Opposition Brief — Natalie Angeles, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefDec 7, 2020
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No. 20-5775
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_______________
NATALIE ANGELES, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
_______________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
_______________
JEFFREY B. WALL
Acting Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
BRIAN C. RABBITT
Acting Assistant Attorney General
FRANCESCO VALENTINI
Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the court of appeals correctly determined, on plainerror review, that the district court did not coerce petitioner
into withdrawing objections to the Probation Office’s presentence
report by expressing a tentative view that her objections lacked
merit
and
that
a
guidelines
adjustment
responsibility was unwarranted.
(I)
for
acceptance
of
ADDITIONAL RELATED PROCEEDINGS
United States District Court (N.D. Tex.):
United States v. Angeles, No. 19-cr-14 (Aug. 16, 2019)
United States Court of Appeals (5th Cir.):
United States v. Angeles, No. 19-10937 (Aug. 24, 2020)
(II)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_______________
No. 20-5775
NATALIE ANGELES, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
_______________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
_______________
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. A1-A6) is
reported at 971 F.3d 535.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on August
24, 2020.
The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on
September 16, 2020.
STATEMENT
Following a guilty plea in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas, petitioner was convicted of
conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more
2
of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846,
and 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B) (2012).
Pet. App. B1.
She was
sentenced to 280 months of imprisonment, to be followed by five
years of supervised release.
affirmed.
1.
Id. at B1-B2.
The court of appeals
Id. at A1-A6.
Between
2016
and
2018,
petitioner
coordinated
the
delivery of methamphetamine she received from suppliers in Mexico
to distributors in California, Georgia, and Texas.
C.A. ROA 50.
She did so by partnering with others to deploy couriers who would
pick up large quantities of liquid methamphetamine from her home
in
Long
Beach,
California
appropriate distributors.
and
transport
the
drugs
to
the
Presentence Investigation Report (PSR)
¶ 5.
For example, in late February 2016, petitioner’s brother
recruited
a
courier
to
transport
liquid
petitioner’s home to Atlanta, Georgia.
methamphetamine
PSR ¶ 6.
from
Petitioner then
provided the courier with the keys to a vehicle and $300 for
expenses along the trip.
Ibid.
During a traffic stop, Arkansas
state officers searched the courier’s vehicle and found four jugs
containing 21.9 kilograms of liquid methamphetamine, as well as
the
equivalent
of
crystallized form.
7.5
kilograms
of
pure
methamphetamine
in
PSR ¶¶ 6-7.
A few weeks later, petitioner’s brother arranged for a second
courier to again retrieve liquid methamphetamine from petitioner’s
home, this time with directions to transport it to Fort Worth,
3
Texas.
PSR ¶ 8.
Upon delivering the drugs, the courier received
$47,000 from the purchaser.
Ibid.
When investigators later
executed a search warrant at the delivery address in Fort Worth,
they found 22.43 liters of liquid methamphetamine, equivalent to
approximately 12.6 kilograms of pure methamphetamine, in various
containers.
PSR ¶ 9.
The containers matched those used by
petitioner and her brother.
In
September
2016,
Ibid.
federal
investigators
conducted
controlled delivery using a confidential informant.
The
informant,
who
had
previously
served
as
a
a
PSR ¶ 10.
courier
for
petitioner, picked up four jugs of liquid methamphetamine from
petitioner’s home.
Ibid.
The FBI then seized the jugs and
provided samples to Drug Enforcement Agency chemists, who were
able
to
determine
that
the
jugs’
content
was
equivalent
approximately 15.2 kilograms of pure methamphetamine.
2.
to
to
Ibid.
A federal grand jury charged petitioner with conspiring
possess
with
intent
to
distribute
50
grams
or
more
of
methamphetamine between January 2016 and June 2018.
C.A. ROA 7.
Petitioner pleaded guilty without a plea agreement.
Id. at 47.
In the Factual Resume accompanying her guilty plea, petitioner
stipulated that, “[f]rom 2016 through June 2018,” she “coordinated
the delivery of methamphetamine in liquid form from suppliers in
Mexico to various distributors in California, Fort Worth, Texas,
[and] Atlanta, Georgia.”
Id. at 50.
She also stipulated that,
4
“[i]n this manner,” she “conspired with others to possess with
intent to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine.” Ibid.
a.
The Probation Office prepared a presentence report in
which he calculated a total offense level of 41 and a criminal
history category of I, which would produce an advisory guidelines
range of 324 to 405 months of imprisonment.
PSR ¶¶ 30, 36, 76.
The presentence report’s guidelines calculation included a base
offense
of
level
of
38,
which
reflected
the
volume
of
methamphetamine for which petitioner was accountable, Sentencing
Guidelines
because
§ 2D1.1(a)(5)
petitioner’s
methamphetamine,
because
id.
petitioner
and
(c)(1);
offense
two-level
involved
§ 2D1.1(b)(5);
maintained
a
a
a
the
importation
two-level
premises
for
enhancement
of
enhancement
distributing
a
controlled substance, id. § 2D1.1(b)(12); a two-level enhancement
because petitioner recruited and supervised drug couriers, id.
§ 3B1.1(c); and a three-level downward adjustment for accepting
responsibility, id. § 3E1.1(a) and (b).
See PSR ¶¶ 20-22, 24, 28-
29.
Petitioner
report.
raised
numerous
objections
to
the
presentence
As relevant here, she objected to the inclusion of any
drug amount beyond that which was seized as a result of the
September 2016 controlled delivery. C.A. ROA 264-266. She further
objected to the three two-level enhancements recommended in the
presentence report, id. at 267-268, and to the absence of a
downward adjustment for her allegedly minor role in the conspiracy,
5
id.
at
268-269.
contested
nearly
In
asserting
every
those
substantive
objections,
paragraph
in
the
including paragraphs that tracked her own admissions.
270.
petitioner
report,
Id. at 264-
For example, she objected to the application of the two-
level enhancement for an offense involving the importation of
methamphetamine, even though she had stipulated in her guilty
plea’s Factual Resume that she had coordinated the delivery of
liquid methamphetamine from Mexico.
Compare C.A. ROA 50, with id.
at 267.
In response, the government submitted investigative reports
and other evidence demonstrating petitioner’s role in the offense
and her responsibility for the relevant conduct set forth in the
presentence
report.
maintained
that
C.A.
ROA
petitioner
176-236.
was
The
frivolously
government
denying
also
relevant
conduct and therefore should not receive a downward adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility.
Id. at 173. Petitioner responded by
further pressing her objections.
Id. at 272-275.
In an addendum to the presentence report, the Probation Office
rejected
petitioner’s
objections
and
frivolously denying relevant conduct.
determined
that
she
C.A. ROA 238-242.
was
As a
result, the Probation Office recommended that petitioner not be
afforded the downward adjustment for accepting responsibility that
the presentence report had previously proposed.
Id. at 241.
Petitioner
importation
then
withdrew
her
objection
to
the
enhancement, but submitted supplemental objections regarding drug
6
quantity.
Id. at 276-280.
In response to those supplemental
objections, the Probation Office made a minor reduction to the
amount of methamphetamine attributed to petitioner, which did not
alter petitioner’s offense level under the Guidelines.
C.A ROA
245-247.
The day before petitioner’s sentencing hearing, the district
court informed the parties that:
After having considered the presentence report pertaining to
[petitioner], and the other sentencing items, the court
tentatively has concluded that the objections made by
[petitioner] to the presentence report are without merit.
Also, the court tentatively has concluded that [petitioner]
should not receive any reduction in her offense level based
on acceptance of responsibility. * * * The parties should
take such tentative conclusions into account in making
decisions as to the presentations to be made at the sentencing
hearing.
C.A. ROA 66-67.
b.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court first
observed that petitioner had made “a number of objections” to the
presentence report and that the court’s order had expressed the
“tentative conclusion” that the objections were “without merit.”
C.A. ROA 128-129.
The court then noted that petitioner had
abandoned or withdrawn one of her objections and asked whether she
still wished to pursue the others.
Id. at 129.
Petitioner’s
counsel, remarking that she did not “want [her] client punished
for [her attorney’s] advocacy,” initially stated that she would
pursue petitioner’s objection to the drug-premises enhancement but
would otherwise “go on [the court’s] ruling from the other day.”
7
Ibid.
The court reiterated that its presentencing order reflected
merely “tentative” conclusions and urged counsel to specify which
objections petitioner intended to pursue.
Id. at 130.
After
consulting with petitioner, defense counsel stated that petitioner
would withdraw all objections to the presentence report.
Ibid.
The district court then turned to “another point” it had made
in
the
prehearing
order,
regarding
the
court’s
“tentative
conclusion” that petitioner should not receive a reduction in her
offense level for acceptance of responsibility.
C.A. ROA 131.
The court emphasized that it had not yet reached a “final decision”
on the matter and urged petitioner to present any relevant evidence
on the issue.
Ibid.
responsibility,
requested
representation,”
and
Petitioner argued that she had accepted
not
observed
to
be
that
objections to the presentence report.
“penalized
she
had
for
zealous
withdrawn
Id. at 131-132.
all
The court
repeated that it had “misgivings” about petitioner’s showing that
she had “clearly demonstrate[d] acceptance of responsibility,” as
required by Sentencing Guidelines § 3E1.1.
C.A. ROA 132.
The
court
had
her
explained
that,
while
petitioner
withdrawn
objections, “that doesn’t change the fact that [the objections]
were made and that they were frivolous denials of relevant conduct
and false denials of relevant conduct.”
Ibid.
After petitioner
insisted that she had “never denied what her behaviors were with
regard” to the core offense conduct, the court decided that it
8
would not “deny her acceptance of responsibility.”
Id. at 134-
135.
The district court accordingly applied a two-level reduction
for
acceptance
an
advisory
Guidelines range of 324 to 405 months of imprisonment.
C.A. ROA
135.
of
responsibility
and
computed
The court then imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 280
months of imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised
release.
3.
Id. at 145.
The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting petitioner’s
claim that the district court “effectively coerc[ed]” her into
withdrawing her objections to the presentence report.
A4-A6.
Pet. App.
The court of appeals observed that petitioner’s coercion
claim was subject to plain-error review because petitioner had not
raised it in the district court.
Id. at A4.
And in this case,
the court of appeals discerned “no error, much less the ‘clear or
obvious’ mistake necessary to overcome plain-error review.”
Id.
at A6 (citation omitted).
The court of appeals explained that the “spectre of judicial
coercion[] may arise where the court tells the defendant that he
must withdraw the objection or lose the possibility of gaining a
reduction for acceptance of responsibility,” but the court “s[aw]
no such strong-arming” on the facts of this case.
Pet. App. A4-
A5 (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).
“Rather,” the district court had “treated withdrawal separately
from
acceptance”
in
the
sentencing
hearing,
first
allowing
9
petitioner to persist with her objections “if she wished,” and
then turning to the analysis of “acceptance of responsibility.”
Id. at A5.
district
The court of appeals further observed that, while the
court
acknowledged
petitioner’s
withdrawal
of
her
objections in considering her acceptance of responsibility, the
court appropriately analyzed whether petitioner’s initial decision
to press the objections showed that she had “frivolously contested
or falsely denied relevant conduct.”
Ibid. (citing Sentencing
Guidelines
(n.1(A))
§ 3E1.1(a),
comment.
(“appropriate
considerations include” whether the defendant “falsely denies, or
frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the court determines
to be true.”)) (brackets omitted).
The court of appeals also rejected petitioner’s contention
that the district court erred by “conveying before the [sentencing]
hearing
its
‘tentative
‘without merit.’”
conclusion’
Pet. App. A5.
that
her
objections
were
The court of appeals explained
that “[i]t would be absurd for a detrimental legal ruling on an
objection to be construed as the court’s coercing a defendant to
withdraw that objection.”
Ibid. (quoting United States v. Medina,
432 Fed. Appx. 349, 352 (5th Cir. 2011)).
“To the contrary,” the
court
a
continued,
“it
is
appropriate
for
district
court
to
‘express concern that a defendant is frivolously denying relevant
conduct and explain [that] this could be a reason to deny an
acceptance reduction.’”
Id. at 5-6 (quoting United States v.
Schenck, 697 Fed. Appx. 422, 423 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam),
10
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1308 (2018), and citing United States v.
Trevino, 829 F.3d 668, 675 (8th Cir. 2016)).
And the court of
appeals determined that because “[h]ere, the district court did no
more than that,” the district court “did not cross the line into
coercing [petitioner] to withdraw her objections.”
Id. at A6.
Finally, the court of appeals made clear that its decision
did not “address the situation where a district court allegedly
coerces
a
defendant
into
withdrawing
objections to a [presentence report].”
potentially
meritorious
Pet. App. A6 n.3.
Among
other things, the court observed that petitioner neither “argue[d]
that
her
objections
“contradict[ed]
her
to
the
[report]
had
any
merit”
probation
officer’s
assessment
that
nor
her
objections amounted to ‘falsely denying and frivolously contesting
relevant conduct.’”
Ibid. (alteration omitted).
ARGUMENT
Petitioner
sentence
and
“overreached
renews
her
contends
(Pet.
its
judicial
challenge
11-17)
authority”
to
her
below-guidelines
that
the
district
by
improperly
court
linking
a
potential downward adjustment for accepting responsibility under
Sentencing Guidelines § 3E1.1 to petitioner’s withdrawal of her
objections to the presentence report.
Pet. 17.
The court of
appeals correctly rejected petitioner’s claim, and petitioner does
not identify any conflict between that factbound decision and a
decision of this Court or another court of appeals.
In any event,
the court of appeals appropriately applied plain-error review to
11
petitioner’s unpreserved challenge, and the plain-error posture
makes this case a particularly poor vehicle in which to consider
the coercion issue.
1.
To
receive
a
two-level
reduction
for
acceptance
of
responsibility under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant must
“clearly
demonstrate[]
offense.”
acceptance
of
responsibility
Sentencing Guidelines § 3E1.1(a).
for
his
Entering a guilty
plea does not automatically entitle a defendant to an acceptance
of
responsibility
adjustment.
Id.
§ 3E1.1,
comment.
(n.3).
Instead, in determining whether a defendant qualifies for the
reduction, a district court may consider, among other things,
whether
the
defendant
“truthfully
admitt[ed]
the
conduct
comprising the offense(s) of conviction, and” did “not falsely
deny[] any additional relevant conduct.”
Id. § 3E1.1, comment.
(n.1(A)).
The commentary explains that “[a] defendant may remain
silent
respect
in
to
relevant
conduct
beyond
the
offense
of
conviction without affecting his ability to obtain a reduction.”
Ibid.
But “[a] defendant who falsely denies, or frivolously
contests, relevant conduct that the court determines to be true
has
acted
in
a
responsibility.”
manner
inconsistent
with
acceptance
of
Ibid.
As the court of appeals correctly determined, the district
court
applied
the
appropriate
acceptance-of-responsibility
analysis to petitioner’s case; the district court did not use the
possibility
of
a
reduction
under
Section 3E1.1(a)
to
coerce
12
petitioner into withdrawing her objections to the presentence
report.
Pet. App. A1-A6.
Indeed, at the sentencing hearing, the
court “treated withdrawal separately from acceptance.”
Pet. App.
A5. It discussed the potential sentencing reduction “[o]nly after”
petitioner had decided which objections she wished to continue to
press.
Ibid.; see C.A. ROA 128-131.
And, when the district court
turned to its analysis of acceptance of responsibility, it made
clear that petitioner’s withdrawal of her objections was not
dispositive as to the applicability of Section 3E1.1(a), observing
that withdrawing the objections
“d[id not] change the fact that
they were made and that they were frivolous denials of relevant
conduct and false denials of relevant conduct.”
The
court
then
asked
whether
further
C.A. ROA at 132.
evidence
supported
petitioner’s acceptance of responsibility, id. at 133-134, and
ultimately granted the reduction after hearing further argument
from defense counsel on that issue, id. at 135.
The court of appeals also correctly rejected the contention
that the district court improperly coerced petitioner by issuing
a
prehearing
order
stating
its
“tentative
conclusions”
that
petitioner’s objections were without merit, and that petitioner
should
not
C.A. ROA 66.
receive
an
acceptance-of-responsibility
reduction.
The prehearing order nowhere states that petitioner
should withdraw her objections or that doing so might alter the
court’s
tentative
conclusion
responsibility reduction.
regarding
the
acceptance-of-
Nor is that an obvious implication of
13
the court’s order, which is most naturally read as an effort to
inform the parties of the court’s preliminary views to allow them
to shape their hearing presentations accordingly.
Moreover, even if petitioner is correct that the district
court’s order was intended to warn petitioner against pursuing her
objections
to
the
presentence
report,
petitioner
has
not
challenged the court’s determination that her objections lacked
any merit.
See Pet. App. A6 n.3.
The Eighth Circuit has explained
that “accurately warn[ing] [a defendant] of the consequence of
pursuing frivolous guidelines objections” neither “‘threaten[s]’”
nor “improperly coerce[s]” the defendant “into withdrawing his
objections to the [presentence report].” United States v. Trevino,
829 F.3d 668, 675 (2016).
a
district
court
to
“To the contrary, it is appropriate for
‘express
concern
that
a
defendant
is
frivolously denying relevant conduct and explain this could be a
reason to deny an acceptance reduction.’”
Pet. App. A6 (quoting
United States v. Schenck, 697 Fed. Appx. 422, 423 (5th Cir. 2017)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1308 (2018)); see also
United States v. Medina, 432 Fed. Appx. 349, 352 (5th Cir. 2011)
(“[I]t would be absurd for a detrimental legal ruling on an
objection to be construed as the court’s coercing a defendant to
withdraw that objection.”).
2.
circuits
Petitioner fails to identify any disagreement in the
regarding
when
a
judge’s
statements
regarding
the
acceptance-of-responsibility reduction might be deemed coercive.
14
As the court of appeals correctly observed, none of the decisions
cited by petitioner involves Sentencing Guidelines § 3E1.1, a
defendant’s objections to a presentence report, or statements by
a sentencing court comparable to those at issue here.
See Pet.
App. A6 n.4.
Instead, petitioner generally cites (Pet. 11-17) decisions
where a district court was alleged to have threatened a higher
sentence if the defendant rejected a plea and was later found
guilty after trial -- a practice that is prohibited by Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (c)(1)
(“The court must not participate in the[] [plea] discussions.”);
Pet. App. A6 n.4; Longval v. Meachum, 693 F.2d 236, 237 (1st Cir.
1982) (finding judicial coercion where a trial court stated that
it “might be disposed to impose a substantial prison sentence” if
defendant did not plead guilty), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098
(1983); United States ex. rel. McGrath v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308,
309 (2d Cir. 1963) (reversing an order denying habeas relief and
remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the trial
judge had threatened a criminal defendant that, among other things,
he would “never see the sunshine again” if he was convicted at
trial); United States v. Rodriguez, 197 F.3d 156, 159 (5th Cir.
1999) (finding a Rule 11 violation where the trial judge “indicated
a belief that if [defendant] opted for a trial, he likely would be
found guilty” and “that a sentencing enhancement filed by the
government could not be withdrawn”); see also Boykin v. Alabama,
15
395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (discussing the standard for determining
the voluntariness of guilty pleas); United States v. Pena, 720
F.3d 561, 571, 573 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that a district court
“participated in [the defendant’s] plea negotiations in violation
of Rule 11” by “stating that [the defendant] should resolve [a
related civil matter] before the court would accept his guilty
plea”).
Decisions reflecting a prohibition on judicial interference
in plea bargaining do not support petitioner’s assertion that the
district court coerced her to give up her objections to the
presentencing
eligibility
reduction.
report
for
the
through
its
statements
regarding
acceptance-of-responsibility
her
sentencing
And petitioner identifies no decision of any court of
appeals that would find error in these circumstances.
Nor is it
apparent that, if any court were to find error, it would deem such
error prejudicial.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52.
Petitioner received
an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment and a below-Guidelines
sentence, Pet. App. B1; that outcome was clearly not affected by
the withdrawal of Guidelines objections whose lack of merit is
undisputed, see id. at 6 n.3.
3.
In any event, this case would constitute a poor vehicle
to review the coercion issue because petitioner failed to raise it
in the district court, and the court of appeals therefore reviewed
her coercion claim only for plain error.
Pet. App. A4.
The same
standard of review would apply before this Court, and given the
16
absence of any precedent supporting petitioner’s claim, see pp.
13-15, supra, she cannot demonstrate that any error was “plain”
-- i.e., “clear” or “obvious,”
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 734 (1993) -- let alone prejudicial.
Petitioner appears to dispute the application of the plain
error standard, contending (Pet. 10-11) that she has raised a
“structural error” that requires “automatic reversal.”
But, as
the court of appeals correctly observed, the only two cases she
cites for this proposition involve cases where a court applied
plain error review to an unpreserved allegation of a sentencing
error.
Pet. App. A4 n.1 (explaining that neither United States v.
Mudekunye, 646 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), nor United
States v. Gonzalez-Terrazas, 529 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2008), support
petitioner’s argument).
And this Court has not only repeatedly
applied
standard
the
plain-error
to
forfeited
claims
that
a
district court erred at sentencing, see, e.g., Rosales-Mireles v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897 (2018); Molina–Martinez v. United
States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016), but also to claims of impermissible
judicial coercion to plead guilty, United States v. Davila, 569
U.S. 597 (2013).
Petitioner offers no reason why a different
standard should apply here.
17
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
JEFFREY B. WALL
Acting Solicitor General
BRIAN C. RABBITT
Acting Assistant Attorney General
FRANCESCO VALENTINI
Attorney
DECEMBER 2020
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