Reply Brief — Anthony Bernard Smith, Jr., Petitioner v. Ron Davis, Warden

Supreme Court briefNov 4, 2020

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No. 20-5366

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

___________

ANTHONY BERNARD SMITH, JR.,

v.

RON DAVIS,

___________

Petitioner,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

___________

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

___________

JEFFREY T. GREEN

ADAM KLEVEN

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

1501 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 736-8000

NAOMI I. IGRA

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

555 California Street

Suite 2000

San Francisco, CA 94104

(415) 772-1200

DAVID M. PORTER*

FEDERAL PUBLIC

DEFENDER’S OFFICE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF

CALIFORNIA

801 I Street, 3rd Floor

Sacramento, CA 95814

(916) 498-7000

David_Porter@fd.org

Counsel for Petitioner

November 4, 2020

* Counsel of Record

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................

ii

INTRODUCTION ................................................

1

ARGUMENT ........................................................

2

I. THE PETITION PRESENTS A CLEAR

CIRCUIT SPLIT ...........................................

2

II. THE STATE IGNORES THE IMPORTANCE OF A UNIFORM APPROACH

TO EQUITABLE TOLLING FOR FEDERAL STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS ............

7

III. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS DISPOSITIVE OF THE TIMING ISSUE IN

MR. SMITH’S CASE ....................................

8

CONCLUSION ....................................................

10

(i)

ii

CASES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S.

424 (1965) ..................................................

8

Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650

(1983) ......................................................... 7, 8

Checo v. Shinseki, 748 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir.

2014) .......................................................... 1, 4

Clay v. United States, 537 U.S.

522 (2003) ..................................................

7

Coulter v. Kelley, 871 F.3d 612 (8th Cir.

2017) .........................................................

1

Harper v. Ercole, 648 F.3d 132 (2d Cir.

2011) ...................................................... 1, 2, 3, 4

Hizbullahankhamon v. Walker, 255 F.3d

65 (2d Cir. 2001) ........................................ 2, 3

Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) ..... 1, 7, 8

Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 711

(11th Cir. 2002) .........................................

4

Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314 (1996) ....

8

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) ...

1

San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257 (11th

Cir.) ............................................................ 5, 6

Simon v. Republic of Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187

(D.C. Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom., Republic

of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S. 848 (2009) ........

6

Socop-Gonzalez v. I.N.S., 272 F.3d 1176

(9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) ...........................

6

Spottsville v. Terry, 476 F.3d 1241 (11th

Cir. 2007) ...................................................

5

Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129 (2d Cir.

2000) ..........................................................

2

INTRODUCTION

The State does not dispute that the circuits are

split on the actual question presented: whether reasonable diligence to remedy an extraordinary circumstance is sufficient for equitable tolling to stop the

clock on a statute of limitations. As the State concedes, “the difference ‘is that one [side] requires an

evaluation of petitioner’s diligence across the whole

time involved, and the other conducts the same inquiry but for just part of that time.’” Opp. 9 n.3 (emphasis added). Exactly. This difference in approach

means that Mr. Smith’s habeas petition was time

barred in the Ninth Circuit even though it would

have been heard in two other circuits, if not more.

Nevertheless, the State contends the split petitioner identified is “substantially overstate[d].” Opp. 10.

It starts by restating points the majority made below

based on Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) and

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005). But the

point of Mr. Smith’s petition is that courts have diverged in their application of precisely those precedents. Like the dissent below, courts in other circuits

read Holland and Pace as supporting a diligence

standard that is directly opposed to the one the Ninth

Circuit applied below. E.g., Harper v. Ercole, 648

F.3d 132, 136–39 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Coulter v.

Kelley, 871 F.3d 612, 624–27 (8th Cir. 2017) (Kelly,

J., dissenting); Checo v. Shinseki, 748 F.3d 1373,

1380 (Fed. Cir. 2014). This fully aired debate underscores the need for this Court’s review.

Congress expressly legislated a single statute of

limitations that applies to cases under AEDPA. The

circuit split over how to conduct equitable tolling defeats the uniformity Congress sought to achieve when

it legislated a federal statute of limitation. The Brief

2

in Opposition disregards this statutory scheme and

the enormous consequences that flow from a court’s

conclusion that a habeas petition is time-barred.

ARGUMENT

I. THE PETITION PRESENTS A CLEAR CIRCUIT SPLIT.

The State acknowledges that in the Second Circuit,

a petitioner “is required to ‘demonstrate diligence’ only ‘for a period warranting tolling,’ and not thereafter

through the date of filing.’” Opp. 10 (quoting Harper,

648 F.3d at 136). In the decision below, the Ninth

Circuit majority took exactly the opposite approach,

holding “that it is not enough for a petitioner seeking

equitable tolling to attempt diligently to remedy his

extraordinary circumstance[].” Pet. App. 31a.

Attempting to soften this clear contrast, the State

gestures to an inapposite Second Circuit case,

Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2000). See

Opp. 10 n.6. As Harper explained, and as the State

recognizes (id.), Valverde involved “extraordinary circumstances that had no discernable end date.” Harper, 648 F.3d at 140. In a scenario like Valverde,

stop-clock courts will extend the scope of the diligence

analysis, because “the amount of time a petitioner

seeks to toll extends to the date of filing.” Pet. 20.

That is not this case. Mr. Smith seeks to toll a period

of time with discernable start and end dates, within

which he presented “convinc[ing]” evidence that he

“acted diligently.” Pet. App. 109a; id. at 62a (Berzon,

J., dissenting) (noting Mr. Smith’s “diligent efforts in

seeking” his legal file from his former attorney).

Indeed, Mr. Smith’s undisputed diligence to remedy

his extraordinary circumstance separates his case

from Hizbullahankhamon v. Walker, 255 F.3d 65 (2d

3

Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.); see Opp. 11—a case that,

in all events, precedes both Pace and Holland. In

Hizbullahankhamon, the petitioner exercised essentially no diligence whatsoever. Moreover, the 22-day

period petitioner sought to equitably toll was not dispositive. Then-Judge Sotomayor reasoned that the

22-day period was relevant to timeliness only after

many assumptions were made: (1) “assuming that the

one-year limitations period should be tolled . . . for

each of the 194 days [petitioner] subsequently spent

in solitary confinement,” “due to his own misbehavior”;(2) assuming a “substract[ion] [of] another 60

days . . . during which petitioner hypothetically could

have moved for reargument of his [state court] coram

nobis motions,” Hizbullahankhamon, 255 F.3d at 75–

76 (emphasis added); and (3) the court had also “assum[ed] that” the state court “permits motions to reargue coram nobis motions,” an argument which he

raised “for the first time on appeal,” id. at 72–73. In

other words, there were multiple significant periods

of delay, beyond the 22-day period petitioner sought

to equitably toll. Hizbullahankhamon is thus easily

distinguishable.

By contrast, Mr. Smith falls squarely within the

key holding of Harper, which follows Holland: he has

“demonstrate[d] that ‘he acted with reasonable diligence throughout the period he seeks to toll,” 648

F.3d at 138, i.e., the 66 days that his former attorney

wrongfully withheld his legal file, see Pet. App. 109a

(magistrate judge opinion); id. at 35a (majority opinion); id. at 62a–63a (Berzon, J., dissenting). And Mr.

Smith filed his habeas petition “within the time that

would have remained available to him under AEDPA” had his attorney properly returned his file. See

4

Harper, 648 F.3d at 138. In short, there is a split—as

the State concedes—and it makes a difference. 1

The State’s further contention that the Eleventh

Circuit follows the Ninth Circuit is wrong; the Eleventh Circuit applies a straightforward stop-clock approach.

In Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 711 (11th Cir.

2002), the court considered “litigants [who] are eligible for such extended deadlines,” contra Opp. 12, as

those who are diligent in remedying their extraordinary circumstances. That is, for example, a petitioner who “exercise[s] diligence in inquiring about”

events that relate to their extraordinary circumstance and who “diligently seeks information about

the status of [their] case.” Knight, 292 F.3d at 711.

In that case, the court explicitly adopted the stopclock rule. Id. at 712 (“Tolling means just what it

says—the clock is stopped while tolling is in effect.”);

see Pet. 8–10.

1 The State tries to sidestep this throughout the opposition by

recasting this case as one about causation and asserts that “the

only way to assess” causation “‘is to examine’ whether the petitioner acted with reasonable diligence throughout the limitations period.” Opp. 3. But the diligence required after a petitioner acts diligently to remedy an extraordinary circumstance,

as in Harper, is that ordinarily required to file “within the time

that would have remained”—that is, within the remaining time

on the limitations clock after tolling. Harper, 648 F.3d at 138;

see Pet. 18. See also Checo, 748 F.3d at 1381. But this is not a

causation case, and indeed, most of the State’s arguments would

only become relevant on remand, where Mr. Smith also has arguments of his own. E.g., id. (a petitioner “only need[s] to

demonstrate causation between [his] [extraordinary circumstance] and the period [he] sought to be tolled”); Harper, 648

F.3d at 138 (“This case presents no negligence to undermine

causation.”).

5

Spottsville v. Terry, 476 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2007)

also does not help the State. Opp. 12. There, “the

limitations period [had run] for 160 days” already,

and then petitioner pursued relief in state court (thus

statutorily pausing the limitations clock). Spotsville,

476 F.3d at 1243. The superior court denied relief

and gave misleading instructions for appeal, contributing to petitioner’s untimely state court appeal, after

which he had exceeded the limitations period. Id. at

1243–45. But the Eleventh Circuit tolled the limitations period “during the pendency of [this] attempted

appeal” because petitioner “followed the instructions

of the state court to the letter”; in other words, he

acted diligently even though he was misled (i.e. the

extraordinary circumstance). Id. at 1245. Then the

court noted that petitioner filed two months after his

extraordinary circumstance ended, which was within

the time he had remaining on the clock after accounting for equitable tolling. Id. at 1245–46. Under the

circuit’s stop-clock approach, the outer limit is easily

discernable—206 days, which would have meant a

total of 366 untolled days had elapsed. In the Ninth

Circuit, that outer limit will shift based on the subjective views of the judge.

Further, the State incorrectly says that San Martin

v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2011) “follow[s]

Pace’s approach,” Opp. 12–13, (as the State construes

Pace). In fact, San Martin does not even cite Pace.

And the petitioner there “failed to make any showings of ‘reasonable diligence’” for any time period,

making it an easy case to deny equitable tolling. San

Martin, 633 F.3d at 1270 (emphasis added). San

Martin, moreover, contrasts with Knight, which

stands for the proposition “that a petitioner’s efforts

to learn the disposition of” his case “are crucial to determining whether equitable tolling is appropriate.”

6

Id. at 1269. In so reasoning, the court relied on Holland’s admonition that “[t]he diligence required for

equitable tolling purposes is ‘reasonable diligence,’

not ‘maximum feasible diligence.’” Id. at 1267 (quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 653). In all events, petitioner did not satisfy the extraordinary circumstances

prong. Id. at 1270. Again, here, Mr. Smith was diligent during the period he seeks to toll, and the Ninth

Circuit assumed he faced an extraordinary circumstance. If the State wishes to contest that assumption, the time and place is on remand.

The State’s remaining attempts to minimize the

circuit split miss the mark. First, the State asserts

that “the ‘inconsistency’” among the lower courts

identified by the D.C. Circuit “no longer exists” because Socop-Gonzalez v. I.N.S., 272 F.3d 1176 (9th

Cir. 2001) (en banc) has been overruled by the decision below. Opp. 13 (citing Simon v. Republic of Iraq,

529 F.3d 1187, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom.

on other grounds, Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S.

848 (2009)). Not so. As explained, the Ninth Circuit

still stands opposed to the Second and Eleventh Circuits. Second, the State contends that “an intracircuit conflict is not something that would ordinarily

warrant a grant of certiorari,” Opp. 13, but that argument misses the point. The petition does not simply seek to resolve intra-circuit inconsistencies; it describes those inconsistencies to highlight the persistent confusion about the contours of Holland and

Pace, which is an underlying cause of the circuit split

that the petition identifies. See also Simon v. Republic of Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that the two approaches “undoubtedly conflict”),

rev’d sub nom. on other grounds, Republic of Iraq v.

Beaty, 556 U.S. 848 (2009).

7

II. THE STATE IGNORES THE IMPORTANCE

OF A UNIFORM APPROACH TO EQUITABLE TOLLING FOR FEDERAL STATUTES

OF LIMITATIONS.

The State has little to say in response to the argument about the importance of the question presented.

Compare Pet. 20–23, with Opp. 15. Primarily, it suggests it is unnecessary to resolve the circuit split because Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650 (1983),

purportedly rejected the need for uniform application

of equitable tolling principles. Opp. 15. That argument ignores critically important context, which

makes clear Chardon did no such thing.

Chardon involved Section 1983 claims. As this

Court explained, “there is no federal statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims.” Chardon, 462 U.S.

at 654. The reasoning in that case flowed directly

from the Court’s observation that “[t]he federal civil

rights statutes do not provide for a specific statute of

limitations, establish rules regarding the tolling of

the limitations period, or prescribe the effect of tolling.” Id. at 655. Instead, “[i]n a § 1983 action . . .

Congress has specifically directed the courts, in the

absence of controlling federal law, to apply state

statutes of limitations and state tolling rules.” Id. at

661.

In this respect, AEDPA is on the opposite end of the

statutory spectrum. AEDPA specifically brought habeas petitions within “a uniform federal rule,” following a period when “no statute of limitations governed

requests for federal habeas corpus or § 2255 habeaslike relief.” Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 528,

531 (2003); see also Holland, 560 U.S. at 650 (“Equitable tolling . . . asks whether federal courts may excuse a petitioner’s failure to comply with federal timing rules, an inquiry that does not implicate a state

8

court’s interpretation of state law.”). AEDPA has

precisely the kind of “federal statute of limitations,”

Chardon, 462 U.S. at 662, that was absent in Chardon.

For AEDPA cases in particular, as well as other

cases involving federal statutes of limitations, Pet.

20—which the State completely ignores—a consistent

approach to equitable tolling is essential to achieving

legislative goals of “national uniformity.” Burnett v.

N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 434 (1965). Anything less undermines congressional authority and

disrupts the delicate balance of power between the

judiciary and the legislature. Pet. 21 (citing ScoopGonzalez, 272 F.3d at 1196). With AEDPA, moreover, fairness concerns are sharpened by “[t]he importance of the Great Writ,” Holland, 560 U.S. at 649,

and the “risk[ ] [of] injury to an important interest in

human liberty,” Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314,

324 (1996). See also Pet. 22–23.

III. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS DISPOSITIVE OF THE TIMING ISSUE IN MR.

SMITH’S CASE.

The State contends Mr. Smith is “unlikely to benefit from the rule he asks the Court to adopt.” Opp.

14. Yet that position is premised solely on the dissenting opinion of the lower court, which noted a “factual ambiguity” related to causation. Id. As the

State must acknowledge, the lower court presumed

that Mr. Smith satisfied the “extraordinary circumstance” standard. Id. The magistrate judge opined

that Mr. Smith presented “convinc[ing]” evidence

that Mr. Smith had “acted diligently” to obtain the

legal file his attorney wrongfully withheld, Pet. App.

109a, and the majority opinion did not contest this

finding. And as Judge Berzon remarked, “[i]t is undisputed that Smith’s lawyer wrongfully withhold

9

Smith’s appellate record, despite Smith’s diligent efforts in seeking it, for 66 days.” Id. at 62a. Meanwhile, the circumstances show that Mr. Smith did

make use of his file. See Pet. 24; Pet. App. 111a–

179a.

If this Court were to endorse the stop-clock approach to equitable tolling, Mr. Smith would surely

benefit from the ruling. The tolling question was the

sole dispositive issue as to whether his habeas petition was time-barred. The fact that both the majority

and dissent below assumed Mr. Smith satisfied the

“extraordinary circumstances” prong of equitable tolling is not a reason to deny this petition for certiorari.

Contra Opp. 14. Rather, it makes this an unusually

clean case for resolution of the circuit split presented

by the petition.

10

CONCLUSION

The petition should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

JEFFREY T. GREEN

ADAM KLEVEN

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

1501 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 736-8000

NAOMI I. IGRA

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

555 California Street

Suite 2000

San Francisco, CA 94104

(415) 772-1200

DAVID M. PORTER*

FEDERAL PUBLIC

DEFENDER’S OFFICE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF

CALIFORNIA

801 I Street, 3rd Floor

Sacramento, CA 95814

(916) 498-7000

David_Porter@fd.org

Counsel for Petitioner

November 4, 2020

* Counsel of Record

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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