Respondents Brief — HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC, et al., Petitioners v. Renewable Fuels Association, et al.

Supreme Court briefDec 9, 2020

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 20-472

================================================================================================================

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE

REFINING, LLC, et al.,

v.

Petitioners,

RENEWABLE FUELS ASSOCIATION, et al.,

Respondents.

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Tenth Circuit

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------MATTHEW W. MORRISON*

CYNTHIA COOK ROBERTSON

SHELBY L. DYL

PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP

1200 Seventeenth Street, NW

Washington, D.C. 20036

Phone: 202-663-8000

matthew.morrison@pillsburylaw.com

*Counsel of Record

Counsel for Respondents

Renewable Fuels Association,

American Coalition for Ethanol,

National Corn Growers Association,

and National Farmers Union

================================================================================================================

COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964

WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) exceeded its authority by granting

“extensions” of the “temporary exemption” for small

refineries under 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B) to three refineries for which the temporary exemption had previously expired.

ii

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

The Renewable Fuels Association (“RFA”) is a

non-profit trade association. Its members are ethanol

producers and supporters of the ethanol industry. RFA

promotes the general commercial, legislative, and other

common interests of its members. RFA does not have a

parent company, and no publicly held company has a

10% or greater ownership interest in it.

The American Coalition for Ethanol (“ACE”) is a

non-profit trade association. Its members include ethanol and biofuel facilities, agricultural producers, ethanol industry investors, and supporters of the ethanol

industry. ACE promotes the general commercial, legislative, and other common interests of its members.

ACE does not have a parent company, and no publicly

held company has a 10% or greater ownership interest

in it.

The National Corn Growers Association (“NCGA”)

is a non-profit trade association. Its members are corn

farmers and supporters of the agriculture and ethanol

industries. NCGA promotes the general commercial,

legislative, and other common interests of its members.

NCGA does not have a parent company, and no publicly held company has a 10% or greater ownership interest in it.

The Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union

of America, doing business as the National Farmers

Union (“NFU”), is a non-profit trade association. Its

iii

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT—Continued

members include farmers who are producers of biofuel

feedstocks and consumers of large quantities of fuel.

The NFU promotes the general commercial, legislative, and other common interests of its members. It

does not have a parent company, and no publicly held

company has a 10% or greater ownership interest in it.

For the purposes of this brief, RFA, ACE, NCGA,

and NFU are referred to collectively as the “Biofuels

Coalition.”

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

OPINION BELOW ...............................................

1

JURISDICTION ...................................................

2

INTRODUCTION ................................................

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..............................

5

I.

II.

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND ...................................................

5

A. The Renewable Fuel Standard ............

5

B. Small Refinery Temporary Exemption ....

6

C. EPA’s Administration of Petitions for

Extension of the Small Refinery Temporary Exemption ................................

7

CASE BACKGROUND ..............................

9

A. Petitioners’ Exemption Extension Petitions ...................................................

9

B. The Biofuels Coalition’s Petition for

Review and the Tenth Circuit’s Judgment ..................................................... 10

REASONS TO DENY THE PETITION ............... 13

I. THERE IS NO CIRCUIT SPLIT OF AUTHORITY ..................................................... 13

II. THE PETITION DOES NOT PRESENT

AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FEDERAL LAW THAT THE COURT NEEDS

TO RESOLVE .............................................. 16

A. The D.C. Circuit Will Address the

Same Question..................................... 17

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

B. The Tenth Circuit’s Decision Will Not

Cause the Economic Harm Imagined by

Petitioners.............................................. 19

III.

OVERTURNING ON THE QUESTION

PRESENTED WOULD NOT ALTER THE

JUDGMENT ................................................ 22

IV.

THE TENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY CONSTRUED THE SMALL REFINERY TEMPORARY EXEMPTION ............................... 23

CONCLUSION..................................................... 28

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Advanced Biofuels Ass’n v. EPA,

792 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ................................17

American Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. EPA,

937 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ................................ 5, 8

Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA,

864 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2017) .......................... passim

Ergon-West Virginia, Inc. v. EPA,

896 F.3d 600 (4th Cir. 2018) ....................................13

Hermes Consol., LLC v. EPA,

787 F.3d 568 (D.C. Cir. 2015) .......................... passim

King v. Burwell,

576 U.S. 473 (2015) .................................................14

Lion Oil Co. v. EPA,

792 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2015) ..................................... 13

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S.

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

463 U.S. 29 (1983) ...................................................23

Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. EPA,

No. 19–1220 (D.C. Cir.)

(petition filed Oct. 22, 2019).................. 15, 17, 18, 19

Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. EPA,

887 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 2017) .................. 9, 10, 13, 24

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. EPA,

No. 19–9562 (10th Cir. Oct. 15, 2019),

ECF No. 010110245406 ..........................................18

Tolan v. Cotton,

572 U.S. 650 (2015) .................................................23

STATUTES AND CODES

United States Code

Title 28, section 1254(1) ............................................2

Title 42, section 7545(o)(1)(k) ...................................6

Title 42, section 7545(o)(2)(B) ...................................5

Title 42, section 7545(o)(5)(D) ............................ 4, 21

Title 42, section 7545(o)(7)(A) ............................. 4, 21

Title 42, section 7545(o)(9) ................................ 26, 27

Title 42, section 7545(o)(9)(A) ............. 6, 7, 25, 26, 27

Title 42, section 7545(o)(9)(B) ......................... passim

Title 42, section 7607(b) ..........................................15

Title 42, section 7607(b)(1) ............................... 11, 18

Pub. L. No. 110–140

121 Stat. 1492 (2007) ............................................ 2, 5

RULES AND REGULATIONS

Code of Federal Regulations

Title 40, section 56.3 ...............................................15

Title 40, section 80.1401 ...........................................6

Title 40, section 80.1427 ...........................................6

Title 40, section 80.1427(b) ................................. 4, 21

Title 40, section 80.1429(b) .......................................6

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Rules of the Supreme Court

Rule 10.....................................................................16

Rule 10(a) ............................................................ 3, 13

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) .......................24

Dallas Burkholder, U.S. EPA, A Preliminary Assessment of RIN Market Dynamics, RIN Prices,

and Their Effects 29 (May 14, 2015) ................. 20, 21

EPA, RFS Small Refinery Exemptions, https://

www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-reporting-andcompliance-help/rfs-small-refinery-exemptions

(last updated Nov. 19, 2020) .....................................8

G. Chakrabarty, T. Fitzgibbon, & M. Smith, Downstream Oil and Gas Amid COVID-19: Succeeding in a Changed Market ........................................20

J. Corrigan & M. Greenan, COVID-19 and the

Oil Price Collapse: Impacts on Refining and

Downstream Businesses, PwC U.S. (Apr. 2020),

https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industries/energyutilities-mining/library/covid-19-impact-oilrefining-downstream-businesses.html .................20

Jarrett Renshaw & Chris Prentice, Chevron, Exxon

Seek ‘Small Refinery’ Waivers from U.S. Biofuels Law, Reuters (Apr. 12, 2018), https://

www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biofuels-eparefineries-exclusive/exclusive-chevron-exxonseek-small-refinery-waivers-from-u-s-biofuelslaw-idUSKBN1HJ32R ..............................................8

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett, & D.

Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Practice § 5.12(c)(3),

p. 352 (10th ed. 2013) ..............................................24

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Trends and Expectations Surrounding the Outlook for Energy

Markets (Aug. 2020), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/

aeo/pdf/trends_and_expectations_2020.pdf ...........19

1

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE

REFINING, LLC, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

RENEWABLE FUELS ASSOCIATION, et al.,

Respondents.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Tenth Circuit

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

OPINION BELOW

The Tenth Circuit order (Pet. App. 1a–94a) is reported at 948 F.3d 1206. The underlying EPA orders

(Suppl. App. 1a–46a) are not published in the Federal

Register or otherwise publicly available.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

2

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on January 24, 2020. A petition for rehearing was denied on April 7, 2020. On March 19, 2020, due to the

COVID-19 pandemic, this Court entered an order extending the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari

to 150 days. The petition for a writ of certiorari was

filed on September 4, 2020. The jurisdiction of this

Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Renewable Fuel Standard

(“RFS”) program “to move the United States toward

greater energy independence” and “to increase the

production of clean renewable fuels.” Americans for

Clean Energy v. EPA (“ACE”), 864 F.3d 691, 696 (D.C.

Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J.) (quoting Pub. L. No. 110140, pmbl., 121 Stat. 1492, 1492 (2007)). To accomplish

these goals, the statute provides “increasing [volume]

requirements [that] are designed to force the market

to create ways to produce and use greater and greater

volumes of renewable fuel each year.” Id. at 710. For

the RFS to function as Congress intended, obligated

parties—refiners and importers of petroleum like the

Petitioners—must each fulfill their share of the program’s annual volume obligations. Id. at 697.

The Petition concerns EPA’s authority to “extend”

a “temporary exemption” from RFS obligations that allowed small refineries additional time to prepare for

3

RFS obligations. Petitioners argue that because the

statute says a refinery may petition EPA for an “extension” of the temporary exemption “at any time,” EPA

can grant a new exemption after the temporary exemption described by the statute has expired.

The Tenth Circuit, however, held that in context

“extension” can only mean “to increase the length or

duration of; lengthen; prolong” the original exemption.

Pet. App. 67a. In practice, this means that “the only

small refineries” that “continue[ ] to be eligible for extensions” are “ones that submitted meritorious hardship petitions each year.” Id. at 68a. This ruling is both

a straightforward reading of the text, and also consistent with other judicial constructions of the small

refinery temporary exemption.

The Tenth Circuit was the first, and thus far the

only, court to address on the merits the specific issue

raised by Petitioners here. The Tenth Circuit’s decision

therefore does not “conflict with the decision of another

United States court of appeals”—or any other court—

“on the same important matter.” See Sup. Ct. R. 10(a).

Moreover, the Petition presents a discrete issue of

statutory interpretation in a case of limited impact.

The case involves only three EPA decisions involving

three individual small refineries. A subsequent 2019

decision announcing EPA’s national policy for adjudicating small refinery temporary exemptions is currently subject to judicial review in the D.C. Circuit.

The same statutory construction questions before the

Tenth Circuit will necessarily be addressed by the D.C.

4

Circuit. The Tenth Circuit’s more limited holding is

therefore not the appropriate vehicle for this Court to

review this issue.

To the extent the Petitioners hypothesize that the

Tenth Circuit’s decision could subject certain geographic

areas or obligated parties to economic harms, the

Clean Air Act has separate provisions to address those

potential issues. See ACE, 864 F.3d at 712 (citing 42

U.S.C. § 7545(o)(5)(D), (7)(A)(i); 40 C.F.R. § 80.1427(b)).

Finally, the Tenth Circuit’s vacatur of the three

challenged EPA decisions rests on three separate and

independent grounds, such that overturning the Tenth

Circuit’s holding on the single question presented in

the Petition would not affect the outcome of the judgment below.

In sum, the Tenth Circuit’s decision does not conflict with the decision of any other court, does not

amount to an important question of federal law that

should be settled by this Court, and the Court’s review

is not warranted before the D.C. Circuit rules on the

issue presented as a matter of EPA’s national policy.

The Petition should be denied.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND

A. The Renewable Fuel Standard

Congress created the RFS program to “move the

United States toward greater energy independence

and security, [and] to increase the production of clean

renewable fuels.” American Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs.

v. EPA (“AFPM”), 937 F.3d 559, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2019)

(quoting Pub. L. No. 110–140, 121 Stat. 1492 (2007)).

The RFS prescribes “applicable volumes—mandatory and annually increasing quantities of renewable

fuels that must be introduced into commerce in the

United States each year,” beginning at 4 billion gallons of renewable fuel in 2006 and ascending to 36

billion gallons in 2022.1 AFPM, 937 F.3d at 568 (quotation marks omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(I).

EPA is required to “ensure[ ]” that the statutory volume requirements are met, which it accomplishes by

“translating the annual volume requirements into ‘percentage standards.’ ” ACE, 864 F.3d at 699. The percentage standards “inform each obligated party”—

gasoline and diesel fuel refineries and importers—“of

how much fuel it must introduce into U.S. commerce

based on the volumes of fossil-based gasoline or diesel

it imports or produces.” Ibid.

The EPA has statutory authority to determine the volume

amounts after 2022. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(ii)–(v).

1

6

To demonstrate compliance, “obligated parties can

acquire and trade credits,” called “Renewable Identification Numbers” or “RINs.” ACE, 864 F.3d at 699. RINs

represent “the volume of ethanol-equivalent fuel gallons” in “each batch of renewable fuel that is produced

or imported in the United States.” Ibid.; 40 C.F.R.

§ 80.1401. When renewable fuel is blended into transportation fuel, “the RINs become ‘separated’ from the

associated volumes of renewable fuel . . . [and] may be

retained by the party who possesses them or sold and

traded on the open RIN market.” ACE, 864 F.3d at 699;

40 C.F.R. § 80.1429(b). Obligated parties meet their obligation by “accumulating or purchasing the requisite

number of RINs and then ‘retiring’ the RINs in an annual compliance demonstration with EPA.” ACE, 864

F.3d at 713; 40 C.F.R. § 80.1427.

B. Small Refinery Temporary Exemption

Most obligated parties were required to begin fulfilling their RFS volume obligations in compliance year

2006. However, “aware that small refineries”—those

whose “average aggregate daily crude oil throughput

for a calendar year . . . does not exceed 75,000 barrels,”

§ 7545(o)(1)(k)—“would face greater difficulty complying with the renewable fuels requirements, [Congress]

created a three-tiered system of exemptions to afford

small refineries a bridge to compliance.” Hermes Consol., LLC v. EPA, 787 F.3d 568, 573 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see

42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(A)–(B).

7

First, the statute provided a “[t]emporary exemption” from RFS obligations to all small refineries until

2011. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(A)(i); see Hermes, 787 F.3d

at 572–73. Second, “the statute directed DOE to conduct a study ‘to determine whether compliance . . .

would impose a disproportionate economic hardship on

small refineries,’ ” and “[i]f DOE determined that any

small refinery ‘would be subject to a disproportionate

economic hardship if required to comply with’ the renewable fuels program, EPA was required to extend

the exemption for that refinery ‘for a period of not less

than 2 additional years.’ ” Hermes, 787 F.3d at 573

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)). Third, the statute permits individual small refineries “at any time

[to] petition the Administrator for an extension of

the exemption under subparagraph (A) for the reason

of disproportionate economic hardship.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 7545(o)(9)(B)(i); see also Hermes, 787 F.3d at 573.

C. EPA’s Administration of Petitions for Extension of the Small Refinery Temporary

Exemption

Congress “contemplated a ‘[t]emporary exemption’

for small refineries with an eye toward eventual compliance with the renewable fuels program for all refineries.” Hermes, 787 F.3d at 578. Consistent with this

objective, EPA phased down the number of exempt

refineries for the first several years of the RFS, from

fifty-nine under the initial exemption to seven exempt

refineries in 2015.

8

However, starting with the 2016 compliance year,

EPA began to dramatically increase the number of exemptions. The number of exemptions jumped to nineteen for 2016, thirty-five for 2017, and thirty-one for

2018. EPA, RFS Small Refinery Exemptions, https://

www.epa.gov/fuels-registrationreporting-and-compliancehelp/rfs-small-refinery-exemptions (last updated Nov.

19, 2020). Because EPA did not adjust the volume obligations to account for these exemptions, the exempt

“gallons of renewable fuels simply [went] unproduced.”

AFPM, 937 F.3d at 571. The 2016–2018 exemptions effectively resulted in a shortfall of more than four billion gallons of renewable fuel relative to the statutorily

required volumes.2

EPA’s reversal of its tapering of the temporary exemptions was not documented publicly, as EPA grants

these exemptions in secret. The market impacts from

EPA’s policy shift drew the attention of the biofuels industry and the media, and ultimately opened up EPA’s

actions to judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Jarrett Renshaw

& Chris Prentice, Chevron, Exxon Seek ‘Small Refinery’

Waivers from U.S. Biofuels Law, Reuters (Apr. 12, 2018),

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biofuels-eparefineries-exclusive/exclusive-chevron-exxon-seek-smallrefinery-waivers-from-u-s-biofuels-law-idUSKBN1HJ32R.

Notably, when the Biofuels Coalition filed its action in

the Tenth Circuit, EPA was still refusing to make any

information regarding its decisions on small refinery

EPA, RFS Small Refinery Exemptions, https://www.epa.gov/

fuels-registrationreporting-and-compliance-help/rfs-small-refineryexemptions (last updated Nov. 19, 2020).

2

9

exemption extension petitions publicly available, classifying all of it as confidential business information.

That lack of public information nearly allowed EPA’s

actions to escape judicial review. It was only because

the Biofuels Coalition was able to gather sufficient

public information (made available by the Petitioners

themselves) to challenge three specific EPA decisions

that the Tenth Circuit was able to open up a window

on the sea change in EPA’s policy.

II.

CASE BACKGROUND

A. Petitioners’ Exemption Extension Petitions

Petitioner HollyFrontier Refining & Marketing

LLC (“HollyFrontier Refining”) submitted exemption

extension petitions for compliance year 2016 on behalf

of two small refineries owned by its subsidiaries, Petitioner HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining LLC (“HollyFrontier Cheyenne”) and Petitioner Holly Frontier

Woods Cross Refining LLC (“HollyFrontier Woods Cross”)

(collectively, with HollyFrontier Refining, “HollyFrontier”).

HollyFrontier Cheyenne received an extension of

the temporary exemption through 2012 based on

DOE’s study, but its exemption was not further extended in 2013 or 2014. Pet. App. 32a. HollyFrontier

Cheyenne applied for an exemption in 2015, but EPA

denied the petition. Ibid. HollyFrontier Cheyenne appealed EPA’s denial to the Tenth Circuit, and the court

remanded the decision for further consideration in

light of its opinion in Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v.

10

EPA, 887 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 2017). For purposes of this

case, the Tenth Circuit assumed that EPA granted the

2015 petition on remand, as the record did not reflect

EPA’s final disposition. Ibid.

The record does not indicate that HollyFrontier

Woods Cross ever received an extension of the small

refinery temporary exemption, either based on DOE’s

study, or thereafter. Pet. App. 35a.

A subsidiary of CVR Refining, LP, Petitioner

Wynnewood Refining Company, LLC (“CVR”), submitted an exemption petition for its Wynnewood Refinery

for compliance year 2017. CVR’s petition stated that it

had received an extension of the blanket exemption in

2011 and 2012 but received no further extensions of its

exemption. Pet. App. 37a.

EPA granted each of these three petitions (two for

2016 and one for 2017) in unpublished decisions that

were initially issued only to the Petitioners. The Biofuels Coalition did not have access to the decisions until

receiving the administrative record for this case from

EPA.

B. The Biofuels Coalition’s Petition for Review and the Tenth Circuit’s Judgment

The Biofuels Coalition learned of these exemptions through media reports and confirmed them

through the Petitioners’ public filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The Biofuels Coalition filed a petition for review challenging EPA’s

11

authority to grant these exemptions as a matter of

statutory construction and challenging the decisions

themselves as arbitrary and capricious.

The Clean Air Act dictates that petitions for

review of agency actions with local or regional applicability are to be heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals

with jurisdiction over that locality or region. 42 U.S.C.

§ 7607(b)(1). The statute dictates that agency actions

with national applicability are to be heard by the D.C.

Circuit. Ibid. EPA’s decisions regarding individual

small refinery exemption petitions are construed as

having local or regional applicability, and therefore the

Biofuel’s Coalition had to file in the Tenth Circuit.3

In the ruling challenged by Petitioners, the Tenth

Circuit vacated all three challenged exemption decisions. It held that EPA exceeded its authority under

42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B) by granting new small refinery exemptions to Petitioners Cheyenne, Woods Cross,

and Wynnewood refineries (the “Refineries”) when the

plain text of the statute allows EPA to grant only “extensions” of exemptions. The court explained that “an

‘extension’ requires a small refinery exemption in prior

years to prolong, enlarge, or add to,” meaning that

“the only small refineries . . . eligible for extensions

were the ones that submitted meritorious hardship

EPA changed its practice in 2019 by addressing all 2018

small refinery exemption extension petitions in a single memorandum, which set forth EPA’s national approach for adjudicating

petitions for small refinery exemptions. The parties comprising

the Biofuels Coalition have sought review of that decision before

the D.C. Circuit.

3

12

petitions each year.” Pet. App. 68a, 75a. Because each

of the three Refineries’ exemptions had expired by

2013 at the latest, the court held that “[a]t most, these

Refineries sought to renew or restart their exemptions,” which “[t]he amended Clean Air Act did not authorize.” Ibid.

The Tenth Circuit found two additional flaws that

Petitioners have not challenged here. First, the Tenth

Circuit held that EPA exceeded its statutory authority

by “[g]ranting extensions of exemptions based at least

in part on hardships not caused by RFS compliance.”

Pet. App. 85a. EPA’s decisions cited to “[a] difficult year

for the refining industry as a whole” and an “industrywide downward trend” of lower net refining margins,

among other factors that the court determined were

“not restricted to disproportionate economic hardship

caused by RFS compliance.” Pet. App. 83a–84a.

Second, the Tenth Circuit held that it was arbitrary and capricious for EPA to have “ignored or failed

to provide reasons for deviating from prior studies

showing that” the costs of purchasing the credits

needed to show RFS compliance (i.e., “RINs”) “do not

disproportionately harm refineries which are not vertically integrated.” Pet. App. 87a. This is because “merchant refineries typically recoup their RIN purchase

costs through higher petroleum fuel prices.” Pet. App.

91a.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

13

REASONS TO DENY THE PETITION

I.

THERE IS NO CIRCUIT SPLIT OF AUTHORITY

The Tenth Circuit’s decision does not “conflict with

the decision of another United States court of appeals”—or any other court—“on the same important

matter.” See Sup. Ct. R. 10(a). The Tenth Circuit was

the first, and thus far the only, court to address the specific issue raised by Petitioners here on the merits.

Notably, this was the first time a court has scrutinized EPA’s authority to grant exemptions under the

small refinery exemption provision. Other cases have

examined the provision in challenges by small refineries addressing EPA’s denial of exemptions. See ErgonWest Virginia, Inc. v. EPA, 896 F.3d 600 (4th Cir. 2018);

Sinclair Wyo. Refining Co. v. EPA, 887 F.3d 986 (10th

Cir. 2017); Hermes Consol., LLC v. EPA, 787 F.3d 568

(D.C. Cir. 2015); Lion Oil Co. v. EPA, 792 F.3d 978 (8th

Cir. 2015). And while there may be overlap in some of

the issues considered in these cases, the specific question presented here—whether EPA has authority to

grant extensions of small refinery exemptions that

have expired—had never been considered by another

court.

Petitioners attempt (Pet. 19–20) to manufacture a

circuit split by citing to instances where other courts

have interpreted the word “extension” in entirely different contexts. But none of these cases addressed

the language in the RFS provisions of the Clean

Air Act governing small refinery exemptions. On the

14

contrary, Petitioners’ arguments run counter to this

Court’s principle that “the Court must read the words

[of a statute] in their context and with a view to their

place in the overall statutory scheme.” King v. Burwell,

576 U.S. 473, 474 (2015) (quotation marks omitted).

The fact that “extension” can have different meanings

in different statutory schemes does not give rise to a

conflict that warrants this Court’s intervention here.

Petitioners further claim (Pet. 33) the Tenth Circuit’s decision effectively creates regional conflict between circuits because small refineries in the Tenth

Circuit will be barred from obtaining exemptions while

refineries in other circuits remain eligible. But this

premise is flawed and misleading. The Tenth Circuit’s

decision does not bar small refineries from continuing

to seek extensions if their exemptions have not lapsed.

The Tenth Circuit merely confirmed some of the prerequisites for issuing such exemptions (e.g., a continuous temporary exemption with no lapses, a finding that

any disproportionate economic hardship is the result

of RFS compliance, and some explanation of how a

small refinery could suffer a disproportionate economic

hardship when EPA has repeatedly concluded that all

refineries, large and small, recover their RFS compliance costs in the cost of the products they sell). To the

extent EPA decides to limit the underlying decision to

the Tenth Circuit, that is the result of the Clean Air

15

Act’s venue provision and EPA’s regional consistency

regulations.4

Section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act requires that

challenges to nationally-applicable standards and regulations be brought in the D.C. Circuit, while challenges to other final agency actions that are locally or

regionally applicable be filed only in the United States

Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. 42 U.S.C.

§ 7607(b). Because the Biofuels Coalition challenged

EPA’s decisions regarding three specific refineries located within the Tenth Circuit, the Clean Air Act’s

venue provision dictated that these had to be addressed in the appropriate regional circuit court of appeals. Ibid.; see also Pet. App. 4a.

EPA’s regional consistency regulations provide

that “[i]t is EPA’s policy to . . . [r]ecognize that only the

decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and decisions of

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit Court

that arise from challenges to ‘nationally applicable regulations . . . or final action’ . . . shall apply uniformly.”

40 C.F.R. § 56.3 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)). The regulations explicitly exempt “decisions of the federal

courts that arise from challenges to ‘locally or regionally’ applicable actions.” Ibid. Consequently, to the

extent EPA has not yet applied the Tenth Circuit’s

In fact, the Biofuels Coalition supports uniform application

of the principles announced by the Tenth Circuit and the parties

comprising the Biofuels Coalition have raised similar issues in

pending litigation in the D.C. Circuit. See Renewable Fuels Ass’n

v. EPA, No. 19–1220 (D.C. Cir.) (petition filed Oct. 22, 2019).

4

16

decision nationally, that is the product of EPA’s regulations, not of the decision itself.

II.

THE PETITION DOES NOT PRESENT AN

IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FEDERAL LAW

THAT THE COURT NEEDS TO RESOLVE

The Petition presents a discrete issue of statutory

interpretation that does not implicate an important

question of federal law. See Sup. Ct. R. 10. Each of the

three challenged EPA adjudications was issued solely

to an individual small refinery. As just noted, EPA’s regional consistency regulations relieve EPA from adopting “decisions that arise from challenges to ‘locally or

regionally applicable actions’ ”—such as the Tenth Circuit decision here—as national agency policy. Therefore, at most, the Tenth Circuit’s ruling directly affects

only those small refineries located in the Tenth Circuit.

A decision with such limited effect is not an appropriate vehicle for this Court’s review, particularly when

the question presented in the Petition will be addressed in a challenge to EPA’s national policy in a case

currently pending before the D.C. Circuit.

Petitioners also exaggerate the economic impact of

the Tenth Circuit’s decision, and to the extent their arguments have any validity, the RFS has other built-in

statutory mechanisms for EPA to address economic

harm, thus obviating the need for this Court to intervene.

17

A. The D.C. Circuit Will Address the Same

Question

Briefing has already begun in a case before the

D.C. Circuit which will decide the question presented

in the Petition in the context of EPA’s national policy

for adjudicating small refinery exemptions. See Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. EPA, No. 19–1220 (D.C. Cir. filed

Oct. 22, 2019) (hereinafter “D.C. Circuit Action”). Until

recently, EPA issued an unpublished individual decision for each petition for a small refinery exemption

extension, like the three decisions addressed by the

Tenth Circuit’s ruling. For compliance year 2018, however, EPA abandoned its established practice of providing individual decisions to each refinery, and instead

issued a single memorandum in August of 2019 to

announce its decision for all of the 2018 petitions,

granting thirty-one out of forty-two petitions received.5

EPA has conceded that the memorandum is a challengeable final agency action.6 The parties comprising

the Biofuels Coalition filed a timely petition for review.

The Clean Air Act’s venue provision requires a

challenge to the 2018 small refinery exemption decision to be brought in the D.C. Circuit, as it contains

EPA, RFS Small Refinery Exemptions, https://www.epa.gov/

fuels-registration-reporting-and-compliance-help/rfs-small-refineryexemptions (last updated Nov. 19, 2020).

6

See Advanced Biofuels Ass’n v. EPA, 792 F. App’x 1, 6 (D.C.

Cir. 2019) (“During oral argument, the EPA acknowledged that

the August 2019 Memorandum is ‘final agency action’ to which a

challenge could be brought if filed within the required limitations

period.”).

5

18

EPA’s statements of its national policy for adjudicating

small refinery exemptions.7 The D.C. Circuit Action

will necessarily address the exact issue Petitioners

raise here—whether EPA exceeded its authority under

the Clean Air Act by granting small refinery exemptions under 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B) where the exemption had previously expired. See Pet’rs Br. 22-30, D.C.

Circuit Action, supra, ECF No. 1874746 (filed Dec. 7,

2020). Petitioners HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining

LLC, HollyFrontier Refining & Marketing LLC, and

HollyFrontier Woods Cross Refining, LLC have intervened in the D.C. Circuit Action.

Notably, the D.C. Circuit expressed interest in

2018 in reviewing EPA’s recent policy change in its administration of small refinery exemptions. Although it

lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the petition

then before it—challenging EPA’s “change in methodology” used to award extensions of small refinery exemptions—the D.C. Circuit panel expressed discomfort

at the record evidence of EPA’s actions. The court’s per

curiam judgment dismissing the case stated that

“EPA’s briefing and oral argument paint a troubling

picture of intentionally shrouded and hidden agency

law that could have left those aggrieved by the agency’s

actions without a viable avenue for judicial review.” Id.

at 5. EPA had, however, recently opened the door for

See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1); EPA Reply in Support of Mot. to

Dismiss 7, Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. EPA, No. 19–9562 (10th Cir.

Oct. 15, 2019), ECF No. 010110245406 (“An agency action that

determines the rights of facilities all over the country, across multiple circuits, using a coordinated and consistent rationale is ‘nationally applicable[.]’ ”).

7

19

judicial review, so that this “ongoing pattern of genuinely secret law” could be challenged through “the August 2019 formal and public memorandum announcing

the EPA’s new decisional framework and applying it to

forty-two refineries.” Ibid. The Biofuels Coalition has

done just that in the D.C. Circuit Action.

B. The Tenth Circuit’s Decision Will Not

Cause the Economic Harm Imagined by

Petitioners

There is no reason to expect the Tenth Circuit’s decision to have the dire consequences hypothesized by

the Petitioners. First and foremost, until 2017, EPA’s

longstanding policy was to funnel small refineries toward accepting their share of RFS obligations. Like

most other small refineries, the Petitioners were among

those that had already come into compliance. It is

impossible to reconcile Petitioners’ claim (Pet. 3) that

the Tenth Circuit’s decision will “pose an existential

threat to . . . businesses” and “wreak havoc upon the

communities they serve” with the fact that as of 2015,

only seven small refineries remained exempt from RFS

obligations.

Moreover, government studies suggest that most

of the current economic turmoil in the oil markets is

the result of COVID-19 impacts, not the Tenth Circuit’s

decision.8 None of these studies even mention the

See, e.g., U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Trends and Expectations Surrounding the Outlook for Energy Markets (Aug. 2020),

https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/trends_and_expectations_2020.

8

20

Tenth Circuit’s decision. Even Petitioners’ example of

Marathon’s decision to idle its Gallup, New Mexico refinery (see Pet. 30) has nothing to do with the Tenth

Circuit’s ruling—Marathon attributes the decision to

“a full three months of the challenges COVID has created for our business.”

Although Petitioners claim (Pet. 12) that the

Tenth Circuit decision will “prevent[ ] some small refineries—who may, for structural reasons, never be

able to blend fuel on their own—from ‘remain[ing] in

the market’ ” (citing Pet. App. 70a), EPA has consistently rejected the notion that merchant refiners that

are unable to blend renewable fuel are disproportionately impacted by the RFS. In 2015, an EPA report assessing the 2013 RIN market concluded that “obligated

parties were generally able to recover [the] increase in

the costs of meeting their RIN obligations in the price

they received for their petroleum-based products,” and

thus “these higher costs have a similar impact on all

obligated parties.” See Dallas Burkholder, U.S. EPA, A

Preliminary Assessment of RIN Market Dynamics, RIN

Prices, and Their Effects 29 (May 14, 2015), https://www.

epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard-program/renewableidentification-number-rin-analysis-renewable-fuel-standard.

The report specifically addressed merchant refiners

pdf; see also G. Chakrabarty, T. Fitzgibbon, & M. Smith, Downstream Oil and Gas Amid COVID-19: Succeeding in a Changed

Market, McKinsey & Company (Sept. 2020); J. Corrigan & M.

Greenan, COVID-19 and the Oil Price Collapse: Impacts on Refining and Downstream Businesses, PwC U.S. (Apr. 2020), https://www.

pwc.com/us/en/industries/energy-utilities-mining/library/covid-19impact-oil-refining-downstream-businesses.html.

21

“who largely purchase separated RINs to meet their

RFS obligations,” and determined that these refiners

“should not therefore be disadvantaged by the higher

RIN prices, as they are recovering these costs in the

sale price of their products.” Id. at 3. EPA has reaffirmed the findings of this report in recent rulemakings.

See 85 Fed. Reg. 7,016, 7,069–68 (Feb. 6, 2020).

Even if Petitioners’ fears did materialize, any

“negative economic effects” caused by “application of

the statutory volume requirements . . . could be addressed through other provisions of the statute.” ACE,

864 F.3d at 712. “In particular, Congress authorized

EPA to reduce the statutory renewable fuel volume requirements upon a determination that implementation of those requirements ‘would severely harm the

economy or environment of a State, a region, or the

United States.’ ” Ibid. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(7)(A)(i)).

Unlike the “temporary” exemption provided to small

refineries, EPA’s “severe economic harm waiver” authority appropriately serves as the “safety valve” sought by

Petitioners to ensure that the RFS obligations are not

excessively burdensome. Further, “[t]he statute provides other protections against economic harm,” including “a safe harbor for individual obligated parties

struggling to comply with a year’s requirements. The

statute mandates that EPA allows those parties to carry

a renewable fuel deficit forward into the next compliance year.” Ibid.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(5)(D); 40

C.F.R. § 80.1427(b).

In sum, the Tenth Circuit decision is unlikely to

have the economic impact described by Petitioners, but

22

even if it did, EPA has multiple mechanisms to address

such impact without resorting to the “temporary”

small refinery exemptions that Congress intended to

be phased out.

III. OVERTURNING ON THE QUESTION PRESENTED WOULD NOT ALTER THE JUDGMENT

Reversing the Tenth Circuit’s decision on the question presented would not alter its judgment because

the court also vacated each of these three EPA decisions on two separate and independent grounds.

First, the Tenth Circuit found that “[g]ranting extensions of exemptions based at least in part on hardships not caused by RFS compliance was outside the

scope of the EPA’s authority.” Pet. App. 84a–85a. In all

three challenged decisions, EPA cited “a difficult year

for the industry as a whole” as a factor for finding

hardship, which went beyond EPA’s authority because

“hardships caused by overall economic conditions are

different from hardships caused by compliance with

statutory renewable fuel obligations.” Pet. App. 84a.

Further, in two of the challenged decisions, EPA stated

that an exemption would relieve those refineries’ disproportionate economic hardship “in whole or in part,”

and the court concluded that “[t]he only way EPA’s

orders could have offered relief ‘in part’ was if the

agency had inappropriately considered disproportionate economic hardship occasioned by something other

than complying with” the RFS. Ibid.

23

Second, the Tenth Circuit held that it was an

abuse of discretion for EPA to find that the three refineries suffered a disproportionate economic hardship

while failing to address the agency’s longstanding position that refineries small and large recover the cost

of RFS compliance through the cost of the goods they

sell. Pet. App. 87a–92a. The court found that “EPA did

not analyze the possibility of RIN cost recoupment

when it granted the Refineries’ extension petitions,”

and in doing so EPA “ ‘failed to consider an important

aspect of the problem,’ and its silence ran counter to

the record.” Id. at 92a (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs.

Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463

U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).

Both holdings are standalone bases for the Tenth

Circuit’s vacatur of all three EPA decisions. This

Court’s review is therefore unwarranted on the single

question presented in the Petition.

IV. THE TENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY CONSTRUED THE SMALL REFINERY TEMPORARY EXEMPTION

The Tenth Circuit correctly applied established

canons of statutory interpretation. Even if it had not,

this Court has long declined to grant petitions for certiorari solely for the purpose of error correction. See

Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 661 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[E]rror correction . . . is outside the mainstream of the Court’s functions and . . . not among

the ‘compelling reasons’ . . . that govern the grant of

24

certiorari.”) (quoting S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop,

E. Hartnett, & D. Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Practice

§ 5.12(c)(3), p. 352 (10th ed. 2013)). This case presents

no reason to depart from the Court’s established practice.

“Extension” as used in § 7545(o)(9)(B) can only

mean “to prolong, enlarge, or add to” the initial small

refinery exemption (Pet. App. 67a), and cannot mean

“make available” a new exemption as Petitioners argue

it can (Pet. 14, 19). Accord, Sinclair Wyo. Refining Co.

v. EPA, 887 F.3d 986, 989 (10th Cir. 2017) (using term

“extension of the initial exemption”) (emphasis added);

Pet. 15 (“[T]he initial exemption could be extended for

an additional two years. . . .”); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) (“The word ‘extension’ ordinarily

implies the existence of something to be extended.”).

The Tenth Circuit found that “ordinary definitions

of ‘extension,’ along with common sense, dictate that

the subject of an extension must be in existence before

it can be extended.” Pet. App. 67a. For example, “if

someone interested in current events subscribes to a

news service in years one through five, allows the subscription to lapse in years six and seven, and goes back

to the news service in year eight, we usually do not say

that year eight was an ‘extension’ of the subscription

from years one through five. Rather, we say that the

person renewed or restarted his or her subscription in

year eight.” Ibid.

The Petitioners’ alternative definitions of “extension” do not make sense in context. For example,

25

Petitioners submit that “to make available” or “to

grant” is a “well-accepted meaning of ‘extension’ ” (Pet.

14). However, § 7545(o)(9)(B) does not authorize “extension of an exemption,” it authorizes “extension of

the [initial temporary] exemption under Subparagraph

(A).” This indicates continuity of the initial, temporary

exemption, not authority “to make available” a new exemption.

Petitioners also suggest that “extension” can mean

“an enlargement in scope or operation” (Pet. 18). But

the Refineries were not seeking to enlarge the “scope”

or “operation” of their exemptions, they were seeking

new exemptions. Regardless, the Refineries’ alternative

definition supports the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation,

as “an enlargement” implies something (i.e., an exemption) in existence to enlarge. Refineries also suggest

that “extension” can mean “the total range over which

something extends” or “a development . . . that includes or affects more people, things, or activities” (Pet.

18–19). Neither of these make sense in the context of

§ 7545(o)(9)(B).

Petitioners argue (Pet. 12) that the Tenth Circuit

interpreted “extension” to require continuous exemptions “[d]espite any indication in the statutory text

that Congress intended to phase out the hardship exemption in subsection (B).” But that is not consistent

with the statute’s characterization of the exemption as

“temporary.” See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) (referencing § 7545(o)(9)(A), “Temporary exemption”). Under

the statute, “once a small refinery figures out how

to put itself in a position of annual compliance, that

26

refinery is no longer a candidate for extending (really

‘renewing’ or ‘restarting’) its exemption.” Pet. App. 68a.

The Tenth Circuit is not alone in reaching that conclusion—the D.C. Circuit has likewise noted that the

terms of § 7545(o)(9) contemplate a “ ‘[t]emporary exemption’ for small refineries with an eye toward eventual compliance . . . for all refineries.” Hermes, 787 F.3d at

578.

Petitioners argue that the “temporary” exemption of

§ 7545(o)(9)(A) is distinct from “[t]he subsection (B) hardship exemption, . . . [which] is not found under the subsection entitled ‘Temporary exemption.’ ” (Pet. 15). But

these are not two separate exemptions—§ 7545(o)(9)(B)

authorizes “an extension of the exemption under subparagraph (A),” referring to the “[t]emporary exemption.” 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) (emphasis added).

The Tenth Circuit correctly recognized this is its decision below. See Pet. App. 65a (“The small refinery

exemption subject to an extension . . . is expressly

identified as ‘Temporary’ in subpart (A).”).

While Petitioners argue that “Congress had a distinct purpose in mind” when it “placed the subsection

(B) hardship exemption in its own subsection” (Pet. 14),

the text can only support the conclusion that the separate subsections denote the distinct procedures Congress established for extensions of the exemption.

Subsection (A) provides an initial blanket exemption

and an extension of that exemption through a study

conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy, while

Subsection (B) provides a procedure for refineries

to petition for an extension of their exemption on a

27

case-by-case basis. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(A)–(B).

Petitioners are wrong to try to read a “distinct purpose”

into the statute based on the organization of these provisions.

Petitioners also misconstrue the statute’s use of

the phrase “at any time” (Pet. 14) to mean that “ ‘at any

time,’ EPA can grant or make available the exemption.”

That is not what the statute says. Section 7545(o)(9)(B)

provides only that “[a] small refinery may at any time

petition [EPA] for an extension of the exemption.” (emphasis added). But “[e]ven if a small refinery can submit a hardship petition at any time, it does not follow

that every single petition can be granted.” Pet. App.

72a. The phrase “at any time” describes when a refinery may submit its extension petition; it has no bearing

on other conditions of eligibility. By making “at any

time” the operative term (Pet. 22–24), Petitioners ignore the limiting terms “extension” and “extend”—

used five times in § 7545(o)(9), each referring back to

the original temporary exemption period.

Finally, Petitioners’ policy argument that § 7545(o)(9)(B)

created a permanent “safety valve” for small refineries

(Pet. 2, 13, 18, 22, 25, 27), is not supported by the text

of the statute. Section 7545(o)(9)(B) does not establish a “safety valve,” but rather, “Congress, aware that

small refineries would face greater difficulty complying with the renewable fuel requirements, created a

three-tiered system of exemptions to afford small

28

refineries a bridge to compliance.” See Hermes, 787

F.3d at 572.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

CONCLUSION

Because the Tenth Circuit’s decision does not conflict with the decision of any other courts or amount to

an important question of federal law that should be

settled by this Court, and because the D.C. Circuit will

have an imminent opportunity to address this issue at

the national level, the Court should deny the Petition.

Respectfully submitted,

MATTHEW W. MORRISON*

CYNTHIA COOK ROBERTSON

SHELBY L. DYL

PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP

1200 Seventeenth Street, NW

Washington, D.C. 20036

Phone: 202-663-8000

matthew.morrison@pillsburylaw.com

*Counsel of Record

Counsel for Respondents

Renewable Fuels Association,

American Coalition for Ethanol,

National Corn Growers Association,

and National Farmers Union

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.