Opposition Brief — adidas AG, Petitioner v. Nike, Inc.
Supreme Court briefDec 28, 2020
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No. 20-728
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
————
ADIDAS AG,
Petitioner,
v.
NIKE, INC.,
Respondent.
————
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
————
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
————
CHRISTOPHER J. RENK
MICHAEL HARRIS
ARNOLD & PORTER
70 West Madison Street,
Suite 4200
Chicago, IL 60602-4321
(312) 583-2300
chris.renk@
arnoldporter.com
michael.harris@
arnoldporter.com
AARON G. FOUNTAIN
Counsel of Record
DLA PIPER LLP (US)
401 Congress Ave.,
Suite 2500
Austin, TX 78701
(512) 457-7000
aaron.fountain@
us.dlapiper.com
STANLEY J. PANIKOWSKI
DLA PIPER LLP (US)
401 B Street, Suite 1700
San Diego, CA 92101-4297
(619) 699-2643
stanley.panikowski@
us.dlapiper.com
Counsel for Respondent
December 28, 2020
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002
RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Respondent NIKE, Inc. has no parent or publicly
held company owning 10% or more of its stock.
(i)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .........
i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................
iv
INTRODUCTION ................................................
1
REASONS WHY THE PETITION SHOULD
BE DENIED .....................................................
1
A.
adidas Forfeited Any Appointments
Clause Challenge ......................................
1
adidas’s Status as the IPR Petitioner Is
an Additional and Independent Ground
for Denying Review ...................................
10
CONCLUSION ....................................................
12
B.
(iii)
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page(s)
Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
941 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019),
cert. granted Oct. 13, 2020 ......................passim
Bedgear, LLC v. Fredman Bros.
Furniture Co.,
779 F. App’x 748 (Fed. Cir. 2019),
reh’g granted and judgment vacated,
803 F. App’x 407 (Fed. Cir. 2020) .............
5
Ciena Corp. v. Oyster Optics, LLC,
958 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2020) .................
10
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967) ...................................
8
Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish Network
Corp., et al.,
No. 20-135, cert. denied Oct. 13, 2020 .....
7, 8
Essity Hygiene & Health AB, et al. v.
Cascades Canada ULC, et al.,
No. 20-131, cert. denied Oct. 13, 2020 .....
7, 8
Freytag v. Commissioner,
501 U.S. 868 (1991) ................................... 4, 8, 9
IYM Technologies LLC v. RPX Corp. and
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,
No. 20-424, cert. denied Nov. 16, 2020 ....
7
Lucia v. SEC,
138 S. Ct. 2044 (June 21, 2018)................ 4, 5, 6
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U. S. 254 (1964) ..................................
8
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau,
839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d en
banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) ...........
10
Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GMBH v.
Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.,
No. 19-1451, cert. denied Oct. 5, 2020 .....
6, 7
SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu,
138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) ...............................
2
Stern v. Marshall,
564 U.S. 462 (2011) ................................... 3, 11
United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725 (1993) ...................................
1, 3
Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414 (1944) ................................... 1-2, 3
CONSTITUTION
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 .........................passim
RULES
Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) .....................................
7
Fed. R. App. P. 44 .........................................
3, 9
INTRODUCTION
adidas’s petition for certiorari should be denied
because it forfeited any Appointments Clause
challenge at every stage of the proceedings below.
This Court already has denied multiple cert petitions
presenting less extreme forfeitures of the Arthrex
issue. Here, the forfeiture is even more thorough than
it was in those cases. Despite being the petitioner in
the inter partes review (IPR) proceedings and the
appellant in two Federal Circuit appeals, adidas never
breathed a word of an Appointments Clause challenge
until its cert petition to this Court. adidas cannot
belatedly piggy-back on Arthrex simply because
certiorari has been granted in that case.
Though it had every opportunity to raise an
Appointments Clause challenge, adidas decided to
take its chances at the Federal Circuit solely on the
merits. adidas lost that gamble. It is far too late to
choose a different strategy now. It does not matter
how Arthrex turns out: adidas already has forfeited
any opportunity for relief. It is not even necessary to
hold the petition until a decision in Arthrex. The
petition for certiorari should be denied.
REASONS WHY THE
PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED
A. adidas Forfeited Any Appointments Clause
Challenge
“‘No procedural principle is more familiar to this
Court than that a constitutional right,’ or a right of
any other sort, ‘may be forfeited in criminal as well as
civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of
the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to
determine it.’” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
731 (1993) (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
2
414, 444 (1944)). This principle requires the denial
of adidas’s petition regardless of Arthrex’s outcome.
adidas forfeited any Appointments Clause challenge
at every conceivable stage of the proceedings below.
Recognizing its predicament, adidas conveniently
omits from its petition many important details of the
timeline of proceedings. This timeline underscores the
completeness of adidas’s forfeiture of any Appointments Clause challenge:
October 19, 2017 – Patent Trial and
Appeal Board (PTAB) issues final written
decisions in the IPRs that adidas filed in
2016
November 13, 2017 – adidas files first
appeal
February 26, 2018 – adidas files opening
brief in first appeal
May 1, 2018 – adidas files reply brief in
first appeal
May 24, 2018 – adidas files motion to
remand first appeal to PTAB based on this
Court’s decision in SAS Institute Inc. v.
Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018)
July 2, 2018 – Federal Circuit grants
adidas’s motion and remands to PTAB
At no point in these proceedings did adidas make an
Appointments Clause challenge in either the PTAB or
the Federal Circuit. The same is true of the postremand proceedings:
February 19, 2019 – PTAB issues postremand final written decisions in IPRs
April 19, 2019 – adidas files second appeal
3
August 30, 2019 – adidas files opening
brief in second appeal
October 31, 2019 – Federal Circuit decides
Arthrex
December 23, 2019 – adidas files reply
brief in second appeal (no mention of
Arthrex or Appointments Clause)
May 15, 2020 – adidas files notice of
supplemental authority in second appeal
(no mention of Arthrex or Appointments
Clause)
June 25, 2020 – Federal Circuit issues
judgment and opinion in second appeal
July 27, 2020 – Time to file rehearing
petition expires (no rehearing petition is
filed)
adidas made no mention of Arthrex or the Appointments Clause at all, before either the PTAB or the
Federal Circuit, at any stage of these proceedings. Nor
did adidas ever file the required notice under Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 44 indicating that it
planned to challenge the constitutionality of a federal
statute on appeal. Whether by design, neglect, or
some combination of the two, adidas’s utter failure to
make any Appointments Clause challenge was an
outright forfeiture of the issue on which it now seeks
this Court’s review. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 731;
Yakus, 321 U.S. at 444; see also Stern v. Marshall, 564
U.S. 462, 482 (2011) (“If Pierce believed that the
Bankruptcy Court lacked the authority to decide his
claim for defamation, then he should have said so—
and said so promptly.”). This forfeiture is fatal to
adidas’s cert petition. No “hold” for Arthrex is needed.
4
adidas’s failure to raise the Appointments Clause
issue at the Federal Circuit in its second appeal is
especially glaring. By the time adidas filed its opening
brief in the second appeal, this Court’s decision in
Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (June 21, 2018), was
more than a year old. In Lucia, this Court held that
administrative law judges (ALJs) of the Securities and
Exchange Commission qualify as inferior “Officers of
the United States” under the Appointments Clause
and hence must be appointed by the President or a
delegated Officer of the United States. Id. at 2053-55.
Lucia itself relied on a long line of this Court’s
Appointment Clause precedents, especially Freytag v.
Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
Starting even before Lucia, IPR litigants had been
challenging the constitutional validity of the appointments of the PTAB’s ALJs under the Appointments
Clause. E.g., Coalition for Affordable Drugs VIII, LLC
v. The Trustees of the Univ. of Penn., IPR2015-01836,
IPR2015-01835; Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Yeda Res. &
Dev. Co. Ltd., PGR2016-00010; Hulu, LLC v. Sound View
Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-00017, IPR2018-00366;
St. Jude Med., LLC v. Snyders Heart Valve, LLC,
IPR2018-00105, IPR2018-00106, IPR2018-00107,
IPR2018-00109; ZTE (USA) Inc. v. Fundamental
Innovation Sys. Int’l LLC, IPR2018-00425; Investors
Exchange LLC v. NASDAQ, Inc., CBM2018-00041,
CBM2018-00042; Unified Patents Inc. v. Bradium Techs.
LLC, IPR2018-00952; Apple, Inc. v. Uniloc Luxembourg,
S.A., IPR2018-00424, IPR2018-00282; Intel Corp. v.
VLSI Tech. LLC, IPR2018-01105, IPR2018-01035,
IPR2018-01144, IPR2018-01033, IPR2018-01040,
IPR2018-01312, IPR2018-01107; Samsung Elecs. Am.,
Inc. v. Uniloc Luxembourg, S.A., IPR2018-01653;
Quest USA Corp. v. PopSockets LLC, IPR2018-00497,
IPR2018-01294; General Elec. Co. v. Vestas Wind Sys.
5
A/S, IPR2018-00928, IPR2018-00895, IPR201800896; Unified Patents, Inc. v. Uniloc 2017 LLC,
IPR2019-00453; Starbucks Corp. et al. v. Fall Line
Patents, LLC, IPR2019-00610; Unified Patents Inc. v.
MOAEC Techs., LLC, IPR2018-01758; Flywheel
Sports, Inc. v. Peloton Interactive, Inc., IPR201900564, IPR2019-00295, IPR2019-00294. These challenges extended at least as far back as 2016—the same
year adidas filed the IPR petitions at issue here.
The Appointments Clause challenges to the PTAB’s
ALJs accelerated after Lucia, and many reached the
Federal Circuit. For example, the appellant in Polaris
Innovations Ltd. v. Kingston Technology Co. (whose
cert petition remains pending) raised the Appointments Clause challenge in the PTAB before Lucia, and
again in its opening Federal Circuit appeal brief less
than three weeks after Lucia: “The cancellation of
Polaris’s claims violated the Appointments Clause . . .
as a final agency decision requiring the Board to act as
‘principal Officers’ without having been appointed by
the President and confirmed by the Senate.” Opening
Brief of Appellant at 1-2 (Dkt. 22), No. 2018-1768
(Fed. Cir. July 10, 2018); id. at 52-60. Arthrex itself
raised the issue in its opening appeal brief in the
Federal Circuit in October 2018. Opening Brief of
Appellant at 2, 5-6, 31, 59-66 (Dkt. 18), No. 2018-2140
(Fed. Cir. Oct. 19, 2018). Other appellants raised the
issue in their Federal Circuit opening appeal briefs as
well. E.g., Bedgear, LLC v. Fredman Bros. Furniture
Co., 779 F. App’x 748 (Fed. Cir. 2019), reh’g granted
and judgment vacated, 803 F. App’x 407 (Fed. Cir.
2020); Opening Brief of Appellant at 63-64 (Dkt. 18),
No. 2018-2170 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 13, 2018); see also
General Order in Cases Remanded Under Arthrex,
Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir.
2019), Patent Trial and Appeal Board (May 1, 2020)
6
(noting that Federal Circuit had already vacated and
remanded more than 100 PTAB decisions under
Arthrex).
The Federal Circuit had not yet decided Arthrex
when appellants like Polaris, Arthrex, and Bedgear
raised the Appointments Clause issue in their opening
briefs. adidas could have raised the issue too. But it
did not. As noted in the timeline above, adidas filed
its opening brief in the second Federal Circuit appeal
on August 30, 2019. By this time, numerous appellants already had raised the issue in their opening
briefs, and the question whether the Appointments
Clause might affect the constitutionality of PTAB
decisions had been the subject of extensive public
commentary in the wake of Lucia. E.g., R. Davis, Are
PTAB Appointments Unconstitutional? A Closer Look,
Law360 (Sept. 5, 2018); D. Crouch, Appointments and
Illegal Adjudication: A Second Patent Judge Appointments Crisis, Patently-O (Jan. 29, 2018); G. Lawson,
Appointments and Illegal Adjudication: The America
Invents Act Through a Constitutional Lens, 26 Geo.
Mason U. L. Rev. 26 (Jan. 2018). adidas had no excuse
for failing to raise the issue then, and it has no justification for attempting to raise it for the first time now.
This Court, in fact, already has denied multiple cert
petitions where the petitioner failed to raise the
Appointments Clause issue in its opening appeal brief
in the Federal Circuit. In none of these cases did the
cert petitioner exhibit the dereliction that adidas has
shown here. Unlike adidas, each of them at least had
lodged an Appointments Clause challenge at some
point during the Federal Circuit proceedings, yet this
Court still denied cert.
For example, in Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GMBH
v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. (No. 19-1451), the cert
7
petitioner first raised the Appointments Clause issue
on November 5, 2019—less than a week after Arthrex
and two months after the Federal Circuit oral
argument—in a Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
28(j) letter asking to file a supplemental brief on the
issue. The Sanofi-Aventis cert petition was distributed for the same September 29, 2020 Court conference for which the Arthrex petitions were initially
distributed. This Court nonetheless denied cert on
October 5, 2020.
Similarly, in IYM Technologies LLC v. RPX Corporation and Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (No. 20-424),
the cert petitioner first raised the Appointments Clause
issue in timely-filed rehearing petitions at the Federal
Circuit—after the Federal Circuit had decided Arthrex,
which in turn had come after briefing in IYM’s appeals
had closed. The IYM cert petition was distributed for
the November 13, 2020 Court conference, a month
after this Court had granted certiorari in Arthrex.
This Court denied cert on November 16, 2020.
The Court likewise has denied petitions for certiorari in multiple other cases where the appellant had
raised the Appointments Clause issue after filing its
opening brief in the Federal Circuit but before arriving
on this Court’s doorstep. E.g., Essity Hygiene &
Health AB, et al. v. Cascades Canada ULC, et al., No.
20-131, cert. denied Oct. 13, 2020 (cert petitioner first
raised Appointments Clause issue in Federal Circuit
motion to remand on November 13, 2019, about two
weeks after Arthrex decision and before response and
reply briefs had been filed in appeal); Customedia
Techs., LLC v. Dish Network Corp., et al., No. 20-135,
cert. denied Oct. 13, 2020 (cert petitioner first raised
Appointments Clause issue in Federal Circuit after
briefing had closed by filing Rule 28(j) supplemental
8
authority letter, motion to remand, and motion for
leave to file a supplemental brief one day after the
Federal Circuit had decided Arthrex). The Court
considered the Essity and Customedia petitions at the
same conference (October 9, 2020) that produced the
cert grant in Arthrex. Yet those petitions were not
held; they were instead denied outright. The same
outcome is warranted here.
Finally, the cases cited by adidas do not support its
“anything goes” approach to forfeiture here. adidas
quotes Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts for the proposition that “the mere failure to interpose [a constitutional] defense prior to the announcement of a decision
which might support it cannot prevent a litigant from
later invoking such a ground.” 388 U.S. 130, 143
(1967) (quoted in Pet. 10). But adidas omits the very
next sentence that this Court wrote in that case: “Of
course, it is equally clear that even constitutional
objections may be waived by a failure to raise them at
a proper time, [citation omitted], but an effective
waiver must, as was said in [citation omitted], be one
of a ‘known right or privilege.’” Id. Further, the Court
acknowledged that the new constitutional defense—
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964)—
had reversed “strong precedent indicating that civil
libel actions were immune from general constitutional
scrutiny,” and the petitioner had “immediately brought
[the new decision] to the attention of the trial court by
a motion for new trial.” Curtis, 388 U.S. at 138, 14344. adidas’s failure to raise this foreseeable issue at
all below, even after Arthrex was decided, stands in
stark contrast.
Freytag also does not help adidas’s cause. See
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) (cited in
Pet. 10). The Court described Freytag as “one of those
9
rare cases in which we should exercise our discretion
to hear petitioners’ challenge” notwithstanding a
potential waiver. Id. at 879. adidas’s petition, by
contrast, is a run-of-the-mill case of forfeiture of an
argument. adidas in fact failed to do anything below,
even after the Federal Circuit had decided Arthrex in
the midst of briefing in adidas’s appeal. The petitioner
in Freytag at least had raised the Appointments
Clause challenge before the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 893
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Further, adidas’s petition does not implicate the “strong interest of the federal judiciary in
maintaining the constitutional plan of separation of
powers” that was invoked in Freytag, 501 U.S. at 879,
because this Court already has decided to hear a case
(Arthrex itself) that presents the issue. So there is no
risk that the issue may evade review if adidas’s
petition is denied. And as described above, the Court
has denied tag-along petitions for certiorari involving
less significant delays in raising the Arthrex issue
than adidas has perpetrated here.
This Court’s grant of certiorari in Arthrex does not
excuse adidas’s forfeiture either. As adidas acknowledges (Pet. 10-11), Arthrex raised its Appointments
Clause challenge in the Federal Circuit despite not
having raised it in the PTAB. Specifically, Arthrex
raised the issue in its opening brief along with a Rule
44 notice of its constitutional challenge. Dkt. 15 & 18,
No. 2018-2140 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 19, 2018). adidas, by
contrast, did nothing. adidas instead sat on its hands
despite having access to the arguments that Arthrex
and other appellants already had briefed and, later, to
the Arthrex decision itself. The two situations are not
remotely comparable.
10
Nor is adidas’s citation to the D.C. Circuit’s panel
opinion in PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau of any avail. 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016),
rev’d en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (cited in
Pet. 10). Unlike adidas, the challenger in PHH raised
the issue before the Court of Appeals, and the panel’s
decision did not involve any of this Court’s considerations governing the disposition of a petition for
certiorari.
B. adidas’s Status as the IPR Petitioner Is an
Additional and Independent Ground for
Denying Review
The forfeiture described above justifies denial of
adidas’s cert petition all by itself. Yet adidas’s status
as the IPR petitioner in the PTAB proceedings is a
further independent reason to deny the cert petition.
In Ciena Corp. v. Oyster Optics, LLC, the Federal
Circuit held that an IPR petitioner had forfeited its
Appointments Clause challenge because, by filing its
IPR petition, it “affirmatively sought a ruling from
the [PTAB] members, regardless of how they were
appointed.” 958 F.3d 1157, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (converting January 28, 2020 non-precedential order into
precedential order on May 5, 2020—all before the
Federal Circuit decided adidas’s second appeal). The
Federal Circuit also held, in the alternative, that the
IPR petitioner’s consent to the PTAB’s jurisdiction
“would most certainly doom” its challenge even if the
forfeiture were disregarded. Id. at 1161.
These holdings apply squarely to adidas’s situation
as the IPR petitioner here. But in its cert petition,
adidas does not even acknowledge these additional
barriers to relief, much less tee them up as questions
presented. adidas’s forfeiture of any Appointments
Clause challenge below is therefore compounded by its
11
further waiver of these threshold issues. Even if it had
not forfeited the underlying Appointments Clause challenge, adidas would need a favorable decision on these
issues before it could obtain any relief from this Court.
Accordingly, adidas’s failure to raise the issues—not
here, not below, not anywhere—is an additional independent reason why its cert petition should be denied.
12
CONCLUSION
It is both troubling and telling that adidas did not
even inform this Court of crucial procedural facts
giving rise to its forfeiture of the questions presented
by its petition. adidas is like a ticketless passenger
trying to board a train unnoticed by hiding in a crowd
of embarking travelers. Its ploy should be sniffed out
and rejected. adidas happily took its chances before
the PTAB and Federal Circuit without ever raising an
Appointments Clause challenge. Regardless of how
Arthrex turns out, adidas cannot obtain relief from this
Court “now that [it] is sad.” Stern, 564 U.S. at 482. By
failing to raise and preserve below the issues it now
urges, adidas has forfeited any access to review. The
petition for certiorari therefore should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTOPHER J. RENK
MICHAEL HARRIS
ARNOLD & PORTER
70 West Madison Street,
Suite 4200
Chicago, IL 60602-4321
(312) 583-2300
chris.renk@
arnoldporter.com
michael.harris@
arnoldporter.com
AARON G. FOUNTAIN
Counsel of Record
DLA PIPER LLP (US)
401 Congress Ave.,
Suite 2500
Austin, TX 78701
(512) 457-7000
aaron.fountain@
us.dlapiper.com
STANLEY J. PANIKOWSKI
DLA PIPER LLP (US)
401 B Street, Suite 1700
San Diego, CA 92101-4297
(619) 699-2643
stanley.panikowski@
us.dlapiper.com
Counsel for Respondent
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