Reply Brief — Anthony Bernard Smith, Jr., Petitioner v. Ron Davis, Warden
Supreme Court briefNov 4, 2020
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No. 20-5366
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
___________
ANTHONY BERNARD SMITH, JR.,
v.
RON DAVIS,
___________
Petitioner,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
___________
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
___________
JEFFREY T. GREEN
ADAM KLEVEN
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
1501 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 736-8000
NAOMI I. IGRA
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
555 California Street
Suite 2000
San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 772-1200
DAVID M. PORTER*
FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER’S OFFICE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA
801 I Street, 3rd Floor
Sacramento, CA 95814
(916) 498-7000
David_Porter@fd.org
Counsel for Petitioner
November 4, 2020
* Counsel of Record
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................
ii
INTRODUCTION ................................................
1
ARGUMENT ........................................................
2
I. THE PETITION PRESENTS A CLEAR
CIRCUIT SPLIT ...........................................
2
II. THE STATE IGNORES THE IMPORTANCE OF A UNIFORM APPROACH
TO EQUITABLE TOLLING FOR FEDERAL STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS ............
7
III. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS DISPOSITIVE OF THE TIMING ISSUE IN
MR. SMITH’S CASE ....................................
8
CONCLUSION ....................................................
10
(i)
ii
CASES
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S.
424 (1965) ..................................................
8
Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650
(1983) ......................................................... 7, 8
Checo v. Shinseki, 748 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2014) .......................................................... 1, 4
Clay v. United States, 537 U.S.
522 (2003) ..................................................
7
Coulter v. Kelley, 871 F.3d 612 (8th Cir.
2017) .........................................................
1
Harper v. Ercole, 648 F.3d 132 (2d Cir.
2011) ...................................................... 1, 2, 3, 4
Hizbullahankhamon v. Walker, 255 F.3d
65 (2d Cir. 2001) ........................................ 2, 3
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) ..... 1, 7, 8
Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 711
(11th Cir. 2002) .........................................
4
Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314 (1996) ....
8
Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) ...
1
San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257 (11th
Cir.) ............................................................ 5, 6
Simon v. Republic of Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187
(D.C. Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom., Republic
of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S. 848 (2009) ........
6
Socop-Gonzalez v. I.N.S., 272 F.3d 1176
(9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) ...........................
6
Spottsville v. Terry, 476 F.3d 1241 (11th
Cir. 2007) ...................................................
5
Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129 (2d Cir.
2000) ..........................................................
2
INTRODUCTION
The State does not dispute that the circuits are
split on the actual question presented: whether reasonable diligence to remedy an extraordinary circumstance is sufficient for equitable tolling to stop the
clock on a statute of limitations. As the State concedes, “the difference ‘is that one [side] requires an
evaluation of petitioner’s diligence across the whole
time involved, and the other conducts the same inquiry but for just part of that time.’” Opp. 9 n.3 (emphasis added). Exactly. This difference in approach
means that Mr. Smith’s habeas petition was time
barred in the Ninth Circuit even though it would
have been heard in two other circuits, if not more.
Nevertheless, the State contends the split petitioner identified is “substantially overstate[d].” Opp. 10.
It starts by restating points the majority made below
based on Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) and
Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005). But the
point of Mr. Smith’s petition is that courts have diverged in their application of precisely those precedents. Like the dissent below, courts in other circuits
read Holland and Pace as supporting a diligence
standard that is directly opposed to the one the Ninth
Circuit applied below. E.g., Harper v. Ercole, 648
F.3d 132, 136–39 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Coulter v.
Kelley, 871 F.3d 612, 624–27 (8th Cir. 2017) (Kelly,
J., dissenting); Checo v. Shinseki, 748 F.3d 1373,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2014). This fully aired debate underscores the need for this Court’s review.
Congress expressly legislated a single statute of
limitations that applies to cases under AEDPA. The
circuit split over how to conduct equitable tolling defeats the uniformity Congress sought to achieve when
it legislated a federal statute of limitation. The Brief
2
in Opposition disregards this statutory scheme and
the enormous consequences that flow from a court’s
conclusion that a habeas petition is time-barred.
ARGUMENT
I. THE PETITION PRESENTS A CLEAR CIRCUIT SPLIT.
The State acknowledges that in the Second Circuit,
a petitioner “is required to ‘demonstrate diligence’ only ‘for a period warranting tolling,’ and not thereafter
through the date of filing.’” Opp. 10 (quoting Harper,
648 F.3d at 136). In the decision below, the Ninth
Circuit majority took exactly the opposite approach,
holding “that it is not enough for a petitioner seeking
equitable tolling to attempt diligently to remedy his
extraordinary circumstance[].” Pet. App. 31a.
Attempting to soften this clear contrast, the State
gestures to an inapposite Second Circuit case,
Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2000). See
Opp. 10 n.6. As Harper explained, and as the State
recognizes (id.), Valverde involved “extraordinary circumstances that had no discernable end date.” Harper, 648 F.3d at 140. In a scenario like Valverde,
stop-clock courts will extend the scope of the diligence
analysis, because “the amount of time a petitioner
seeks to toll extends to the date of filing.” Pet. 20.
That is not this case. Mr. Smith seeks to toll a period
of time with discernable start and end dates, within
which he presented “convinc[ing]” evidence that he
“acted diligently.” Pet. App. 109a; id. at 62a (Berzon,
J., dissenting) (noting Mr. Smith’s “diligent efforts in
seeking” his legal file from his former attorney).
Indeed, Mr. Smith’s undisputed diligence to remedy
his extraordinary circumstance separates his case
from Hizbullahankhamon v. Walker, 255 F.3d 65 (2d
3
Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.); see Opp. 11—a case that,
in all events, precedes both Pace and Holland. In
Hizbullahankhamon, the petitioner exercised essentially no diligence whatsoever. Moreover, the 22-day
period petitioner sought to equitably toll was not dispositive. Then-Judge Sotomayor reasoned that the
22-day period was relevant to timeliness only after
many assumptions were made: (1) “assuming that the
one-year limitations period should be tolled . . . for
each of the 194 days [petitioner] subsequently spent
in solitary confinement,” “due to his own misbehavior”;(2) assuming a “substract[ion] [of] another 60
days . . . during which petitioner hypothetically could
have moved for reargument of his [state court] coram
nobis motions,” Hizbullahankhamon, 255 F.3d at 75–
76 (emphasis added); and (3) the court had also “assum[ed] that” the state court “permits motions to reargue coram nobis motions,” an argument which he
raised “for the first time on appeal,” id. at 72–73. In
other words, there were multiple significant periods
of delay, beyond the 22-day period petitioner sought
to equitably toll. Hizbullahankhamon is thus easily
distinguishable.
By contrast, Mr. Smith falls squarely within the
key holding of Harper, which follows Holland: he has
“demonstrate[d] that ‘he acted with reasonable diligence throughout the period he seeks to toll,” 648
F.3d at 138, i.e., the 66 days that his former attorney
wrongfully withheld his legal file, see Pet. App. 109a
(magistrate judge opinion); id. at 35a (majority opinion); id. at 62a–63a (Berzon, J., dissenting). And Mr.
Smith filed his habeas petition “within the time that
would have remained available to him under AEDPA” had his attorney properly returned his file. See
4
Harper, 648 F.3d at 138. In short, there is a split—as
the State concedes—and it makes a difference. 1
The State’s further contention that the Eleventh
Circuit follows the Ninth Circuit is wrong; the Eleventh Circuit applies a straightforward stop-clock approach.
In Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 711 (11th Cir.
2002), the court considered “litigants [who] are eligible for such extended deadlines,” contra Opp. 12, as
those who are diligent in remedying their extraordinary circumstances. That is, for example, a petitioner who “exercise[s] diligence in inquiring about”
events that relate to their extraordinary circumstance and who “diligently seeks information about
the status of [their] case.” Knight, 292 F.3d at 711.
In that case, the court explicitly adopted the stopclock rule. Id. at 712 (“Tolling means just what it
says—the clock is stopped while tolling is in effect.”);
see Pet. 8–10.
1 The State tries to sidestep this throughout the opposition by
recasting this case as one about causation and asserts that “the
only way to assess” causation “‘is to examine’ whether the petitioner acted with reasonable diligence throughout the limitations period.” Opp. 3. But the diligence required after a petitioner acts diligently to remedy an extraordinary circumstance,
as in Harper, is that ordinarily required to file “within the time
that would have remained”—that is, within the remaining time
on the limitations clock after tolling. Harper, 648 F.3d at 138;
see Pet. 18. See also Checo, 748 F.3d at 1381. But this is not a
causation case, and indeed, most of the State’s arguments would
only become relevant on remand, where Mr. Smith also has arguments of his own. E.g., id. (a petitioner “only need[s] to
demonstrate causation between [his] [extraordinary circumstance] and the period [he] sought to be tolled”); Harper, 648
F.3d at 138 (“This case presents no negligence to undermine
causation.”).
5
Spottsville v. Terry, 476 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2007)
also does not help the State. Opp. 12. There, “the
limitations period [had run] for 160 days” already,
and then petitioner pursued relief in state court (thus
statutorily pausing the limitations clock). Spotsville,
476 F.3d at 1243. The superior court denied relief
and gave misleading instructions for appeal, contributing to petitioner’s untimely state court appeal, after
which he had exceeded the limitations period. Id. at
1243–45. But the Eleventh Circuit tolled the limitations period “during the pendency of [this] attempted
appeal” because petitioner “followed the instructions
of the state court to the letter”; in other words, he
acted diligently even though he was misled (i.e. the
extraordinary circumstance). Id. at 1245. Then the
court noted that petitioner filed two months after his
extraordinary circumstance ended, which was within
the time he had remaining on the clock after accounting for equitable tolling. Id. at 1245–46. Under the
circuit’s stop-clock approach, the outer limit is easily
discernable—206 days, which would have meant a
total of 366 untolled days had elapsed. In the Ninth
Circuit, that outer limit will shift based on the subjective views of the judge.
Further, the State incorrectly says that San Martin
v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2011) “follow[s]
Pace’s approach,” Opp. 12–13, (as the State construes
Pace). In fact, San Martin does not even cite Pace.
And the petitioner there “failed to make any showings of ‘reasonable diligence’” for any time period,
making it an easy case to deny equitable tolling. San
Martin, 633 F.3d at 1270 (emphasis added). San
Martin, moreover, contrasts with Knight, which
stands for the proposition “that a petitioner’s efforts
to learn the disposition of” his case “are crucial to determining whether equitable tolling is appropriate.”
6
Id. at 1269. In so reasoning, the court relied on Holland’s admonition that “[t]he diligence required for
equitable tolling purposes is ‘reasonable diligence,’
not ‘maximum feasible diligence.’” Id. at 1267 (quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 653). In all events, petitioner did not satisfy the extraordinary circumstances
prong. Id. at 1270. Again, here, Mr. Smith was diligent during the period he seeks to toll, and the Ninth
Circuit assumed he faced an extraordinary circumstance. If the State wishes to contest that assumption, the time and place is on remand.
The State’s remaining attempts to minimize the
circuit split miss the mark. First, the State asserts
that “the ‘inconsistency’” among the lower courts
identified by the D.C. Circuit “no longer exists” because Socop-Gonzalez v. I.N.S., 272 F.3d 1176 (9th
Cir. 2001) (en banc) has been overruled by the decision below. Opp. 13 (citing Simon v. Republic of Iraq,
529 F.3d 1187, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom.
on other grounds, Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S.
848 (2009)). Not so. As explained, the Ninth Circuit
still stands opposed to the Second and Eleventh Circuits. Second, the State contends that “an intracircuit conflict is not something that would ordinarily
warrant a grant of certiorari,” Opp. 13, but that argument misses the point. The petition does not simply seek to resolve intra-circuit inconsistencies; it describes those inconsistencies to highlight the persistent confusion about the contours of Holland and
Pace, which is an underlying cause of the circuit split
that the petition identifies. See also Simon v. Republic of Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that the two approaches “undoubtedly conflict”),
rev’d sub nom. on other grounds, Republic of Iraq v.
Beaty, 556 U.S. 848 (2009).
7
II. THE STATE IGNORES THE IMPORTANCE
OF A UNIFORM APPROACH TO EQUITABLE TOLLING FOR FEDERAL STATUTES
OF LIMITATIONS.
The State has little to say in response to the argument about the importance of the question presented.
Compare Pet. 20–23, with Opp. 15. Primarily, it suggests it is unnecessary to resolve the circuit split because Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650 (1983),
purportedly rejected the need for uniform application
of equitable tolling principles. Opp. 15. That argument ignores critically important context, which
makes clear Chardon did no such thing.
Chardon involved Section 1983 claims. As this
Court explained, “there is no federal statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims.” Chardon, 462 U.S.
at 654. The reasoning in that case flowed directly
from the Court’s observation that “[t]he federal civil
rights statutes do not provide for a specific statute of
limitations, establish rules regarding the tolling of
the limitations period, or prescribe the effect of tolling.” Id. at 655. Instead, “[i]n a § 1983 action . . .
Congress has specifically directed the courts, in the
absence of controlling federal law, to apply state
statutes of limitations and state tolling rules.” Id. at
661.
In this respect, AEDPA is on the opposite end of the
statutory spectrum. AEDPA specifically brought habeas petitions within “a uniform federal rule,” following a period when “no statute of limitations governed
requests for federal habeas corpus or § 2255 habeaslike relief.” Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 528,
531 (2003); see also Holland, 560 U.S. at 650 (“Equitable tolling . . . asks whether federal courts may excuse a petitioner’s failure to comply with federal timing rules, an inquiry that does not implicate a state
8
court’s interpretation of state law.”). AEDPA has
precisely the kind of “federal statute of limitations,”
Chardon, 462 U.S. at 662, that was absent in Chardon.
For AEDPA cases in particular, as well as other
cases involving federal statutes of limitations, Pet.
20—which the State completely ignores—a consistent
approach to equitable tolling is essential to achieving
legislative goals of “national uniformity.” Burnett v.
N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 434 (1965). Anything less undermines congressional authority and
disrupts the delicate balance of power between the
judiciary and the legislature. Pet. 21 (citing ScoopGonzalez, 272 F.3d at 1196). With AEDPA, moreover, fairness concerns are sharpened by “[t]he importance of the Great Writ,” Holland, 560 U.S. at 649,
and the “risk[ ] [of] injury to an important interest in
human liberty,” Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314,
324 (1996). See also Pet. 22–23.
III. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS DISPOSITIVE OF THE TIMING ISSUE IN MR.
SMITH’S CASE.
The State contends Mr. Smith is “unlikely to benefit from the rule he asks the Court to adopt.” Opp.
14. Yet that position is premised solely on the dissenting opinion of the lower court, which noted a “factual ambiguity” related to causation. Id. As the
State must acknowledge, the lower court presumed
that Mr. Smith satisfied the “extraordinary circumstance” standard. Id. The magistrate judge opined
that Mr. Smith presented “convinc[ing]” evidence
that Mr. Smith had “acted diligently” to obtain the
legal file his attorney wrongfully withheld, Pet. App.
109a, and the majority opinion did not contest this
finding. And as Judge Berzon remarked, “[i]t is undisputed that Smith’s lawyer wrongfully withhold
9
Smith’s appellate record, despite Smith’s diligent efforts in seeking it, for 66 days.” Id. at 62a. Meanwhile, the circumstances show that Mr. Smith did
make use of his file. See Pet. 24; Pet. App. 111a–
179a.
If this Court were to endorse the stop-clock approach to equitable tolling, Mr. Smith would surely
benefit from the ruling. The tolling question was the
sole dispositive issue as to whether his habeas petition was time-barred. The fact that both the majority
and dissent below assumed Mr. Smith satisfied the
“extraordinary circumstances” prong of equitable tolling is not a reason to deny this petition for certiorari.
Contra Opp. 14. Rather, it makes this an unusually
clean case for resolution of the circuit split presented
by the petition.
10
CONCLUSION
The petition should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
JEFFREY T. GREEN
ADAM KLEVEN
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
1501 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 736-8000
NAOMI I. IGRA
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
555 California Street
Suite 2000
San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 772-1200
DAVID M. PORTER*
FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER’S OFFICE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA
801 I Street, 3rd Floor
Sacramento, CA 95814
(916) 498-7000
David_Porter@fd.org
Counsel for Petitioner
November 4, 2020
* Counsel of Record
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