Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Deverick Scott, Petitioner v. Danny Burl, Warden, et al.

Supreme Court briefJul 1, 2020

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Text

NO.

0'“5845

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

DEVERICK SCOTT # 131042- PETITIONER

VS.

DANNY BURL, ET AL - RESPONDENT®! 1

u '

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE 8th CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

filed

M 0 7 2020

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DEVERICK SCOTT # 131042

P.O. BOX 600

GRADY, AR. 71644

1

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

1. If the A.D.C. authorizes a prisoner to have his personal property in Isolation

Confinement by giving to him on his 48hr relief after he served 30 days

consecutive in punitive measures and forget to come back and get that property, “

can A.D.C. on shakedown “confiscate”, and “Destroy” that very property for being

in possession of that very same property while housed in Punitive

Isolation.(Property that have sentimentally value). And after several administrative

grievance complaints properly still destroyed... Is this Constitutional? CODY V.

Weber. 256 F 3d 764,771 (8th Cir. 2001). Shaw v. Murphy 532 U.S. 223.

232-31 (2001V

2. If an prisoner is allowed to buy hygiene items in Punitive Isolation for Oct. Nov.

2015 but after constant redressing of grievances of his personal property being

destroyed then Major refuse to sign off on prisoner 48hr relief slip to by hygiene

items. Its denied now saying inmate is not allowed to buy hygiene items in

Punitive Isolation having inmates living and smelling like criminals. Is that cruel

and unusual punishment? Cody v. Weber,256 F 3d 764,771 (8th Cir. 2001).

Shaw v. Murphy 532 U.S. 223.232-31(20011. Farmer v. Brennan ,511 U.S.

825,825,834 (1970) Owens v. Scott county jail. 328 F. 3d 1026.1027

(8th Cir. 2003V

3. Did 8 Circuit, and District Court abuse its discretion by failing to liberally

construe Scott complaint as a complete failure to treat abscess, cause his hair was

twisted and locked for his religious beliefs. “By Scott being out his cell for lhr at

medical jacket review. The D.O.N. of infirmary telling guards to escort Scott

infirmary once he left medical jacket review. Scott being already strip search

2

before he left his cell, and walking in infirmary door to be medically treated in full

handcuffs, and shackles” . By A.D.C. officers Stout and Clark telling guards stop!

Take Scott back to his cell and don’t let him out to he take his hair down, is that

denial, delayed of serious medical attention? More importantly is that a violation of

Scotts religious beliefs. He had wait 6 hours till next shift to receive medical

attention. Is that cruel and unusual? And 1st Amendment violation? Atkins v.

Bokin, 91 F. 3d 1127,2128-29 (8th Cir. 1999): Sea lock, 218 F. 3d at 1211:

Love v. Reed, 216 F. 3d 682 8th Cir. 2000 U.S.C. A; Thomas v. Collins,

323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).

4. If in Discovery process of 42 U.S.C. complaint Defendants admit that the “false

disciplinary hat was written in retaliation” and inmate was found guilty on “some

evidence” standard. But officer admit in Discovery another officer had told them to

write disciplinary. None of allegations in disciplinary are true against plaintiff. In

today; society should that plaintiff then receive some type of relief? Should

retaliation disciplinaries inmates alleging be put to new standard of today’s society

standards. Cause if an officer is already retaliating on an inmate and falsifying a

disciplinary, they gone fabricate the evidence to find him guilty. Johnson v.

Ganim 342 F 3d 105,112 (2d Cir. 20031 Thaddeus-X v. Blatter 175 F.

3d378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) Dixon v. Brown. 38 F. 3d 379 I8th Cir. 1994);

Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F. 3d 826 (8th Cir. 2008T

3

LIST OF PARTIES

[

] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[ ^ ] All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list

of all parties to the proceedings in the court whose judgment is the subject of this

petition is as follows: See next page.

RELATED CASES

4

Parties

The Petitioner Deverick Scott, is a prisoner of the Varner Supermax of the

Arkansas Department of Correction.

The Respondents are:

Danny Burl, Warden Tucker Max Unit.

Aundreo F. Fitzgerald, Asst. Warden, Tucker Max.

Carl E Stout, Major Tucker Max Unit, Cochoran.

Angelah Kennedy, Sgt. Tucker Max Unit.

Cornelius Christopher, Sgt. Tucker Max Unit.

Eddie Thompson, Corporal, Tucker Max Unit.

Hunter Neal Officer tucker Max Unit.

Reena Harrison, Commissary Supervisor Tucker Max Unit.

Wendy Kelly, Director ADC.

5

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents

OPINIONS BELOW

10

JURISDICTION

11

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

12

STATEMENT OF THE CAUSE

13

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

14

CONCLUSION

28

PROOF OF SERVICE

29

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Finding of United States District Court

(1-31)

APPENDIX B: Judgment of United States Court of Appeals

(1-2)

APPENDIX C: Motion of extension of time July 10, 2020

(1-3)

APPENDIX D: Writ Scott filed incomplete to meet deadline cause he didn’t

receive response to motion of extension of time

APPENDIX E:

APPENDIX F:

6

(

)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Atkins v. Bohn, 91 F 3d 1127, 1128-29 (8th Cir. 1999)................

16

Atkins v. Bokin, 91 F. 3d 1127, 2128-29 (8th Cir. 1999)..............

3

Banner v. Coughlin 517 F 2d 1311, 1315-17 (7th Cir. 1975)........

25

Benjamin v. Coughlin 905 F 2d 571 (2nd Cir. 1990)....................

19

Black Moore v. Kalamazoo County 390 F. 3d 890 (6th Cir. 2004)

17

Bonner v. Coughlin 517 F 2d 317.................................................

26

Braussand v. Johnson, 253 F 3d 874 (8th Cir. 2001).....................

21

Cardenas v. Wigen 921 F. Supp 286 (ED Pa 1996).......................

21

Celotex v. Catrett 477 US 317 (1987............................................

18

Cho Taylor v. Sullivan 980 F . Supp 697, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)....

23

Cody v. Weber. 256 F 3d 764, 771 (8th Cir. 2001).......................

2

Deverick Scott v. Danny Burl No. #19-2759.................................

13

Deverick Scott v. Danny Burl,5:17-CV-0098DPM.......................

13

Dixon v. Brown, 38 F. 3d 379 (8th Cir. 1994)...............................

3,24

Estelle v. Gamble 429 US 97 (1976).............................................

17

Farmer v. Brennan ,511 U.S. 825, 825, 834 (1970)......................

2

Franco v. Kelly 854 F 2d 504, 585 (2nd Cir. 1988).......................

23

Gluston v. Coughlin at 81 F. Supp 2d 381, 386 (N.D.NY 1999)....

23

Goff v. Bruton, 7 F 3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 1993)............................

21

Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F 3d 132, 134, 136-38 (2d Cir. 2000)....

16

Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F 3d 826 (8th Cir. 2008)......................

24

Henderson v. Baird 29 F 3d 826 (8th Cir 1994).............................

14,21

Higgs, 286 F 3d 437.......................................................................

22

Howell Burden 12 f 3d 190...........................................................

17

7

Johnson v. Busbee 953 F 2d 349 (8th Cir. 1991)..........

17

Johnson v. Ganim 342 F 3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2003)....

3,23

Johnson-el v. Schoemehl 828 Fed 1043 (8th Cir. 1989)

18

Logan v. Zimmerman Bush Co. 455 US 442, 102 S.Ct 1148 71 L.Ed 2d 265 (1982)

26

Love v. Reed, 216 F. 3d 682 8th Cir. 2000........................................

3

Majluta v. Samples, 375 F 3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004)................

23

Noncke v. City of Port Hills 284 F 3d 923 (8th Cir. 2000).................

18

O’Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons 349 F 3d 399 (7th Cir. 2003)..............

15, 19

Orebough v. Casporil 910 F 2d 396 (8th Cir. 1990)..........................

14

Othoman v. City of Country Club Hills 677 F 2d 622 (8th Cir. 2012)

18

Owens v. Scott county jail, 328 F. 3d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003).....

2

Parti v. Taylor 451 US 527, 536, 1010 S.Ct. 1908, 1913, 68 L.Ed. 2d 420 (1981)26

Scott v. Kelly 5:16-65 DPM-JTK.............................................

22, 26

Sea lock, 218 F. 3d at 1211......................................................

3, 17

Shaw v. Murphy 532 U.S. 223, 232-31 (2001).........................

2

Simmons v. Cook 154 F 3d 805, 809 (8th Cir. 1998)...............

27

Sprouse v. Bobcock 870 F 2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1999)............

27

Steinberg v. Taylor, 500 F. Supp 477, 479-80 (D. Conn. 1980)

25

Superintendant v. Hill 105 S.Ct 3768 (1985)............................

20

Thaddeus-X v. Blatter 175 F. 3d378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999)........

3,23

Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)...........................

3

Turner v. Safley 107 S.Ct 2254 (1987)....................................

15

U.S. Const Amend 04...............................................................

25

United States v. Lilly, 576 F 2d 1240, 1244-47 (5th Cir. 1978)

25,26

United States v. Stumes, 549 F 2d 831, 832 (8th Cir 1977).....

25

Williams v. Brimeyer 116 F 3d 351, 352-355 (8th Cir. 1997)..

27

8

Young v. Lynch, 846 F 3d 960 (4th Cir. 1988)

20

Statutes

28 U.S.C.A 1331

13

Other Authorities

U.S. Const Amend 01

13, 19, 23,27

U.S. Const Amend 05

13

U.S. Const Amend 08

13, 17, 18

U.S. Const Amend 14

.....13,25

9

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[ ] For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at appendix B to the

petition and is

[ ] reported at

or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[S] is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix A to the petition

and is

[ ] reported at

or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[•S\ is unpublished.

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at

Appendix______to the petition and is

[ ] reported at

.; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

10

JURISDICTION

[ ] For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case was

April 1.2020

K) No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

[ ] A timely petition for a rehearing was denied by the United States Court

of Appeals on the Following date:_____________________ and a copy

of the order was denying rehearing appears at Appendix___.

Kl An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was

granted to and including July 10, 2020 (date) on US Const Amend

_________________(date) in Application No.

A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix_____.

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following

date:____________________

, and a copy of the order denying

rehearing appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was

granted to and including _

(date) on

in Application No.____A

The jurisdiction of this court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

11

(date)

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves:

1) The 1st Amend Violations.

2) The 8th Amend Violations.

3) The 14 Amend Violations.

4) 42U.S.C. §200cc-l(a)(c)-(2)/RLUIPA violation.

These Amendment’s guarantee the right to practice my religion freely,

procedural due process, due process of the law, to be from cruel and unusual

punishment, arbitrary abuse of authority including retaliation, and the right to

adequate medical treatment.

These Amendment’s are enforced by the title 42 U.S.C.§1983 of the United

State’s Code.

12

STATEMENT OF THE CAUSE

The Petitioner initiated this case pursuant to his constitutional right to

practice his religion freely, Due process, Procedural Due process, Adequate

medical treatment, and to be free of cruel and unusual punishment; including

retaliation.

In 2017, the petitioner sought 42 U.S.C. §1983 relief in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. See Deverick Scott v.

Danny Burl,5;17-CV-0098DPM. Defendants denied the Plaintiffs claims, and

asserted, among other things. Qualified immunity along with many other

affirmative defenses. The District Court agreed , and Dismissed with Prejudice said

Complaint. See Doc entry No. #1. Petitioner appealed.

However, Petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Eighth Circuit. See Deverick Scott v. Danny Burl No. #19-2759.

Consequently, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals declared that they found no

reason/ basis for reversal, and Affirmed the District Courts decision; And

Petitioner’s reasoning of petitioning the Supreme Court of the United States.

BASIS FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION

This case asks for an expanded interpretation from the high court of the 1st

Amendment Religious Practice doctrine, 5th Amendments Due Process Clause, the

8th Amendment application of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, and the 14th

Amendment standard of liberty interest. The District Court had jurisdiction under

the General Federal Question Jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C.A 1331

13

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

A. Conflicting Decision among Circuit Courts

B. Need for Broader interpretation of Constitution standards of Cruel and

Unusual punishment in interference with medical treatment context

C. Need for broader interpretation of the Constitution Standards in the

excursive of religion in prison context.

D. The need for a declaration that lack of possession of contraband render a

Disciplinary in violation of due process where no other evidence is presented.

E. Need for a broader interpretation of Constitution standards of Retaliation for

use of prisoner grievance procedure.

a. NOTE: Destruction of property authorize to have, and refusal to

buy basic necessities hygiene items all in punitive segregation. Is

this cruel and unusual punishment. Due process of law violations?

A. Complicit with decisions of other courts

Retaliation

Otherwise proper acts are actionable under § 1983 if done in retaliation for

grievance filed under established grievance procedure.

Orebough v. Casporil 910 F 2d 396 (8th Cir. 1990)

But See >=> Henderson v. Baird 29 F 3d 826 (8th Cir 1994) ‘s “Violation of

Regulation essentially checkmated retaliation claim”

14

Here, in the first ruling the Court made it clear that in a situation where a

disciplinary that was a “proper act” was written in retaliation for filing a grievance,

that disciplinary write up was “actionable” (thus unconstitutional)

However, in the Second Ruling it is explicitly clear that the Court considers a

violation of rules a mechanism that voids a retaliation claim. Furthermore,

Religion

Some Circuits hold officials “must demonstrate and not just assert, that rule

at issue is the least restrictive means of “achieving a compelling interest”

O’Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons 349 F 3d 399 (7th Cir. 2003)

However, under the reasonableness standard, in contrast the Burden is on

prisoners to point to an alternative that fully accommodates the Prisoners rights at

minus the cost to valid penological interests in order to prevail.

Turner v. Safley 107 S.Ct 2254 (1987)

These standards conflict and should be sorted so that the true test to

standardize the right is known. This is a task only for this High Court.

B. Importance of questions presented

This case presents fundamental questions of how we will interpret the right

to exercise free religion in the prison setting and whether a minor security interest

should outweigh the right to immediate medical treatment for a serious condition

(for the purpose of granting summary judgment).

This case also involves the standard of review and burden of proof in prison

disciplinary proceeding dealing with “some evidence “rule. And it lack thereof

precludes summary judgment.

15

We’ll begin with the third question did previous courts abuse its discretion

by failing to liberally construe Stout / Clark complete failure of medical attention

of Scott by denial, and delays. In this case at bar, Scott believed he had been bitten

by a spider because of facial swelling... he sought medical attention by telling

nurse who informed security to have him escorted to the infirmary for evaluation.

{NOTE: Scott was housed in a maximum security area that requires a strip search

prior to leaving his cell, then submitting to full restraints of handcuffs behind back,

shackles and a security belt attached to handcuffs the entire time out of his cell.}

While entering the infirmary door the escort officers was told by Defendants

Clark and Stout “STOP! Take him back to his cell and don’t let him back out until

he takes his hair down” (D.E#51-0 pg.99 Admission No. 7 LR Clerk)

As a result of this interference, Petitioner suffered all day before finally

being taken to medical after cutting out his Religious Dreadlocks. And being

diagnosed as abscess put on K-flex on antibiotics and referred to dental on an

emergency basis (D.E.#No. 51 at 122) Atkins v. Bohn, 91 F 3d 1127,1128-29

(8th Cir. 19991: Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F 3d 132,134,136-38 (2d Cir.

2000).

The Petitioner here contends this violated his 8th Amendment right to be

free from Cruel and Unusual Punishment? And should’ve precluded summary

judgment.

Deliberate indifference occurs when prison officials prevent an inmate from

receiving treatment or deny his access to medical personnel capable of evaluating

he need for treatment... it... the medical professionals knows that his role in a

particular medical emergency is solely to serve as a gatekeeper for other medical

personnel capable of treating the condition and if he delays or refuses to fulfill hat

16

gatekeeper role due to deliberate indifference from denying access to medical care.

Sea lock, 218 F 3d at 1211; Howell Burden 12 f 3d 190,191 ni*(11th

Cir. 1994).

Whereas, if Defendant were deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs

this establishes a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. Estelle v. Gamble 429 US 97 (1976).

A medical need is serious if it has been evaluated by medical staff

mandating treatment or is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the

need for medical attention. Johnson v. Busbee 953 F 2d 349 (8th Cir. 1991).

The Eight Amendment explicitly prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain. See, Black Moore v. Kalamazoo County 390 F. 3d 890 (6th Cir.

2004).

It was held, “Eight Amendment right to avoid the pain from officer delay in access

to treatment.”

There is no dispute that the treatment was interfered with and that the

Defendants were responsible.

There is evidence in the record that it was determined later that swelling was

due to abscess. Moreover, there’s evidence medical requested he be brought to

infirmary.

Here the Petitioner satisfied both objective and subjective test to establish

that not only was staff directed to bring him to infirmary but the swelling, thus

need for treatment, was obvious.

17

In Johnson-el v. Schoemehl 828 Fed 1043 (8th Cir. 1989) it was held

“conditions that is medically serious r painful in nature creates a claim.”

The question then turns to granting of summary judgment

The standard of review for summary judgment mandates that, it is only

appropriate when the moving party show there is no genuine dispute of material

fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law Celotex v.

Catrett 477 US 317 (19871

When reviewing a motion for summary judgment the court must view the

evidence in light most favorable to the non-moving party. NONCKE V. CITY OF

Port Hills 284 F 3d 923 (8th Cir. 2000).

A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it court cause a reasonable

jury to return a verdict for either party, a fact is material if its resolution affects the

outcome of the case Othoman v. City of Country Club Hills 677 F 2d 622

(8th Cir. 2012).

Whereby, as to the 8th Amendment claim that the Petitioner was denied

medical treatment there was a genuine dispute of material facts, and summary

judgment for Defendants should have been precluded.

Now we look at the 1st Amendment Violation. Whether the practice of

religion should be infringe upon by Security interest. When no Security reason

exist. Cause Scott was out his cell for 1 hour already and handcuff and shackle

being escorted by 2 officers.

18

When judging whether a prison rule should interfere with the practice of

religion the courts have said, “Officials must demonstrate and not just assert, that

the rule at issue is for least restrictive means of achieving a compelling interest”

O’Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons Supra.

In the case at bar, as afore mentioned, Scott was being escorted to medical

then told by officers he was being returned to his cell until he took his hair down.

Scott is part of the “One God” religion which observed the Rastafarian style

of hair in dreaded twists. Anyone familiar with this style knows that once they set

in, the only way to take them down is to cut or tear the hair(D.E#44-4).

The Petitioner was in so much pain he agreed to do this in order to be taken

to medical. However he contends that his rights under the 1st Amendments to the

United States Constitution was violated in being made to do so.

Whereas, the standard in this issue is cruel and where Defendant did not

attempt to inquire if he had permission to wear his hair in this style and where

Defendants allege there was a policy prohibiting this type of hair. The Defendants

and policy violated the First Amendment Rights of Petitioner.

In Benjamin v. Coughlin 905 F 2d 571 (2nd Cir. 1990) The court held

that “Rastafarian inmates could not be made to cut their hair because an adequate

ID could be made with Hair pulled back.”

This claim, thus presented a obvious issue of genuine dispute of material fact

and should have precluded summary judgment for Defendants.

Next we arrive at our fourth question: does a lack of possession of actual

contraband render a disciplinary for same unconstitutional?

19

The resolution of this question turns to the question of due process in prisons.

These procedures revolve around a “some evidence” entails is sometimes unclear.

The courts have long held a standard of review that if there was “some

evidence” to convict an inmate of a disciplinary rule violation the conviction

would be up held. Superintendant v. Hill 105 S.Ct 3768 (1985).

So what constitutes “some evidence”

In Petitioners case it was said a weapon was found in the cage he had

previously been in before he was transferred to an entirely different ADC Unit.

There is evidence in the record that hall cages are transit and many prisoners

frequent them in a day, not to mention the fact the hall itself may have many

inmates up and down it.

The Petitioner asserted that he knew nothing about the weapon and was at a

whole new unit when he received this disciplinary, Defendants would not produce

recording of video surveillance of hall cages.

One case worth reviewing in deciding in whatever the lack of any evidence

should’ve precluded summary judgment for Defendants is:

Young v. Lynch, 846 F 3d 960 (4th Cir. 1988) “ Due process may require

production of evidence “ when it is the dispositive item of proof, it is critical to the

inmates defense, it is in the custody of the prison officials, and could be produced

without impairing institutional concerns.

In Young, the inmate was accused of smoking marijuana cigarette (joint)

which he said was only tobacco. There was apparently no evidence but the officials

20

opinioned that the substance was marijuana. Then court ruled in favor of the

prisoner due to failure to produce proof.

In this case. Just as in Young, it is claim that the “Same Evidence “ rule was

no t satisfied and should have precluded summary judgment.

See also, Cardenas v. Wigen 921 F. Supp 286 (ED Pa 1996! stating that

only 98.3% likelihood of guilt arising where contraband was found in area shared

by 12 inmates was not “some Evidence”.

Similarly, Braussand v. Johnson, 253 F 3d 874 (8th Cir. 2001) the

only valid evidence that the prisoner possessed and escape related contraband was

the presence of a pair of bolt cutters in his work area, but they were not the “some

evidence of the offense since 100 inmates had access to the area.

The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “if the discipline which the

prisoner claims to have been retaliatory was in fact imposed for and actual

violation of prisoner rules or regulation, then the prisoner, claim that the

disciplinary was retaliatory in nature must fail.” Goff v. Bruton, 7 F 3d 734,

738 (8th Cir. 1993). See Also Henderson v. Baird, 29 F 3d 464,469 (8th

Cir. 1994).

In this case we have here today, it makes up face a reality that inmates deal

with everyday. Correctional Officers are human, with good and bad behavior as all

inmates. This makes us see and question how bias the due process requirements for

an inmate to really get a due process disciplinary hearing. Only way Scott got the

truth out of Thompson was through discovery that only came with filing a §1983

complaint. Inmates don’t have that luxury, or the right to due process disciplinary

procedures to asked they witnesses the question to get answers that’ll prove they

innocence, thousands of inmates still in prison now cause they was lack the justice

21

to prove they innocence which lead to not being eligible for parole. And

disciplinaries no overturned like Scotts not so they still denied justice.

Scott had been writhing grievances every month prior year of Appellee

Kennedy refusing to give him his legal books, she then retaliated on and destroyed

Scott property twice see Scott v. Kelly 5:16-65 DPM-JTK D.E.# 58-0 Pg 16

(for each and copy of their grievances.) the recently had just file grievance

(D.E.#51-0 pg 24, D.E. #5 l-0pg) were Appellee Kennedy had just retaliated on

Scott by destroying his property.

As Higgs implicitly recognized, a Plaintiff alleging retaliation must

reference at a minimum, the suit or grievance spinning the retaliation and the acts

constituting retaliatory conduct. Higgs, 286 F 3d 437, AT 439. Absent these

allegations a Defendant would know how to respond to complaint.

In retaliation of these grievances Scott filed on her. On 2/5/16 as Scott was

being ship to another unit. Appellee Kennedy had Thompson write a falsified

disciplinary that Thompson found shank in Scott possession. (D.E.#51-0 pg 63)

Scott was found guilty at disciplinary hearing by a judge that was bias and

not impartial. Scott told Judge he was not there. Ask officer Neal, Neese they strip

search him and shackle him once he left his cell and in their eyes the whole time

before he was put in the cage. Kennedy and Thompson had set up fake evidence so

well that Judge automatically (bias) found Scott guilty for being in possession of

shank on 005 form from staff supporting F-l report, photo endorse, witness

statement. Scott was found guilty at new unit Varner unit and locked up out of

population (D.E. #51-0 pg 63-65, D.E.#44-1 pg.)

Once Scott appealed disciplinary and wrote grievances Scott voice was not

ever heard. Warden Burl, and Assist Director Payne (D.E.#51-0 pg. 62, D.E. #51-0

22

pg. 106 answer No. 10) The shank was found after you were removed from

holding cell, (this is lead to believe once Scott was immediately pulled out cage. Its

invasion, and manipulation. Now after all this injustice Scott is force to file §1983

complaint, and do to discovery Appellee Thompson admits in admission that the

shank was not found while Scott was being removed from cell, that Scott was

handcuffed and shackled while he entered the cage, that the shank, and that shank

was found while Scott wasn’t at unit. For Kennedy have Cpl. Thompson to write

disciplinary is a arbitrary abuse of authority and punishment Majluta V.

Samples, 375 F 3d 1269,1273 (11th Cir. 2004)

It is settled law that Scott: right to complain about Kennedy conducted and

to seek administrated relief is protected by the First amendment.” GLUSTON V.

Coughlin at 81 F, Supp 2d 381,386 (N.D.NY 19991 See Cho Taylor v.

Sullivan 980 F. Supp 697,704 (S.D.N.Y. 19971. And Franco v. Kelly 854

F 2d 504, 585 (2nd ClR. 1988). 01 The conduct itself and action by Appellee

Kennedy to have Appellee Thompson write a falsified disciplinary on Scott was

inhumane, harass, retaliate and punish Scott, Kennedy, Thompson, retaliation

disciplinary they wrote on Scott on 2/5/16 was an adverse employment action (2)

Scott prior filing of Prisoner’s grievance against Kennedy was a substantial and

motivating factor in Appellee Kennedy, Thompson adverse employment action.

See Johnson v. Ganim. 342 F 3d 105,112 (2nd Cir. 2003). Making Scott

injury to his First Amendment was Kennedy, Thompson writing the falsified

retaliation disciplinary itself along with 30 days punitive isolation suffering in a

cell ( he can’t sleep form being put in mental health isolation , all the banging on

toilets, beating on toilets, and screaming) Thaddeus v. Blatter 175 F3d 378,

394 (6th Cir. 1999ften banc) holing in a prisoner, retaliation case that the injury

is “adverse consequences which flow from the constitutional protection action”)

23

Dixon v. Brown, 38 F 3d 379, (8th Cir. 1994) (Noting a prisoner case, that

the injury inheres in the retaliatory conduct itself.)

In this case for Appellee Thompson to now admit after all Scott charges for

state to correct they wrong, and more importantly know that shank was not found

on Scott while he was being search or pulled out visitation cage, or even at unit.

(D.E.#51-0 pg 111 at 5, D.E. #51-0 pg 110) and allow Kennedy to have him write

falsified disciplinary to intentionally punish is enough to “chill” an ordinary inmate

from further use of grievances. Scott was punished 30 days punitive segregation

for a “ADC prison rule violation he did not actually commit.)”

Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F 3d 826 (8th Cir. 20081.

Now the 1st Question of property.

Property: If an inmate is authorize by ADC to have property in punitive

segregation can that property now be destroyed as contraband for having in your

possession in punitive segregation.

In this case, Scott bought Nike Size 11 shoes for ADC Commissary

D.E.#51-0pg. 34 and gave back to Scott on 48 hr. relief on 8/24/2015. And on his

48 hour relief in October, November, Mailroom brought him 4 magazines he had

just bought from Wall Periodicals. ADC Officers brought him his property. Books,

pictures, non-nude catalogs, radio (D.EJ51-0 pg 79)

So now the question in this 20th century is this. Can you now in this case say

this property you authorized and gave Appellant Scott on 48 hour relief in his

punitive isolation cell is now considered contraband, cause come shake him down

and say it considered contraband because you were found in possession of this

contraband while housed in punitive isolation. (D.E. #51-0pg 24) (D.EJ44-16 pg

24

2) and it will be destroyed. But not his authorized property that Appellee’s brought

him on 4 hour relief in his punitive cell in isolation because they couldn’t move

him out of isolation by ADC policy cause of bed space (D.EJ51-0 pg 79). See

D.E.#44-12 pg 6 section H. Consecutive punitive sentences: Inmates serving

consecutive punitive sentences shall have their privileges restored for a 48 hour

period at the end of each 30 day punitive period. This relief shall b known as “48

hr relief.” These 48 hr relief periods are to be in housing outside the Punitive

Isolation area if at all possible . And since they didn’t move Scott out of his

punitive isolation cell on 48 hour relief they brought Scott hi property. There is a

certain belief that the powers that be when they made our laws they didn’t foresee

a case like this in the future. They didn’t foresee officers “correctional officers”

acting under color of state law to abuse they authority. To act criminal mind like

the alleged convicted felons they are guarding. Is there a difference between

inmate’s criminal actions and a C.O.’s there is a substantial body of authority

holding that convicted prisoners do retain limited privacy interest under the Fourth

Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause in connection with

unreasonable searches and unjustified confiscation of personal property by prison

officials, See e.g. United States v. Lilly, 576 F 2d 1240,1244-47 (5th Cir.

1978): United States v. Stumes, 549 F 2d 831,832 (8th Cir 1977); Banner

v. Coughlin 517 F 2d 1311,1315-17 (7th Cir. 1975); Steinberg v. Taylor.

500 F. Supp 477,479-80 (D. Conn. 1980). This Court need not decide in this

case the full extent to the constitution protection afforded convicted prisoners

against unreasonable search and confiscations. The Court does conclude, however

that a prisoner has in protectable property interests in items of personal property he

legitimately possess, and that these interests are infringed when prison officials

seize such property in an unreasonable manner or without a legitimate justification.

One a prisoner has proven the confiscation of legitimately possessed property, the

25

burden is in the prison officials to establish the reasonableness of the seizure. See,

e g. United States v. Lilly, 576 F 2d at 1245; Bonner v. Coughlin 517 F

2d 317.

2. Which leads to the main reason Scott property was unreasonably confiscated

and destroyed. See on 12/15/2915 Sgt. Lt. Cpts. “ Appellee Clark” told Scott his

“Books, magazines, shoes, family pictures, non nude catalogs” would be put in his

property.(D.E #51-0 pg 24). On 12/23/2015 Scott talk to Appellee’s weekly

(Fitzgerald/ Culclage, Stout) about his property since Appellee Kennedy the

Property Officers was the officer didn’t come get Scott property once he came off

punitive which she herself actions is what now they considered made Scott

property now contraband(D.E#51-0 pg27).

Kennedy knowing this knew that property was not contraband. But do to

motives of retaliation Scott filing grievances on her every month refusing to give

his legal books and destroying some more property in retaliation. See SCOTT V.

Kelly 5:16-65 DPM-JTK; ( D.EJ58-0 pg 16)

And due to these facts. Kennedy retaliated on Scott destroying his property

and Appellee’s weekly, Stout, Clark failure to take corrective action. By telling her

to not destroy Scott property he could have legitimately or replacing it and District

Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants/ Appellee’s

when evidence was sufficient to raise genuine issue of material fact. Partl V.

Taylor 451 US 527.536,1010 S.Ct. 1908,1913.68 L.Ed. 2d 420 (19811.

Logan v. Zimmerman Bush Co. 455 US 442,102 S.Ct 1148 71 L.Ed 2d 265

(1982); j_U.S. Court of Appeals.

3. To further prove Kennedy actions was done in retaliation and to punish Scott by

destroying his property where to only get some more he was gone have to have his

26

family sent him more money. See D.E.#51-0 pg 43 Same officer Watson found

more property in Scott cell and punitive isolation “Sweat pants” confiscated them

and Kennedy didn’t destroy them and gave back to Scott his next 48 hour relief

This shows her conduct amounted to reckless and callous indifference to Scott’s

First Amendment right to submit grievances and may all for deference and

punishment over and above that provided by a compensatory award. See

Williams v. Brimeyer 116 F 3d 351,352-355 (8th Cir. 1997) (Defendants

who unconstitutionally denied inmate incoming mail were callously indifferent to

inmate’s First Amendment rights and $1,000 punitive damage award was

appropriate. Scott has met his evidentiary burden by submitting direct evidence

that Defendant Kennedy destroyed Scott property as a retaliatory measure Prison

officials do not have the discretion to punish an inmate for exercising his First

Amendment rights...)

Scott is entitled to compensatory , punitive , nominal damages for Kennedy,

Thompson violated of his 1st Amendment Rights. See SPROUSE V. BOBCOCK 870 F

2d 450,452 (8th Cir. 1999); Simmons v. Cook 154 F 3d 805,809 (8th Cir.

1998) upholding $2,000 damage award for paralegal inmate placed in solitary

confinement for thirty two hours. Scott was placed in there for 30 days.

27

CONCLUSION

Here the lower courts have spoken and Petitioner humbly requests the Higher

Court to grant Certiorari and re-order these questions. Reverse, remand to District

Court for trial, and appointment of counsel.

I swear under penalty of perjury the foregoing is true and correct and best of my

knowledge, understanding and belief

This

day of

, 2020.

Mr. Deverick Scott# 131042

P.O. Box 400

Grady, AR. 71644

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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