Respondents Brief — HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC, et al., Petitioners v. Renewable Fuels Association, et al.
Supreme Court briefMar 24, 2021
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No. 20-472
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In The
Supreme Court of the United States
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE
REFINING, LLC, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
RENEWABLE FUELS ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,
Respondents.
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------On Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For The Tenth Circuit
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------KEVIN M. FONG
PILLSBURY WINTHROP
SHAW PITTMAN LLP
Four Embarcadero Center,
22nd Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 983-1000
MATTHEW W. MORRISON
Counsel of Record
CYNTHIA COOK ROBERTSON
SHELBY L. DYL
PILLSBURY WINTHROP
SHAW PITTMAN LLP
1200 Seventeenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 663-8036
matthew.morrison@
pillsburylaw.com
Counsel for Respondents
Renewable Fuels Association,
American Coalition for
Ethanol, National Corn
Growers Association,
National Farmers Union
================================================================================================================
COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964
WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Under the Renewable Fuel Standard provisions of
the Clean Air Act and the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA’s”) implementing regulations, refiners and importers of transportation fuel are
required to blend increasing amounts of renewable fuel
into their products. In recognition of the fact that small
refineries might need more time to adjust to these
blending mandates, Congress provided them with a
temporary compliance exemption through 2010. EPA
could extend this temporary exemption for additional
time if, inter alia, a small refinery submitted a request
to EPA showing that coming into compliance would
cause it to suffer a disproportionate economic hardship. The Tenth Circuit concluded that, to be eligible to
seek an extension of the temporary compliance exemption, the small refinery had to remain exempt in the
years preceding its request.
Accordingly, the question presented is:
Whether EPA exceeded its authority by granting
“extensions” of the “temporary exemption” under 42
U.S.C. §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) to small refineries for which
the temporary exemption had previously expired.
ii
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
The Renewable Fuels Association (“RFA”) is a
non-profit trade association. Its members are ethanol producers and supporters of the ethanol industry.
RFA promotes the general commercial, legislative, and
other common interests of its members. RFA does not
have a parent company, and no publicly held company
has a 10% or greater ownership interest in it.
The American Coalition for Ethanol (“ACE”) is a
non-profit trade association. Its members include ethanol and biofuel facilities, agricultural producers, ethanol industry investors, and supporters of the ethanol
industry. ACE promotes the general commercial, legislative, and other common interests of its members.
ACE does not have a parent company, and no publicly
held company has a 10% or greater ownership interest
in it.
The National Corn Growers Association (“NCGA”)
is a non-profit trade association. Its members are corn
farmers and supporters of the agriculture and ethanol
industries. NCGA promotes the general commercial,
legislative, and other common interests of its members.
NCGA does not have a parent company, and no publicly held company has a 10% or greater ownership interest in it.
The Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union
of America, doing business as the National Farmers
Union (“NFU”), is a non-profit trade association. Its
iii
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT—Continued
members include farmers who are producers of biofuel
feedstocks and consumers of large quantities of fuel.
NFU promotes the general commercial, legislative,
and other common interests of its members. It does not
have a parent company, and no publicly held company
has a 10% or greater ownership interest in it.
For the purposes of this brief, RFA, ACE, NCGA,
and NFU are referred to collectively as the “Biofuels
Respondents.”
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED...................................
i
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT ....................................
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................. vii
OPINION BELOW ...............................................
1
JURISDICTION ...................................................
1
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED ..............
1
INTRODUCTION ................................................
4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE..............................
6
I.
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND ...................................................
6
A. The Renewable Fuel Standard Program .....................................................
6
B. Temporary Exemptions for Small Refineries .................................................
8
C. EPA’s Administration of the Small Refinery Temporary Exemption .............. 11
II.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE ................ 12
A. Petitioners’ Exemption Extension Petitions ................................................... 12
B. The Biofuels Respondents’ Petition for
Review and the Tenth Circuit’s Judgment ..................................................... 14
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..................... 16
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
ARGUMENT ........................................................ 19
I.
THE STATUTE AUTHORIZES ONLY AN
EXTENSION OF A SMALL REFINERY’S
INITIAL TEMPORARY EXEMPTION ...... 19
A. The Plain Text of §7545(o)(9) Confirms
the Tenth Circuit’s Interpretation of
Subparagraph (B)(i) ............................ 20
1. The term “extension” in §7545(o)(9)(B)(i)
cannot mean “to grant” or “make
available” ......................................... 23
2. The term “extension” in §7545(o)(9)(B)(i)
requires temporal continuity ........... 28
B. The Structure of the Small Refinery
Exemption Provisions Confirms That
They Are Only a Temporary Bridge to
Compliance .......................................... 33
1. “Extension of exemption” has the same
meaning throughout §7545(o)(9)....... 34
2. Ability to petition EPA “at any time”
does not alter the eligibility criteria
for an extension of the exemption ... 37
3. The statutory definition of “small
refinery” does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the
exemption ....................................... 40
C. The Purposes of §7545(o)(9) and the
Renewable Fuel Standard Program
Confirm the Tenth Circuit’s Interpretation ................................................... 42
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
D. Petitioners’ Policy Arguments Lack Merit
and Cannot Overcome the Text, Structure, and Purpose of §7545(o)(9) ......... 46
II.
CHEVRON DEFERENCE DOES NOT
APPLY........................................................ 53
CONCLUSION..................................................... 58
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Advanced Biofuels Ass’n v. EPA,
792 Fed. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ............................12
Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton,
137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017) .............................................27
Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc. v. EPA,
936 F.3d 628 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ................................ 6, 8
American Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. EPA,
937 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2019) .............................. 7, 46
Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA,
864 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2017) .......................... passim
Aquilent, Inc. v. Distributed Solutions, Inc.,
2012 WL 405009 (E.D. Va. Feb. 7, 2012) .................31
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) ......................................... passim
Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Hunt,
139 S. Ct. 1507 (2019) .............................................34
Duncan v. Walker,
533 U.S. 167 (2001) .................................................38
Eastham v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C.,
754 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2014) ....................................31
Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp.,
549 U.S. 561 (2007) .................................................36
FCC v. AT & T Inc.,
562 U.S. 397 (2011) ..................................... 23, 24, 33
Field v. Mans,
157 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 1998) ......................................27
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,
458 U.S. 564 (1982) .................................................40
Guedes v. BATFE,
140 S. Ct. 789 (2020) ......................................... 54, 55
Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.,
137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017) .............................................35
Hermes Consol., LLC v. EPA,
787 F.3d 568 (D.C. Cir. 2015) .................... 8, 9, 32, 42
IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez,
546 U.S. 21 (2005) ...................................................35
Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n,
497 U.S. 871 (1990) .................................................32
Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc.,
138 S. Ct. 883 (2018) ...............................................34
Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth.,
566 U.S. 449 (2012) .................................................35
Monroe Energy, LLC v. EPA,
750 F.3d 909 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ....................................7
N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc.,
137 S. Ct. 929 (2017) ...............................................26
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def.,
138 S. Ct. 617 (2018) ...............................................38
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Maine Corp.,
503 U.S. 407 (1992) .................................................55
Nijhawan v. Holder,
557 U.S. 29 (2009) ...................................................35
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton,
139 S. Ct. 1881 (2019) .............................................24
Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. EPA,
No. 19-1220 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 22, 2019) ..............14
Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. EPA,
No. 21-9518 (10th Cir. filed Feb. 8, 2021) ...............11
RFS Power Coalition v. EPA,
No. 20-1046 (D.C. Cir. filed Jan. 29, 2021) ..............42
Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 93 (2012) ............................................. 21, 24
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
519 U.S. 337 (1997) .................................................27
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
138 S. Ct. 816 (2018) ...............................................33
Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
571 U.S. 220 (2015) .................................................24
SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu,
138 S. Ct. 1348 (2017) .............................................53
Sebelius v. Cloer,
569 U.S. 369 (2013) .................................................21
Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA,
887 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 2017) ..................................13
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Rigsby,
137 S. Ct. 436 (2016) ...............................................47
Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes,
416 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1967) .....................................30
x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd.,
566 U.S. 560 (2012) .................................................24
United States v. Hermanek,
289 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2002) ..................................30
United States v. Menasche,
348 U.S. 528 (1955) .................................................38
United States v. Ojeda Rios,
875 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1989) .......................................30
Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA,
573 U.S. 302 (2014) .................................................38
Xenia v. State,
746 N.E.2d 666 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) ......................31
Yates v. United States,
574 U.S. 528 (2015) .................................................24
STATUTES
United States Code
Title 11 Section 523(a)(2)(A) ...................................28
Title 15 Section 78l(f )(1)(E) ....................................28
Title 15 Section 1141d ............................................28
Title 15 Section 1141e .............................................28
Title 15 Section 1141f .............................................28
Title 15 Section 1141g.............................................28
Title 18 Section 892 ................................................28
Title 19 Section 2434(c) ..........................................28
Title 19 Section 2437(c)(1) ......................................28
Title 22 Section 4061(a)(2) ......................................28
Title 22 Section 4061(a)(3) ......................................28
Title 25 Section 3204(b)(3) ......................................28
xi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Title 28 Section 1254(1) ............................................1
Title 32 Section 308(a) ............................................28
Title 32 Section 310(b) ............................................28
Title 38 Section 3748 ..............................................28
Title 42 Section 7545(c)(4)(C)(ii)(III) ......................27
Title 42 Section 7545(f )(4) ......................................27
Title 42 Section 7545(k)(7)(A).................................27
Title 42 Section 7545(k)(B)(iv)................................27
Title 42 Section 7545(m)(3)(C)(ii) ...........................27
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(1)(K) ............................. 8, 40
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(2) ......................................45
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) ...............................7
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(2)(B) ...................................7
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(2)(B)(i) .............................43
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(I)............................7
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(2)(B)(ii) ............................43
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(3)(B)(i) .............................39
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(5)(D) .................................51
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(7) ......................................47
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(7)(A)(i) .............................51
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(7)(C) .................................27
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9) .............................. passim
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(A) ......................... passim
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(A)(i) ..................... passim
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii) ..............................9
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(I) .................. 22, 39
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II) .........................5
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(B) ........... 8, 22, 36, 37, 43
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) ..................... passim
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii) ............................10
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(iii) ...........................26
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(C) ........................... 36, 37
xii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Title 42 Section 7545(o)(9)(D) ........................... 36, 37
Title 42 Section 7607(b)(1) ......................................14
Title 42 Section 9601(20)(H) ...................................28
Title 43 Section 451b(c) ..........................................28
Title 50 Section 2333(c) ..........................................28
Energy Independence and Security Act,
Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Statute 1492 (2007) ..... 6, 45
Energy Policy Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Statute 594 ................. 27, 45
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Code of Federal Regulations
Title 40 Section 80.1401 ...........................................8
Title 40 Section 80.1406(a)(1) ...................................7
Title 40 Section 80.1427 ...........................................8
Title 40 Section 80.1427(b) .....................................51
Title 40 Section 80.1441 (2010) ..............................56
Title 40 Section 80.1441(e)(2)(i) .............................44
Title 40 Section 80.1441(e)(2)(iii) ...........................41
Federal Register
77 Fed. Reg. 1,320 (Jan. 9, 2012) ...................... 11, 39
78 Fed. Reg. 36,042 (June 14, 2013) .......................56
78 Fed. Reg. 49,794 (Aug. 15, 2013) ........................44
79 Fed. Reg. 42,128 (July 18, 2014) ...... 41, 53, 56, 57
82 Fed. Reg. 34,206 (July 21, 2017) ........................49
85 Fed. Reg. 7,016 (Feb. 6, 2020).............................50
86 Fed. Reg. 5,182 (Jan. 19, 2021) ..........................51
xiii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Section 6(b)(1) .........................................................32
Section 6(b)(1)(A) ....................................................31
Section 6(b)(1)(B) .............................................. 31, 32
OTHER AUTHORITIES
API’s Comments on EPA’s Proposed Annual
Standards for 2020 (November 29, 2019),
https://www.api.org/-/media/Files/News/LettersComments/2019/November_2019/API%20
Comment%202020%20RFS%20Supplemental
%20Notice%20EPA-HQ-OAR-2019-0136.pdf .........43
Clifford Krauss, Oil Refineries See Profit in
Turning Kitchen Grease Into Diesel, New York
Times (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/12/03/business/energy-environment/oilrefineries-renewable-diesel.html ............................44
Dallas Burkholder, Office of Transp. & Air Quality, EPA, A Preliminary Assessment of RIN
Market Dynamics, RIN Prices, and Their Effects
(May 14, 2015), https://www.epa.gov/renewablefuel-standard-program/renewable-identificationnumber-rin-analysis-renewable-fuel-standard .......49
EPA, Annual Compliance Data for Obligated
Parties and Renewable Fuel Exporters under
the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program, Table 5, https://www.epa.gov/fuelsregistration-reporting-and-compliance-help/
annual-compliance-data-obligated-parties-and
(last updated Nov. 10, 2020) ...................................52
xiv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
EPA, Denial of Small Refinery Gap-Filling Petitions (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2020-09/documents/rfs-denialsmall-refinery-gap-filling-petitions-2020-09-14.
pdf ............................................................................40
EPA, EPA-420-R-17-008, Denial of Petitions for
Rulemaking to Change the RFS Point of Obligation (Nov. 2017) ...................................................50
EPA, RFS Small Refinery Exemptions, https://
www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-reporting-andcompliance-help/rfs-small-refinery-exemptions
(last updated Mar. 18, 2021) ................. 11, 12, 39, 46
EPA, RIN Trade and Price Information, https://
www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-reporting-andcompliance-help/rin-trades-and-price-information
(last updated Feb. 10, 2021) ....................................48
EPA, After Careful Consideration, EPA Supports
Tenth Circuit’s Renewable Fuels Association
Decision (Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.epa.
gov/newsreleases/after-careful-considerationepa-supports-tenth-circuits-renewable-fuelsassociation ...............................................................54
Extension, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019) ........................................................................30
xv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Jarrett Renshaw & Chris Prentice, Chevron,
Exxon Seek ‘Small Refinery’ Waivers from U.S.
Biofuels Law, Reuters (Apr. 12, 2018), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biofuels-eparefineries-exclusive/exclusive-chevron-exxonseek-small-refinery-waivers-from-u-s-biofuelslawidUSKBN1HJ32R .............................................12
Life Cycle Associates, GHG Emissions Reductions Due to the RFS2–A 2020 Update (Feb.
11, 2021), https://ethanolrfa.org/wp-content/
uploads/2021/02/LCA_-_RFS2-GHG-Update_
2020.pdf ...................................................................46
Margaret Austin, HollyFrontier Seeking Permit,
Public Comment for Pivot to Renewable Diesel,
Wyoming Tribune Eagle (Feb. 5, 2021), https://
www.wyomingnews.com/news/local_news/holly
frontier-seeking-permit-public-comment-forpivot-to-renewable-diesel/article_15433e32-6eaa5cd0-950d-75054c264968.html ...............................45
Melissa Scully, Gregory Norris, Tania Alarcon
Falconi, & David MacIntosh, Carbon Intensity
of Corn Ethanol in the United States: State of
the Science, Envtl. Res. Letters (Mar. 10,
2021), https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/
1748-9326/abde08/pdf .............................................46
News Release, Marathon Petroleum Corp., Marathon Petroleum Corp. Reports Second-Quarter
2020 Results (Aug. 3, 2020), https://ir.marathon
petroleum.com/investor/news-releases/newsdetails/2020/Marathon-Petroleum-Corp.-ReportsSecond-Quarter-2020-Results/default.aspx ...........53
xvi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Office of Air & Radiation, EPA, Financial and
Other Information to Be Submitted with 2016
RFS Small Refinery Hardship Exemption Requests (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2016-12/documents/rfs-smallrefinery-2016-12-06.pdf ..........................................10
Office of Policy & Int’l Affairs, Dep’t of Energy,
EPACT 2005 Section 1501: Small Refineries
Exemption Study (Jan. 2009) ....................................9
Office of Policy & Int’l Affairs, Dep’t of Energy,
Small Refinery Exemption Study (Mar.
2011) ........................................................ 9, 10, 11, 39
Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (Deluxe Ed. 2001) .............................................31
S. Rep. No. 111-45 (2009) ..............................................9
Temporary, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019) ........................................................................43
Temporary, Lexico, https://www.lexico.com/definition/temporary (last visited Mar. 4, 2021) ..........43
U.S. Energy Information Administration, Refinery
Capacity Report (June 21, 2019), https://www.
eia.gov/petroleum/refinerycapacity/ .......................48
1
OPINION BELOW
The Tenth Circuit’s opinion is reported at 948 F.3d
1206 and reproduced at Petition Appendix (“App.”) 1a–
94a. The underlying EPA orders are not published in
the Federal Register or otherwise publicly available,
but they are produced in the Supplemental Appendix
to the Petition (“Suppl. App.”) 1a–46a.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered its judgment on January 24, 2020. A petition for rehearing was denied on
April 7, 2020. This Court entered an order on March
19, 2020 extending the time to file a petition for a writ
of certiorari to 150 days. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on September 4, 2020, and granted on
January 8, 2021. This Court has jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. §1254(1).
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED
Section 211(o)(9) of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), 42
U.S.C. §7545(o)(9), provides:
(9)
Small refineries.
(A)
Temporary exemption
2
(i)
In general
The requirements of paragraph
(2) shall not apply to small refineries until calendar year 2011.
(ii)
Extension of exemption
(I) Study by Secretary of
Energy
Not later than December 31,
2008, the Secretary of Energy shall conduct for the
Administrator a study to determine whether compliance
with the requirements of paragraph (2) would impose a
disproportionate economic
hardship on small refineries.
(II)
Extension of exemption
In the case of a small refinery that the Secretary of
Energy determines under
subclause (I) would be subject to a disproportionate
economic hardship if required to comply with paragraph (2), the Administrator
shall extend the exemption
under clause (i) for the small
refinery for a period of not
less than 2 additional years.
3
(B) Petitions based on disproportionate economic hardship
(i)
Extension of exemption
A small refinery may at any time
petition the Administrator for
an extension of the exemption
under subparagraph (A) for the
reason of disproportionate economic hardship.
(ii)
Evaluation of petitions
In evaluating a petition under
clause (i), the Administrator, in
consultation with the Secretary
of Energy, shall consider the findings of the study under subparagraph (A)(ii) and other economic
factors.
(iii) Deadline for action on petitions
The Administrator shall act on
any petition submitted by a small
refinery for a hardship exemption not later than 90 days after
the date of receipt of the petition.
(C)
Credit program
If a small refinery notifies the Administrator that the small refinery
waives the exemption under subparagraph (A), the regulations promulgated under paragraph (2)(A) shall
provide for the generation of credits
4
by the small refinery under paragraph (5) beginning in the calendar
year following the date of notification.
(D)
Opt-in for small refineries
A small refinery shall be subject to the
requirements of paragraph (2) if the
small refinery notifies the Administrator that the small refinery waives the
exemption under subparagraph (A).
42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(9). Other relevant provisions are set
forth in Appendix C to the Petition. See App. 97a–103a.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Renewable Fuel Standard
(“RFS”) program to force the transportation market toward greater production and consumption of renewable fuels, which in turn would reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, boost U.S. energy security, and support rural communities. For the RFS to function as intended,
refiners and importers of gasoline and diesel fuels
must blend increasing amounts of renewable fuel into
their products each year.
When Congress enacted the RFS, it established a
temporary exemption to provide all small refineries
with additional time to prepare for compliance, 42
U.S.C. §7545(o)(9)(A)(i), with two pathways by which
EPA could extend the initial exemption for refineries
that needed more time before coming into compliance.
5
Id. §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II), (B)(i). Under the pathway at
issue here, small refineries could petition EPA for an
extension of the initial exemption if they demonstrated
that compliance with the RFS would result in disproportionate economic hardship.
The question presented in this case derives from
the Tenth Circuit’s determination that §7545(o)(9)(B)(i)
authorizes EPA to extend a refinery’s temporary exemption only if the refinery has been continuously exempt in each prior year. The Tenth Circuit analyzed
the statutory term “extension of exemption” and emphasized that “[t]he small refinery exemption subject
to an extension” is the initial exemption provided to all
small refineries, which “is expressly identified as ‘Temporary.’ ” App. 65a. The court then concluded that,
“[p]aired with the rest of the amended Clean Air Act,
. . . common definitions of ‘extension’ mean that a small
refinery which did not seek or receive an exemption in
prior years is ineligible for an extension, because at
that point there is nothing to prolong, enlarge, or add
to.” App. 67a. The court explained that “[c]onstruing
the word ‘extension’ to require prior exemptions—as a
predicate to prolongment or enlargement—limits but
preserves the small refinery exemption while giving
meaning to the remainder of 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9).”
App. 70a–71a.
As explained herein, the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the small refinery exemption provisions is the
only interpretation that conforms with the statute’s
text, structure, and purpose. Continuity of the temporary exemption is inherent in both the ordinary
6
meaning of the word “extension” and the specific context in which it is employed in §7545(o)(9)(B)(i)—with
a specific reference back to the finite “temporary” exemption granted to all small refineries at the start of
the RFS program. This reading also carries out the
small refinery exemption provisions’ purpose of providing a temporary delay in RFS obligations for small refineries, with an eye toward bringing all refineries into
compliance.
This Court should affirm the decision below.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
A. The Renewable Fuel Standard Program
Congress created the RFS program to “move the
United States toward greater energy independence
and security, [and] to increase the production of clean
renewable fuels.” Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA
(“ACE”), 864 F.3d 691, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting the
Energy Independence and Security Act, Pub. L. No.
110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (2007)). To accomplish these
goals, “[t]he statute mandates the gradual introduction
of four nested categories of renewable fuels into the
United States’ supply of gasoline, diesel, and other
transportation fuels.” Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc.
7
v. EPA, 936 F.3d 628, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2019); 42 U.S.C.
§7545(o)(2)(B).1
The statute prescribes annually increasing “applicable volumes” of renewable fuels that must be introduced each year, beginning at 4 billion gallons of
renewable fuel in 2006 and ascending to 36 billion gallons in 2022. Id. §7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(I). “Under certain circumstances, the [statute] grants [EPA] authority to
exercise so-called waivers to reduce applicable volumes below statutory levels.” American Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. EPA (“AFPM”), 937 F.3d 559, 569–70
(D.C. Cir. 2019). “After exercising any waivers and finalizing an applicable volume for each type of fuel,” the
statute requires EPA to “calculate and promulgate renewable fuel obligations that will ensure that the Program’s requirements are met in the upcoming year.”
AFPM, 937 F.3d at 570. In effect, EPA converts the applicable volume into a “percentage standard informing
each obligated party”—any entity refining or importing transportation fuel, 40 C.F.R. §80.1406(a)(1)—“how
much of its fuel production must consist of renewable
fuels.” Monroe Energy, LLC v. EPA, 750 F.3d 909, 912
(D.C. Cir. 2014).
Obligated parties satisfy their renewable fuel
obligation by “retiring” credits, called “Renewable
Identification Numbers” or “RINs,” “at an annual compliance demonstration.” AFPM, 937 F.3d at 572; 40
1
These categories are: (1) renewable fuel; (2) advanced biofuel; (3) cellulosic biofuel; and (4) biomass-based diesel. 42 U.S.C.
§7545(o)(2)(A)(i).
8
C.F.R. §80.1427. RINs are “unique number[s] generated to represent a volume of renewable fuel[.]” 40
C.F.R. §80.1401. “RINs remain attached to the renewable fuel until that fuel is purchased by an obligated
party or blended into fossil fuels to be used for transportation fuel.” Alon, 936 F.3d at 637. “At that point the
RINs become ‘separated,’ meaning they are, in effect, a
form of compliance credit.” Id. Separated RINs “may be
retained by the party who possesses them or sold or
traded on the open RIN market.” ACE, 864 F.3d at 699.
“[A]n obligated party [that] does not have enough RINs
to meet its renewable fuel obligation . . . may: (i) attempt to purchase any RINs it needs on the open RIN
market; (ii) use carryover RINs it has from the prior
year to meet some portion of its obligation; or (iii) carry
a renewable fuel deficit forward into the next compliance year, provided that some conditions are met.”
ACE, 864 F.3d at 699−700.
B. Temporary Exemptions for Small Refineries
Most obligated parties began fulfilling their RFS
volume obligations in compliance year 2006. However,
Congress “created a three-tiered system of exemptions
to afford small refineries”—those whose “average aggregate daily crude oil throughput for a calendar year
. . . does not exceed 75,000 barrels,” §7545(o)(1)(K)—
“a bridge to compliance.” Hermes Consol., LLC v.
EPA, 787 F.3d 568, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2015); 42 U.S.C.
§7545(o)(9)(A)−(B). First, the statute provided a “[t]emporary exemption” from RFS obligations to all small
9
refineries through 2010. Id. §7545(o)(9)(A)(i). Second,
“the statute directed [the Department of Energy
(“DOE”)] to conduct a study ‘to determine whether
compliance . . . would impose a disproportionate economic hardship on small refineries,’ ” and “[i]f DOE determined that any small refinery ‘would be subject to a
disproportionate economic hardship if required to comply with’ the renewable fuels program, EPA was required to extend the exemption for that refinery ‘for a
period of not less than 2 additional years.’ ” Hermes,
787 F.3d at 573 (quoting §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)). Third, the
statute allowed individual small refineries “at any
time [to] petition the Administrator for an extension
of the exemption under subparagraph (A) for the
reason of disproportionate economic hardship.” Id.
§7545(o)(9)(B)(i).
DOE conducted the mandated study in 2009 and
found “no reason to believe small refineries will be disproportionately harmed by inclusion in the RFS[ ] program.” Office of Policy & Int’l Affairs, Dep’t of Energy,
EPACT 2005 Section 1501: Small Refineries Exemption Study, at 13 (Jan. 2009). DOE explained that
the RFS provided sufficient “flexibility,” in that “[s]ome
[small refineries] will be able to generate RINs
through blending renewable fuels into their products;
others may choose to purchase RINs[.]” Id. A few
months later, the Senate Committee on Appropriations
directed DOE to “reopen and reassess” its study. S. Rep.
No. 111-45, at 109 (2009). DOE issued a revised study
in 2011. Office of Policy & Int’l Affairs, Dep’t of Energy,
Small Refinery Exemption Study (Mar. 2011) (“2011
10
DOE Study”). In the 2011 DOE Study, DOE reversed
itself and determined that small refineries can suffer
disproportionate economic hardship from compliance
with the RFS program, at least to the extent that compliance costs increase to the point that the refineries
are not viable. Id.
The statute requires that EPA evaluate refineries’
petitions for exemption extensions “in consultation”
with DOE. 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(9)(B)(ii). The statute
does not define the term “disproportionate economic
hardship,” but directs EPA and DOE to “consider the
findings” of DOE’s study and “other economic factors.”
Id. §7545(o)(9)(B)(i)−(ii). EPA has offered little public
information regarding its adjudication of small refinery exemption petitions after it receives DOE’s recommendations. A 2016 EPA memorandum asserted that
EPA considers “the findings of the DOE Small Refinery
Study and a variety of economic factors,” including
“profitability, net income, cash flow and cash balances,
gross and net refining margins, ability to pay for small
refinery improvement projects, corporate structure, debt
and other financial obligations, RIN prices, and the
cost of compliance through RIN purchases.” See Office
of Air & Radiation, EPA, Financial and Other Information to Be Submitted with 2016 RFS Small Refinery
Hardship Exemption Requests (Dec. 6, 2016), https://
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-12/documents/
rfs-small-refinery-2016-12-06.pdf. It is not clear from
publicly available sources, however, whether EPA continues to undertake the analysis identified in EPA’s
2016 memorandum.
11
C. EPA’s Administration of the Small Refinery Temporary Exemption
Fifty-nine small refineries were exempt through
2010 under the initial blanket exemption. §7545(o)(9)(A)(i);
2011 DOE Study at 26. Between a two-year extension
of exemption based on the 2011 DOE Study (i.e., for
2011 and 2012) and a few individual petition-based
exemptions, only 24 refineries remained exempt for
2011 and 23 remained exempt for 2012. 77 Fed. Reg.
1,320, 1,340 (Jan. 9, 2012); EPA, RFS Small Refinery
Exemptions, Table 2, https://www.epa.gov/fuelsregistration-reporting-and-compliance-help/rfs-smallrefinery-exemptions (last updated Mar. 18, 2021)
(“RFS Small Refinery Exemptions”). Consistent with
the “temporary” nature of the exemption, the number
of exempt refineries “tapered down” between 20132015, with only eight extension petitions granted in
2013, eight granted in 2014, and seven granted in
2015. See RFS Small Refinery Exemptions; App. 68a.
But starting with the 2016 compliance year, EPA
abruptly changed course. The number of exempt refineries jumped to 19 for 2016, 35 for 2017, and 32 for
2018.2 RFS Small Refinery Exemptions. EPA adjudicates petitions for small refinery exemption extensions
2
EPA has received 32 petitions for 2019 and 16 for 2020,
RFS Small Refinery Exemptions, but has stated it will not act on
these petitions until this Court issues a decision in this case, with
the exception of two petitions that EPA granted the night before
President Biden’s inauguration. See Petition for Review, Ex. A–
D, Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. EPA, No. 21-9518 (10th Cir. filed Feb.
8, 2021).
12
in secret, so the public only learned of the uptick in exempt refineries through news reports in the spring of
2018.3 In August 2018, EPA created an online “dashboard” through which it periodically releases updates
on the aggregate number of exemptions and the corresponding aggregate amount of renewable fuel covered
by the exemptions. RFS Small Refinery Exemptions.
But “[t]he dashboard does not identify the refineries
that received extensions, the date of decisions, the regulatory standards being applied to evaluate applications, or the reasons for granting or denying the
exemptions.” Advanced Biofuels Ass’n v. EPA, 792 Fed.
App’x 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
II.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
A. Petitioners’ Exemption Extension Petitions
Petitioner HollyFrontier Refining & Marketing,
LLC (“HollyFrontier Refining”) submitted exemption
extension petitions for compliance year 2016 on behalf of two small refineries owned by its subsidiaries,
Petitioner HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC
(“HollyFrontier Cheyenne”) and Petitioner HollyFrontier Woods Cross Refining, LLC (“HollyFrontier Woods
Cross”) (collectively, with HollyFrontier Refining,
3
See, e.g., Jarrett Renshaw & Chris Prentice, Chevron, Exxon
Seek ‘Small Refinery’ Waivers from U.S. Biofuels Law, Reuters
(Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biofuelsepa-refineries-exclusive/exclusive-chevron-exxon-seek-small-refinerywaivers-from-u-s-biofuels-lawidUSKBN1HJ32R.
13
“HollyFrontier”). HollyFrontier Cheyenne received an
extension of the temporary exemption through 2012
based on the 2011 DOE Study, but its exemption
was not further extended in 2013 or 2014. App. 29a.
HollyFrontier Cheyenne applied for an exemption extension in 2015, but EPA denied the petition. App. 29a.
HollyFrontier Cheyenne appealed EPA’s denial to the
Tenth Circuit, which remanded the decision for further consideration in light of its opinion in Sinclair
Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, 887 F.3d 986 (10th Cir.
2017). For purposes of this case, the Tenth Circuit assumed that EPA granted the 2015 petition on remand,
as the record did not reflect EPA’s final disposition.
App. 30a. The record does not indicate that HollyFrontier
Woods Cross ever received an extension of the small
refinery temporary exemption based on either the 2011
DOE Study or a petition to EPA. App. 32a.
A subsidiary of CVR Refining, LP, Petitioner
Wynnewood Refining Company, LLC (“Wynnewood”),
submitted an exemption extension petition for its
Wynnewood Refinery for compliance year 2017.
Wynnewood’s petition stated that it had received an
extension of the initial exemption in 2011 and 2012
but received no further extensions of the exemption.
App. 34a.
EPA granted each of these three petitions in unpublished decisions that were initially issued only to
the Petitioners. The Biofuels Respondents did not have
access to these decisions until receiving the administrative record for this case from EPA.
14
B. The Biofuels Respondents’ Petition for
Review and the Tenth Circuit’s Judgment
The Biofuels Respondents learned of Petitioners’
exemptions through media reports and confirmed
them through the Petitioners’ public filings with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The Biofuels Respondents filed a petition for review challenging
EPA’s statutory authority to grant these exemptions
and challenging EPA’s decisions as arbitrary and capricious in several respects.
The Clean Air Act dictates that petitions for review of agency actions with local or regional applicability are to be heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals with
jurisdiction over that locality or region, while agency
actions with national applicability are to be heard by
the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1). Because EPA’s
decisions regarding individual small refinery exemption petitions are construed as having local or regional
applicability, the Biofuels Respondents filed for review
in the Tenth Circuit.4
In the ruling challenged by Petitioners, the Tenth
Circuit vacated all three exemption decisions, holding
4
In 2019, EPA changed its prior practice of issuing individual decision documents for each small refinery petition submitted.
That year, EPA addressed all 2018 small refinery exemption extension petitions in a single memorandum, which also set forth
EPA’s national approach for adjudicating such petitions. The parties comprising the Biofuels Respondents have sought review of
that decision before the D.C. Circuit. See Renewable Fuels Ass’n
v. EPA, No. 19-1220 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 22, 2019).
15
that EPA exceeded its authority under 42 U.S.C.
§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) by granting new small refinery exemptions to Petitioners’ refineries when the plain text
of the statute allows EPA to grant only “extensions” of
the initial temporary exemption. The court explained
that “an ‘extension’ requires a small refinery exemption in prior years to prolong, enlarge, or add to,”
meaning that “the only small refineries . . . eligible
for extensions were the ones that submitted meritorious hardship petitions each year.” App. 68a, 75a. Because each of the three refineries’ exemptions had
expired by 2013 at the latest, the court held that “[a]t
most, these Refineries sought to renew or restart their
exemptions,” which “[t]he amended Clean Air Act did
not authorize.” App. 75a.
The Tenth Circuit found two additional flaws with
EPA’s decisions that Petitioners have not challenged
here. First, the Tenth Circuit held that EPA exceeded
its statutory authority by “[g]ranting extensions of exemptions based at least in part on hardships not
caused by RFS compliance.” App. 84a–85a. EPA’s decisions cited to “[a] difficult year for the refining industry
as a whole” and an “industry-wide downward trend”
of lower net refining margins. App. 84a. These were
among other factors that the court determined were inappropriately considered because they were “not restricted to disproportionate economic hardship caused
by RFS compliance.” App. 83a–84a.
Second, the Tenth Circuit held that it was arbitrary and capricious for EPA to have “ignored or failed
to provide reasons for deviating from prior studies
16
showing that” the costs of purchasing the credits
needed to show RFS compliance (i.e., “RINs”) “do not
disproportionately harm refineries which are not vertically integrated.” App. 87a. This is because “merchant
refineries typically recoup their RIN purchase costs
through higher petroleum fuel prices.” App. 91a.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Most refineries and petroleum importers in the
United States have complied with the requirements of
the RFS, diversifying the United States’ energy portfolio while reducing carbon-based pollution across the
country. Recently, however, EPA has allowed certain
smaller refineries to avoid compliance through unlawful application of the statute’s small refinery
exemption provisions. These provisions establish a
temporary exemption for all small refineries through
2010, 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(9)(A)(i), and two mechanisms
for extending that temporary exemption. First, the
statute provides that EPA “shall extend the exemption
. . . for a period of not less than two additional years”
for refineries that a statutorily-mandated DOE study
concluded “would be subject to a disproportionate economic hardship if required to comply” with the RFS.
Id. §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II). Second, “[a] small refinery
may at any time petition [EPA] for an extension of the
exemption . . . for the reason of disproportionate economic hardship.” Id. §7545(o)(9)(B)(i).
17
In the challenged actions, EPA granted three
small refineries’ petitions for exemption extensions,
despite the fact that the refineries were no longer in
exempt status. Applying the commonly understood
and accepted meaning of “extension”—“to prolong”
something that is currently in place—the Tenth Circuit held that EPA exceeded its authority under
§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) by creating new exemptions from
whole cloth, when the statute only authorized EPA to
extend an existing exemption. Because none of the
three refineries still had an exemption, there was nothing for EPA to extend.
Petitioners challenge the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute, asserting that because “extension” can sometimes mean “grant” or “make available,”
the temporary exemption should be treated as a “freestanding exemption” that EPA can grant ad hoc.
The text, structure, and purpose of the statute preclude that interpretation. Starting with the text,
§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) authorizes only “an extension of the
exemption under subparagraph (A).” This alone forecloses the possibility that this provision allows EPA to
grant a “free-standing exemption.” Authority to extend
is explicitly limited to the “temporary exemption” under subparagraph (A), which Congress granted when
it enacted the RFS. There is thus nothing for EPA to
“grant” or “make available,” only a specific existing exemption to prolong. Further, because “extension” can
only mean the continuance of the time-limited subparagraph (A) exemption, temporal continuity is required.
See infra Part I.A.
18
The structure of the small refinery exemption provisions and surrounding terms further confirms this
reading of §7545(o)(9)(B)(i). Petitioners concede that
§7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II)—authorizing extension of the exemption “for a period of . . . additional years” based on
the DOE study—requires temporal continuity. Established principles of statutory interpretation dictate
that when Congress used the same term, “extension of
exemption,” in the following provision of the same section of the statute, it intended the same meaning. That
refineries may submit their petitions “at any time” has
no bearing on the refineries’ eligibility for exemption
extensions. Likewise, Congress’s decision to define
“small refinery” based on a year’s throughput does not
override the other conditions of eligibility for exemption extensions. See infra Part I.B.
The stated purposes of the RFS fully support the
Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of §7545(o)(9)(B)(i). The
United States cannot realize Congress’s vision for a
cleaner and more diverse energy portfolio if small refinery exemptions continue indefinitely and unpredictably to siphon a significant portion of renewable fuel
blending requirements out of the RFS program. The
Tenth Circuit’s holding also comports with the small
refinery exemption provisions’ “temporary” character
and overarching goal of funneling all small refineries
into compliance with the RFS. See infra Part I.C.
Petitioners’ policy argument that §7545(o)(9)(B)(i)
is meant to be a permanent “safety valve,” which they
conceive as an option for small refineries to never comply with the RFS, is foreclosed by the statute. This
19
argument also fails on its merits, particularly given
that all but seven or eight small refineries complied for
three consecutive years between 2013-2015. More importantly, the alleged harms cannot be reconciled with
EPA’s steadfast conclusion that refineries of all sizes
can fully recover the costs of RFS compliance in the
sales prices of their products. In any event, to the extent there is any validity to Petitioners’ claims of economic harm caused by the RFS, the statute includes
separate provisions to address such circumstances for
all obligated parties. See infra Part I.D.
Lastly, this is not a Chevron deference case. Petitioners’ claim that the Tenth Circuit’s holding was a
necessary assumption underlying a 2014 EPA rule is
not only wrong, but also unpersuasive as a ground
for giving deference to EPA’s prior interpretation of
§7545(o)(9)(B)(i). See infra Part II.
This Court should affirm the Tenth Circuit’s decision.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
ARGUMENT
I.
THE STATUTE AUTHORIZES ONLY AN
EXTENSION OF A SMALL REFINERY’S
INITIAL TEMPORARY EXEMPTION.
The text, structure, and purpose of 42 U.S.C.
§7545(o)(9), independently and as part of the statutory
scheme, dictate that an “extension of exemption” under subparagraph (B)(i) can only mean the temporal
20
extension of the “temporary exemption” that Congress
provided to all small refineries at the start of the RFS
program.
A. The Plain Text of §7545(o)(9) Confirms
the Tenth Circuit’s Interpretation of
Subparagraph (B)(i).
Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i), captioned “Extension of
exemption,” provides that “[a] small refinery may at
any time petition the Administrator for an extension of
the exemption under subparagraph (A) for the reason
of disproportionate economic hardship.” Because the
statute delineates EPA’s “extension” authority by reference to the finite “temporary exemption” granted under subparagraph A, “extension” cannot, in the context
of this statute, mean “to grant” a new exemption or “to
make available” the exemption after a refinery’s exemption term has expired. Accordingly, when the
Tenth Circuit held that the only small refineries that
are “eligible for extensions [are] ones that submitted
meritorious hardship petitions each [prior] year,” App.
68a, it applied a requirement inherent in the statute—
i.e., that a refinery needs to still have an exemption to
be eligible to extend that exemption. This requirement
was compelled by the ordinary meaning of “extension,”
which “dictate[s] that the subject of an extension must
be in existence before it can be extended.” Id. at 67a.
In any statutory construction case, this Court begins with the statute’s text, considering “whether the
language at issue has a plain and unambiguous
21
meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the
case.” Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 100
(2012) (citation omitted). Statutory terms not defined
by the statute “are generally interpreted in accordance
with their ordinary meaning.” Sebelius v. Cloer, 569
U.S. 369, 376 (2013) (citation omitted). Because statutory language “cannot be construed in a vacuum,” however, “the words of a statute must be read in their
context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme.” Roberts, 566 U.S. at 101 (citation
omitted).
Here, the ordinary meaning of the words of the
statute and their context are in harmony. Critically,
§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) identifies the “temporary exemption”
granted under subparagraph (A) as the specific thing
that may extended. That the statute describes “extension” by reference to a specific time-limited exemption
granted by the statute is strong evidence that Congress used “extension” in the relevant ordinary sense
of “an increase in length of time.” See App. 66a. It is
equally strong evidence that subparagraph (B)(i) does
not confer on EPA any authority to grant a new “freestanding exemption” decoupled from the time-limited
temporary exemption already granted by the statute.
Pet’rs Br. 19, 28.
The surrounding text in §7545(o)(9) reinforces
that interpretation. Subparagraph (B)(i) describes “extension” by reference to subparagraph (A), captioned
“Temporary exemption,” which provides that statutory
RFS obligations “shall not apply to small refineries
until calendar year 2011.” Id. §7545(o)(9)(A)(i). The
22
statute offers two ways of lengthening that initial, finite term beyond 2010, both by an “extension of exemption.” Id. §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II), (B)(i). Neither of these
“extension of exemption” clauses leaves any doubt as
to what Congress permitted to be “extended”: the “temporary exemption” under subparagraph A.
The first of these appears in subparagraph (A)’s
second clause, “Extension of exemption.” Therein,
Congress directed DOE to conduct a study “to determine whether compliance with [RFS] requirements
. . . would impose a disproportionate economic hardship on small refineries.” Id. §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(I). The
second subclause, also captioned “Extension of exemption,” directed EPA to “extend the exemption under
clause [A](i) . . . for a period of not less than 2 additional years” for small refineries that the DOE study
determined “would be subject to a disproportionate
economic hardship” if required to comply with the RFS.
Id. §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II).
The second way to extend the temporary exemption appears in subparagraph (B). There, Congress
provided a refinery-driven petition process “based on
disproportionate economic hardship.” Id. §7545(o)(9)(B).
Like §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II), subparagraph (B)(i) is captioned “Extension of exemption,” and it similarly specifies what can be extended by reference to the original
exemption: “the extension of the exemption under subparagraph (A).” Id. §7545(o)(9)(B)(i).5
5
Because subparagraph (B)(i) references the entirety of paragraph A, an exemption extension by petition was available to
23
Petitioners’ arguments that §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) gives
EPA authority to grant a “free-standing exemption” either try to manufacture ambiguity where there is
none, and/or take words and phrases out of context to
avoid the otherwise obvious implications of the statutory scheme. None of Petitioners’ arguments undercut
the plain text of the statute or this Court’s established
principles of interpretation.
1. The term “extension” in §7545(o)(9)(B)(i)
cannot mean “to grant” or “make available.”
Petitioners’ central premise is that the Tenth Circuit used the wrong definition of “extension” when interpreting §7545(o)(9)(B)(i). To argue that “extension”
need not mean “an increase in length of time,” App.
66a, Petitioners offer several examples showing that—
at least as a general matter—the terms “extend” and
“extension” can have “a wide range of possible meanings.” Pet’rs Br. 23. But “construing statutory language
is not merely an exercise in ascertaining the outer limits of a word’s definitional possibilities.” FCC v. AT & T
Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 407 (2011) (quotation marks omitted). Statutory language must be construed “in light of
the terms surrounding it,” and there is “no sound reason in the statutory text or context to disregard the
eligible refineries either immediately after the initial exemption
period in §7545(o)(9)(A)(i), or immediately after the expiration of
the exemption extension under §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II).
24
ordinary meaning of ” extension in §7545(o)(9)(B)(i). Id.
at 405, 407 (quotation marks omitted).
The Tenth Circuit appropriately identified “[a]
common definition of ‘extension’ that meshes with th[e]
statutory scheme”: “an increase in length of time, especially an increase in time allowed under agreement
or concession.” App. 66a (quotation marks omitted).
That approach incorporates two fundamental canons
of statutory construction: (1) that otherwise undefined
words “will be interpreted as taking their ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning,” Sandifer v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 571 U.S. 220, 227 (2015) (quotation marks omitted); and (2) that “the words of a statute must be read
in their context and with a view to their place in
the overall statutory scheme.” Parker Drilling Mgmt.
Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, 139 S. Ct. 1881, 1888 (2019)
(quoting Roberts, 566 U.S. at 101). Construing “extension” in its temporal sense applies not only its ordinary
meaning, but also the only meaning that makes sense
in the context of §7545(o)(9)(B)(i).
Petitioners argue that the court should have considered that “extension” can also mean “to grant” or
“make available.” Pet’rs Br. 27–28. But identifying a
possible alternative definition of a word “does not establish that the word is ordinarily understood in that
sense.” Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S.
560, 568 (2012) (citation omitted). Nor does the existence of an alternative definition render a statute ambiguous—particularly when the proffered alternative
cannot be squared with the plain terms of the statute.
AT & T, 562 U.S. at 407; Yates v. United States, 574 U.S.
25
528, 537 (2015) (“[T]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined not only by reference to
the language itself, but as well by the specific context
in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”) (quotation marks omitted).
To begin with, the words “extend” and “extension”
cannot be interpreted independently—in §7545(o)(9)
these words are always used in conjunction with “exemption.” They appear together in three captions—
§7545(o)(9)(A)(ii), (A)(ii)(II), (B)(i) (“Extension of exemption”)—and in each of the two operative extension clauses, both of which also identify the specific
exemption to be extended—(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II) (“extend the
exemption under clause [A](i)”) and (o)(9)(B)(i) (“extension of the exemption under subparagraph (A)”). Thus,
the operative term is not simply “extension” but “extension of the exemption in subparagraph (A).” Accordingly, §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) authorizes only an “extension of
the exemption under subparagraph (A),” not an exemption in isolation. And because “the exemption under
subparagraph (A)” is time-limited, an “extension”
thereof is naturally interpreted as meaning “to make
longer.”
Interpreting §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) as instead authorizing EPA to grant a “free-standing exemption,” Pet’rs
Br. 28, rather than an extension of a specific existing
exemption, renders meaningless the reference to “the
exemption under subparagraph A”—the very term
Congress used to identify the subject of the “extension.”
This violates the “cardinal principle of statutory
26
construction that [courts and agencies] must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.”
N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 941 (2017)
(quotation marks omitted).
More fundamentally, replacing “extension” in
§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) with Petitioners’ suggested alternatives—“grant” or “make available”—renders the provision either redundant or impossible to execute by its
literal terms. The provision would read: A “small refinery may at any time petition the Administrator for [a
grant] of the exemption under subparagraph (A). . . .”
But the statute already grants “the exemption under
subparagraph (A)” in subparagraph (A)(i), which by its
plain terms expired as of 2010. The conditional extension under subparagraph (A)(ii) was also finite (expiring as of 2012) and likewise granted by the statute. So,
to interpret “extension” in (B)(i) as “grant” or “make
available” “the exemption under subparagraph (A),”
would ignore the express temporal limitations in subparagraph A.
Petitioners’ interpretive problem is not solved by
what they argue is “one of the most important textual
clues in the statute”: the reference in §7545(o)(9)(B)(iii)
to a “petition for a hardship exemption.” Pet’rs Br.
28. That Congress referred to “petition[s] for a hardship exemption” in a subclause instructing EPA to
rule on such petitions within 90 days does not alter
Congress’s description in §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) of what specifically can be extended—“the exemption under subparagraph (A).” Nor does it make Petitioners’ concept
27
of a free-standing exemption any more compatible with
the rest of the statute.
Had Congress intended to create a “free-standing
exemption,” it would have done so in plain terms. Indeed, it would most likely have avoided using the term
“extension” at all; it most likely would have used the
word “grant,” as it did throughout the Clean Air Act.
For example, 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(7)(C) speaks in terms
of “[a] waiver granted,” not a waiver extended.6 Congress also used variations of “grant”—rather than “extension”—in other provisions of the Energy Policy Act
of 2005 when referring to granting an exemption. See
Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594, 1101 (“No such exemption shall be granted. . . .”); 119 Stat. 594, 955
(“any exemption granted”). Where, as here, “legislators
did not adopt obvious alternative language, the natural implication is that they did not intend the alternative.” Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137
S. Ct. 1652, 1659 (2017) (quotation marks omitted).
Petitioners’ examples of how “extension” is used in
other statutes “are largely irrelevant” except to make
the uncontested point that “extension” can take on
other meanings in other contexts. See Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, n.4 (1997).7 Tellingly, Petitioners’
6
See also, e.g., §7545(c)(4)(C)(ii)(III) (“grant the waiver”);
§7545(f )(4) (“grant or deny an application”); §7545(k)(B)(iv) (“the
granting and use of credits”); §7545(k)(7)(A) (“the granting of an
appropriate amount of credits”); §7545(m)(3)(C)(ii) (“waiver may
be granted”).
7
For example, Petitioners cite Field v. Mans, 157 F.3d 35, 43
(1st Cir. 1998), which states that the phrase “extension of credit”
28
examples of statutes where Congress used “extension”
synonymously with “grant” or “make available” do not
involve Congress authorizing an “extension” of something similarly time-limited, specific, and already in
place.8
2. The term “extension” in §7545(o)(9)(B)(i)
requires temporal continuity.
Petitioners argue in the alternative that the
term “extension” does not require temporal continuity. Similar to their arguments regarding other possible definitions of extension, Petitioners again fail to
demonstrate how a “free-standing exemption” is workable within the text of the statute. Instead, Petitioners offer only general examples in which temporal
as used in section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code has two
possible meanings—to grant or to lengthen or enlarge. The fact
that the meaning of “extension” is ambiguous under an entirely
different statutory scheme is irrelevant here, where the context
and purpose of the provision at issue eliminate any ambiguity
that the word “extension” may have in isolation.
8
22 U.S.C. §4061(a)(2) (“extension of the benefits of the [Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System],” including “future
benefits,” “to new groups of employees”); 22 U.S.C. §4061(a)(3) (“extension of benefits”); 43 U.S.C. §451b(c) (“extension of benefits”);
15 U.S.C. §78l(f )(1)(E) (“extension of unlisted trading privileges”);
38 U.S.C. §3748 (“extension of financial assistance”); 50 U.S.C.
§2333(c) (“extension of foreign assistance”); 15 U.S.C. §§1141d,
1141e, 1141f, 1141g (“extension of protection”); 18 U.S.C. §892
(“extension of credit”); 42 U.S.C. §9601(20)(H) (“extension of
credit”); 25 U.S.C. §3204(b)(3) (“extension of access”); 32 U.S.C.
§308(a), §310(b) (“extension of temporary Federal recognition”);
19 U.S.C. §2434(c), §2437(c)(1) (“extension of nondiscriminatory
treatment”).
29
continuity is not an inherent requirement of “extension” in other, non-analogous contexts outside of the
RFS. Context is integral to statutory interpretation,
however, and the context of §7545(o)(9)(B)(i), authorizing extension of an established exemption, requires
continuity.
The concept of temporal continuity is implicit in
§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) because the term “extension” is delineated by reference to a specific extant, time-limited exemption. “Extension” in this context can mean only the
continuance of the particular exemption that Congress
granted “in subparagraph (A).” As the Tenth Circuit
put it, an “extension” under §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) “requires
a small refinery exemption in prior years to prolong,
enlarge, or add to.” App. 75a.
While Petitioners dispute that the term “extension” in subparagraph (B)(i) requires temporal continuity, they concede that nearly identical language
in the immediately preceding subparagraph (A)(ii)(II)
does require it. Pet’rs Br. 26–27; see 42 U.S.C.
§7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II) (authorizing EPA to “extend the
exemption . . . for a period of . . . additional years.”). As
explained infra, Petitioners offer no plausible reason
why this Court should assign different meanings to essentially the same phrase in adjacent subparagraphs
(A) (“extend the exemption”) and (B) (“extension of the
exemption”), particularly because both clauses use “extension” together with explicit reference back to the
same exemption. Continuity is therefore required in
both instances.
30
Even standing alone, the ordinary meaning and
use of the term “extension” implicate continuity. Despite Petitioners’ claim otherwise, Pet’rs Br. 29, the
Tenth Circuit did reference a dictionary definition of
“extension” implicating “continuity.” App. 66a (citing Extension, Cambridge Online Dictionary, https://dictionary.
cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english (last visited Mar.
20, 2021) (“[T]he fact of reaching, stretching, or continuing; the act of adding to something in order to make
it bigger or longer.”) (emphasis added)). Other dictionaries have likewise defined “extension” to invoke
temporal continuity. See, e.g., Extension, Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“The continuation of the
same contract for a specified period.”). Consistent with
these definitions, courts routinely interpret “extension”
to mean a continuous temporal period. See United
States v. Hermanek, 289 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“an order is an extension of an earlier order only if it
authorizes continued interception of the same location. . . .”); United States v. Ojeda Rios, 875 F.2d 17, 21
(2d Cir. 1989) (“the term extensions is to be understood
in a common sense fashion as encompassing all consecutive continuations of a wiretap order. . . .”) (quotation marks omitted), vacated and remanded on
other grounds by 495 U.S. 257 (1990); see also Sunac
Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes, 416 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex.
1967) (“It seems clear that the new lease was not an
Extension of the old lease. An extension, as used in this
context, generally means the prolongation or continuation of the term of the existing lease. . . . [But here]
the lease had long since expired. . . .”).
31
Moreover, if Congress did not intend to require
continuity, it could have simply allowed for new exemptions, instead of “extensions” of the “temporary” exemption, or used a different term in place of
“extension,” such as “renewal,” which is defined as “to
begin or take up again.” See Random House Webster’s
Unabridged Dictionary at 684, 1631 (Deluxe Ed. 2001);
see also Eastham v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C.,
754 F.3d 356, 362 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Xenia v.
State, 746 N.E.2d 666, 673 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000)) (“Paragraph 12 set forth an option to extend, rather than an
option to renew, the water contract. Therefore . . . no
new water contracts ever came into being, but the original water contract remained continuously in force
through a series of successive one-year extensions.”);
Aquilent, Inc. v. Distributed Solutions, Inc., 2012 WL
405009, at *7 (E.D. Va. Feb. 7, 2012) (A new contract
cannot be considered an “extension” of a prior contract).
Petitioners provide the example of an extension of
a filing deadline under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B), Pet’rs
Br. 29, to suggest that extensions need not be continuous. However, this example actually supports the notion that the ordinary meaning of “extension” implies
continuity. In conferring discretionary power to “extend the time” when “an act may or must be done
within a specified time,” Rule 6 distinguishes between
the power to extend time “before the original time or
its extension expires” for “good cause,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
6(b)(1)(A), from the separately-conferred power to extend most deadlines after “time has expired,” Fed. R.
32
Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B), which requires a higher showing. See
Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 895–96
(1990). This suggests that the power to extend after expiration is not inherent to—and should not be inferred
from—a grant of the general power to “extend.” Unlike
Rule 6(b), §7545(o)(9) does not confer authority on EPA
to “extend” a refinery’s exemption after it expires, and
such authority should not be implied from the term
“extension” alone. See 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(9). That is
particularly so because the discretion to grant an “extension of exemption” under §7545(o)(9) is not analogous to a court’s power to “extend the time” when “an
act may or must be done within a specified time.” See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). The temporary exemption is not
“an act,” but a continuation of a status—the status of
being exempt from RFS obligations. Extension of the
exemption is a continuation of that status for an additional period of time. That is quite different from extending a deadline for completing a specific “act.”
Petitioners’ other examples of instances where
Congress expressly authorized the extension of a benefit after the benefit had lapsed similarly have no bearing on the statute at issue here. While there may be
some instances where Congress intends to authorize
an extension after a lapse, that intent is absent in
§7545(o)(9). Instead, the text reflects that Congress intended the exemption provision to funnel all small refineries into compliance with the RFS. See Hermes, 787
F.3d at 578.
As discussed in Sections I.B and I.C, infra, the flaws
with Petitioners’ interpretation of §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) are
33
even more obvious when the plain text is construed
within the structure of the small refinery exemption
provisions and in light of their purpose.
B. The Structure of the Small Refinery Exemption Provisions Confirms That They
Are Only a Temporary Bridge to Compliance.
The structure of §7545(o)(9) supplies contextual
clues confirming that subparagraph (B)(i) can only be
interpreted to authorize temporal extensions of the
temporary exemption provided by subparagraph (A)(i).
As noted, Petitioners concede that the extensions
granted under subparagraph (A)(ii) are continuous extensions of the initial, temporary exemption in (A)(i).
Pet’rs Br. 26–27. Yet Petitioners challenge the need for
continuity in the nearly identical provision under subparagraph (B)(i). Petitioners cannot assign different
meanings to the same phrase in the same section of the
statute, particularly where, as here, the context makes
clear that Congress intended the same meaning.
Nor can Petitioners use other statutory terms to
negate the commonsense meaning of the term “extension of exemption.” While language must be “construe[d] . . . in light of the terms surrounding it,”
AT&T, 562 U.S. at 398 (quotation marks omitted), it
must also be read so that “no part will be inoperative
or superfluous, void or insignificant.” Rubin v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816, 824 (2018) (quotation
marks omitted). For this reason, the Tenth Circuit
34
correctly rejected Petitioners’ proposed interpretation
because it would not “allow[ ] the word ‘extension’ to
maintain its ordinary meaning” or “meaningfully promote the aims of the statute.” App. 74a.
1. “Extension of exemption” has the same
meaning throughout §7545(o)(9).
Petitioners
admit
that
“extension”
in
§7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II) invokes temporal continuity,
Pet’rs Br. 26–27, but nonetheless argue that the same
word should be interpreted entirely differently in
§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) based on “context.” Every piece of contextual evidence, however, points in the opposite direction.
First, both of the extension provisions have the
same caption, “Extension of exemption,” and while
these “cannot limit the plain meaning of a statutory
text, they supply clues as to what Congress intended.”
Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S. Ct.
883, 893 (2018) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). Second, both the captions and the two operative clauses refer specifically to an “extension of exemption” in some form, within the same statutory
provision, strongly suggesting that they have a single,
fixed meaning. Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United
States ex rel. Hunt, 139 S. Ct. 1507, 1512 (2019) (“In all
but the most unusual situations, a single use of a statutory phrase must have a fixed meaning. We therefore
avoid interpretations that would attribute different
meanings to the same phrase.”) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted).
35
There is a well-established presumption that “a
given term is used to mean the same thing throughout
a statute.” Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449,
456 (2012) (quotation marks omitted). This presumption is heightened where, as here, the same term is
used multiple times in close proximity—e.g., in different subparagraphs of the same paragraph, as extend/extension is used in §7545(o)(9). See Henson v.
Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1722
(2017) (“[T]o rule for [petitioners] we would have to
suppose Congress set two words cheek by jowl in the
same phrase but meant them to speak to entirely different periods of time. . . . [S]upposing such a surreptitious subphrasal shift in time seems to us a bit much.”);
Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 39 (2009) (“[S]ubparagraph M(i) appears just prior to subparagraph M(ii)
. . . and their structures are identical. Where, as here,
Congress uses similar statutory language and similar
statutory structure in two adjoining provisions, it normally intends similar interpretations.”).
Moreover, both §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II) and
§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) describe “extend” and “extension”
by reference to the same statutory exemption, further
confirming that they are describing the same thing.
See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 22 (2005) (“[T]here
is no plausible argument that these terms mean something different in §4(a)(2) than they do in §4(a)(1). This
is not only because of the normal rule of statutory interpretation that identical words used in different
parts of the same statute are generally presumed to
have the same meaning. It is also because §4(a)(2)
36
refers to ‘said principal activity or activities.’ The ‘said’
is an explicit reference to the use of the identical term
in §4(a)(1).”) (internal citation omitted); see also Envtl.
Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 582–84 (2007)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part) (“The statute here includes a statutory cross-reference, which conveys a
clear congressional intent to provide a common definition[.]”).
Petitioners’ attempt to impose meaning on Congress’s decision to split §7545(o)(9) into subparagraphs
is likewise unavailing. Indeed, that the two exemption
extension provisions appear in separate subparagraphs is unsurprising given their different schedules
and procedures. Subparagraph (A) establishes the initial exemption and provides a one-time, two-year extension beginning in calendar year 2011 based on a
DOE study. 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(9)(A). Subparagraph
(B), in contrast, provides an extension based on petitions to EPA, for any refinery that continues to be eligible. Id. §7545(o)(9)(B). A separate paragraph was
also necessary because there are provisions in subparagraphs (C) and (D) that apply only to subparagraph
(A), but not (B). Id. §7545(o)(9)(C), (D) (describing
procedure for when a small refinery “waives the exemption under subparagraph (A)”).9 What remains
9
Subparagraphs (C) and (D) also undermine Petitioners’ position. These provisions require a small refinery opting out of the
exemption in subparagraph (A) to comply with RFS obligations
“beginning in the calendar year following the date of notification.”
See 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(9)(C), (D). The phase “beginning in the calendar year” indicates that once a refinery undertakes its RFS
compliance obligations, it would no longer be eligible for future
37
unaltered across subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D), however, is the cross-reference to “the exemption under
subparagraph (A)”—the only exemption contemplated
in §7545(o)(9).
2. Ability to petition EPA “at any time”
does not alter the eligibility criteria
for an extension of the exemption.
Petitioners argue that the phrase “extension of
the exemption under subparagraph (A)” should not be
given its most sensible meaning because subparagraph (B)(i) states that a small refinery “may at any
time petition” for such an exemption extension. This
erroneously conflates the timing for submitting a petition with eligibility for an exemption extension.
While the statute provides that a refinery may
submit a petition “at any time,” a refinery may petition
only to extend its initial, temporary exemption. As the
Tenth Circuit correctly explained, “even if a small refinery can submit a hardship petition at any time, it
does not follow that every single petition can be
granted.” App. 72a. Within the context of the statute,
and giving every word its ordinary meaning, this can
mean only that a refinery may petition at any time for
an exemption so long as the refinery remained exempt
from compliance in the immediately preceding year.
extensions of its initial, temporary exemption. If Congress had intended for refineries opting out of the exemption to be eligible for
future exemptions, it would have just said “in the year following
the date of notification.”
38
Congress could have allowed a small refinery to obtain
an exemption at any time—but that is not what the
statute provides.
The word “any” in a statute can certainly have a
broad sweep. Pet’rs Br. 33. But the meaning of “any”
“depends on the statutory context,” and “ ‘any’ in this
context does not bear the heavy weight” Petitioners put
upon it. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct.
617, 629 (2018); see also Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA,
573 U.S. 302, 337 (2014) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I
agree with the Court that the word ‘any,’ when used in
a statute, does not normally mean ‘any in the universe.’ ”). Here, the use of the word “any” to describe the
timing of the petition process does not change the eligibility of refineries seeking to extend their respective
exemptions. By trying to make the phrase “at any time”
the operative term, Pet’rs Br. 33–36, Petitioners ignore
the limiting term “extend” or “extension,” which is used
five times in §7545(o)(9). Indeed, if this Court were to
adopt Petitioners’ position, the term “extension” would
be surplusage. See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S.
528, 538–39 (1955) (“It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.”) (quotation
marks omitted).
There are at least two plausible interpretations
that give “some operative effect” to both “at any time”
and “extension.” See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167,
175 (2001) (quotation marks omitted). First, the
phrase “at any time” could signal that refineries
seeking an exemption extension are not constrained
by the various deadlines applicable to the process of
39
setting annual renewable fuel standards. These include: EPA’s November 30th deadline for issuing renewable fuel annual standards for the upcoming
year, §7545(o)(3)(B)(i); the 90-day period in which
EPA is obligated to act on small refinery petitions,
§7545(o)(9)(B)(iii); and the December 31, 2008 deadline by which DOE had to complete its study,
§7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(I). In other words, a small refinery
may “petition” at any point during a calendar year for
another extension of the initial, temporary exemption.
Second, the phrase “at any time” could distinguish
the third tier of the small refinery exemption from the
first two tiers, which are explicitly time-limited. Subparagraph (A)(i) set the initial temporary exemption
through 2010; and (A)(ii) required EPA to extend that
exemption for two additional years for certain refineries. The third tier, (B)(i), is not inherently time-limited—refineries could petition for extensions in 2011
and any year thereafter, so long as they had received
exemptions continuously and met all other requirements. For instance, refineries could petition immediately after the initial five-year exemption for all small
refineries, if not exempted by the DOE study under
§7545(o)(9)(A)(ii). Indeed, that is what happened in
2011 and 2012: 21 small refineries were exempt based
upon the 2011 DOE Study, 77 Fed. Reg. 1,320, 1,340
(Jan. 9, 2012), and two to three more small refineries
obtained an exemption extension from EPA under
§7545(o)(9)(B)(i). RFS Small Refinery Exemptions.
Petitioners’ more expansive reading of “at any
time” would also lead to absurd results. If a small
40
refinery in 2018 were permitted to request an exemption for 2013, long after its compliance deadline had
passed, it is unlikely that the refinery—after waiting
years to request an exemption—could have been facing
hardship at the time of compliance.10 See Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982)
(“[I]nterpretations of a statute which would produce
absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are
available.”).
3. The statutory definition of “small
refinery” does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the
exemption.
Petitioners also suggest that if Congress had intended to limit the hardship exemption to small refineries that had been continuously exempt every year of
the program, one would not expect the definition of
“small refinery” to turn on the refinery’s throughput
“for a calendar year.” Pet’rs Br. 36–38; 42 U.S.C.
§7545(o)(1)(K). Instead, they argue, Congress would
have required the refinery’s throughput to remain
below 75,000 barrels in every preceding year of the
10
EPA has agreed that the phrase “at any time” in
§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) cannot be boundless. See EPA, Denial of Small
Refinery Gap-Filling Petitions (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.epa.
gov/sites/production/files/2020-09/documents/rfs-denial-smallrefinery-gap-filling-petitions-2020-09-14.pdf (“Indeed, it seems
unlikely that Congress contemplated or intended to allow a small
refinery to obtain hardship relief through submitting a petition in
calendar year 2020 for RFS compliance year 2011, for example.”).
41
program. Pet’rs Br. 38. This argument is misplaced.
A small refinery’s eligibility for the original exemption under (A)(i) was based on volumetric output
alone, but exemption extensions under (B)(i) have additional requirements, including continuity. EPA’s regulations recognize this distinction. A small refinery
petitioning under subparagraph (B)(i) must show that
it was “small” in the compliance year as well as
the immediately preceding calendar year. 40 C.F.R.
§80.1441(e)(2)(iii).11
The requirement for an annual volumetric demonstration was added in EPA’s 2014 regulation, consistent with the statutory purpose of reducing the
subset of refineries eligible for “further extension” by
making ineligible refineries that were “small” in 2006
but that were no longer “small.” 79 Fed. Reg. 42,128,
42,152 (July 18, 2014) (“[W]e no longer believe that it
is appropriate that refineries satisfying the 75,000
[barrels per day] threshold in 2006 should be eligible
for extensions to their small refinery RFS exemption
if they no longer meet the 75,000 [barrels per day]
threshold.”). In other words, the 2014 regulation established that a small refinery cannot cease being small,
yet still be exempt from compliance as a small refinery.
This in no way conflicts with the Tenth Circuit’s
11
The requirement that a small refinery demonstrate it met
the threshold in the prior year is necessary because a petition includes only a “project[ion]” of whether the refinery will meet the
threshold “for the year or years for which an exemption is sought.”
40 C.F.R. §80.1441(e)(2)(iii). So, when the refinery petitions for an
extension in the following year, EPA has to confirm that the prior
year’s projection was accurate.
42
interpretation of §7545(o)(9)(B)(i). See App. 77a–78a.
(“The 2014 Small Refinery Rule establishes who may
seek an extension of an exemption, but it does not resolve what constitutes a valid extension.”).
C. The Purposes of §7545(o)(9) and the Renewable Fuel Standard Program Confirm the Tenth Circuit’s Interpretation.
The Tenth Circuit correctly recognized that the
purpose of §7545(o)(9) is to “funnel[ ] small refineries
toward compliance over time.” App. 68a. The court
noted a similar interpretation by the D.C. Circuit,
which observed that “the terms of the statute[ ] contemplate a ‘[t]emporary exemption’ for small refineries
with an eye toward eventual compliance with the
[RFS] program for all refineries.” Hermes, 787 F.3d at
578; App. 68a. The purpose of this “temporary exemption” was to give small refineries “time to develop compliance strategies and increase blending capacity.” Id.
at 572–73, 588. In other words, “once a small refinery
figures out how to put itself in a position of annual
compliance, that refinery is no longer a candidate for
extending” its temporary compliance exemption.12 App.
68a.
12
Indeed, the American Petroleum Institute (“API”) —the
largest U.S. trade association for the oil and natural gas industry—has advocated for the interpretation of the small refinery
exemption provisions adopted by the Tenth Circuit and has consistently argued that EPA should not grant large numbers of exemption extensions. See Br. of Am. Fuel & Petrochem. Mfrs., et
al. at 34–36, RFS Power Coalition v. EPA, No. 20-1046 (D.C. Cir.
43
Petitioners’ claim that “Congress gave no indication that it believed the hardship exemption would
sunset,” Pet’rs Br. 39, is patently false. Congress labeled the exemption “temporary,” an explicit indication
of intent that the exemption provision would phase
out.13 See Temporary, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019) (“Lasting for a time only; existing or continuing
for a limited (usu. Short) time; transitory.”); Temporary,
Lexico, https://www.lexico.com/definition/temporary (last
visited Mar. 4, 2021) (“Lasting for only a limited period
of time; not permanent.”). Petitioners’ attempt to confine the “temporary” label to subparagraph (A) fails,
because as explained supra, subparagraph (B) does not
establish a separate “hardship exemption,” but rather
filed Jan. 29, 2021) (argument presented by API only); see also
API’s Comments on EPA’s Proposed Annual Standards for 2020
(November 29, 2019), https://www.api.org/~/media/Files/News/
Letters-Comments/2019/November_2019/API%20Comment%202020
%20RFS%20Supplemental%20Notice%20EPA-HQ-OAR-2019-0136.
pdf (“In recent years, EPA has granted Small Refinery Exemptions (SREs) liberally, creating significant turmoil in the RFS program. The exemptions have created an unlevel playing field in the
marketplace.”).
13
The statute’s framework for setting annual standards for
volumes of renewable fuels further confirms the temporary nature of the initial small refinery exemption and extensions of that
temporary exemption. While Congress dictated the levels of renewable fuel that must be blended into transportation fuels between 2005 and 2022, §7545(o)(2)(B)(i), Congress deferred to EPA
and DOE to set the annual standards thereafter based on a variety of factors. 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(2)(B)(ii). While Petitioners assert that they need relief from EPA to reduce the cost of complying
with the increasing levels set by Congress, it would make little
sense for EPA to extend compliance exemptions past 2022, when
EPA becomes responsible for setting those annual standards.
44
authorizes only “an extension of the exemption under
subparagraph (A)”—the “[t]emporary exemption.” 42
U.S.C. §7545(o)(9)(B)(i); Pet’rs Br. 40–41.
EPA’s regulations reflect that the mechanisms
available to extend the initial temporary exemption
were meant to force refineries toward compliance. See
78 Fed. Reg. 49,794, 49,825 (Aug. 15, 2013) (“Congress
provided two ways that small refineries can receive a
temporary extension of the exemption beyond 2010.”)
(emphasis added). Specifically, EPA requires petitions
for exemption extensions to identify “the date the refiner
anticipates that compliance with the requirements can
reasonably be achieved,” 40 C.F.R. §80.1441(e)(2)(i), indicating that refineries cannot request relief without
demonstrating to EPA that they are looking ahead toward compliance.
Further, the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of
§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) is consistent with the well-established
purposes of the RFS program. “By mandating the
replacement—at least to a certain degree—of fossil
fuel with renewable fuel, Congress intended the [RFS]
Program to move the United States toward greater energy independence and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.” ACE, 864 F.3d at 696.14 The statute provides
14
Petitioners reference the fact that HollyFrontier’s Cheyenne Refinery no longer produces petroleum fuels as evidence of
the impact of the Tenth Circuit’s decision. Pet’rs Br. 17. Petitioners fail to mention that HollyFrontier is converting the Cheyenne
facility into a renewable diesel plant, a transition projected to
yield a substantial profit. See Clifford Krauss, Oil Refineries See
Profit in Turning Kitchen Grease Into Diesel, New York Times
(Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/03/business/
45
“increasing [volume] requirements [that] are designed
to force the market to create ways to produce and use
greater and greater volumes of renewable fuel each
year.” Id. at 710; §7545(o)(2). For the RFS to function
as Congress intended, obligated parties—refiners and
importers of petroleum like the Petitioners—must
each fulfill their share of the program’s annual volume
obligations. ACE, 864 F.3d at 697. As the Tenth Circuit
correctly observed, even “assuming arguendo that certain legislators thought the small refinery exemption
was important, the ones who enacted the law also
made clear that the renewable fuel targets reflected in
the Energy Policy Act and the Energy Independence
and Security Act were essential to promoting biofuel
production, energy independence, and environmental
protection.” App. 69a–70a. The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of “extension” is the only interpretation that
is consistent with these purposes.
Small-refinery exemptions “create[]” a “renewablefuel shortfall” because EPA has not adjusted the volume obligations to account for retroactive exemptions,
so the exempt “gallons of renewable fuels simply [go]
energy-environment/oil-refineries-renewable-diesel.html; Margaret
Austin, HollyFrontier Seeking Permit, Public Comment for Pivot
to Renewable Diesel, Wyoming Tribune Eagle (Feb. 5, 2021), https://
www.wyomingnews.com/news/local_news/hollyfrontier-seekingpermit-public-comment-for-pivot-to-renewable-diesel/article_
15433e32-6eaa-5cd0-950d-75054c264968.html. Far from demonstrating need for a permanent compliance exemption, HollyFrontier’s conversion of the Cheyenne Refinery wholly aligns with the
RFS’s goal of replacing some volumes of fossil fuel with renewable
fuel.
46
unproduced.” AFPM, 937 F.3d at 571. For example, the
exemptions EPA granted for compliance years 20162018 effectively resulted in a shortfall of more than
four billion gallons of renewable fuel relative to the
statutorily required volumes. See RFS Small Refinery
Exemptions. Because small refinery exemptions create a renewable fuel shortfall, contrary to the purposes of the RFS, the only plausible interpretation of
§7545(o)(9) is for it to serve as a bridge to compliance
such that the number of exempt small refineries would
“taper[ ]” down each year. App. 68a. Providing limitless
exemptions to petroleum refiners at the expense of the
renewable fuels industry would both curb U.S. energy
independence and increase greenhouse gas emissions.15
D. Petitioners’ Policy Arguments Lack
Merit and Cannot Overcome the Text,
Structure, and Purpose of §7545(o)(9).
Petitioners claim that the “escalating burdens on
regulated parties to blend renewable fuels” demonstrate an intent to create a permanent “safety valve”
for small refineries. Pet’rs Br. 40. This self-serving
characterization of §7545(o)(B)(i) is unsupported by
15
See Life Cycle Associates, GHG Emissions Reductions Due
to the RFS2–A 2020 Update (Feb. 11, 2021), https://ethanolrfa.org/
wp-content/uploads/2021/02/LCA_-_RFS2-GHG-Update_2020.pdf;
Melissa Scully, Gregory Norris, Tania Alarcon Falconi, & David
MacIntosh, Carbon Intensity of Corn Ethanol in the United States:
State of the Science, Envtl. Res. Letters (Mar. 10, 2021), https://
iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/abde08/pdf.
47
the text of the statute and the history of its implementation. Congress created a “temporary” exemption program at the same time it established the increasing
volume requirements. In other words, Congress knew
at the time it labeled the exemption “temporary” that
refiners would be required to blend increasing volumes
of renewable fuel each year. Likewise, the phrase “at
any time” does not imply congressional intent for small
refinery exemptions to serve as a permanent safety
valve. Pet’rs Br. 40. As explained supra, the phrase “at
any time” refers only to the timing of small refineries’
petitions. It does not eliminate the exemption provision’s “temporary” label. “[H]ad Congress intended” to
create a permanent “regulatory relief program,” Pet’rs
Br. 4, “it would have said so.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.
v. United States ex rel. Rigsby, 137 S. Ct. 436, 443 (2016).
Although Petitioners assert that small refineries
will face extinction if exemption extensions are no
longer available, Pet’rs Br. 4, they fail to reconcile that
assertion with the fact that (a) most small refineries
complied with the RFS between 2013-2015, and (b)
EPA has consistently determined that refineries of all
sizes can completely recoup the cost of RFS compliance
in the prices received for their products. Moreover, the
statute contains specific waiver provisions to address
situations where application of the RFS requirements
would cause severe economic harm. See 42 U.S.C.
§7545(o)(7).
Petitioners’ interpretation of §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) is
partly based on the flawed premise that a phase-out of
small refinery exemptions would “threaten[ ] to shutter
48
important domestic refining capacity, undermining
Congress’s energy-independence purpose.” Pet’rs Br. 4;
see also Pet’rs Br. 41–42. To start, history contradicts
Petitioners’ suggestion that the end of small refinery
exemptions would spell the end of a substantial number of small refineries. For compliance years 2013,
2014, and 2015, only eight, eight, and seven refineries
were exempt each year, respectively. A similarly low
number of refineries applied in each of these years: 16,
13, and 14, respectively.16 Thus, for the three years
prior to EPA’s change in policy for adjudicating small
refinery exemption petitions, most small refineries did
not even apply for an extension of their exemptions—
meaning most small refineries came into compliance
for three consecutive years.17 For Petitioners now to
claim that elimination of small refinery exemptions
would cause a reduction in the U.S. refining capacity
so significant as to damage our nation’s energy security is simply disingenuous.
Moreover, “[i]n establishing the RFS program, Congress sought to bolster energy security and independence by boosting the amount of renewable fuels used in
16
As of January 1, 2019, there were 53 small refineries operating in the U.S. See U.S. Energy Information Administration,
Refinery Capacity Report (June 21, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/
petroleum/refinerycapacity/.
17
Notably, during this period where most small refineries
complied with their RFS obligations, RIN prices (and thus, compliance costs) were historically high. See EPA, RIN Trade and
Price Information (last updated Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.epa.
gov/fuels-registration-reporting-and-compliance-help/rin-tradesand-price-information.
49
the domestic transportation fuel pool.” See 82 Fed. Reg.
34,206, 34,211–12 (July 21, 2017) (emphasis added). In
other words, Congress determined that the best way to
increase U.S. energy independence and security was by
diversifying the domestic fuel supply through the addition of increasing volumes of renewable fuel, not by
“protecting domestic refining capacity.” Pet’rs Br. 41.
Petitioners’ assertion that refineries cannot “come
into a settled state of ‘compliance’ ” in part due to
“structural constraints” unique to small refineries,
Pet’rs Br. 42–44, is negated by EPA’s longstanding position that refineries of all sizes are able to recover the
costs of RFS compliance in the prices of their products.
An EPA report assessing the 2013 RIN market concluded that “obligated parties were generally able to
recover [the] increase in the costs of meeting their RIN
obligations in the price they received for their petroleum-based products,” and thus “these higher costs
have a similar impact on all obligated parties.” See
Dallas Burkholder, Office of Transp. & Air Quality,
EPA, A Preliminary Assessment of RIN Market Dynamics, RIN Prices, and Their Effects 29 (May 14,
2015), https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standardprogram/renewable-identification-number-rin-analysisrenewable-fuel-standard. The report specifically addressed merchant refiners “who largely purchase separated RINs to meet their RFS obligations,” and
determined that these refiners “should not therefore be
disadvantaged by the higher RIN prices, as they are
recovering these costs in the sale price of their products.” Id. at 3.
50
EPA has consistently reiterated the conclusions of
this report in the following years. For example, in a
2017 rulemaking, EPA reviewed studies submitted by
commenters purporting to show “an inability to passthrough the cost of the RFS program to consumers,”
but EPA did “not find these assessments convincing”
and concluded that “[a]ll obligated parties, including
merchant refiners, are generally able to recover the
cost of the RINs they need for compliance with the RFS
obligations through the cost of the gasoline and diesel
fuel they produce.” EPA, EPA-420-R-17-008, Denial of
Petitions for Rulemaking to Change the RFS Point of
Obligation (Nov. 2017), at 23–24. EPA has reaffirmed
its position on the ability of all refineries to passthrough and recover their compliance costs in rulemakings as recent as the 2020 RFS standards. In the
final rule for the 2020 standards, EPA stated: “We have
reviewed and assessed the available information,
which shows that obligated parties, including small entities, are generally able to recover the cost of acquiring
the RINs necessary for compliance with the RFS
standards. . . . Even if we were to assume that the cost
of acquiring RINs was not recovered by obligated parties . . . a cost-to-sales ratio test shows that the costs to
small entities of the RFS standards are far less than 1
percent of the value of their sales.” 85 Fed. Reg. 7,016,
7,067–68 (Feb. 6, 2020) (emphasis added). The fact that
EPA has been unwavering in its position that small refineries are not disproportionately harmed by RFS
compliance refutes Petitioners’ claims that a permanently available exemption is necessary to keep small
refineries in business.
51
Further, the RFS has other mechanisms that provide EPA with flexibility to address any “negative economic effects” caused by “application of the statutory
volume requirements.” See ACE, 864 F.3d at 712.
Specifically, “Congress authorized EPA to reduce the
statutory renewable fuel volume requirements upon a
determination that implementation of those requirements ‘would severely harm the economy or environment of a State, a region, or the United States.’ ” ACE,
864 F.3d at 712 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(7)(A)(i)).
Any state or obligated party can petition EPA for such
relief. Id. §7545(o)(7)(A)(i). Unlike the “temporary” exemption provided to “funnel[ ] small refineries toward
compliance,” App. 68a, EPA’s “severe economic harm
waiver” authority already serves as an appropriate
“safety valve” where the RFS obligations are shown to
be excessively burdensome. Petitioners are fully aware
of this safety valve, as evidenced by their recent petition for a severe-harm waiver. 86 Fed. Reg. 5,182, 5,183
(Jan. 19, 2021). The congressionally-intended phaseout
of the small refinery exemption in §7545(o)(9) clearly
does not leave EPA and obligated parties without recourse to address any economic harm caused by the
RFS.
The statute also provides “a safe harbor for individual obligated parties struggling to comply with a
year’s requirements,” namely, “[t]he statute mandates
that EPA allows those parties to carry a renewable
fuel deficit forward into the next compliance year.”
ACE, 864 F.3d at 712; 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(5)(D); 40
C.F.R. §80.1427(b). Obligated parties frequently take
52
advantage of the deficit provision to shift some portion
of their compliance burden to the following year. EPA’s
data shows that parties carried forward deficits of
more than 390 million, 681 million, 130 million, and
442 million RINs in compliance years 2016, 2017, 2018,
and 2019, respectively. EPA, Annual Compliance Data
for Obligated Parties and Renewable Fuel Exporters
under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program,
Table 5 (last updated Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.epa.
gov/fuels-registration-reporting-and-compliance-help/
annual-compliance-data-obligated-parties-and. The deficit provision addresses the situation raised by Petitioners wherein a small refinery’s ability to comply with
their RFS obligations may vary year-to-year; if a refinery is struggling financially in a given year, it can defer
its RFS obligations by carrying forward a deficit.
In a last-ditch attempt, Petitioners claim that the
“unique conditions” caused by the COVID pandemic
demonstrate a need for permanent small refinery exemptions. Pet’rs Br. 45. This argument fails because, in
a holding that Petitioners declined to challenge, the
Tenth Circuit held that “renewable fuels compliance
must be the cause of any disproportionate hardship”
used to justify an exemption. App. 83a. Because EPA
had considered factors unrelated to the RFS in making
the hardship determinations in each of the three challenged decisions, this constituted separate grounds (in
addition to the “extension” issue before this Court) to
vacate the exemptions. App. 83a. Petitioners’ attempt
to distract with other factors impacting refinery operations should be ignored, as these are clearly beyond
53
the scope of EPA’s statutory authority in implementing
the small refinery exemption provisions.18
CHEVRON DEFERENCE DOES NOT APPLY.
II.
This is not a Chevron deference case. Under Chevron, this Court does not give any deference to an
agency’s interpretation of the law unless this Court is
unable to discern Congress’s meaning after applying
“traditional tools of statutory construction.” SAS Inst.,
Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2017) (quoting
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843, n.9 (1984)). Here, after applying traditional tools of interpretation, there is “no uncertainty
that could warrant deference” under Chevron. SAS
Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1358.
In an argument of last resort, Petitioners urge this
Court to defer to what they view as a statutory interpretation made by EPA in its 2014 Small Refinery
Rule. See 79 Fed. Reg. 42,128 (July 18, 2014). But Petitioners devoted little of their briefing in the Tenth
18
For instance, Petitioners point to Marathon Petroleum
Corporation’s decision to close its Gallup, New Mexico refinery
as evidence of the impact of the Tenth Circuit’s ruling, Pet’rs
Br. 17, when in reality, Marathon attributed the decision to “the
challenges COVID has created for our business.” News Release,
Marathon Petroleum Corp., Marathon Petroleum Corp. Reports
Second-Quarter 2020 Results (Aug. 3, 2020), https://ir.marathonpetroleum.com/investor/news-releases/news-details/2020/MarathonPetroleum-Corp.-Reports-Second-Quarter-2020-Results/default.aspx.
54
Circuit to such an argument. In fact, in the Tenth Circuit, the HollyFrontier parties did not cite Chevron at
all. While Wynnewood recited the principles of Chevron
deference, it made little attempt to explain how EPA
made any statutory interpretation in its 2014 Small
Refinery Rule. See Intervenor-Respondent Wynnewood
Refining Company Br. 19, Renewable Fuels Ass’n v.
EPA, No. 18-9533 (10th Cir. Apr. 8, 2020) (stating only
that “[a]s part of that rulemaking, EPA promulgated a
rule interpreting the CAA as allowing small refineries
to apply for hardship relief if they were ‘small’ (i.e., had
a crude oil throughput of fewer than 75,000 [barrels
per day]) both in the year the exemption is sought and
the immediately preceding year”).
While EPA asked for Chevron deference in the
Tenth Circuit, it did not mention the 2014 Small Refinery Rule at all in its discussion of deference. See EPA
Br. 33–34, Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. EPA, No. 18-9533
(10th Cir. Mar. 25, 2020). “This Court has often declined to apply Chevron deference when the government fails to invoke it.” Guedes v. BATFE, 140 S. Ct.
789, 790 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari). Moreover, EPA now agrees with the Tenth
Circuit’s reading of the small refinery exemption provision. See EPA, After Careful Consideration, EPA
Supports Tenth Circuit’s Renewable Fuels Association
Decision (Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/
after-careful-consideration-epa-supports-tenth-circuitsrenewable-fuels-association. In these circumstances,
Chevron deference to anything in the 2014 Small Refinery Rule would be especially inappropriate. See
55
Guedes, 140 S. Ct. at 790 (“Even when Chevron deference is sought, this Court has found it inappropriate
where the Executive seems of two minds about the result it prefers.”) (quotation marks omitted).
In any event, Petitioners’ argument for Chevron
deference is meritless. Petitioners recognize that EPA
did not expressly make any statutory interpretation in
the 2014 Small Refinery Rule. Instead, Petitioners suggest that EPA implicitly made a statutory interpretation that was a “necessary presupposition” of the 2014
Small Refinery Rule. See Pet’rs Br. 48 (citing Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407,
420 (1992)). In fact, there was no such “necessary presupposition.” This Court should not defer to what Petitioners speculate that EPA had in mind when it
adopted the 2014 Small Refinery Rule.
The Tenth Circuit correctly noted that the 2014
Small Refinery Rule did “not explain or resolve any
ambiguity with respect to the statutory definition of
‘extension.’ ” App. 80a. It explained that “[t]he 2014
Small Refinery Rule establishes who may seek an extension of an exemption, but it does not resolve what
constitutes a valid extension.” App. 78a. Moreover,
“neither the preamble nor the administrative rule contains any discussion of what the word ‘extension’ actually means.” App. 78a.
Petitioners’ only response to the Tenth Circuit’s
analysis is their conclusory assertion that the 2014
Small Refinery Rule “indisputably rests on the premise
that a small refinery that was ineligible for a hardship
56
exemption in a prior year may still receive a ‘valid extension’ of the exemption in a later year, and thus necessarily rejected the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation.”
Pet’rs Br. 49. According to Petitioners, the “only reasonable reading” of the 2014 Small Refinery Rule is that
EPA rejected the interpretation of the statute adopted
by the Tenth Circuit in 2020, six years later.
Petitioners’ recitation of the background of the
2014 Small Refinery Rule, however, ignores an explanation that is consistent with the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute. The predecessor to the 2014
Small Refinery Rule provided that the “small refinery”
determination should be based upon whether a refinery satisfied the 75,000 barrels per day threshold in
2006. 40 C.F.R. §80.1441 (2010). Thus, at the time EPA
was considering its 2014 amendments, there could
have been refineries that met the small refinery
threshold in 2006 and therefore qualified to receive exemption extensions in the intervening years (if they
met the other requirements), even if the refineries had
exceeded the 75,000 barrels per day threshold in any
year(s) after 2006. EPA’s original proposal in 2014—a
requirement that a refinery meet the threshold in 2006
and each year thereafter—could have rendered such
refineries ineligible for future exemption extensions.
78 Fed. Reg. 36,042, 36,064 (June 14, 2013). EPA ultimately rejected that proposal in the final 2014 Small
Refinery Rule. 79 Fed. Reg. at 42,152. In other words,
EPA did not want to preclude a refinery from seeking
an extension of a temporary exemption if it had been
57
eligible for and received continuous exemption extensions under the 2010 regulation but risked being
deemed ineligible for future extensions based on retroactive application of the 2014 Small Refinery Rule. See
id.
In fact, EPA’s rationale for changing the definition
of “small refinery” in the 2014 Small Refinery Rule is
consistent with the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of
the small refinery exemption. With the 2014 Small Refinery Rule, EPA sought to narrow the number of refineries that were eligible for exemptions. See 79 Fed.
Reg. at 42,152.
For all of these reasons, Chevron deference does
not apply.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
58
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the Tenth Circuit’s decision.
Respectfully submitted,
KEVIN M. FONG
PILLSBURY WINTHROP
SHAW PITTMAN LLP
Four Embarcadero Center,
22nd Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 983-1000
MATTHEW W. MORRISON
Counsel of Record
CYNTHIA COOK ROBERTSON
SHELBY L. DYL
PILLSBURY WINTHROP
SHAW PITTMAN LLP
1200 Seventeenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 663-8036
Counsel for Respondents
Renewable Fuels Association,
American Coalition for
Ethanol, National Corn
Growers Association,
National Farmers Union
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.