Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Addie Smith, Petitioner v. Syhadley, LLC

No.

9° - 7°°

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Addie Smith,

i

Petitioner,

vs.

SyHadley, L.L.C.,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to

the United States Washington State Court of Appeals

Division I

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

FILED

NOV 0 2 2020

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT, U.S.

Addie Smith

Pro Se

2601 76th Ave SE

Apt 502

Mercer Island, WA 98040

Email: absmith27@icloud.com

(425) 399-3331

RECEIVED

NOV 1 8 2020

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT UR

Friend of the Court

11 P a g e

I.

Question Presented

The trial court, WA State Court of Appeals, and WA State

Supreme Court have attempted to invalidate the parties’ arbitration

agreement with state law, in whole, even though both parties agreed to

arbitrate our disputes.

King County Board of Health Chairman, Joe McDermott, declared

racism a public health crisis. In a statement, King County Executive Dow

Constantine committed the County and its public health authority to

implementing a racially equitable response to racism, centering on

community. He went on to acknowledge the County’s past and present

complicity “in maintaining and perpetuating structural racism,” and said that

“as an institution we must be a vital player in dismantling oppressive

systems that are grounded in White supremacy.”

“Washington State Court of Appeals, Washington State Supreme

Court and the King County Superior Court have refused to rule on the

Petitioner’s Motion to Compel Arbitration. Congress adopted the [Federal]

Arbitration Act in 1925” because “courts were unduly hostile to arbitration.”

Epic Svs. Corp. v. Lewis. 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018).

2 | Page

Many years later, “judicial antagonism toward arbitration” continues to

“manifest [] itself in a great variety of devices and formulas.” Id. At 1623

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Under the Supremacy Clause, from

which our preemption doctrine is derived, any state law, however clearly

within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to

federal law, must yield.” Dean Witter Reynolds Inc, v. Byrd. 470 U.S. 213,

219-220(1985)

The United States Supreme Court, in a 7-1 decision, Justice Kagan

writing for the majority, reiterated that “the FAA preempts any state law that

discriminates against arbitration on its face,” and also held that the “FAA

preempts any [state] rule that covertly accomplishes the same objective by

disfavoring contracts that (oh so coincidentally) have the defining features of

arbitration agreements”. Kindred Nursing Centers L.P. v. Clark. 2017 U.S.

Lexis 2948.

“[P]re-emption doctrine is derived” from the Supremacy Clause, which

makes federal law the “supreme Law of the Land.” Whether a particular

federal statute preempts a particular state law, thus rendering the state law

unenforceable, depends on the congressional intent. The Supreme Court held

Southland Corp. v. Keating that section 2 applies in the state court and

preempts conflicting state laws.

3 | Page

The Petitioner, Ms. Smith, Pro Se, was employed by the Respondents,

SyHadley, LLC., (also Legacy Partners Residential, Inc., and Legacy

Partners, LLC). Ms. Smith was provided an apartment, as part of her salary.

Ms. Smith is a hate crime survivor. Both parties signed a binding arbitration

agreement. Ms. Smith requested arbitration on September 16, 2019. To date

there has not been any arbitration whatsoever. Ms. Smith filed a timely

Motion to Compel Arbitration, on November 20, 2019, in trial court. To date

the trial court has refused to rule on the motion. It is still sitting in trial court

without a decision. Ms. Smith filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration in the

Court of Appeals on January 3, 2020, months after appealing the trial court’s

decision granting the Respondent’s Unlawful Detainer. The Court of

Appeals then ordered the Respondents to get a ruling from the trial court on

a Supersedeas Bond. Still no ruling on the Motion to Compel Arbitration.

The rationale of the decision indicates the court’s desire to enforce

conflicting state laws. It singles out arbitration agreements for different

treatment than other contracts. The Respondents, the Trial Court, the Court

of Appeals and Washington State Supreme Court have so far successfully

upheld Ms. Smith’s contract lease agreement and the state’s “at-will”

employment in the unlawful detainer.

4 | Page

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state

Supersedeas law? Does this state law conflict with the FAA?

2. Whether the Federal Arbitration Act standard of the rule is

satisfied when the courts violate Petitioner’s right to arbitrate by

enforcing conflicting state laws.

3. Whether the Petitioner should have been granted Motion for

Discretionary Review based on the Federal Arbitration

Agreement?

4. Based on the decisions of other Washington State cases, granting

Motion for Discretionary Review by the Washington State

Supreme Court regarding similar arbitration agreements, should

the Petitioner also have been granted Discretionary Review?

5. The King County Division I Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s

Motion to Compel Arbitration. Should the Motion to Compel

Arbitration been granted based on the Federal Arbitration Act?

6. Whether, based on the FAA, the Washington State Supreme Court

and the Washington State Court of Appeals should have ended the

Petitioner’s Stay pending the outcome of the ruling?

5 | Page

7. Should employees and employers be allowed to agree that any

disputes between them will be resolved through one-on-one

arbitration? Or should employees always be permitted to bring

their claims in class or collective actions, no matter what they

agreed with their employers?

8. Should Ms. Smith be granted a Stay pending the outcome of this

case?

6 | Page

II.

Table of Contents

I.

Questions Presented

pg 5-6

II.

Table of Contents

Pg7

III.

Table of Authorities

pg 8-10

IV.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari

PgH

V.

Opinions Below

,pg 11

VI.

Jurisdiction

Pg 12

VII. Constitutional Provisions Involved

Pg 12

VIII. Statement of the Case

pg 13-21

1. The Superior Court Case

2. Direct Appeal

3. Motion for Discretionary Review

IX.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

pg 22-25

X.

CONCLUSION

pg 25-26

XI.

APPENDIX

pg 27-28

7 | Page

III.

Table of Authorities

Cases

State of Washington v. Spencer Grant

Wn. App. 1067 (2016)........................

State of Washington v. Vazquez

95 Wn. App. 12, 15, 972 P. 2d 109(1999)

Shamlev v. Olympia.

47 Wn.2d 124, 286 P.2d 702 (1955)(involving injunctive relief in aid of the court’s appellate

jurisdiction). Id. at 127............................................................................................................

Kenneth v. Levine.

49 Wn.2d 605, 607, 304 P.2d 682 (1956)

Purser v. Rahm,

104 Wn.2d 159, 177, 702P.2d 1196 (1985)

Burnett v. Pagliacci Pizza. Inc.,

442 P.3d 1267 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019)

Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Com.,

43 Wn. App. 288, 716 P.2d 956 (1986)

Landa v. Holiday Appelwick, J.

No. 74406-2-1 Court of Appeals of the State of Washington

Kindred Nursing Centers L.P. v. Clark.

2017 U.S. Lexis 2948

Coventry Health Care of Mo.. Inc, v. Nevils,

137 S. Ct. 1190,1199(2017)

Logan v. Lithia Motors, et al..

No. 18-2-19068-1 SEA.

DIRECTV. Inc, v. Imburgia.

136 S. Ct. 463 (2015)

8 | Page

Marmet Health Care Ctr.. Inc, v. Brown,

565 U.S. 530 (2012)

Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard.

568 U.S. 17(2012)

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.

563 U.S. 333 (2011).........................

Preston v. Ferrer.

552 U.S. 346 (2008)

Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos, v. Dobson.

513 U.S. 265,(1995)

Doctor’s Associates. Inc, v. Casarotto,

517 U.S. 681,(1996)

Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton.

514 U.S. 52(1995)

Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs.,

489 U.S. 468 (1989)

Perry v. Thomas,

482 U.S. 483 (1987)

Southland Corn, v. Keating,

465 U.S. 1 (1984)...............

Maryland v. Louisiana.

451 U.S. 725, 746(1981)

Wickard v. Filbum.

317 U.S. Ill, 124(1942)

Dean Witter Reynolds Inc, v. Byrd.

470 U.S. 213,219-220(1985)

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,

563 U.S. 333,344(2011).................

9 | Page

Cf. Volt Info. Scis..

489 U.S. at All

Adler v. Fred Lind Manor.

153 Wn.2d 331, 342,103 P.3d 773 (2004).

Hill v. Garda CL Nw„ Inc.

179 Wn.2d 47, 53, 308 P.3d 635 (2013)

HiH.

179 Wn.2dat53

Circuit City Stores. Inc, v. Adams

532 U.S. 105, 119,121 S. Ct. 1302,149 L Ed. 2d 234 (2001)

Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos, v. Dobson

513 U.S. 265, 268, 115 S. Ct. 834, 130 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1995)

Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett,

133 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2013)

Moses H. Cone Menrl Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corn,

460 U.S. 1,24(1983)....................................................

Statutes

RCW 59.18.040(8)

RCW 7.04A.060

RAP 13.5(a)(b)(2)

RAP 8.3

RAP 8.1(b)(3)

RAP 8.1(b)(2)

Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16

28U.S.C. § 1257

28 U.S.C. §2101(e)(f)

10 | P a g e

IV.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari

Addie Smith, Pro Se respectfully petitions this court for a writ of

certiorari to review the judgment of the Washington State Supreme Court

and the Washington State Division I Court of Appeals.

V.

Opinions Below

The decision by the Washington State Division I Court of Appeals

and Washington State Supreme court denying Ms. Smith’s Motion to

Compel Arbitration and Motion for Discretionary Review are reported as

SyHadley, LLC. v. Addie Smith, 80780-3-1 (Court of Appeals) and 98196-5

(Washington State Supreme Court) respectively. The Court of Appeals

denied Ms. Smith’s Motion to Compel Arbitration on February 20, 2020.

The Washington State Supreme Court denied Ms. Smith’s Motion for

Discretionary Review on July 8, 2020. In 2012, a former employee, Lorena

Nelsen filed a Putative Class Action lawsuit against the Respondents.

Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential LLC.. 207 Cal.App.4th 1115 (2012)

144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198 No. A132927. The King County Resolution 20.08.2

declaring racism a public health crisis. Those orders and opinions are

attached at Appendix (“App.”).

ll | P a g e

VI.

Jurisdiction

Ms. Smith’s petition for hearing to the Washington State Supreme

Court was denied on July 8, 2020. Ms. Smith invokes this Court’s

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 and U.S.C. § 2101(e)(f), having timely

filed this petition for a writ of certiorari within ninety days of the

Washington State Supreme Court’s judgment.

VII. Constitutional Provisions Involved

United States Constitution, Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides

that both pre-dispute and post-dispute arbitration agreements within its scope

“shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as

exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. §2

(2000) United States Constitution, Article I, Section 2 requires that

“similarly situated persons received similar treatment under the law”.

Harmon v. McNutt. 91 Wn.2d 126, 130, 587 P.2d 537 (1978).

Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C., §3 requires this court to

stay the Washington State action. In order to give effect to this policy,

courts must entertain presumptions “in favor of arbitration, whether the

problem at hand is the construction of the language itself or an allegation of

waiver, delay or a like defense to arbitrability.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l

Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp„ 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).

12 | P a g e

VIII. Statement of the Case

Congress adopted the Arbitration Act in 1925 in response to a

perception that courts were unduly hostile to arbitration. No doubt there was

much to that perception.

Before 1925, English and American common law courts routinely refused to

enforce agreements to arbitrate disputes. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.. 417

U. S. 506, 510, n. 4 (1974). But in Congress’s judgment arbitration had more

to offer than courts recognized—not least the promise of quicker, more

informal, and often cheaper resolutions for eveiyone involved. Id., at 511.

So Congress directed courts to abandon their hostility and instead treat

arbitration agreements as “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”

9 U. S. C. §2. The Act, this Court has said, establishes “a liberal federal

policy favoring arbitration agreements.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital

v. Mercury Constr. Corn., 460 U. S. 1, 24 (1983) (citing Prima Paint Corp.

v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395 (1967)); see id., at 404

(discussing “the plain meaning of the statute” and “the unmistakably clear

congressional purpose that the arbitration procedure, when selected by the

parties to a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction in

the courts”). Not only did Congress require courts to respect and enforce

agreements to arbitrate; it also specifically directed them to respect and

13 | P a g e

enforce the parties’ chosen arbitration procedures. See §3 (providing for a

stay of litigation pending arbitration “in accordance with the terms of the

agreement”); §4 (providing for “an order directing that... arbitration

proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement”).

Indeed, we have often observed that the Arbitration Act requires courts

“rigorously” to “enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms,

including terms that specify with whom the parties choose to arbitrate their

disputes and the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted.”

American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U. S. 228, 233

(2013).

In a 7-1 Supreme Court decision, Justice Kagan writing for the

majority reiterated that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts any state law

that discriminated against arbitration on its face, and also held that the FAA

preempts, “any [state] rule that covertly accomplishes the same objective by

disfavoring contracts that (oh so coincidentally) have the defining features of

arbitration agreements”. Kindred Nursing Centers v. Clark, 2017 U.S. Lexis

2948.

Recently the Washington State Supreme Court granted the Employer

Discretionary Review on Steve Burnett, et al... Respondents, v. Pagliacci

Pizza, Inc., Petitioner 451 P.3d 332 (2019) and No. 97429-2. Department II

14 | P a g e

of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Madsen,

Stephens, Gonzalez and Yu, considered at its November 5, 2019, Motion

Calendar whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b) and

unanimously agreed that the following order be entered,

“That the petition for review is granted. Any party may serve and file a

supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of this order, see RAP 13.7(d).

The Respondents' motion to strike the Petitioner's reply is granted to the

extent that the portion of the reply that goes beyond the contingent issue

raised in the answer to the petition for review is stricken.”

Meanwhile, Ms. Smith, an Employee, and a Pro Se litigant’s

Discretionary Review was denied by Commissioner Michael E. Johnston.

Ms. Smith’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by this court.

Under Article I Section 2 “No State shall make or enforce any law which

shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;

nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws.”

Also recently, the Washington State Supreme Court has ruled on

Steve Burnett, et al... Respondents, v. Pagliacci Pizza, Inc., Petitioner. Judge

Madsen stated, “At issue on interlocutory review is whether the trial court

sustainably denied the employer’s motion to compel arbitration. The Court

15 | P a g e

of Appeals affirmed, determining that the mandatory arbitration policy

contained in the employee handbook, which was provided to the named

plaintiff after he signed the employment handbook, which was provided to

the named plaintiff after he signed the employment relationship agreement,

was procedurally and substantively unconscionable and, thus,

unenforceable... we affirm the denial of the motion to compel arbitration.”

Ms. Smith was employed by the Respondents and is exempt from

RLTA 59.12 and 59.18 pursuant to RCA 59.18.40 (8) Occupancy by an

employee of a landlord whose right to occupy is conditioned upon

employment in or about the premises.

This case presents the question of whether the Federal Arbitration Act

standard of the rule is satisfied when the courts violate Petitioner’s right to

arbitrate by enforcing conflicting state laws.

1. Ms. Smith Requested Arbitration on September 16, 2019

Ms. Smith was employed by the Respondents, SyHadley LLC., as the

community manager of Hadley Apartments in May, 2019. As part of her

salary, she was provided an apartment onsite. By June of

2019, Ms. Smith began reporting hate crimes to her former employers.

16 | P a g e

The harassment, stalking, threats, and attacks continued from June, 2019

through February 2020. On August 7, 2019, the Respondents terminated

Ms. Smith. It was over the phone, on a mental health day, after being

attacked for 10 hours straight by racists who were allowed to continue to

live in the building Ms. Smith was hired to manage.

On September 16, 2019, Ms. Smith requested arbitration. The

Respondents retaliated with an eviction notice two days later, on September

18, 2019. Despite the fact that the eviction notice was improperly served,

despite the retaliation, despite the Arbitration Agreement that was signed by

both parties, despite Washington State Residential Landlord Tenant

Act (RLTA) 59.18 and 59.12. Ms. Smith is a former employee.

The trial court granted an unlawful detainer for the Respondents on

November 19, 2019, and ordered the clerk to issue a writ of restitution.

She is exempt pursuant to 59.18.40(8) Landa v. Holiday Appelwick,

J. No. 74406-2-1

Despite Ms. Smith’s exemption; despite the improper service; despite the

arbitration agreement, King County Superior Court granted the Respondents

an eviction. The King County Superior Court presiding judge still hasn’t

ruled on Ms. Smith’s timely filed Motion to Compel Arbitration on

November 20, 2019. As the case now stands there is a real risk that Ms.

17 | P a g e

Smith will be evicted during a pandemic and unemployed. Ms. Smith is

the mother of a teenaged daughter whom also lives in the home.

Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 Under the strong national

Policy favoring arbitration is “so integral to modem dispute

resolution that the FAA preempts conflicting state law.” § 2 of the

FAA mandates arbitration because employment relationships are considered

related to interstate commerce and are therefore governed by the FAA.

§ 3 of the FAA requires this court to stay the Washington state action

while arbitration is pending. Ms. Smith is the mother of a teenaged

daughter whom also lives in the home.

The Respondents also lied to obtain orders of protection, from a

district court judge, against Ms. Smith. On appeal, those fraudulent orders

have been reversed, and canceled.

2. Direct Appeal

On direct appeal of the eviction, Ms. Smith renewed her argument that

her Motion to Compel Arbitration had not been ruled upon in trial court. Ms.

Smith filed her direct appeal with the Court of Appeals on November 20,

2019. Ms. Smith filed her Motion to Compel Arbitration in the Court of

Appeals on January 3, 2020. From the Court of Appeals, Commissioner

Mary Neel issued a mling on December 19, 2019, The Court of Appeals

18 | P a g e

acknowledged the parties’ arbitration agreement stating,

“In her emergency motion for stay, Smith has raised issues that appear

to go beyond the dispute over possession. She argues that the unlawful

detainer statutes do not apply here because her occupancy of the

apartment was part of her employment, citing RCW 59.18.040(8) (the

following living arrangements are not intended to be governed by the

provisions of this chapter: occupancy of an employee of a landlord

whose right to occupy is conditioned upon employment in or about

the premises). At this point Syhadley has not addressed Smith’s

argument that the unlawful detainer procedure is unavailable. Smith

also argues that as part of her employment she signed an arbitration

agreement and that the dispute must go to arbitration. Again Syhadley

has not yet addressed this argument.”

Commissioner Mary Neel

Ms. Smith filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration in both the trial court and

the court of appeals. Despite the parties’ binding arbitration agreement and

despite the acknowledgement of Ms. Smith’s employment and citing the

RCW exempting her from the Residential Landlord Tenant Act, the Court of

Appeals then ruled that a decision on a Supersedeas Bond must be made

from the trial court.

King County Superior Court Judge Bill Bowman, now a Court of

Appeals Division I Judge, ruled in favor of a Supersedeas Bond, despite the

fact that Ms. Smith is exempt from the Residential Landlord Tenant Act

(RLTA) 59.12 and 59.18. Despite the fact that the trial court, and now the

Court of Appeals refused to rule on the parties’ arbitration agreement. Judge

Bowman granted the Respondents a supersedeas bond in the amount of

19 | P a g e

$53,631.85. Ms. Smith filed a Motion for Reconsideration and an Objection

to the Ruling on January 27, 2020. This is not a straightforward landlord

tenant matter. Both courts have violated Ms. Smith’s right to arbitrate by

enforcing conflicting state laws. Although Ms. Smith was employed by the

Respondents, and exempt from the Residential Landlord Tenant Act, in Otis

Housing Association v. Ha, 165 Wn.2d 582, 201 P.3d 309 (2009), “the

court, in a 5-4 decision, held that an optionee under a lease agreement

waived the right to arbitration claims because of a failure to assert the claims

during an unlawful detainer action.”

This is not the case with Ms. Smith. She has informed the court and the

Respondents in the trial court, Court of Appeals, and the Washington State

Supreme Court. Ms. Smith filed Motions to Modify Commissioner Mary

Neel’s rulings on December 19, 2019, January 31, 2020 and February 5,

2020 rulings.

On February 20, 2020, the Court of Appeals denied Ms. Smith’s

Motion to Compel Arbitration and Motions to Modify. The Court of Appeals

denied Ms. Smith’s Motion to Compel Arbitration as

“Smith’s motion to compel arbitration goes to the merits of her

appeals and is denied as premature.”

20 | P a g e

On February 24, 2020, Ms. Smith, Petitioner, filed her Motion for

Discretionary Review and Motion for Accelerated Consideration and

Emergency Motion for Stay. Commissioner Michael Johnston denied Ms.

Smith Motion for Discretionary Review on April 9, 2020. Ms. Smith filed a

Motion to Modify the commissioner’s ruling. On July 8, 2020, Department I

of the Washington State Supreme Court, composed of Chief Justice

Stephens and Justices Johnson, Owens, Gordon McCloud and MontoyaLewis unanimously agreed,

“That the Petitioner’s motion to modify the Commissioner’s

ruling is denied. The Respondent’s motion for an order

requiring the Appellant to provide a transcript of the oral

argument before the Commissioner is also denied. Further, the

stay imposed in the Supreme Court Commissioner’s April 9,

2020, ruling is now lifted. DATED at Olympia, Washington,

this 8th day of July, 2020.”

211 P a g e

IX.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

A. To avoid erroneous deprivations of the right to Compel Arbitration,

this Court should determine whether the standard under the FAA

preempts conflicting state laws, such as the supersedeas bond, for

employees whom have lived where they worked.

“The Supreme Court holds the responsibility to say what a federal

statute means, and once the Court has spoken, it is the duty of the other

courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule of law.” Nitro-Lift

Tech. LLC v. Howard. —U.S.—,133 S.Ct. 500, 503, 184 L.Ed.2d 328

(2012).

“Arbitration is meant to streamline the proceedings, lower costs, and

conserve private and judicial resources, and it furthers none of those

purposes when a party actively litigates a case for an extended period only to

blatantly assert that the dispute should have been arbitrated, not litigated, in

the first place.” Nino v. Jewelry Exch,. Inc., 609 F.3d at 209 (3rd Cir.2010).

The King County Supreme Court intentionally ignored the Arbitration

Agreement signed by both parties when they granted the Respondents and

eviction pursuant to RLTA 59.18. The Arbitration Agreement is binding.

The Respondents have a history of violating the law. In Nelsen v. Legacy

Partners Residential, Inc., 207 Cal.App.4th 1115 (2012) 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d

198. Lorena Nelson filed a Putative Class Action lawsuit against our former

22 | P a g e

employers, Legacy Partners Residential (SyHadley, LLC), for multiple

violations of the Labor Code. Lorena Nelson also signed an Arbitration

Agreement. When she sued, the Respondents filed a Motion to Compel

Arbitration. The Respondent’s Motion to Compel Arbitration was granted.

Ms. Smith has been requesting Arbitration since September 16, 2019. To

date the Respondents have refused to arbitrate, instead abusing state laws

with the help of the trial, appeal and supreme court. Federal preemption

occurs when a validly enacted federal law supersedes inconsistent state laws.

As a result, where federal and state laws are in conflict, the state law is

generally supplanted, leaving it void and without effect. See Maryland v.

Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (finding state laws that conflict with

federal law are “without effect.”); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. Ill, 124,

(1942) (“[N]]o form of state activity can constitutionally thwart the

regulatory power granted by the commerce clause to Congress.”).

Ms. Smith informed the trial court judge that her family’s right to

peaceful enjoyment was breached by the Respondents, and residents living

in the building.

Ms. Smith was terminated, over the phone, on a mental health day, after

complaining about horrible working conditions, hate crimes, and horrible

living conditions. Ms. Smith timely filed a counterclaim of breach of

23 | P a g e

peaceful enjoyment, and a Motion to Compel Arbitration.

The decision by the Court of Appeals is plainly incorrect, as it both

contradicts the Federal Arbitration Act and the express purpose of the rule.

In a July 12, 2019 ruling, Judge John McHale of the King County Superior

Court found that the state law disallowing arbitration is preempted by the

FAA. Logan v. Lithia Motors, et. al., No. 18-2-19068-1 SEA. The rationale

of the decision indicates the court’s desire to enforce conflicting state laws.

It singles out arbitration agreements for different treatment than other

contracts. The Arbitration Agreement signed by both parties’ states.

“I further agree and acknowledge that Legacy Partners and I

will use binding arbitration to resolve all disputes that may arise out of

the employment context. Both Legacy Partners and I

agree that any claim, dispute, and/or controversy that either I may

have against Legacy Partners (or its owners, directors, officers,

managers, employees, agents, and parties affiliated with its employee

benefit health plan) or Legacy Partners may have against me, arising

from, related to, or having any relationship or connection whatsoever

with my seeking employment with, employment by, or other

association with Legacy Partners shall be submitted to and determined

exclusively by binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act

(Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1280 et seq., including section

1283.05 and all of the Act’s other mandatory and permissive rights to

discovery). Included within the scope of this Agreement are all

disputes, whether based on tort, contract, statute (including but not

limited to, any claims of discrimination and harassment, whether they

be based on the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, or any other state or

federal law or regulation), equitable law, or otherwise, with exception

of claims arising under the National Labor Relations Act which are

brought before the National Labor Relations Board, claims for

medical and disability benefits under the California Workers’

24 | P a g e

medical and disability benefits under the California Workers’

Compensation Act, Employment Development Department claims, or

as otherwise required by state or federal law.”

What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all

its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its

arbitration clause. The Act makes any such state policy unlawful, for that

kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on unequal “footing,” directly

contrary to the Act’s language and Congress’ intent. 513 U.S. 265, 281

(1995).

This case presents this Court with an opportunity to clarify the

preemption standard in the face of supersedeas bond actions that conflict

with the Federal Arbitration Act. Absent intervention by this Court, the

Washington State Supreme Court and Court of Appeals rulings will work to

undermine the safeguards that this Court has spent the past 50 years

developing.

X.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Smith respectfully requests that this Court

issue a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Washington State

Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.

DATED this 30th day of October, 2020.

25 | P a g e

Respectfully submitted,

Addie Smith

Petitioner, PRO SE

2601 76th Ave SE, Unit 502

Mercer Island, WA 98040

(425)399-3331

Email: absmith27@icloud.com

26 | P a g e