Respondents Brief — Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al., Petitioners v. Yassir Fazaga, et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 21, 2021

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No. 20-828

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

d

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION , et al.,

Petitioners,

—v.—

YASSIR FAZAGA , et al.,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS

PETER BIBRING

MOHAMMAD TAJSAR

ACLU FOUNDATION OF

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

1313 West Eighth Street

Los Angeles, CA 90017

AMR SHABAIK

DINA CHEHATA

CAIR-LOS ANGELES

2180 W. Crescent Avenue,

Suite F

Anaheim, CA 92801

PATRICK TOOMEY

ASHLEY GORSKI

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES

UNION FOUNDATION

125 Broad Street

New York, NY 10004

AHILAN ARULANANTHAM

Counsel of Record

UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW

385 Charles E. Young Drive East

Los Angeles, CA 90095

(310) 825-1029

arulanantham@law.ucla.edu

DAN STORMER

SHALEEN SHANBHAG

HADSELL STORMER RENICK

& DAI LLP

128 North Fair Oaks Avenue

Pasadena, CA 91103

DAVID D. COLE

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES

UNION FOUNDATION

915 15th Street, NW

Washington, DC 20005

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... iv

INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 1

STATEMENT............................................................... 3

I.

Legal Background ........................................... 3

A. State Secrets .............................................. 3

B. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ...... 4

II.

The FBI’s Surveillance Program:

Operation Flex ................................................ 7

III. Procedural History ........................................ 13

A. District Court ........................................... 13

B. Court of Appeals ...................................... 16

C. Proceedings on Remand .......................... 18

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................... 19

ARGUMENT .............................................................. 24

I.

The State-Secrets Privilege Does Not

Permit Dismissal Here ................................. 24

A. This Court’s State-Secrets Cases Do

Not Permit Dismissal Here ..................... 24

B. The Pre-Reynolds Common Law Does

Not Permit Dismissal Here ..................... 28

ii

PAGE

C. The Few Lower Court Cases

Permitting Dismissal Where

Defendants Seek to Use Privileged

Evidence to Defend Themselves

Precede General Dynamics, and Are

Wrong or Inapplicable ............................. 30

II.

If the State-Secrets Privilege Otherwise

Authorizes Dismissal, FISA Displaces It,

and Requires Ex Parte, In Camera Review

Rather Than Dismissal ................................. 33

A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Triggers FISA’s Special Review

Procedures Under Sections 1806(c)

and (f) ....................................................... 35

B. Plaintiffs’ Prayer for Relief

Independently Triggers FISA’s Special

Review Procedures Under Section

1806(f) ...................................................... 39

C. Defendants’ Objections Are Meritless .... 40

1. Defendants’ Interpretation of “Use”

Contravenes Its Ordinary Meaning .. 40

2. Defendants’ Non-Textual Limitation

on Section 1806(f) Cannot Be

Squared With Its Plain Text .............. 41

3. Defendants’ Limiting Construction

Would Eviscerate the Civil Remedy

Congress Created in Section 1810 ..... 48

iii

PAGE

III. FISA Speaks Clearly to Displace Any

“Dismissal Remedy” That the StateSecrets Privilege Might Otherwise

Authorize ....................................................... 52

A. Section 1806(f)’s Review Procedures

Displace the State-Secrets Privilege in

Cases Involving Domestic Electronic

Surveillance ............................................. 53

B. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance

Does Not Support Defendants’

Interpretation .......................................... 58

1. FISA’s Ex Parte, In Camera Review

Procedures Present No Article II

Concerns ............................................. 58

2. The Agent Defendants’ Speculative

Due Process and Seventh

Amendment Concerns Do Not

Support Their Interpretation ............ 63

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 67

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE(S)

Cases

ACLU Found. of So. Cal. v. Barr,

952 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1991) .................... 7, 46, 47

Alderman v. United States,

394 U.S. 165 (1969) .................................. 45, 52, 53

Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut,

564 U.S. 410 (2011) .............................................. 52

Bank Line Ltd. v. United States,

68 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) .......................... 29

Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.,

534 U.S. 438 (2002) .............................................. 44

Black v. United States,

62 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 1995) ................................ 31

Bostock v. Clayton County,

140 S Ct. 1731 (2020) ........................................... 42

Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,

333 U.S. 103 (1948) .............................................. 60

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan,

451 U.S. 304 (1981) .............................................. 52

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l,

568 U.S. 398 (2013) .............................................. 60

Clark v. Martinez,

543 U.S. 371 (2005) .............................................. 64

Cogen v. United States,

278 U.S. 221 (1929) .............................................. 43

v

PAGE(S)

Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor,

478 U.S. 833 (1986) .............................................. 37

Cooke v. Maxwell,

[1817] 2 Stark. 183 ............................................... 25

Cresmer v. United States,

9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) ............................... 29

CSX Transp., Inc. v. Alabama Dep’t of Revenue,

562 U.S. 277 (2011) .............................................. 44

Dellums v. Powell,

561 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977) .............................. 54

Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan,

484 U.S. 518 (1988) ........................................ 59, 60

Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co.,

[1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.)..................................... 30, 33

El-Masri v. United States,

479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) ......................... 30, 32

Emp’t Div. v. Smith,

494 U.S. 872 (1990) .............................................. 64

Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency,

478 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1973) .................................. 54

Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co.,

199 F. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912) ................................... 28

General Dynamics Corp. v. United States,

563 U.S. 478 (2011) ....................................... passim

Grant Brothers Constr. Co. v. United States,

232 U.S. 647 (1914) .............................................. 43

In re Grove,

180 F. 62 (3d Cir. 1910) ........................................ 29

vi

PAGE(S)

H.M.S. Bellerophon,

[1875] 44 LJR 5 .................................................... 29

Halpern v. United States,

258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958) .................................... 57

Jabara v. Kelley,

75 F.R.D. 475 (E.D. Mich. 1977) .......................... 57

Jabara v. Webster,

691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982) .......................... 56, 57

Jennings v. Rodriguez,

138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) ............................................ 38

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,

436 U.S. 618 (1978) .............................................. 49

Mohamed v. Jeppesen,

614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010)

(en banc)........................................ 14, 15, 16, 30, 32

Molerio v. FBI,

749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984) .................. 31, 32, 65

N.L.R.B. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.,

437 U.S. 214 (1978) .............................................. 60

Nielsen v. Preap,

139 S. Ct. 954 (2019) ............................................ 58

Olson Rug Co. v. NLRB,

291 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1961) ................................ 54

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,

523 U.S. 75 (1998) ................................................ 42

Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co.,

26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) .......................... 28

vii

PAGE(S)

Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

491 U.S. 440 (1989) .............................................. 63

Rex v. Watson,

2 Stark. 116 (1817) ............................................... 29

Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

138 S. Ct. 816 (2018) ............................................ 37

In re Sealed Case,

494 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ........................ 31, 32

Tenenbaum v. Simonini,

372 F.3d 776 (6th Cir. 2004) ................................ 31

Tenet v. Doe,

544 U.S. 1 (2005) ........................................ 4, 25, 26

Totten v. United States,

92 U.S. 105 (1875) ......................................... passim

United States v. Aguilar,

515 U.S. 593 (1995) .............................................. 45

United States v. Belfield,

692 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ....................... 55, 56

United States v. Burr,

25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) ......................... 62

United States v. Coplon,

185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950) .................................. 32

United States v. Lyon,

567 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1977) ................................ 54

United States v. Nixon,

418 U.S. 683 (1974) .................................. 53, 59, 62

United States v. Reynolds,

345 U.S. 1 (1953) ........................................... passim

viii

PAGE(S)

United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians,

448 U.S. 371 (1980) .............................................. 38

United States v. Stevens,

559 U.S. 460 (2010) .............................................. 44

United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith),

407 U.S. 297 (1972) .................................. 23, 59, 62

Vance v. Terrazas,

444 U.S. 252 (1980) .............................................. 59

Webster v. Doe,

486 U.S. 592 (1988) ........................................ 25, 26

Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency,

__ F.4th __, No. 20-1191, slip op.

(4th Cir. Sept. 15, 2021) ................................. 44, 45

Worthington v. Scribner,

109 Mass. 487 (1872) ............................................ 29

Wyatt v. Gore,

[1816] Holt N.P.C. 299 ................................... 25, 30

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,

343 U.S. 579 (1952) .......................................... 5, 59

Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry,

576 U.S. 1 (2015) .................................................. 59

Statutes

18 U.S.C. 2712 ........................................................... 51

18 U.S.C. 2712(b)(4) ................................................... 51

18 U.S.C. App. III § 6(c)(1), Classified Information

Procedures Act (“CIPA”)................................. 47, 65

ix

PAGE(S)

42 U.S.C. ch. 21B § 2000bb et seq.,

Religious Freedom Restoration Act ..................... 13

42 U.S.C. 1985(3) ....................................................... 13

50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq., Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Act (“FISA”) .............................. passim

50 U.S.C. 1802(a)(3) ............................................. 60

50 U.S.C. 1803 ...................................................... 60

50 U.S.C. 1806 ............................................... passim

50 U.S.C. 1806(c) ........................................... passim

50 U.S.C. 1806(e) .................................................. 45

50 U.S.C. 1806(f) ........................................... passim

50 U.S.C. 1806(g) ........................................... passim

50 U.S.C. 1806(h) ................................................. 44

50 U.S.C. 1809 ........................................................ 7

50 U.S.C. 1809(a)(1) ............................................. 50

50 U.S.C. 1810 ............................................... passim

50 U.S.C. 1812 ...................................................... 50

Federal Tort Claims Act ............................................ 13

Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) ....................... 60

Invention Secrecy Act ................................................ 56

Privacy Act ........................................................... 13, 31

x

PAGE(S)

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 5 ................................. 61

U.S. Constitution, Article II .................... 58, 59, 60, 61

U.S. Constitution, Article III..................................... 62

U.S. Constitution, First Amendment ...... 13, 20, 31, 65

U.S. Constitution, Fourth Amendment ............. passim

U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment........................ 63

U.S. Constitution, Sixth Amendment ....................... 65

U.S. Constitution, Seventh Amendment ............ 63, 65

Legislative Materials

H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283 (1978) .................... 5, 34, 48, 50

H.R. Rep. No. 95-1720 (1978) ............................ 5, 7, 48

S. Rep. No. 94-755, Church Report, Book II (1976) .... 5

S. Rep. No. 95-604 (1977) ...................................... 4, 51

S. Rep. No. 95-701 (1978) ................................ 5, 48, 62

Other Authorities

Raoul Berger, Executive Privilege: A Constitutional

Myth, 50 Indiana L.J. 193 (1974)......................... 62

Black’s Law Dictionary .............................................. 39

Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of

National Security Litigation, 75 Geo. Wash.

L. Rev. 1249 (2007) ............................................... 55

xi

PAGE(S)

Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Division, “Guidance

Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law

Enforcement Authorities,” (June 2003),

https://www.scribd.com/document/22092319/

DOJ-Guidance-Regarding-the-Use-of-Race-byFederal-Law-Enforcement-Agencies-June-2003 . 64

The Federalist No. 64 (John Jay) .............................. 61

The Federalist No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) .......... 61

Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Critical Comment

on the Constitutionality of Executive Privilege,

83 Minn. L. Rev. 1143 (1999) ............................... 62

William Sanford, Evidentiary Privileges Against

the Production of Data Within the Control

of Executive Departments, 3 Vanderbilt

L. Rev. 73 (1949) ................................................... 29

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:

The Interpretation of Legal Texts 176

(2012) ........................................................ 36, 45, 48

Abraham D. Sofaer, Executive Power and the Control

of Information: Practice Under the Framers,

16 Duke L.J. 1, 46 (1977) ..................................... 61

The Convert, THIS AMERICAN LIFE

(Aug. 10, 2012) ...................................................... 12

Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions,

85 Geo. L.J. 1945 (1997) ....................................... 63

Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary

(1977) ........................................................ 36, 38, 43

xii

PAGE(S)

John Henry Wigmore, Treatise on the System of

Evidence in Trials at Common Law (1905) ......... 55

1

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs are three Americans who allege that,

fifteen years ago, the FBI sent an informant to spy on

them and others in their community because of their

religion. The Government acknowledges that it

employed the informant and possesses recordings he

made. The informant himself submitted sworn

declarations testifying that FBI agents directed him

to spy on Plaintiffs and hundreds of other members of

Southern

California’s

Muslim

communities,

instructed him to collect information on these lawabiding Americans simply because of their faith, and

told him Islam itself is a threat. Eventually, the

informant tried to incite community members to

violence, scaring them enough that they reported

him—to the FBI.

These acts caused deep harm to Plaintiffs and

many other members of their communities. Plaintiff

Fazaga, a religious leader and licensed therapist, was

forced to restrict the counseling he provided to his

congregants for fear it was no longer private.

Plaintiffs Malik and AbdelRahim grew afraid to

practice their faith openly and to attend the mosques

the informant had infiltrated.

The question presented is whether Plaintiffs’ claim

that

Defendants

violated

the

Constitution’s

protection for freedom of religion will ever receive its

day in court. Defendants maintain that no judge can

decide whether they violated the Free Exercise and

Establishment Clauses because they need to use

certain evidence to defend themselves, but

introducing it would reveal “state secrets.”

Defendants do not contend that the very subject

matter of this case is secret; they have not sought to

dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims on

2

privilege grounds. Defendants seek to dismiss just

the religion claims on state secrets—even though

Plaintiffs need no secret information to prove them.

Defendants are wrong for two reasons. First, the

state-secrets privilege does not permit dismissal of

the religion claims based on Defendants’ need to rely

on secret information. Like all other privileges, the

state-secrets privilege authorizes the exclusion of

privileged evidence. But Defendants do not need to

assert the privilege to keep the information out of

this case. Only they possess the information they

seek to keep secret, and Plaintiffs have not sought it

to establish their entitlement to relief. Defendants

instead seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ religion claims,

based on their own need to use the information to

defend themselves. But dismissal for that reason has

no basis in the common-law state-secrets privilege or

this Court’s precedent. The decision below should be

affirmed on that basis alone.

Second, because the secret information on which

Defendants rely came from the electronic surveillance

of U.S. persons on U.S. soil conducted in the name of

national security, the procedures for litigating it are

governed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

(“FISA”), 50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq., not common law.

Under 50 U.S.C. 1806, whenever the Government

seeks to use information from FISA surveillance or

Americans seek to obtain it for a suit against their

government, and the Attorney General asserts that

disclosing that information could threaten national

security, the court “shall” review it ex parte and in

camera to determine whether the underlying

surveillance was lawful. These procedures apply

“notwithstanding any other law,” “whenever” the

statute’s conditions are met. They govern this case.

Thus, even if the state-secrets privilege would

3

otherwise permit dismissal of Plaintiffs’ religion

claims, FISA’s procedures displace it here.1

STATEMENT

I.

Legal Background

A. State Secrets

The concept of state secrets encompasses two “quite

different” doctrines. General Dynamics Corp. v.

United States, 563 U.S. 478, 485 (2011). The one

involved here is a common-law privilege “in the law of

evidence,” concerning “military and state secrets.”

United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1953).

When the Government successfully invokes this

privilege, “[t]he privileged information is excluded

and the trial goes on without it. . . . [T]he Court [does]

not order judgment in favor of the Government.”

General Dynamics, 563 U.S. at 485. Under Reynolds,

dismissals occur only when plaintiffs cannot prove

their case without the secret evidence. Brief of

Professor Laura K. Donahue As Amicuc Curiae In

Support of Neither Party (“Donohue Amicus”) at 4–17

(collecting cases).

The other state-secrets doctrine, not presented

here, is a justiciability bar this Court created from its

“authority to fashion contractual remedies in

Government-contracting disputes.” General Dynamics,

Because some Defendants are petitioners and some

respondents in this Court, Plaintiffs use “Plaintiffs” and

“Defendants” throughout. The “Government” refers to the

official capacity Defendants. “Agent Defendants” refers to FBI

agents sued in their individual capacities. When citing to the

Government’s opening brief, Plaintiffs use the abbreviation “Br.”

1

4

563 U.S. at 485. That doctrine requires dismissal of

government-contracting lawsuits “where the very

subject matter of the action . . . [i]s a matter of state

secret.” Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (discussing

Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875)) (cleaned

up); Tenet, 544 U.S. at 12 (Scalia, J., concurring)

(“the bar of Totten is a jurisdictional one”). The

authority for such dismissals is “something quite

different from a mere evidentiary point,” and the

“state-secrets jurisprudence bearing upon that

authority is not Reynolds, but two cases dealing with

alleged contracts to spy.” General Dynamics, 563

U.S. at 485–86 (citing Tenet and Totten). Individuals

who enter into such secret contracts “assume[] the

risk that state secrets would prevent the

adjudication of” any disputes that may arise from

them. Id. at 491. “The secrecy which such contracts

impose precludes any action for their enforcement.”

Totten, 92 U.S. at 107.

While a few lower court cases conflated these two

doctrines prior to General Dynamics, this Court has

never done so. Reynolds itself makes clear that Totten

rests on a “broader holding that lawsuits premised on

alleged espionage agreements are altogether

forbidden.” Tenet, 544 U.S. at 9. Only Totten permits

“dismiss[al] on the pleadings without ever reaching

the question of evidence.” Id. (quoting Reynolds,

emphasis in Tenet).

B. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

Congress enacted FISA in 1978 to establish “an

exclusive charter for the conduct of electronic

surveillance in the United States” in the name of

national security, S. Rep. No. 95-604, at 15 (1977).

5

Through

FISA,

Congress

“eliminat[ed]

any

congressional recognition or suggestion of inherent

Presidential power with respect to electronic

surveillance.” S. Rep. No. 95-701, at 72 (1978). The

statute provides substantive rules governing when

such surveillance can occur, rules for judges to

authorize it, procedures for litigating cases involving

such surveillance, and a civil remedy to provide

redress to Americans who are unlawfully surveilled.

In the years before FISA’s passage, a congressional

committee led by Senator Frank Church investigated

claims of abusive surveillance practices. It discovered

the government had, in the name of national security,

surveilled an enormous number of innocent Americans

without warrants—including Martin Luther King, Jr.

and other civil rights leaders, journalists, antiwar

groups, a law firm, and a member of Congress.

Church Report, Book II, S. Rep. No. 94-755, at 6–13

(1976). President Nixon even authorized a wiretap

program that obtained “information about a Supreme

Court justice.” Id. at 10. These abuses “demonstrate[d]

the inappropriateness of relying solely on executive

branch discretion to safeguard civil liberties.” H.R.

Rep. No. 95-1283, at 21 (1978).

FISA “embodies a legislative judgment that court

orders and other procedural safeguards are necessary

to insure that electronic surveillance by the U.S.

Government within this country conforms to the

fundamental principles of the fourth amendment.” S.

Rep. No. 95-701 at 13; see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-1720,

at 35 (1978) (invoking Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.

v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).

The FISA provisions relevant here are 50 U.S.C.

1806 and 1810. Section 1806(c) requires the

Government to notify the court and those surveilled

6

(“aggrieved persons”) whenever it intends to use

information obtained or derived from electronic

surveillance

in

litigation:

“[w]henever

the

Government intends to enter into evidence or

otherwise use or disclose in any trial . . . against an

aggrieved person, any information obtained or

derived from an electronic surveillance of that

aggrieved person . . . the Government shall . . . notify

the aggrieved person and the court . . . that the

Government intends to so disclose or so use such

information.”

Section 1806(f) mandates special procedures for

judicial review of secret information. Whenever the

Government seeks to use information under

subsection (c), “if the Attorney General files an

affidavit . . . that disclosure [of information obtained

or derived from electronic surveillance] or an

adversary hearing would harm the national security

of the United States,” the “district court . . . shall,

notwithstanding any other law, . . . review in camera

and ex parte the application, order, and such other

materials relating to the surveillance as may be

necessary to determine whether the surveillance of

the aggrieved person was lawfully authorized and

conducted.”

Section 1806(f) also contains a catch-all provision

that requires district courts to use the same review

procedures “whenever any motion or request is made

by an aggrieved person pursuant to any other statute

or rule . . . to discover or obtain . . . materials relating

to electronic surveillance” or “information obtained or

derived from electronic surveillance.”

If the court finds the surveillance unlawful after

conducting its ex parte, in camera review, Section

1806(g) directs that it “shall, in accordance with the

7

requirements of law, suppress the evidence” or

“otherwise grant the motion of the aggrieved person.”

Section 1810 establishes a civil damages remedy

for U.S. persons subjected to unlawful surveillance. It

makes federal officials who “intentionally engage[] in

electronic surveillance under color of law” (as defined

in Section 1809) liable for damages if their

surveillance was not authorized. As the D.C. Circuit

has recognized, courts dealing with secret

information relating to electronic surveillance arising

in civil litigation, including in Section 1810 suits,

must use Section 1806(f)’s procedures when

considering requests to discover or obtain such

information. ACLU Found. of So. Cal. v. Barr, 952

F.2d 457, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also H.R. Rep. No.

95-1720, at 32 (courts will use statute’s special review

procedures “in both criminal and civil cases”).

II. The FBI’s Surveillance Program: Operation

Flex

Plaintiff Sheikh Yassir Fazaga is a U.S. citizen who

has lived in the United States for more than 30 years.

J.A. 83. He has earned a national reputation for his

progressive teachings about Islam. J.A. 83–84. In

2007, the State Department sponsored him to travel

to Romania to speak at a conference. He has been

interviewed for print, television, and radio, including

by NBC’s Today Show and the New York Times. J.A.

84. He was the imam of the Orange County Islamic

Foundation at the time the events here occurred. J.A.

84.

Plaintiff Ali Malik is also a U.S. citizen, born and

raised in Orange County, California. J.A. 65. He

regularly attended services at the Islamic Center of

Irvine, California. J.A. 65. Malik started a young

8

Republicans club in high school, and in college

founded the Olive Tree Initiative, a peace-building

program in which students from diverse religious

backgrounds conduct fact-finding missions in Israel

and Palestine—for which he was recognized by the

University of California and the State Department.

J.A. 86.

Plaintiff Yasser AbdelRahim is an immigrant from

Egypt and long-time lawful permanent resident. He

attended business school in Arizona before

completing his degree in Southern California. J.A. 65.

At the time the events here occurred, he lived in a

house with other young immigrants. J.A. 90. In his

free time, he watched TV, talked politics with his

housemates, and played video games with them on

Xbox. J.A. 214. He also attended services at the

Islamic Center of Irvine. J.A. 65.

None of the Plaintiffs were ever charged with or

convicted of any crime. Nonetheless, the FBI spied on

them, along with hundreds of other law-abiding

Southern California residents, because of their faith.

Plaintiffs filed suit on February 22, 2011. Drawing

exclusively on publicly available sources, including

Defendants’ own public statements, detailed

declarations from the FBI’s informant, J.A. 165–219,

and documents obtained through the Freedom of

Information Act, their complaint paints a detailed

picture of the FBI’s 14-month-long investigation.

In the years after September 11, 2001, the FBI

investigated many Americans because of their

Muslim faith. J.A. 69–70. These investigations took

different forms, including detentions, interrogations,

broad efforts to “count” mosques and Muslims in each

jurisdiction, and surveillance of communities

throughout the country. J.A. 69–70. After 2003,

9

official FBI policy permitted agents to conduct

“assessments” of people without any factual basis for

believing they were engaged in criminal activity or

even presented a security threat. J.A. 72–75. And in

national security investigations, the FBI’s own policy

did not prohibit religious profiling. J.A. 74.

When this suit was filed, approximately 500,000

people practiced Islam in Southern California. J.A.

79. The FBI spied on thousands of them. Between

2001 and 2006, it gathered lists of mosques in the

area, collected names of local religious leaders,

amassed membership lists of religious organizations,

interrogated hundreds of people in the area, and

planted bugs and cameras in mosques.

In June 2006, Defendant Tidwell, the Los Angeles

FBI Assistant Director, told an audience at the

Islamic Center of Irvine that the FBI would not send

informants into mosques to monitor community

members. J.A. 81. This was false. In fact, he had

already approved a plan for an informant to infiltrate

mosques, and two of his agents, Defendants Allen

and Armstrong, had already started training Craig

Monteilh for the job. J.A. 81–82 & n.28.2

Less than a month after Tidwell’s public address,

Defendants sent Monteilh to introduce himself to

congregants at the very mosque where Tidwell had

spoken. J.A. 82. Monteilh told them he was ready to

convert to Islam. J.A. 82. After he participated in a

ceremonial declaration of faith, congregants talked

with him about the tenets of the religion, showed him

Defendants would later confirm that the FBI “utilized

Monteilh as a confidential human source,” and that it possesses

his notes and the audio and video recordings he made. J.A. 49–

50.

2

10

how to pray, and socialized with him. J.A. 83. Under

the direction of Defendants Allen and Armstrong,

Monteilh used that access to surveil and record

community members. J.A. 168–70. Defendant Rose

supervised and directed Allen and Armstrong’s

handling of Monteilh, while Defendant Walls worked

below Tidwell to manage Armstrong, Allen, and Rose.

J.A. 68–69, 109.

As Monteilh’s declarations explain, the explicit

purpose of Operation Flex was to gather information

on people who practice Islam in Orange County—not

terrorists, spies, or even ordinary criminals. See, e.g.,

J.A. 173–75. Defendants did not identify specific

targets, instead instructing Monteilh “to gather as

much information on as many people in the Muslim

community as possible.” J.A. 174. The FBI discarded

information Monteilh gathered on non-Muslims.

J.A. 182. Defendants told him to focus on people who

appeared more devout because they were “more

suspicious.” J.A. 184.

The Agents told Monteilh, “Islam is a threat to our

national security.” J.A. 194. They instructed him to:

Collect contact information on at least “ten

new Muslims per day,” J.A. 174;

Obtain the names and license plates of

individuals who attended dawn and late

evening prayers, because they were more

devout, J.A. 184;

Gather compromising information (whether

marital, business, or petty criminal issues)

they hoped to leverage to recruit other

informants, J.A. 180, 187, 191, 209; and

Report on all charitable giving, travel plans,

and fundraising activities, J.A. 178–79, 216, as

11

well as any lectures, classes, or any other

events held at mosques, J.A. 179–80, 182, 217.

Through Monteilh, Defendants gathered “hundreds

of phone numbers and thousands of email addresses;”

“hundreds of hours of video recordings that captured

the interiors of mosques, homes, businesses, and the

associations of hundreds of people;” and “thousands of

hours of audio recordings of conversations . . . as well

as recordings of public discussion groups, classes, and

lectures.” J.A. 194.

Monteilh repeatedly recorded conversations to

which he was not a party, including religious prayer

groups in the mosque sanctuary. He did so by leaving

behind a secret recording device hidden in his car key

fob. J.A. 178, 192–93, 211. With it he recorded private

religious conversations and study groups, including

ones in which Malik and AbdelRahim participated.

J.A. 192–93, 211, 217–18. Monteilh also videorecorded sensitive locations, including mosques,

homes, and businesses using a hidden camera. J.A.

192–93, 202–03, 205. His handlers told him they were

conducting electronic surveillance in at least eight

area mosques, including Fazaga’s office, and

indicated there was no warrant for that surveillance.

J.A. 177; see also J.A. 193.

By early 2007, Plaintiffs Malik, AbdelRahim, and

other community members became frightened when

Monteilh began expressing interest in violence, as

Agents Armstrong and Allen had instructed him to

do. J.A. 89, 91–92, 98, 112–13, 195–96. Monteilh also

encouraged his “friends” to visit websites the Agents

deemed “jihadist,” so the FBI could document these

site visits and use them as leverage to pressure more

congregants to become informants. J.A. 182–83. In

May 2007, Monteilh told several community members

12

that he had access to weapons and wanted to take

violent action. J.A. 112–13. Alarmed, those

individuals told a community leader, who reported

Monteilh to the FBI. J.A. 112–13. Members of one

mosque obtained a restraining order against him.

J.A. 112–13. By October 2007, the FBI ended its work

with Monteilh. J.A. 113, 198.

The FBI revealed Monteilh’s identity as an

informant during a public court hearing in a different

case, in February 2009. J.A. 49, 114–16, 198. Once

the news spread, national news media covered it

extensively.3

Operation Flex severely harmed the religious

practice of Plaintiffs and many other people in

Southern California. Malik stopped attending the

mosque for fear of seeing Monteilh and altered his

practice to appear less religious. J.A. 90, 127.

AbdelRahim also reduced his attendance at mosques

and decreased his charitable giving to religious

organizations for fear of additional surveillance.

J.A. 133–34. Fazaga stopped offering therapist

services to community members for fear their

conversations would not be confidential. J.A. 123. All

three were subjected to repeated interrogations,

searches, and delays when traveling internationally.

J.A. 123, 127, 130, 133.

Despite the scale of this dragnet surveillance

program, Operation Flex yielded only a single

criminal prosecution of any kind: an immigration

fraud case dismissed on the Government’s motion.

J.A. 49 n.3, 62, 114–15.

See, e.g., The Convert, THIS AMERICAN LIFE (Aug. 10, 2012),

available at https://www.thisamericanlife.org/471/the-convert.

3

13

III. Procedural History

A. District Court

Plaintiffs sued the United States, the FBI, and five

individual officers who oversaw Monteilh’s actions,

alleging two types of unlawful conduct: illegal

searches under the Fourth Amendment, 50 U.S.C.

1810 (FISA), and the Federal Tort Claims Act

(“search claims”); and unlawful targeting of religion

under the First and Fifth Amendments, 42 U.S.C.

1985(3), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and

the Privacy Act (“religion claims”). J.A. 137–145.

They sought damages, declaratory relief, and

expungement or disclosure of the records of unlawful

surveillance. J.A. 146.

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ religion

claims under the state-secrets privilege. J.A. 157–64.

Defendants did not invoke state secrets as to the

search claims, explaining that “[t]he Government

does not seek dismissal of all claims at the outset

based on the privilege assertion, nor to bar disclosure

of all information concerning Operation Flex or

Monteilh’s activities.” J.A. 160. The Government

submitted a public declaration from then-Attorney

General Eric Holder, J.A. 26–40, and both public and

classified declarations from Mark Giuliano, the

Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism

Division. J.A. 41–60 (public declaration).

Attorney General Holder asserted privilege over:

(1) evidence identifying whether anyone “was or was

not the subject of an FBI counterterrorism

investigation,” (2) the “reasons for” and “results” of

any FBI counterterrorism investigation, and (3)

information “that could tend to reveal whether

particular sources and methods were used in a

14

counterterrorism investigation.” J.A. 28–29. He

stated that disclosure of such information “could

reasonably be expected to cause significant harm to

the national security.” J.A. 27.

The Giuliano Declaration stated that “[a]ddressing

plaintiffs’ allegations in this case will risk or require

the disclosure of certain sensitive information

concerning counterterrorism investigative activity in

Southern California.” J.A. 45. It also made clear that

all the secret information at issue is in the FBI’s

possession. See, e.g., J.A. 50 (“the FBI cannot publicly

disclose” identities, reasons, and sources).

In their motion to dismiss, the Government

emphasized its privilege assertion was “limited” in

two ways. J.A. 160. First, it did not assert privilege

over much of the information Monteilh collected, as

they had previously produced some of it in other

proceedings, and “expect[ed] that the majority of the

audio and video will be available in connection with

further proceedings” relating to Plaintiffs’ search

claims. J.A. 161–62.

Second, the Government sought to dismiss only the

religion claims based on the state-secrets privilege,

not the search claims. J.A. 161–62. As to the search

claims, the Government stated “At least at this stage

of the proceedings, sufficient non-privileged evidence

may be available to litigate these claims should they

otherwise survive motions to dismiss on non-privilege

grounds.” J.A. 162.

The Government’s motion seeking dismissal of

Plaintiffs’ religion claims asserted that “full and

effective litigation of” them “would risk or require the

disclosure of privileged information.” Mot. to Dismiss

(“MTD”) at 47, Fazaga, No. 8:11-cv-0031-CJC, ECF

No. 55 (citing Mohamed v. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d 1070,

15

1083 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)). It claimed “even if

plaintiffs could make a prima facie case with

nonprivileged evidence,” the evidence Defendants

required “to mount a full and effective defense . . .

would create an unjustifiable risk of revealing state

secrets.” Id. at 49 (cleaned up); see also id. at 5 (“any

rebuttal of” Plaintiffs’ religion claims would risk

disclosure of secret information). Alternatively, the

Government argued the court should order Plaintiffs

to proffer “precisely what discovery [they] intend[] to

seek against the Government.” Id. at 52.

In response, Plaintiffs disclaimed any need for

secret evidence to establish their religion claims.

Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, at 21–22, Fazaga, No. 8:11cv-0031-CJC, ECF No. 64 (hereinafter “Opp’n to

MTD”). They publicly filed four declarations from

Monteilh describing in detail the Government’s

surveillance program and how it involved Plaintiffs.

J.A. 165–219. He stated “my handlers did not give me

any specific targets, but instead told me to gather as

much information on as many people in the Muslim

community as possible,” J.A. 173, and that “when my

handlers asked me to identify individuals from

photographs, . . . when I indicated . . . that the

individual was not a Muslim, the picture was

discarded.” J.A. 182 (cleaned up). Plaintiffs also

argued dismissal would be premature, and that the

privilege was inapplicable. Opp’n to MTD at 31–40.

The district court granted the Government’s motion

to dismiss the religion claims on state-secrets

grounds, and went further, dismissing search claims

the Government had not moved to dismiss. It

dismissed all claims except for Plaintiffs’ FISA claim

under Section 1810. Pet. App. 166a.

16

Based on the Government’s classified declaration

and classified supplemental memorandum, the

district court concluded that “the Government will

inevitably need the privileged information to defend”

against Plaintiffs’ claims. Pet. App. 164–66a. In the

court’s view, this warranted dismissal for two reasons

under Ninth Circuit precedent. First, “privileged

information

provides

essential

evidence

for

Defendants’ full and effective defense against

Plaintiffs’ claims.” Pet. App. 173a–74a (emphasis in

original). Second, the court found “privileged and

nonprivileged

information

are

inextricably

intertwined,” Pet. App. 175a, and therefore “cannot

be separated as a practical matter.” Pet. App. 176a.

B. Court of Appeals

The court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in

part, and remanded. As to state secrets, the court

first ruled the district court erred in dismissing the

claims Defendants had not sought to dismiss on

privilege grounds. Pet. App. 42a–44a. Defendants

have not challenged that ruling; the search claims

remain to be litigated below.

The court of appeals also reversed the district

court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ religion claims, holding

FISA’s special review procedures displaced the

“dismissal remedy” that accompanies the statesecrets privilege under circuit precedent, at least at

this preliminary stage. Pet. App. 46a–67a.4 Instead,

FISA requires the court to undertake ex parte, in

camera review to determine whether the surveillance

The Ninth Circuit had previously held dismissal was

permissible in state-secrets privilege cases. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d

1070. Plaintiffs contend Jeppesen is wrong. See Section I, infra.

4

17

was lawfully authorized and conducted. Pet. App.

40a, 48a. FISA “speaks directly to the question

otherwise answered by federal common law”

concerning how a court should proceed in electronic

surveillance cases where the Attorney General

declares information too sensitive to disclose on

national security grounds. The court emphasized that

Plaintiffs would not be permitted to examine the

secret evidence; but that FISA required the court to

conduct ex parte, in camera review. Pet. App. 38a–

39a.

The court held that, under 50 U.S.C. 1806, FISA’s

review procedures were triggered here for two

independent reasons: (1) the Government sought to

enter into evidence or otherwise use the information

“obtained or derived from electronic surveillance” in

its defense; and (2) Plaintiffs’ Prayer for Relief

seeking expungement or return of unlawfully

obtained surveillance records “requested . . . to

‘obtain’ information gathered during or derived from

electronic surveillance.” Pet. App. 57a–58a.

The court found that “all of Plaintiffs’ legal causes

of action relate to electronic surveillance, at least for

the most part, and in nearly all instances entirely,

and thus require a determination as to the lawfulness

of the surveillance.” Pet. App. 93a (emphasis

omitted). Moreover, “1806(f) provides that the district

court may consider ‘other materials relating to the

surveillance’” as necessary to determine if it “was

lawfully authorized and conducted.” Pet. App. 94a.

And, “it is far from clear” that even the claims that

might require consideration of evidence not derived

from electronic surveillance would, “as actually

litigated . . . involve more than the electronic

surveillance that is otherwise the focus of the

lawsuit.” Pet. App. 94a. The court therefore held the

18

district court may be able to assess the lawfulness of

all the conduct Plaintiffs challenge using Section

1806(f)’s ex parte, in camera procedures.

The court therefore held that FISA displaced the

“dismissal remedy” available under circuit precedent.

It emphasized that Defendants could reassert the

privilege either if Plaintiffs seek to apply FISA’s

procedures to secret information not relating to

electronic surveillance, or if electronic surveillance

“drop[s] out of consideration” from the case. Pet. App.

95a–96a.5

The court denied Defendants’ requests for

rehearing en banc over a dissent. Pet. App. 3a. In

doing so, two members of the panel reiterated that

their decision does not require disclosure to Plaintiffs

of any secret evidence. They noted that “in the

unprecedented event that a district court does order

disclosure,” the government could reassert the

privilege “as a backstop.” Pet. App. 100a n.1 (Gould

and Berzon, JJ., concurring in denial of rehearing en

banc) (emphasis in original).

C. Proceedings on Remand

On remand, the district court ordered the parties to

address how proceedings should go forward. Resp’t

Supp. App. 1a. Plaintiffs stated their intent to seek

discovery on their search claims, including the

informant’s audio recordings of conversations to

which he was not a party, and video recordings inside

mosques and homes. Resp’t Supp. App. at 6a–8a.

5 In the event that occurred, the court of appeals instructed the

district court to apply the D.C. Circuit’s definition of “valid

defense.” Pet. App. 96a–97a. Defendants do not challenge that

aspect of the decision below.

19

Plaintiffs also stated they would move for summary

judgment on their religion claims based entirely on

publicly available information. Resp’t Supp. App. at

9a–10a, 14a–15a. The district court stayed all

proceedings.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs have asserted—and documented with

declarations from Defendants’ own informant—that

FBI agents violated their religious freedom rights by

spying on them because of their religion. In response,

Defendants rely on the state-secrets privilege to

argue for dismissal of those claims without any

adjudication of whether the Defendants’ surveillance

was unlawful. Both this Court’s state-secrets

jurisprudence and the law governing domestic

electronic surveillance prohibit that result.

1. The district court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’

religion claims under the state-secrets privilege. Like

all other privileges, the common-law state-secrets

privilege authorizes the exclusion of evidence. It

deprives all parties of the evidence withheld. As with

any privilege, its application may lead to dismissal

where the plaintiffs cannot prove their claims

without the excluded evidence, but plaintiffs must be

given the opportunity to make their case, as they

were in Reynolds itself.

The privilege does not support dismissal here.

Defendants have not sought to exclude evidence from

this case. They do not need to; only Defendants

possess the secret information at issue, and Plaintiffs

have disclaimed any intent to use it for their religious

freedom claims. Defendants instead assert that

Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed because

Defendants need to use secret information in their

20

own defense. But while the state-secrets privilege,

when properly asserted, can justify keeping

privileged information out of a case, it does not

authorize a party to win dismissal because it wants

both to keep the information secret and to use it in in

its own defense. Like other privileges, state secrets

authorizes only the exclusion of evidence, not the use

of secret evidence to dismiss claims.

Defendants’ attempt to win dismissal erroneously

conflates the evidentiary privilege recognized in

Reynolds with the distinct state-secrets justiciability

bar recognized in Totten. That bar supports

dismissal, but only for government-contracting

lawsuits where the “very subject matter” of the suit is

secret. Defendants have acknowledged that “the very

subject matter” of this case is not a secret.

Moreover, Totten’s bar derives from federal courts’

authority to fashion contractual remedies in cases

where the parties assume the risk that there may be

no judicial recourse to enforce a secret government

contract. Plaintiffs never contracted with the

Government, and never assumed the risk they would

forfeit their First Amendment rights simply by

practicing their faith. No doctrine of this Court

permits the Government to extinguish Plaintiffs’

constitutional rights under these circumstances.

Accordingly, the district court had no authority to

dismiss Plaintiffs’ religion claims at the pleading

stage. Under the common-law rule, “the privileged

information is excluded and the trial goes on without

it,” General Dynamics, 563 U.S. at 485. Plaintiffs are

entitled to the opportunity “to adduce the essential

facts . . . without resort to material touching upon”

state secrets. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11. The decision

below should be affirmed on this ground alone.

21

2. Even if the state-secrets privilege would

otherwise support dismissal here, Congress has

displaced that remedy in cases involving electronic

surveillance. FISA’s comprehensive provisions govern

all aspects of domestic electronic surveillance of U.S.

persons conducted for national security purposes.

Section 1806 requires courts to conduct ex parte, in

camera review to determine whether government

officials complied with the law in two situations

applicable here: (1) where the Government seeks to

use information obtained or derived from electronic

surveillance, see 1806(c); and (2) where U.S. persons

sue the Government plausibly alleging that they were

unlawfully surveilled, and request information

related to that surveillance, see 1806(f). In both

situations, if the Attorney General files a declaration

attesting that disclosure of the information would

threaten national security, Section 1806(f) requires

the court to review the information ex parte and in

camera to determine whether the underlying

surveillance was lawful.

Section 1806(c) applies here because the

Government says it has secret information it would

like to “use” in its defense, and has sought dismissal

of the religion claims on that basis. In support, it filed

a declaration from the Attorney General stating

disclosure of the information could threaten national

security, and also a classified declaration. Under

those circumstances, FISA requires a court to review

the information ex parte and in camera to determine

whether the underlying surveillance was lawful. It

does not permit the Government to win dismissal

without a judge determining whether it broke the

law. Allowing such dismissals would permit the

Government to escape civil liability even if it engages

22

in precisely the conduct that Congress enacted FISA

to prevent. FISA forecloses that result.

Section 1806(f) independently triggers application

of FISA’s review procedures because Plaintiffs are

“aggrieved persons”—i.e., U.S. persons whom the

Government surveilled—who have requested to

“obtain” the information the Government illegally

gathered about them. Section 1806(f) requires that,

where an American seeks to “obtain” such

information, the court must employ the same ex

parte, in camera procedure. Plaintiffs’ Prayer for

Relief, which seeks destruction or return of the

records Defendants illegally obtained, constitutes a

“request” to “obtain” “information obtained or derived

from electronic surveillance” under Section 1806(f).

Defendants propose a non-textual limitation on

Section 1806, contending that courts can use its ex

parte, in camera procedures only for “procedural

motions,” such as motions to suppress, and not to

adjudicate “the merits.” But the text contains no such

distinction, and all textual signals refute it. Courts

“shall” use Section 1806’s procedures “whenever”

their conditions are met, “notwithstanding any other

law,” in response to “any motion or request” under

“any other statute or rule,” irrespective of whether

the motion could be described as “procedural”—a

word that never appears in the statute.

Defendants’ limitation also cannot be reconciled

with Congress’s decision to create a damages remedy

for individuals subject to unlawful electronic

surveillance in Section 1810. Defendants concede they

could invoke Section 1806(f)’s procedures to defend

themselves with secret information in such a lawsuit,

but inexplicably maintain that the same is not true

for a plaintiff bringing such a suit. That is not what

23

Congress wrote. Defendants’ argument would leave

the government free to win dismissal of virtually any

Section 1810 suit simply by asserting that the

underlying conduct was secret—whether or not it was

lawful—thus nullifying the civil damages remedy

Congress created to ensure surveillance remains

constrained by law.

3. Where FISA applies, it speaks more than clearly

enough to displace the dismissal remedy of the statesecrets privilege. FISA speaks directly to the precise

concerns addressed by the privilege. The fact that it

does not explicitly use the words “state secrets” is

hardly surprising; prior to 1978, this Court and

others often referred to “national security” rather

than “state secrets” to describe the Reynolds

privilege. Accordingly, Section 1806(f) applies where

the Attorney General attests that disclosure would

harm “national security.” And it requires in camera

review rather than dismissal, “notwithstanding any

other law.”

Defendants argue applying the statute as the court

of appeals directed would give rise to constitutional

problems related to the executive’s constitutional

authority to control national security information,

but Congress clearly has authority to regulate

surveillance affecting Americans, and to establish

evidentiary rules governing civil litigation regarding

that surveillance. United States v. U.S. District Court

(Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 323–24 (1972).

Nor does FISA give rise to serious constitutional

problems for the Agent Defendants. Judges routinely

resolve many dispositive issues in national security

cases using ex parte, in camera review. And the

statute expressly accommodates any constitutional

concerns by specifying that any remedies must be “in

24

accordance with the requirements of law.” 1806(g). If

a particular remedy would be unconstitutional, the

statute itself bars it.

Finally, Defendants’ interpretation gives rise to

serious constitutional problems. They read the

statute to permit the Government to both assert that

information is secret and use it to dismiss a suit

alleging serious constitutional violations, without any

judicial determination of whether the Government

broke the law. Congress enacted FISA to constrain

precisely such assertions of unchecked Executive

power.

ARGUMENT

I.

The State-Secrets Privilege

Permit Dismissal Here

Does

Not

The court of appeals’ decision can be affirmed

without addressing the FISA issues because the

state-secrets privilege the Government asserted

authorizes only exclusion of privileged evidence, not

dismissal on the pleadings based on defendants’ need

for evidence. This Court’s cases establish two “quite

different” state-secrets doctrines. General Dynamics,

563 U.S. at 485. Defendants conflate these doctrines

throughout their brief. Neither provides the dismissal

remedy Defendants advocate here.

A. This Court’s State-Secrets Cases Do Not

Permit Dismissal Here

Reynolds recognized a common-law privilege “in

the law of evidence.” 345 U.S. at 6–7. Where it

applies, it operates like other evidentiary privileges:

“[t]he privileged information is excluded and the trial

goes on without it. . . . [T]he Court [does] not order

25

judgment in favor of the Government.” General

Dynamics, 563 U.S. at 485.

Under Reynolds, if the district court excludes secret

information, it must give Plaintiffs the opportunity to

make their case without it. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.

The common law has always required that approach;

plaintiffs occasionally succeeded on the merits

despite losing on privilege. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Gore,

[1816] Holt N.P.C. 299, 305 (plaintiff won even after

privileged material was excluded); Cooke v. Maxwell,

[1817] 2 Stark. 183, 185–86 (same); see Donohue

Amicus at 8–12.

The other state-secrets doctrine, reflected in Totten,

also does not support dismissal here. It establishes a

distinct justiciability bar for government-contracting

lawsuits “where the very subject matter of the

action . . . [i]s a matter of state secret.” Tenet, 544

U.S. at 9. As this Court’s most recent Totten decision

explained, individuals entering into such contracts

“assume[] the risk that state secrets would prevent

the adjudication of” any disputes arising from their

contracts, given their highly secret nature. General

Dynamics, 563 U.S. at 491; see also Tenet, 544 U.S. at

8 (claim barred because “success depend[ed] upon the

existence of [plaintiff’s] secret espionage relationship

with the Government”) (citing Totten).6

Where it applies, the Totten bar supports dismissal

on the pleadings, but it does not apply here.

Defendants never argued this is a nonjusticiable spycontracting case, or that its very subject matter is

secret. On the contrary, Defendants said, “The

Government does not seek dismissal of all claims at

6 Not every case involving a contract to spy necessarily requires

dismissal. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).

26

the outset based on the privilege assertion, nor to bar

disclosure of all information concerning Operation

Flex or Monteilh’s activities.” J.A. 160.

Even if Defendants had not disclaimed such

arguments, they would be meritless. The “very

subject matter” of this case is not a state secret.

Defendants have acknowledged their informant

worked for the FBI, J.A. 49–50, and represented that

they could likely make large portions of the

informant’s recordings and notes available without

threatening national security. J.A. 49. The

complaint’s allegations rest on what Plaintiffs and

others saw the informant do, as well as other

information made publicly available more than a

decade ago, including the informant’s own detailed

declarations. J.A. 165–219.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs never entered into secret

contracts with the government, and never “assumed

the risk” they would lose the right to vindicate their

Free Exercise rights just by practicing their faith.

Nor is there any risk of “graymail” presented, because

Plaintiffs have no access to any state secrets to use as

leverage. Tenet, 544 U.S. at 11. Denying them a

forum in which to present their constitutional claims

under these circumstances, absent any such implicit

waiver, poses serious constitutional problems. Cf.

Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (noting “the

‘serious constitutional question’ that would arise if a

federal statute were construed to deny any judicial

forum for a colorable constitutional claim”).

For these reasons, Defendants’ assertion that they

possess information relevant to this case would at

most support exclusion of that evidence, not

dismissal—and certainly not dismissal on the

pleadings. Plaintiffs must have the opportunity to

27

make their case without the secret information.

Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.

The district court order contravenes this Court’s

state-secrets doctrine. It ordered dismissal based

specifically on Defendants’ need for the privileged

information “to defend” themselves, and the risk that

their doing so could lead to inadvertent disclosure.

Pet. App. 166a, 172a–76a; J.A. 163. Moreover,

because the district court dismissed at the pleading

stage, it never allowed Plaintiffs to make their case

using nonprivileged evidence, as Reynolds requires,

despite Plaintiffs’ repeated assertions they could do

so. Opp’n to MTD at 21–22; Resp’t Supp. App. 14a–

15a. Thus, contrary to Defendants’ claim, the district

court’s dismissal was not the “result” of excluding

evidence. Br. 26.

Defendants argue the district court found dismissal

warranted because litigating the religion claims

would present an unacceptable risk of disclosing

secret

information

“even

without

privileged

evidence,” Br. 46, but the district court made no such

finding. It found that “the Government will inevitably

need the privileged information to defend against

Plaintiffs’ [religion claims].” Pet. App. 166a. While

the district court noted that secret and non-secret

information were “inextricably intertwined,” Pet.

App. 158a, 175a, it was referring to the Government’s

evidence; its rationale was that “any rebuttal against”

Plaintiffs’ allegations would create the risk of

disclosure. Pet. App. 158a (emphasis added); 172a–

74a (same).

In any event, this Court’s cases do not support

dismissal based on an “unacceptable risk” that

litigation will disclose secret information even where

Plaintiffs intend neither to seek nor submit it.

28

Rather, the privilege permits the court to eliminate

any such risk by simply excluding all the privileged

evidence

and

any

non-privileged

evidence

“intertwined” with it. Here, that process would be

straightforward, as neither Plaintiffs nor the

informant possesses any state secrets, let alone the

particular secret information over which the

Government asserts privilege. Only the FBI holds the

secrets here; there is no risk that Plaintiffs will

disclose them. J.A. 50 (“the FBI cannot publicly

disclose” identities, reasons, and sources); J.A. 52

(“The FBI seeks to protect . . . information that would

confirm or deny” those facts); J.A. 59 (same as to

sources and methods).

B. The Pre-Reynolds Common Law Does

Not Permit Dismissal Here

Comprehensive review of the common-law statesecrets authorities, including every authority cited in

Reynolds, confirms they would not permit dismissal

here. 345 U.S. at 7 n.11, 15. With the exception of

Totten—which rests on a distinct doctrine, as both

Tenet and General Dynamics explained—in every

state-secrets case Reynolds cites, and every case on

which those cases rely, if the privilege is sustained

the evidence is excluded and the case proceeds

without it. Dismissals occur only when the plaintiffs

cannot make their case without the excluded

evidence; never because the defendant needs to use

the evidence or because there is an “unacceptable

risk” of inadvertent disclosure.

The American cases Reynolds cites confirm this.

See Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co.,

199 F. 353, 356 (E.D. Pa. 1912) (court ordered

“expunging the exhibits in question from the record,”

29

not dismissal); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F.

Supp. 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) (motion to compel

denied, no dismissal); Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.

R. D. 203, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (court conducted ex

parte, in camera review in response to privilege

assertion, granted motion to compel); Bank Line Ltd.

v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 587, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1946)

(court reaffirmed prior order granting motion to

compel production of Navy record); In re Grove, 180

F. 62, 70 (3d Cir. 1910) (reversing contempt order

where witness had refused to produce documents

deemed secret by the Navy, without regard to

underlying litigation).

The secondary sources cited in Reynolds also

confirm Plaintiffs’ understanding. William Sanford

described the privilege as applicable where “[a] public

interest demands that such matters be beyond the

reach of court processes for production or disclosure,”

without mentioning a remedy permitting defendants

to seek dismissal based on their need to use their own

privileged information. William Sanford, Evidentiary

Privileges Against the Production of Data Within the

Control of Executive Departments, 3 Vanderbilt L.

Rev. 73, 75 (1949) (emphasis added). And no example

cited in Sanford, Wigmore, or Greenleaf involves

dismissal even where the plaintiff could make their

case without privileged evidence. See, e.g., H.M.S.

Bellerophon, [1875] 44 LJR 5–9 (cited in Wigmore)

(excluding evidence and then resolving the merits for

defendants); Rex v. Watson, [1817] 2 Stark. 116, 148,

159 (excluding evidence defendant sought; defendant

ultimately acquitted); Worthington v. Scribner, 109

Mass. 487 (1872) (cited in Greenleaf) (extensively

reviewing English and American privilege cases

without ever mentioning dismissal, and concluding

30

that reports of potential criminal activity could not be

sought by interrogatory).

The British cases Reynolds referenced (in footnote

15) are in accord. Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co.,

[1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.), upholds a privilege claim

against a subpoena for documents in a private party

suit, without dismissal. Duncan cites many other

cases, none of which support dismissal on

Defendants’ theory. See, e.g., Wyatt, supra.

C. The Few Lower Court Cases Permitting

Dismissal Where Defendants Seek to Use

Privileged Evidence to Defend Themselves Precede General Dynamics, and

Are Wrong or Inapplicable

Defendants rely on a few lower court decisions that

conflated Reynolds and Totten prior to General

Dynamics. Br. 26 (citing, inter alia, El-Masri v.

United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); Jeppesen,

614 F.3d 1070). But as General Dynamics makes

clear, those cases were wrongly decided. El-Masri and

Jeppesen held the Government could win dismissal at

the pleading stage in cases not involving government

contracts where either the defendants needed secret

evidence to defend themselves, or where secret and

non-secret evidence were so “inseparable” as to create

an “unacceptable risk” that state secrets would be

revealed through discovery. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at

1083 (citing El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 308). While those

rationales might have made sense as further

exercises of courts’ “common-law authority to fashion

contractual remedies in Government-contracting

disputes,” General Dynamics, 563 U.S. at 485, they

have no basis in Reynolds or any other privilege law,

31

and therefore no application outside the contracting

context.7

Although the D.C. Circuit has also dismissed cases

following an invocation of the state-secrets privilege

where the Government asserts a need for secret

information to defend itself, it has required

defendants to show they have a “meritorious”

defense, not merely a “possible” or “plausible” one. In

re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 149–50 (D.C. Cir.

2007)). As a result, such dismissals do not occur at

the pleading stage, but only after the court

undertakes ex parte, in camera review to resolve

whether the defendant acted lawfully in light of

plaintiff’s claims. For example, Molerio v. FBI

reviewed secret materials to determine, after “in

camera consideration of the state-secrets privilege,”

that plaintiff’s First Amendment and Privacy Act

claims were “properly dismissed” on the merits. 749

F.2d 815, 822, 825–26 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.).

The court held it would be a “mockery of justice for

the court—knowing the erroneousness” of plaintiff’s

claims, to nonetheless rule for plaintiff. Id. at 825.8

Defendants cite two other circuit cases, but they offer little

support for Defendants’ approach. Black v. United States upheld

a state-secrets dismissal with minimal explanation. It appears

the court may have found sufficient the district court’s

conclusion that, without the privileged evidence, the plaintiff

could not make a prima facie case. 62 F.3d 1115, 1118–19 (8th

Cir. 1995). This is standard privilege procedure. Tenenbaum v.

Simonini conclusorily states that the court “reviewed the

materials Defendants produced under seal” and determined that

their exclusion “deprived Defendants of a valid defense.” It

therefore appears to have determined that plaintiffs’ claim

failed on the merits. 372 F.3d 776, 777 (6th Cir. 2004).

8 These cases do not explain why their rationale would not apply

to other privileges, where the traditional rule requires exclusion

7

32

This Court need not decide if the common law

permits the D.C. Circuit’s innovation, because

Defendants have not asserted the secret information

would exonerate them—i.e., prove that religion

played no motivating part in their decision to surveil

Plaintiffs, or that their use of a religious classification

was sufficiently tailored to satisfy strict scrutiny. The

court of appeals instructed the district court to permit

the Government to do so on remand, should it reassert the state-secrets privilege. Pet. App. 96a–97a.

Finally, even were this Court to take the

unprecedented step of ratifying El-Masri and

Jeppesen’s transmogrified “privilege” doctrine, the

district court acted prematurely in applying it here.

Given Defendants’ acknowledgment that “the

majority” of Monteilh’s audio and video recordings

likely need not remain secret, J.A. 162, the court

should have permitted the case to proceed. Indeed,

the Government suggested this as an alternative

remedy in its own dismissal motion. J.A. 163–64

(arguing that the court should dismiss the Agent

Defendants while allowing Plaintiffs to propose

discovery against the Government).

A district court cannot apply Reynolds without

knowing what secret information could be disclosed.

The Government’s speculative assertion that certain

kinds of information may eventually be relevant to its

defense is no substitute for the court’s consideration

irrespective of which side benefits. As Judge Learned Hand

explained, the “grievous hardship” that sometimes follows the

exclusion of evidence is “a consequence of any evidentiary

privilege.” United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir.

1950). It may be relevant that both Sealed Case and Molerio

involve individuals who either worked for or sought to work for

the government in positions involving sensitive information.

33

of the actual information the Government would seek

to use—whether through a specific description of it or

review of the actual evidence. The Attorney General’s

declaration confirms dismissal was premature, as it

does not state that he personally examined the

allegedly secret information the Government would

have to use, as opposed to just “the matter.” See J.A.

27. Compare Duncan, A.C. at 625 (head of

department “should have seen and considered the

contents of the documents”) (emphasis added).

The state-secrets privilege is concerned with

preventing the disclosure of secret information. Here,

because Plaintiffs disclaimed any intention to seek

secret information, the Government has complete

control over any risk of disclosure. Neither law nor

logic permit it to win dismissal at the pleading stage

based on the risk that its own actions could disclose

state secrets.9

II. If the State-Secrets Privilege Otherwise

Authorizes Dismissal, FISA Displaces It,

and Requires Ex Parte, In Camera Review

Rather Than Dismissal

Even if the state-secrets privilege would otherwise

provide for dismissal here, the decision below

correctly concluded that FISA has displaced that

remedy through its comprehensive, exclusive

framework for litigation concerning domestic

electronic surveillance undertaken for national

security purposes.

Plaintiffs preserved this ground for affirmance. See Opp’n.

Cert at 3. It is also encompassed within the question presented,

which does not define the “state-secrets privilege.”

9

34

Congress might have simply deprived all parties of

the use of secret information in surveillance cases—

as under common law—or it might have allowed

courts to dismiss suits where the Government

claimed it needed secret information to defend itself,

as Defendants seek here. However, having uncovered

widespread “abuses of domestic national security

surveillance[]”

that

“demonstrate[d]

the

inappropriateness of relying solely on executive

branch discretion to safeguard civil liberties,” H.R.

Rep. No. 95-1283, at 21, Congress rejected those

options in favor of a middle path that would protect

national security while giving courts ultimate

responsibility to ensure surveillance remained

constrained by law.

That path included a civil damages remedy. See 50

U.S.C. 1810. Congress recognized the statute’s rules

for litigation included “[r]equirements to disclose

certain information . . . [that] might force the

Government to dismiss the case (or concede the case,

if it were a civil suit against it) to avoid disclosure,”

but nonetheless enacted those procedures to ensure

that challenges to surveillance conducted in violation

of FISA could go forward. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, at

94.

FISA requires district courts to use its ex parte, in

camera review procedures whenever (1) the

Government claims it needs to enter into evidence or

otherwise use information that the Attorney General

asserts must remain secret to protect national

security, or (2) a civil litigant seeks to obtain such

secret information as part of a suit plausibly alleging

unlawful surveillance. Because both conditions apply

here, the district court should have conducted ex

parte review, rather than granting dismissal.

35

A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Triggers

FISA’s Special Review Procedures Under

Sections 1806(c) and (f)

Defendants’ motion to dismiss triggers FISA’s ex

parte, in camera review procedures because

Defendants seek to “enter into evidence or otherwise

use” secret information obtained through electronic

surveillance to dismiss Plaintiffs’ religion claims. 50

U.S.C. 1806(c).

The statute’s terms are clear and mandatory.

Section 1806(c) requires the Government to notify the

court and the aggrieved person “whenever” it intends

to “enter into evidence or otherwise use” information

obtained or derived from electronic surveillance.

Section 1806(f) requires that “whenever a court . . . is

notified,” and “the Attorney General [has] file[d] an

affidavit . . . that disclosure or an adversary hearing

would harm the national security of the United

States,” the “district court . . . shall, notwithstanding

any other law . . . review in camera and ex parte the

application, order, and such other materials relating

to the surveillance as may be necessary to determine

whether the surveillance of the aggrieved person was

lawfully authorized and conducted.”

Here, Defendants stated they would need to “enter

into evidence or otherwise use” such information. Pet.

App. 56a–58a; see also MTD at 49. And the Holder

Declaration states that “disclosure of [the secret]

information . . . could reasonably be expected to cause

significant harm to the national security,” J.A. 27.

Therefore, Section 1806(f) requires that the court

review the information ex parte and in camera to

determine “whether the surveillance . . . was lawfully

authorized and conducted.”

36

Defendants’ motion seeking dismissal based on

their need to rely on secret information—including

the submission of a classified declaration to support

that request—notified the court of their intent to use

and was itself a use of that information. “Use” means

“to put into action or service.” Use, Webster’s New

Collegiate Dictionary 1288 (1977) (hereinafter

“Webster’s”). By relying on secret information to

support their motion to dismiss, Defendants “put[] [it]

into service” to win dismissal.

That Section 1806(c) adds the word “otherwise”

before “use” underscores that Congress meant “use”

capaciously. “Otherwise” is a catch-all, enlarging the

actions to which “use” refers. Otherwise, Webster’s

813 (defining “otherwise” as including “a different

way or manner,” “in different circumstances,” and “in

other respects”).

The statute’s separation of “otherwise use” from

both “enter into evidence” and “disclose” also

supports a broad understanding of “use.” “If a

provision is susceptible of (1) a meaning that gives it

an effect already achieved by another provision, or

that deprives another provision of all independent

effect, and (2) another meaning that leaves both

provisions with some independent operation, the

latter should be preferred.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan

A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal

Texts (hereinafter “Reading Law”) 176 (2012). FISA

expressly contemplates that the Government may

“use” secret information even without “enter[ing] it

into evidence” or “disclos[ing]” that information. That

is precisely what Defendants have done here: they

are “using” the information to secure dismissal by

relying on it as the factual predicate for their motion.

Defendants’ contrary interpretation of the statute

fails to give “use” distinct meaning. Br. 36 (conflating

37

“use” of evidence with “introducing” it); Br. 37

(conflating “use” with “disclose”).

By the same token, Defendants’ motion expresses

intent to “enter [the secret information] into

evidence,” as their motion to dismiss is predicated on

their own need to rely on secret information to defend

themselves. J.A. 163 (“any rebuttal of [Plaintiffs’

religion] claim would risk or require disclosure of

[secret information]”); J.A. 163–64 (arguing Agent

Defendants could not litigate Bivens and qualified

immunity defenses absent privileged information).

FISA speaks directly to that scenario by requiring the

court to conduct ex parte, in camera review to

determine whether the surveillance from which the

secret information derives was lawful, rather than

simply dismissing in order to keep the information

secret.

Defendants assert they merely seek to prevent

introduction or disclosure of the information. Br. 18,

25. But because only Defendants possess the

information, they do not need to assert privilege to

keep it secret. They can simply choose not to rely on

it. Their reliance on the information to seek

dismissal, even where Plaintiffs have stated their

own case rests wholly on public information,

constitutes more than mere exclusion.

Where, as here, the Government triggers FISA’s

procedures, they are mandatory, and displace all

options otherwise available to the court. Section

1806(f) applies “notwithstanding any other law.” The

common law is “other law.” See, e.g., Rubin v.

Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816, 824 (2018)

(“notwithstanding any other provision of law”

abrogates

common-law

sovereign

immunity);

Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478

38

U.S. 833, 846–47 (1986) (“notwithstanding” clause

encompasses common-law debt claims); United States

v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 390–91

(1980) (“notwithstanding” clause abrogates commonlaw res judicata).

In addition, Section 1806(f) commands that courts

“shall” use its procedures. “Shall” means “must”— it

imposes an “unequivocal mandate,” Jennings v.

Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 834, 835 (2018), and

precludes “further refinement” through common-law

adjudication. General Dynamics, 563 U.S. at 491. And

both Sections 1806(c) and (f) apply “whenever”—i.e.,

“at any or every time that”—their conditions are met.

Whenever, Webster’s 1333.

Thus, because Defendants’ motion to dismiss rests

on their own asserted need to “enter into evidence or

otherwise use” secret information, FISA requires that

the district court “shall” conduct ex parte, in camera

review.10

10 Nothing in the decision below requires the Government to

produce information on which it chooses not to rely. Pet. App.

57a (FISA procedures triggered because “the Government would

like to use this information to defend itself”). Defendants’

assertion that they would be forced to disclose secret

information if Plaintiffs prevail also misreads the decision

below. Br. 47. Plaintiffs have requested destruction or return of

the illegally obtained records. Compelled disclosure would only

occur if Defendants declined to destroy the evidence, and even

then Defendants would have a further opportunity to object to

public disclosure on state-secrets grounds. Pet. App. 100a n.1.

39

B. Plaintiffs’

Prayer

for

Relief

Independently Triggers FISA’s Special

Review Procedures Under Section

1806(f)

The court of appeals also correctly held that

Section 1806(f)’s catch-all provision independently

requires ex parte, in camera review here because

Plaintiffs requested return of the illegally obtained

surveillance in their Prayer for Relief.

Section 1806(f) requires that courts employ its ex

parte, in camera review procedures not just when the

Government provides notice of intent to use secret

information under 1806(c), or a litigant files a motion

to suppress such information under 1806(e), but also

“whenever . . . any motion or request is made by an

aggrieved

person

...

to

obtain

...

information . . . derived from electronic surveillance,”

and the Attorney General responds with a

declaration seeking to shield it. Plaintiffs’ Prayer for

Relief seeking “destr[uction] or return [of] any

information

gathered

through

the

unlawful

surveillance program” constitutes a “request”

triggering Section 1806(f)’s procedures. Pet. App. 58a.

Plaintiffs’ Prayer is, literally, a “request” that seeks

to “obtain” information “obtained or derived from”

electronic surveillance. Black’s Law Dictionary

defines “prayer for relief” as “[a] request addressed to

the court . . . esp. . . . for specific relief.” Prayer for

Relief, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968).

Defendants do not dispute that if Plaintiffs were to

prevail on their claim that the surveillance was

40

unlawful, their Prayer would entitle them to seek

destruction or return of the evidence.11

Thus, Plaintiffs’ Prayer independently requires

ex parte, in camera review to determine whether the

surveillance at issue was lawful.

C. Defendants’ Objections Are Meritless

In the face of Section 1806’s clear and mandatory

textual directive, Defendants argue that its

procedures do not apply, and that they should

therefore win outright dismissal under the statesecrets privilege. But their argument ignores the

broad meaning of “use” and relies on non-textual

limitations they would superimpose on the statute’s

plain language. Their position also cannot be

reconciled with other provisions of the statute, in

particular Section 1810. Having established a

comprehensive system for judicial oversight of

domestic electronic surveillance undertaken for

national security purposes, Congress did not then

allow the government to evade that system simply by

invoking state secrets.

1. Defendants’ Interpretation of “Use”

Contravenes Its Ordinary Meaning

Defendants object that they do not seek to “use” the

secret information to win dismissal, but their

arguments fail. They first contend their invocation of

the state-secrets privilege does not “use” secret

information by analogizing to the assertion of other

privileges, such as the attorney-client or marital11 Defendants have not challenged the court of appeals’ holding

that expungement remains available “to vindicate constitutional

rights.” Pet. App. 67a.

41

communications privilege. Br. 25. But defendants

who assert attorney-client privilege in a lawsuit

cannot obtain dismissal because they need to use

their own privileged communications to defend

themselves, or might disclose them by accident. As

explained above, Defendants do not merely seek to

exclude the evidence; they seek to use it to win

dismissal.

Defendants next argue they asserted the privilege

“not as a litigant” against aggrieved persons, but

instead “to safeguard the public interest,” Br. 27. But,

as explained above, Defendants could keep the

information secret without asserting the privilege.

They chose instead to seek dismissal precisely so they

could, “as a litigant,” use that information to prevail

against Plaintiffs’ religious freedom claims. In any

event, Section 1806(c) refers only to use by “the

Government,” not to “litigants,” and Defendants have

assuredly used the information to assert the privilege

“against” Plaintiffs, as they sought dismissal of

Plaintiffs’ religion claims.

Defendants next argue that seeking dismissal “at

most” constitutes a use of the privilege, rather than

the information, Br. 27, but this fails for the same

reason: they are using the information to win

dismissal, not just trying to keep it secret. And the

fact that the Government requested dismissal of

claims to which it was not initially a party changes

nothing. Br. 26. Its motion puts secret information

“into service” to win their dismissal.

2. Defendants’ Non-Textual Limitation

on Section 1806(f) Cannot Be

Squared With Its Plain Text

Defendants next propose a non-textual limitation

on Section 1806(f): they ask the Court to interpret its

42

review procedures to apply only to “procedural”

motions related to “admissibility and suppression of

evidence.” Br. 21, 23. On their view, Congress did not

intend courts to use Section 1806(f)’s ex parte, in

camera review procedures to determine whether the

government’s surveillance was lawfully authorized

and conducted where that question goes to “the

merits” of whether the government violated federal

law.

Defendants never define “procedural” or explain

why neither their motion to dismiss nor Plaintiffs’

Prayer qualifies, but their argument fails for a more

basic reason: the text must govern, not what

Defendants believe Congress contemplated. Statutory

text governs even where Congress indisputably did

not contemplate a particular application. “The fact

that a statute has been applied in situations not

expressly anticipated by Congress does not

demonstrate ambiguity, but rather the breadth of a

legislative command.” Bostock v. Clayton County, 140

S Ct. 1731, 1749 (2020) (cleaned up). Thus, even if

Congress did not contemplate that motions to dismiss

based on state secrets would trigger Section 1806(c),

or that requests for return of illegally obtained

evidence would trigger Section 1806(f), that would

not justify ignoring the words Congress wrote.

“[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond the

principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils,

and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather

than the principal concerns of our legislators by

which we are governed.” Oncale v. Sundowner

Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).

Section 1806(f) simply does not distinguish

between “procedural motions” and the “merits.” It

mandates ex parte, in camera review “whenever” the

Government seeks to “use” secret information or any

43

aggrieved person “requests” it. And it requires the

court to determine whether surveillance was

“lawfully authorized and conducted” “whenever”

those conditions apply, not just when the question

affects admissibility. Its terms foreclose the nontextual limitation the Government proposes.

Nor does any other provision support Defendants’

view. On the contrary, Section 1806(g) confirms

Section 1806(f)’s breadth. If the court finds the

surveillance unlawful, it “shall, in accordance with

the requirements of law, suppress the evidence . . . or

otherwise grant the motion of the aggrieved person.”

50 U.S.C. 1806(g). Thus, if the Court finds the

surveillance here unlawful, it must “suppress” the

evidence on which the Government says it needs to

rely, thereby prohibiting its use for any purpose—not

reward the Government with dismissal of claims

because it acted in secret when it broke the law. See

Suppress, Webster’s 1171 (defining “suppress” as,

inter alia, “to exclude from consciousness”).12

Similarly, when Plaintiffs move for summary

judgment, if Defendants decide to rely on their secret

information for their defense by submitting it for ex

parte, in camera review, the court will decide if the

surveillance was lawful. If it was not, then the court

shall, “in accordance with the requirements of law,”

grant Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion and other

12 While suppression is most often discussed in criminal cases,

the term has long also applied in civil contexts, including to

motions to suppress evidence gathered in discovery. See, e.g.,

Cogen v. United States, 278 U.S. 221, 223–24 (1929) (referencing

civil motions “to secure or to suppress evidence”); Grant

Brothers Constr. Co. v. United States, 232 U.S. 647, 662 (1914)

(affirming denial of “motion to suppress certain depositions”

read into evidence in civil case).

44

appropriate relief. 50 U.S.C. 1806(g). The flexible

remedial authority in Section 1806(g) confirms

Section 1806(f)’s breadth.13

Defendants invoke two canons—noscitur a sociis

and ejusdem generis, Br. 29–31—to support their

proposed limitation of Section 1806(f) to procedural

motions. But neither applies absent ambiguity.

“When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then,

this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is

complete.” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S.

438, 462 (2002) (cleaned up).

In any event, the canons do not support

Defendants’ non-textual limitation. Defendants cite

noscitur a sociis and Section 1806(g)’s use of “motion”

to argue that “request” must be similar to “motion,”

which they further limit to “procedural” motions. Br.

29. But the statute refers capaciously to “any” motion

or request pursuant to “any other statute or rule,” not

just to “procedural” motions. The canon cannot limit

such unambiguous catch-all language. Compare

United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 474 (2010)

(rejecting noscitur where statute was unambiguous)

with Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, __ F.4th

__, No. 20-1191, slip op. at 37–38 (4th Cir. Sept. 15,

2021) (invoking noscitur to limit “any,” while ignoring

“other”).

Ejusdem generis is also inapplicable. There is no

need “to ensure that a general word will not render

specific words meaningless” in Section 1806(f),

because it expressly uses the words “any” and “other”

to make clear that it is a catch-all. CSX Transp., Inc.

v. Alabama Dep’t of Revenue, 562 U.S. 277, 295

13 Orders granting such relief are final and therefore appealable.

See 50 U.S.C. 1806(h).

45

(2011). Moreover, the canon does not limit the fourth

of the four long, separate paragraphs at 1806(c)–(f).

Every example of ejusdem generis Defendants cite,

and every example in Reading Law, involves a list of

words or phrases, not separate lengthy paragraphs.

Cf. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 615 (1995)

(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

(ejusdem generis applies to “a general or collective

term following a list of specific items to which a

particular statutory command is applicable”);

Reading Law, at 199–206.14

Defendants raise several practical concerns they

say warrant adopting their non-textual limitation.

First, they argue that FISA’s text cannot govern

because it would require district courts to conduct

secret trials. Br. 32. But the statute merely requires

that district courts determine the legality of

surveillance ex parte and in camera, as they have for

decades under FISA. In some cases, the district

court’s determination will require suppression, while

in others it might justify discovery, cf. Alderman v.

United States, 394 U.S. 165, 181–82 (1969),

destruction of illegally obtained evidence, or some

other relief. The statute’s text contains no limitation

14 Wikimedia recently misused ejusdem generis to narrow

Section 1806(f)’s catch-all provision, holding that it applies only

when an aggrieved person makes a request in response to the

government’s attempt to use FISA evidence. Wikimedia, slip op.

at 38. The court believed a broader reading would render the

second clause of Section 1806(f)—which refers to motions to

suppress pursuant to Section 1806(e)—meaningless. See id. But

construing the catch-all provision to encompass requests by

plaintiffs in civil litigation, including Plaintiffs’ Prayer for

Relief, would not render 1806(e) meaningless. The catch-all

contains the word “other,” and therefore applies to motions or

requests pursuant to any statute or rule “other” than Section

1806(e).

46

on the types of motions courts must resolve using

Section 1806(f)’s procedures and limits the relief only

insofar as it must be in “accordance with . . . law.”

Second, Defendants contend applying the statute

as written requires district courts to use Section

1806(f) to “award judgment,” Br. 32, but it does not.

Just as a finding that the only probative evidence

against a criminal defendant must be suppressed

does not by itself “award judgment” for the defense,

so FISA simply requires that the court determine

whether the surveillance was lawful, and then grant

any relief “in accordance with the requirements of

law,” as the context of the particular case demands.15

Defendants next characterize as novel the court of

appeals’ view that FISA could be used to adjudicate

the lawfulness of government surveillance in civil

litigation. Br. 21. But that was the Government’s

position when the ACLU sued the Attorney General

under Section 1810 for allegedly unlawful

surveillance. ACLU Found. of So. Cal. v. Barr, 952

F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The Government’s brief in

Barr maintained that courts should use Section

1806(f)’s review procedures to resolve questions

concerning “the legality of the surveillance” “in

administrative, civil, or criminal proceedings” where

FISA-derived evidence is sought for use. Br. of

Appellees at 15, No. 90-5261 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 24, 1991).

The Government never suggested Section 1806(f) was

limited to cases where the government sought to

introduce FISA-derived evidence against the

15 Proposing still another non-textual limit, Defendants argue

that Section 1806’s title, “Use of Information,” should be

interpreted to cover only the Government’s intended use. Br. 29–

30. But the plain meaning of “use” without further limitation

includes use by any party.

47

plaintiffs. Rather, it stated “Section 1806(f) provides

that district courts are to determine if surveillance

was lawfully authorized and conducted whenever any

person who was overheard moves or requests before

any authority of the United States to discover or

obtain materials relating to electronic surveillance

under the FISA.” Id. at 38 (emphasis added).

Agreeing with the Government, the D.C. Circuit

found Section 1806(f)’s procedures applicable in

constitutional challenges to unlawful surveillance:

“Congress also anticipated that issues regarding the

legality of FISA-authorized surveillance would arise

in civil proceedings and . . . empowered federal

district courts to resolve those issues, ex parte and in

camera whenever the Attorney General files an

appropriate affidavit under § 1806(f) . . . .” 952 F.2d

at 470. As Barr recognized, “the normal rules

regarding discovery must be harmonized with . . .

§ 1806(f).” Id. at 469.

Defendants also cite the Classified Information

Procedures Act (CIPA), by way of contrast, to argue

that Congress would have provided more guidance if

it intended FISA’s special procedures to be used in

civil litigation. Br. 32–33. But this Court cannot

ignore the statute’s plain text because of a perceived

deficiency in the level of detail it provides. Moreover,

this argument proves too much, as CIPA provides

more detail than FISA even for criminal cases, where

Defendants concede FISA applies.

The notion that Congress did not intend for its

evidentiary procedures to be used by plaintiffs in civil

litigation is also directly refuted in the legislative

history. Defendants cherry-pick quotes from Senate

reports to suggest Section 1806(f) was intended only

48

for suppression, so the government could always

avoid ex parte, in camera review by choosing to “forgo

the use of the surveillance-based evidence.” Br. 31,

40. But Congress did not enact the Senate’s version of

Section 1806. The House passed a different version,

and when the conference committee reconciled the

bills, it “agree[d] that an in camera and ex parte

proceeding is appropriate . . . in both criminal and

civil cases.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-1720, at 31–32

(emphasis added). The conferees also amended the

Senate’s version of Section 1806(g) to add that if a

court finds surveillance unlawful, it must either

suppress evidence “or otherwise grant the motion of

the aggrieved person.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-1720, at 14

(emphasis added). Thus, they adopted the House’s

understanding that “[r]equirements to disclose

certain information . . . might force the Government

to dismiss the case (or concede the case, if it were a

civil suit against it) to avoid disclosure.” H.R. Rep.

No. 95-1283, at 94 (emphasis added). The legislative

history thus confirms that Section 1806(f) applies

where civil plaintiffs challenge unlawful surveillance

and seek secret information in furtherance of their

claims. Compare S. Rep. No. 95-701, at 88–89 with

H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, at 10–11 and 50 U.S.C. 1806(g)

(adopting House language).

3. Defendants’ Limiting Construction

Would Eviscerate the Civil Remedy

Congress Created in Section 1810

Defendants’ construction also cannot be reconciled

with a key feature of FISA’s structure: the civil

damages remedy in Section 1810. Cf. Reading Law,

at 167 (courts should “consider the entire text, in

view of . . . [the] logical relation of its many parts”).

Defendants acknowledge that Congress meant to

“creat[e] a private cause of action for damages” in

49

1810 to remedy unlawful electronic surveillance, Br.

41, but their construction eviscerates that remedy by

permitting the Government to win dismissal of

virtually all such suits by invoking state secrets. See

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625

(1978) (even where statute is not comprehensive, it

displaces common law that would otherwise render it

toothless).

In 50 U.S.C. 1810, Congress provided victims of

unlawful surveillance a civil damages remedy.

Because FISA surveillance is authorized and

conducted in secret, and because Section 1810

permits litigation to challenge unlawful FISA

surveillance, Congress no doubt understood that

many Section 1810 suits would involve information

that, if disclosed, might harm national security. It

therefore required courts to use FISA’s ex parte, in

camera review procedures to resolve such suits.

Defendants’ one-sided view of Section 1806(f)

maintains that the Government can use its ex parte

procedures in Section 1810 suits, Br. 33, but

Plaintiffs cannot. Indeed, on Defendants’ theory, the

same information would be available for the

Government’s use through ex parte, in camera

review, but not available to plaintiffs. According to

Defendants, the statute provides no mechanism for

plaintiffs to obtain ex parte, in camera review of

secret information to pursue 1810 suits.

But the text makes no distinction between requests

by the Government and requests by plaintiffs. As the

court of appeals recognized, “[i]t would make no sense

for Congress to pass a comprehensive law concerning

foreign intelligence surveillance, expressly enable

aggrieved persons to sue for damages when that

surveillance is unauthorized, see id. § 1810, and

50

provide procedures deemed adequate for the review of

national security-related evidence, see id. § 1806(f),

but not intend for those very procedures to be used

when an aggrieved person sues [under 1810].” Pet.

App. 61a. Nor can Defendants explain why Congress

would have wanted courts to use FISA’s procedures if

the Government requests information, but not if

plaintiffs request that same material.16

Defendants object that Sections 1806(f) and 1810

do not cross-reference each other, Br. 33, but that is

hardly surprising given that Section 1806(f) applies

not just to 1810 suits, but broadly to all motions or

requests under “any” statute or rule seeking

information derived from electronic surveillance.

Similarly, Section 1810 creates civil liability for

unlawful surveillance under several provisions

outside the chapter containing FISA. See Section

1809(a)(1).

Most important, if Defendants’ reading of Section

1806(f) were correct, the Government could adopt a

secret warrantless surveillance program in blatant

contravention of FISA’s constraints, knowing that it

could use the state-secrets privilege to win dismissal

of Section 1810 suits against that program. Cf. J.A.

162 (Defendants suggesting they may eventually

invoke privilege to “foreclose litigation of [the Fourth

Amendment and FISA claims]”). This would render

Section 1810 toothless against the very abuses

Congress enacted FISA to prevent, undermining

16 Defendants’ theory also cannot explain why Congress believed

the statute’s “requirements to disclose certain information”

might force the Government to “concede . . . a civil suit against

it.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, at 94. If Section 1806(f) were only for

the Government’s use, it would never have to concede an 1810

suit to avoid disclosing information to a court.

51

Congress’s determination that “the statutory rule of

law must prevail in the area of foreign intelligence

surveillance.” S. Rep. No. 95-604, at 7; cf. 50 U.S.C. 1812

(prohibiting non-statutory electronic surveillance).17

Defendants note that other doctrines (besides state

secrets) may also sometimes bar litigation

challenging national security measures, Br. 34, but

this grossly understates the problem their

construction creates. Whereas standing, sovereign

immunity, and other doctrines make civil rights

litigation more difficult in some contexts, FISA

surveillance by definition occurs for national security

purposes and virtually always involves secret

information. Defendants’ construction of Section

1806(f) would give the Government a tool to dismiss

nearly all 1810 suits, even where (as here) Plaintiffs

can establish standing and face no sovereign

immunity or other barriers. That result provides a

strong reason to reject Defendants’ view. Congress

wanted Americans to obtain civil remedies for

unlawful surveillance, as Section 1810’s enactment

itself shows. The Court should reject any reading that

gives the Government complete control over the

outcome of such suits.18

For similar reasons, Defendants’ construction of Section

1806(f) would also eviscerate the remedy in 18 U.S.C. 2712 for

FISA violations. Congress enacted that provision in 2001 to

provide a further remedy for the misuse of information obtained

through surveillance. Like Section 1810, it requires district

courts to use Section 1806(f)’s ex parte, in camera review

procedures to review secret FISA information when determining

whether the government’s conduct was unlawful. 18 U.S.C.

2712(b)(4).

18 Defendants do not press Judge Bumatay’s view that Section

1806(c) does not apply even when the Government seeks to use

secret information in civil suits. On his view, the provision

17

52

*

*

*

For these reasons, the text, structure, and history

of Section 1806 make clear that it governs this case.

III. FISA Speaks Clearly to Displace Any

“Dismissal Remedy” That the State-Secrets

Privilege Might Otherwise Authorize

Section 1806’s broad and unequivocal language

easily satisfies any applicable standard for

congressional displacement of the dismissal remedy

that, according to Defendants, accompanies the statesecrets privilege. “[W]e start with the assumption

that it is for Congress, not federal courts, to

articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as

a matter of federal law.” City of Milwaukee v. Illinois

& Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (cleaned up).

Therefore, FISA need only “speak[] directly to the

question at issue.” Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v.

Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 423–24 (2011). However,

even if the Court were to conclude that Congress

must use “clear and explicit” language to displace the

privilege’s dismissal remedy in this setting, Br. 42, it

has done so.

applies only in proceedings “against an aggrieved person,” which

he believes requires that person to be a defendant. Pet. App.

129a–30a (citing Section 1806(c)). But as Defendants rightly

recognize, Section 1806(c) applies when the information is used

“against the Section 1810 plaintiff,” Br. 33, and the same is true

for plaintiffs suing under other causes of action. It is the use of

the information that must be “against an aggrieved person,” not

the lawsuit itself. This interpretation does not render “against

an aggrieved person” surplusage. Pet. App. 130a n.11. The

phrase makes clear that Section 1806(f) does not apply if the

Government seeks to use secret information against someone

who makes no claim they are “aggrieved” by surveillance. Cf.

Alderman, 394 U.S. at 171–72.

53

A. Section 1806(f)’s Review Procedures

Displace the State-Secrets Privilege in

Cases Involving Domestic Electronic

Surveillance

FISA speaks directly to the issue addressed by the

state-secrets privilege in the context of domestic

electronic surveillance for national security purposes.

Reynolds described how courts should apply the

privilege for “military matters which, in the interest

of national security, should not be divulged.” 345 U.S.

at 10. Section 1806(f) addresses precisely that issue;

namely, judicial treatment of information where

“disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm

. . . national security.” Instead of exclusion or

dismissal, Congress provided for ex parte, in camera

review of the disputed surveillance to assess its

lawfulness, rather than simple dismissal. That choice

governs.

The fact that Congress did not use the words “state

secrets,” Br. 35–36, is immaterial. “State secrets” was

not the generally accepted term for the Reynolds

privilege in 1978. Reynolds itself referred only once to

“military and state secrets.” Id. at 7. Shortly before

FISA’s enactment, this Court described Reynolds as

protecting “national security secrets” and “military

matters which, in the interest of national security,

should not be divulged.” United States v. Nixon, 418

U.S. 683, 706, 711 (1974) (quoting Reynolds)

(emphasis added). Justice Harlan referred to the

“national security privilege” when discussing

Reynolds just a few years earlier. Alderman, 394 U.S.

at 199 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part). By establishing alternative procedures for

information the government seeks to protect for

“national security” reasons, Section 1806(f) directly

54

displaced any dismissal remedy that the state-secrets

privilege would otherwise provide in this class of

cases.19

Defendants point to superficial differences between

the state-secrets privilege and FISA’s procedure, but

that Congress altered the common-law doctrine does

not show it lacked intent to displace it. In any event,

the insignificance of the differences to which

Defendants point underscores how fundamentally

similar the rules actually are. Officials other than the

Attorney General can invoke the state-secrets

privilege, Br. 37, but Section 1806(f) sensibly

consolidates responsibility for invoking its procedures

in surveillance cases under the Attorney General,

who both supervises domestic electronic surveillance

of Americans under FISA and represents the

Government in court proceedings. The fact that

Congress chose to displace the privilege’s remedies

only in a subset of cases involving electronic

surveillance does not diminish the clear displacement

in this context.

19 Pre-FISA courts of appeals decisions also used “national

security,” “military secrets,” “diplomatic secrets” and other

phrases as often as “state secrets” when describing Reynolds.

See, e.g., Dellums v. Powell, 561 F.2d 242, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1977)

(Reynolds inapplicable because case “[was] not premised on a

claim of a need to protect national security, military or

diplomatic secrets”); United States v. Lyon, 567 F.2d 777, 783

n.4 (8th Cir. 1977) (“national security privilege”); Olson Rug Co.

v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1961) (“[i]nformation

relating to national defense and security may be withheld”

under Reynolds); see also Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 478

F.2d 47, 51 (4th Cir. 1973) (Reynolds privilege “has been often

described as ‘state secrets’ or matters relating to national

security, either military or diplomatic”).

55

Defendants contend that Reynolds addresses a

different harm from FISA because it “generally

forecloses” even in camera inspection, Br. 37–38, but

the primary concern has always been public

disclosure (which FISA prevents), not review by

courts. Reynolds emphasized “[j]udicial control over

the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the

caprice of executive officers.” 345 U.S. at 9–10. And

while in camera review is not “automatically

require[d]” under Reynolds, the Court contemplated

that courts would sometimes require it. Id.

Submission of some secret information to the court to

establish the basis for the privilege assertion remains

the norm. See Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and

the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 Geo.

Wash. L. Rev. 1249, 1288–89 (2007).

Wigmore’s discussion of the privilege confirms that

the primary harm it addresses is public disclosure,

not keeping information from courts. Wigmore

believed state-secrets determinations should be made

by judges. In “matters involving international

negotiations or military precautions against a foreign

enemy . . . the existence of a necessity for secrecy

must be in each instance declared . . . [by] the Court.”

John Henry Wigmore, Treatise on the System of

Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2376 (1905). For

a court to do otherwise would be to “abdicate its” role

and “furnish to designing officials too ample

opportunities for abusing the privilege.” Id.

Defendants claim that because ex parte, in camera

review “coexisted” with the state-secrets privilege

prior to FISA, Congress must not have meant to

displace the privilege’s dismissal remedy. Br. 37–38

(citing United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141, 149

n.38 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). But Defendants have not

established there was a dismissal remedy under the

56

state-secrets privilege in 1978. At the time Congress

enacted FISA, only one case, in any context—Totten—

had authorized dismissal based on anything akin to

the state-secrets privilege where plaintiffs could

make their case without secret evidence. See

Donohue Amicus at 8 (“Totten is the single exception

that proves the rule”). No court had ever dismissed an

electronic surveillance case on state secrets where, as

here, the plaintiff did not seek or need secret

information. See Section I, supra.

In any event, what the history Defendants rely on

actually shows is that Congress chose a particular

procedure—ex parte, in camera review—that had

been used in some state-secrets cases, and mandated

its use in all such cases involving the electronic

surveillance of Americans. Belfield and the cases it

collects show that ex parte, in camera review (rather

than dismissal) was already the pre-FISA norm in

criminal cases. But Defendants fail to recognize that,

prior to FISA, several courts used that same

procedure in civil cases where the government

invoked Reynolds, including where the government

asserted the need to defend itself based on secret

information. In FISA, Congress mandated this

procedure, thereby precluding any alternatives,

including outright dismissal.

For example, in Jabara v. Webster, a civil action

challenging illegal surveillance, the government

acknowledged it had conducted surveillance without

a warrant, but asserted the state-secrets privilege.

691 F.2d 272, 274 (6th Cir. 1982). The district court

reviewed the secret evidence ex parte and in camera

to determine whether the surveillance was lawful. On

appeal, the Sixth Circuit cited Reynolds in holding

“the district court was correct in its ruling” that

“materials . . . properly protected by the state secret

57

privilege, should be submitted in camera,” to

determine whether the surveillance was lawful. Id.;

see also Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475 (E.D. Mich.

1977). It went on to reverse on the merits.

Similarly, Halpern v. United States held the statesecrets privilege required in camera proceedings to

resolve a patent suit under the Invention Secrecy Act.

258 F.2d 36, 43–44 (2d Cir. 1958) (holding that

statute displaced the privilege “dependent upon the

availability and adequacy of other methods of

protecting the overriding interest of national

security”). Halpern distinguished Reynolds and

Totten because “[n]either of these cases involved a

specific enabling statute contemplating the trial of

actions that by their very nature concern security

information.” Id.

Section 1806(f) codified the ex parte, in camera

practice used in such cases, and thereby displaced

any alternative remedy in cases concerning the

domestic electronic surveillance of Americans.

Defendants point to nothing in the pre-FISA history

even suggesting Congress meant to silently preserve

a dismissal remedy, to the extent such a remedy even

existed.

The concurrence from denial of rehearing en banc

underscores the limited nature of the displacement

here. It emphasized that FISA pre-empts state

secrets only insofar as it requires ex parte, in camera

review by judges at this stage. If the district court

orders disclosure of secret information to Plaintiffs,

the court noted, Defendants can reassert the privilege

at that point. Pet. App. 100a n.1.

What FISA does not permit, as both the decision

below and the concurrence make clear, is dismissal

without a court conducting an ex parte, in camera

58

review to determine whether the Government broke

the law. Congress mandated such judicial review

because it did not want the Government to escape

accountability for secretly spying on Americans in

violation of federal law.

B. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance

Does

Not

Support

Defendants’

Interpretation

Defendants invoke the canon of constitutional

avoidance to support their non-textual limitation on

Section 1806, but it “has no application absent

ambiguity.” Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 972

(2019) (cleaned up). See Section II, supra.

In any event, merely conducting ex parte, in

camera review, as FISA requires here, raises no

constitutional concerns. Courts routinely conduct ex

parte, in camera review of sensitive information in

national security cases. And the statute’s express

statement that any relief afforded must be “in

accordance with law” would preclude, as a statutory

matter, relief that would violate the Constitution.

That provision, akin to a savings clause, ensures that

the statute by its terms authorizes only constitutional

forms of relief.

1. FISA’s Ex Parte, In Camera Review

Procedures Present No Article II

Concerns

FISA’s ex parte review procedures present no

Article II problems. The materials the court must

review ex parte, in camera by definition “relat[e]” to

the domestic electronic surveillance of Americans. 50

U.S.C. 1806(f). This Court has already recognized

Congress’s authority to craft “protective standards” in

59

that context, Keith, 407 U.S. at 323–24, including

evidentiary rules to implement them, Vance v.

Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1980). Thus, even if

the Executive has some inherent Article II authority

to keep information secret absent congressional

regulation, its authority is not “exclusive and

conclusive” in this area. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky

v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 10 (2015); see also Youngstown

Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952)

(Jackson, J., concurring). Congress plainly has

authority to displace it to the limited extent of

requiring ex parte, in camera judicial review where

the court must determine the legality of domestic

surveillance, which is all that is at issue here.

The cases Defendants cite do not even suggest that

ex parte, in camera review is unconstitutional. Br.

43–45. The only state-secrets case Defendants cite—

Reynolds, see Br. 43—explicitly avoided reliance on

any “constitutional overtones” based on Article II.

Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6 & n.9; see also General

Dynamics, 563 U.S. at 485 (Reynolds resolved “a

purely evidentiary dispute by applying evidentiary

rules”). It also expressly contemplated courts would

sometimes engage in ex parte, in camera review of

secret information to decide privilege claims, even

without congressional authorization. Id. at 9–10.

The other cases Defendants cite are far afield.

Nixon recognized that secret national security

information contained in the President’s own

communications might be privileged, but nowhere

suggested that privilege extended to mid-level law

enforcement officers, or that in camera review

violated Article II. 418 U.S. at 710. Nixon actually

authorized the district court to review national

security information in camera. Id. at 715 n.21 (citing

Reynolds). Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518,

60

520 (1988), addressed the “narrow question” of

which administrative agency within the Executive

branch handled appeals from denials of security

clearances. And while it described a sphere of

executive authority over such clearances, to which

“no one has a ‘right,’” id. at 528, it did not address

executive authority to control information in the face

of

congressional

regulation

and

competing

constitutional rights.20

The longstanding authority of courts to review

classified documents under FOIA and FISA confirms

that merely requiring ex parte, in camera judicial

review does not impermissibly intrude on Executive

authority. N.L.R.B. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.,

437 U.S. 214, 226 (1978) (1974 FOIA amendments

reaffirmed

courts’

authority

to

conduct in

camera review to determine if documents are

properly classified—and even to order public release).

FISA’s existing judicial review process and legislative

reporting requirements, including those added in

2008, also confirm that Congress may order the

Executive to provide secret information to courts

without violating Article II. See 50 U.S.C. 1803

(creating Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to

hear applications for orders under FISA); Clapper v.

Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 403–04 (2013)

(describing FISC review and approval of electronic

surveillance applications both before and after FISA

amendments in 2008); 50 U.S.C. 1802(a)(3) (requiring

20 Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp. decided

nothing at all about executive privilege. It merely held nonjusticiable a challenge to a Presidential directive concerning air

traffic patterns. 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948). The other cases

Defendants cite simply describe presidential power in unrelated

areas. Br. 43–45.

61

Attorney General to provide information about

warrantless surveillance to FISC).

Defendants also cite Founding era history, Br. 42–

43, but scattered examples of Presidents sometimes

keeping secrets do not show the Founders implicitly

incorporated the state-secrets privilege into the

penumbra of Article II, let alone that they precluded

ex parte, in camera review of assertedly secret

information where needed to secure constitutional

rights. Indeed, as a textual matter, the Founders

explicitly authorized only Congress to keep secrets,

not the Executive. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 5.

To the extent the doctrine derived from

governmental privilege under British law, the

Framers chose not to imbue the American executive

with the powers of the King. See, e.g., The Federalist

No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton). Neither John Jay’s

emphasis in Federalist No. 64 on the benefits of

secrecy in treaty-making—favoring placement of that

power in the executive—nor early instances of

congressional demands for information from the

President and his “very highest officers,” show that

Congress lacks authority to require courts to conduct

ex parte, in camera review to determine whether midlevel executive officials broke the law. Abraham D.

Sofaer, Executive Power and the Control of

Information: Practice Under the Framers, 16 Duke

L.J. 1, 46 (1977).21

Judge Sofaer interpreted early Presidents’ surreptitious

withholding of information to demonstrate “that they regarded

Congress as empowered to disagree with and override their

judgments.” Id. He concluded that Congress could and should

regulate executive secrecy through statutory reform. Id. at 50–

54; see also Pet. App. 114a–15a (Bumatay, J., dissenting) (citing

Sofaer). Other scholars have cast doubt on whether the

21

62

Defendants cite the Burr trial, but it further

undermines their argument. Br. 3, 43. Although the

case never resolved whether the President has

authority to resist judicial subpoenas, Chief Justice

Marshall stated he would review the letter over

which the President had asserted privilege to

determine which parts should be withheld, and also

suggested a closed proceeding to allow full use of any

information properly considered secret. United States

v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).

Defendants’ interpretation also raises its own

constitutional problems, because it would permit the

Executive to block courts from adjudicating claims of

unconstitutional surveillance, thereby eviscerating

the civil remedy Congress established to serve as a

critical check on Executive power in this context.

“The impediment that an absolute, unqualified

privilege would place in the way of the primary

constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do

justice . . . would plainly conflict with the function of

the courts under Art. III.” Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707.

That concern has particular force here, because the

Fourth Amendment requires the judiciary to oversee

executive search authority, even where the executive

asserts disclosure to courts would threaten national

security. Keith, 407 U.S. at 317.

FISA “eliminat[ed] any congressional recognition or

suggestion of inherent Presidential power with

respect to electronic surveillance.” S. Rep. No. 95-701,

Constitution protects any form of executive privilege, given the

Constitution’s failure to mention it and meager historical

support. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Executive Privilege: A

Constitutional Myth, 50 Indiana L.J. 193 (1974); Saikrishna

Bangalore Prakash, A Critical Comment on the Constitutionality

of Executive Privilege, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1143, 1157–58 (1999).

63

at 71–72. It “embodies a legislative judgment that

court orders and other procedural safeguards are

necessary to insure that electronic surveillance . . .

within this country conforms to [fourth amendment]

principles.” S. Rep. No. 95-701, at 13. Given that

Congress enacted FISA to constrain executive

authority, it would not want the Court to “shy[] away

from constitutional questions” about executive power,

but rather to “construe [the] statute expansively . . .

to give the statute its maximum constitutionally

permissible scope.” Adrian Vermeule, Saving

Constructions, 85 Geo. L.J. 1945, 1956 (1997).

Because “firm evidence” shows “Congress intended

to” legislate in the “constitutional thickets”

surrounding electronic surveillance, avoidance

doctrine should not be applied. Pub. Citizen v. U.S.

Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989).

2. The Agent Defendants’ Speculative

Due

Process

and

Seventh

Amendment

Concerns

Do

Not

Support Their Interpretation

The Agent Defendants raise distinct Due Process

and

Seventh

Amendment

arguments

as

constitutional concerns, but they provide no support

to Defendants’ proposed non-textual limitations on

FISA.

As an initial matter, the Agent Defendants’

constitutional objections are speculative and

premature. The parties have not moved for summary

judgment; no one even knows whether any material

facts triggering the jury trial right will ever be in

dispute.

If

Plaintiffs

establish

religious

discrimination using non-privileged information and

the district court determines after review of the

secret information that no material factual disputes

64

exist, their concerns will not arise. If instead the

court determines that trial is needed and the Agent

Defendants object to the procedures the court

employs to handle secret information, the decision

below permits them to raise their constitutional

objections when they are ripe. Pet. App. 65a n.31.22

Nor do the Agent Defendants’ arguments support

application of avoidance doctrine. Br. of Resp’ts

Tidwell and Walls 21–22 (citing Clark v. Martinez,

543 U.S. 371 (2005)), Br. of Resp’ts Allen, Armstrong,

and Rose 15–16. As explained above, because Section

1806(g) requires the district court to act “in

accordance with the requirements of law” when

granting any relief, the statute prohibits relief that

violates the Constitution. It already requires that

courts consider any constitutional problems when

they actually arise, and therefore need not be

“construed” to avoid unconstitutional relief.

The Agent Defendants also overstate the

constitutional problems. No court has ever held that

22 Plaintiffs argued below that they could prove their religion

claims by showing merely that (1) their religion was a factor in

Defendants’ decision to surveil them, and (2) Defendants could

not show that using religion as a factor warranting suspicion

was narrowly tailored. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886

n.3 (1990) (holding religious classifications “subject to the most

exacting scrutiny”) (citations omitted). Thus, if Plaintiffs’ legal

theory proves correct, the only information about these

investigations relevant to establishing liability may be the fact

that religion was a factor in opening them, which may not

require consideration of any secret information at all. See Dep’t

of Justice Civil Rights Division, “Guidance Regarding the Use of

Race by Federal Law Enforcement Authorities,” at 7–8 (June

2003), available at https://www.scribd.com/document/22092319/

DOJ-Guidance-Regarding-the-Use-of-Race-by-Federal-Law-Enforce

ment-Agencies-June-2003 (permitting racial and religious

profiling in national security or border integrity investigations).

65

FISA’s ex parte, in camera review procedures violate

Due Process or the Sixth or Seventh Amendments’

jury trial right. In analogous contexts, courts use

various substitute procedures, including unclassified

substitutions, to “provide the defendant with

substantially the same ability to make his defense as

would

disclosure

of

the

specific

classified

information.” 18 U.S.C. App. III § 6(c)(1) (CIPA).

Moreover, liability will not turn solely on the results

of in camera review. There is already a large amount

of non-privileged evidence in the record, and

according to the Government, “the majority” of

Monteilh’s audio and video recording is likely

available. J.A. 162. And more evidence will likely be

declassified, both due to its age and because

Defendants may want to use it.23

That a court may consider some evidence relevant

to liability ex parte and in camera does not

necessarily render the proceedings unconstitutional.

In Molerio, for example, the court did exactly that to

determine “the genuine reason for denial of

employment,” and concluded that the FBI did not

violate plaintiff’s rights. 749 F.2d at 825. The court

dismissed the claim after determining, based on its in

camera review, that the government’s conduct was

lawful.

Finally, the Agent Defendants’ alternative

construction—that FISA permits dismissal even

though Plaintiffs can prove their claims without any

privileged evidence—itself raises serious questions

regarding Plaintiffs’ First Amendment, Due Process,

and Seventh Amendment rights. It would deny them

The Government already declassified portions of Monteilh’s

tasking in an attempt to support their brief on appeal. See J.A.

220–231.

23

66

any forum to adjudicate a substantial claim that their

constitutional rights have been violated. Because the

Agent Defendants’ construction fails to avoid

constitutional problems, it provides no justification

for invoking the canon.

*

*

*

Where it applies, Section 1806 directs courts to

review allegedly unlawful FISA surveillance ex parte

and in camera to assess whether the government

broke the law, rather than to dismiss such lawsuits

at the outset. Congress did not want the defendants

to escape civil liability for unlawful domestic

electronic surveillance programs simply by declaring

them secret.

67

CONCLUSION

This Court should affirm the decision below.

Respectfully Submitted,

PETER BIBRING

MOHAMMAD TAJSAR

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Dated September 21, 2021

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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