surveillance, Br.
41, but their construction eviscerates that remedy by
permitting the Government to win dismissal of
virtually all such suits by invoking state secrets. See
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625
(1978) (even where statute is not comprehensive, it
displaces common law that would otherwise render it
toothless).
In 50 U.S.C. 1810, Congress provided victims of
unlawful surveillance a civil damages remedy.
Because FISA surveillance is authorized and
conducted in secret, and because Section 1810
permits litigation to challenge unlawful FISA
surveillance, Congress no doubt understood that
many Section 1810 suits would involve information
that, if disclosed, might harm national security. It
therefore required courts to use FISA’s ex parte, in
camera review procedures to resolve such suits.
Defendants’ one-sided view of Section 1806(f)
maintains that the Government can use its ex parte
procedures in Section 1810 suits, Br. 33, but
Plaintiffs cannot. Indeed, on Defendants’ theory, the
same information would be available for the
Government’s use through ex parte, in camera
review, but not available to plaintiffs. According to
Defendants, the statute provides no mechanism for
plaintiffs to obtain ex parte, in camera review of
secret information to pursue 1810 suits.
But the text makes no distinction between requests
by the Government and requests by plaintiffs. As the
court of appeals recognized, “[i]t would make no sense
for Congress to pass a comprehensive law concerning
foreign intelligence surveillance, expressly enable
aggrieved persons to sue for damages when that
surveillance is unauthorized, see id. § 1810, and
50
provide procedures deemed adequate for the review of
national security-related evidence, see id. § 1806(f),
but not intend for those very procedures to be used
when an aggrieved person sues [under 1810].” Pet.
App. 61a. Nor can Defendants explain why Congress
would have wanted courts to use FISA’s procedures if
the Government requests information, but not if
plaintiffs request that same material.16
Defendants object that Sections 1806(f) and 1810
do not cross-reference each other, Br. 33, but that is
hardly surprising given that Section 1806(f) applies
not just to 1810 suits, but broadly to all motions or
requests under “any” statute or rule seeking
information derived from electronic surveillance.
Similarly, Section 1810 creates civil liability for
unlawful surveillance under several provisions
outside the chapter containing FISA. See Section
1809(a)(1).
Most important, if Defendants’ reading of Section
1806(f) were correct, the Government could adopt a
secret warrantless surveillance program in blatant
contravention of FISA’s constraints, knowing that it
could use the state-secrets privilege to win dismissal
of Section 1810 suits against that program. Cf. J.A.
162 (Defendants suggesting they may eventually
invoke privilege to “foreclose litigation of [the Fourth
Amendment and FISA claims]”). This would render
Section 1810 toothless against the very abuses
Congress enacted FISA to prevent, undermining
16 Defendants’ theory also cannot explain why Congress believed
the statute’s “requirements to disclose certain information”
might force the Government to “concede . . . a civil suit against
it.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, at 94. If Section 1806(f) were only for
the Government’s use, it would never have to concede an 1810
suit to avoid disclosing information to a court.
51
Congress’s determination that “the statutory rule of
law must prevail in the area of foreign intelligence
surveillance.” S. Rep. No. 95-604, at 7; cf. 50 U.S.C. 1812
(prohibiting non-statutory electronic surveillance).17
Defendants note that other doctrines (besides state
secrets) may also sometimes bar litigation
challenging national security measures, Br. 34, but
this grossly understates the problem their
construction creates. Whereas standing, sovereign
immunity, and other doctrines make civil rights
litigation more difficult in some contexts, FISA
surveillance by definition occurs for national security
purposes and virtually always involves secret
information. Defendants’ construction of Section
1806(f) would give the Government a tool to dismiss
nearly all 1810 suits, even where (as here) Plaintiffs
can establish standing and face no sovereign
immunity or other barriers. That result provides a
strong reason to reject Defendants’ view. Congress
wanted Americans to obtain civil remedies for
unlawful surveillance, as Section 1810’s enactment
itself shows. The Court should reject any reading that
gives the Government complete control over the
outcome of such suits.18
For similar reasons, Defendants’ construction of Section
1806(f) would also eviscerate the remedy in 18 U.S.C. 2712 for
FISA violations. Congress enacted that provision in 2001 to
provide a further remedy for the misuse of information obtained
through surveillance. Like Section 1810, it requires district
courts to use Section 1806(f)’s ex parte, in camera review
procedures to review secret FISA information when determining
whether the government’s conduct was unlawful. 18 U.S.C.
2712(b)(4).
18 Defendants do not press Judge Bumatay’s view that Section
1806(c) does not apply even when the Government seeks to use
secret information in civil suits. On his view, the provision
17
52
*
*
*
For these reasons, the text, structure, and history
of Section 1806 make clear that it governs this case.
III. FISA Speaks Clearly to Displace Any
“Dismissal Remedy” That the State-Secrets
Privilege Might Otherwise Authorize
Section 1806’s broad and unequivocal language
easily satisfies any applicable standard for
congressional displacement of the dismissal remedy
that, according to Defendants, accompanies the statesecrets privilege. “[W]e start with the assumption
that it is for Congress, not federal courts, to
articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as
a matter of federal law.” City of Milwaukee v. Illinois
& Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (cleaned up).
Therefore, FISA need only “speak[] directly to the
question at issue.” Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v.
Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 423–24 (2011). However,
even if the Court were to conclude that Congress
must use “clear and explicit” language to displace the
privilege’s dismissal remedy in this setting, Br. 42, it
has done so.
applies only in proceedings “against an aggrieved person,” which
he believes requires that person to be a defendant. Pet. App.
129a–30a (citing Section 1806(c)). But as Defendants rightly
recognize, Section 1806(c) applies when the information is used
“against the Section 1810 plaintiff,” Br. 33, and the same is true
for plaintiffs suing under other causes of action. It is the use of
the information that must be “against an aggrieved person,” not
the lawsuit itself. This interpretation does not render “against
an aggrieved person” surplusage. Pet. App. 130a n.11. The
phrase makes clear that Section 1806(f) does not apply if the
Government seeks to use secret information against someone
who makes no claim they are “aggrieved” by surveillance. Cf.
Alderman, 394 U.S. at 171–72.
53
A. Section 1806(f)’s Review Procedures
Displace the State-Secrets Privilege in
Cases Involving Domestic Electronic
Surveillance
FISA speaks directly to the issue addressed by the
state-secrets privilege in the context of domestic
electronic surveillance for national security purposes.
Reynolds described how courts should apply the
privilege for “military matters which, in the interest
of national security, should not be divulged.” 345 U.S.
at 10. Section 1806(f) addresses precisely that issue;
namely, judicial treatment of information where
“disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm
. . . national security.” Instead of exclusion or
dismissal, Congress provided for ex parte, in camera
review of the disputed surveillance to assess its
lawfulness, rather than simple dismissal. That choice
governs.
The fact that Congress did not use the words “state
secrets,” Br. 35–36, is immaterial. “State secrets” was
not the generally accepted term for the Reynolds
privilege in 1978. Reynolds itself referred only once to
“military and state secrets.” Id. at 7. Shortly before
FISA’s enactment, this Court described Reynolds as
protecting “national security secrets” and “military
matters which, in the interest of national security,
should not be divulged.” United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 706, 711 (1974) (quoting Reynolds)
(emphasis added). Justice Harlan referred to the
“national security privilege” when discussing
Reynolds just a few years earlier. Alderman, 394 U.S.
at 199 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). By establishing alternative procedures for
information the government seeks to protect for
“national security” reasons, Section 1806(f) directly
54
displaced any dismissal remedy that the state-secrets
privilege would otherwise provide in this class of
cases.19
Defendants point to superficial differences between
the state-secrets privilege and FISA’s procedure, but
that Congress altered the common-law doctrine does
not show it lacked intent to displace it. In any event,
the insignificance of the differences to which
Defendants point underscores how fundamentally
similar the rules actually are. Officials other than the
Attorney General can invoke the state-secrets
privilege, Br. 37, but Section 1806(f) sensibly
consolidates responsibility for invoking its procedures
in surveillance cases under the Attorney General,
who both supervises domestic electronic surveillance
of Americans under FISA and represents the
Government in court proceedings. The fact that
Congress chose to displace the privilege’s remedies
only in a subset of cases involving electronic
surveillance does not diminish the clear displacement
in this context.
19 Pre-FISA courts of appeals decisions also used “national
security,” “military secrets,” “diplomatic secrets” and other
phrases as often as “state secrets” when describing Reynolds.
See, e.g., Dellums v. Powell, 561 F.2d 242, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(Reynolds inapplicable because case “[was] not premised on a
claim of a need to protect national security, military or
diplomatic secrets”); United States v. Lyon, 567 F.2d 777, 783
n.4 (8th Cir. 1977) (“national security privilege”); Olson Rug Co.
v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1961) (“[i]nformation
relating to national defense and security may be withheld”
under Reynolds); see also Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 478
F.2d 47, 51 (4th Cir. 1973) (Reynolds privilege “has been often
described as ‘state secrets’ or matters relating to national
security, either military or diplomatic”).
55
Defendants contend that Reynolds addresses a
different harm from FISA because it “generally
forecloses” even in camera inspection, Br. 37–38, but
the primary concern has always been public
disclosure (which FISA prevents), not review by
courts. Reynolds emphasized “[j]udicial control over
the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the
caprice of executive officers.” 345 U.S. at 9–10. And
while in camera review is not “automatically
require[d]” under Reynolds, the Court contemplated
that courts would sometimes require it. Id.
Submission of some secret information to the court to
establish the basis for the privilege assertion remains
the norm. See Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and
the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1249, 1288–89 (2007).
Wigmore’s discussion of the privilege confirms that
the primary harm it addresses is public disclosure,
not keeping information from courts. Wigmore
believed state-secrets determinations should be made
by judges. In “matters involving international
negotiations or military precautions against a foreign
enemy . . . the existence of a necessity for secrecy
must be in each instance declared . . . [by] the Court.”
John Henry Wigmore, Treatise on the System of
Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2376 (1905). For
a court to do otherwise would be to “abdicate its” role
and “furnish to designing officials too ample
opportunities for abusing the privilege.” Id.
Defendants claim that because ex parte, in camera
review “coexisted” with the state-secrets privilege
prior to FISA, Congress must not have meant to
displace the privilege’s dismissal remedy. Br. 37–38
(citing United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141, 149
n.38 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). But Defendants have not
established there was a dismissal remedy under the
56
state-secrets privilege in 1978. At the time Congress
enacted FISA, only one case, in any context—Totten—
had authorized dismissal based on anything akin to
the state-secrets privilege where plaintiffs could
make their case without secret evidence. See
Donohue Amicus at 8 (“Totten is the single exception
that proves the rule”). No court had ever dismissed an
electronic surveillance case on state secrets where, as
here, the plaintiff did not seek or need secret
information. See Section I, supra.
In any event, what the history Defendants rely on
actually shows is that Congress chose a particular
procedure—ex parte, in camera review—that had
been used in some state-secrets cases, and mandated
its use in all such cases involving the electronic
surveillance of Americans. Belfield and the cases it
collects show that ex parte, in camera review (rather
than dismissal) was already the pre-FISA norm in
criminal cases. But Defendants fail to recognize that,
prior to FISA, several courts used that same
procedure in civil cases where the government
invoked Reynolds, including where the government
asserted the need to defend itself based on secret
information. In FISA, Congress mandated this
procedure, thereby precluding any alternatives,
including outright dismissal.
For example, in Jabara v. Webster, a civil action
challenging illegal surveillance, the government
acknowledged it had conducted surveillance without
a warrant, but asserted the state-secrets privilege.
691 F.2d 272, 274 (6th Cir. 1982). The district court
reviewed the secret evidence ex parte and in camera
to determine whether the surveillance was lawful. On
appeal, the Sixth Circuit cited Reynolds in holding
“the district court was correct in its ruling” that
“materials . . . properly protected by the state secret
57
privilege, should be submitted in camera,” to
determine whether the surveillance was lawful. Id.;
see also Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475 (E.D. Mich.
1977). It went on to reverse on the merits.
Similarly, Halpern v. United States held the statesecrets privilege required in camera proceedings to
resolve a patent suit under the Invention Secrecy Act.
258 F.2d 36, 43–44 (2d Cir. 1958) (holding that
statute displaced the privilege “dependent upon the
availability and adequacy of other methods of
protecting the overriding interest of national
security”). Halpern distinguished Reynolds and
Totten because “[n]either of these cases involved a
specific enabling statute contemplating the trial of
actions that by their very nature concern security
information.” Id.
Section 1806(f) codified the ex parte, in camera
practice used in such cases, and thereby displaced
any alternative remedy in cases concerning the
domestic electronic surveillance of Americans.
Defendants point to nothing in the pre-FISA history
even suggesting Congress meant to silently preserve
a dismissal remedy, to the extent such a remedy even
existed.
The concurrence from denial of rehearing en banc
underscores the limited nature of the displacement
here. It emphasized that FISA pre-empts state
secrets only insofar as it requires ex parte, in camera
review by judges at this stage. If the district court
orders disclosure of secret information to Plaintiffs,
the court noted, Defendants can reassert the privilege
at that point. Pet. App. 100a n.1.
What FISA does not permit, as both the decision
below and the concurrence make clear, is dismissal
without a court conducting an ex parte, in camera
58
review to determine whether the Government broke
the law. Congress mandated such judicial review
because it did not want the Government to escape
accountability for secretly spying on Americans in
violation of federal law.
B. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance
Does
Not
Support
Defendants’
Interpretation
Defendants invoke the canon of constitutional
avoidance to support their non-textual limitation on
Section 1806, but it “has no application absent
ambiguity.” Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 972
(2019) (cleaned up). See Section II, supra.
In any event, merely conducting ex parte, in
camera review, as FISA requires here, raises no
constitutional concerns. Courts routinely conduct ex
parte, in camera review of sensitive information in
national security cases. And the statute’s express
statement that any relief afforded must be “in
accordance with law” would preclude, as a statutory
matter, relief that would violate the Constitution.
That provision, akin to a savings clause, ensures that
the statute by its terms authorizes only constitutional
forms of relief.
1. FISA’s Ex Parte, In Camera Review
Procedures Present No Article II
Concerns
FISA’s ex parte review procedures present no
Article II problems. The materials the court must
review ex parte, in camera by definition “relat[e]” to
the domestic electronic surveillance of Americans. 50
U.S.C. 1806(f). This Court has already recognized
Congress’s authority to craft “protective standards” in
59
that context, Keith, 407 U.S. at 323–24, including
evidentiary rules to implement them, Vance v.
Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1980). Thus, even if
the Executive has some inherent Article II authority
to keep information secret absent congressional
regulation, its authority is not “exclusive and
conclusive” in this area. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky
v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 10 (2015); see also Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring). Congress plainly has
authority to displace it to the limited extent of
requiring ex parte, in camera judicial review where
the court must determine the legality of domestic
surveillance, which is all that is at issue here.
The cases Defendants cite do not even suggest that
ex parte, in camera review is unconstitutional. Br.
43–45. The only state-secrets case Defendants cite—
Reynolds, see Br. 43—explicitly avoided reliance on
any “constitutional overtones” based on Article II.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6 & n.9; see also General
Dynamics, 563 U.S. at 485 (Reynolds resolved “a
purely evidentiary dispute by applying evidentiary
rules”). It also expressly contemplated courts would
sometimes engage in ex parte, in camera review of
secret information to decide privilege claims, even
without congressional authorization. Id. at 9–10.
The other cases Defendants cite are far afield.
Nixon recognized that secret national security
information contained in the President’s own
communications might be privileged, but nowhere
suggested that privilege extended to mid-level law
enforcement officers, or that in camera review
violated Article II. 418 U.S. at 710. Nixon actually
authorized the district court to review national
security information in camera. Id. at 715 n.21 (citing
Reynolds). Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518,
60
520 (1988), addressed the “narrow question” of
which administrative agency within the Executive
branch handled appeals from denials of security
clearances. And while it described a sphere of
executive authority over such clearances, to which
“no one has a ‘right,’” id. at 528, it did not address
executive authority to control information in the face
of
congressional
regulation
and
competing
constitutional rights.20
The longstanding authority of courts to review
classified documents under FOIA and FISA confirms
that merely requiring ex parte, in camera judicial
review does not impermissibly intrude on Executive
authority. N.L.R.B. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.,
437 U.S. 214, 226 (1978) (1974 FOIA amendments
reaffirmed
courts’
authority
to
conduct in
camera review to determine if documents are
properly classified—and even to order public release).
FISA’s existing judicial review process and legislative
reporting requirements, including those added in
2008, also confirm that Congress may order the
Executive to provide secret information to courts
without violating Article II. See 50 U.S.C. 1803
(creating Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to
hear applications for orders under FISA); Clapper v.
Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 403–04 (2013)
(describing FISC review and approval of electronic
surveillance applications both before and after FISA
amendments in 2008); 50 U.S.C. 1802(a)(3) (requiring
20 Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp. decided
nothing at all about executive privilege. It merely held nonjusticiable a challenge to a Presidential directive concerning air
traffic patterns. 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948). The other cases
Defendants cite simply describe presidential power in unrelated
areas. Br. 43–45.
61
Attorney General to provide information about
warrantless surveillance to FISC).
Defendants also cite Founding era history, Br. 42–
43, but scattered examples of Presidents sometimes
keeping secrets do not show the Founders implicitly
incorporated the state-secrets privilege into the
penumbra of Article II, let alone that they precluded
ex parte, in camera review of assertedly secret
information where needed to secure constitutional
rights. Indeed, as a textual matter, the Founders
explicitly authorized only Congress to keep secrets,
not the Executive. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 5.
To the extent the doctrine derived from
governmental privilege under British law, the
Framers chose not to imbue the American executive
with the powers of the King. See, e.g., The Federalist
No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton). Neither John Jay’s
emphasis in Federalist No. 64 on the benefits of
secrecy in treaty-making—favoring placement of that
power in the executive—nor early instances of
congressional demands for information from the
President and his “very highest officers,” show that
Congress lacks authority to require courts to conduct
ex parte, in camera review to determine whether midlevel executive officials broke the law. Abraham D.
Sofaer, Executive Power and the Control of
Information: Practice Under the Framers, 16 Duke
L.J. 1, 46 (1977).21
Judge Sofaer interpreted early Presidents’ surreptitious
withholding of information to demonstrate “that they regarded
Congress as empowered to disagree with and override their
judgments.” Id. He concluded that Congress could and should
regulate executive secrecy through statutory reform. Id. at 50–
54; see also Pet. App. 114a–15a (Bumatay, J., dissenting) (citing
Sofaer). Other scholars have cast doubt on whether the
21
62
Defendants cite the Burr trial, but it further
undermines their argument. Br. 3, 43. Although the
case never resolved whether the President has
authority to resist judicial subpoenas, Chief Justice
Marshall stated he would review the letter over
which the President had asserted privilege to
determine which parts should be withheld, and also
suggested a closed proceeding to allow full use of any
information properly considered secret. United States
v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
Defendants’ interpretation also raises its own
constitutional problems, because it would permit the
Executive to block courts from adjudicating claims of
unconstitutional surveillance, thereby eviscerating
the civil remedy Congress established to serve as a
critical check on Executive power in this context.
“The impediment that an absolute, unqualified
privilege would place in the way of the primary
constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do
justice . . . would plainly conflict with the function of
the courts under Art. III.” Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707.
That concern has particular force here, because the
Fourth Amendment requires the judiciary to oversee
executive search authority, even where the executive
asserts disclosure to courts would threaten national
security. Keith, 407 U.S. at 317.
FISA “eliminat[ed] any congressional recognition or
suggestion of inherent Presidential power with
respect to electronic surveillance.” S. Rep. No. 95-701,
Constitution protects any form of executive privilege, given the
Constitution’s failure to mention it and meager historical
support. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Executive Privilege: A
Constitutional Myth, 50 Indiana L.J. 193 (1974); Saikrishna
Bangalore Prakash, A Critical Comment on the Constitutionality
of Executive Privilege, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1143, 1157–58 (1999).
63
at 71–72. It “embodies a legislative judgment that
court orders and other procedural safeguards are
necessary to insure that electronic surveillance . . .
within this country conforms to [fourth amendment]
principles.” S. Rep. No. 95-701, at 13. Given that
Congress enacted FISA to constrain executive
authority, it would not want the Court to “shy[] away
from constitutional questions” about executive power,
but rather to “construe [the] statute expansively . . .
to give the statute its maximum constitutionally
permissible scope.” Adrian Vermeule, Saving
Constructions, 85 Geo. L.J. 1945, 1956 (1997).
Because “firm evidence” shows “Congress intended
to” legislate in the “constitutional thickets”
surrounding electronic surveillance, avoidance
doctrine should not be applied. Pub. Citizen v. U.S.
Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989).
2. The Agent Defendants’ Speculative
Due
Process
and
Seventh
Amendment
Concerns
Do
Not
Support Their Interpretation
The Agent Defendants raise distinct Due Process
and
Seventh
Amendment
arguments
as
constitutional concerns, but they provide no support
to Defendants’ proposed non-textual limitations on
FISA.
As an initial matter, the Agent Defendants’
constitutional objections are speculative and
premature. The parties have not moved for summary
judgment; no one even knows whether any material
facts triggering the jury trial right will ever be in
dispute.
If
Plaintiffs
establish
religious
discrimination using non-privileged information and
the district court determines after review of the
secret information that no material factual disputes
64
exist, their concerns will not arise. If instead the
court determines that trial is needed and the Agent
Defendants object to the procedures the court
employs to handle secret information, the decision
below permits them to raise their constitutional
objections when they are ripe. Pet. App. 65a n.31.22
Nor do the Agent Defendants’ arguments support
application of avoidance doctrine. Br. of Resp’ts
Tidwell and Walls 21–22 (citing Clark v. Martinez,
543 U.S. 371 (2005)), Br. of Resp’ts Allen, Armstrong,
and Rose 15–16. As explained above, because Section
1806(g) requires the district court to act “in
accordance with the requirements of law” when
granting any relief, the statute prohibits relief that
violates the Constitution. It already requires that
courts consider any constitutional problems when
they actually arise, and therefore need not be
“construed” to avoid unconstitutional relief.
The Agent Defendants also overstate the
constitutional problems. No court has ever held that
22 Plaintiffs argued below that they could prove their religion
claims by showing merely that (1) their religion was a factor in
Defendants’ decision to surveil them, and (2) Defendants could
not show that using religion as a factor warranting suspicion
was narrowly tailored. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886
n.3 (1990) (holding religious classifications “subject to the most
exacting scrutiny”) (citations omitted). Thus, if Plaintiffs’ legal
theory proves correct, the only information about these
investigations relevant to establishing liability may be the fact
that religion was a factor in opening them, which may not
require consideration of any secret information at all. See Dep’t
of Justice Civil Rights Division, “Guidance Regarding the Use of
Race by Federal Law Enforcement Authorities,” at 7–8 (June
2003), available at https://www.scribd.com/document/22092319/
DOJ-Guidance-Regarding-the-Use-of-Race-by-Federal-Law-Enforce
ment-Agencies-June-2003 (permitting racial and religious
profiling in national security or border integrity investigations).
65
FISA’s ex parte, in camera review procedures violate
Due Process or the Sixth or Seventh Amendments’
jury trial right. In analogous contexts, courts use
various substitute procedures, including unclassified
substitutions, to “provide the defendant with
substantially the same ability to make his defense as
would
disclosure
of
the
specific
classified
information.” 18 U.S.C. App. III § 6(c)(1) (CIPA).
Moreover, liability will not turn solely on the results
of in camera review. There is already a large amount
of non-privileged evidence in the record, and
according to the Government, “the majority” of
Monteilh’s audio and video recording is likely
available. J.A. 162. And more evidence will likely be
declassified, both due to its age and because
Defendants may want to use it.23
That a court may consider some evidence relevant
to liability ex parte and in camera does not
necessarily render the proceedings unconstitutional.
In Molerio, for example, the court did exactly that to
determine “the genuine reason for denial of
employment,” and concluded that the FBI did not
violate plaintiff’s rights. 749 F.2d at 825. The court
dismissed the claim after determining, based on its in
camera review, that the government’s conduct was
lawful.
Finally, the Agent Defendants’ alternative
construction—that FISA permits dismissal even
though Plaintiffs can prove their claims without any
privileged evidence—itself raises serious questions
regarding Plaintiffs’ First Amendment, Due Process,
and Seventh Amendment rights. It would deny them
The Government already declassified portions of Monteilh’s
tasking in an attempt to support their brief on appeal. See J.A.
220–231.
23
66
any forum to adjudicate a substantial claim that their
constitutional rights have been violated. Because the
Agent Defendants’ construction fails to avoid
constitutional problems, it provides no justification
for invoking the canon.
*
*
*
Where it applies, Section 1806 directs courts to
review allegedly unlawful FISA surveillance ex parte
and in camera to assess whether the government
broke the law, rather than to dismiss such lawsuits
at the outset. Congress did not want the defendants
to escape civil liability for unlawful domestic
electronic surveillance programs simply by declaring
them secret.
67
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the decision below.
Respectfully Submitted,
PETER BIBRING
MOHAMMAD TAJSAR
ACLU FOUNDATION OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
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Los Angeles, CA 90017
AHILAN ARULANANTHAM
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UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW
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Drive East
Los Angeles, CA 90095
(310) 825-1029
arulanantham@law.ucla.edu
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DINA CHEHATA
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DAN STORMER
SHALEEN SHANBHAG
HADSELL STORMER
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Avenue
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DAVID D. COLE
PATRICK TOOMEY
ASHLEY GORSKI
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION
UNION FOUNDATION
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New York, NY 10004
Dated September 21, 2021
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.