Reply Brief — Cynthia Holmes, Petitioner v. James Y. Becker, et al.

No. 20-5531

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES

C. Holmes

Petitioner,

v.

James Y. Becker, M. M. Caskey,

Mikell R. Scarborough, and

Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, PA,

as successor to Sinkler & Boyd, PA,

Respondents,

REPLY TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

C. Holmes

P.O. Box 187

Sullivans Island, SC 29482

843.883.3010

received

OCT 16 2020

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities

IX

Reply to Statement of the Case

1

Reply to Brief in Opposition

9

Conclusion

14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Brooks v. SCCOID and OID, 797 S.E.2d 402

7

(SC Ct. App. 2017)

Burnham v. Superior Court of California, Cty. ofMarin, 495

U.S. 604, 609, 110 S.Ct. 2105, 109 L.Ed.2d 631 (1990)

10

Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 402 (1990)

6

Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1980)

1

Doe v. Duncan (unpublished).

6

ExxonMobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries

Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)

11

Garner v. Houck, 312 S.C. 481, 435 S.E.2d 847 (1993)

7

Hanahan v. Simpson, 326 S.C. 140, 485 S.E.2d 903 (1997)

7

Holmes v. Becker, Grier, Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, PA,

6,7

760 S.E.2d 399 (S.C. 2014)

Holmes v. ECCH, Inc., 758 S.E.2d 483 (2014)

6

Hulsey v. Cisa, 947 F.3d 246 (4th Cir., January 17, 2020)

9,12

Innovative Waste Mgmt. Inc. v. Crest Energy Partners GP,

LLC, 815 S.E.2d 780 (S.C. App. 2018)

10

u

Jordahlv. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 202

(4th Cir.1997)

13

Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006)

11

Lyles v. Bolles, 8 S.C. 258 (1876)

10

Bose v. Himely, 8 U.S. 4 Cranch 241, 268-69,

2 L.Ed. 608 (1808) (Marshall, C.J.)

10

Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 531, 131 S.Ct. 1289,

11

179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011)

Thana v. Bd. ofLicense Comm'rs for Charles Cnty.,

827 F.3d 314 (4th Cir., 2016)

11

Unisun Ins. v. Hawkins, 537 S.E.2d 559 (Ct.App.2000)

7

Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274 (4th Cir., 2005)

13

STATUTES AND RULES

S.C. Code Ann.(sic) § 15-11-10

1

S.C. Code Ann.(sic) § 15-11-15

1

S.C. Code Ann.(sic) § 14-11-15

1

S.C. Code § 14-11-310

3,8

S.C. Code § 15-36-10 (M)

4,6

SCACR, Rule 268(d)(2)

7,12

SCRCP, Rule 43(1)

9

SCRCP, Rule 60

2

REPLY TO STATEMENT OF THE CASE

As a threshold matter, without being disagreeable, there is disagreement and

petitioner disputes Mr. Andrew Lindemann’s Statement of the Case which omits material

facts and makes material misstatements of fact. On page 1, Mr. Lindemann falsely claims

S.C. Code Ann.(sic) § 15-11-10 contains a provision that states, “A Master-in-Equity is a

part of the unified state court system in South Carolina.” It does not. Furthermore, “S,C.

Code Ann.” is considered antiquated and/or obsolete. Moreover, a master-in-equity

(hereafter MOE) is not the equivalent of a state circuit court judge and S.C. Code Ann.

(sic) § 15-11-15 does not state that MOE is the equivalent. In fact, S.C. Code Ann.(sic) §

15-11-15 does not exist. To the extent he attempts to cite “S.C. Code Ann.(sic) § 14-11-15,”

Mr. Lindemann misrepresents the quotation, which is taken out of context and which is

incomplete. Mr. Lindemann materially omits the final sentence which negates the

statement^ MOE is the equivalent of a state court circuit judge. That final sentence

definitively delineates MOE is NOT a judge, may not be construed to be a judge, and

MOE’s are prohibited from participating in the State Retirement System for Judges.

On page 1 in the second paragraph, petitioner disputes the second sentence and

Mr. Lindemann’s attempt to limit and mischaracterize the complaint. Instead, the

allegations assert claims including conspiracy by defendants all in concert under color of

state law to deny petitioner’s constitutional, individual, and property rights for the

benefit of private parties to fix the outcome of the case. In Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24,

28-29 (1980), the U.S. Supreme Court held that private parties who conspired with a

1

judge to fix a case acted under color of law.

In Footnote 1 on page 1, Mr. Lindemann misrepresents the February 9, 2017, MOE

order is “sua sponte.” Specifically, the attached February 9, 2017, MOE order states “This

action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a

decision rendered.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 2d Edition, provides the following definition

for “ex parte”: Court order against a party absent from the proceedings and given no

prior notice. The Charleston County public access website for Case No. 2007-CP-10-1444

shows there was no prior notice for the hearing referenced in the order and no

opportunity to be heard. “Sua sponte” is not the proper term.

On page 2 at the top of the page, Mr. Lindemann materially omits the

referee/master lacked jurisdiction to strike the Rule 60, SCRCP, motion then pending

before the trial judge who is the only judge with jurisdiction to hear the Rule 60, SCRCP,

Motion. Moreover, disposition on that Rule 60, SCRCP, Motion is a condition precedent to

supplemental proceedings and a condition precedent to jurisdiction for the order of

reference. Without it, the order of reference is invalid. Even assuming the order of

reference is valid, which is denied, only the trial judge has jurisdiction for disposition of

the pending Rule 60, SCRCP, Motion and MOE is not the trial judge. Further, the

referee/master lacked jurisdiction to strike the MTD then pending before the Presiding

Circuit Court Judge. Mr. Lindemann materially omits that his client

confiscated/converted petitioner’s monies paid in good faith for filing fees while giving a

“free pass” to defendant corporation on jurisdictional full payment of filing fees. This non­

judicial wrongdoing speaks volumes. MOE did not require full payment of filing fees from

defendant corporation which is an administrative, non-judicial act of wrongdoing and

2

prejudicial bias. MOE did not require full payment of filing fees from defendant

corporation which every other attorney is required to pay and which is required for

statutory authority:

S.C. CODE SECTION 14-11-310.

Masters-in-equity to collect certain fees.

Masters-in-equity shall collect the following fees which must be deposited in the general

fund of the county:

...(4) for a supplemental proceeding, a fee of twenty-five dollars;...

The fees provided for in this section, including the first day's fee provided for in item (5)

and excluding the commission on sale, must be paid at the time the order of reference is

signed and is nonrefundable unless so ordered by the master-in-equity on proper cause

being shown. S.C. Code § 14-11-310 (emphasis supplied).

On page 2 in the first complete paragraph, Mr. Lindemann fails to disclose S.C.

Code § 14-11-310 provides that a salaried employee of defendant corporation is not

entitled to attorney’s fees. As such, the $2500 order for attorneys fees for employee

Caskey is a violation of S.C. Code § 14-11-310. Moreover, the transcript reflects the

petitioner timely complied with discovery in the courtroom on the record, it reflects

defendant corporation failed to provide admissible evidence of non-compliance, and it

reflects the petitioner was not allowed to testify, to present evidence, or to call witnesses.

On page 2 in the last full paragraph, Mr. Lindemann states, “The district court

further ruled that ‘it is clear that Scarborough issued the orders in question in his

judicial capacity and not in the absence of jurisdiction, as they were made pursuant to

orders of reference from the circuit court (emphasis supplied).’” Importantly, the district

3

court failed to address the validity of the orders of reference. By inference, at least one of

those “orders” is invalid and plaintiff contends both are. Summary dismissal is improper

under these facts with multiple (invalid) “orders” of reference.

With regard to fn. 2 on page 3, petitioner retired from the practice of law with

Neighborhood Legal Aid before attending medical school and there have never been any

client complaints. But for the unconstitutional retroactive application of the inapplicable

revised FPA, S.C. Code § 15-36-10, and unauthorzed reporting to ODC in subsection M

of the FPA while that Haynsworth FPA order was stayed pending appeal, there would be

no complaint to ODC. S.C. Code § 15-36-10(M). Further, there would be no definite

suspension after multiple attempts at improper default by Barbie Seymour, now

removed. But for the unconstituional retroactive application of the revised FPA, we would

not be here. A detailed description by petitioner’s state court Appellate Counsel of Record

may be found at sccourts.org, select C-Track Public Access under Quick Links, select

Court of Appeals (COA), be sure to uncheck “exclude closed cases,” and enter Case No.

2019-000880, then click on the entry date of 04/24/2020 for Petition For Rehearing on

improper dismissal of that appeal. Current appeal by Haynsworth is pending under COA

Case No. 2020-000968 based on the attached state court order dated June 11, 2020.

Currently, Mr. Lindemann contemptuously flouts the attached state court order for

mandatory ADR (Alternative Dispute Resolution) regarding viable state court claims

specified in the R&R, adopted by the district court, and timely filed in state court. ADR

applies to essentially all civil litigants in the unified state court system. As he points out

on page 1, MOE is part of the unified state court system, yet Mr. Lindemann apparently

believes he and MOE, a county (not Judicial Department) employee, are above the law

4

and do not have to comply with state court orders of the unified state court system.

Significantly and materially, the unified state court system is struggling to manage its

docket in these uncertain times of unfolding and unprecedented public health and

affiliated economic emergencies. Public policy mandates compliance with ADR. In

derogation of his professional responsibilities and the South Carolina Rules of

Professional Conduct, Attorney Lindemann cavalierly and contemptuously refuses to

comply with the attached state court order dated July 13, 2020. Attorney Lindemann

could have but did not timely file a motion to reconsider and/or to alter or amend and/or

appeal. He unreasonably fails and refuses his professional responsibility to comply with a

valid court order and refuses to even discuss mediation, contrary to legislative intent and

the letter and spirit of ADR. Importantly, in compliance with that order, deposit was paid

and mediation scheduled for September 18, 2020, or any other mutually agreeable date

and time which Mr. Lindeman contemptuously ignored without providing alternate date.

Turning to fn. 3 on page 3, regarding the first case, see attached Civil Action Cover

Sheet showing Counsel of Record filed the suit and signed at the bottom certifying the

case is not frivolous. Importantly, the dissent in Footnote 23 of the opinion in that case

properly points out that the majority agreed with petitioner’s Counsel of Record that the

case law “might not be [so] limited....” supporting petitioner’s counsel of record and his

theory of the case. Holmes v. ECCH, Inc., 758 S.E.2d 483, fn. 23 (2014). Significantly, in

his dissenting opinion, Former Chief Justice, then Justice Pleicones correctly noted there

was no basis in law for finding the physician violated the FPA and no basis in fact or law

for sanctioning the party alone and not the attorney. Of note, that very issue is scheduled

for oral argument in another case on November 12, 2020, in the state COA under COA

5

App. Case No. 2018-000467.

Regarding the second case in fn. 3 on page 3, the definite suspension in that case

was based on improper default and the above referenced unauthorized sanction against a

represented party while stayed pending appeal in which the majority agreed and the

dissenting opinion found that Counsel of Record’s suit was not frivolous and that a

represented party alone could not be sanctioned. Holmes v. ECCH, Inc., 758 S.E.2d 483,

fn. 23 (2014). As a matter of law in that case, therefore, the reasonable attorney standard

in S.C. Code § 15-36-10 (FPA) as well as a reasonable jurist standard is met. There is no

frivolity. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 402, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110

L.Ed.2d 359, 58 USLW 4763 (l990)(the lack of any legal requirement other than the

talismanic recitation of ‘“frivoloul will foreclose meaningful review.” (emphasis

supplied)). The reasonable attorney standard is not fair notice to the general public or to

parties.

Regarding the third case in fn. 3 on page 3, but for the unconstitutional retroactive

application of the revised FPA, we would not be here. The dissent in that case agreed, “I

agree with appellant that the original version of the FCPSA and not the amended version

applies here." Holmes v. Haynsworth et al, 408 S.C. 620, 760 S.E.2d 399 (S.C. 2014).

Further, the trial judge expressly ruled there is no intent to harm. But for the attached

denial of the plaintiffs motion for substitution of counsel in that underlying case of

Haynsworth’s malfeasance, we would not be here. The record reflects that the Presiding

District Court Judge who denied plaintiffs timely and meritorious motion to substitute

counsel did not timely recuse himself in the instant case despite timely notice.

On page 3, Mr. Lindemann again omits material facts. He fails to provide any

6

citation, source, or case number for his reliance on Doe v. Duncan.and materially fails to

disclose it is unpublished. Unpublished orders have no precedential value and should not

be cited except in proceedings in which they are directly involved. Rule 268(d)(2), SCACR.

Even Mr. Lindemann is unable to cite, locate, or access that John Doe order which is

inadmissible untrustworthy hearsay and which supports petitioner’s allegation of direct

or indirect impermissible ex parte communication by defendant corporation and

defendants with MOE, otherwise that unpublished order could not be found. That John

Doe case is unrelated to and not directly involved with the matter herein and in any case,

is not applicable because the physician is in a defensive posture. See Brooks v. SCCID

and OID, South Carolina Court of Appeals, decided February 15, 2017, App. Case No.

2014-002477 (Remittitur sent March 3, 2017). Of note, Former Chief Justice Toal, who at

every opportunity publicly praises Haynsworth for “launching” her career “and the rest is

history,” authored two of the four opinions on page 3 and participated in the other two

Per Curiam.

At the bottom of page 3, Mr. Lindemann materially omits directed verdict was

granted to two of the three defendants on insufficient service in Holmes v. Becker, Grier,

and Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, PA, 760 S.E.2d 399 (2014), authored by Former Chief

Justice Toal. After the individual defendants appeared, testified, and defended at trial,

the trial judge granted directed verdict on the grounds of insufficient service. Former

Chief Justice, then Justice Pleicones dissented arguing it was against controlling

precedent and well-settled rule of law, which essentially describes the entire majority

opinion^

As I understand the applicable law, however, these respondents waived their right to rely

7

upon the belated service when they failed to raise the issue pursuant to Rule 12(h),

SCRCP. See Garner v. Houck, 312 S.C. 481, 435 S.E.2d 847 (1993). Failure to properly

raise this issue under the rule also operates as a waiver of a statute of limitations

defense. Id.; see also Unisun Ins. v. Hawkins, 342 S.C. 537, 537 S.E.2d 559

(Ct.App.2000)....Further, I agree with appellant that the original version of the FCPSA

and not the amended version applies here. See 2005 S.C. Acts No. 27 § 16(3) 123 (revised

FCPSA applies to causes of action arising on or after July 1, 2005). Thus the trial court

erred as a matter of law in awarding sanctions under the FCPSA. Hanahan v. Simpson,

326 S.C. 140, 485 S.E.2d 903 (1997).

Holmes v. Haynsworth et al., 408 S.C. 620, 760 S.E.2d 399, 413 (S.C. 2014).

In addition, the dissent confirmed the revised FCPSA with its reporting provisions is

inapplicable. S.C. Code § 15-36-10(M).

On page 4, Mr. Lindemann again engages in self-interested omission of material

facts. Specifically, he fails to disclose there was no hearing date issued because statutory

authorization requires full filing fees “must be paid” before the order of reference is

authorize d:

S.C. CODE SECTION 14-11-310.

Masters-in-equity to collect certain fees.

Masters-in-equity shall collect the following fees which must be deposited in the general

fund of the county:

...(4) for a supplemental proceeding, a fee of twenty-five dollars;...

The fees provided for in this section, including the first day's fee provided for in item (5)

and excluding the commission on sale, must be paid at the time the order of reference is

signed and is nonrefundable unless so ordered by the master-in-equity on proper cause

being shown. S.C. Code § 14-11-310 (emphasis supplied).

Thus, by statute the payment of fees is jurisdictional. The record reflects full fees have

not been paid, including but not limited to, the full $50.00 initiation fee: $25 to file the

8

petition with the state circuit court and $25 for MOE. Materially, the record reflects MOE

in his non-judicial and administrative capacity gave Haynsworth a free pass on full

payment. A jury could find this is evidence of administrative wrongdoing in a non-judicial

capacity for which there is no judicial immunity and evidence of prejudicial bias. Further,

Mr. Lindemann fails to disclose there was no hearing date on the order of reference

pending disposition on the plaintiffs pending Motion to Dismiss (MTD). See attached

true copy of incomplete order of reference. Significantly and materially, the MTD was

based on, including but not limited to, lack of standing due to lack of ownership interest

which defendants later admitted in the attached copy of document filed September 29,

2017, as well as false, disputed claims and lack of verified petition which is a fatal defect.

Toyota ofFlorence, Inc. v. Lynch, 314 S.C. 257, 442 S.E.2d 611 (1994). The order of

reference is incomplete and not final. No other judge has jurisdiction to enter, alter, or

revise another judge’s pending matter. Rule 43(1), SCRCP. The attached true copy of the

incomplete order of reference, which is incomplete for jurisdictional lack of full payment.

is not final and to date, full payment has not been made. It is not a final, valid order of

reference, and there is no jurisdiction for MOE or MOE orders under these facts.

On page 4, Mr. Lindemann misconstrues the complaint. It is respectfully

submitted the allegations in the complaint are not so limited. Writ of Certiorari is

respectfully requested.

9

REPLY TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

There is conflict in the Fourth Circuit regarding the disparate rulings under the

same or similar fact pattern in Hulsey;this Court is requested to grant review regarding

consistency. Hulsey v. Cisa, 947 F.3d 246 (4th Cir., January 17, 2020). Moreover, the

propriety of adopting Report & Recommendation (R&R) admittedly based on extrajudicial

untrustworthy hearsay over the internet is challenged, including but not limited to,

denial of timely request for notice and opportunity to respond to extrajudicial

communication/content outside the record and/or denial of adequate record for

meaningful judicial review. On page 5, Mr. Lindemann asserts two bases for denying the

petition- absolute judicial immunity and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. As set forth more

fully herein, neither provides sanctuary for his client.

With respect to absolute judicial immunity, the referee/master is not a state circuit

court judge and does not enjoy absolute judicial immunity. Specifically, he does not enjoy

absolute judicial immunity because, including but not limited to, he does not enjoy

general jurisdiction as does a state circuit court judge and never did. His jurisdiction is

subject to a valid order of reference and only as specified in that order. In this case, there

is no final, valid order of reference, therefore, the referee/master has no lawful judicial

authority, and any actions he took including, but not limited to, judge-shopping for a

second (invalid) order of reference, are outside his scope of authority and constitute non­

judicial wrongdoing:

10

Lyles v. Bolles, 8 S.C. 258 (1876) endorsed the following language- "A sentence professing

on its face to be the sentence of a judicial tribunal, if rendered by a self-constituted body,

or a body not empowered by its government to take cognizance of the subject it had

decided, could have no legal effect whatever." Id. at 262 (quoting Bose v. Himely, 8 U.S. 4

Cranch 241, 268-69, 2 L.Ed. 608 (1808) (Marshall, C.J.)). Both Lyles and Rose used the

traditional term of art, coram non judice," ‘before a person not a judge’—meaning, in

effect, that the proceeding in question was not a judicial proceeding because lawful

judicial authority was not present, and could therefore not yield a judgment." Burnham

v. Superior Court of California, Cty. ofMarin, 495 U.S. 604, 609, 110 S.Ct. 2105, 109

L.Ed.2d 631 (1990).

Innovative Waste Mgmt. Inc. v. Crest Energy Partners GP, LLC, 815 S.E.2d 780 (S.C.

App. 2018).

Accordingly, “because lawful judicial authority was not present, and could therefore not

yield a judgment,” the orders of the referee/master, including the February 9, 2017, order,

“could have no legal effect whatever.” Id.

In addition, even assuming a valid order of reference, which is denied, there is no

judicial immunity for administrative and/or non-judicial wrongdoing in a non-judicial

capacity which plaintiff has pled, such as, including but not limited to, causing

false/misleading information to be published on the Charleston County public access

website on which the district court relied to dismiss summarily. See Footnote 10 on page

9 of the Report & Recommendation (R&R) dated October 31, 2018.

As for the second reason to deny the petition, Mr. Lindemann misconstrues or

misapprehends the Rooker-Feldman (R-F) doctrine. Specifically, the case of Thana v. Bd.

ofLicense Comm'rs for Charles Cnty., 827 F.3d 314 (4th Cir., 2016) provides as follows^

To emphasize the narrow role that the Rooker -Feldman doctrine is to play, the Supreme

Court has noted repeatedly that, since the decisions in Rooker and Feldman, it has never

applied the doctrine to deprive a district court of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g.,

Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 531, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011); Lance,

546 U.S. at 464, 126 S.Ct. 1198; Exxon, 544 U.S. at 287, 125 S.Ct. 1517 (2005). Similarly,

since Exxon, we have never, in a published opinion, held that a district court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker -Feldman doctrine. ...

11

In the circumstances of this case, we conclude that this federal action is a concurrent,

independent action supported by original jurisdiction conferred by Congress on federal

district courts, even though the complaint in the action includes claims and legal

arguments similar to or the same as those made in the state proceedings, and that

therefore it is not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Thana v. Bd. ofLicense Comm'rs for Charles Cnty., 827 F.3d 314 (4th Cir., 2016).

In addition, the Fourth Circuit has since reversed the Eastern Division of the

District Court of South Carolina based on misapprehension and/or overreach of the

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. As in the recent Hulsey case, the instant case does not fall

within the Rooker-Feldman doctrine’s narrow scope, for multiple independent reasons

including but not limited to, because the injury herein is caused by defendants all in

concert conspiring to cause harm under color of state law, including by misrepresenting

an unspecified, unpublished order from an unrelated case. Hulsey v. Cisa, 947 F.3d 246

(4th Cir. 2020). Unpublished orders have no precedential value and should not be cited

except in proceedings in which they are directly involved. Rule 268(d)(2), SCACR. That

unpublished John Doe order in an unrelated case is not directly involved in the instant

case. Accordingly, new case law in Hulsey supports reversal. Id.

As noted above, new case law ruled the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable

under the same or similar facts. Hulsey v. Cisa, 947 F.3d 246 (4th Cir., January 17,

2020). There is conflict in the Fourth Circuit regarding the disparate rulings under the

same or similar fact pattern in Hulsey,'this Court is requested to grant review regarding

consistency. Id. Plaintiff challenges defendants’ wrongdoing pursuant to the revised

SCFPA and the February 9, 2017, order, copy attached, which defendants admit is

currently pending state court appeal and for which there is no decision by the state court

12

of last resort.

The magistrate dismissed due to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine based on false

evidence admittedly outside the record from the internet which he cited in Footnote 10 on

page 9 of the R&R filed on October 31, 2018. The magistrate relied on false information

regarding a false remittitur wrongfully posted by defendants all in concert on the county

government public website in October 2018. A jury should and would find that the false

remittitur was wrongfully published by defendants all in concert to obtain dismissal

herein. It is evidence consistent with intentional wrongdoing. Discovery is indicated. A

pattern and practice has emerged of defendants’ wrongdoing all in concert to cause entry

of altered/erroneous information on the county government’s public website, under color

of state law to benefit private parties. Serious questions are raised regarding direct or

indirect ex parte communication of false information to the district court over the

internet and outside the record by and through the federal magistrate. Petitioner is

prejudiced by wrongful dismissal and denial of timely request for notice and opportunity

to respond to the magistrate’s unlawful search and solicitation over the internet. Without

defendants’ wrongdoing all in concert the outcome should and would be different.

Even under the now rejected, overly expansive application of the R-F doctrine prior

to Exxon, supra, the facts in this case are consistent with the 1997 4th Circuit case in

Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir.1997). The case herein

does not seek review of a state court decision by the state court of last resort because

there is no decision by the state court of last resort on the February 9, 2017, order

currently pending appeal; instead, the challenge is to the process by which the state court

decisions resulted, which is within the express legislative intent and jurisdiction of the

13

district court.

In Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274 (4th Cir., 2005) (after Exxon, supra), the

4th Circuit cited Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 1997), and

distinguished between actions seeking review of the state court decisions themselves and

those cases challenging the constitutionality of the process by which the state court

decisions resulted. Similarly, the plaintiffs claims herein rest not on a state court

judgment itself, but rather on challenge to the constitutionality of the process by which

the state court decisions resulted and to the revised SCFPA on its face and/or as applied.

Accordingly, there is no absolute judicial immunity for MOE under these facts and the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not applicable. Petitioner respectfully requests Writ of

Certiorari.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for substantial justice affecting substantial rights, petitioner

respectfully requests that this Court grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

SI, SC 29482-01

843.883.3010

14