Respondents Brief — HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC, et al., Petitioners v. Renewable Fuels Association, et al.

Supreme Court briefMar 24, 2021

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No. 20-472

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE

REFINING, LLC, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

RENEWABLE FUELS ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,

Respondents.

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------On Writ Of Certiorari To The

United States Court Of Appeals

For The Tenth Circuit

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------KEVIN M. FONG

PILLSBURY WINTHROP

SHAW PITTMAN LLP

Four Embarcadero Center,

22nd Floor

San Francisco, CA 94111

(415) 983-1000

MATTHEW W. MORRISON

Counsel of Record

CYNTHIA COOK ROBERTSON

SHELBY L. DYL

PILLSBURY WINTHROP

SHAW PITTMAN LLP

1200 Seventeenth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 663-8036

matthew.morrison@

pillsburylaw.com

Counsel for Respondents

Renewable Fuels Association,

American Coalition for

Ethanol, National Corn

Growers Association,

National Farmers Union

================================================================================================================

COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964

WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Under the Renewable Fuel Standard provisions of

the Clean Air Act and the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA’s”) implementing regulations, refiners and importers of transportation fuel are

required to blend increasing amounts of renewable fuel

into their products. In recognition of the fact that small

refineries might need more time to adjust to these

blending mandates, Congress provided them with a

temporary compliance exemption through 2010. EPA

could extend this temporary exemption for additional

time if, inter alia, a small refinery submitted a request

to EPA showing that coming into compliance would

cause it to suffer a disproportionate economic hardship. The Tenth Circuit concluded that, to be eligible to

seek an extension of the temporary compliance exemption, the small refinery had to remain exempt in the

years preceding its request.

Accordingly, the question presented is:

Whether EPA exceeded its authority by granting

“extensions” of the “temporary exemption” under 42

U.S.C. §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) to small refineries for which

the temporary exemption had previously expired.

ii

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

The Renewable Fuels Association (“RFA”) is a

non-profit trade association. Its members are ethanol producers and supporters of the ethanol industry.

RFA promotes the general commercial, legislative, and

other common interests of its members. RFA does not

have a parent company, and no publicly held company

has a 10% or greater ownership interest in it.

The American Coalition for Ethanol (“ACE”) is a

non-profit trade association. Its members include ethanol and biofuel facilities, agricultural producers, ethanol industry investors, and supporters of the ethanol

industry. ACE promotes the general commercial, legislative, and other common interests of its members.

ACE does not have a parent company, and no publicly

held company has a 10% or greater ownership interest

in it.

The National Corn Growers Association (“NCGA”)

is a non-profit trade association. Its members are corn

farmers and supporters of the agriculture and ethanol

industries. NCGA promotes the general commercial,

legislative, and other common interests of its members.

NCGA does not have a parent company, and no publicly held company has a 10% or greater ownership interest in it.

The Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union

of America, doing business as the National Farmers

Union (“NFU”), is a non-profit trade association. Its

iii

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT—Continued

members include farmers who are producers of biofuel

feedstocks and consumers of large quantities of fuel.

NFU promotes the general commercial, legislative,

and other common interests of its members. It does not

have a parent company, and no publicly held company

has a 10% or greater ownership interest in it.

For the purposes of this brief, RFA, ACE, NCGA,

and NFU are referred to collectively as the “Biofuels

Respondents.”

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED...................................

i

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT ....................................

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................. vii

OPINION BELOW ...............................................

1

JURISDICTION ...................................................

1

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED ..............

1

INTRODUCTION ................................................

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..............................

6

I.

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND ...................................................

6

A. The Renewable Fuel Standard Program .....................................................

6

B. Temporary Exemptions for Small Refineries .................................................

8

C. EPA’s Administration of the Small Refinery Temporary Exemption .............. 11

II.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE ................ 12

A. Petitioners’ Exemption Extension Petitions ................................................... 12

B. The Biofuels Respondents’ Petition for

Review and the Tenth Circuit’s Judgment ..................................................... 14

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..................... 16

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

ARGUMENT ........................................................ 19

I.

THE STATUTE AUTHORIZES ONLY AN

EXTENSION OF A SMALL REFINERY’S

INITIAL TEMPORARY EXEMPTION ...... 19

A. The Plain Text of §7545(o)(9) Confirms

the Tenth Circuit’s Interpretation of

Subparagraph (B)(i) ............................ 20

1. The term “extension” in §7545(o)(9)(B)(i)

cannot mean “to grant” or “make

available” ......................................... 23

2. The term “extension” in §7545(o)(9)(B)(i)

requires temporal continuity ........... 28

B. The Structure of the Small Refinery

Exemption Provisions Confirms That

They Are Only a Temporary Bridge to

Compliance .......................................... 33

1. “Extension of exemption” has the same

meaning throughout §7545(o)(9)....... 34

2. Ability to petition EPA “at any time”

does not alter the eligibility criteria

for an extension of the exemption ... 37

3. The statutory definition of “small

refinery” does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the

exemption ....................................... 40

C. The Purposes of §7545(o)(9) and the

Renewable Fuel Standard Program

Confirm the Tenth Circuit’s Interpretation ................................................... 42

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

D. Petitioners’ Policy Arguments Lack Merit

and Cannot Overcome the Text, Structure, and Purpose of §7545(o)(9) ......... 46

II.

CHEVRON DEFERENCE DOES NOT

APPLY........................................................ 53

CONCLUSION..................................................... 58

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Advanced Biofuels Ass’n v. EPA,

792 Fed. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ............................12

Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton,

137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017) .............................................27

Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc. v. EPA,

936 F.3d 628 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ................................ 6, 8

American Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. EPA,

937 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2019) .............................. 7, 46

Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA,

864 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2017) .......................... passim

Aquilent, Inc. v. Distributed Solutions, Inc.,

2012 WL 405009 (E.D. Va. Feb. 7, 2012) .................31

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837 (1984) ......................................... passim

Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Hunt,

139 S. Ct. 1507 (2019) .............................................34

Duncan v. Walker,

533 U.S. 167 (2001) .................................................38

Eastham v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C.,

754 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2014) ....................................31

Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp.,

549 U.S. 561 (2007) .................................................36

FCC v. AT & T Inc.,

562 U.S. 397 (2011) ..................................... 23, 24, 33

Field v. Mans,

157 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 1998) ......................................27

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,

458 U.S. 564 (1982) .................................................40

Guedes v. BATFE,

140 S. Ct. 789 (2020) ......................................... 54, 55

Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.,

137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017) .............................................35

Hermes Consol., LLC v. EPA,

787 F.3d 568 (D.C. Cir. 2015) .................... 8, 9, 32, 42

IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez,

546 U.S. 21 (2005) ...................................................35

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n,

497 U.S. 871 (1990) .................................................32

Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc.,

138 S. Ct. 883 (2018) ...............................................34

Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth.,

566 U.S. 449 (2012) .................................................35

Monroe Energy, LLC v. EPA,

750 F.3d 909 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ....................................7

N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc.,

137 S. Ct. 929 (2017) ...............................................26

Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def.,

138 S. Ct. 617 (2018) ...............................................38

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Maine Corp.,

503 U.S. 407 (1992) .................................................55

Nijhawan v. Holder,

557 U.S. 29 (2009) ...................................................35

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton,

139 S. Ct. 1881 (2019) .............................................24

Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. EPA,

No. 19-1220 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 22, 2019) ..............14

Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. EPA,

No. 21-9518 (10th Cir. filed Feb. 8, 2021) ...............11

RFS Power Coalition v. EPA,

No. 20-1046 (D.C. Cir. filed Jan. 29, 2021) ..............42

Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc.,

566 U.S. 93 (2012) ............................................. 21, 24

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,

519 U.S. 337 (1997) .................................................27

Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

138 S. Ct. 816 (2018) ...............................................33

Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp.,

571 U.S. 220 (2015) .................................................24

SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu,

138 S. Ct. 1348 (2017) .............................................53

Sebelius v. Cloer,

569 U.S. 369 (2013) .................................................21

Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA,

887 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 2017) ..................................13

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Rigsby,

137 S. Ct. 436 (2016) ...............................................47

Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes,

416 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1967) .....................................30

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd.,

566 U.S. 560 (2012) .................................................24

United States v. Hermanek,

289 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2002) ..................................30

United States v. Menasche,

348 U.S. 528 (1955) .................................................38

United States v. Ojeda Rios,

875 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1989) .......................................30

Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA,

573 U.S. 302 (2014) .................................................38

Xenia v. State,

746 N.E.2d 666 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) ......................31

Yates v. United States,

574 U.S. 528 (2015) .................................................24

STATUTES

United States Code

Title 11 Section 523(a)(2)(A) ...................................28

Title 15 Section 78l(f )(1)(E) ....................................28

Title 15 Section 1141d ............................................28

Title 15 Section 1141e .............................................28

Title 15 Section 1141f .............................................28

Title 15 Section 1141g.............................................28

Title 18 Section 892 ................................................28

Title 19 Section 2434(c) ..........................................28

Title 19 Section 2437(c)(1) ......................................28

Title 22 Section 4061(a)(2) ......................................28

Title 22 Section 4061(a)(3) ......................................28

Title 25 Section 3204(b)(3) ......................................28

xi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Title 28 Section 1254(1) ............................................1

Title 32 Section 308(a) ............................................28

Title 32 Section 310(b) ............................................28

Title 38 Section 3748 ..............................................28

Title 42 Section 7545(c)(4)(C)(ii)(III) ......................27

Title 42 Section 7545(f )(4) ......................................27

Title 42 Section 7545(k)(7)(A).................................27

Title 42 Section 7545(k)(B)(iv)................................27

Title 42 Section 7545(m)(3)(C)(ii) ...........................27

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(1)(K) ............................. 8, 40

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(2) ......................................45

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) ...............................7

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(2)(B) ...................................7

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(2)(B)(i) .............................43

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(I)............................7

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(2)(B)(ii) ............................43

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(3)(B)(i) .............................39

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(5)(D) .................................51

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(7) ......................................47

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(7)(A)(i) .............................51

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(7)(C) .................................27

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9) .............................. passim

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(A) ......................... passim

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(A)(i) ..................... passim

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii) ..............................9

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(I) .................. 22, 39

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II) .........................5

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(B) ........... 8, 22, 36, 37, 43

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) ..................... passim

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii) ............................10

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(iii) ...........................26

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(C) ........................... 36, 37

xii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(D) ........................... 36, 37

Title 42 Section 7607(b)(1) ......................................14

Title 42 Section 9601(20)(H) ...................................28

Title 43 Section 451b(c) ..........................................28

Title 50 Section 2333(c) ..........................................28

Energy Independence and Security Act,

Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Statute 1492 (2007) ..... 6, 45

Energy Policy Act of 2005,

Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Statute 594 ................. 27, 45

RULES AND REGULATIONS

Code of Federal Regulations

Title 40 Section 80.1401 ...........................................8

Title 40 Section 80.1406(a)(1) ...................................7

Title 40 Section 80.1427 ...........................................8

Title 40 Section 80.1427(b) .....................................51

Title 40 Section 80.1441 (2010) ..............................56

Title 40 Section 80.1441(e)(2)(i) .............................44

Title 40 Section 80.1441(e)(2)(iii) ...........................41

Federal Register

77 Fed. Reg. 1,320 (Jan. 9, 2012) ...................... 11, 39

78 Fed. Reg. 36,042 (June 14, 2013) .......................56

78 Fed. Reg. 49,794 (Aug. 15, 2013) ........................44

79 Fed. Reg. 42,128 (July 18, 2014) ...... 41, 53, 56, 57

82 Fed. Reg. 34,206 (July 21, 2017) ........................49

85 Fed. Reg. 7,016 (Feb. 6, 2020).............................50

86 Fed. Reg. 5,182 (Jan. 19, 2021) ..........................51

xiii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Section 6(b)(1) .........................................................32

Section 6(b)(1)(A) ....................................................31

Section 6(b)(1)(B) .............................................. 31, 32

OTHER AUTHORITIES

API’s Comments on EPA’s Proposed Annual

Standards for 2020 (November 29, 2019),

https://www.api.org/-/media/Files/News/LettersComments/2019/November_2019/API%20

Comment%202020%20RFS%20Supplemental

%20Notice%20EPA-HQ-OAR-2019-0136.pdf .........43

Clifford Krauss, Oil Refineries See Profit in

Turning Kitchen Grease Into Diesel, New York

Times (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/

2020/12/03/business/energy-environment/oilrefineries-renewable-diesel.html ............................44

Dallas Burkholder, Office of Transp. & Air Quality, EPA, A Preliminary Assessment of RIN

Market Dynamics, RIN Prices, and Their Effects

(May 14, 2015), https://www.epa.gov/renewablefuel-standard-program/renewable-identificationnumber-rin-analysis-renewable-fuel-standard .......49

EPA, Annual Compliance Data for Obligated

Parties and Renewable Fuel Exporters under

the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program, Table 5, https://www.epa.gov/fuelsregistration-reporting-and-compliance-help/

annual-compliance-data-obligated-parties-and

(last updated Nov. 10, 2020) ...................................52

xiv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

EPA, Denial of Small Refinery Gap-Filling Petitions (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/sites/

production/files/2020-09/documents/rfs-denialsmall-refinery-gap-filling-petitions-2020-09-14.

pdf ............................................................................40

EPA, EPA-420-R-17-008, Denial of Petitions for

Rulemaking to Change the RFS Point of Obligation (Nov. 2017) ...................................................50

EPA, RFS Small Refinery Exemptions, https://

www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-reporting-andcompliance-help/rfs-small-refinery-exemptions

(last updated Mar. 18, 2021) ................. 11, 12, 39, 46

EPA, RIN Trade and Price Information, https://

www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-reporting-andcompliance-help/rin-trades-and-price-information

(last updated Feb. 10, 2021) ....................................48

EPA, After Careful Consideration, EPA Supports

Tenth Circuit’s Renewable Fuels Association

Decision (Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.epa.

gov/newsreleases/after-careful-considerationepa-supports-tenth-circuits-renewable-fuelsassociation ...............................................................54

Extension, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.

2019) ........................................................................30

xv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Jarrett Renshaw & Chris Prentice, Chevron,

Exxon Seek ‘Small Refinery’ Waivers from U.S.

Biofuels Law, Reuters (Apr. 12, 2018), https://

www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biofuels-eparefineries-exclusive/exclusive-chevron-exxonseek-small-refinery-waivers-from-u-s-biofuelslawidUSKBN1HJ32R .............................................12

Life Cycle Associates, GHG Emissions Reductions Due to the RFS2–A 2020 Update (Feb.

11, 2021), https://ethanolrfa.org/wp-content/

uploads/2021/02/LCA_-_RFS2-GHG-Update_

2020.pdf ...................................................................46

Margaret Austin, HollyFrontier Seeking Permit,

Public Comment for Pivot to Renewable Diesel,

Wyoming Tribune Eagle (Feb. 5, 2021), https://

www.wyomingnews.com/news/local_news/holly

frontier-seeking-permit-public-comment-forpivot-to-renewable-diesel/article_15433e32-6eaa5cd0-950d-75054c264968.html ...............................45

Melissa Scully, Gregory Norris, Tania Alarcon

Falconi, & David MacIntosh, Carbon Intensity

of Corn Ethanol in the United States: State of

the Science, Envtl. Res. Letters (Mar. 10,

2021), https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/

1748-9326/abde08/pdf .............................................46

News Release, Marathon Petroleum Corp., Marathon Petroleum Corp. Reports Second-Quarter

2020 Results (Aug. 3, 2020), https://ir.marathon

petroleum.com/investor/news-releases/newsdetails/2020/Marathon-Petroleum-Corp.-ReportsSecond-Quarter-2020-Results/default.aspx ...........53

xvi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Office of Air & Radiation, EPA, Financial and

Other Information to Be Submitted with 2016

RFS Small Refinery Hardship Exemption Requests (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/

production/files/2016-12/documents/rfs-smallrefinery-2016-12-06.pdf ..........................................10

Office of Policy & Int’l Affairs, Dep’t of Energy,

EPACT 2005 Section 1501: Small Refineries

Exemption Study (Jan. 2009) ....................................9

Office of Policy & Int’l Affairs, Dep’t of Energy,

Small Refinery Exemption Study (Mar.

2011) ........................................................ 9, 10, 11, 39

Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (Deluxe Ed. 2001) .............................................31

S. Rep. No. 111-45 (2009) ..............................................9

Temporary, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.

2019) ........................................................................43

Temporary, Lexico, https://www.lexico.com/definition/temporary (last visited Mar. 4, 2021) ..........43

U.S. Energy Information Administration, Refinery

Capacity Report (June 21, 2019), https://www.

eia.gov/petroleum/refinerycapacity/ .......................48

1

OPINION BELOW

The Tenth Circuit’s opinion is reported at 948 F.3d

1206 and reproduced at Petition Appendix (“App.”) 1a–

94a. The underlying EPA orders are not published in

the Federal Register or otherwise publicly available,

but they are produced in the Supplemental Appendix

to the Petition (“Suppl. App.”) 1a–46a.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals entered its judgment on January 24, 2020. A petition for rehearing was denied on

April 7, 2020. This Court entered an order on March

19, 2020 extending the time to file a petition for a writ

of certiorari to 150 days. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on September 4, 2020, and granted on

January 8, 2021. This Court has jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. §1254(1).

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

Section 211(o)(9) of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), 42

U.S.C. §7545(o)(9), provides:

(9)

Small refineries.

(A)

Temporary exemption

2

(i)

In general

The requirements of paragraph

(2) shall not apply to small refineries until calendar year 2011.

(ii)

Extension of exemption

(I) Study by Secretary of

Energy

Not later than December 31,

2008, the Secretary of Energy shall conduct for the

Administrator a study to determine whether compliance

with the requirements of paragraph (2) would impose a

disproportionate economic

hardship on small refineries.

(II)

Extension of exemption

In the case of a small refinery that the Secretary of

Energy determines under

subclause (I) would be subject to a disproportionate

economic hardship if required to comply with paragraph (2), the Administrator

shall extend the exemption

under clause (i) for the small

refinery for a period of not

less than 2 additional years.

3

(B) Petitions based on disproportionate economic hardship

(i)

Extension of exemption

A small refinery may at any time

petition the Administrator for

an extension of the exemption

under subparagraph (A) for the

reason of disproportionate economic hardship.

(ii)

Evaluation of petitions

In evaluating a petition under

clause (i), the Administrator, in

consultation with the Secretary

of Energy, shall consider the findings of the study under subparagraph (A)(ii) and other economic

factors.

(iii) Deadline for action on petitions

The Administrator shall act on

any petition submitted by a small

refinery for a hardship exemption not later than 90 days after

the date of receipt of the petition.

(C)

Credit program

If a small refinery notifies the Administrator that the small refinery

waives the exemption under subparagraph (A), the regulations promulgated under paragraph (2)(A) shall

provide for the generation of credits

4

by the small refinery under paragraph (5) beginning in the calendar

year following the date of notification.

(D)

Opt-in for small refineries

A small refinery shall be subject to the

requirements of paragraph (2) if the

small refinery notifies the Administrator that the small refinery waives the

exemption under subparagraph (A).

42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(9). Other relevant provisions are set

forth in Appendix C to the Petition. See App. 97a–103a.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Renewable Fuel Standard

(“RFS”) program to force the transportation market toward greater production and consumption of renewable fuels, which in turn would reduce greenhouse gas

emissions, boost U.S. energy security, and support rural communities. For the RFS to function as intended,

refiners and importers of gasoline and diesel fuels

must blend increasing amounts of renewable fuel into

their products each year.

When Congress enacted the RFS, it established a

temporary exemption to provide all small refineries

with additional time to prepare for compliance, 42

U.S.C. §7545(o)(9)(A)(i), with two pathways by which

EPA could extend the initial exemption for refineries

that needed more time before coming into compliance.

5

Id. §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II), (B)(i). Under the pathway at

issue here, small refineries could petition EPA for an

extension of the initial exemption if they demonstrated

that compliance with the RFS would result in disproportionate economic hardship.

The question presented in this case derives from

the Tenth Circuit’s determination that §7545(o)(9)(B)(i)

authorizes EPA to extend a refinery’s temporary exemption only if the refinery has been continuously exempt in each prior year. The Tenth Circuit analyzed

the statutory term “extension of exemption” and emphasized that “[t]he small refinery exemption subject

to an extension” is the initial exemption provided to all

small refineries, which “is expressly identified as ‘Temporary.’ ” App. 65a. The court then concluded that,

“[p]aired with the rest of the amended Clean Air Act,

. . . common definitions of ‘extension’ mean that a small

refinery which did not seek or receive an exemption in

prior years is ineligible for an extension, because at

that point there is nothing to prolong, enlarge, or add

to.” App. 67a. The court explained that “[c]onstruing

the word ‘extension’ to require prior exemptions—as a

predicate to prolongment or enlargement—limits but

preserves the small refinery exemption while giving

meaning to the remainder of 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9).”

App. 70a–71a.

As explained herein, the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the small refinery exemption provisions is the

only interpretation that conforms with the statute’s

text, structure, and purpose. Continuity of the temporary exemption is inherent in both the ordinary

6

meaning of the word “extension” and the specific context in which it is employed in §7545(o)(9)(B)(i)—with

a specific reference back to the finite “temporary” exemption granted to all small refineries at the start of

the RFS program. This reading also carries out the

small refinery exemption provisions’ purpose of providing a temporary delay in RFS obligations for small refineries, with an eye toward bringing all refineries into

compliance.

This Court should affirm the decision below.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND

A. The Renewable Fuel Standard Program

Congress created the RFS program to “move the

United States toward greater energy independence

and security, [and] to increase the production of clean

renewable fuels.” Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA

(“ACE”), 864 F.3d 691, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting the

Energy Independence and Security Act, Pub. L. No.

110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (2007)). To accomplish these

goals, “[t]he statute mandates the gradual introduction

of four nested categories of renewable fuels into the

United States’ supply of gasoline, diesel, and other

transportation fuels.” Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc.

7

v. EPA, 936 F.3d 628, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2019); 42 U.S.C.

§7545(o)(2)(B).1

The statute prescribes annually increasing “applicable volumes” of renewable fuels that must be introduced each year, beginning at 4 billion gallons of

renewable fuel in 2006 and ascending to 36 billion gallons in 2022. Id. §7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(I). “Under certain circumstances, the [statute] grants [EPA] authority to

exercise so-called waivers to reduce applicable volumes below statutory levels.” American Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. EPA (“AFPM”), 937 F.3d 559, 569–70

(D.C. Cir. 2019). “After exercising any waivers and finalizing an applicable volume for each type of fuel,” the

statute requires EPA to “calculate and promulgate renewable fuel obligations that will ensure that the Program’s requirements are met in the upcoming year.”

AFPM, 937 F.3d at 570. In effect, EPA converts the applicable volume into a “percentage standard informing

each obligated party”—any entity refining or importing transportation fuel, 40 C.F.R. §80.1406(a)(1)—“how

much of its fuel production must consist of renewable

fuels.” Monroe Energy, LLC v. EPA, 750 F.3d 909, 912

(D.C. Cir. 2014).

Obligated parties satisfy their renewable fuel

obligation by “retiring” credits, called “Renewable

Identification Numbers” or “RINs,” “at an annual compliance demonstration.” AFPM, 937 F.3d at 572; 40

1

These categories are: (1) renewable fuel; (2) advanced biofuel; (3) cellulosic biofuel; and (4) biomass-based diesel. 42 U.S.C.

§7545(o)(2)(A)(i).

8

C.F.R. §80.1427. RINs are “unique number[s] generated to represent a volume of renewable fuel[.]” 40

C.F.R. §80.1401. “RINs remain attached to the renewable fuel until that fuel is purchased by an obligated

party or blended into fossil fuels to be used for transportation fuel.” Alon, 936 F.3d at 637. “At that point the

RINs become ‘separated,’ meaning they are, in effect, a

form of compliance credit.” Id. Separated RINs “may be

retained by the party who possesses them or sold or

traded on the open RIN market.” ACE, 864 F.3d at 699.

“[A]n obligated party [that] does not have enough RINs

to meet its renewable fuel obligation . . . may: (i) attempt to purchase any RINs it needs on the open RIN

market; (ii) use carryover RINs it has from the prior

year to meet some portion of its obligation; or (iii) carry

a renewable fuel deficit forward into the next compliance year, provided that some conditions are met.”

ACE, 864 F.3d at 699−700.

B. Temporary Exemptions for Small Refineries

Most obligated parties began fulfilling their RFS

volume obligations in compliance year 2006. However,

Congress “created a three-tiered system of exemptions

to afford small refineries”—those whose “average aggregate daily crude oil throughput for a calendar year

. . . does not exceed 75,000 barrels,” §7545(o)(1)(K)—

“a bridge to compliance.” Hermes Consol., LLC v.

EPA, 787 F.3d 568, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2015); 42 U.S.C.

§7545(o)(9)(A)−(B). First, the statute provided a “[t]emporary exemption” from RFS obligations to all small

9

refineries through 2010. Id. §7545(o)(9)(A)(i). Second,

“the statute directed [the Department of Energy

(“DOE”)] to conduct a study ‘to determine whether

compliance . . . would impose a disproportionate economic hardship on small refineries,’ ” and “[i]f DOE determined that any small refinery ‘would be subject to a

disproportionate economic hardship if required to comply with’ the renewable fuels program, EPA was required to extend the exemption for that refinery ‘for a

period of not less than 2 additional years.’ ” Hermes,

787 F.3d at 573 (quoting §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)). Third, the

statute allowed individual small refineries “at any

time [to] petition the Administrator for an extension

of the exemption under subparagraph (A) for the

reason of disproportionate economic hardship.” Id.

§7545(o)(9)(B)(i).

DOE conducted the mandated study in 2009 and

found “no reason to believe small refineries will be disproportionately harmed by inclusion in the RFS[ ] program.” Office of Policy & Int’l Affairs, Dep’t of Energy,

EPACT 2005 Section 1501: Small Refineries Exemption Study, at 13 (Jan. 2009). DOE explained that

the RFS provided sufficient “flexibility,” in that “[s]ome

[small refineries] will be able to generate RINs

through blending renewable fuels into their products;

others may choose to purchase RINs[.]” Id. A few

months later, the Senate Committee on Appropriations

directed DOE to “reopen and reassess” its study. S. Rep.

No. 111-45, at 109 (2009). DOE issued a revised study

in 2011. Office of Policy & Int’l Affairs, Dep’t of Energy,

Small Refinery Exemption Study (Mar. 2011) (“2011

10

DOE Study”). In the 2011 DOE Study, DOE reversed

itself and determined that small refineries can suffer

disproportionate economic hardship from compliance

with the RFS program, at least to the extent that compliance costs increase to the point that the refineries

are not viable. Id.

The statute requires that EPA evaluate refineries’

petitions for exemption extensions “in consultation”

with DOE. 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(9)(B)(ii). The statute

does not define the term “disproportionate economic

hardship,” but directs EPA and DOE to “consider the

findings” of DOE’s study and “other economic factors.”

Id. §7545(o)(9)(B)(i)−(ii). EPA has offered little public

information regarding its adjudication of small refinery exemption petitions after it receives DOE’s recommendations. A 2016 EPA memorandum asserted that

EPA considers “the findings of the DOE Small Refinery

Study and a variety of economic factors,” including

“profitability, net income, cash flow and cash balances,

gross and net refining margins, ability to pay for small

refinery improvement projects, corporate structure, debt

and other financial obligations, RIN prices, and the

cost of compliance through RIN purchases.” See Office

of Air & Radiation, EPA, Financial and Other Information to Be Submitted with 2016 RFS Small Refinery

Hardship Exemption Requests (Dec. 6, 2016), https://

www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-12/documents/

rfs-small-refinery-2016-12-06.pdf. It is not clear from

publicly available sources, however, whether EPA continues to undertake the analysis identified in EPA’s

2016 memorandum.

11

C. EPA’s Administration of the Small Refinery Temporary Exemption

Fifty-nine small refineries were exempt through

2010 under the initial blanket exemption. §7545(o)(9)(A)(i);

2011 DOE Study at 26. Between a two-year extension

of exemption based on the 2011 DOE Study (i.e., for

2011 and 2012) and a few individual petition-based

exemptions, only 24 refineries remained exempt for

2011 and 23 remained exempt for 2012. 77 Fed. Reg.

1,320, 1,340 (Jan. 9, 2012); EPA, RFS Small Refinery

Exemptions, Table 2, https://www.epa.gov/fuelsregistration-reporting-and-compliance-help/rfs-smallrefinery-exemptions (last updated Mar. 18, 2021)

(“RFS Small Refinery Exemptions”). Consistent with

the “temporary” nature of the exemption, the number

of exempt refineries “tapered down” between 20132015, with only eight extension petitions granted in

2013, eight granted in 2014, and seven granted in

2015. See RFS Small Refinery Exemptions; App. 68a.

But starting with the 2016 compliance year, EPA

abruptly changed course. The number of exempt refineries jumped to 19 for 2016, 35 for 2017, and 32 for

2018.2 RFS Small Refinery Exemptions. EPA adjudicates petitions for small refinery exemption extensions

2

EPA has received 32 petitions for 2019 and 16 for 2020,

RFS Small Refinery Exemptions, but has stated it will not act on

these petitions until this Court issues a decision in this case, with

the exception of two petitions that EPA granted the night before

President Biden’s inauguration. See Petition for Review, Ex. A–

D, Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. EPA, No. 21-9518 (10th Cir. filed Feb.

8, 2021).

12

in secret, so the public only learned of the uptick in exempt refineries through news reports in the spring of

2018.3 In August 2018, EPA created an online “dashboard” through which it periodically releases updates

on the aggregate number of exemptions and the corresponding aggregate amount of renewable fuel covered

by the exemptions. RFS Small Refinery Exemptions.

But “[t]he dashboard does not identify the refineries

that received extensions, the date of decisions, the regulatory standards being applied to evaluate applications, or the reasons for granting or denying the

exemptions.” Advanced Biofuels Ass’n v. EPA, 792 Fed.

App’x 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

II.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

A. Petitioners’ Exemption Extension Petitions

Petitioner HollyFrontier Refining & Marketing,

LLC (“HollyFrontier Refining”) submitted exemption

extension petitions for compliance year 2016 on behalf of two small refineries owned by its subsidiaries,

Petitioner HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC

(“HollyFrontier Cheyenne”) and Petitioner HollyFrontier Woods Cross Refining, LLC (“HollyFrontier Woods

Cross”) (collectively, with HollyFrontier Refining,

3

See, e.g., Jarrett Renshaw & Chris Prentice, Chevron, Exxon

Seek ‘Small Refinery’ Waivers from U.S. Biofuels Law, Reuters

(Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biofuelsepa-refineries-exclusive/exclusive-chevron-exxon-seek-small-refinerywaivers-from-u-s-biofuels-lawidUSKBN1HJ32R.

13

“HollyFrontier”). HollyFrontier Cheyenne received an

extension of the temporary exemption through 2012

based on the 2011 DOE Study, but its exemption

was not further extended in 2013 or 2014. App. 29a.

HollyFrontier Cheyenne applied for an exemption extension in 2015, but EPA denied the petition. App. 29a.

HollyFrontier Cheyenne appealed EPA’s denial to the

Tenth Circuit, which remanded the decision for further consideration in light of its opinion in Sinclair

Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, 887 F.3d 986 (10th Cir.

2017). For purposes of this case, the Tenth Circuit assumed that EPA granted the 2015 petition on remand,

as the record did not reflect EPA’s final disposition.

App. 30a. The record does not indicate that HollyFrontier

Woods Cross ever received an extension of the small

refinery temporary exemption based on either the 2011

DOE Study or a petition to EPA. App. 32a.

A subsidiary of CVR Refining, LP, Petitioner

Wynnewood Refining Company, LLC (“Wynnewood”),

submitted an exemption extension petition for its

Wynnewood Refinery for compliance year 2017.

Wynnewood’s petition stated that it had received an

extension of the initial exemption in 2011 and 2012

but received no further extensions of the exemption.

App. 34a.

EPA granted each of these three petitions in unpublished decisions that were initially issued only to

the Petitioners. The Biofuels Respondents did not have

access to these decisions until receiving the administrative record for this case from EPA.

14

B. The Biofuels Respondents’ Petition for

Review and the Tenth Circuit’s Judgment

The Biofuels Respondents learned of Petitioners’

exemptions through media reports and confirmed

them through the Petitioners’ public filings with the

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The Biofuels Respondents filed a petition for review challenging

EPA’s statutory authority to grant these exemptions

and challenging EPA’s decisions as arbitrary and capricious in several respects.

The Clean Air Act dictates that petitions for review of agency actions with local or regional applicability are to be heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals with

jurisdiction over that locality or region, while agency

actions with national applicability are to be heard by

the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1). Because EPA’s

decisions regarding individual small refinery exemption petitions are construed as having local or regional

applicability, the Biofuels Respondents filed for review

in the Tenth Circuit.4

In the ruling challenged by Petitioners, the Tenth

Circuit vacated all three exemption decisions, holding

4

In 2019, EPA changed its prior practice of issuing individual decision documents for each small refinery petition submitted.

That year, EPA addressed all 2018 small refinery exemption extension petitions in a single memorandum, which also set forth

EPA’s national approach for adjudicating such petitions. The parties comprising the Biofuels Respondents have sought review of

that decision before the D.C. Circuit. See Renewable Fuels Ass’n

v. EPA, No. 19-1220 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 22, 2019).

15

that EPA exceeded its authority under 42 U.S.C.

§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) by granting new small refinery exemptions to Petitioners’ refineries when the plain text

of the statute allows EPA to grant only “extensions” of

the initial temporary exemption. The court explained

that “an ‘extension’ requires a small refinery exemption in prior years to prolong, enlarge, or add to,”

meaning that “the only small refineries . . . eligible

for extensions were the ones that submitted meritorious hardship petitions each year.” App. 68a, 75a. Because each of the three refineries’ exemptions had

expired by 2013 at the latest, the court held that “[a]t

most, these Refineries sought to renew or restart their

exemptions,” which “[t]he amended Clean Air Act did

not authorize.” App. 75a.

The Tenth Circuit found two additional flaws with

EPA’s decisions that Petitioners have not challenged

here. First, the Tenth Circuit held that EPA exceeded

its statutory authority by “[g]ranting extensions of exemptions based at least in part on hardships not

caused by RFS compliance.” App. 84a–85a. EPA’s decisions cited to “[a] difficult year for the refining industry

as a whole” and an “industry-wide downward trend”

of lower net refining margins. App. 84a. These were

among other factors that the court determined were inappropriately considered because they were “not restricted to disproportionate economic hardship caused

by RFS compliance.” App. 83a–84a.

Second, the Tenth Circuit held that it was arbitrary and capricious for EPA to have “ignored or failed

to provide reasons for deviating from prior studies

16

showing that” the costs of purchasing the credits

needed to show RFS compliance (i.e., “RINs”) “do not

disproportionately harm refineries which are not vertically integrated.” App. 87a. This is because “merchant

refineries typically recoup their RIN purchase costs

through higher petroleum fuel prices.” App. 91a.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Most refineries and petroleum importers in the

United States have complied with the requirements of

the RFS, diversifying the United States’ energy portfolio while reducing carbon-based pollution across the

country. Recently, however, EPA has allowed certain

smaller refineries to avoid compliance through unlawful application of the statute’s small refinery

exemption provisions. These provisions establish a

temporary exemption for all small refineries through

2010, 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(9)(A)(i), and two mechanisms

for extending that temporary exemption. First, the

statute provides that EPA “shall extend the exemption

. . . for a period of not less than two additional years”

for refineries that a statutorily-mandated DOE study

concluded “would be subject to a disproportionate economic hardship if required to comply” with the RFS.

Id. §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II). Second, “[a] small refinery

may at any time petition [EPA] for an extension of the

exemption . . . for the reason of disproportionate economic hardship.” Id. §7545(o)(9)(B)(i).

17

In the challenged actions, EPA granted three

small refineries’ petitions for exemption extensions,

despite the fact that the refineries were no longer in

exempt status. Applying the commonly understood

and accepted meaning of “extension”—“to prolong”

something that is currently in place—the Tenth Circuit held that EPA exceeded its authority under

§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) by creating new exemptions from

whole cloth, when the statute only authorized EPA to

extend an existing exemption. Because none of the

three refineries still had an exemption, there was nothing for EPA to extend.

Petitioners challenge the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute, asserting that because “extension” can sometimes mean “grant” or “make available,”

the temporary exemption should be treated as a “freestanding exemption” that EPA can grant ad hoc.

The text, structure, and purpose of the statute preclude that interpretation. Starting with the text,

§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) authorizes only “an extension of the

exemption under subparagraph (A).” This alone forecloses the possibility that this provision allows EPA to

grant a “free-standing exemption.” Authority to extend

is explicitly limited to the “temporary exemption” under subparagraph (A), which Congress granted when

it enacted the RFS. There is thus nothing for EPA to

“grant” or “make available,” only a specific existing exemption to prolong. Further, because “extension” can

only mean the continuance of the time-limited subparagraph (A) exemption, temporal continuity is required.

See infra Part I.A.

18

The structure of the small refinery exemption provisions and surrounding terms further confirms this

reading of §7545(o)(9)(B)(i). Petitioners concede that

§7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II)—authorizing extension of the exemption “for a period of . . . additional years” based on

the DOE study—requires temporal continuity. Established principles of statutory interpretation dictate

that when Congress used the same term, “extension of

exemption,” in the following provision of the same section of the statute, it intended the same meaning. That

refineries may submit their petitions “at any time” has

no bearing on the refineries’ eligibility for exemption

extensions. Likewise, Congress’s decision to define

“small refinery” based on a year’s throughput does not

override the other conditions of eligibility for exemption extensions. See infra Part I.B.

The stated purposes of the RFS fully support the

Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of §7545(o)(9)(B)(i). The

United States cannot realize Congress’s vision for a

cleaner and more diverse energy portfolio if small refinery exemptions continue indefinitely and unpredictably to siphon a significant portion of renewable fuel

blending requirements out of the RFS program. The

Tenth Circuit’s holding also comports with the small

refinery exemption provisions’ “temporary” character

and overarching goal of funneling all small refineries

into compliance with the RFS. See infra Part I.C.

Petitioners’ policy argument that §7545(o)(9)(B)(i)

is meant to be a permanent “safety valve,” which they

conceive as an option for small refineries to never comply with the RFS, is foreclosed by the statute. This

19

argument also fails on its merits, particularly given

that all but seven or eight small refineries complied for

three consecutive years between 2013-2015. More importantly, the alleged harms cannot be reconciled with

EPA’s steadfast conclusion that refineries of all sizes

can fully recover the costs of RFS compliance in the

sales prices of their products. In any event, to the extent there is any validity to Petitioners’ claims of economic harm caused by the RFS, the statute includes

separate provisions to address such circumstances for

all obligated parties. See infra Part I.D.

Lastly, this is not a Chevron deference case. Petitioners’ claim that the Tenth Circuit’s holding was a

necessary assumption underlying a 2014 EPA rule is

not only wrong, but also unpersuasive as a ground

for giving deference to EPA’s prior interpretation of

§7545(o)(9)(B)(i). See infra Part II.

This Court should affirm the Tenth Circuit’s decision.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

ARGUMENT

I.

THE STATUTE AUTHORIZES ONLY AN

EXTENSION OF A SMALL REFINERY’S

INITIAL TEMPORARY EXEMPTION.

The text, structure, and purpose of 42 U.S.C.

§7545(o)(9), independently and as part of the statutory

scheme, dictate that an “extension of exemption” under subparagraph (B)(i) can only mean the temporal

20

extension of the “temporary exemption” that Congress

provided to all small refineries at the start of the RFS

program.

A. The Plain Text of §7545(o)(9) Confirms

the Tenth Circuit’s Interpretation of

Subparagraph (B)(i).

Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i), captioned “Extension of

exemption,” provides that “[a] small refinery may at

any time petition the Administrator for an extension of

the exemption under subparagraph (A) for the reason

of disproportionate economic hardship.” Because the

statute delineates EPA’s “extension” authority by reference to the finite “temporary exemption” granted under subparagraph A, “extension” cannot, in the context

of this statute, mean “to grant” a new exemption or “to

make available” the exemption after a refinery’s exemption term has expired. Accordingly, when the

Tenth Circuit held that the only small refineries that

are “eligible for extensions [are] ones that submitted

meritorious hardship petitions each [prior] year,” App.

68a, it applied a requirement inherent in the statute—

i.e., that a refinery needs to still have an exemption to

be eligible to extend that exemption. This requirement

was compelled by the ordinary meaning of “extension,”

which “dictate[s] that the subject of an extension must

be in existence before it can be extended.” Id. at 67a.

In any statutory construction case, this Court begins with the statute’s text, considering “whether the

language at issue has a plain and unambiguous

21

meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the

case.” Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 100

(2012) (citation omitted). Statutory terms not defined

by the statute “are generally interpreted in accordance

with their ordinary meaning.” Sebelius v. Cloer, 569

U.S. 369, 376 (2013) (citation omitted). Because statutory language “cannot be construed in a vacuum,” however, “the words of a statute must be read in their

context and with a view to their place in the overall

statutory scheme.” Roberts, 566 U.S. at 101 (citation

omitted).

Here, the ordinary meaning of the words of the

statute and their context are in harmony. Critically,

§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) identifies the “temporary exemption”

granted under subparagraph (A) as the specific thing

that may extended. That the statute describes “extension” by reference to a specific time-limited exemption

granted by the statute is strong evidence that Congress used “extension” in the relevant ordinary sense

of “an increase in length of time.” See App. 66a. It is

equally strong evidence that subparagraph (B)(i) does

not confer on EPA any authority to grant a new “freestanding exemption” decoupled from the time-limited

temporary exemption already granted by the statute.

Pet’rs Br. 19, 28.

The surrounding text in §7545(o)(9) reinforces

that interpretation. Subparagraph (B)(i) describes “extension” by reference to subparagraph (A), captioned

“Temporary exemption,” which provides that statutory

RFS obligations “shall not apply to small refineries

until calendar year 2011.” Id. §7545(o)(9)(A)(i). The

22

statute offers two ways of lengthening that initial, finite term beyond 2010, both by an “extension of exemption.” Id. §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II), (B)(i). Neither of these

“extension of exemption” clauses leaves any doubt as

to what Congress permitted to be “extended”: the “temporary exemption” under subparagraph A.

The first of these appears in subparagraph (A)’s

second clause, “Extension of exemption.” Therein,

Congress directed DOE to conduct a study “to determine whether compliance with [RFS] requirements

. . . would impose a disproportionate economic hardship on small refineries.” Id. §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(I). The

second subclause, also captioned “Extension of exemption,” directed EPA to “extend the exemption under

clause [A](i) . . . for a period of not less than 2 additional years” for small refineries that the DOE study

determined “would be subject to a disproportionate

economic hardship” if required to comply with the RFS.

Id. §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II).

The second way to extend the temporary exemption appears in subparagraph (B). There, Congress

provided a refinery-driven petition process “based on

disproportionate economic hardship.” Id. §7545(o)(9)(B).

Like §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II), subparagraph (B)(i) is captioned “Extension of exemption,” and it similarly specifies what can be extended by reference to the original

exemption: “the extension of the exemption under subparagraph (A).” Id. §7545(o)(9)(B)(i).5

5

Because subparagraph (B)(i) references the entirety of paragraph A, an exemption extension by petition was available to

23

Petitioners’ arguments that §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) gives

EPA authority to grant a “free-standing exemption” either try to manufacture ambiguity where there is

none, and/or take words and phrases out of context to

avoid the otherwise obvious implications of the statutory scheme. None of Petitioners’ arguments undercut

the plain text of the statute or this Court’s established

principles of interpretation.

1. The term “extension” in §7545(o)(9)(B)(i)

cannot mean “to grant” or “make available.”

Petitioners’ central premise is that the Tenth Circuit used the wrong definition of “extension” when interpreting §7545(o)(9)(B)(i). To argue that “extension”

need not mean “an increase in length of time,” App.

66a, Petitioners offer several examples showing that—

at least as a general matter—the terms “extend” and

“extension” can have “a wide range of possible meanings.” Pet’rs Br. 23. But “construing statutory language

is not merely an exercise in ascertaining the outer limits of a word’s definitional possibilities.” FCC v. AT & T

Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 407 (2011) (quotation marks omitted). Statutory language must be construed “in light of

the terms surrounding it,” and there is “no sound reason in the statutory text or context to disregard the

eligible refineries either immediately after the initial exemption

period in §7545(o)(9)(A)(i), or immediately after the expiration of

the exemption extension under §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II).

24

ordinary meaning of ” extension in §7545(o)(9)(B)(i). Id.

at 405, 407 (quotation marks omitted).

The Tenth Circuit appropriately identified “[a]

common definition of ‘extension’ that meshes with th[e]

statutory scheme”: “an increase in length of time, especially an increase in time allowed under agreement

or concession.” App. 66a (quotation marks omitted).

That approach incorporates two fundamental canons

of statutory construction: (1) that otherwise undefined

words “will be interpreted as taking their ordinary,

contemporary, common meaning,” Sandifer v. U.S. Steel

Corp., 571 U.S. 220, 227 (2015) (quotation marks omitted); and (2) that “the words of a statute must be read

in their context and with a view to their place in

the overall statutory scheme.” Parker Drilling Mgmt.

Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, 139 S. Ct. 1881, 1888 (2019)

(quoting Roberts, 566 U.S. at 101). Construing “extension” in its temporal sense applies not only its ordinary

meaning, but also the only meaning that makes sense

in the context of §7545(o)(9)(B)(i).

Petitioners argue that the court should have considered that “extension” can also mean “to grant” or

“make available.” Pet’rs Br. 27–28. But identifying a

possible alternative definition of a word “does not establish that the word is ordinarily understood in that

sense.” Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S.

560, 568 (2012) (citation omitted). Nor does the existence of an alternative definition render a statute ambiguous—particularly when the proffered alternative

cannot be squared with the plain terms of the statute.

AT & T, 562 U.S. at 407; Yates v. United States, 574 U.S.

25

528, 537 (2015) (“[T]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined not only by reference to

the language itself, but as well by the specific context

in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”) (quotation marks omitted).

To begin with, the words “extend” and “extension”

cannot be interpreted independently—in §7545(o)(9)

these words are always used in conjunction with “exemption.” They appear together in three captions—

§7545(o)(9)(A)(ii), (A)(ii)(II), (B)(i) (“Extension of exemption”)—and in each of the two operative extension clauses, both of which also identify the specific

exemption to be extended—(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II) (“extend the

exemption under clause [A](i)”) and (o)(9)(B)(i) (“extension of the exemption under subparagraph (A)”). Thus,

the operative term is not simply “extension” but “extension of the exemption in subparagraph (A).” Accordingly, §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) authorizes only an “extension of

the exemption under subparagraph (A),” not an exemption in isolation. And because “the exemption under

subparagraph (A)” is time-limited, an “extension”

thereof is naturally interpreted as meaning “to make

longer.”

Interpreting §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) as instead authorizing EPA to grant a “free-standing exemption,” Pet’rs

Br. 28, rather than an extension of a specific existing

exemption, renders meaningless the reference to “the

exemption under subparagraph A”—the very term

Congress used to identify the subject of the “extension.”

This violates the “cardinal principle of statutory

26

construction that [courts and agencies] must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.”

N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 941 (2017)

(quotation marks omitted).

More fundamentally, replacing “extension” in

§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) with Petitioners’ suggested alternatives—“grant” or “make available”—renders the provision either redundant or impossible to execute by its

literal terms. The provision would read: A “small refinery may at any time petition the Administrator for [a

grant] of the exemption under subparagraph (A). . . .”

But the statute already grants “the exemption under

subparagraph (A)” in subparagraph (A)(i), which by its

plain terms expired as of 2010. The conditional extension under subparagraph (A)(ii) was also finite (expiring as of 2012) and likewise granted by the statute. So,

to interpret “extension” in (B)(i) as “grant” or “make

available” “the exemption under subparagraph (A),”

would ignore the express temporal limitations in subparagraph A.

Petitioners’ interpretive problem is not solved by

what they argue is “one of the most important textual

clues in the statute”: the reference in §7545(o)(9)(B)(iii)

to a “petition for a hardship exemption.” Pet’rs Br.

28. That Congress referred to “petition[s] for a hardship exemption” in a subclause instructing EPA to

rule on such petitions within 90 days does not alter

Congress’s description in §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) of what specifically can be extended—“the exemption under subparagraph (A).” Nor does it make Petitioners’ concept

27

of a free-standing exemption any more compatible with

the rest of the statute.

Had Congress intended to create a “free-standing

exemption,” it would have done so in plain terms. Indeed, it would most likely have avoided using the term

“extension” at all; it most likely would have used the

word “grant,” as it did throughout the Clean Air Act.

For example, 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(7)(C) speaks in terms

of “[a] waiver granted,” not a waiver extended.6 Congress also used variations of “grant”—rather than “extension”—in other provisions of the Energy Policy Act

of 2005 when referring to granting an exemption. See

Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594, 1101 (“No such exemption shall be granted. . . .”); 119 Stat. 594, 955

(“any exemption granted”). Where, as here, “legislators

did not adopt obvious alternative language, the natural implication is that they did not intend the alternative.” Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137

S. Ct. 1652, 1659 (2017) (quotation marks omitted).

Petitioners’ examples of how “extension” is used in

other statutes “are largely irrelevant” except to make

the uncontested point that “extension” can take on

other meanings in other contexts. See Robinson v. Shell

Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, n.4 (1997).7 Tellingly, Petitioners’

6

See also, e.g., §7545(c)(4)(C)(ii)(III) (“grant the waiver”);

§7545(f )(4) (“grant or deny an application”); §7545(k)(B)(iv) (“the

granting and use of credits”); §7545(k)(7)(A) (“the granting of an

appropriate amount of credits”); §7545(m)(3)(C)(ii) (“waiver may

be granted”).

7

For example, Petitioners cite Field v. Mans, 157 F.3d 35, 43

(1st Cir. 1998), which states that the phrase “extension of credit”

28

examples of statutes where Congress used “extension”

synonymously with “grant” or “make available” do not

involve Congress authorizing an “extension” of something similarly time-limited, specific, and already in

place.8

2. The term “extension” in §7545(o)(9)(B)(i)

requires temporal continuity.

Petitioners argue in the alternative that the

term “extension” does not require temporal continuity. Similar to their arguments regarding other possible definitions of extension, Petitioners again fail to

demonstrate how a “free-standing exemption” is workable within the text of the statute. Instead, Petitioners offer only general examples in which temporal

as used in section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code has two

possible meanings—to grant or to lengthen or enlarge. The fact

that the meaning of “extension” is ambiguous under an entirely

different statutory scheme is irrelevant here, where the context

and purpose of the provision at issue eliminate any ambiguity

that the word “extension” may have in isolation.

8

22 U.S.C. §4061(a)(2) (“extension of the benefits of the [Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System],” including “future

benefits,” “to new groups of employees”); 22 U.S.C. §4061(a)(3) (“extension of benefits”); 43 U.S.C. §451b(c) (“extension of benefits”);

15 U.S.C. §78l(f )(1)(E) (“extension of unlisted trading privileges”);

38 U.S.C. §3748 (“extension of financial assistance”); 50 U.S.C.

§2333(c) (“extension of foreign assistance”); 15 U.S.C. §§1141d,

1141e, 1141f, 1141g (“extension of protection”); 18 U.S.C. §892

(“extension of credit”); 42 U.S.C. §9601(20)(H) (“extension of

credit”); 25 U.S.C. §3204(b)(3) (“extension of access”); 32 U.S.C.

§308(a), §310(b) (“extension of temporary Federal recognition”);

19 U.S.C. §2434(c), §2437(c)(1) (“extension of nondiscriminatory

treatment”).

29

continuity is not an inherent requirement of “extension” in other, non-analogous contexts outside of the

RFS. Context is integral to statutory interpretation,

however, and the context of §7545(o)(9)(B)(i), authorizing extension of an established exemption, requires

continuity.

The concept of temporal continuity is implicit in

§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) because the term “extension” is delineated by reference to a specific extant, time-limited exemption. “Extension” in this context can mean only the

continuance of the particular exemption that Congress

granted “in subparagraph (A).” As the Tenth Circuit

put it, an “extension” under §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) “requires

a small refinery exemption in prior years to prolong,

enlarge, or add to.” App. 75a.

While Petitioners dispute that the term “extension” in subparagraph (B)(i) requires temporal continuity, they concede that nearly identical language

in the immediately preceding subparagraph (A)(ii)(II)

does require it. Pet’rs Br. 26–27; see 42 U.S.C.

§7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II) (authorizing EPA to “extend the

exemption . . . for a period of . . . additional years.”). As

explained infra, Petitioners offer no plausible reason

why this Court should assign different meanings to essentially the same phrase in adjacent subparagraphs

(A) (“extend the exemption”) and (B) (“extension of the

exemption”), particularly because both clauses use “extension” together with explicit reference back to the

same exemption. Continuity is therefore required in

both instances.

30

Even standing alone, the ordinary meaning and

use of the term “extension” implicate continuity. Despite Petitioners’ claim otherwise, Pet’rs Br. 29, the

Tenth Circuit did reference a dictionary definition of

“extension” implicating “continuity.” App. 66a (citing Extension, Cambridge Online Dictionary, https://dictionary.

cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english (last visited Mar.

20, 2021) (“[T]he fact of reaching, stretching, or continuing; the act of adding to something in order to make

it bigger or longer.”) (emphasis added)). Other dictionaries have likewise defined “extension” to invoke

temporal continuity. See, e.g., Extension, Black’s Law

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“The continuation of the

same contract for a specified period.”). Consistent with

these definitions, courts routinely interpret “extension”

to mean a continuous temporal period. See United

States v. Hermanek, 289 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002)

(“an order is an extension of an earlier order only if it

authorizes continued interception of the same location. . . .”); United States v. Ojeda Rios, 875 F.2d 17, 21

(2d Cir. 1989) (“the term extensions is to be understood

in a common sense fashion as encompassing all consecutive continuations of a wiretap order. . . .”) (quotation marks omitted), vacated and remanded on

other grounds by 495 U.S. 257 (1990); see also Sunac

Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes, 416 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex.

1967) (“It seems clear that the new lease was not an

Extension of the old lease. An extension, as used in this

context, generally means the prolongation or continuation of the term of the existing lease. . . . [But here]

the lease had long since expired. . . .”).

31

Moreover, if Congress did not intend to require

continuity, it could have simply allowed for new exemptions, instead of “extensions” of the “temporary” exemption, or used a different term in place of

“extension,” such as “renewal,” which is defined as “to

begin or take up again.” See Random House Webster’s

Unabridged Dictionary at 684, 1631 (Deluxe Ed. 2001);

see also Eastham v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C.,

754 F.3d 356, 362 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Xenia v.

State, 746 N.E.2d 666, 673 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000)) (“Paragraph 12 set forth an option to extend, rather than an

option to renew, the water contract. Therefore . . . no

new water contracts ever came into being, but the original water contract remained continuously in force

through a series of successive one-year extensions.”);

Aquilent, Inc. v. Distributed Solutions, Inc., 2012 WL

405009, at *7 (E.D. Va. Feb. 7, 2012) (A new contract

cannot be considered an “extension” of a prior contract).

Petitioners provide the example of an extension of

a filing deadline under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B), Pet’rs

Br. 29, to suggest that extensions need not be continuous. However, this example actually supports the notion that the ordinary meaning of “extension” implies

continuity. In conferring discretionary power to “extend the time” when “an act may or must be done

within a specified time,” Rule 6 distinguishes between

the power to extend time “before the original time or

its extension expires” for “good cause,” Fed. R. Civ. P.

6(b)(1)(A), from the separately-conferred power to extend most deadlines after “time has expired,” Fed. R.

32

Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B), which requires a higher showing. See

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 895–96

(1990). This suggests that the power to extend after expiration is not inherent to—and should not be inferred

from—a grant of the general power to “extend.” Unlike

Rule 6(b), §7545(o)(9) does not confer authority on EPA

to “extend” a refinery’s exemption after it expires, and

such authority should not be implied from the term

“extension” alone. See 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(9). That is

particularly so because the discretion to grant an “extension of exemption” under §7545(o)(9) is not analogous to a court’s power to “extend the time” when “an

act may or must be done within a specified time.” See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). The temporary exemption is not

“an act,” but a continuation of a status—the status of

being exempt from RFS obligations. Extension of the

exemption is a continuation of that status for an additional period of time. That is quite different from extending a deadline for completing a specific “act.”

Petitioners’ other examples of instances where

Congress expressly authorized the extension of a benefit after the benefit had lapsed similarly have no bearing on the statute at issue here. While there may be

some instances where Congress intends to authorize

an extension after a lapse, that intent is absent in

§7545(o)(9). Instead, the text reflects that Congress intended the exemption provision to funnel all small refineries into compliance with the RFS. See Hermes, 787

F.3d at 578.

As discussed in Sections I.B and I.C, infra, the flaws

with Petitioners’ interpretation of §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) are

33

even more obvious when the plain text is construed

within the structure of the small refinery exemption

provisions and in light of their purpose.

B. The Structure of the Small Refinery Exemption Provisions Confirms That They

Are Only a Temporary Bridge to Compliance.

The structure of §7545(o)(9) supplies contextual

clues confirming that subparagraph (B)(i) can only be

interpreted to authorize temporal extensions of the

temporary exemption provided by subparagraph (A)(i).

As noted, Petitioners concede that the extensions

granted under subparagraph (A)(ii) are continuous extensions of the initial, temporary exemption in (A)(i).

Pet’rs Br. 26–27. Yet Petitioners challenge the need for

continuity in the nearly identical provision under subparagraph (B)(i). Petitioners cannot assign different

meanings to the same phrase in the same section of the

statute, particularly where, as here, the context makes

clear that Congress intended the same meaning.

Nor can Petitioners use other statutory terms to

negate the commonsense meaning of the term “extension of exemption.” While language must be “construe[d] . . . in light of the terms surrounding it,”

AT&T, 562 U.S. at 398 (quotation marks omitted), it

must also be read so that “no part will be inoperative

or superfluous, void or insignificant.” Rubin v. Islamic

Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816, 824 (2018) (quotation

marks omitted). For this reason, the Tenth Circuit

34

correctly rejected Petitioners’ proposed interpretation

because it would not “allow[ ] the word ‘extension’ to

maintain its ordinary meaning” or “meaningfully promote the aims of the statute.” App. 74a.

1. “Extension of exemption” has the same

meaning throughout §7545(o)(9).

Petitioners

admit

that

“extension”

in

§7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II) invokes temporal continuity,

Pet’rs Br. 26–27, but nonetheless argue that the same

word should be interpreted entirely differently in

§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) based on “context.” Every piece of contextual evidence, however, points in the opposite direction.

First, both of the extension provisions have the

same caption, “Extension of exemption,” and while

these “cannot limit the plain meaning of a statutory

text, they supply clues as to what Congress intended.”

Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S. Ct.

883, 893 (2018) (internal citation and quotation marks

omitted). Second, both the captions and the two operative clauses refer specifically to an “extension of exemption” in some form, within the same statutory

provision, strongly suggesting that they have a single,

fixed meaning. Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United

States ex rel. Hunt, 139 S. Ct. 1507, 1512 (2019) (“In all

but the most unusual situations, a single use of a statutory phrase must have a fixed meaning. We therefore

avoid interpretations that would attribute different

meanings to the same phrase.”) (internal citation and

quotation marks omitted).

35

There is a well-established presumption that “a

given term is used to mean the same thing throughout

a statute.” Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449,

456 (2012) (quotation marks omitted). This presumption is heightened where, as here, the same term is

used multiple times in close proximity—e.g., in different subparagraphs of the same paragraph, as extend/extension is used in §7545(o)(9). See Henson v.

Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1722

(2017) (“[T]o rule for [petitioners] we would have to

suppose Congress set two words cheek by jowl in the

same phrase but meant them to speak to entirely different periods of time. . . . [S]upposing such a surreptitious subphrasal shift in time seems to us a bit much.”);

Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 39 (2009) (“[S]ubparagraph M(i) appears just prior to subparagraph M(ii)

. . . and their structures are identical. Where, as here,

Congress uses similar statutory language and similar

statutory structure in two adjoining provisions, it normally intends similar interpretations.”).

Moreover, both §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II) and

§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) describe “extend” and “extension”

by reference to the same statutory exemption, further

confirming that they are describing the same thing.

See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 22 (2005) (“[T]here

is no plausible argument that these terms mean something different in §4(a)(2) than they do in §4(a)(1). This

is not only because of the normal rule of statutory interpretation that identical words used in different

parts of the same statute are generally presumed to

have the same meaning. It is also because §4(a)(2)

36

refers to ‘said principal activity or activities.’ The ‘said’

is an explicit reference to the use of the identical term

in §4(a)(1).”) (internal citation omitted); see also Envtl.

Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 582–84 (2007)

(Thomas, J., concurring in part) (“The statute here includes a statutory cross-reference, which conveys a

clear congressional intent to provide a common definition[.]”).

Petitioners’ attempt to impose meaning on Congress’s decision to split §7545(o)(9) into subparagraphs

is likewise unavailing. Indeed, that the two exemption

extension provisions appear in separate subparagraphs is unsurprising given their different schedules

and procedures. Subparagraph (A) establishes the initial exemption and provides a one-time, two-year extension beginning in calendar year 2011 based on a

DOE study. 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(9)(A). Subparagraph

(B), in contrast, provides an extension based on petitions to EPA, for any refinery that continues to be eligible. Id. §7545(o)(9)(B). A separate paragraph was

also necessary because there are provisions in subparagraphs (C) and (D) that apply only to subparagraph

(A), but not (B). Id. §7545(o)(9)(C), (D) (describing

procedure for when a small refinery “waives the exemption under subparagraph (A)”).9 What remains

9

Subparagraphs (C) and (D) also undermine Petitioners’ position. These provisions require a small refinery opting out of the

exemption in subparagraph (A) to comply with RFS obligations

“beginning in the calendar year following the date of notification.”

See 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(9)(C), (D). The phase “beginning in the calendar year” indicates that once a refinery undertakes its RFS

compliance obligations, it would no longer be eligible for future

37

unaltered across subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D), however, is the cross-reference to “the exemption under

subparagraph (A)”—the only exemption contemplated

in §7545(o)(9).

2. Ability to petition EPA “at any time”

does not alter the eligibility criteria

for an extension of the exemption.

Petitioners argue that the phrase “extension of

the exemption under subparagraph (A)” should not be

given its most sensible meaning because subparagraph (B)(i) states that a small refinery “may at any

time petition” for such an exemption extension. This

erroneously conflates the timing for submitting a petition with eligibility for an exemption extension.

While the statute provides that a refinery may

submit a petition “at any time,” a refinery may petition

only to extend its initial, temporary exemption. As the

Tenth Circuit correctly explained, “even if a small refinery can submit a hardship petition at any time, it

does not follow that every single petition can be

granted.” App. 72a. Within the context of the statute,

and giving every word its ordinary meaning, this can

mean only that a refinery may petition at any time for

an exemption so long as the refinery remained exempt

from compliance in the immediately preceding year.

extensions of its initial, temporary exemption. If Congress had intended for refineries opting out of the exemption to be eligible for

future exemptions, it would have just said “in the year following

the date of notification.”

38

Congress could have allowed a small refinery to obtain

an exemption at any time—but that is not what the

statute provides.

The word “any” in a statute can certainly have a

broad sweep. Pet’rs Br. 33. But the meaning of “any”

“depends on the statutory context,” and “ ‘any’ in this

context does not bear the heavy weight” Petitioners put

upon it. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct.

617, 629 (2018); see also Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA,

573 U.S. 302, 337 (2014) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I

agree with the Court that the word ‘any,’ when used in

a statute, does not normally mean ‘any in the universe.’ ”). Here, the use of the word “any” to describe the

timing of the petition process does not change the eligibility of refineries seeking to extend their respective

exemptions. By trying to make the phrase “at any time”

the operative term, Pet’rs Br. 33–36, Petitioners ignore

the limiting term “extend” or “extension,” which is used

five times in §7545(o)(9). Indeed, if this Court were to

adopt Petitioners’ position, the term “extension” would

be surplusage. See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S.

528, 538–39 (1955) (“It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.”) (quotation

marks omitted).

There are at least two plausible interpretations

that give “some operative effect” to both “at any time”

and “extension.” See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167,

175 (2001) (quotation marks omitted). First, the

phrase “at any time” could signal that refineries

seeking an exemption extension are not constrained

by the various deadlines applicable to the process of

39

setting annual renewable fuel standards. These include: EPA’s November 30th deadline for issuing renewable fuel annual standards for the upcoming

year, §7545(o)(3)(B)(i); the 90-day period in which

EPA is obligated to act on small refinery petitions,

§7545(o)(9)(B)(iii); and the December 31, 2008 deadline by which DOE had to complete its study,

§7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(I). In other words, a small refinery

may “petition” at any point during a calendar year for

another extension of the initial, temporary exemption.

Second, the phrase “at any time” could distinguish

the third tier of the small refinery exemption from the

first two tiers, which are explicitly time-limited. Subparagraph (A)(i) set the initial temporary exemption

through 2010; and (A)(ii) required EPA to extend that

exemption for two additional years for certain refineries. The third tier, (B)(i), is not inherently time-limited—refineries could petition for extensions in 2011

and any year thereafter, so long as they had received

exemptions continuously and met all other requirements. For instance, refineries could petition immediately after the initial five-year exemption for all small

refineries, if not exempted by the DOE study under

§7545(o)(9)(A)(ii). Indeed, that is what happened in

2011 and 2012: 21 small refineries were exempt based

upon the 2011 DOE Study, 77 Fed. Reg. 1,320, 1,340

(Jan. 9, 2012), and two to three more small refineries

obtained an exemption extension from EPA under

§7545(o)(9)(B)(i). RFS Small Refinery Exemptions.

Petitioners’ more expansive reading of “at any

time” would also lead to absurd results. If a small

40

refinery in 2018 were permitted to request an exemption for 2013, long after its compliance deadline had

passed, it is unlikely that the refinery—after waiting

years to request an exemption—could have been facing

hardship at the time of compliance.10 See Griffin v.

Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982)

(“[I]nterpretations of a statute which would produce

absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are

available.”).

3. The statutory definition of “small

refinery” does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the

exemption.

Petitioners also suggest that if Congress had intended to limit the hardship exemption to small refineries that had been continuously exempt every year of

the program, one would not expect the definition of

“small refinery” to turn on the refinery’s throughput

“for a calendar year.” Pet’rs Br. 36–38; 42 U.S.C.

§7545(o)(1)(K). Instead, they argue, Congress would

have required the refinery’s throughput to remain

below 75,000 barrels in every preceding year of the

10

EPA has agreed that the phrase “at any time” in

§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) cannot be boundless. See EPA, Denial of Small

Refinery Gap-Filling Petitions (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.epa.

gov/sites/production/files/2020-09/documents/rfs-denial-smallrefinery-gap-filling-petitions-2020-09-14.pdf (“Indeed, it seems

unlikely that Congress contemplated or intended to allow a small

refinery to obtain hardship relief through submitting a petition in

calendar year 2020 for RFS compliance year 2011, for example.”).

41

program. Pet’rs Br. 38. This argument is misplaced.

A small refinery’s eligibility for the original exemption under (A)(i) was based on volumetric output

alone, but exemption extensions under (B)(i) have additional requirements, including continuity. EPA’s regulations recognize this distinction. A small refinery

petitioning under subparagraph (B)(i) must show that

it was “small” in the compliance year as well as

the immediately preceding calendar year. 40 C.F.R.

§80.1441(e)(2)(iii).11

The requirement for an annual volumetric demonstration was added in EPA’s 2014 regulation, consistent with the statutory purpose of reducing the

subset of refineries eligible for “further extension” by

making ineligible refineries that were “small” in 2006

but that were no longer “small.” 79 Fed. Reg. 42,128,

42,152 (July 18, 2014) (“[W]e no longer believe that it

is appropriate that refineries satisfying the 75,000

[barrels per day] threshold in 2006 should be eligible

for extensions to their small refinery RFS exemption

if they no longer meet the 75,000 [barrels per day]

threshold.”). In other words, the 2014 regulation established that a small refinery cannot cease being small,

yet still be exempt from compliance as a small refinery.

This in no way conflicts with the Tenth Circuit’s

11

The requirement that a small refinery demonstrate it met

the threshold in the prior year is necessary because a petition includes only a “project[ion]” of whether the refinery will meet the

threshold “for the year or years for which an exemption is sought.”

40 C.F.R. §80.1441(e)(2)(iii). So, when the refinery petitions for an

extension in the following year, EPA has to confirm that the prior

year’s projection was accurate.

42

interpretation of §7545(o)(9)(B)(i). See App. 77a–78a.

(“The 2014 Small Refinery Rule establishes who may

seek an extension of an exemption, but it does not resolve what constitutes a valid extension.”).

C. The Purposes of §7545(o)(9) and the Renewable Fuel Standard Program Confirm the Tenth Circuit’s Interpretation.

The Tenth Circuit correctly recognized that the

purpose of §7545(o)(9) is to “funnel[ ] small refineries

toward compliance over time.” App. 68a. The court

noted a similar interpretation by the D.C. Circuit,

which observed that “the terms of the statute[ ] contemplate a ‘[t]emporary exemption’ for small refineries

with an eye toward eventual compliance with the

[RFS] program for all refineries.” Hermes, 787 F.3d at

578; App. 68a. The purpose of this “temporary exemption” was to give small refineries “time to develop compliance strategies and increase blending capacity.” Id.

at 572–73, 588. In other words, “once a small refinery

figures out how to put itself in a position of annual

compliance, that refinery is no longer a candidate for

extending” its temporary compliance exemption.12 App.

68a.

12

Indeed, the American Petroleum Institute (“API”) —the

largest U.S. trade association for the oil and natural gas industry—has advocated for the interpretation of the small refinery

exemption provisions adopted by the Tenth Circuit and has consistently argued that EPA should not grant large numbers of exemption extensions. See Br. of Am. Fuel & Petrochem. Mfrs., et

al. at 34–36, RFS Power Coalition v. EPA, No. 20-1046 (D.C. Cir.

43

Petitioners’ claim that “Congress gave no indication that it believed the hardship exemption would

sunset,” Pet’rs Br. 39, is patently false. Congress labeled the exemption “temporary,” an explicit indication

of intent that the exemption provision would phase

out.13 See Temporary, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.

2019) (“Lasting for a time only; existing or continuing

for a limited (usu. Short) time; transitory.”); Temporary,

Lexico, https://www.lexico.com/definition/temporary (last

visited Mar. 4, 2021) (“Lasting for only a limited period

of time; not permanent.”). Petitioners’ attempt to confine the “temporary” label to subparagraph (A) fails,

because as explained supra, subparagraph (B) does not

establish a separate “hardship exemption,” but rather

filed Jan. 29, 2021) (argument presented by API only); see also

API’s Comments on EPA’s Proposed Annual Standards for 2020

(November 29, 2019), https://www.api.org/~/media/Files/News/

Letters-Comments/2019/November_2019/API%20Comment%202020

%20RFS%20Supplemental%20Notice%20EPA-HQ-OAR-2019-0136.

pdf (“In recent years, EPA has granted Small Refinery Exemptions (SREs) liberally, creating significant turmoil in the RFS program. The exemptions have created an unlevel playing field in the

marketplace.”).

13

The statute’s framework for setting annual standards for

volumes of renewable fuels further confirms the temporary nature of the initial small refinery exemption and extensions of that

temporary exemption. While Congress dictated the levels of renewable fuel that must be blended into transportation fuels between 2005 and 2022, §7545(o)(2)(B)(i), Congress deferred to EPA

and DOE to set the annual standards thereafter based on a variety of factors. 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(2)(B)(ii). While Petitioners assert that they need relief from EPA to reduce the cost of complying

with the increasing levels set by Congress, it would make little

sense for EPA to extend compliance exemptions past 2022, when

EPA becomes responsible for setting those annual standards.

44

authorizes only “an extension of the exemption under

subparagraph (A)”—the “[t]emporary exemption.” 42

U.S.C. §7545(o)(9)(B)(i); Pet’rs Br. 40–41.

EPA’s regulations reflect that the mechanisms

available to extend the initial temporary exemption

were meant to force refineries toward compliance. See

78 Fed. Reg. 49,794, 49,825 (Aug. 15, 2013) (“Congress

provided two ways that small refineries can receive a

temporary extension of the exemption beyond 2010.”)

(emphasis added). Specifically, EPA requires petitions

for exemption extensions to identify “the date the refiner

anticipates that compliance with the requirements can

reasonably be achieved,” 40 C.F.R. §80.1441(e)(2)(i), indicating that refineries cannot request relief without

demonstrating to EPA that they are looking ahead toward compliance.

Further, the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of

§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) is consistent with the well-established

purposes of the RFS program. “By mandating the

replacement—at least to a certain degree—of fossil

fuel with renewable fuel, Congress intended the [RFS]

Program to move the United States toward greater energy independence and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.” ACE, 864 F.3d at 696.14 The statute provides

14

Petitioners reference the fact that HollyFrontier’s Cheyenne Refinery no longer produces petroleum fuels as evidence of

the impact of the Tenth Circuit’s decision. Pet’rs Br. 17. Petitioners fail to mention that HollyFrontier is converting the Cheyenne

facility into a renewable diesel plant, a transition projected to

yield a substantial profit. See Clifford Krauss, Oil Refineries See

Profit in Turning Kitchen Grease Into Diesel, New York Times

(Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/03/business/

45

“increasing [volume] requirements [that] are designed

to force the market to create ways to produce and use

greater and greater volumes of renewable fuel each

year.” Id. at 710; §7545(o)(2). For the RFS to function

as Congress intended, obligated parties—refiners and

importers of petroleum like the Petitioners—must

each fulfill their share of the program’s annual volume

obligations. ACE, 864 F.3d at 697. As the Tenth Circuit

correctly observed, even “assuming arguendo that certain legislators thought the small refinery exemption

was important, the ones who enacted the law also

made clear that the renewable fuel targets reflected in

the Energy Policy Act and the Energy Independence

and Security Act were essential to promoting biofuel

production, energy independence, and environmental

protection.” App. 69a–70a. The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of “extension” is the only interpretation that

is consistent with these purposes.

Small-refinery exemptions “create[]” a “renewablefuel shortfall” because EPA has not adjusted the volume obligations to account for retroactive exemptions,

so the exempt “gallons of renewable fuels simply [go]

energy-environment/oil-refineries-renewable-diesel.html; Margaret

Austin, HollyFrontier Seeking Permit, Public Comment for Pivot

to Renewable Diesel, Wyoming Tribune Eagle (Feb. 5, 2021), https://

www.wyomingnews.com/news/local_news/hollyfrontier-seekingpermit-public-comment-for-pivot-to-renewable-diesel/article_

15433e32-6eaa-5cd0-950d-75054c264968.html. Far from demonstrating need for a permanent compliance exemption, HollyFrontier’s conversion of the Cheyenne Refinery wholly aligns with the

RFS’s goal of replacing some volumes of fossil fuel with renewable

fuel.

46

unproduced.” AFPM, 937 F.3d at 571. For example, the

exemptions EPA granted for compliance years 20162018 effectively resulted in a shortfall of more than

four billion gallons of renewable fuel relative to the

statutorily required volumes. See RFS Small Refinery

Exemptions. Because small refinery exemptions create a renewable fuel shortfall, contrary to the purposes of the RFS, the only plausible interpretation of

§7545(o)(9) is for it to serve as a bridge to compliance

such that the number of exempt small refineries would

“taper[ ]” down each year. App. 68a. Providing limitless

exemptions to petroleum refiners at the expense of the

renewable fuels industry would both curb U.S. energy

independence and increase greenhouse gas emissions.15

D. Petitioners’ Policy Arguments Lack

Merit and Cannot Overcome the Text,

Structure, and Purpose of §7545(o)(9).

Petitioners claim that the “escalating burdens on

regulated parties to blend renewable fuels” demonstrate an intent to create a permanent “safety valve”

for small refineries. Pet’rs Br. 40. This self-serving

characterization of §7545(o)(B)(i) is unsupported by

15

See Life Cycle Associates, GHG Emissions Reductions Due

to the RFS2–A 2020 Update (Feb. 11, 2021), https://ethanolrfa.org/

wp-content/uploads/2021/02/LCA_-_RFS2-GHG-Update_2020.pdf;

Melissa Scully, Gregory Norris, Tania Alarcon Falconi, & David

MacIntosh, Carbon Intensity of Corn Ethanol in the United States:

State of the Science, Envtl. Res. Letters (Mar. 10, 2021), https://

iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/abde08/pdf.

47

the text of the statute and the history of its implementation. Congress created a “temporary” exemption program at the same time it established the increasing

volume requirements. In other words, Congress knew

at the time it labeled the exemption “temporary” that

refiners would be required to blend increasing volumes

of renewable fuel each year. Likewise, the phrase “at

any time” does not imply congressional intent for small

refinery exemptions to serve as a permanent safety

valve. Pet’rs Br. 40. As explained supra, the phrase “at

any time” refers only to the timing of small refineries’

petitions. It does not eliminate the exemption provision’s “temporary” label. “[H]ad Congress intended” to

create a permanent “regulatory relief program,” Pet’rs

Br. 4, “it would have said so.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.

v. United States ex rel. Rigsby, 137 S. Ct. 436, 443 (2016).

Although Petitioners assert that small refineries

will face extinction if exemption extensions are no

longer available, Pet’rs Br. 4, they fail to reconcile that

assertion with the fact that (a) most small refineries

complied with the RFS between 2013-2015, and (b)

EPA has consistently determined that refineries of all

sizes can completely recoup the cost of RFS compliance

in the prices received for their products. Moreover, the

statute contains specific waiver provisions to address

situations where application of the RFS requirements

would cause severe economic harm. See 42 U.S.C.

§7545(o)(7).

Petitioners’ interpretation of §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) is

partly based on the flawed premise that a phase-out of

small refinery exemptions would “threaten[ ] to shutter

48

important domestic refining capacity, undermining

Congress’s energy-independence purpose.” Pet’rs Br. 4;

see also Pet’rs Br. 41–42. To start, history contradicts

Petitioners’ suggestion that the end of small refinery

exemptions would spell the end of a substantial number of small refineries. For compliance years 2013,

2014, and 2015, only eight, eight, and seven refineries

were exempt each year, respectively. A similarly low

number of refineries applied in each of these years: 16,

13, and 14, respectively.16 Thus, for the three years

prior to EPA’s change in policy for adjudicating small

refinery exemption petitions, most small refineries did

not even apply for an extension of their exemptions—

meaning most small refineries came into compliance

for three consecutive years.17 For Petitioners now to

claim that elimination of small refinery exemptions

would cause a reduction in the U.S. refining capacity

so significant as to damage our nation’s energy security is simply disingenuous.

Moreover, “[i]n establishing the RFS program, Congress sought to bolster energy security and independence by boosting the amount of renewable fuels used in

16

As of January 1, 2019, there were 53 small refineries operating in the U.S. See U.S. Energy Information Administration,

Refinery Capacity Report (June 21, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/

petroleum/refinerycapacity/.

17

Notably, during this period where most small refineries

complied with their RFS obligations, RIN prices (and thus, compliance costs) were historically high. See EPA, RIN Trade and

Price Information (last updated Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.epa.

gov/fuels-registration-reporting-and-compliance-help/rin-tradesand-price-information.

49

the domestic transportation fuel pool.” See 82 Fed. Reg.

34,206, 34,211–12 (July 21, 2017) (emphasis added). In

other words, Congress determined that the best way to

increase U.S. energy independence and security was by

diversifying the domestic fuel supply through the addition of increasing volumes of renewable fuel, not by

“protecting domestic refining capacity.” Pet’rs Br. 41.

Petitioners’ assertion that refineries cannot “come

into a settled state of ‘compliance’ ” in part due to

“structural constraints” unique to small refineries,

Pet’rs Br. 42–44, is negated by EPA’s longstanding position that refineries of all sizes are able to recover the

costs of RFS compliance in the prices of their products.

An EPA report assessing the 2013 RIN market concluded that “obligated parties were generally able to

recover [the] increase in the costs of meeting their RIN

obligations in the price they received for their petroleum-based products,” and thus “these higher costs

have a similar impact on all obligated parties.” See

Dallas Burkholder, Office of Transp. & Air Quality,

EPA, A Preliminary Assessment of RIN Market Dynamics, RIN Prices, and Their Effects 29 (May 14,

2015), https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standardprogram/renewable-identification-number-rin-analysisrenewable-fuel-standard. The report specifically addressed merchant refiners “who largely purchase separated RINs to meet their RFS obligations,” and

determined that these refiners “should not therefore be

disadvantaged by the higher RIN prices, as they are

recovering these costs in the sale price of their products.” Id. at 3.

50

EPA has consistently reiterated the conclusions of

this report in the following years. For example, in a

2017 rulemaking, EPA reviewed studies submitted by

commenters purporting to show “an inability to passthrough the cost of the RFS program to consumers,”

but EPA did “not find these assessments convincing”

and concluded that “[a]ll obligated parties, including

merchant refiners, are generally able to recover the

cost of the RINs they need for compliance with the RFS

obligations through the cost of the gasoline and diesel

fuel they produce.” EPA, EPA-420-R-17-008, Denial of

Petitions for Rulemaking to Change the RFS Point of

Obligation (Nov. 2017), at 23–24. EPA has reaffirmed

its position on the ability of all refineries to passthrough and recover their compliance costs in rulemakings as recent as the 2020 RFS standards. In the

final rule for the 2020 standards, EPA stated: “We have

reviewed and assessed the available information,

which shows that obligated parties, including small entities, are generally able to recover the cost of acquiring

the RINs necessary for compliance with the RFS

standards. . . . Even if we were to assume that the cost

of acquiring RINs was not recovered by obligated parties . . . a cost-to-sales ratio test shows that the costs to

small entities of the RFS standards are far less than 1

percent of the value of their sales.” 85 Fed. Reg. 7,016,

7,067–68 (Feb. 6, 2020) (emphasis added). The fact that

EPA has been unwavering in its position that small refineries are not disproportionately harmed by RFS

compliance refutes Petitioners’ claims that a permanently available exemption is necessary to keep small

refineries in business.

51

Further, the RFS has other mechanisms that provide EPA with flexibility to address any “negative economic effects” caused by “application of the statutory

volume requirements.” See ACE, 864 F.3d at 712.

Specifically, “Congress authorized EPA to reduce the

statutory renewable fuel volume requirements upon a

determination that implementation of those requirements ‘would severely harm the economy or environment of a State, a region, or the United States.’ ” ACE,

864 F.3d at 712 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(7)(A)(i)).

Any state or obligated party can petition EPA for such

relief. Id. §7545(o)(7)(A)(i). Unlike the “temporary” exemption provided to “funnel[ ] small refineries toward

compliance,” App. 68a, EPA’s “severe economic harm

waiver” authority already serves as an appropriate

“safety valve” where the RFS obligations are shown to

be excessively burdensome. Petitioners are fully aware

of this safety valve, as evidenced by their recent petition for a severe-harm waiver. 86 Fed. Reg. 5,182, 5,183

(Jan. 19, 2021). The congressionally-intended phaseout

of the small refinery exemption in §7545(o)(9) clearly

does not leave EPA and obligated parties without recourse to address any economic harm caused by the

RFS.

The statute also provides “a safe harbor for individual obligated parties struggling to comply with a

year’s requirements,” namely, “[t]he statute mandates

that EPA allows those parties to carry a renewable

fuel deficit forward into the next compliance year.”

ACE, 864 F.3d at 712; 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(5)(D); 40

C.F.R. §80.1427(b). Obligated parties frequently take

52

advantage of the deficit provision to shift some portion

of their compliance burden to the following year. EPA’s

data shows that parties carried forward deficits of

more than 390 million, 681 million, 130 million, and

442 million RINs in compliance years 2016, 2017, 2018,

and 2019, respectively. EPA, Annual Compliance Data

for Obligated Parties and Renewable Fuel Exporters

under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program,

Table 5 (last updated Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.epa.

gov/fuels-registration-reporting-and-compliance-help/

annual-compliance-data-obligated-parties-and. The deficit provision addresses the situation raised by Petitioners wherein a small refinery’s ability to comply with

their RFS obligations may vary year-to-year; if a refinery is struggling financially in a given year, it can defer

its RFS obligations by carrying forward a deficit.

In a last-ditch attempt, Petitioners claim that the

“unique conditions” caused by the COVID pandemic

demonstrate a need for permanent small refinery exemptions. Pet’rs Br. 45. This argument fails because, in

a holding that Petitioners declined to challenge, the

Tenth Circuit held that “renewable fuels compliance

must be the cause of any disproportionate hardship”

used to justify an exemption. App. 83a. Because EPA

had considered factors unrelated to the RFS in making

the hardship determinations in each of the three challenged decisions, this constituted separate grounds (in

addition to the “extension” issue before this Court) to

vacate the exemptions. App. 83a. Petitioners’ attempt

to distract with other factors impacting refinery operations should be ignored, as these are clearly beyond

53

the scope of EPA’s statutory authority in implementing

the small refinery exemption provisions.18

CHEVRON DEFERENCE DOES NOT APPLY.

II.

This is not a Chevron deference case. Under Chevron, this Court does not give any deference to an

agency’s interpretation of the law unless this Court is

unable to discern Congress’s meaning after applying

“traditional tools of statutory construction.” SAS Inst.,

Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2017) (quoting

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467

U.S. 837, 843, n.9 (1984)). Here, after applying traditional tools of interpretation, there is “no uncertainty

that could warrant deference” under Chevron. SAS

Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1358.

In an argument of last resort, Petitioners urge this

Court to defer to what they view as a statutory interpretation made by EPA in its 2014 Small Refinery

Rule. See 79 Fed. Reg. 42,128 (July 18, 2014). But Petitioners devoted little of their briefing in the Tenth

18

For instance, Petitioners point to Marathon Petroleum

Corporation’s decision to close its Gallup, New Mexico refinery

as evidence of the impact of the Tenth Circuit’s ruling, Pet’rs

Br. 17, when in reality, Marathon attributed the decision to “the

challenges COVID has created for our business.” News Release,

Marathon Petroleum Corp., Marathon Petroleum Corp. Reports

Second-Quarter 2020 Results (Aug. 3, 2020), https://ir.marathonpetroleum.com/investor/news-releases/news-details/2020/MarathonPetroleum-Corp.-Reports-Second-Quarter-2020-Results/default.aspx.

54

Circuit to such an argument. In fact, in the Tenth Circuit, the HollyFrontier parties did not cite Chevron at

all. While Wynnewood recited the principles of Chevron

deference, it made little attempt to explain how EPA

made any statutory interpretation in its 2014 Small

Refinery Rule. See Intervenor-Respondent Wynnewood

Refining Company Br. 19, Renewable Fuels Ass’n v.

EPA, No. 18-9533 (10th Cir. Apr. 8, 2020) (stating only

that “[a]s part of that rulemaking, EPA promulgated a

rule interpreting the CAA as allowing small refineries

to apply for hardship relief if they were ‘small’ (i.e., had

a crude oil throughput of fewer than 75,000 [barrels

per day]) both in the year the exemption is sought and

the immediately preceding year”).

While EPA asked for Chevron deference in the

Tenth Circuit, it did not mention the 2014 Small Refinery Rule at all in its discussion of deference. See EPA

Br. 33–34, Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. EPA, No. 18-9533

(10th Cir. Mar. 25, 2020). “This Court has often declined to apply Chevron deference when the government fails to invoke it.” Guedes v. BATFE, 140 S. Ct.

789, 790 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in denial of

certiorari). Moreover, EPA now agrees with the Tenth

Circuit’s reading of the small refinery exemption provision. See EPA, After Careful Consideration, EPA

Supports Tenth Circuit’s Renewable Fuels Association

Decision (Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/

after-careful-consideration-epa-supports-tenth-circuitsrenewable-fuels-association. In these circumstances,

Chevron deference to anything in the 2014 Small Refinery Rule would be especially inappropriate. See

55

Guedes, 140 S. Ct. at 790 (“Even when Chevron deference is sought, this Court has found it inappropriate

where the Executive seems of two minds about the result it prefers.”) (quotation marks omitted).

In any event, Petitioners’ argument for Chevron

deference is meritless. Petitioners recognize that EPA

did not expressly make any statutory interpretation in

the 2014 Small Refinery Rule. Instead, Petitioners suggest that EPA implicitly made a statutory interpretation that was a “necessary presupposition” of the 2014

Small Refinery Rule. See Pet’rs Br. 48 (citing Nat’l R.R.

Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407,

420 (1992)). In fact, there was no such “necessary presupposition.” This Court should not defer to what Petitioners speculate that EPA had in mind when it

adopted the 2014 Small Refinery Rule.

The Tenth Circuit correctly noted that the 2014

Small Refinery Rule did “not explain or resolve any

ambiguity with respect to the statutory definition of

‘extension.’ ” App. 80a. It explained that “[t]he 2014

Small Refinery Rule establishes who may seek an extension of an exemption, but it does not resolve what

constitutes a valid extension.” App. 78a. Moreover,

“neither the preamble nor the administrative rule contains any discussion of what the word ‘extension’ actually means.” App. 78a.

Petitioners’ only response to the Tenth Circuit’s

analysis is their conclusory assertion that the 2014

Small Refinery Rule “indisputably rests on the premise

that a small refinery that was ineligible for a hardship

56

exemption in a prior year may still receive a ‘valid extension’ of the exemption in a later year, and thus necessarily rejected the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation.”

Pet’rs Br. 49. According to Petitioners, the “only reasonable reading” of the 2014 Small Refinery Rule is that

EPA rejected the interpretation of the statute adopted

by the Tenth Circuit in 2020, six years later.

Petitioners’ recitation of the background of the

2014 Small Refinery Rule, however, ignores an explanation that is consistent with the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute. The predecessor to the 2014

Small Refinery Rule provided that the “small refinery”

determination should be based upon whether a refinery satisfied the 75,000 barrels per day threshold in

2006. 40 C.F.R. §80.1441 (2010). Thus, at the time EPA

was considering its 2014 amendments, there could

have been refineries that met the small refinery

threshold in 2006 and therefore qualified to receive exemption extensions in the intervening years (if they

met the other requirements), even if the refineries had

exceeded the 75,000 barrels per day threshold in any

year(s) after 2006. EPA’s original proposal in 2014—a

requirement that a refinery meet the threshold in 2006

and each year thereafter—could have rendered such

refineries ineligible for future exemption extensions.

78 Fed. Reg. 36,042, 36,064 (June 14, 2013). EPA ultimately rejected that proposal in the final 2014 Small

Refinery Rule. 79 Fed. Reg. at 42,152. In other words,

EPA did not want to preclude a refinery from seeking

an extension of a temporary exemption if it had been

57

eligible for and received continuous exemption extensions under the 2010 regulation but risked being

deemed ineligible for future extensions based on retroactive application of the 2014 Small Refinery Rule. See

id.

In fact, EPA’s rationale for changing the definition

of “small refinery” in the 2014 Small Refinery Rule is

consistent with the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of

the small refinery exemption. With the 2014 Small Refinery Rule, EPA sought to narrow the number of refineries that were eligible for exemptions. See 79 Fed.

Reg. at 42,152.

For all of these reasons, Chevron deference does

not apply.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

58

CONCLUSION

This Court should affirm the Tenth Circuit’s decision.

Respectfully submitted,

KEVIN M. FONG

PILLSBURY WINTHROP

SHAW PITTMAN LLP

Four Embarcadero Center,

22nd Floor

San Francisco, CA 94111

(415) 983-1000

MATTHEW W. MORRISON

Counsel of Record

CYNTHIA COOK ROBERTSON

SHELBY L. DYL

PILLSBURY WINTHROP

SHAW PITTMAN LLP

1200 Seventeenth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 663-8036

Counsel for Respondents

Renewable Fuels Association,

American Coalition for

Ethanol, National Corn

Growers Association,

National Farmers Union

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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