Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Luis Pina, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefJan 8, 2021

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NO._____________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

LUIS LEON PINA and

SAUL ZAMORA DE ANDA,

Petitioners,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

MARJORIE A. MEYERS

Federal Public Defender

Southern District of Texas

Attorney of Record

KATHRYN SHEPHARD

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Attorneys for Petitioners

440 Louisiana Street, Suite 1350

Houston, TX 77002-1056

Telephone: (713) 718-4600

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether, in light of Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), the

immigration court issuing orders of removal against each petitioner lacked

jurisdiction to issue such orders, so that use of such orders in a prosecution

for illegal reentry violated the separation of powers and due process.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners were convicted in separate proceedings before the district court, and the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered separate judgments in each of

their cases. Because petitioners seek review of these judgments on the basis of identical

questions, they jointly file this petition with this Court. See Sup. Ct. R. 12.4. All parties to

petitioners’ Fifth Circuit proceedings are named in the caption of the case before this Court.

DIRECTLY RELATED CASES

• United States v. Pina, No. 19-cr-81, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of

Texas. Judgment entered November 19, 2019.

• United States v. Pina, No. 19-20777, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Judgment entered August 28, 2020.

• United States v. Zamora De Anda, No. 19-cr-248, U.S. District Court for the

Southern District of Texas. Judgment entered January 28, 2020.

• United States v. Zamora De Anda, No. 20-20012, U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit. Judgment entered October 12, 2020.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ................................................................................................. ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ................................................................................ iii

DIRECTLY RELATED CASES ........................................................................................ iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... iv

TABLE OF CITATIONS ................................................................................................... vi

PRAYER ............................................................................................................................. 1

OPINIONS BELOW ........................................................................................................... 1

JURISDICTION .................................................................................................................. 1

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND REGULATORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED ............................................................................................. 2

BASIS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT .......................................................................... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................... 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ........................................................................ 5

The Court should grant certiorari to address the important issue whether, in

light of Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), the immigration court

issuing orders of removal against each petitioner lacked jurisdiction to issue

such orders, so that use of such orders in a prosecution for illegal reentry

violated the separation of powers and due process. ................................................. 5

The decisions below in each case are incorrect and violate the

separation of powers. ..................................................................................... 5

This Court should resolve a circuit split over whether, in light of

Pereira, the statutory definition of “notice to appear” defines the

jurisdiction of the immigration courts. .......................................................... 7

TABLE OF CONTENTS – (cont’d)

Page

The Fifth Circuit’s restrictions on collaterally attacking removal

orders in illegal-reentry prosecutions conflict with this Court’s

precedent and violate due process. .............................................................. 10

The Court should grant certiorari. ............................................................... 11

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 13

APPENDIX A: Opinion of the Court of Appeals in

United States v. Pina ...................................................................................................... 14

APPENDIX B: Opinion of the Court of Appeals in

United States v. Zamora De Anda .................................................................................. 16

APPENDIX C: Opinion of the District Court in

United States v. Pina ...................................................................................................... 18

APPENDIX D: Order of the District Court in

United States v. Zamora De Anda .................................................................................. 27

APPENDIX E: Texts of Constitutional, Statutory,

and Regulatory Provisions Involved .............................................................................. 28

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Page

CASES

Ali v. Barr, 924 F.3d 983

(8th Cir. 2019) ............................................................................................................. 8-9

Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d 101

(2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 954 (2020) .................................................... 8-9

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) ............................................................................ 6

City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290 (2013) ............................................................. 5

Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946) .............................................................. 10-11

Goncalves Pontes v. Barr, 938 F.3d 1

(1st Cir. 2019) ........................................................................................................... 8-10

Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305

(6th Cir. 2018) ................................................................................................................ 9

Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158

(9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom.

Karingithi v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1106 (2020) ................................................................. 8-9

Lopez v. Barr, 925 F.3d 396

(9th Cir. 2019), rehearing en banc granted,

948 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2020) ...................................................................................... 8-9

Lopez-Munoz v. Barr, 941 F.3d 1013

(10th Cir. 2019) ............................................................................................................ 10

Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. 441 (BIA 2018) ............................................ 9

Nkomo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 930 F.3d 129

(3d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2740 (2020) ............................................... 8, 10

Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956

(7th Cir. 2019) ........................................................................................................... 8-10

Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) ............................................................ passim

TABLE OF CITATIONS – (cont’d)

Page

CASES – (cont’d)

Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 935 F.3d 1148

(11th Cir. 2019) ........................................................................................................... 8-9

Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684

(5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2718 (2020) ......................................... 4, 6, 8-9

Santos-Santos v. Barr, 917 F.3d 486

(6th Cir. 2019) ................................................................................................................ 8

United States v. Cortez, 930 F.3d 350

(4th Cir. 2019) ............................................................................................................. 8-9

United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) ................................................................... 5

United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987) .................................................. 10

United States v. Pedroza-Rocha, 933 F.3d 490

(5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2769 (2020) . ...................................... 3-4, 6, 11

Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014) ............................................. 7

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

U.S. Constitution amend. V .............................................................................................. 2

STATUTES AND RULES

8 C.F.R. § 1003.13 ..................................................................................................... 2-3, 6

8 C.F.R. § 1003.14 ............................................................................................................ 2

8 C.F.R. § 1103.14(a) ........................................................................................................ 6

8 C.F.R. § 1003.15 ............................................................................................................ 2

vii

TABLE OF CITATIONS – (cont’d)

Page

STATUTES AND RULES – (cont’d)

8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(b) .................................................................................................... 6-7

8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(c) ........................................................................................................ 7

8 C.F.R. § 1003.18 ........................................................................................................ 2, 7

8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b) ....................................................................................................... 6

8 C.F.R. § 1239.1 .............................................................................................................. 6

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) ....................................................................................................... 6

8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) ............................................................................................................ 6

8 U.S.C. § 1229 ............................................................................................................. 2, 6

8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) ........................................................................................... 5-6, 8-10

8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i) .......................................................................................... 3, 5

8 U.S.C. § 1326 .............................................................................................................. 2-3

8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) ..................................................................................................... 10-11

8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) ..................................................................................................... 10-11

8 U.S.C. § 1329 ................................................................................................................. 2

18 U.S.C. § 3231 ............................................................................................................... 2

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) .......................................................................................................... 1

Sup. Ct. R. 12.4 ............................................................................................................... iii

viii

TABLE OF CITATIONS – (cont’d)

Page

MISCELLANEOUS

Immigration and Naturalization Service and EOIR, Proposed Rules, Inspection and

Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. 444-01, 1997 WL 1514 (Jan. 3, 1997) .......... 7

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) of 1996,

§ 309(c)(2), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat 3009 (1996) ........................................................ 6

Sup. Ct. Order of Mar. 19, 2020 ................................................................................................. 1

TRAC-Immigration, Immigration Prosecutions for 2019 (Oct. 31, 2019),

https://tracfed.syr.edu/results/9x705dbb47e5a0.html ........................................................... 12

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, EOIR, Statistics Yearbook FY 2018,

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1198896/download ........................................................... 12

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, EOIR, FY 2013 Statistics Yearbook (Apr. 2014),

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/04/16/fy13syb.pdf ................ 12

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, EOIR, FY 2008 Statistical Year Book (Mar. 2009),

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2009/03/27/fy08syb.pdf ................ 12

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, EOIR, FY 2003 Statistical Year Book (Apr. 2004),

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2008/04/18/fy03syb.pdf ................ 12

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Marshals Service, FY 2020 Performance Budget:

Federal Prisoner Detention Appropriation 19 (Mar. 2019),

https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1144161/download .................................................. 12

U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Quick Facts: Illegal Reentry Offenses (Fiscal Year 2018),

https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quickfacts/Illegal_Reentry_FY18.pdf. ............................................................................................ 12

PRAYER

Petitioners Pina and Zamora respectfully pray that this Court grant their

consolidated petition for certiorari.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in

petitioners’ cases are attached to this petition as Appendices A and B. The opinions and

orders of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas are attached as

Appendices C and D.

JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued its opinions on

August 28, 2020, for Mr. Pina and on October 12, 2020, for Mr. Zamora. See Appendices

A-B. This petition is filed within 150 days after entry of judgment in each case. See Sup.

Ct. Order of Mar. 19, 2020. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND REGULATORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The texts of the following relevant constitutional, statutory, and regulatory

provisions involved are attached as Appendix E:

• 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13 Definitions ........................................................................... 97

• 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14 Jurisdiction and commencement of proceedings ................. 98

• 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15 Contents of the order to show cause and notice to appear and

notification of change of address ....................................................................... 100

• 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18 Scheduling of cases ............................................................ 102

• 8 U.S.C. § 1229 Initiation of removal proceedings ........................................... 103

• 8 U.S.C. § 1326 Reentry of removed aliens ...................................................... 107

• U.S. Constitution amend. V ............................................................................... 110

BASIS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

These cases were originally brought as federal criminal prosecutions under 8 U.S.C.

1326. The district court therefore had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1329 and 18

U.S.C. § 3231.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In separate proceedings in the United States District Court for the Southern District

of Texas, petitioners were charged by indictment with the offense of illegal reentry of a

previously deported alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Each petitioner filed a motion

to dismiss the indictment in his respective case, arguing that, in light of Pereira v. Sessions,

138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), the prior order of removal and any reinstatement thereof was void

because the Immigration Judge issuing the order did not have jurisdiction to issue such an

order and that the use of such a void order violated due process. Specifically, each

petitioner argued that the “Notice to Appear” provided by immigration authorities alleging

the grounds of removal prior to issuance of the first order of removal did not state the time

and place at which removal proceedings were to be held and, in light of Pereira, such a

document lacking that information was not a valid “Notice to Appear” under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Consequently, petitioners argued, the document did not vest

jurisdiction with the immigration court in light of regulations which provide that

“[j]urisdiction vests, and proceedings before an Immigration Judge commence, when” the

Department of Homeland Security files a notice to appear with the immigration court. 8

C.F.R. § 1103.14(a); see also 8 C.F.R. 1003.13. The district court denied the motion in

each case. See Appendices C-D, and petitioners timely appealed.

In both of Petitioners’ appeals, the government filed a motion for summary

affirmance relying on the decision in United States v. Pedroza-Rocha, 933 F.3d 490 (5th

Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2769 (2020). In Pedroza-Rocha, the Fifth Circuit held

that the omission of the hearing time did not make the notice to appear defective because

the regulatory definition of the notice to appear (which does not require a hearing time),

not the statutory definition (which does), controls. Pedroza-Rocha, 933 F.3d at 497 (citing

Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684, 689-90 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2718

(2020)). Even if the notice to appear was defective, the later notice of hearing cured it.

Pedroza-Rocha, 933 F.3d at 497. And the regulation requiring a notice to appear to be filed

with the immigration court was not jurisdictional. Id. at 497-98. Consequently, the Fifth

Circuit, relying on Pedroza-Rocha, affirmed the judgment in each of petitioners’ cases. See

Appendices A-B.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Court should grant certiorari to address the important issue whether, in

light of Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), the immigration court

issuing orders of removal against each petitioner lacked jurisdiction to issue

such orders, so that use of such orders in a prosecution for illegal reentry

violated the separation of powers and due process.

The decisions below in each case are incorrect and violate the separation of

powers.

An agency’s power to act comes from Congress. City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 569

U.S. 290, 298 (2013). Courts must “tak[e] seriously, and apply[ ] rigorously, in all cases,

statutory limits on agencies’ authority.” Id. at 307.

The notice to appear is such a limit. Congress specified that the notice to appear

must be served on every noncitizen in removal proceedings. § 1229(a)(1). It also required

that a notice to appear must have a hearing time. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). The omission of a

hearing time cannot be cured; without it, the document is not a notice to appear. Pereira,

138 S. Ct. at 2116.

Without a notice to appear, the immigration court lacks authority to remove a

noncitizen. § 1229(a)(1). That is because service of the notice to appear is necessary for

subject matter jurisdiction—the immigration judge’s authority to preside over cases. See

United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (describing subject matter jurisdiction

as “the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case” (cleaned up)).

Immigration judges only have authority to decide cases in which the Department of

Homeland Security chooses to serve a notice to appear. § 1229(a)(1). In contrast,

immigration officials—not judges—can rule on a noncitizen’s deportability and inadmis-

sibility through certain expedited procedures when no notice to appear is filed. See, e.g., 8

U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1), 1228(b). The notice to appear confers subject matter jurisdiction by

defining the cases over which immigration judges preside. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S.

205, 213 (2007) (“the notion of subject-matter jurisdiction obviously extends to classes of

cases . . . falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority” (cleaned up)).

The government has sought to avoid this straightforward application of § 1229(a)(1)

and Pereira by arguing that the regulatory definition of a notice to appear, not the statutory

one, applies to the notice to appear required to start the removal proceeding. The

regulations do not require a hearing time. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.15(b), 1003.18(b).

In Pierre-Paul and Pedroza-Rocha, the Fifth Circuit agreed. By ignoring the

jurisdictional import of § 1229(a)(1) and finding “no glue” between the regulations and

§ 1229(a)(1), the Fifth Circuit distinguished Pereira and approved a two-step procedure:

first a notice to appear with no hearing time, and then a notice of hearing. Pierre-Paul, 930

F.3d at 691.

But there is glue binding the statute to the regulations. Congress’s transitional

instructions recognize the jurisdictional significance of the notice to appear. Illegal

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) of 1996, § 309(c)(2),

Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat 3009 (1996) (making certain documents “valid as if provided

under [§ 1229] (as amended by this subtitle) to confer jurisdiction on the immigration

judge”). And the regulations incorporate the statutory jurisdictional limit by providing that

a charging document such as a notice to appear vests jurisdiction with the immigration

court. §§ 1003.13, 1003.14(a); see 8 C.F.R. § 1239.1.

The agency even acknowledged the need to “implement[ ] the language of the

amended Act indicating that the time and place of the hearing must be on the Notice to

Appear” and committed to providing a hearing time in the notices to appear “as fully as

possible by April 1, 1997[.]” Immigration and Naturalization Service and EOIR, Proposed

Rules, Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. 444-01, 1997 WL 1514

(Jan. 3, 1997). But the agency created an exception that hearing times could be omitted if

providing them was not practicable, such as when “automated scheduling [is] not possible

. . . (e.g., power outages, computer crashes/downtime).” Id. at 449; see 8 C.F.R.

§§ 1003.15(b), (c); 1003.18.

Two decades later, “almost 100 percent of notices to appear omit the time and date

of proceeding[.]” Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2111 (cleaned up). The “where practicable”

regulatory exception swallowed the statutory rule of including the hearing time in the

notice to appear. And the Fifth Circuit sanctioned the agency’s attempt to rewrite the

statute. This violates the separation of powers. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573

U.S. 302, 327 (2014) (agencies cannot “revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to

work in practice”).

This Court should resolve a circuit split over whether, in light of Pereira, the

statutory definition of “notice to appear” defines the jurisdiction of the

immigration courts.

Eleven circuits, as well as the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), have weighed

in on the proper definition of a “notice to appear” and the effect of a putative notice missing

a hearing time. The circuits are split on whether the statutory or regulatory definition of a

notice to appear governs, and whether a notice to appear is a jurisdictional requirement or

a claims-processing rule.

Two circuits hold that the statutory definition of a notice to appear applies to starting

a removal proceeding, but eight circuits and the BIA hold that the regulatory definition

does.

The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, applying this Court’s reasoning in Pereira,

interpret § 1229(a)(1) as requiring the notice to appear used to begin removal proceedings

to have a hearing time. The Seventh Circuit rejects as “absurd” the government’s argument

that the notice to appear referenced in the regulations is not the same notice to appear

defined in the statute. Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 961-62 (7th Cir. 2019). The

Eleventh Circuit explains that, per § 1229(a)(1), Congress intended for service of the notice

to appear to “operate as the point of commencement for removal proceedings[,]” and “the

agency was not free to redefine the point of commencement[.]” Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y

Gen., 935 F.3d 1148, 1154 (11th Cir. 2019).

The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits find that

the regulatory definition of a notice to appear, which does not require a hearing time,

applies for beginning removal proceedings. 1 Several circuits also hold that a later notice

of hearing cures any statutory defect. See Pierre-Paul, 930 F.3d at 690; but see Lopez v.

See Goncalves Pontes v. Barr, 938 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 2019); Banegas Gomez v. Barr,

922 F.3d 101, 110-12 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 954 (2020); Nkomo v. U.S. Att’y

Gen., 930 F.3d 129, 133-34 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2740 (2020); United States v.

Cortez, 930 F.3d 350, 363 (4th Cir. 2019); Pierre-Paul, 930 F.3d at 690; Santos-Santos v. Barr,

917 F.3d 486, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2019); Ali v. Barr, 924 F.3d 983, 986 (8th Cir. 2019); Karingithi v.

Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. Karingithi v. Barr, 140

S. Ct. 1106 (2020).

Barr, 925 F.3d 396, 405 (9th Cir. 2019) (a defective § 1229(a)(1) notice to appear cannot

be cured by a notice of hearing for the stop-time rule), rehearing en banc granted, 948 F.3d

989 (9th Cir. 2020).

In finding that the regulatory definition controls, the First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits

specifically defer to the BIA’s reasoning. Goncalves Pontes, 938 F.3d at 7; Karingithi, 913

F.3d at 1161; Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 2018). The BIA

interpreted Pereira narrowly, limiting it to the stop-time rule, and approved the two-step

process of a notice to appear without a hearing time followed by a notice of hearing. Matter

of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. 441, 443-47 (BIA 2018). The Seventh Circuit, however,

sharply criticized reliance on the BIA’s decision, which it found “brushed too quickly over

the Supreme Court’s rationale in Pereira” and failed to consider significant legislative

history. Ortiz-Santiago, 924 F.3d at 962.

Four circuits and the BIA believe that a notice to appear is a jurisdictional

requirement, but five circuits disagree. The Second and Eighth Circuits hold that a notice

to appear, as defined by the regulations, confers “jurisdiction” on the immigration court.

Ali, 924 F.3d at 986; Banegas Gomez, 922 F.3d at 112. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits adopt

similar reasoning after deferring to the BIA. Karingithi, 913 F.3d at 1161; HernandezPerez, 911 F.3d at 314-15; see Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 447.

The Fourth and Fifth Circuits disagree and find that the regulations provide a claimsprocessing, not jurisdictional, rule. Pierre-Paul, 930 F.3d at 692; Cortez, 930 F.3d at 362.

The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits also hold that the statutory time requirement is a claimsprocessing, not a jurisdictional rule. Perez-Sanchez, 935 F.3d at 1154; Ortiz-Santiago, 924

F.3d at 963. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit holds that neither the statute nor the regulations

provide a jurisdictional rule. Lopez-Munoz v. Barr, 941 F.3d 1013, 1015-18 (10th Cir.

2019).

The First and Third Circuits reject that § 1229(a)(1) has jurisdictional significance

but do not decide whether the regulations do. Goncalves Pontes, 938 F.3d at 7 n.3; Nkomo,

930 F.3d at 134. In light of the fractured reasoning of the circuits’ decisions on the

jurisdictional significance of the statutory and regulatory definitions of “Notice to Appear,”

certiorari should be granted.

The Fifth Circuit’s restrictions on collaterally attacking removal orders in

illegal-reentry prosecutions conflict with this Court’s precedent and violate

due process.

The offense of illegal reentry depends on a determination made in an administrative

proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 1326(a); United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837-38

(1987). The government must prove the defendant is a noncitizen who “has been . . .

removed” from the United States and later reenters the United States without permission.

18 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Section 1326(d) provides that a defendant “may not challenge the

validity of the deportation order . . . unless” the defendant shows exhaustion of

administrative remedies, deprivation of judicial review, and fundamental unfairness. Due

process, however, requires a defendant be allowed to challenge the jurisdictional basis of

the administrative order being used to prosecute him.

This Court considered the use of an administrative order to impose criminal

sanctions when selective service registrants, whose military inductions were ordered by

local boards, were prosecuted for refusing to be inducted into the military. Estep v. United

States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946). Even though the statute did not specify that defendants could

collaterally attack those induction orders, the Court could not “believe that Congress

intended that criminal sanctions were to be applied to orders issued by local boards no

matter how flagrantly they violated the rules and regulations which define their

jurisdiction.” Id. at 121. The Court refused to resolve any statutory ambiguity against the

accused, noting that “[w]e are dealing here with a question of personal liberty.” Id. at 122.

Here, too, we are dealing with a question of personal liberty and an administrative

agency that acted outside the authority defining its jurisdiction. Congress limits any

challenge to the “validity of the deportation order” in § 1326(d), but that cannot be read to

remove the government’s burden to prove that a defendant has been removed. See 18

U.S.C. § 1326(a). Just as a notice to appear without a hearing time is not a notice to appear,

Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2116, a removal order entered without jurisdiction is not a removal

order.

Alternatively, § 1326(d) is unconstitutional if it prevents a defendant from

challenging the jurisdictional validity of the removal order. To comport with due process,

a defendant must be able to challenge whether the immigration court lacked jurisdiction

even if he cannot satisfy the § 1326(d) criteria. The Fifth Circuit’s contrary decision in

Pedroza-Rocha, applied in petitioners’ cases, conflicts with this Court’s precedent in Estep.

The Court should grant certiorari.

For decades, immigration authorities ignored the statutory requirement to include a

hearing time in the notice to appear. In the past two decades, well over 200,000 notices to

appear were filed on average per year. 2 Most of those notices lacked hearing times.

Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2111. As a result, millions of people have been deported by an agency

without authority to do so.

Many of those removed came back unlawfully. Illegal reentry continues to be the

most prosecuted federal felony. 3 In fiscal year 2018, more than 18,000 people were

sentenced for illegal reentry. 4 These prosecutions not only cost defendants their liberty,

taxpayers pay approximately $27,000 to detain a defendant for the average 10-month

sentence. 5 The number of people affected militates against leaving the agency’s deliberate,

decades-long violation of a congressional directive unchecked.

For these reasons, the consolidated petition for certiorari should be granted.

See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), Statistics

Yearbook FY 2018, at 7, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1198896/download; U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

EOIR,

2013

Statistics

Yearbook,

(Apr.

2014),

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/04/16/fy13syb.pdf; U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

EOIR,

2008

Statistical

Year

Book,

(Mar.

2009),

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2009/03/27/fy08syb.pdf; U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

EOIR,

2003

Statistical

Year

Book,

(Apr.

2004),

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2008/04/18/fy03syb.pdf.

TRAC-Immigration, Immigration Prosecutions

https://tracfed.syr.edu/results/9x705dbb47e5a0.html.

for

2019

(Oct.

31,

2019),

U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Quick Facts: Illegal Reentry Offenses (Fiscal Year 2018),

https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quickfacts/Illegal_Reentry_FY18.pdf.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Marshals Service, FY 2020 Performance Budget: Federal Prisoner

Detention Appropriation 19 (Mar. 2019), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1144161/download

(daily non-federal facility cost in fiscal year 2018 was $90.17).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Date: January 8, 2021

Respectfully submitted,

MARJORIE A. MEYERS

Federal Public Defender

Southern District of Texas

Attorney of Record

KATHRYN SHEPHARD

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Attorneys for Petitioners

440 Louisiana Street, Suite 1350

Houston, TX 77002-1056

Telephone: (713) 718-4600

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.