Respondents Brief — HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC, et al., Petitioners v. Renewable Fuels Association, et al.
Supreme Court briefDec 9, 2020
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 20-472
================================================================================================================
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE
REFINING, LLC, et al.,
v.
Petitioners,
RENEWABLE FUELS ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Respondents.
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Tenth Circuit
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------MATTHEW W. MORRISON*
CYNTHIA COOK ROBERTSON
SHELBY L. DYL
PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP
1200 Seventeenth Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20036
Phone: 202-663-8000
matthew.morrison@pillsburylaw.com
*Counsel of Record
Counsel for Respondents
Renewable Fuels Association,
American Coalition for Ethanol,
National Corn Growers Association,
and National Farmers Union
================================================================================================================
COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964
WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) exceeded its authority by granting
“extensions” of the “temporary exemption” for small
refineries under 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B) to three refineries for which the temporary exemption had previously expired.
ii
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
The Renewable Fuels Association (“RFA”) is a
non-profit trade association. Its members are ethanol
producers and supporters of the ethanol industry. RFA
promotes the general commercial, legislative, and other
common interests of its members. RFA does not have a
parent company, and no publicly held company has a
10% or greater ownership interest in it.
The American Coalition for Ethanol (“ACE”) is a
non-profit trade association. Its members include ethanol and biofuel facilities, agricultural producers, ethanol industry investors, and supporters of the ethanol
industry. ACE promotes the general commercial, legislative, and other common interests of its members.
ACE does not have a parent company, and no publicly
held company has a 10% or greater ownership interest
in it.
The National Corn Growers Association (“NCGA”)
is a non-profit trade association. Its members are corn
farmers and supporters of the agriculture and ethanol
industries. NCGA promotes the general commercial,
legislative, and other common interests of its members.
NCGA does not have a parent company, and no publicly held company has a 10% or greater ownership interest in it.
The Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union
of America, doing business as the National Farmers
Union (“NFU”), is a non-profit trade association. Its
iii
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT—Continued
members include farmers who are producers of biofuel
feedstocks and consumers of large quantities of fuel.
The NFU promotes the general commercial, legislative, and other common interests of its members. It
does not have a parent company, and no publicly held
company has a 10% or greater ownership interest in it.
For the purposes of this brief, RFA, ACE, NCGA,
and NFU are referred to collectively as the “Biofuels
Coalition.”
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
OPINION BELOW ...............................................
1
JURISDICTION ...................................................
2
INTRODUCTION ................................................
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE..............................
5
I.
II.
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND ...................................................
5
A. The Renewable Fuel Standard ............
5
B. Small Refinery Temporary Exemption ....
6
C. EPA’s Administration of Petitions for
Extension of the Small Refinery Temporary Exemption ................................
7
CASE BACKGROUND ..............................
9
A. Petitioners’ Exemption Extension Petitions ...................................................
9
B. The Biofuels Coalition’s Petition for
Review and the Tenth Circuit’s Judgment ..................................................... 10
REASONS TO DENY THE PETITION ............... 13
I. THERE IS NO CIRCUIT SPLIT OF AUTHORITY ..................................................... 13
II. THE PETITION DOES NOT PRESENT
AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FEDERAL LAW THAT THE COURT NEEDS
TO RESOLVE .............................................. 16
A. The D.C. Circuit Will Address the
Same Question..................................... 17
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
B. The Tenth Circuit’s Decision Will Not
Cause the Economic Harm Imagined by
Petitioners.............................................. 19
III.
OVERTURNING ON THE QUESTION
PRESENTED WOULD NOT ALTER THE
JUDGMENT ................................................ 22
IV.
THE TENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY CONSTRUED THE SMALL REFINERY TEMPORARY EXEMPTION ............................... 23
CONCLUSION..................................................... 28
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Advanced Biofuels Ass’n v. EPA,
792 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ................................17
American Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. EPA,
937 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ................................ 5, 8
Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA,
864 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2017) .......................... passim
Ergon-West Virginia, Inc. v. EPA,
896 F.3d 600 (4th Cir. 2018) ....................................13
Hermes Consol., LLC v. EPA,
787 F.3d 568 (D.C. Cir. 2015) .......................... passim
King v. Burwell,
576 U.S. 473 (2015) .................................................14
Lion Oil Co. v. EPA,
792 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2015) ..................................... 13
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S.
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983) ...................................................23
Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. EPA,
No. 19–1220 (D.C. Cir.)
(petition filed Oct. 22, 2019).................. 15, 17, 18, 19
Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. EPA,
887 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 2017) .................. 9, 10, 13, 24
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. EPA,
No. 19–9562 (10th Cir. Oct. 15, 2019),
ECF No. 010110245406 ..........................................18
Tolan v. Cotton,
572 U.S. 650 (2015) .................................................23
STATUTES AND CODES
United States Code
Title 28, section 1254(1) ............................................2
Title 42, section 7545(o)(1)(k) ...................................6
Title 42, section 7545(o)(2)(B) ...................................5
Title 42, section 7545(o)(5)(D) ............................ 4, 21
Title 42, section 7545(o)(7)(A) ............................. 4, 21
Title 42, section 7545(o)(9) ................................ 26, 27
Title 42, section 7545(o)(9)(A) ............. 6, 7, 25, 26, 27
Title 42, section 7545(o)(9)(B) ......................... passim
Title 42, section 7607(b) ..........................................15
Title 42, section 7607(b)(1) ............................... 11, 18
Pub. L. No. 110–140
121 Stat. 1492 (2007) ............................................ 2, 5
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Code of Federal Regulations
Title 40, section 56.3 ...............................................15
Title 40, section 80.1401 ...........................................6
Title 40, section 80.1427 ...........................................6
Title 40, section 80.1427(b) ................................. 4, 21
Title 40, section 80.1429(b) .......................................6
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Rules of the Supreme Court
Rule 10.....................................................................16
Rule 10(a) ............................................................ 3, 13
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) .......................24
Dallas Burkholder, U.S. EPA, A Preliminary Assessment of RIN Market Dynamics, RIN Prices,
and Their Effects 29 (May 14, 2015) ................. 20, 21
EPA, RFS Small Refinery Exemptions, https://
www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-reporting-andcompliance-help/rfs-small-refinery-exemptions
(last updated Nov. 19, 2020) .....................................8
G. Chakrabarty, T. Fitzgibbon, & M. Smith, Downstream Oil and Gas Amid COVID-19: Succeeding in a Changed Market ........................................20
J. Corrigan & M. Greenan, COVID-19 and the
Oil Price Collapse: Impacts on Refining and
Downstream Businesses, PwC U.S. (Apr. 2020),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industries/energyutilities-mining/library/covid-19-impact-oilrefining-downstream-businesses.html .................20
Jarrett Renshaw & Chris Prentice, Chevron, Exxon
Seek ‘Small Refinery’ Waivers from U.S. Biofuels Law, Reuters (Apr. 12, 2018), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biofuels-eparefineries-exclusive/exclusive-chevron-exxonseek-small-refinery-waivers-from-u-s-biofuelslaw-idUSKBN1HJ32R ..............................................8
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett, & D.
Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Practice § 5.12(c)(3),
p. 352 (10th ed. 2013) ..............................................24
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Trends and Expectations Surrounding the Outlook for Energy
Markets (Aug. 2020), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/
aeo/pdf/trends_and_expectations_2020.pdf ...........19
1
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE
REFINING, LLC, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
RENEWABLE FUELS ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Respondents.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Tenth Circuit
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
OPINION BELOW
The Tenth Circuit order (Pet. App. 1a–94a) is reported at 948 F.3d 1206. The underlying EPA orders
(Suppl. App. 1a–46a) are not published in the Federal
Register or otherwise publicly available.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
2
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on January 24, 2020. A petition for rehearing was denied on April 7, 2020. On March 19, 2020, due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, this Court entered an order extending the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari
to 150 days. The petition for a writ of certiorari was
filed on September 4, 2020. The jurisdiction of this
Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Renewable Fuel Standard
(“RFS”) program “to move the United States toward
greater energy independence” and “to increase the
production of clean renewable fuels.” Americans for
Clean Energy v. EPA (“ACE”), 864 F.3d 691, 696 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J.) (quoting Pub. L. No. 110140, pmbl., 121 Stat. 1492, 1492 (2007)). To accomplish
these goals, the statute provides “increasing [volume]
requirements [that] are designed to force the market
to create ways to produce and use greater and greater
volumes of renewable fuel each year.” Id. at 710. For
the RFS to function as Congress intended, obligated
parties—refiners and importers of petroleum like the
Petitioners—must each fulfill their share of the program’s annual volume obligations. Id. at 697.
The Petition concerns EPA’s authority to “extend”
a “temporary exemption” from RFS obligations that allowed small refineries additional time to prepare for
3
RFS obligations. Petitioners argue that because the
statute says a refinery may petition EPA for an “extension” of the temporary exemption “at any time,” EPA
can grant a new exemption after the temporary exemption described by the statute has expired.
The Tenth Circuit, however, held that in context
“extension” can only mean “to increase the length or
duration of; lengthen; prolong” the original exemption.
Pet. App. 67a. In practice, this means that “the only
small refineries” that “continue[ ] to be eligible for extensions” are “ones that submitted meritorious hardship petitions each year.” Id. at 68a. This ruling is both
a straightforward reading of the text, and also consistent with other judicial constructions of the small
refinery temporary exemption.
The Tenth Circuit was the first, and thus far the
only, court to address on the merits the specific issue
raised by Petitioners here. The Tenth Circuit’s decision
therefore does not “conflict with the decision of another
United States court of appeals”—or any other court—
“on the same important matter.” See Sup. Ct. R. 10(a).
Moreover, the Petition presents a discrete issue of
statutory interpretation in a case of limited impact.
The case involves only three EPA decisions involving
three individual small refineries. A subsequent 2019
decision announcing EPA’s national policy for adjudicating small refinery temporary exemptions is currently subject to judicial review in the D.C. Circuit.
The same statutory construction questions before the
Tenth Circuit will necessarily be addressed by the D.C.
4
Circuit. The Tenth Circuit’s more limited holding is
therefore not the appropriate vehicle for this Court to
review this issue.
To the extent the Petitioners hypothesize that the
Tenth Circuit’s decision could subject certain geographic
areas or obligated parties to economic harms, the
Clean Air Act has separate provisions to address those
potential issues. See ACE, 864 F.3d at 712 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 7545(o)(5)(D), (7)(A)(i); 40 C.F.R. § 80.1427(b)).
Finally, the Tenth Circuit’s vacatur of the three
challenged EPA decisions rests on three separate and
independent grounds, such that overturning the Tenth
Circuit’s holding on the single question presented in
the Petition would not affect the outcome of the judgment below.
In sum, the Tenth Circuit’s decision does not conflict with the decision of any other court, does not
amount to an important question of federal law that
should be settled by this Court, and the Court’s review
is not warranted before the D.C. Circuit rules on the
issue presented as a matter of EPA’s national policy.
The Petition should be denied.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
A. The Renewable Fuel Standard
Congress created the RFS program to “move the
United States toward greater energy independence
and security, [and] to increase the production of clean
renewable fuels.” American Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs.
v. EPA (“AFPM”), 937 F.3d 559, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(quoting Pub. L. No. 110–140, 121 Stat. 1492 (2007)).
The RFS prescribes “applicable volumes—mandatory and annually increasing quantities of renewable
fuels that must be introduced into commerce in the
United States each year,” beginning at 4 billion gallons of renewable fuel in 2006 and ascending to 36
billion gallons in 2022.1 AFPM, 937 F.3d at 568 (quotation marks omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(I).
EPA is required to “ensure[ ]” that the statutory volume requirements are met, which it accomplishes by
“translating the annual volume requirements into ‘percentage standards.’ ” ACE, 864 F.3d at 699. The percentage standards “inform each obligated party”—
gasoline and diesel fuel refineries and importers—“of
how much fuel it must introduce into U.S. commerce
based on the volumes of fossil-based gasoline or diesel
it imports or produces.” Ibid.
The EPA has statutory authority to determine the volume
amounts after 2022. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(ii)–(v).
1
6
To demonstrate compliance, “obligated parties can
acquire and trade credits,” called “Renewable Identification Numbers” or “RINs.” ACE, 864 F.3d at 699. RINs
represent “the volume of ethanol-equivalent fuel gallons” in “each batch of renewable fuel that is produced
or imported in the United States.” Ibid.; 40 C.F.R.
§ 80.1401. When renewable fuel is blended into transportation fuel, “the RINs become ‘separated’ from the
associated volumes of renewable fuel . . . [and] may be
retained by the party who possesses them or sold and
traded on the open RIN market.” ACE, 864 F.3d at 699;
40 C.F.R. § 80.1429(b). Obligated parties meet their obligation by “accumulating or purchasing the requisite
number of RINs and then ‘retiring’ the RINs in an annual compliance demonstration with EPA.” ACE, 864
F.3d at 713; 40 C.F.R. § 80.1427.
B. Small Refinery Temporary Exemption
Most obligated parties were required to begin fulfilling their RFS volume obligations in compliance year
2006. However, “aware that small refineries”—those
whose “average aggregate daily crude oil throughput
for a calendar year . . . does not exceed 75,000 barrels,”
§ 7545(o)(1)(k)—“would face greater difficulty complying with the renewable fuels requirements, [Congress]
created a three-tiered system of exemptions to afford
small refineries a bridge to compliance.” Hermes Consol., LLC v. EPA, 787 F.3d 568, 573 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see
42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(A)–(B).
7
First, the statute provided a “[t]emporary exemption” from RFS obligations to all small refineries until
2011. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(A)(i); see Hermes, 787 F.3d
at 572–73. Second, “the statute directed DOE to conduct a study ‘to determine whether compliance . . .
would impose a disproportionate economic hardship on
small refineries,’ ” and “[i]f DOE determined that any
small refinery ‘would be subject to a disproportionate
economic hardship if required to comply with’ the renewable fuels program, EPA was required to extend
the exemption for that refinery ‘for a period of not less
than 2 additional years.’ ” Hermes, 787 F.3d at 573
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)). Third, the statute permits individual small refineries “at any time
[to] petition the Administrator for an extension of
the exemption under subparagraph (A) for the reason
of disproportionate economic hardship.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 7545(o)(9)(B)(i); see also Hermes, 787 F.3d at 573.
C. EPA’s Administration of Petitions for Extension of the Small Refinery Temporary
Exemption
Congress “contemplated a ‘[t]emporary exemption’
for small refineries with an eye toward eventual compliance with the renewable fuels program for all refineries.” Hermes, 787 F.3d at 578. Consistent with this
objective, EPA phased down the number of exempt
refineries for the first several years of the RFS, from
fifty-nine under the initial exemption to seven exempt
refineries in 2015.
8
However, starting with the 2016 compliance year,
EPA began to dramatically increase the number of exemptions. The number of exemptions jumped to nineteen for 2016, thirty-five for 2017, and thirty-one for
2018. EPA, RFS Small Refinery Exemptions, https://
www.epa.gov/fuels-registrationreporting-and-compliancehelp/rfs-small-refinery-exemptions (last updated Nov.
19, 2020). Because EPA did not adjust the volume obligations to account for these exemptions, the exempt
“gallons of renewable fuels simply [went] unproduced.”
AFPM, 937 F.3d at 571. The 2016–2018 exemptions effectively resulted in a shortfall of more than four billion gallons of renewable fuel relative to the statutorily
required volumes.2
EPA’s reversal of its tapering of the temporary exemptions was not documented publicly, as EPA grants
these exemptions in secret. The market impacts from
EPA’s policy shift drew the attention of the biofuels industry and the media, and ultimately opened up EPA’s
actions to judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Jarrett Renshaw
& Chris Prentice, Chevron, Exxon Seek ‘Small Refinery’
Waivers from U.S. Biofuels Law, Reuters (Apr. 12, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biofuels-eparefineries-exclusive/exclusive-chevron-exxon-seek-smallrefinery-waivers-from-u-s-biofuels-law-idUSKBN1HJ32R.
Notably, when the Biofuels Coalition filed its action in
the Tenth Circuit, EPA was still refusing to make any
information regarding its decisions on small refinery
EPA, RFS Small Refinery Exemptions, https://www.epa.gov/
fuels-registrationreporting-and-compliance-help/rfs-small-refineryexemptions (last updated Nov. 19, 2020).
2
9
exemption extension petitions publicly available, classifying all of it as confidential business information.
That lack of public information nearly allowed EPA’s
actions to escape judicial review. It was only because
the Biofuels Coalition was able to gather sufficient
public information (made available by the Petitioners
themselves) to challenge three specific EPA decisions
that the Tenth Circuit was able to open up a window
on the sea change in EPA’s policy.
II.
CASE BACKGROUND
A. Petitioners’ Exemption Extension Petitions
Petitioner HollyFrontier Refining & Marketing
LLC (“HollyFrontier Refining”) submitted exemption
extension petitions for compliance year 2016 on behalf
of two small refineries owned by its subsidiaries, Petitioner HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining LLC (“HollyFrontier Cheyenne”) and Petitioner Holly Frontier
Woods Cross Refining LLC (“HollyFrontier Woods Cross”)
(collectively, with HollyFrontier Refining, “HollyFrontier”).
HollyFrontier Cheyenne received an extension of
the temporary exemption through 2012 based on
DOE’s study, but its exemption was not further extended in 2013 or 2014. Pet. App. 32a. HollyFrontier
Cheyenne applied for an exemption in 2015, but EPA
denied the petition. Ibid. HollyFrontier Cheyenne appealed EPA’s denial to the Tenth Circuit, and the court
remanded the decision for further consideration in
light of its opinion in Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v.
10
EPA, 887 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 2017). For purposes of this
case, the Tenth Circuit assumed that EPA granted the
2015 petition on remand, as the record did not reflect
EPA’s final disposition. Ibid.
The record does not indicate that HollyFrontier
Woods Cross ever received an extension of the small
refinery temporary exemption, either based on DOE’s
study, or thereafter. Pet. App. 35a.
A subsidiary of CVR Refining, LP, Petitioner
Wynnewood Refining Company, LLC (“CVR”), submitted an exemption petition for its Wynnewood Refinery
for compliance year 2017. CVR’s petition stated that it
had received an extension of the blanket exemption in
2011 and 2012 but received no further extensions of its
exemption. Pet. App. 37a.
EPA granted each of these three petitions (two for
2016 and one for 2017) in unpublished decisions that
were initially issued only to the Petitioners. The Biofuels Coalition did not have access to the decisions until
receiving the administrative record for this case from
EPA.
B. The Biofuels Coalition’s Petition for Review and the Tenth Circuit’s Judgment
The Biofuels Coalition learned of these exemptions through media reports and confirmed them
through the Petitioners’ public filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The Biofuels Coalition filed a petition for review challenging EPA’s
11
authority to grant these exemptions as a matter of
statutory construction and challenging the decisions
themselves as arbitrary and capricious.
The Clean Air Act dictates that petitions for
review of agency actions with local or regional applicability are to be heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals
with jurisdiction over that locality or region. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(b)(1). The statute dictates that agency actions
with national applicability are to be heard by the D.C.
Circuit. Ibid. EPA’s decisions regarding individual
small refinery exemption petitions are construed as
having local or regional applicability, and therefore the
Biofuel’s Coalition had to file in the Tenth Circuit.3
In the ruling challenged by Petitioners, the Tenth
Circuit vacated all three challenged exemption decisions. It held that EPA exceeded its authority under
42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B) by granting new small refinery exemptions to Petitioners Cheyenne, Woods Cross,
and Wynnewood refineries (the “Refineries”) when the
plain text of the statute allows EPA to grant only “extensions” of exemptions. The court explained that “an
‘extension’ requires a small refinery exemption in prior
years to prolong, enlarge, or add to,” meaning that
“the only small refineries . . . eligible for extensions
were the ones that submitted meritorious hardship
EPA changed its practice in 2019 by addressing all 2018
small refinery exemption extension petitions in a single memorandum, which set forth EPA’s national approach for adjudicating
petitions for small refinery exemptions. The parties comprising
the Biofuels Coalition have sought review of that decision before
the D.C. Circuit.
3
12
petitions each year.” Pet. App. 68a, 75a. Because each
of the three Refineries’ exemptions had expired by
2013 at the latest, the court held that “[a]t most, these
Refineries sought to renew or restart their exemptions,” which “[t]he amended Clean Air Act did not authorize.” Ibid.
The Tenth Circuit found two additional flaws that
Petitioners have not challenged here. First, the Tenth
Circuit held that EPA exceeded its statutory authority
by “[g]ranting extensions of exemptions based at least
in part on hardships not caused by RFS compliance.”
Pet. App. 85a. EPA’s decisions cited to “[a] difficult year
for the refining industry as a whole” and an “industrywide downward trend” of lower net refining margins,
among other factors that the court determined were
“not restricted to disproportionate economic hardship
caused by RFS compliance.” Pet. App. 83a–84a.
Second, the Tenth Circuit held that it was arbitrary and capricious for EPA to have “ignored or failed
to provide reasons for deviating from prior studies
showing that” the costs of purchasing the credits
needed to show RFS compliance (i.e., “RINs”) “do not
disproportionately harm refineries which are not vertically integrated.” Pet. App. 87a. This is because “merchant refineries typically recoup their RIN purchase
costs through higher petroleum fuel prices.” Pet. App.
91a.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
13
REASONS TO DENY THE PETITION
I.
THERE IS NO CIRCUIT SPLIT OF AUTHORITY
The Tenth Circuit’s decision does not “conflict with
the decision of another United States court of appeals”—or any other court—“on the same important
matter.” See Sup. Ct. R. 10(a). The Tenth Circuit was
the first, and thus far the only, court to address the specific issue raised by Petitioners here on the merits.
Notably, this was the first time a court has scrutinized EPA’s authority to grant exemptions under the
small refinery exemption provision. Other cases have
examined the provision in challenges by small refineries addressing EPA’s denial of exemptions. See ErgonWest Virginia, Inc. v. EPA, 896 F.3d 600 (4th Cir. 2018);
Sinclair Wyo. Refining Co. v. EPA, 887 F.3d 986 (10th
Cir. 2017); Hermes Consol., LLC v. EPA, 787 F.3d 568
(D.C. Cir. 2015); Lion Oil Co. v. EPA, 792 F.3d 978 (8th
Cir. 2015). And while there may be overlap in some of
the issues considered in these cases, the specific question presented here—whether EPA has authority to
grant extensions of small refinery exemptions that
have expired—had never been considered by another
court.
Petitioners attempt (Pet. 19–20) to manufacture a
circuit split by citing to instances where other courts
have interpreted the word “extension” in entirely different contexts. But none of these cases addressed
the language in the RFS provisions of the Clean
Air Act governing small refinery exemptions. On the
14
contrary, Petitioners’ arguments run counter to this
Court’s principle that “the Court must read the words
[of a statute] in their context and with a view to their
place in the overall statutory scheme.” King v. Burwell,
576 U.S. 473, 474 (2015) (quotation marks omitted).
The fact that “extension” can have different meanings
in different statutory schemes does not give rise to a
conflict that warrants this Court’s intervention here.
Petitioners further claim (Pet. 33) the Tenth Circuit’s decision effectively creates regional conflict between circuits because small refineries in the Tenth
Circuit will be barred from obtaining exemptions while
refineries in other circuits remain eligible. But this
premise is flawed and misleading. The Tenth Circuit’s
decision does not bar small refineries from continuing
to seek extensions if their exemptions have not lapsed.
The Tenth Circuit merely confirmed some of the prerequisites for issuing such exemptions (e.g., a continuous temporary exemption with no lapses, a finding that
any disproportionate economic hardship is the result
of RFS compliance, and some explanation of how a
small refinery could suffer a disproportionate economic
hardship when EPA has repeatedly concluded that all
refineries, large and small, recover their RFS compliance costs in the cost of the products they sell). To the
extent EPA decides to limit the underlying decision to
the Tenth Circuit, that is the result of the Clean Air
15
Act’s venue provision and EPA’s regional consistency
regulations.4
Section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act requires that
challenges to nationally-applicable standards and regulations be brought in the D.C. Circuit, while challenges to other final agency actions that are locally or
regionally applicable be filed only in the United States
Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(b). Because the Biofuels Coalition challenged
EPA’s decisions regarding three specific refineries located within the Tenth Circuit, the Clean Air Act’s
venue provision dictated that these had to be addressed in the appropriate regional circuit court of appeals. Ibid.; see also Pet. App. 4a.
EPA’s regional consistency regulations provide
that “[i]t is EPA’s policy to . . . [r]ecognize that only the
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and decisions of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit Court
that arise from challenges to ‘nationally applicable regulations . . . or final action’ . . . shall apply uniformly.”
40 C.F.R. § 56.3 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)). The regulations explicitly exempt “decisions of the federal
courts that arise from challenges to ‘locally or regionally’ applicable actions.” Ibid. Consequently, to the
extent EPA has not yet applied the Tenth Circuit’s
In fact, the Biofuels Coalition supports uniform application
of the principles announced by the Tenth Circuit and the parties
comprising the Biofuels Coalition have raised similar issues in
pending litigation in the D.C. Circuit. See Renewable Fuels Ass’n
v. EPA, No. 19–1220 (D.C. Cir.) (petition filed Oct. 22, 2019).
4
16
decision nationally, that is the product of EPA’s regulations, not of the decision itself.
II.
THE PETITION DOES NOT PRESENT AN
IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FEDERAL LAW
THAT THE COURT NEEDS TO RESOLVE
The Petition presents a discrete issue of statutory
interpretation that does not implicate an important
question of federal law. See Sup. Ct. R. 10. Each of the
three challenged EPA adjudications was issued solely
to an individual small refinery. As just noted, EPA’s regional consistency regulations relieve EPA from adopting “decisions that arise from challenges to ‘locally or
regionally applicable actions’ ”—such as the Tenth Circuit decision here—as national agency policy. Therefore, at most, the Tenth Circuit’s ruling directly affects
only those small refineries located in the Tenth Circuit.
A decision with such limited effect is not an appropriate vehicle for this Court’s review, particularly when
the question presented in the Petition will be addressed in a challenge to EPA’s national policy in a case
currently pending before the D.C. Circuit.
Petitioners also exaggerate the economic impact of
the Tenth Circuit’s decision, and to the extent their arguments have any validity, the RFS has other built-in
statutory mechanisms for EPA to address economic
harm, thus obviating the need for this Court to intervene.
17
A. The D.C. Circuit Will Address the Same
Question
Briefing has already begun in a case before the
D.C. Circuit which will decide the question presented
in the Petition in the context of EPA’s national policy
for adjudicating small refinery exemptions. See Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. EPA, No. 19–1220 (D.C. Cir. filed
Oct. 22, 2019) (hereinafter “D.C. Circuit Action”). Until
recently, EPA issued an unpublished individual decision for each petition for a small refinery exemption
extension, like the three decisions addressed by the
Tenth Circuit’s ruling. For compliance year 2018, however, EPA abandoned its established practice of providing individual decisions to each refinery, and instead
issued a single memorandum in August of 2019 to
announce its decision for all of the 2018 petitions,
granting thirty-one out of forty-two petitions received.5
EPA has conceded that the memorandum is a challengeable final agency action.6 The parties comprising
the Biofuels Coalition filed a timely petition for review.
The Clean Air Act’s venue provision requires a
challenge to the 2018 small refinery exemption decision to be brought in the D.C. Circuit, as it contains
EPA, RFS Small Refinery Exemptions, https://www.epa.gov/
fuels-registration-reporting-and-compliance-help/rfs-small-refineryexemptions (last updated Nov. 19, 2020).
6
See Advanced Biofuels Ass’n v. EPA, 792 F. App’x 1, 6 (D.C.
Cir. 2019) (“During oral argument, the EPA acknowledged that
the August 2019 Memorandum is ‘final agency action’ to which a
challenge could be brought if filed within the required limitations
period.”).
5
18
EPA’s statements of its national policy for adjudicating
small refinery exemptions.7 The D.C. Circuit Action
will necessarily address the exact issue Petitioners
raise here—whether EPA exceeded its authority under
the Clean Air Act by granting small refinery exemptions under 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B) where the exemption had previously expired. See Pet’rs Br. 22-30, D.C.
Circuit Action, supra, ECF No. 1874746 (filed Dec. 7,
2020). Petitioners HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining
LLC, HollyFrontier Refining & Marketing LLC, and
HollyFrontier Woods Cross Refining, LLC have intervened in the D.C. Circuit Action.
Notably, the D.C. Circuit expressed interest in
2018 in reviewing EPA’s recent policy change in its administration of small refinery exemptions. Although it
lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the petition
then before it—challenging EPA’s “change in methodology” used to award extensions of small refinery exemptions—the D.C. Circuit panel expressed discomfort
at the record evidence of EPA’s actions. The court’s per
curiam judgment dismissing the case stated that
“EPA’s briefing and oral argument paint a troubling
picture of intentionally shrouded and hidden agency
law that could have left those aggrieved by the agency’s
actions without a viable avenue for judicial review.” Id.
at 5. EPA had, however, recently opened the door for
See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1); EPA Reply in Support of Mot. to
Dismiss 7, Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. EPA, No. 19–9562 (10th Cir.
Oct. 15, 2019), ECF No. 010110245406 (“An agency action that
determines the rights of facilities all over the country, across multiple circuits, using a coordinated and consistent rationale is ‘nationally applicable[.]’ ”).
7
19
judicial review, so that this “ongoing pattern of genuinely secret law” could be challenged through “the August 2019 formal and public memorandum announcing
the EPA’s new decisional framework and applying it to
forty-two refineries.” Ibid. The Biofuels Coalition has
done just that in the D.C. Circuit Action.
B. The Tenth Circuit’s Decision Will Not
Cause the Economic Harm Imagined by
Petitioners
There is no reason to expect the Tenth Circuit’s decision to have the dire consequences hypothesized by
the Petitioners. First and foremost, until 2017, EPA’s
longstanding policy was to funnel small refineries toward accepting their share of RFS obligations. Like
most other small refineries, the Petitioners were among
those that had already come into compliance. It is
impossible to reconcile Petitioners’ claim (Pet. 3) that
the Tenth Circuit’s decision will “pose an existential
threat to . . . businesses” and “wreak havoc upon the
communities they serve” with the fact that as of 2015,
only seven small refineries remained exempt from RFS
obligations.
Moreover, government studies suggest that most
of the current economic turmoil in the oil markets is
the result of COVID-19 impacts, not the Tenth Circuit’s
decision.8 None of these studies even mention the
See, e.g., U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Trends and Expectations Surrounding the Outlook for Energy Markets (Aug. 2020),
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/trends_and_expectations_2020.
8
20
Tenth Circuit’s decision. Even Petitioners’ example of
Marathon’s decision to idle its Gallup, New Mexico refinery (see Pet. 30) has nothing to do with the Tenth
Circuit’s ruling—Marathon attributes the decision to
“a full three months of the challenges COVID has created for our business.”
Although Petitioners claim (Pet. 12) that the
Tenth Circuit decision will “prevent[ ] some small refineries—who may, for structural reasons, never be
able to blend fuel on their own—from ‘remain[ing] in
the market’ ” (citing Pet. App. 70a), EPA has consistently rejected the notion that merchant refiners that
are unable to blend renewable fuel are disproportionately impacted by the RFS. In 2015, an EPA report assessing the 2013 RIN market concluded that “obligated
parties were generally able to recover [the] increase in
the costs of meeting their RIN obligations in the price
they received for their petroleum-based products,” and
thus “these higher costs have a similar impact on all
obligated parties.” See Dallas Burkholder, U.S. EPA, A
Preliminary Assessment of RIN Market Dynamics, RIN
Prices, and Their Effects 29 (May 14, 2015), https://www.
epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard-program/renewableidentification-number-rin-analysis-renewable-fuel-standard.
The report specifically addressed merchant refiners
pdf; see also G. Chakrabarty, T. Fitzgibbon, & M. Smith, Downstream Oil and Gas Amid COVID-19: Succeeding in a Changed
Market, McKinsey & Company (Sept. 2020); J. Corrigan & M.
Greenan, COVID-19 and the Oil Price Collapse: Impacts on Refining and Downstream Businesses, PwC U.S. (Apr. 2020), https://www.
pwc.com/us/en/industries/energy-utilities-mining/library/covid-19impact-oil-refining-downstream-businesses.html.
21
“who largely purchase separated RINs to meet their
RFS obligations,” and determined that these refiners
“should not therefore be disadvantaged by the higher
RIN prices, as they are recovering these costs in the
sale price of their products.” Id. at 3. EPA has reaffirmed the findings of this report in recent rulemakings.
See 85 Fed. Reg. 7,016, 7,069–68 (Feb. 6, 2020).
Even if Petitioners’ fears did materialize, any
“negative economic effects” caused by “application of
the statutory volume requirements . . . could be addressed through other provisions of the statute.” ACE,
864 F.3d at 712. “In particular, Congress authorized
EPA to reduce the statutory renewable fuel volume requirements upon a determination that implementation of those requirements ‘would severely harm the
economy or environment of a State, a region, or the
United States.’ ” Ibid. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(7)(A)(i)).
Unlike the “temporary” exemption provided to small
refineries, EPA’s “severe economic harm waiver” authority appropriately serves as the “safety valve” sought by
Petitioners to ensure that the RFS obligations are not
excessively burdensome. Further, “[t]he statute provides other protections against economic harm,” including “a safe harbor for individual obligated parties
struggling to comply with a year’s requirements. The
statute mandates that EPA allows those parties to carry
a renewable fuel deficit forward into the next compliance year.” Ibid.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(5)(D); 40
C.F.R. § 80.1427(b).
In sum, the Tenth Circuit decision is unlikely to
have the economic impact described by Petitioners, but
22
even if it did, EPA has multiple mechanisms to address
such impact without resorting to the “temporary”
small refinery exemptions that Congress intended to
be phased out.
III. OVERTURNING ON THE QUESTION PRESENTED WOULD NOT ALTER THE JUDGMENT
Reversing the Tenth Circuit’s decision on the question presented would not alter its judgment because
the court also vacated each of these three EPA decisions on two separate and independent grounds.
First, the Tenth Circuit found that “[g]ranting extensions of exemptions based at least in part on hardships not caused by RFS compliance was outside the
scope of the EPA’s authority.” Pet. App. 84a–85a. In all
three challenged decisions, EPA cited “a difficult year
for the industry as a whole” as a factor for finding
hardship, which went beyond EPA’s authority because
“hardships caused by overall economic conditions are
different from hardships caused by compliance with
statutory renewable fuel obligations.” Pet. App. 84a.
Further, in two of the challenged decisions, EPA stated
that an exemption would relieve those refineries’ disproportionate economic hardship “in whole or in part,”
and the court concluded that “[t]he only way EPA’s
orders could have offered relief ‘in part’ was if the
agency had inappropriately considered disproportionate economic hardship occasioned by something other
than complying with” the RFS. Ibid.
23
Second, the Tenth Circuit held that it was an
abuse of discretion for EPA to find that the three refineries suffered a disproportionate economic hardship
while failing to address the agency’s longstanding position that refineries small and large recover the cost
of RFS compliance through the cost of the goods they
sell. Pet. App. 87a–92a. The court found that “EPA did
not analyze the possibility of RIN cost recoupment
when it granted the Refineries’ extension petitions,”
and in doing so EPA “ ‘failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem,’ and its silence ran counter to
the record.” Id. at 92a (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
Both holdings are standalone bases for the Tenth
Circuit’s vacatur of all three EPA decisions. This
Court’s review is therefore unwarranted on the single
question presented in the Petition.
IV. THE TENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY CONSTRUED THE SMALL REFINERY TEMPORARY EXEMPTION
The Tenth Circuit correctly applied established
canons of statutory interpretation. Even if it had not,
this Court has long declined to grant petitions for certiorari solely for the purpose of error correction. See
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 661 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[E]rror correction . . . is outside the mainstream of the Court’s functions and . . . not among
the ‘compelling reasons’ . . . that govern the grant of
24
certiorari.”) (quoting S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop,
E. Hartnett, & D. Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Practice
§ 5.12(c)(3), p. 352 (10th ed. 2013)). This case presents
no reason to depart from the Court’s established practice.
“Extension” as used in § 7545(o)(9)(B) can only
mean “to prolong, enlarge, or add to” the initial small
refinery exemption (Pet. App. 67a), and cannot mean
“make available” a new exemption as Petitioners argue
it can (Pet. 14, 19). Accord, Sinclair Wyo. Refining Co.
v. EPA, 887 F.3d 986, 989 (10th Cir. 2017) (using term
“extension of the initial exemption”) (emphasis added);
Pet. 15 (“[T]he initial exemption could be extended for
an additional two years. . . .”); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) (“The word ‘extension’ ordinarily
implies the existence of something to be extended.”).
The Tenth Circuit found that “ordinary definitions
of ‘extension,’ along with common sense, dictate that
the subject of an extension must be in existence before
it can be extended.” Pet. App. 67a. For example, “if
someone interested in current events subscribes to a
news service in years one through five, allows the subscription to lapse in years six and seven, and goes back
to the news service in year eight, we usually do not say
that year eight was an ‘extension’ of the subscription
from years one through five. Rather, we say that the
person renewed or restarted his or her subscription in
year eight.” Ibid.
The Petitioners’ alternative definitions of “extension” do not make sense in context. For example,
25
Petitioners submit that “to make available” or “to
grant” is a “well-accepted meaning of ‘extension’ ” (Pet.
14). However, § 7545(o)(9)(B) does not authorize “extension of an exemption,” it authorizes “extension of
the [initial temporary] exemption under Subparagraph
(A).” This indicates continuity of the initial, temporary
exemption, not authority “to make available” a new exemption.
Petitioners also suggest that “extension” can mean
“an enlargement in scope or operation” (Pet. 18). But
the Refineries were not seeking to enlarge the “scope”
or “operation” of their exemptions, they were seeking
new exemptions. Regardless, the Refineries’ alternative
definition supports the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation,
as “an enlargement” implies something (i.e., an exemption) in existence to enlarge. Refineries also suggest
that “extension” can mean “the total range over which
something extends” or “a development . . . that includes or affects more people, things, or activities” (Pet.
18–19). Neither of these make sense in the context of
§ 7545(o)(9)(B).
Petitioners argue (Pet. 12) that the Tenth Circuit
interpreted “extension” to require continuous exemptions “[d]espite any indication in the statutory text
that Congress intended to phase out the hardship exemption in subsection (B).” But that is not consistent
with the statute’s characterization of the exemption as
“temporary.” See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) (referencing § 7545(o)(9)(A), “Temporary exemption”). Under
the statute, “once a small refinery figures out how
to put itself in a position of annual compliance, that
26
refinery is no longer a candidate for extending (really
‘renewing’ or ‘restarting’) its exemption.” Pet. App. 68a.
The Tenth Circuit is not alone in reaching that conclusion—the D.C. Circuit has likewise noted that the
terms of § 7545(o)(9) contemplate a “ ‘[t]emporary exemption’ for small refineries with an eye toward eventual compliance . . . for all refineries.” Hermes, 787 F.3d at
578.
Petitioners argue that the “temporary” exemption of
§ 7545(o)(9)(A) is distinct from “[t]he subsection (B) hardship exemption, . . . [which] is not found under the subsection entitled ‘Temporary exemption.’ ” (Pet. 15). But
these are not two separate exemptions—§ 7545(o)(9)(B)
authorizes “an extension of the exemption under subparagraph (A),” referring to the “[t]emporary exemption.” 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
The Tenth Circuit correctly recognized this is its decision below. See Pet. App. 65a (“The small refinery
exemption subject to an extension . . . is expressly
identified as ‘Temporary’ in subpart (A).”).
While Petitioners argue that “Congress had a distinct purpose in mind” when it “placed the subsection
(B) hardship exemption in its own subsection” (Pet. 14),
the text can only support the conclusion that the separate subsections denote the distinct procedures Congress established for extensions of the exemption.
Subsection (A) provides an initial blanket exemption
and an extension of that exemption through a study
conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy, while
Subsection (B) provides a procedure for refineries
to petition for an extension of their exemption on a
27
case-by-case basis. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(A)–(B).
Petitioners are wrong to try to read a “distinct purpose”
into the statute based on the organization of these provisions.
Petitioners also misconstrue the statute’s use of
the phrase “at any time” (Pet. 14) to mean that “ ‘at any
time,’ EPA can grant or make available the exemption.”
That is not what the statute says. Section 7545(o)(9)(B)
provides only that “[a] small refinery may at any time
petition [EPA] for an extension of the exemption.” (emphasis added). But “[e]ven if a small refinery can submit a hardship petition at any time, it does not follow
that every single petition can be granted.” Pet. App.
72a. The phrase “at any time” describes when a refinery may submit its extension petition; it has no bearing
on other conditions of eligibility. By making “at any
time” the operative term (Pet. 22–24), Petitioners ignore the limiting terms “extension” and “extend”—
used five times in § 7545(o)(9), each referring back to
the original temporary exemption period.
Finally, Petitioners’ policy argument that § 7545(o)(9)(B)
created a permanent “safety valve” for small refineries
(Pet. 2, 13, 18, 22, 25, 27), is not supported by the text
of the statute. Section 7545(o)(9)(B) does not establish a “safety valve,” but rather, “Congress, aware that
small refineries would face greater difficulty complying with the renewable fuel requirements, created a
three-tiered system of exemptions to afford small
28
refineries a bridge to compliance.” See Hermes, 787
F.3d at 572.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
CONCLUSION
Because the Tenth Circuit’s decision does not conflict with the decision of any other courts or amount to
an important question of federal law that should be
settled by this Court, and because the D.C. Circuit will
have an imminent opportunity to address this issue at
the national level, the Court should deny the Petition.
Respectfully submitted,
MATTHEW W. MORRISON*
CYNTHIA COOK ROBERTSON
SHELBY L. DYL
PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP
1200 Seventeenth Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20036
Phone: 202-663-8000
matthew.morrison@pillsburylaw.com
*Counsel of Record
Counsel for Respondents
Renewable Fuels Association,
American Coalition for Ethanol,
National Corn Growers Association,
and National Farmers Union
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.