Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Todd Alan Winkler, Petitioner v. California

Supreme Court briefApr 27, 2021

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Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District

Andrea K. Wallin-Rohmann, Clerk

Electronically FILED on 11 /2/2020 by L. Outman. Deputy Clerk

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(El Dorado)

THE PEOPLE,

C077992

Plaintiff and Respondent,

(Super. Ct. No. P13CRF0308)

v.

TODD ALAN "WINKLER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of El Dorado County, Kenneth J.

Melikian, Judge. Affirmed.

Athena Shudde, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief

Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L.'

Christoffersen, Robert C. Nash, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this opinion is certified

for publication with the exception of Parts II - V of the Discussion.

Appendix A (104 pages)

Defendant killed his third wife (the victim) by plunging a pair of scissors into her

neck, severing her jugular vein, She had been having an extramarital affair and was

planning to divorce defendant. Defendant did not deny killing her, but claimed he did so

in self-defense. A jury found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree and found true

the enhancement allegation that defendant personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon

in the commission of the murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189, 12022, subd. (b)(1).)1 The trial

court sentenced defendant to a term of 26 years to life.

On appeal, defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred in admitting, pursuant to

Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), evidence related to the 1999 death of his

second wife as relevant to his intent to kill the victim, the absence of mistake or accident,

or to negate self-defense; (2) the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s prior

statements to others about her fear of defendant; (3) the cumulative effect of the

foregoing errors requires reversal; (4) the evidence was legally insufficient to support a

finding of premeditation and deliberation so as to support a conviction of first degree

murder; and (5) an error on the abstract of judgment must be corrected.

We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the 1999

death of defendant’s second wife under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).

The Georgia authorities where the incident took place determined the death was

accidental. Before allowing the jury to hear this evidence, the trial court had a

gatekeeping duty under Evidence Code section 403, subdivision (a) to determine whether

there was sufficient evidence to establish a homicidal act by a preponderance of the

evidence. In doing so, the trial court relied on evidence related to the charged offense as

proof of the earlier homicidal act. This was error. We further conclude that any

probative value the uncharged act evidence had was substantially outweighed by the

Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise

indicated.

l

2

Evidence Code section 352 concerns of undue consumption of time and undue prejudice.

However, given the strength of the admissible evidence, we conclude the error was

harmless.

As to his asserted error regarding evidence related to the victim’s fear of him,

defendant forfeited several of these contentions. Those contentions which are preserved

are either without merit or harmless. As to those claims which defendant forfeited , we

conclude that, contrary to defendant’s contentions, he was not denied the constitutionally

effective assistance of counsel for his attorney’s failure to object to the evidence . We

also reject defendant’s cumulative error argument. And we conclude there was

substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support his conviction of

murder m the first degree. Finally, we agree with defendant that the abstract ofjudgment

must be corrected to reflect that the indeterminate sentence imposed was 25 years to life,

and delete reference to the term of life without the possibility of parole.

We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Given the nature of defendant’s claims, a fairly detailed summary of the evidence

presented at trial and the hearing concerning the uncharged act evidence is required.

The Prosecution’s Evidence

Defendant’s Report of a “Domestic Incident,” His Physical Condition &

Arrest

At approximately 10:30 or 11:00 a.m. on February 27, 2012, D.B., defendant’s

neighbor and a social acquaintance, received a telephone call from defendant. Defendant

told D.B. there had been a domestic incident, and that the victim had been killed,

D.B.

told defendant that he would call 911 while defendant took his children to a neighbor’s

house.

At approximately 10:30, defendant knocked on the door of his neighbors, V.J. and

B.J. B.J. answered the door and defendant stated there was a medical emergency and he

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asked them to watch his children. When defendant dropped off the children, V.J. noticed

that defendant had “taken a shower. He smelled like shampoo or cologne. V.J. testified

that defendant did not have any injuries on his hands or face. When defendant handed

V.J. his infant son, she saw that there were no injuries on his hands. B.J. also testified

that he did not observe any injuries to defendant’s hands or face. V.J. and B.J. both

testified that defendant’s tone was “normal,” he had no tears in his eyes and was not

acting nervous, emotional, or with any urgency or panic.

At approximately 10:40, El Dorado County Deputy Sheriff Michael Roberts

responded to the defendant’s house. Roberts parked across the street and kept the house

under observation while awaiting additional units. Seventeen minutes after he arrived,

defendant emerged from the house. Roberts pointed his firearm at defendant, identified

himself, and ordered defendant to approach him with his hands in the air. Roberts

observed bandages on both of defendant’s hands. The bandages were “obvious” and he

first noticed them from some 20 feet away. Roberts later observed a pretty significant

gouge. . .” to one of defendant’s thumbs. After placing defendant in his patrol car,

Roberts and other law enforcement officers entered the house. When Roberts saw the

victim, it was clear that she was dead.

Defendant’s Interview Statement Describing the Killing2

Detectives Michael Lensing and Paul Hadjes interviewed defendant on the day of

his arrest. Defendant stated that the victim had been having an affair, he had recently

accepted the fact that she did not wish to reconcile with him, and she had told him that

she wanted primary custody of the children. Defendant stated that, on a family trip to Las

Vegas the previous weekend, he finally accepted that the couple would divorce. The

victim “started to lay out. . . all the terms that she had wanted and . . . one of them was

2 The two-hour interview between defendant and two detectives was video recorded, A

substantial portion of the recording was played for the jury.

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primary custody of the children and [she] wants to keep the children up here in—in this

area, in the Cameron Park area because that’s where her boyfriend lives.”

Defendant told the detectives he woke up at approximately 3:30 a.m. that morning

to prepare to leave for work in Alameda County. He went into the victim’s bedroom, as

they had been sleeping in separate bedrooms, and crawled into bed next to her, which,

according to defendant, was “still. . . okay with her, no sexual relations . . . .” She was

awake. Defendant told her that he would not agree to allow her to have full custody of

the children. He told her, I m a

going to fight you on this.” According to defendant,

the victim responded, I can have my boyfriend get rid of you.” Defendant told the

detectives the victim’s boyfriend was “a big gun collector ... I don’t know if he’s

dangerous or not but his ex-wife says that he is . . . .” Defendant said after the victim’s

comment, he hit her with his fist on the right side of her face. She sat up with her back to

him. Defendant rubbed her back and apologized. According to defendant, the victim

then turned around and came at him “with a V of scissors.” Defendant said he “got a

hold of them, got his hand “into the V” and then they struggled over the scissors and fell

off the bed. He said he took some cuts to his hands trying to get the scissors away from

her, including the cut the detective noticed when he and the detective shook hands earlier.

Defendant stated he “was able to get—em turned around onto her . . .,” “[a]nd

give her some

some jabs, a lot of jabs . . . .” He “was just striking for her face.” The

couple engaged in a “long, long protracted struggle” over the scissors. According to

defendant, the victim was “a very strong girl” and was in much better shape than he was.

During the course of the struggle, she was injured, but “probably not seriously.”

Defendant stated that he “poked her in the eye really hard3 and got her to break free .

He then dropped the scissors and ran to the garage.

During his testimony at trial, he explained he poked the victim in the eye with his

thumb.

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In the garage, defendant became concerned about the children and felt that he

needed to get his infant child out of the victim’s bedroom. Defendant put on a padded

motorcycle jacket because it had pads “for like breaking down the door” and returned to

the bedroom. As Lensing went over the events a second time, defendant said that, at this

point, he was concerned that the victim may have been drinking, and he should not leave

the children in the house.

When defendant returned to the victim’s bedroom, the door was closed. He turned

the doorknob, rushed into the room, tripped on something in the doorway, and fell down

at the foot of the bed on all fours. The victim, who was sitting on the floor, kicked him in

the face. Defendant became enraged, and he “went after her.” They began to struggle on

the floor. Defendant “bear crawled up her,” and tried to choke her with both hands.

According to defendant, the victim “end[ed] up with the scissors again in her hand.”

Defendant said he “started to get the upper hand ...” and eventually got control of the

scissors and “went for her throat.” He struck her on the face and throat.

Defendant told the detectives that the victim begged for her life, and repeatedly

told him they could “resolve this.” She said they would not get a divorce, and she begged

for her life and for defendant to “give [her] another chance.” She pleaded with him:

“[d]on’t do this.” However, defendant told the detectives he “felt like if [he] g[a]ve her a

chance she’ll be right back at [him] and [he] was exhausted.” According to defendant, he

“pushed the scissors in as far as [he] could.” Defendant explained he “[j]ust tried to drive

it deeper and deeper” into her throat. He said he was in a rage, but he also felt like he

was in a “kill or be killed” situation. Defendant acknowledged that, at that point, he

wanted the victim to die. He stated, “I just. . . went for the throat and then eventually her

body went limp.” He said it took “a long time” before she went motionless.

Defendant said he “just laid there on top of her for a long time to make sure she

actually was (inaudible) but I (inaudible) for I don’t know how long, for a long time.” He

estimated that he laid on top of her for five or ten minutes. He told the detectives that

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approximately 30 minutes later, he tried to resuscitate her. He performed chest

compressions, but “blood just flowed out of her,” “blood just squirted out, I mean big

time, there was blood everywhere—urn—she’s clearly dead.”

Not wanting his children to “see their mom all bloody and see there’s blood

everywhere,” defendant began to clean up the blood. After it became light and all three

children were up, defendant got the children situated in another part of the house. He

then went back to the victim’s bedroom and thought, “what do I do with all these

cleaning supplies, this looks horrible.” Defendant threw the cleaning supplies into the

fire in the fireplace. He stated he bandaged himself when he cleaned himself up.4

Thereafter, he called D.B. and told him: “[The victim’s] dead. We got in a—we

got in a fight. She came at me with a pair of scissors but—urn—I didn’t have to take it

that far. Defendant asked D.B. to call 911 while he brought the children to a neighbor’s

house.

Defendant told the detectives he should not have confronted the victim because

she had “been spinning a little more and more out-of-control, whole lots of different

things indicated that. .. you know, a powder keg.” He said she had been binge drinking.

He acknowledged that the victim had made up her mind about the divorce.

However, when he mentioned getting an attorney, she said they should “leave the

attorneys out of this” and go to mediation.

He said when he went back into her room, his priority was getting the baby. He

stated, I want my children” and “I’m thinking get possession now ... or I may never get

possession.” He was thinking he would just grab his son and the two girls and leave.

4 At trial, defendant testified that he cleaned and bandaged his hands before going to the

J.s.

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The Investigation and Autopsy

Lensing had Deputies Palmberg and Massingale transport defendant to a medical

center to have his blood drawn and to have his hands examined. Photographs showed

injuries to defendant’s left cheek and nose, the backs of his hands, his left thumb, his

palms, his left hand and index finger, and to his left thigh. Palmberg described defendant

during this time as “[v]ery quiet. Kind of a stern look on his face. Really a lack of any

type of real emotion.” Defendant was 5 feet 6 inches tall and weighed 230 pounds at the

time of his arrest.

Lensing returned to defendant’s house for a more detailed review of the scene. •

Based on blood stains, their location, blood flow on the victim’s body, spatter patterns,

and the coagulation of the blood, Lensing concluded that the victim was seated in an

upright position when she received the wound to her neck.

Lensing looked throughout the house for a Toshiba computer that belonged to the

victim. However, law enforcement never located it. Also, there was a hard drive missing

from a computer at the house which was never located. A box labeled “Ashes of [name

of defendant’s second wife]” was found in a bed stand in the master bedroom.

Dr. Stephany Fiore, a forensic pathologist, performed the autopsy . The victim was

5 feet 3 inches tall, and weighed 110 pounds. She sustained abrasions to her nose, face,

and lips. She had bruising around her eye and an abrasion beginning above her eyebrow

and extending onto her cheek. The bruising under the victim s eye could have been

caused by punching or similar direct trauma. A cluster of wounds on the victim’s left

arm and hand were consistent with bite marks. The victim had some pinpoint

hemorrhaging in her eye that could have resulted from neck compressions or

strangulation. And she had a fractured rib on her left side, which could have been

inflicted by a bear-type hug.

The victim had multiple incised wounds which could have been caused by the

blades of scissors. One such wound was partially gaping and extended from the edge of

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her eyelashes down her cheek, exposing her cheekbone. Another, more shallow, incised

wound extended from her eyelashes towards her ear.

There was a small abrasion to the cheek and multiple similar injuries behind the

ear, on her neck and in the area of the collar bone. Dr. Fiore opined that these wounds

could have been caused by the tip of closed scissors.

The victim also had several linear wounds crossing the front of her neck from one

side to the other. These were consistent with something long being drawn across the skin

of her neck. She described these wounds as being “like tracks,” “a pattern that’s being

repeated on the neck.” Additionally, there was a stab wound to the victim’s lip that

punctured through to the inside. The victim also had a “fairly deep” stab wound just

above the buttocks.

The victim had multiple incised and stabbing wounds to her hands, which Dr..

Fiore described as defensive. There was a stab wound on the victim’s left hand between

her thumb and index finger. As for her right hand, there were cuts across the joints of her

index, middle, and ring fingers which, on two of those fingers, cut into, and in one case,

through her tendons, causing the index and middle fingers to “go straight.” It was “like

something was drawn across all those fingers at one time.” There were also separate

“small pokes” to the palm of the right hand.

Fiore also noted the victim had multiple abrasions and bruises to her knees. These

wounds had the appearance “like she maybe had been on her knees, fell to her knees,

moving around on her knees.”

Fiore testified that the victim sustained a fatal stab wound to the right side of her

neck. This wound was created by an object with two closed or overlapping blades, such

as scissors, being driven into the neck.” The wound was approximately an inch and a

half deep, extending into her jugular vein.

Fiore testified that death would not have been instantaneous. Rather, it would

have taken several minutes, perhaps as many as ten, before the victim lost enough blood

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to lose consciousness, and several more minutes, but less than a half an hour, before she

died. At the time of her death, the victim’s blood alcohol level was 0.011 percent.

Based on photographs of defendant’s hands, Fiore testified that, in addition to a

number of superficial wounds, some of which she described as scratches, defendant

sustained a deep wound to his left thumb with the tissue appearing to have been cut away.

Fiore testified it looked “more kind of cut out” than a defensive wound. Defendant also

had a stab wound to the palm of his right hand that could have been caused by scissors

twisting into it. Additionally, he sustained a fairly deep linear wound to his left thigh.

The Affair and the Victim’s Plans for Divorce

D.E. was a pilot, and he had met the victim when she managed the Cameron Park

Airport. J.W. lived with D.E. J.W. met the victim in September 2009; they worked

together and then became friends. In June 2010, they began a romantic relationship. In

2013, they planned to marry. J.W. testified the victim felt guilty about having an affair,

particularly because her father was a pastor, She also knew it was not fair to defendant

that she was having an affair, but she wanted to divorce him.

At some point, the victim told J.W. that defendant was aware of the affair. In an

October 2010 e-mail to J.W., the victim expressed concern that defendant was suspicious,

and she told J.W. they had to “put it on ice for a while.”

In another communication, the victim complained of how much money defendant

spent, and wrote: “This is what scares me about [defendant]. He spends to the max, and

so divorce is going to piss him off.” The victim noted that defendant made $200,000 or

$280,000 annually and said, “[w]e are rich,” but followed that with: “Hahhahahaha. And

I worry about getting offed over child support.” The victim further wrote: “[defendant]

will definitely move on. He doesn’t care about me and what I do, just what affects him,

his money.” On one occasion, J.W. asked the victim if defendant was abusive, and she

responded, “I don’t bruise easily.” The victim also told J.W., D.E., and her brother on

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separate occasions that defendant had raped her, and that was how she became pregnant

with her third child.

Je.W. met the victim when they were in college. In October 2011, Je.W., the

victim, and two other friends went to Calistoga for a “girls’ weekend.” During a

conversation that weekend, the victim started to cry. She said that her marriage was

falling apart, and said that she needed advice and help. The victim stated that defendant

was extremely controlling. He did not let her have money and she had been forced to ask

friends for money for diapers and formula. Her house was in a state of disrepair and

defendant would not give her money to fix it. The victim also stated defendant was

extremely manipulative and good at “creating situations,” and she was afraid that he

might manipulate things to make matters look bad for her. The victim also told her

friends that she had not wanted a third child, but defendant “basically forced himself

upon her.”

Je.W., being a lawyer, advised the victim about the divorce process. The victim

felt she needed to get her financial matters in order before she could move forward; she

was worried that she would be left with nothing and with no way to support her three

children. The victim also told Je.W. that she did not intend to take the children away

from defendant or prevent him from being around the children. She hoped to come up

with a solution that was fair, and she hoped to resolve the matter through a settlement

agreement rather than through a contentious divorce process.

Approximately three months before the victim was killed, she told D.E. she had

discovered defendant had stopped making payments on the house, the cars, and the boat.

The victim knew defendant was “keeping the money somewhere . . ,” but she did not

know why. She said this made her fear for her life.

On November 9, 2011, the victim called Je.W. and indicated she was ready to

move forward, and that things were happening that made her feel it was “time to do this.”

The victim told Je.W. that defendant, who was in Amsterdam, was planning to fake a

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nervous breakdown with his employer so that he could take medical leave. Je.W. sent the

victim an e-mail directing her to a California courts website so that the victim could fill

out the paperwork to start the divorce process.

The victim began filling out divorce papers. She spent time at D.E.’s house filling

out the forms on her laptop. In February 2012, the victim indicated that she was ready to

file. However, she told J.W. defendant discovered the electronic document on her

computer, and, according to J.W., either the document or the computer itself

disappeared.5 J.W. printed a copy of the forms so the victim could complete them by

hand, and she started to do so.

The victim’s father testified he learned that the victim was having an extramarital

affair. He let her know he opposed it. Shortly before the victim’s death, defendant called

the victim’s father, which was unusual. Defendant spoke to him “with this kind of highpitched, almost fake voice, like a little child’s, saying ‘Daddy, what am I going to do?

. the marriage is in trouble. What can I do? I’m desperate. I want to save my family.

” Defendant told the victim’s father the victim was psychologically unstable, she was

smoking, drinking, and losing weight. Defendant said the victim was having an affair

and claimed she was “losing her mind.” Defendant also called the victim’s brother and

told him she was having an affair, and that he had no one to talk to.

The victim’s father saw no indication that the victim was binge drinking or having

psychological problems. J.W. testified that the victim drank only moderately and that,

< between 2009 and her death, her drinking habits did not change. He did not detect

alcohol on her breath, and did not think she was sneaking alcohol. J.W. testified that,

during this time, the victim was losing weight and losing hair, but he thought it was from

5 It is not clear from J.W.’s testimony whether it was the computer or the forms that

disappeared. He testified: “when [defendant] came back when she was filling out the

electronic divorce papers, he got ahold of the computer and it disappeared.”

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stress. However, she did not talk about suicide or depression or anxiety or anything that

caused J.W. to be concerned about her mental health. They were planning a future

together.

On February 5, 2012, J.W., who had been a Marine and who owned firearms, had

just finished shooting target practice in his backyard when the victim’s vehicle pulled

into his driveway. J.W. went out front and saw defendant and her father each holding

one of the children “as human shields.” J.W. kept his nine-millimeter handgun under his

coat because the victim had told him defendant “chased people down the street in the

neighborhood with baseball bats and thr[ew] rocks at people.” J.W. did not know what to

expect and did not want to take any chances. Defendant told J.W., “[the victim] and I are

not divorced yet. I would appreciate if you wouldn’t see her anymore.” J.W. said,

“Fine,” and the two men left. Thereafter, J.W. called the victim.6

The victim’s father testified that it was his idea to go talk to J.W. He

acknowledged he and defendant brought one of the children “as kind of a safety shield

from any violence.

According to the victim’s father, defendant was holding a child

when he spoke with J.W.

On February 26, 2012, the day before defendant killed the victim, she sent a text to

J.W. saying that she had told defendant “to chill and not be so doomsdayers and dramatic

about divorce. He keeps crying and pleading.” She also asked J.W. if she could come

over to work on the divorce paperwork. She could not stay at home while defendant was

there. She told J.W., “He keeps trying to talk me into staying and saying it’s all about

you and I haven’t given him a chance . . . .”

J.W. picked the victim up and brought her to the house he shared with D.E. The

victim worked on the divorce paperwork and child support calculations. J.W. helped.

6 There was no testimony about the conversation J.W. had with the victim after

defendant and her father left.

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J.W. testified that the California online support calculator indicated that, based on the

information the victim provided, defendant would be required to pay approximately

$7,800 per month. The victim asked if she could return the following morning to use

D.E.’s fax machine to fax divorce papers to her attorney. D.E. agreed. The victim

planned to leave defendant with her kids the next day, temporarily move in with J.W.,

and file the divorce paperwork.

J.W. repeatedly tried to get in touch with the victim the next morning. Eventually,

D.E. called him and told him defendant had killed her. J.W. called the victim’s father

who confirmed that defendant killed her.

Defendant’s Characterization of the Victim as Unstable

E.D. was defendant’s supervisor at work. He recalled that, approximately two

weeks before the victim’s death, defendant was very depressed and he expressed concern

for the victim. Defendant told E.D. that the victim was paralyzed with depression, and

that defendant was trying to arrange for psychiatric care. Defendant also told E.D. that

the victim had been drinking and was suffering from alcoholism. He stated that he was

concerned about her ability to care for the children. Defendant told E.D. that he might

need to take time off from work. On February 10, 2012, E.D. texted defendant that he

hoped all was well “on the family front.” Defendant responded, “trying to get [the

victim] stabilized. Hard. Outcome unknown.” In what E.D. thought was the last

sequence of text messages he received from defendant, defendant texted E.D., “Very

serious home situation. Out all week,” and “Sorry.” The next day, E.D. learned

defendant had killed the victim.

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The Death of Defendant’s Second Wife7

At 2:00 or 3:00 a.m. on the morning of September 26, 1999, W.D. and M.H. were

camping in the Chattahoochee National Forest in Georgia and were awoken by someone

calling, Help. Help. Help. My wife is dead.” The two men walked towards a trail

where they encountered defendant and two women. One of the women told W.D. they

were afraid and did not want anything to do with the situation. W.D. said he would

handle it and spoke with defendant. Defendant said he had been camping with his wife,

he had been stung by a bee and had an allergic reaction, his wife was rushing him to the

hospital while he lay in the back of a pickup truck, his wife lost control of the vehicle and

he was ejected from it. W.D. testified defendant said “he came to because of the

adrenaline from maybe the fire or something around had—had made the allergic reaction

to the bee sting go away, and then he came down the mountain to our campsite. ”8

W.D. thought defendant’s attire - boots and winter clothes including very thick

pants and a jacket—was odd given that it was not below 60 degrees outside. M.H., who

was wearing shorts, also took notice of how defendant was dressed. M.H. estimated that

it was 70 degrees at the time.

7 In part I. of the Discussion, post, we conclude that the trial court erred in admitting this

evidence.

On cross-examination, the defense sought to discredit the testimony concerning what

defendant said caused the allergic reaction and where he was situated in the truck. M.H.

initially testified defendant said he had been “stung by a bee or an ant or something or

had an allergic reaction.” However, on cross-examination, M.H. said defendant “did not

specify exactly what had bit him,” but only said he was bitten and was having an allergic

reaction. W.D. acknowledged that the police report memorializing their statements (he

and M.H. were interviewed together) did not mention that defendant told them he was in

the bed of the truck. M.H. acknowledged he did not personally tell the deputy that

defendant had said that. He said W.D. did.

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W.D. stated that defendant initially seemed somewhat frantic, but as he related his

story, he “went kind of very calm and just kind of going through this—this story.” W.D.

characterized defendant’s demeanor as “maybe not. . . real legitimate concern or care.

M.H. testified that defendant was sobbing when he first entered their campsite, but

to M.H., “it didn’t seem believable.” M.H. stated, “I don’t know if it was the adrenaline

that he was going through and—it was just such a hard story to believe, that I just

couldn’t fathom that something like that would happen. He just didn’t seem to be really

genuine, like he didn’t convince me.”

W.D. and M.H. then drove defendant back to the crash site, where they found a

large area engulfed in flames. Upon their arrival, W.D, and M.H. ran down to the vehicle

while defendant remained on the road. The flames were very high, and there was no way

to get inside the vehicle. The whole truck was on fire. Defendant then asked the two

men to take him back to his campsite, stating that perhaps his wife had walked back to

the campsite after the wreck. When they did, defendant’s wife was not there. They

remained there for approximately five minutes before returning to the crash site to meet

first responders.

W.D, did not observe any injuries on defendant and did not observe defendant

limping. M.H. did not see any injuries on defendant or anything about defendant which

would suggest that he needed medical attention.

Deputy Ricardo Johnson responded to the scene of the crash at approximately 4:00

a.m He asked defendant if there was someone in the burning vehicle. Defendant

responded that his wife was in or around the vehicle. Deputy Johnson recalled that

defendant said he had been bitten by an insect and started having an allergic reaction and

he and his wife were on their way to the hospital when the vehicle crashed. On direct

examination, Deputy Johnson testified defendant first indicated he had been in the bed of

the truck, but thereafter he “just stated he was in the truck.” However, on crossexamination, after being shown his written report, Deputy Johnson acknowledged he first

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wrote “in the bed of’ and crossed it out because he had made a mistake. Defendant had

actually told him that he had been in the truck, not the bed of the truck. Defendant said

he remembered waking up halfway down the mountain and seeing the vehicle on fire.

Defendant then climbed up the mountain and went for help.

Deputy Johnson asked defendant to show him the insect bite. Defendant changed

the subject, stating that “his wife was down there. He didn’t have time to show [him] the

bug bite or anything.” Deputy Johnson asked several times to see the insect bite, but

defendant never did. He changed the subject each time Deputy Johnson asked. He also

changed the subject when Deputy Johnson asked why he did not bring an EpiPen

camping if he knew he was allergic to insect bites.

Deputy Johnson asked defendant a number of questions “about what happened,

how the car got down there, what were you doing when it went down there.” Instead of

answering the questions, defendant repeated that his wife was down the hill in the truck.

Deputy Johnson spoke with defendant for 20 or 30 minutes. He did not observe any

injuries on defendant, and defendant did not complain of pain or ask for medical

attention. Deputy Johnson also noted that defendant was “bundled up,” wearing a long

sleeve shirt and “toboggan, long pants.” His attire was not seasonal for that time of year.

Deputy Johnson characterized defendant’s demeanor as casual. He was not upset or

crying; he was “just there.”

When another deputy arrived, Deputy Johnson left defendant and rappelled down

to the crash site. The truck was on its passenger side. Deputy Johnson discovered a

badly charred body underneath the truck, near the bed.

The responding deputies thought the circumstances were suspicious, so they called

for an investigator. Detective Gerald Johnson, an investigator with the local Sheriffs

office, responded. Special Agent Mike Roberts from the Georgia Bureau of Investigation

(GBI) also responded and took the lead in the investigation.

17

Detective Johnson and Agent Roberts together interviewed defendant at the

Sheriffs facility. Defendant stated that he and his wife had come to the camping location

at approximately 3:00 p.m. the previous day, and, after a hike, they stayed at the campsite

all night. Defendant had started having an allergic reaction to an insect bite including

shortness of breath, swelling of his throat, and loss of muscle control. Detective Johnson

remembered defendant describing prior anaphylactic episodes before addressing what

happened to his wife. Defendant had experienced prior episodes that did not require

medical intervention. Defendant said he forgot to bring his EpiPen on the camping trip.

Defendant told the investigators he told his wife he needed help, and she helped

him to the truck. Defendant lay down in the seat while his wife drove out of the

campsite. According to defendant, his wife was frantic. After driving for approximately

30 seconds, defendant felt the vehicle go off the road and roll. Defendant was not

wearing a seat belt, and the next thing he knew, he awoke, the pickup truck was

approximately 60 or 80 feet below him, and the surrounding woods were on fire.

Defendant yelled for his wife and looked for her, thinking that she may have been thrown

from the vehicle as well. After looking for approximately 20 minutes, defendant returned

to the road and then to the campsite to see if she had found her way back, but she was not

there. Defendant retrieved a gallon of water, went back to the crash site, and threw the

water on the fire.

Defendant told the investigators he left and found another campsite where he

spoke to two women and asked them to call 911. They did not have a cell phone, but

they drove him to a nearby campsite where he asked some men to call 911 and to take

him back to the crash site. Eventually, the two women from the first campsite drove

defendant back to the crash site. Defendant said he continued to look for his wife and

was calling her name when help arrived.

Defendant told the investigators that he and his wife were not having any financial

problems or marital problems. To Detective Johnson, defendant “seemed very matter of

18

fact, almost distant to actually what we were there to investigate in the sense that it was

almost like he was just telling a story . . .

It seemed that defendant brought up many

subjects “other than the actual death investigation.”

Detective Johnson testified that, based on his experience, he would expect to see

more injuries on defendant or more evidence consistent with someone having b een

involved in a rollover accident that resulted in a fatality. According to Detective

Johnson, defendant only had minor injuries to his head and arm.

Detective Johnson acknowledged on cross-examination that, notwithstanding

inconsistencies which raised his suspicion, no one was arrested in connection with the

death. Johnson told an insurance investigator no evidence was found to substantiate any

theory other than that the incident was an accident.

The road where the accident took place was a narrow, single lane dirt road with

fresh gravel. W.D. testified that when he drove M.H. and defendant up the mountain to

get to the crash site it took like what “seemed like . .. forever to get there.” It was only a

mile and a half from the where they had met defendant. As W.D. explained, “[t]he roads

are a little bit treacherous there.” He had a lot of experience on that road, and testified he

was always very careful when travelling on it.9 W.D. testified, “we went slowly up there.

You couldn’t drive fast,” and noted that the speed limit is “maybe” 25 miles per hour.

W.D. testified there are points in the road “where it just kind of falls a good long ways

down and told the jury ‘at high speeds, . . . the gravel. . . would cause you to have an

accident.” Defendant’s campsite was about one to two miles past the crash site, near the

end of the road.

W.D. testified he was very familiar with the area because he went there “practically

every other weekend.” He had experience travelling on that road in a car, on foot and on

his mountain bike.

19

The second wife’s sister testified that she visited her sister approximately two

weeks prior to her death. The second wife told her sister that defendant had been

“hounding her to go on a camping trip,” but she did not want to go. She had also told her

sister that she was hoping to perform well on an upcoming physical examination because

they were increasing her life insurance policy. On cross-examination, the sister testified

that she was aware that defendant had a history of allergic reactions.

Prior to her death, the second wife told N.D., a coworker, that she and defendant

were experiencing difficult financial times, and that defendant s startup business

produced little to no income. On one occasion, the second wife told N.D. that she had a

doctor’s appointment in connection with a life insurance application. Approximately two

weeks later, she left her job. Approximately two weeks after that, N.D. learned she was

dead.

Marilyn Meixner testified as an expert in forensic auditing. Meixner investigated

the second wife’s USAA life insurance policy. Defendant applied for the policy in

February 1999. The policy paid out on February 29, 2000, in the amount of $457,833.21,

whichincluded-interesf—Defendant—and-hi s-w-ife-had applied-fora- second_life_insurance

policy, furnished by CIGNA, on August 19, 1999. The payout under the voluntary

coverage was issued in January 2000, for $155,211.60, and the accidental death benefit of

$553,753.75 paid out in March 2000. Thus, the total amount paid out on life insurance

policies taken out on the life of defendant’s second wife was $1,166,798.56. With regard

to the Winkler’s general financial status, Meixner testified that, on a monthly basis, their

expenditures outpaced their income.

Dr. Fiore reviewed the Georgia pathologist’s report prepared in connection with

the second wife’s death, as well as photographs from the scene and autopsy. The report

set forth the cause of death as soot and smoke inhalation and thermal bums. Fiore

testified that the Georgia pathologist did “a fairly thorough job.” The Georgia pathologist

concluded that the causes of death were accidental. Testing did not reveal the presence of

20

any volatile substances or accelerants. The pathologist also did not find any penetrating

wounds such as stab wounds or gunshot wounds or other trauma that would have been

masked by the burned nature of the body.

Dr, Fiore stated that the body was not found in the vehicle or near the driver’s side

of the car. Rather, the pickup truck was resting on the driver’s side, and the body was

found on her back underneath the back end of the truck by the wheel well.10 Dr. Fiore

testified that there was nothing in the materials she reviewed that would establish where

the second wife had been in the truck at the time of the crash, or even that she was in the

cab of the truck as opposed to the truck bed. But Dr. Fiore also testified on recross­

examination, I don t think that anybody staged that accident and put her underneath the

truck and tipped it up on end. I don’t think that’s a reasonable scenario, [fj I think the

accident is a real - is a real thing. I just don’t know where she was to start with because

she was ejected, and that’s true of any motor vehicle accident where somebody is ejected,

It’s very difficult to tell where they were positioned at the time prior to the accident.” Dr.

Fiore stated that there was “no evidence to support or refute,” asphyxiation and that it

was simply unknown. According to Dr. Fiore, the toxicological testing was not the most

comprehensive, “but for what they looked at at that time, they didn’t find any drugs or

alcohol in her system.” Dr. Fiore concluded on redirect examination that it was fair to

say that “there’s a lot that’s just unknown.”

Dr. Travis Miller, a physician specializing in allergies, testified that he had been

practicing since 2006.11 He consulted colleagues who were experts regarding issues

Dr. Fiore s testimony that the truck was resting on the driver’s side conflicted with

Deputy Johnson s testimony that the truck was found on its passenger side.

11 Dr. Miller received his undergraduate degree, went to medical school, and completed

his medical training in California. He did not testify that he had any experience with

allergies or allergic reactions related to the Georgia woods where the crash took place.

21

relating to anaphylactic shock and epinephrine. Dr. Miller testified that it was difficult to

say whether a person experiencing an anaphylactic reaction could recover without

treatment. He clarified, “If if s truly anaphylaxis and you have a combination of two

symptoms, I guess, theoretically, it’s possible that someone could.” He continued, “with

the lower grades of allergic reactions, some people we know, by experience, that do

experience symptoms don’t administer epinephrine and can live through the event.”

However, with higher grades of anaphylaxis, it would be unlikely for the person to

survive without treatment. Presented with a hypothetical scenario where a patient

suffering an allergic reaction presented with shortness of breath, swelling in the throat,

loss of muscle control, feeling woozy, and loss of vision, Miller testified that he would

not expect the person to recover without epinephrine or other treatment. Miller testified

that he had never seen a patient recover from similar symptoms without intervention, but

noted the “caveat” that when he sees a person in that condition, he administers

epinephrine. Miller also testified that he had never seen nor heard of a situation where

someone had an allergic reaction to an insect bite which was sufficient to render them

capable only of crawling to their car to try to get to a hospital, yet, one hour later, that---person had no signs of any bite.

Defendant’s Statements about the Second Wife’s Death and Her Ashes

J.W. recalled the victim telling him that defendant’s second wife died when they

were driving in Georgia. She told J.W. a bee flew in the vehicle and stung defendant, he

lost control of the vehicle and was thrown from it, and the vehicle crashed and burned.

J.W. also recalled the victim telling him that defendant “walked away without a scratch,”

and that he received a $630,000 life insurance payment. The victim’s father also recalled

her telling him that the second wife had been killed when the car she was in went over a

cliff, “and that [defendant] escaped pretty much unscathed.”

E.D., defendant’s supervisor, recalled defendant telling him that his second wife

had died in a car crash. Defendant told E.D. that he had been stuck in the car and

22

unconscious and there was a fire. Defendant regained consciousness and was able to get

out of the car, but his second wife did not make it. E.D. did not recall defendant telling

him anything about having been bitten.

The victim told several people, including her father, Je.W., J.W., and D.E. that, at

some point, she found the second wife’s ashes in a box in the garage. According to the

victim’s father they were “next to some greasy airplane parts on the shelf. . . .” In each

account, the victim shared an exchange she had with defendant upon finding the ashes

and asking defendant if that “what’s going to happen to me someday” or words to that

effect. She told her father defendant replied, “No. Just don’t make me—not if you don’t

make me angry.” She told Je.W. defendant responded by saying something like, “[i]f you

don t get out of line, then you won’t.” She told J.W. defendant responded, “You’re not

going to get in my way, are you?” She told D.E. defendant responded, “Not if you watch

yourself.

The victim said defendant’s response made her feel nervous and afraid.

Three days to a week before the victim was killed, she told D.E. she intended to

seek a restraining order against defendant. When D.E. asked why, she responded that

defendant had told her in the preceding week, “If you divorce me, you’H wind up like my

second wife.”

Additional Incidents Causing the Victim to Fear Defendant12

The victim’s brother testified that, on one occasion when he went out with his

girlfriend, defendant, and the victim, defendant described a time when he got what he felt

to be a bad deal on an airplane which he felt put his life in danger. Defendant

demonstrated what he wanted to do to the person involved in that transaction by grabbing

the victim around her neck and shaking her violently. Defendant released her, betraying

12 As will be discussed in an unpublished portion of this opinion, part II. of the

Discussion, the defense moved in limine to exclude some of the victim’s statements

evincing her fear of defendant, but did not object to all of this evidence.

23

no awareness that he had hurt her, and then went to the bathroom. When defendant left,

the victim began to cry.

E.D. recalled attending a conference with defendant in Amsterdam in 2011 where

defendant was scheduled to make a presentation to 300 to 400 people. E.D. reviewed

defendant’s plans for the presentation several days prior to traveling to Amsterdam and

told him that the presentation needed to be more limited. On the Sunday night before the

conference was to begin, another employee brought E.D. to defendant’s hotel room

where defendant had been found by a maid incapacitated or paralyzed. Defendant was

taken to the hospital, and E.D. gave the presentation. The victim told J.W. and her father

that defendant staged this incident.

The victim also told J.W. and her father that defendant was considering staging an

accident in which he would dive out of his Mustang at the last minute and the car would

be destroyed. Defendant intended to sue his employer, claiming that the lawsuit would

be worth $23 million because he was working 20 hours a day, six days a week at that

time.

-------- jbc victim told Je.W and her other fricnds during the girls—weekend that, on one

occasion when she was on vacation, a man hit on her, and defendant beat that person to

a bloody pulp and left them there, and she wasn’t sure if they were alive or dead.” J.W.

testified that, according to the victim, during her honeymoon in Bali, defendant assaulted

a tour guide who had “goosed” the victim. The victim said defendant beat the man and

may have killed him.

J.W. also testified that the victim told him she and defendant were on their

honeymoon in Australia scuba diving at night in 60 feet of water. Defendant, who had

the only light, left. The victim was left disoriented and frightened, and this experience

made her afraid of defendant. The victim told her father a similar story, where she said

she had to swim for her life to get back to the boat.

24

The victim also told J.W. that, while she was riding on the back of a motorcycle

with defendant in New Mexico, defendant tried to throw her off. She said defendant

accelerated and she nearly fell off.

When they first began their romantic relationship, the victim told J.W., “[i]f

anything happens to me, I want you to look at” defendant.

Defendant’s Evidence

Prior Allergic Reactions

M.Hd. attended the Air Force academy with defendant, and after graduation they

were both stationed in Texas. M.Hd. was boating with defendant when defendant was

bitten by an insect. Defendant began sweating profusely, complained of dizziness, and

grew incoherent. Defendant laid down on the boat while M.Hd. navigated to shore.

M.Hd. had to assist defendant to the truck because he was wobbly on his feet. He turned

on the truck’s air conditioning and got defendant some ice and cold water. Defendant did

not want to go to the hospital and stated he just wanted to go home. As defendant cooled

off in the truck, drank water, and iced the insect bites, his condition improved. The next

day, defendant was fine.

Defendant’s Injuries after the Crash

Regarding the crash involving defendant’s second wife, Dr. Albert DiVittorio

testified that defendant’s injuries were consistent with being thrown out of a vehicle and

within the range of what one could expect. DiVittorio emphasized the sloping nature of

the topography and the brush in the area which would have gradually slowed defendant

down.

Defendant’s Testimony

Defendant testified he attended the United States Air Force Academy, and became

an F-16 fighter pilot. He married his second wife while he was stationed in Florida, and

was later reassigned to Japan.

25

While stationed in Japan, defendant developed carpal tunnel syndrome which

prevented him from flying. Defendant was angry and frustrated as a result of this

setback. Approximately three months later, he was called into his commanding officer’s

office and informed that he had been filmed shoplifting at a base store in Korea where he

had been two days earlier. Defendant had an angry, emotional outburst. He testified that,

prior to being confronted about the incident, he had no recollection of walking out of the

store without paying for items. This is an example of what defendant described as his

occasional instances of amnesia. As a result of this incident, defendant was hospitalized

and treated by psychiatrists for three or four months in Hawaii. Defendant spent another

four months in treatment in the Washington D.C. area. He was honorably discharged and

he and his second wife returned to Florida.

Thereafter, defendant and his second wife moved to Georgia, and defendant

started his own business. They were planning to have a family.

Defendant testified that he had experienced symptoms of an allergic reaction on

the boat as described by M.Hd. Following that episode, defendant recovered after

resting, and he was not treated by a doctor or in a hospital. On another occasion,

defendant was in his front yard in Tampa when he began to feel nauseous and sat down.

Defendant looked down and saw ants on his ankle. After removing the ants, the nausea

increased and defendant began to experience tightening of the throat and difficulty

breathing. Thereafter, he walked into the house and collapsed. He crawled into the

kitchen, and his second wife called 911. Defendant was transported to the hospital and

treated by EMTs on the way. A physician prescribed defendant an EpiPen. Defendant

had another allergic reaction while at his home in Georgia.

Defendant testified that he and his second wife enjoyed outdoor activities

including hiking, camping, and skiing, both in Japan and in Georgia. Contrary to the

testimony of her sister, the second wife did want to go on the camping trip.

26

On the first night of the camping trip, his wife invited Ranger David Shattock to

eat dinner with them, but he declined. Later, after they went to sleep, defendant woke up

and left the tent to urinate. After he returned, he felt the symptoms of an allergic

reaction, including shortness of breath, tightness of the throat, and weakness. Defendant

woke up his wife and alerted her to his condition. She assisted him in getting into the

passenger seat of the truck, and he reclined. She then drove to the road.

At some point, defendant felt the truck beginning to roll over. The next he knew,

he was lying on the ground in the midst of a fire. Defendant could see the truck in the

fire and realized that he had been in an accident. He feared his wife might be in the fire,

but he also thought it possible that she, too, was ejected.from the vehicle. He began to

search the area and tried try to get near the truck to locate her. He could not see whether

she was in the truck, as it was engulfed in flames. He testified that he spent

approximately 20 minutes searching the area, and then he went up to the road.

Thinking that his second wife may have made it out of the truck and returned to

the campsite, defendant went there, but she was not there. Defendant grabbed a jug of

water from the campsite, returned to the fire, and tossed the water on the fire

as a

nonsensical effort at fire fighting.” Because he did not have a cell phone, defendant

went to look for help.

Defendant went downhill toward other campsites and came upon the campsite of

two women. Defendant yelled that there had been an accident and said he thought his

wife was dead. The women did not have a phone, so they had defendant ride in the back

of their truck and drove to another campsite. Defendant approached W.D, and M.H.’s

campsite, yelling that his wife was dead, he needed help, and asking them to call 911,

which one of them did. Defendant began to walk back to the site of the accident.

According to defendant, the two women gave defendant a ride back to the accident site,

and W.D, and M.H. followed in their vehicle.

27

Defendant and one of the men searched the area for 15 to 20 minutes. Defendant

could not get closer than 100 feet from the vehicle. He decided to check their campsite

again, so he went there, accompanied by W.D. and M.H. She was not there, so they

returned to the crash site.

As defendant arrived back at the scene of the crash, law enforcement and

firefighters were arriving. Other than W.D, and M.H., the only people defendant had

contact with at the scene were the two deputies. Deputy Johnson informed defendant that

he had seen his wife’s body.

Defendant testified that, when Deputy Johnson asked to see the bug bite,

defendant responded that he did not know where it was. He said he did not know what

caused his allergic reaction.

Agent Roberts later interviewed defendant for 30 to 45 minutes. Defendant

showed Roberts his injuries, including his swollen hand, scrapes on his forearm, his knee,

and a contusion and scrape on his forehead. Defendant’s jacket was tom. During the

interview, defendant was asked where he was bitten, and he again responded that he did

not know. Defendant said he never determined the cause of his allergic reaction.

Defendant denied that he was wearing boots, heavy pants, a heavy jacket, and a

stocking cap when he encountered W.D. and M.H. He said he was wearing a T-shirt, a

medium-weight jacket, and cargo pants.

Defendant denied killing his second wife. He also denied that any medical

appointment she attended in the weeks prior to her death was for purposes of obtaining

life insurance. There was only one life insurance policy which required a medical

examination, and that had been completed in November or December 1998.

Defendant later relocated to the Bay Area. He met the victim in July 2005, and

they married three weeks later. Defendant’s company relocated him to Australia where

they remained for 13 months.

28

Defendant acknowledged he kept some of his second wife’s ashes in a box in his

nightstand. He testified he never stored the ashes in the garage. According to defendant,

the victim did confront him about the ashes. She asked defendant why the ashes were in

the bedroom, and defendant replied that he thought it was an okay place to keep them.

He testified the victim never asked him if she was going to end up like that, and he never

told her that she would if she did not do as he said.

Defendant denied that his baby son was conceived as a result of him raping the

victim.

He testified that, in 2010, he first began to suspect that the victim and J.W . were

involved in a relationship. Sometime thereafter, defendant received a telephone call from

J.W.’s wife. She told defendant that J.W. and the victim were having an affair, that J.W.

was dangerous, and that defendant should be careful. She told defendant that J.W.

possessed “an arsenal of weapons . . . .” and that he was no longer able to work in

corrections because he had a violent altercation while employed in law enforcement. The

victim confirmed to defendant that J.W. owned guns and that he had a violent altercation

while in law enforcement. She also confirmed the affair and how long it had been going

on.

On the suggestion of the victim’s father, defendant and the father went to J.W.’s

house to confront him and tell him to “lay[] off.” Defendant acknowledged that he was

holding one of his children when he did so, but denied holding her as a human shield.

The father was holding defendant’s son.

According to defendant, after he confronted J.W., the victim seemed more

amenable to, even eager for, reconciliation. Defendant and the victim formed a tentative

plan to move to the city where her father lived. They viewed some rental properties

there. Ultimately, the plan did not come to fruition, as the victim and J.W. resumed their

relationship.

29

Defendant testified that he and the victim were not sexually intimate in the month

of February 2012. This corresponded with the resumption of her relationship with J.W.

According to defendant, the victim changed dramatically that month.

In December 2011, the victim had told defendant she planned to leave, but she

stated that defendant could keep the children. Therefore, as of February 26 or 27, 2012,

defendant believed that, in the event he and the victim separated, custody of the children

would be resolved amicably and fairly.

Defendant testified that, as of February 2012, the victim was “lashing out, and

confrontational and combative.” She started smoking cigarettes and started “doing a little

bit of day drinking, not much, but some day drinking.” While the victim previously had

been a capable mother, in the month of February, when defendant would come home on

Fridays, he would find her “highly inebriated with the kids in the house.” She also

stopped taking the children to their social activities, and she stopped breast feeding the

baby. She told defendant that she did not even want the children, which was shocking to

defendant. She also stopped engaging in her own social activities.

On the night of February 26, 2012, the victim came home and told defendant she

intended to have the children 100 percent of the time, and defendant would only be

allowed to visit them. Previously, they seemed to agree they would share equal custody

of the children.

Defendant got up at approximately 3:00 a.m. the following morning to go to work.

Later, he went into the victim’s bedroom. Defendant got in bed with her. He told her

that her having the children 100 percent of the time was unacceptable. According to

defendant, the victim responded, “I’ll get [J.W.] to come over here and take care of you.”

Defendant perceived this as a death threat. Defendant testified, “I knew she was spinning

out of control, but I didn’t know it had gotten to this point.”

Defendant hit the victim with a partially closed fist on the left side of her face.

The victim sat up and turned away from defendant with her feet on the floor, and

30

defendant started to rub her back and apologized. The victim turned around and lunged

at defendant with scissors with the blades open. She thrust the scissors at defendant, and

defendant put his hand up between the blades to block them. Defendant and the victim

wrestled, each attempting to control the scissors. He felt endangered. He testified he

sustained injuries to his hands, and the victim sustained cuts from the scissors on her

chest and face. He poked the victim’s left eye with his thumb, she bit his hand, and

defendant fled the room and ran to the garage.

In the garage, defendant thought “maybe leaving this situation isn’t the best.

Maybe I need to get the children out of here.” Because of the victim’s purported binge

drinking and the fact that she just attacked him with scissors, defendant decided to collect

the children and remove them from the house because they were not safe there. Their son

was in his crib in the victim’s bedroom, and defendant testified he thought it urgent to get

him away from her. Defendant was particularly worried about his son and believed he

was in danger because the victim had a “weird” relationship with him as he was the result

of an unwanted pregnancy. On cross-examination, defendant testified he thought it was

possible that the victim was capable of killing their son. However, he also acknowledged

that she had never shown aggression towards the children and had never harmed them.

He also acknowledged that he did not call 911 after he left the room.

Defendant ran back to the bedroom where he saw that the door was closed. He

thought the victim might be on the other side of the door, holding it closed. He returned

to the garage and put on his motorcycle jacket because it had crash padding and would

protect him if he broke the door in as well as against scissor attacks.

Defendant again returned to the bedroom, turned the doorknob, and put his

shoulder into the door. He fell into the room onto the floor and landed at the victim’s feet

where she was seated on the floor with her legs in front of her. He testified that the

victim kicked him in the head. Defendant said he “crawled up [her] body . . .,” and she

began to fight back. He testified he felt a sharp pain below his waist, and later discovered

31

that he had been cut on his left thigh. Defendant said he grabbed the victim by the throat

and then noticed she was holding the scissors. He testified they struggled over the

scissors again as they rolled around on the floor.

Defendant turned the scissors toward the victim and jabbed at her face and chest.

According to defendant, the victim then got control of the scissors, and he grew

concerned that he “might not win this battle.” He felt as though they struggled for 20

minutes, although he testified that the struggle probably lasted only four to five minutes.

He testified he was exhausted and had no energy remaining. He felt that he was in a “kill

or be killed” situation.

Unable to use his right arm and right hand, defendant testified he bit the victim’s

arm. Defendant slid his head up the victim’s arm and bit the back of her left hand. With

his left hand, defendant overpowered the victim’s right hand. Defendant then pushed the

scissors into the left side of her neck. As this began to happen, the victim told defendant

that she wanted to resolve everything, that she was willing to reconcile and that she

wanted to remain together. Defendant did not respond because he could not speak. He

did not stop struggling, because he believed that if she gained the upper hand, she would

kill him. He believed that if he did not kill her, she would have obtained control over the

scissors and he would not have the ability to defend himself. Defendant pushed the

scissors into the victim’s neck, killing her. He then lay on top of the victim for what felt

like a long time. Thereafter, he pushed himself off of her and cried.

On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that the victim had begged for her

life, and, at that point, he wanted her to die. Defendant agreed that he told law

enforcement that he did not have to “take it that far,” although on redirect, he testified he

meant he “should have had the strength to disable her and get the child and get out of the

room without having it erode or degrade into a life-or-death situation.”

Defendant acknowledged that he did not tell law enforcement he was unable to

move his right hand and arm during the incident. He also acknowledged that he told law

32

enforcement he pushed the scissors into the victim’s neck with his left hand while pulling

her in with his right hand;

He admitted the victim was not a violent person. He also acknowledged she had

never threatened him or anyone else.

Defendant admitted that, after killing the victim, he did not call police right away,

but instead “starred] processing what’s happened.” He burned a bottle of cleaner, rubber

gloves, a scrub brush, and paper towels. On redirect, defendant testified that he did that

because he realized it looked bad, as though he was trying to manipulate the crime scene.

He said six and a half hours passed between defendant killing the victim and calling D.B.

At some point after killing the victim, defendant sent a text message to E.D.,

stating, “Very serious home situation. Out all week. Sorry.” He testified he sent this

message “as a professional courtesy” to let E.D. know that he would not be at work.

Defendant claimed he cleaned and bandaged his hands before going to the J.s.

He testified that the victim handled household finances, and he did not prevent her

from accessing or using any funds. She never complained she did not have enough

money for her needs and the needs of the children. There was only a $25,000 policy on

her life.

Defendant denied that any incident occurred on their honeymoon where he nearly

beat a man to death for acting inappropriately toward the victim. Although she did ride

on the back of his motorcycle on numerous occasions, defendant did not recall an

incident where she nearly fell off. Defendant also denied chasing a contractor down the

street while holding a baseball bat. He testified he did not recall the incident described

by the victim s brother, in which defendant purportedly described being cheated on an

airplane deal and grabbed the victim by the throat.

Regarding the Amsterdam trip, defendant testified that he was to deliver a major

presentation. However, once he arrived in Amsterdam, he was directed by executives,

who did not have a full understanding of the presentation, to reconfigure it. Defendant

33

worked on revising the presentation for 72 hours straight until he collapsed in his hotel

room. He was taken to a hospital where he was treated over six days for psychosomatic

disorder. Defendant experienced paralysis of his limbs and inability to speak. He denied

this episode was a scam or was perpetrated to defraud his company, or that he told

anyone as much. However, defendant acknowledged on cross-examination that, when

paramedics arrived, his vital signs were fine.

Defendant also denied planning a scheme to obtain money from his company by

staging an automobile accident. However, based on how he felt he was mistreated in

connection with the presentation, defendant did tell the victim that he wanted to file a

lawsuit. Ultimately, he decided not to pursue the matter.

Defendant testified that, when he worked for a previous employer, he was having

inappropriate verbal outbursts with other employees and he was being reprimanded for

his conduct. He was told to attend anger management classes, although he did not do so.

He pretended to have cancer so that he could work from home and avoid these situations.

Defendant used the same ruse when he later worked for E.D. Defendant testified he had

discovered the affair between the victim and J.W., and he could not be in the office in his

emotional state.

On cross-examination, defendant testified that, although he had lied in the past, he

was not lying in his testimony. He testified that J.W. was not truthful about some things

in his testimony. D.E. and the victim’s father were “untruthful about some things, and

the victim’s brother, E.D., Deputy Johnson, Detective Johnson, W.D., M.H., and N.D.

were all “[l]ess than truthful.” According to defendant, the J.s were “as truthful as [they]

could be” There were aspects of his second wife’s sister’s testimony with which he

disagreed. He testified that the victim lied. But, again, defendant testified that he told the

truth about everything.

34

Expert Testimony Concerning Defendant’s Mental Heath

Dr. Frank Lossy, a psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, and forensic psychiatrist, testified

as an expert. Lossy reviewed investigative reports and other materials, including

defendant’s military records, records from defendant’s hospitalization in Amsterdam, and

defendant’s interview with police. Lossy also interviewed defendant on three occasions.

Lossy testified that the medical personnel who prepared defendant’s military

records in connection with his psychological treatment concluded that defendant suffered

from a dissociative disorder, or a state of mind which is dissociated from the subject’s

normal state of mind. Such a state can cause the subject to experience amnesia. In

defendant’s case, the diagnosis of dissociative disorder was supported by a period of

amnesia with no physical pathology in the brain or central nervous system to account for

it.

With regard to the Amsterdam incident, Dr, Lossy testified that defendant

experienced outrage at the developments concerning the presentation. Lossy opined that,

when defendant was admitted into the hospital in Amsterdam, he was suffering from

conversion disorder, by which the subject copes with a situation he or she deems

unacceptable by developing an abnormality of the motor or sensory apparatus. The

physical symptom is not caused by any physical pathology, but is purely a mental

phenomenon. According to Dr. Lossy, defendant’s condition resulted from an inner

conflict about anger.

Dr. Lossy’s opinion was that, at the time of defendant’s struggle with the victim

resulting in her death, defendant was suffering from elements of both a dissociative

disorder and a conversion disorder. He opined that defendant’s mental disorder could

have been a factor in causing defendant to act the way he did which resulted in the killing

of the victim. Dr. Lossy further opined that defendant’s mental disorder could explain

defendant s conduct between the victim’s death and when police were contacted.

35

Stipulations

The parties stipulated that, if called, Dr. Frederick Heilman would testify that “it is

possible to have an allergic reaction to a bug bite or something breathed and recover

without treatment. This is referring to common allergies, ffl] In answering the question

as to whether someone can recover from anaphylactic shock without treatment, he would

say he would not be . . . able to answer that question without first doing some research on

the issue.”

In another stipulation, the parties stipulated that Ranger David Shattock stated,

“On Saturday evening, 9-25-99,1 went by the campsite of [the Winklers]. I talked briefly

with the Winklers from my pickup truck. Ms. Winkler asked ... me to come down and

have some sausage, that she was cooking with them. I did not go eat with the Winklers.

Everything seemed fine with the Winklers when I left them.”

The parties agreed that, during the interview with Detective Johnson and Agent

Roberts in 1999, defendant

U &

was emotional and had injuries to his left knee. His left

hand was swollen and hurting. His jacket was tom at the right shoulder. His forehead

was scraped and bruised. There was a large scrape and bruise along the right forearm up

to the wrist area.

9

95

Verdict and Sentence

The jury found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree. (§§ 187, 189.) The

jury also found true the personal use of a deadly weapon enhancement allegation.

(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).)

The trial court sentenced defendant to 26 years to life, calculated as follows: 25

years to life for murder in the first degree (§§ 187, 189), and a consecutive one-year term

for the personal use of a deadly weapon enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)).

36

DISCUSSION

I. Evidence Concerning the Second Wife’s Death Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b)

A. Defendant’s Contentions

Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the 1999

uncharged death of his second wife under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b)

(section 1101(b)) as evidence proving his intent to kill the victim here, absence of

mistake or accident, and to negate self-defense. He asserts that the uncharged death of

his second wife had no tendency to prove his intent to kill the victim. He further asserts

that the prosecution “conjured up” a murder where there was no evidence that he turned

the steering wheel or struck his wife, causing the vehicle to go over the embankment as

the prosecution speculated. He contends that the grounds on which the prosecutor relied

in the trial court in arguing the admissibility of the evidence, such as witnesses’

conclusions that “there was something that wasn’t right,” and that “[njothing made

sense,” amounted to pure speculation. He emphasizes that the 1999 incident was ruled an

accident by the Georgia authorities and no charges were filed. He also asserts there were

no similarities between the death of his second wife and the charged offense substantial

enough to have any significant probative value. He acknowledges the similarities upon

which the trial court relied, but argues they are without significance.

Defendant further asserts that even if this evidence was relevant, it should have

been excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 (section 352), because whatever

probative value it had was substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission

would create a substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, and of

misleading the jury. He also asserts that the error in admitting this evidence violated his

right to due process and was prejudicial, in that he was essentially forced to defend

himself against a second murder.

37

We agree with defendant that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the

evidence pertaining to the second wife’s death. However, we further conclude that based

on the admissible evidence, defendant was not prejudiced by this error.

B. Additional Background

1. The Prosecution’s Motion

In a pretrial motion, the prosecution argued the evidence was admissible to prove

defendant’s intent to kill, contending that defendant had placed his intent to kill at issue

by claiming he killed the victim in self-defense. The prosecution asserted that the death

of his second wife and this case bore the following similarities: the decedent was married

to defendant; defendant offered innocent explanations in each case; defendant walked

away from each incident essentially unharmed despite the underlying violence involved;

both killings were preceded by financial hardship; and defendant stood to benefit

financially as a result of both killings. According to the prosecution, these similarities

satisfied the threshold of the “least degree of similarity” necessary for the introduction of

uncharged misconduct evidence to prove intent. (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380,

402 (Ewoldt).) The prosecution also asserted this evidence was admissible to prove

absence of mistake. As a separate theory, the prosecution asserted that the evidence was

admissible under the doctrine of chances, which holds that the more often one does

something, the more likely that doing so was intended.13

The prosecution further asserted that section 352 did not bar the admission of this

evidence. It argued its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the

13 The prosecution did not argue that the evidence of the second wife’s death was

admissible to show the absence of accident related to the charged crime. The trial court,

nevertheless, included that theory in its instruction about how the jury could use the

uncharged act evidence. While defendant’s claim of self-defense could entail the concept

of mistake (mistake in the need to defend or to use the level of force used), we do not see

how the defense of accident applies here. However, defendant makes no specific

contention as to this matter, and accordingly, we shall not discuss it further.

38

probability that the admission of the evidence would necessitate an undue consumption of

time, or create a substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of

misleading the jury. The prosecution argued the evidence had additional probative value

because it was “cross-admissible,” in that it related to the statements defendant made to

the victim when she asked about the second wife’s ashes and that defendant was planning

to stage a vehicle accident. Additionally, the prosecution argued “the circumstances of

both wives’ death show an overall pattern of deceit and lies by defendant.”

In opposing the motion, defendant maintained he did not commit the prior act

alleged to be uncharged misconduct. He marshaled evidence from law enforcement and

insurance investigation reports, and asserted that the evidence demonstrated the death of

his second wife was an accident. An insurance investigation report submitted to the trial

court as part of defendant’s opposition stated: “An extensive interview was conducted

with the GBI special agent who has also advised that they have received no information

which is contrary to what the beneficiary has reports [j/c]. The GBI agent also advised

he felt that this situation was nothing more than an unfortunate accident.” The report

from a second insurance company indicated the GBI agent said they could not disprove

anything defendant told them and there were no signs of foul play nor evidence indicating

defendant was responsible for his second wife’s death. Based on the evidence, the GBI

agent told the second insurance company’s investigator, “it just appears to be a sad and

tragic accident, with no foul play involved.” A GBI arson investigator also ruled out

“foul play.”

The defense also proffered information from the Georgia pathologist, who stated

he found “no evidence of foul play.” Additionally, the pathologist stated, “It is possible

to have an allergic reaction to a bite or something breathed and recover without

treatment.” He added that a person could have an allergic reaction to various plants in

the woods, and allergic reactions to insects and plants in the area are not uncommon.

39

Defendant also proffered documents and photographs indicating that the injuries

he suffered were not inconsistent with his description of what happened, disputing the

prosecutor’s representations that he walked away from the incident “unscathed.” The

GBI agent noted one of defendant’s knees was swollen twice the normal size and he had

scrapes along his arms. The injury to his left arm was described as a “large scrape” and

bruise. His left hand was also swollen. His forehead was also scraped and bruised.

None of the reports or proffers of evidence before the court indicated defendant’s injuries

were inconsistent with his description of what happened.

The GBI investigative report noted the mountain road on which defendant and his

second wife had been travelling was a narrow, single-lane road with ravines on the edge.

The GBI agent told insurance investigators that the mountain road was “extremely slick.”

Addressing similarity, defendant asserted that the accidental death bore no

similarities to the instant case beyond the fact that he was married to both decedents. He

argued that admission of evidence based on the doctrine of chances depends on the

existence of prior similar acts as a “foundation for a probability based calculation.” He

asserted that, because there was no prior similar act here, the evidence of his second

wife’s death was inadmissible.

Finally, defendant asserted that the evidence should be excluded under section

352. He argued this evidence would essentially entail a second murder trial, which would

give rise to undue consumption of time, including testimony by accident reconstruction

experts, road engineers, and insurance investigators.14 He argued this was “a classic

example of the need for . . . section 352 protection to avoid the undue consumption of

time, avoid substantial danger of undue prejudice, confusing the issues and misleading

14 Ultimately, the defense offered no testimony from reconstruction experts, road

engineers, and insurance investigators.

40

the jury” and that “[a]ny probative value of the dissimilar 1999 accident is far outweighed

by its prejudicial effect.”

In reply, the prosecution asserted that the “jury should be the final authority on

what facts they find true.” The prosecution also argued the court should look to the law

of joinder, asserting that area of the law would provide “insight” here. It also argued that

the evidence of the victim’s state of mind to establish that the defendant was the initial

aggressor would be admissible, and thus there was cross-admissibility regarding

statements made by the victim establishing her fear based on what had happened to

defendant’s second wife.15

2. The Hearing on the Motion

At the hearing, the court noted that the 1999 incident had been determined by the

Georgia authorities to be an accident. When the trial court asked the prosecutor to

explain how defendant caused the crash, the prosecutor responded, “we’ll never know

exactly,” because he was the only witness. She stated that defendant had said he had an

allergic reaction to a bug bite requiring that he go to the hospital and that is why his

second wife was driving. She asserted that defendant had provided different versions of

where he was in the vehicle at the time of the incident. “So he’s somewhere in the car,

and he pushes her - pushes the car or gets her out and turns the - or gets out, turns the

wheel. Who knows exactly how he managed

The trial court interrupted, stating that it

required a plausible theory and opining that it would not be easy to do what the

prosecutor alleged. The court stated, “I need some kind of workable theory as to how he

15 In this appeal, the People do not advance the prosecution’s “cross-admissibility”

theory concerning the victim’s fear stemming from statements she reported defendant

made concerning the second wife’s death. We note that the statements were essentially

related to the victim’s inquiries of defendant as to whether she would end up as ashes in a

box, which did not require the breadth of evidence introduced regarding the Georgia

incident. In any event, since the People do not advance the prosecution’s theory on

appeal, we have no reason to consider it.

41

got out of the car so much earlier, almost unscathed, and his [second] wife ends down at

the bottom of the ravine and then she burned to death.” The prosecutor responded,

“There could be 800 ways that he did this” and proffered: “It’s his wife. He could tell

her to stop the car. He needs to throw up. Who knows what his excuse was . . . why he

needed the car stopped. He gets out and puts it into drive, turns the wheel, and, you

know, punches her. flj] I mean, there could be many ways. He turns the wheel himself:

He could be - they could be driving along, and he has his car - he has his door unlocked,

ready to go. He’s driving along. He swerves the car and jumps out, you know, taking

control of the car himself, swerving the car, and jumping out. What’s -1 mean, there are

many different ways that he could have gone about doing it.” Later, the prosecutor

argued, “How do we know that this [defendant wasn’t the one that was'driving, driving

her off?”

The court disagreed that there were many ways defendant could have engineered

the crash, but agreed that he could have been in the seat, steered the wheel down the

embankment and jumped out. “I guess that’s doable. But I don’t think there’s 800 ways

this could be done.” The court added, “It’s kind of a difficult thing to do, to be honest”

and “it sounds like it would be somewhat difficult to get a car all the way down there to

the point where it kills one party and the other one is suffering only minor injuries.” The

prosecutor stated that, although the incident had been ruled an accident, “every law

enforcement person and every civilian that we have interviewed has said that they knew

there was something that wasn’t right. Nothing made sense.” According to the

prosecutor, “[tjhey couldn’t say for sure what happened, so they had no choice but to

ultimately rule it an accident.”

The trial court first considered the three-part analysis courts employ when

deciding whether to admit uncharged act evidence, beginning with the materiality of the

42

uncharged act evidence.16 The court observed that defendant’s intent was at issue, as

was his related claim of self-defense. Based on that, the trial court concluded that the

materiality of the uncharged event was “significant.”

As to the probative value of the uncharged misconduct evidence, the court told the

prosecutor, “I’m having a little trouble here.” It noted that the detective who investigated

the incident appeared to be “fairly comfortable” concluding that the incident was an

accident, and the arson investigator and the pathologist likewise determined the death

was accidental. According to the trial court, based on the evidence submitted in the

motion and opposition, not one agency involved in the investigation “pushed this for a

homicide.” The court told the prosecutor that while the circumstances sounded “fishy,”

that did not make the event a homicide.

The prosecutor argued that, for evidence to be admitted pursuant to section

1101(b), the prior uncharged misconduct need not have resulted in prosecution, and could

even be a crime for which there was an acquittal. When pressed by the court on how she

would demonstrate that the death was indeed a homicide as opposed to an accident, and

thus probative, the prosecutor listed the following circumstances: the second wife hated

camping and did not want to go; defendant had recently taken out new life insurance

policies on her; defendant had just substituted a “fake ring” for her diamond wedding

ring;17 they went to a remote location; defendant, who was a former fighter pilot , was

16 As discussed in more detail, post, “the admissibility of uncharged crimes depends

upon three factors: (1) the materiality of the facts sought to be proved; (2) the tendency

of the uncharged crimes to prove or disprove the material fact (i.e., probative value); and

(3) the existence of any rule or policy requiring the exclusion of relevant evidence (i.e.,

prejudicial effect or other section 352 concern).” (People v. Hendrix (2013) 214

Cal.App.4th 216, 238 (Hendrix).)

17 In his opposition to the prosecution’s motion, defendant asserted that they had

purchased a ring with a more modem setting to replace his second wife’s antique style

ring. The new ring had been delivered with a Cubic Zirconia stone. The plan had been to

43

trained in survival skills and “knows how to handle himself in a situation like this”; he

did not bring a cell phone or EpiPen on the camping trip; when defendant approached

two individuals’ campsite for assistance, he seemed suspicious to them because he was

not acting as though anything was wrong; law enforcement did not initially observe any

injuries on defendant; when asked, defendant did not show law enforcement the insect

bite which allegedly caused him to go into anaphylactic shock; the notion that defendant

could recover from an anaphylactic episode without any treatment was not credible; and

defendant only exhibited injuries after he had been outside of the presence of law

enforcement for a period of time. The prosecutor noted circumstances in the charged

case, including that defendant initially had no injuries but, after some time to himself, he

had minor injuries, which the prosecutor asserted were self-inflicted.

The trial court then turned to Evidence Code section 352. The court expressed

skepticism about whether the People could present this evidence within one day, as the

prosecutor claimed in her moving papers, thus avoiding undue consumption of time. The

prosecutor asserted that, even if the matter consumed two days of trial, it would not

constitute undue consumption of time in the context of what was expected to be a long

trial.

Regarding points of similarity, the trial court noted: (1) both decedents were

married to defendant; (2) both suffered “violent deaths;” (3) defendant was the only other

person present; (4) the injuries suffered by defendant were minor given what would be

expected if the events occurred as defendant claimed; and (5) defendant stood to gain

financially in both cases, in the prior situation based on life insurance proceeds, and in

this case because the victim intended to divorce defendant, which would be costly, and

she intended to seek spousal and child support. The prosecutor added to these similarities

replace the Cubic Zirconia that came in the modern setting with the diamond from the

antique style ring, but his second wife had not gotten around to doing that. Nine months

passed, during which defendant did not sell the old ring or its diamond.

44

that, prior to each incident, the defendant and his wives were experiencing financial

hardships.

In opposition, defense counsel asserted that the prosecutor’s arguments were based

on “ assumptions and speculation.” Defense counsel also emphasized that, in controlling

case law relied upon by the prosecution, the killings themselves bore substantial

similarities to each other. For instance, in People v. New (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 442

{New), both of the defendant’s wives were “shot in the head” while they were asleep. {Id.

at p. 446.) The court acknowledged that the offenses in New were “very, very similar,”

but noted the New court stated the most important similarity was the fact both victims

were the defendant’s wives. Defense counsel responded that is the only similarity present

here.

After defense counsel pointed out the similarities in the manner and circumstances

of the killings in New, the trial court asked “should a defendant who’s smart enough to do

two killings in different methods benefit from the fact that he didn’t shoot both victims or

didn’t stab both victims?” Defense counsel acknowledged that the mere fact of killing

two different victims in two different ways would not automatically result in the

inadmissibility of the evidence. But here, there were no similarities between the two

events, and evidence of the second wife’s death was irrelevant to defendant’s intent here.

Focusing on one of the suspicious circumstances, defense counsel argued that the

Georgia pathologist noted it was not unusual to have an anaphylactic reaction from a bug

bite or from something he breathed in the woods and it was possible for the reaction to

clear up without treatment. Additionally, there were other incidents in defendant’s life

where he suffered from anaphylactic reactions. Counsel also emphasized there was no

evidence of any trauma to the second wife other than the injuries resulting from the

vehicle crash and fire.

In reviewing the points of similarity with defense counsel, the court stated: “I’ve

never heard of anyone receiving such minor injuries,” as in the Georgia incident and “that

45

would be true of the stabbing too.” The court stated the belief that in both situations,

defendant would have received more serious injuries if events occurred as he claimed.

3. The Trial Court’s Ruling

The trial court concluded that the evidence was material, as defendant’s intent and

whether he acted in self-defense were at issue. The court again recited the similarities it

found between the two incidents, noting again based on New, the fact they were married

“is a very important factor.” The trial court then stated: “The Court is satisfied that, by a

preponderance of the evidence, the prior uncharged act is true. I’m not making any

indication as to whether or not it’s been proven by beyond a reasonable doubt or whether

it’s been proven by clear and convincing evidence. That’s not the standard. The standard

is preponderance of the evidence, and I believe it’s been met in view of the summaries

that I’ve just given as well as the similarities as well as the information provided by

counsel.” (Italics added.) We discuss the significance of the italicized portion of the

court’s ruling, post.

In considering the Evidence Code section 352 balancing analysis, the trial court

did acknowledge that the asserted manner of killing in each of the two cases was

dissimilar. However, the court further stated that the underlying circumstances, if not the

manner of death, were very similar, as were the motives. Ultimately, the court concluded

that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by its

prejudicial effect. The court allowed the evidence to be admitted.

4. Uncharged Misconduct Evidence Instructions & the Defense Mistrial

Motions

At the conclusion of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, upon the request of the

defense, the trial court, instructed the jury: “The People have presented evidence

regarding the death of [defendant’s] former wife ... in Georgia on September 26 of 1999.

This evidence was admitted for limited purposes. You may consider this information

only to determine whether or not at the time of [the victim’s] death, in Count I, that

46

[defendant] had necessary intent, ffl] You may also use this information to determine

whether . . . [defendant's alleged actions in Count I—regarding Count I were the result

of a mistake, accident, or self-defense. You may consider that evidence only for these

purposes and for no Other.”

Following the close of all evidence, the trial court instructed the jury with

CALCRIM No. 375 as follows: “The People presented evidence that. .. [defendant

committed an uncharged offense, to wit, murder, on September 26, 1999, and that offense

was not charged in this case, [f] You may consider that evidence only if the People have

proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the [defendant, in fact, committed the

uncharged offense, [f] Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a different burden of

proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a preponderance of the

evidence if you conclude that it is more likely than not that the fact is true. [ft| If the

People have not met this burden, you must disregard this evidence entirely, [fj If you

decide that the [djefendant committed the uncharged offense, you may, but are not

required to, consider that evidence for the limited purpose of deciding whether or not: [^j]

A, . . . [djefendant acted with the intent to kill [the victim] in this case; ffl] Or B__

and/or B, whether or not. . . [djefendant’s actions were the result of a mistake, accident,

or self-defense. fl[] In evaluating this evidence, consider the similarity or lack of the

similarity between the uncharged offense and the charged offense, and do not consider

this evidence regarding September 26[], 1999, for any other purpose. ffl] Do not

conclude from that evidence that. . . [djefendant has a bad character or is disposed to

commit crime. []f] And if you conclude that. . . [djefendant committed the uncharged

offense, that conclusion is only one factor to consider, along with all the other evidence.

It is not sufficient by itself to prove that. . . [djefendant is guilty of murder. The People

must still prove the charge in this case beyond a reasonable doubt.”

During the prosecution’s initial closing argument, defendant moved for a mistrial,

asserting that the prosecutor was impermissibly arguing propensity, and that the argument'

47

was misconduct. The trial court noted the argument “could have been cleaner,” but

denied the motion.18

During the prosecution’s rebuttal argument, the defense again objected, but the

objection was overruled without argument.19 After the jury began deliberating, the

defense sought to make a record regarding the basis for its objection and moved once

more for a mistrial. The defense asserted the prosecution argued propensity and was

using circular logic and improperly attempting to prove defendant killed his second wife

based on the evidence in the instant case, and then prove defendant had the intent to kill

the victim here with willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation, based on the prior

death. In the alternative to granting a mistrial, the defense argued the jury should be

instructed the 1999 incident involving the second wife had to be proved on its own merits

without consideration of the evidence related to the charged offense. The prosecutor

responded that her argument was not inappropriate and that it was the same concept she

argued in her initial closing argument. “It’s the Doctrine of Chances. The person that

wins the lottery once - this is exactly what the basis of the cases are that allow this

18 The prosecutor argued the following to the jury: “[Bjesides the fact that the evidence

has showed us what happened to [the victim] that night, we also know that the Defendant

killed [her] because of what happened with [his second wife], and it’s what’s called the

Doctrine of Chances. ffl] You know, there’s a saying that if you win the lottery once,

you’re envied. If you win the lottery twice, you’re investigated. And there’s a reason for

that, ffl] Look at - look at what’s happened with the death of [his second wife]. The

Defendant now has two dead wives, and in both cases look at these similarities: He’s the

only witness. Two cases, he’s the only witness.” It was at this point that defendant

objected on the grounds the prosecutor was arguing propensity and requested a mistrial.

19 The prosecutor told the jury: “So either you believe his testimony - and to believe

him, you must believe that he is the unluckiest guy in the world, because he had two

wives die under suspiciously similar circumstances, going to his intent. Both of his

wives—” it was at this point that the defense objected, but the objection was overruled.

The prosecutor went on to argue that both of defendant’s wives “called him a

pathological liar,” but never said anything more about intent.

48

1101(b) evidence to come in. The person who wins it once is envied. The person that

wins it twice is . . . investigated.” She further explained she was going to discuss intent

when the objection was made. The court acknowledged further instruction might be

warranted, indicated it would look at the transcript of the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument,

and took the matter under submission overnight.

The following morning, after filing a written mistrial motion, the defense

reiterated its arguments from the previous afternoon. Thereafter, the trial court brought

in the jury and reread CALCRIM No. 375 and then gave the following additional

instruction: “In determining whether the People have proven that the Defendant

committed murder in Georgia on September 26, 1999, by a preponderance of the

evidence, you must analyze the Georgia incident apart from all of the other evidence in

this case, [^f] In other words, you may not consider in any way any evidence that

pertains to the charged February 2012 incident in determining whether or not the

Defendant committed murder on September 26, 1999, in Georgia. ”20

C. Admissibility of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence

“Subdivision (a) of section 1101 prohibits admission of evidence of a person’s

character, including evidence of character in the form of specific instances of uncharged

misconduct, to prove the conduct of that person on a specified occasion.” (.Ewoldt, supra,

7 Cal.4th at p. 393.) “ ‘The reason for this rule is not that such evidence is never

relevant; to the contrary, the evidence is excluded because it has too much probative

value.’ [Citations.] ( u The natural and inevitable tendency” ’ is to give excessive weight

20 On the previous day, the defense also argued that the prosecution’s use of a

PowerPoint slide which stated “ ‘Defendant is the unluckiest man in the world and has

two wives die was the equivalent of arguing propensity and was misconduct. The trial

court indicated it was concerned about that argument, but concluded the new instruction

would cure it. On appeal, defendant does not raise the propriety of any of the

prosecutor’s arguments to the jury.

49

to the prior conduct and either allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or to

take the proof of it as justifying a conviction irrespective of guilt of the present charge.”

(Hendrix, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th atp. 238, quoting People v. Guerrero (1976) 16 Cal.3d

719, 724 (Guerrero).)

“Evidence of other crimes is admissible, however, when relevant for a

noncharacter purpose—that is, when it is relevant to prove some fact other than the

defendant’s criminal disposition, such as ‘motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake [of fact] or accident.’ [Citations.] ffl] Although

a prior criminal act may be relevant for a noncharacter purpose to prove some fact other

than the defendant’s criminal disposition, the probative value of that evidence may

nevertheless be counterbalanced by a section 352 concern. Evidence may be excluded

under section 352 if its probative value is ‘substantially outweighed by the probability

that its admission [would] . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing

the issues, or of misleading the jury.

5 55

(Hendrix, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th atp. 238.)

Thus, as noted ante, the admissibility of uncharged crimes evidence depends upon

consideration of three factors: (1) materiality of the facts to be proved; (2) probative

value, or the tendency of the uncharged crimes to prove or disprove the material fact; and

(3) the existence of any rule or policy requiring the exclusion of relevant evidence such

as prejudicial effect or other section 352 concerns. (Ibid.) “Courts subject other crimes

evidence to 1 “extremely careful analysis.

55 5

55

(Ibid., quoting, Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at

p. 404.)

“[Ojther crimes evidence need be proven only by a preponderance of the

evidence.” (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1245, fn. 2 (Steele)) And as

defendant acknowledges, his plea of not guilty put all elements of the charged offense at

issue. (People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 171.) “We review the trial court’s

evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014)

60 Cal.4th 335, 405.)

50

In performing its gatekeeping function21 under Evidence Code section 403,

subdivision (a),22 the trial court must determine by a preponderance of the evidence the

existence of the prior uncharged act and defendant’s connection to it as preliminary

factual issues before the prior misconduct can be deemed admissible. (.People v. Cottone

(2013) 57 Cal.4th 269, 286, fn.10 (Cottone) [distinguishing the preliminary fact

determinations between other crimes evidence under Evid. Code, §§1101, subdivision

(b) & 1108]; People v. Garelick (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1115 (Garelick) [“the

truth of the prior uncharged act and defendant’s connection to it are preliminary factual

issues which must be decided before the prior misconduct can be deemed admissible”

under section 1101(b)]; People v. Simon (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 125, 131, 132, 135

(Simon) [same; evidence was admissible under section 1101(b) to prove intent, motive,

and to negate self-defense].) “[I]f the prior and defendant’s connection to it are not

established by a preponderance of the evidence, the prior is irrelevant to prove the

section 1101(b) fact for which it is being offered.” (Garelick, at p. 1115.) Thus, in the

context of this case, the court had a duty to determine whether there was sufficient

21 Another panel of this court described Evidence Code section 402 as a “gatekeeping

procedure.” (People v. Galambos (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1157.) And our high

court has also used the term “gatekeeper” to describe the court’s duty in determining the

admissibility of expert testimony. (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern

California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 771-772.) Thus, we shall use the same term to

describe the trial court’s preliminary fact-determination duty under Evidence Code

section 403 relative to the admissibility of evidence under section 1101(b).

Evidence Code section 403, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part: “(a) The

proponent of the proffered evidence has the burden of producing evidence as to the

existence of the preliminary fact, and the proffered evidence is inadmissible unless the

court finds that there is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of the existence of the

preliminary fact, when: [^[] (1) The relevance of the proffered evidence depends on the

existence of the preliminary fact; ... (4) The proffered evidence is . . . conduct of a

particular person and the preliminary fact is whether that person ... so conducted

himself.”

51

evidence to determine defendant committed a homicidal act when his second wife was

killed.

In cases where the underlying act of the uncharged act event is a given, probative

value strictly depends on the degree of similarity between the uncharged act and charged

crime. “The least degree of similarity is needed when ... the evidence is offered to prove

intent.” {People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 346, 371; see Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at

p. 402.) “[T]o be admissible to prove intent, the uncharged misconduct must be

sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant ‘ “probably harbor[ed] the

same intent in each instance.” [Citations.]

•)

55

{Ewoldt, at p. 402, italics added.) As our

high court has explained, “the recurrence of a similar result tends to negate an innocent

mental state and tends to establish the presence of the normal criminal intent.” {Jones, at

p. 371; see also Ewoldt, atp. 402.)

Still, the similarities between the two events must be substantial enough to have

probative value. {Guerrero, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 728.) As defendant observes, “‘it

would be possible to list any number of marks common to the charged and uncharged

crimes each of which is so lacking in distinctiveness that its presence, whether or not in

combination with other equally nondistinctive factors, is wholly lacking in significance..

. . The sum of zeroes is always zero,

5 55

{Id. at pp. 728-729.) And as another panel of

this court recently observed, the trial court u c u must look behind the label describing the

kind of similarity or relation between the [uncharged] offense and the charged offense; it

must examine the precise elements ofsimilarity between the offenses with respect to the

issue for which the evidence is proffered and satisfy itself that each link of the chain of

inference between the former and the latter is reasonably strong.” [Citation.] If the

connection between the uncharged offense and the ultimate fact in dispute is not clear,

the evidence should be excluded.

5 55

{People v. Williams (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 396, 419-

420 {Williams), italics added, quoting People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 330, 316

{Thompson)', see also People v. C. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1114 (C. Thompson)

52

[“[bjecause this type of evidence can be so damaging, ‘[i]f the connection between the

uncharged offense and the ultimate fact in dispute is not clear, the evidence should be

excluded’ ”]; People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 818, 856 {Daniels) [same]; Hendrix,

supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 245 [same]; People v. Spector (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1335,

1373 (Spector) [same].)

D. Decisional Law Relied Upon by the Trial Court

The trial court relied upon a line of cases involving the admission of evidence of

prior uncharged acts. Unlike here, in each of these cases, there was no dispute that the

defendant committed the act underlying the uncharged events.

In People v. Griffin (1967) 66 Cal.2d 459 {Griffin), the defendant was charged

with the sexually motivated murder of a woman. On appeal, the defendant contended

that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a subsequently alleged act of sexual

misconduct involving another woman which took place in Mexico. The defendant relied

on the fact that he had been acquitted of that crime.- {Id. at p. 464.) Our high court first

stated that otherwise admissible evidence of another crime is not rendered inadmissible

by the defendant’s acquittal. {Ibid.) The court then reasoned: “the evidence of the

subsequent crime was admissible because the similarities between the crimes made

evidence of the later crime relevant to prove that [the victim’s] injuries were not

accidental but inflicted by defendant and to prove that he intended to rape her. The

evidence tended to prove that in both instances defendant became acquainted with a man

living with a common law wife, used that acquaintance to be invited to the man’s home

for the night or longer, and then attacked the woman in the man’s absence. Under these

circumstances, the evidence of the other crime is relevant

”23

{Id. atpp. 464-465.)

Our high court further concluded, however, that it was reversible error for the trial

court to exclude evidence that the defendant was acquitted of that subsequent crime by a

Mexican court. {Griffin, supra, 66 Cal.2d at pp. 465-467.)

53

But in Griffin there was no dispute that there had been a sexual encounter between

defendant and the woman. When the woman’s husband arrived home, he found the

woman in her slip and defendant in the process of pulling up his pants. {Id. at p. 463.)

The Mexican judgment stated: the woman “complained that she had been forcibly raped;

[the] defendant declared that she had offered to have intercourse for five dollars.” {Id. at

p. 466, fn. 3.) Thus, it was a given that there had been a sexual encounter between the

two.

In Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1230, the defendant was charged with the 1988 killing

of a woman (the victim) and the trial court admitted evidence of the defendant’s 1971

killing of another woman as relevant to the defendant’s mental state when he killed the

victim. {Id. at p. 1243.) There was no dispute the defendant committed the 1971 killing.

Our high court summarized the relevant evidence as follows: “In 1971, [the] defendant

stabbed to death [a woman], who had been babysitting his girlfriend’s children. [Both]

killings bore several similarities. Both victims suffered manual strangulation and

received a cluster of about eight stab wounds in the chest or abdomen. The victims

resembled each other somewhat. Moreover, in both cases, [the] defendant admitted the

killing to the police shortly afterwards, but supplied an explanation. After the first

killing, [the] defendant claimed he had taken some mescaline, drank some beer, and

smoked marijuana. When he arrived home, the victim complained that he had been gone

a long time. Then, [the] defendant told the police, ‘It just hit me the wrong way. All

these mescaline and everything was taking effect. And I hit her. The next thing that I

really remember is when I stabbed her and all the blood and everything.’ In this case,

[the] defendant blamed the killing on drinking peppermint schnapps and hearing a

helicopter.” {Id. at p. 1244, italics added.) Our high court concluded that the two killings

were sufficiently similar to make the 1971 killing relevant to the defendant’s mental state

in committing the 1988 killing, observing that the least degree of similarity is required to

prove intent. {Ibid., citing Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402.)

54

In its reasoning, the Steele court applied the doctrine of chances, which “is based

on a combination of similar events,” and “teaches that the more often one does

something, the more likely that something was intended, and even premeditated, rather

than accidental or spontaneous. Specifically, the more often one kills, especially under

similar circumstances, the more reasonable the inference the killing was intended and

premeditated.” {Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th atp. 1244.) From this, the Steele court

reasoned that the evidence pertaining to the 1971 killing bolstered all three categories of

evidence generally considered in determining whether the evidence of premeditation and

deliberation is sufficient.24 {Id. at pp. 1244-1245.)

In New, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th 442, defendant moved for severance. At issue

was whether two murders were properly joined and whether the evidence was crossadmissible.25 The defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, one

count based on the shooting death of his first wife in 1973, and the other count for the

shooting death of his third wife in 2004. {Id. at p. 446.) The defendant acknowledged

the 1973 shooting, but claimed his rifle had discharged when he dropped it while

cleaning it. {Ibid.) Law enforcement had initially concluded the shooting was accidental,

but reopened the case after the shooting of the defendant’s third wife. {Ibid.) His third

wife was discovered shot to death in the couple’s bed. {Ibid.) The defendant denied

shooting her, claiming he had gone out and later returned home to find her dead. {Ibid.)

24 Discussed in greater detail post, these three categories of evidence or guidelines that

may be considered in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding

of premeditation and deliberation are: (1) planning activity, (2) motive, and (3) the

manner of the killing. {People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 {Anderson).)

25 The trial court relied heavily on New and so do the People on appeal. As we discuss

post, the analysis for severance is different from the analysis concerning the admissibility

of uncharged acts of misconduct.

55

The trial court in New ruled the evidence was cross-admissible to “prove absence

of mistake or accident with regard to the 1973 events” and further to prove intent and

motive. (New, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at pp. 466-467.) The defendant asserted that he

was prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of his motion to sever the two murder charges

because the evidence was not cross-admissible. (Id. at p. 468.) Specifically, the

defendant asserted that the earlier murder was not cross-admissible because evidence of .

the circumstances surrounding his first wife’s death was not admissible to prove identity

or common plan or design in connection with his third wife’s death. (Id. at p. 469.)

However, on appeal, the court in New reasoned that evidence regarding the

defendant’s third wife’s death was cross-admissible on the issue of intent and lack of

accident or mistake with regard to the defendant’s first wife’s death. (New, supra, 163

Cal.App.4th at p. 469.) Noting that the least degree of similarity was required for intent,

the New court stated: “The circumstances surrounding” the deaths of the defendant’s first

and third wives were similar. “Perhaps most significant is the fact that both victims were

married to [the defendant] at the time they were killed. In addition, both [victims] were

shot a single time, in the back of the head, from a relatively close distance. Both victims

appeared to have been asleep at the time they were shot. At the time each of the victims

was killed, [the defendant] was the beneficiary of the victim’s life insurance policy.

These facts are sufficient to support an inference that [the defendant] did not accidentally

shoot [his first wife], but instead, that he shot her intending to kill her.” (Id. at p. 470.)

The trial court here found New significant because it viewed New as an example of

an uncharged prior act “deemed an accident initially” but later held to be admissible

under section 1101(b). However, the issue in New was not admissibility under section

1101(b); the issue was severance. And although the defendant asserted the first shooting

was accidental, there was no dispute that the defendant had caused the gun to discharge

and kill his first wife.

56

In Spector, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th 1335, the defendant was charged with murder

for the shooting death of a woman (the victim) with whom he was acquainted. The

question at trial was whether the defendant committed implied malice murder by killing

the victim in the course of assaulting her with a firearm or whether the victim shot

herself, either committing suicide or killing herself accidently. (Id. at p. 1342.) The trial

court allowed testimony from five different women acquaintances who were victims of

armed assaults by the defendant over a 20-year period. (Id. at pp. 1342-1343, 1372.) The

Spector court concluded that the other crimes evidence was properly admitted to prove

the defendant’s motive for committing the victim’s murder, and to prove that the victim’s

fatal gunshot wound was not self-inflicted. (Id. at pp. 1342-1343.)

In discussing the materiality of this evidence to prove absence of accident,'

mistake, or suicide, the Spector court stated that the evidence “was relevant because it

tended logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference to make it less likely [the victim]

had shot herself either intentionally or accidentally, a fact the defense tried to prove. As a

result, the other crimes evidence tended to establish both the corpus delicti of the charged

offense, and that Spector was responsible for the actus reus, facts the prosecution needed

to prove.” (Spector, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1374.)

The Spector court determined that the other crimes evidence “was logically

relevant because of. . . the ‘doctrine of chances.

5 55

(Spector, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at

p. 1377.) It described the “doctrine of chances” as a “probability-based calculation that

arises from a history of prior similar acts.” (Id. at 1379.) Under the doctrine of chances,

the trier of fact must decide “whether the uncharged incidents are so numerous that it is

objectively improbable that so many accidents would befall the accused.” (Ibid.) The

doctrine of chances is a u c u < logical process which eliminates the element of innocent

intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is perceived that this element

cannot explain them all.

5 55 5 55

(Id. at p. 1380, quoting People v. Carpenter (1997) 15

Cal.4th 312, 379, abrogated on another ground in Verdin v. Superior Court (2008) 43

57

Cal.4th 1096,1106-1107.) Because of the similarities, the Spector court concluded that

the separate incidents in which the defendant committed armed assaults against women

acquaintances in specific circumstances tended to prove the improbability that the victim

either committed suicide or accidentally killed herself. {Spector, at p. 1380.)

Regarding similarity, the Spector court noted the following:

U 4

The record reveals

defining similarities between appellant’s assault on [the victim] and his prior

assaults .... In each of these prior incidents, (1) appellant was alone with a woman

whom he had invited to his house or hotel, (2) appellant had a romantic or sexual interest

in her, (3) appellant drank alcohol, (4) appellant exhibited romantic or sexual behavior

with her, (5) she attempted to leave, (6) appellant lost control, (7) appellant threatened

her and pointed his accessible gun at her, and (8) appellant blocked or locked the door to

force her to stay against her will.

5 95

{Spector, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th atp. 1383.) The

Spector court also observed that, in each instance, the defendant was characterized as

extremely angry or enraged, and he demonstrated a significant mood swing. {Id. at

p. 1384.) The evidence regarding the charged crime showed: “[the victim] . . . agreed to

go [to Spector’s home] with [Spector]. . .. Spector drank a substantial amount of alcohol

that night. There was evidence some intimate or sexual activity had taken place during

the two hours [the victim] spent at Spector’s house. When she was shot, [the victim] was

sitting in a foyer near the rear door of Spector’s house, just a few feet from where

[Spector’s chauffeur] was sitting in the Mercedes waiting to drive her home. [The

victim’s] purse was apparently slung over her shoulder in preparation for leaving.”

{Ibid) Under the circumstances presented, the Spector court concluded that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the other crimes evidence to show motive

for his conduct and lack of accident or suicide. {Id. at p. 1385.) The court also rejected

the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in finding the other crimes evidence more

probative than prejudicial. {Id. atpp. 1387-1390.)

58

In People v. Rogers (2013) 57 Cal.4th 296 (Rogers), the defendant asserted the

trial court improperly admitted evidence of the murder of two women in other states as

probative of the defendant’s intent and common design or plan in murdering the victim of

the charged murder. (Id. at p. 325.) In each of the uncharged out-of-state murders, the

victims died from multiple stab wounds. (Id. at pp. 312-315.) Thus, there was no dispute

that the uncharged crime victims died as the result of a homicidal act at the hands of

another. The victim of the charged killing died from manual strangulation. (Id. at

pp. 302, 309-310.) Notwithstanding the difference in the manner of killing, the

prosecution asserted that there were numerous distinctive features between the charged

murder and the two uncharged murders. (Id. at p. 327.) Our high court determined that

the trial court acted within its discretion in determining that “the combination of

distinctive marks and similarities in all three murders was sufficient to meet the standard

for admissibility of the other crimes evidence” as to intent, premeditation and

deliberation. (Ibid.) Our high court observed: “Defendant selected each of his victims in

a similar manner, used a common ploy to lure them to a place where they would be alone

before murdering them, then acted in similar fashion after each murder; cleaning up the

murder scenes or otherwise attempting to conceal the victims’ bodies to buy himself time

to escape, taking personal property from each victim, and fleeing across state lines.” (Id.

at pp. 327-328.)

Rejecting the defendant’s argument that the three killings were insufficiently

similar to be probative because “ ‘there was nothing distinctive about the fact that he

talked, danced and drank” in bars with women his own age,’ ” our high court observed

that the

(( i

features of substantial but lesser distinctiveness may yield a distinctive

combination when considered together.’ ” (Rogers, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 328.) The

court continued: “Although several of the factors . . ., e.g., drinking, dancing, and

socializing with persons close to one’s age in bars, when viewed in isolation, may not

appear particularly unusual or distinctive, it was the combination of similar fact ors

59

common to all three murders—defendant’s socializing, drinking, or dancing with women

in their 30’s, unaccompanied by a male companion, in local bars; buying them rounds of

drinks to gain their trust; convincing them to give him a ride, or to accompany him back

to his home or lodging; killing them in a confined or secluded space ([one victim’s]

bedroom, defendant’s Tampa motel room to which [the other victim] had given him a

ride, and in the case of [the charged] murder, the cab of [the victim’s] pickup under cover

of darkness late at night); hiding the bodies (or in the case of [the victim of the charged

murder], burning her body) so as to avoid detection and buy further time to escape;

fleeing from each crime scene with the victim’s property; crossing state lines, in each

instance within two days, to further facilitate his escape; and the fact that all three

murders were committed within the very short time span of approximately six weeks—

that rendered evidence of the out-of-state murders admissible to show that [the charged]

murder was both premeditated and deliberate and committed with express malice.”

(Ibid.) (Bold omitted.)

All of these cases have one key circumstance in common. Unlike here, there was

no dispute about whether the defendant committed the act underlying the uncharged

misconduct evidence. In Griffin, there was no dispute the defendant had a sexual

encounter with the woman in Mexico. In Steele, New, and Rogers, there was no dispute

that the victims died as the result of homicidal acts. And in Spector, the evidence clearly

showed defendant had engaged in prior assaultive conduct. We shall discuss the import

of this circumstance post in our discussion of probative value.

E. Analysis

1. Material Purpose

“In order to satisfy the requirement of materiality, the fact sought to be proved or

disproved must be either an ultimate fact or an intermediate fact from which such

ultimate fact may be inferred. [Citation.] Elements of the offense and defenses are

ultimate facts. [Citation.] The absence of mistake is an intermediate fact. [Citation.] By

60

pleading not guilty . . . defendant placed all elements of the crime in dispute.” (Hendrix,

supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at pp. 239-240.) Indeed, defendant’s mental state (intent to

unlawfully kill and premeditation and deliberation) and whether he acted in self-defense

or imperfect self-defense were in active dispute here. (See People v. Rios (2000) 23

Cal.4th 450, 462 (Rios) [where the issue of imperfect self-defense is properly presented,

the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that this circumstance was lacking

to establish the element of malice]; Simon, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 129 [section

1101(b) has been interpreted to allow the admission of “other acts” evidence that tends to

negate a defendant’s claim of self-defense].)

Accordingly, the uncharged act evidence here was offered for a material purpose.

2. Relevance and Probative Value

Normally, our review on this prong of the analysis would focus exclusively on

similarities, but we first address another issue that is pertinent to the tendency of the

evidence to prove material facts typically not addressed in other cases involving

admissibility under section 1101(b). As in the cases upon which the trial court relied,

there is typically no dispute about the act underlying the uncharged crime. In this case,

the actus reus of the prior incident was in dispute. Unlike the cases upon which the trial

court relied, it was not clear that defendant committed an act that caused his second

wife’s death. In our view, the theory advanced in limine by the prosecution amounted to

using the charged killing of the victim to prove criminal agency as to the second wife’s

death, so as to then establish mens rea and negate self-defense regarding the victim’s

killing. Uncharged act evidence cannot be used in this way.

In People v. Albertson (1944) 23 Cal.2d 550, our high court stated:

“Circumstantial proof of a crime charged cannot be intermingled with circumstantial

proof of suspicious prior occurrences in such manner that it reacts as a psychological

factor with the result that the proof of the crime charged is used to bolster up the theory

or foster suspicion in the mind that the defendant must have committed the prior act, and

61

the conclusion that he must have committed the prior act is then used in turn to strengthen

the theory and induce the conclusion that he must also have committed the crime

charged. This is but a vicious circle.” (Id. at pp. 580-581.) Other California appellate

courts have applied this principle from Albertson. (See People v. Erving (1998) 63

Cal.App.4th 652, 664; People v. Long (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 586, 590.) Here, although

there is direct evidence defendant committed the act causing the victim’s death in the

charged offense and that he intended to kill her, the evidence concerning whether he

intended to unlawfully kill, premeditation, deliberation and negating self-defense is

circumstantial. And the evidence related to the death of defendant’s second wife could

aptly be characterized as “circumstantial proof of suspicious prior occurrences . . . .”

(Albertson, at pp. 580-581.) Thus, we conclude the “vicious circle” referred to in

Albertson is present here. Indeed, when the defense pointed out Long in arguing for

mistrial after the prosecution’s rebuttal argument, the trial court gave a belated instruction

telling the jurors they must not consider evidence of the charged crime in determining

whether defendant murdered his second wife. The problem here is that the trial court did

that very thing in ruling on the admissibility of the uncharged event.

As we have noted, as a preliminary fact, the trial court must determine by a

preponderance of the evidence the existence of the prior uncharged act and defendant’s

connection to it. (Cottone, supra, 57 Cal.4th atp. 286, fn.10; Garelick, supra, 161

Cal.App.4th at p. 1115; Simon, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at pp. 131, 132, 135.) And “if the

prior and defendant’s connection to it are not established by a preponderance of the

evidence, the prior is irrelevant to prove the . . . section 1101(b) fact for which it is being

offered.” (Garelick, atp. 1115.) Courts have also noted that “[i]f the connection

between the uncharged offense and the ultimate fact in dispute is not clear, the evidence

should be excluded.” (Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 316, italics added; Daniels,

supra, 52 Cal.3d atp. 856; Williams, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th atp. 420; Hendrix, supra,

214 Cal.App.4th at p. 245; Spector, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1373.) This is so

62

“[b]ecause this type of evidence can be so damaging.” (C. Thompson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at

p. 1114.) Thus, other acts evidence under section 1101(b) “ ‘should be received with

extreme caution” and if its connection with the crime is not clearly perceived, the doubt

should be resolved in favor of the accused.

9

99

(Guerrero, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 724,

italics added.) The connection between an uncharged act and the charged crime cannot

be clear unless there is clarity that the defendant committed the asserted act underlying

the uncharged crime.

Indeed, there was no evidence establishing that defendant committed a specific act

that resulted in his second wife’s death. During the in limine hearing, the prosecutor

speculated that there may have been “800 ways” defendant could have caused the crash

and engineered his second wife’s death, but no proof was offered to establish any specific

act. The proffered evidence argued by the prosecution to establish defendant’s

culpability was a series of suspicious circumstances. But the proffered evidence before

the trial court also showed that the lead investigator, arson investigator and pathologist

concluded the death was accidental.

Nevertheless, in ruling on the admissibility of the Georgia incident, the trial court

stated: “The Court is satisfied that, by a preponderance of the evidence, the prior

uncharged act is true. . . . The standard is preponderance of the evidence, and I believe

it’s been met in view of the summaries that I've just given as well as the similarities as

well as the information provided by counsel.” (Italics added.) The court did not outline

the evidence establishing a homicidal act in the “information provided by counsel” or

otherwise discuss the proffered evidence that satisfied it that defendant’s commission of

murder regarding his second wife could be established by a preponderance of the

evidence. Our review of the record reveals that the “summaries” the trial court referred

to did not involve evidence establishing the murder of the second wife, but rather was a

reference to its summary of the similarities between the deaths of defendant’s second and

third wives. And in any event, the italicized portion of the trial court’s ruling set forth

63

above makes clear it relied, at least in part, on the purported similarities to determine

there was proof by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant murdered his second

wife. By relying on these similarities, the trial court used evidence related to the charged

offense to establish defendant’s culpability for murder related to the uncharged act.

Thus, in performing its gatekeeping duty to determine the truth of the uncharged act of

misconduct, the trial court did exactly what it later appropriately admonished the jury it

could not do.

Part of the trial court’s error relates back to its misunderstanding of New, supra,

163 Cal.App.4th 442, Upon which it heavily relied. Indeed, the trial court returned to

New in discussing defendant’s mistrial motion after the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument.

Again, the trial court focused on New's analysis of similarities. In doing so, the court

erroneously observed, “the issue in the New case was whether or not the defendant at the

time of the charged offense possessed the intent to kill his victim.” But that was only

partially correct. The issue there was whether charges related to the deaths of both wives

were properly joined. And in such a situation, evidence of the later wife’s death could be

used to establish that the death of the prior wife was intentional. The same does not hold

true when the issue is the admissibility of uncharged acts to prove some material fact

related to charged offenses. In other words, unlike where evidence may be considered

“cross-admissible” for purposes of severance of joined charges, when the issue is strictly

whether evidence of an uncharged offense is admissible under section 1101(b) to

establish some material fact related to the charged offense, evidence of the charged

offense cannot be used to establish the commission of an uncharged criminal act.

(( c

Action that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is

outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an “abuse” of discretion

5

??

; thus,

where the trial court failed to apply the applicable principles in ruling on the admissibility

of evidence, we must consider that an abuse of discretion. {Hendrix, supra, 214

Cal.App.4th at p. 239.) Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its

64

discretion in performing its gatekeeping function and making its preliminary fact

determination that there was evidence establishing by a preponderance of the evidence

■

defendant’s culpability for his second wife’s death. Thus, we conclude the trial court

abused its discretion in determining the evidence of the second wife’s death tended to

prove material facts related to the charged offense.

We need not address whether the evidence concerning the Georgia incident

independent of the evidence related to the charged offenses established defendant

committed a homicidal act resulting in his second wife’s death because, as we next

discuss, the probative value of this evidence, if any, was substantially outweighed by

concerns listed in section 352.

3. Section 352 Analysis

Even if we were to conclude that the evidence related to the second wife’s death

was relevant and had probative value, we would conclude that the trial court abused its

discretion by refusing to exclude that evidence pursuant to section 352. Section 352,

provides that a court “may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption

of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of

misleading the jury.”

Defendant asserts that any probative value related to the evidence of his second

wife s death was substantially outweighed by section 352 prejudice because: (1) the

uncharged act, which occurred in 1999, was remote; (2) the uncharged act had little

probative value to prove that which it was admitted to prove; (3) the uncharged act was

inflammatory; (4) the jury may have wanted to punish defendant for his second wife’s

death, and (5) the evidence would have the tendency to lead the jury to believe that he

was a criminal mastermind and must have killed the victim here with deliberation and

premeditation, and thus was impermissible propensity evidence.

65

We conclude that, assuming the trial court did not err in determining there was

sufficient proof of defendant’s culpability as to his second wife’s death to establish

relevance, any probative value of that evidence was substantially outweighed by the

probability that its admission would necessitate undue consumption of time and create a

substantial danger of undue prejudice. (Evid. Code, § 352.)

a. Probative Value - Proof of Culpability and Similarities

As a first step to weighing the section 352 concerns, courts must first consider the

evidence’s probative value. That consideration includes an evaluation of how strongly

the evidence tends to prove the material fact at issue. Because substantial prejudicial

effect is inherent in uncharged act evidence, such evidence is admissible over a section

352 objection only if it has “substantial probative value.” {Rogers, supra, 57 Cal.4th at

p. 331; People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1302, 1331; Ewoldt, supra,1 Cal.4th at p. 404;

Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 318.) Given the lack of proof as to the actus reus, i.e.,

the homicidal act defendant purportedly committed to cause the death of his second wife,

and the dissimilarities between her death and the killing here, we conclude that any

probative value the uncharged event had relative to establishing intent and negating

mistake and self-defense was insubstantial.

Even though the lowest degree of similarity is required to show intent, the more

substantive similarities there are from which one can infer that defendant probably

harbored the same intent in each instance, the higher the probative value. The similarities

the trial court found here do not provide substantial probative value. Those points of

similarity are: (1) both decedents were married to defendant; (2) both victims suffered

“violent deaths” and defendant was the only person present at the time each wife was

killed; (3) despite the violent nature of both incidents, defendant sustained relatively

minor injuries which were purportedly not consistent with what one would expect if the

events occurred as defendant claimed; and (4) both times defendant was under financial

stress and he stood to benefit financially as a result of the deaths. We acknowledge these

66

similarities, but in examining “the precise elements of similarity” (Williams, supra, 23

Cal.App.5th at pp. 419-420), we also note in our calculus of probative value that there are

significant dissimilarities.

The trial court here relied heavily on the New court’s statement about the

significance of the fact the defendant therein was married to both victims. So too do the

People on appeal, referring to this as the most “glaring similarity.” But the New court’s

observation about marital status was made in the context of a motion to sever separate '

murder charges for the defendant’s killing of two wives, not in analyzing probative value

of evidence to balance against section 352 concerns.

Our high court has noted that there are differences in the analysis concerning

severance of properly j oined charges and the analysis applicable to the related but

different situation posed by admission of facts underlying an uncharged offense. {People

v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 772 {Soper).) In the latter situation, the prosecution has

the burden of establishing the admissibility of the evidence, including persuading the trial

court that the potential prejudice is outweighed by the probative value of the evidence.

{Ibid.) “ ‘Admission of the evidence involves, inter alia, the danger of confusing the

issues, introducing collateral matters, or tempting the jury to condemn [the] defendant

because he has escaped adequate punishment in the past. [Citation.] It is therefore

appropriate, when the evidence is of an uncharged offense, to place on the People the

burden of establishing that the evidence has substantial probative value that clearly

outweighs its inherent prejudicial effect.

5

55

{Id. atpp. 772-773, second italics added.)

The burden is reversed when it comes to the question of severance. {Id. at p. 773.)

Regarding severance, “ ‘ [t]he prosecution is entitled to join offenses under the

. circumstances specified in section 954J26^ The burden is on the party seeking severance

26 Section 954 provides in pertinent part: “An accusatory pleading may charge two or

more different offenses connected together in their commission, or different statements of

67

to clearly establish that there is a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the

charges be separately tried. [Citations.] When the offenses are [properly] joined for trial

the defendant’s guilt of all the offenses is at issue and the problem of confusing the jury

with collateral matters does not arise. The other-crimes evidence does not relate to [an]

offense for which the defendant may have escaped punishment. That the evidence would

otherwise be inadmissible [under section 352] may be considered as a factor suggesting

possible prejudice, but countervailing considerations [of efficiency and judicial economy]

that are not present when evidence of uncharged offenses is offered must be weighed in

ruling on a . . . motion [to sever properly joined charges]. The burden is on the defendant

therefore to persuade the court that these countervailing considerations are outweighed

by a substantial danger of undue prejudice.

5

55

{Soper, at p. 773.)

In addition to the different allocation of the burdens, the nature of the abuse of

discretion standard is different. {Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 774.) A defendant

seeking to establish error for failure to sever “must make a i u clear showing ofprejudice

to establish that the trial court abused its discretion ....

55 5 55

{Ibid.) Thus, “ ‘in the

context of properly joined offenses, “a party seeking severance must make a stronger

showing of potential prejudice than would be necessary to exclude other-crimes evidence

in a severed trial.

55 5 55

{Ibid.) Where the evidence underlying the charges “would be

cross-admissible, that factor alone is normally sufficient to dispel” prejudice for purpose

of severance of properly joined charges. {Id. at pp. 774-775.) For example, in New, the

evidence related to the last wife’s death could be considered to establish that the previous

wife’s death was intentional and not accidental. {New, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at

pp. 469-470.) However, as we have noted, in the context of the issue before us, the

evidence here was not cross-admissible in the sense that evidence of the charged offense

the same offense or two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or

offenses, under separate counts, and if two or more accusatory pleadings are filed in such

cases in the same court, the court may order them to be consolidated.”

68

could be used to establish the commission of a culpable act related to the uncharged

offense. Accordingly, while the New court’s discussion of similarities has some bearing

here, its reasoning, conclusion, and affirmance of the trial court’s ruling in that case is not

“apples to apples” analogous.

As for the similarities the trial court relied upon here, we begin with the fact that

both women were married to defendant at the time of their deaths. As the People point

out, the court in New observed: “The circumstances surrounding [the two] deaths were

similar. Perhaps most significant is the fact that both victims were married to [the

defendant] at the time they were killed.” {New, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 469.) But

the court immediately followed that statement with: “In addition, both . . . were shot a

single time, in the back of the head, from a relatively close distance. Both victims

appeared to have been asleep at the time they were shot. At the time each of the victims

was killed, New was the beneficiary of the victims ’ life insurance policy. These facts are

sufficient to support an inference that [the defendant] did not accidentally shoot [the first

wife], but instead, that he shot her intending to kill her.” {Id. at pp. 469-470, italics

added.) Thus, as the italicized language makes clear, the New court’s observation

concerning marital status was not divorced from important aspects of the circumstances

in which the two wives were killed and the motive for the killings. And while we find

the fact defendant here was married to the two decedents is not insignificant, we conclude

the way in which the victims were killed and the lack of proof related to that

circumstance regarding defendant’s second wife cannot be overlooked in deciding the

probative value to be weighed in the balance. This is not to say that other act evidence

has to involve the same manner of killing. Rogers is an example where that was not

required. {Rogers, supra, 57 Cal.4th 296 [prior uncharged murders committed by

stabbing, charged murder committed by strangulation].) Nevertheless, the manner of

killing is a significant dissimilarity here and more to the point, it was questionable

whether defendant even committed a homicidal act in relation to his second wife’s death.

69

Next, the trial court noted that the defendant was the only person present when the

two wives were killed. And, on appeal, the People argue: “there was no question that

[defendant] was the only person present” at the time of the deaths. We disagree. Unlike

the uncharged Georgia incident, the charged offense did not take place in a remote

location where nobody else was around. The charged act took place in the family home

in a residential neighborhood and the couple’s children were in the home at the time.

Thus, this is not a situation where defendant committed a homicidal act at a location of

his choosing where there was no chance of his act being discovered by others.

The trial court relied on its characterization that both victims suffered “violent

deaths” as a similarity, but this does not strike us as being of much probative value. First,

most homicides are the result of violence, so the same could be said for nearly all

killings. Second, there is no similarity between the violence of inflicting multiple stab

wounds and injuries sustained in a vehicle crash. Indeed, unlike the direct violence

inflicted in the killing in the charged offense, under the prosecution’s speculative theory,

the purported violence related to the second wife’s death was only indirectly inflicted by

defendant by somehow causing the crash.

The trial court also relied on the nature of defendant’s injuries, but this

circumstance does not help move the needle either. It appears that the determination that

defendant’s injuries were inconsistent with both the uncharged event and the charged

event was nothing more than the opinion of the trial court at the time it made its ruling.

Indeed, there was no specific evidentiary proffer or expert report submitted to the trial

court before its ruling indicating that the injuries defendant had after the Georgia incident

were inconsistent with his description of what had happened or opining as to what

injuries one should expect following such an incident. Nor was there any such evidence

provided to the trial court supporting its finding that the type of injuries observed on

defendant after his arrest for the charged offense were inconsistent with the events as he

described them. Rather, again, at the time of the ruling, the determination that

70

defendant’s injuries in both instances were inconsistent with what would be expected

under the attendant circumstances was merely the court’s opinion.

The trial court found as a point of similarity that defendant was under financial

stress at the time of both deaths and that he financially benefited from both deaths.

However, the nature of the financial benefit and amount of the benefits are materially

dissimilar. Unlike the death of the second wife which resulted in large insurance

payments, there was no such benefit associated with the death of the victim here. As for

child support, defendant would be legally obligated to support his children whether the

victim was alive or dead. And since there was evidence that it was the victim’s income

that paid for the kids’ food, clothing and childcare, killing her would mean defendant

would have to fund these expenses from his income. That leaves the potential avoidance

of support payments to the victim, but to achieve the benefit of avoiding spousal support,

defendant would have to convince people that he killed the victim in self-defense; this

case does not present a situation where a killer husband tries to make the deaths of both

wives appear accidental to achieve a financial benefit. As for defendant being financially

stressed, the insurance payoff would have alleviated this problem at the time his second

wife died, but killing the victim here would not have made his bills go away. Similar to

child support, killing the victim and losing her income would only exacerbate this

problem.

More importantly here, when the in limine motions were argued, it was clear that

the main motive in this case was the affair and fear of loss of custody of his children, not

financial gain. (See Williams, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 410 [noting that the motive in

the charged incident was “rage at the collapse of the marriage”].) Defendant only killed

the victim here when it was clear she would not terminate the affair and resume her

relationship with him. Importantly, no similar circumstance was established regarding

the death of the second wife.

71

The prosecution argued in the trial court and the People argue on appeal that the

doctrine of chances establishes probative value. But the doctrine of chances is not a

separate doctrine to show intent; rather it explains why a defendant’s intent can be

inferred from other acts of misconduct and events involving similar circumstances.

Indeed, the doctrine of chances is the theory upon which the requirement to show

similarities to establish intent is based.

Our high court has written: “The reasoning underlying use of an actor’s prior acts

as circumstantial evidence of that actor’s later intent is well explained by Wigmore. It is

based on ‘the doctrine of chances—the instinctive recognition of that logical process

which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same

result until it is perceived that this element cannot explain them all. Without formulating

any accurate test, and without attempting by numerous instances to secure absolute

certainty of inference, the mind applies this rough and instinctive process of reasoning,

namely, that an unusual and abnormal element might perhaps be present in one instance,

but that the oftener similar instances occur with similar results, the less likely is the

abnormal element likely to be the true explanation of them, ffl] ... In short, similar

results do not usually occur through abnormal causes; and the recurrence of a similar

' result (here in the shape of an unlawful act) tends (increasingly with each instance) to

negative accident or inadvertence or self-defense or good faith or other innocent mental

state, and tends to establish (provisionally, at least, though not certainly) the presence of

the normal, i.e., criminal, intent accompanying such an act; and the force of each

additional instance will vary in each kind of offense according to the probability that the

act could be repeated, within a limited time under given circumstances, with an innocent

intent.’ ” {People v. Robbins (1988) 45 Cal.3d 867, 879-880.)

Imwinkelried, upon whom the Robbins court relied, has noted: “The doctrine

teaches us that the more often the defendant performs the actus reus, the smaller is the

likelihood that the defendant acted with an innocent state of mind.” (1 Imwinkelried,

72

Uncharged Misconduct Evidence (rev. ed. 2020), § 5:6, p. 6 (Imwinkelried).) However,

sometimes a single uncharged act will suffice when the conduct underlying the uncharged

and charged events is similar and complex. “If the crime requires several separate steps

for completion, the defendant’s performance of a similar, complex act has obvious

probative value on the issue of intent.” {Id. at § 5:7, p. 5)

However, application of the doctrine of chances requires clarity as to the culpable

act underlying the uncharged events as well as similarity. When uncharged misconduct

evidence is offered to prove mens rea in the charged offense, Imwinkelried has noted: “It

is a given that the defendant committed the uncharged acts, and the question is whether

those acts are so similar to the charged act that they increase the probability that the

defendant committed the charged act with a mens rea.” (Imwinkelried, supra, at § 5:8,

p. 9, italics added.) Here, it was not “a given” that defendant committed the uncharged

acts, there is no complex series of similar acts, and in fact, as we have noted, there are

material dissimilarities in the asserted similar circumstances.

This case is nothing like Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1230 and Spector, supra, 194

Cal.App.4th 1335, upon which the People rely in their doctrine of chances argument. We

have previously discussed both cases, but briefly return to Steele, a case involving a

single uncharged act event and the application of the doctrine of chances. The Steele

court noted, “the doctrine of chances is based on a combination of similar events. . . .

The fact that defendant killed twice under similar circumstances is logically probative of

whether the second killing was premeditated even if no independent evidence existed that

the first killing was itself premeditated. . . . The fact defendant had previously killed

with a knife strengthens the inference that he considered the possibility of homicide from

the outset when he entered the victim’s house with a knife. The fact that defendant had

previously killed a young woman supports his stated motive that he hated women. The

fact that defendant killed twice in the same distinctive manner—a cluster of seven or'

eight stab wounds in the chest or abdomen combined with manual strangulation—

73

strengthens the inference that he had a calculated design to kill precisely that way.”

{Steele, at pp. 1244-1245.) There is no similar combination of complex circumstances

here.

We conclude that given the problems of proof concerning the asserted homicidal

act and the dissimilarities, the probative value of the evidence concerning the second

wife’s death was not substantial. We turn next to the pertinent section 352

counterweights.

b. Undue Consumption of Time

The “probability” that the presentation of the subject evidence would necessitate

undue consumption of time was high. (Evid. Code, § 352.) We review the trial court’s

ruling in this regard based on matters as they were before the trial court at the time of the

motion, not at trial. (See People v. Cervantes (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 162, 176 [we

normally review a trial court’s evidentiary ruling based on the facts known to the trial

court at the time of the ruling].)

In its pretrial motion to introduce this evidence, the prosecution represented that

it’s presentation would consume “no more than one day” of trial. The trial court correctly

expressed skepticism, stating: “I’m not so sure I can see how you can possibly do it

anywhere near that quickly.” The prosecution even acknowledged that it would present

the testimony of at least two “civilian witnesses,” presumably W.D. and/or M.H. and/or

the second wife’s sister, “a couple of police officers,” testimony concerning the autopsy,

and testimony concerning financial matters. Defense counsel notified the court that

defendant would testify to respond to these matters. Defense counsel asserted that, if this

evidence were introduced, “[wje’re talking about two trials.” In addition to evidence

presentation, the closing argument on the uncharged event by both counsel and additional

instructions were factors the trial court should have considered regarding the

consumption of time. (See People v. Harris (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 727, 739 [noting that

the other act evidence “necessitated lengthy instructions and admonitions and occupied a

74

good portion of the closing arguments”].) In short, it was clear at the time the trial court

originally considered and ruled on this motion that the presentation of this evidence was

going to consume a substantial amount of time. Defense counsel was right in that the

evidence essentially involved a second murder trial. As it turned out, at trial, between the

prosecution and the defense, no fewer than 13 witnesses testified, at least in part, about

circumstances related to the second wife’s death. This testimony was presented over

parts of eight different days. The entire trial involved the presentation of witness

testimony over the course of 12 days.

It was always clear that the presentation of the evidence and argument of the

evidence related to the second wife’s death would consume a significant portion of this

trial.

c. Undue Prejudice

While the evidence concerning the death of the second wife was not necessarily

more inflammatory than the evidence of the charged offense, it nevertheless presented a

substantial danger of prejudice because it painted defendant as someone who repeatedly

killed his spouses. In the absence of sufficient evidence establishing a culpable

homicidal act and points of similarity tending logically, naturally, and by reasonable

inference to establish a culpable mental state in the charged offense or tending to negate

self-defense or the existence of a mistaken need to act in self-defense, the evidence was

not much more than speculative propensity evidence.

Moreover, as our high court has noted, “the prejudicial effect of [uncharged act]

evidence is increased if the uncharged acts did not result in a criminal conviction. This is

because the jury might be inclined to punish the defendant for the uncharged acts

regardless of whether it considers the defendant guilty of the charged offense and because

the absence of a conviction increases the likelihood of confusing the issues, in that the

jury will have to determine whether the uncharged acts occurred.” (.People v. Tran

(2011) 51 Cal.4th 1040, 1047, citing Ewoldt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 405.) Unlike in

75

Steele, where the court concluded the fact the defendant was convicted of the prior killing

reduced any prejudicial effect (Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1245), here there was no

punishment and, to the contrary, there was a significant financial benefit defendant

realized-over one million dollars in insurance payments. Thus, the danger that some

jurors might want to punish defendant for his second wife’s death was high.

Moreover, at the time of the ruling, the evidence was potentially unduly

prejudicial inasmuch as it gave rise to the likelihood of the jury employing circular

reasoning in convicting him: Defendant killed is third wife in the charged offense,

therefore he likely killed his second wife during the 1999 Georgia incident, therefore in

the charged offense, he acted with intent to unlawfully kill and premeditation and

deliberation and not in self-defense or under the mistaken belief in the need to defend

himself. The trial court finally realized this potential prejudice and gave an instruction in

an attempt to mitigate that prejudice.

d. Conclusion - Section 352

In light of the insubstantial probative value of this evidence, and the probability

that its admission would necessitate undue consumption of time and create a substantia

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