Reply Brief — Territory of Guam, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefDec 23, 2020

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No. 20-382

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

GOVERNMENT OF GUAM,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

LEEVIN T. CAMACHO

Attorney General

JAMES L. CANTO II

Deputy Attorney General

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL

590 S. Marine Corps Drive

Suite 901

Tamuning, Guam 96913

JOHN D.S. GILMOUR

WILLIAM J. JACKSON

FABIO C. DWORSCHAK

KELLEY DRYE

& WARREN LLP

515 Post Oak Boulevard

Suite 900

Houston, TX 77027

GREGORY G. GARRE

Counsel of Record

ROMAN MARTINEZ

BLAKE E. STAFFORD

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

555 Eleventh Street, NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 637-2207

gregory.garre@lw.com

BEZALEL STERN

KELLEY DRYE

& WARREN LLP

3050 K Street, NW

Suite 400

Washington, DC 20007

Counsel for Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... iii

INTRODUCTION .......................................................1

ARGUMENT ...............................................................2

A. The Circuits Are Split On Both

Questions .......................................................2

B. The Importance Of This Case Is

Undisputed.....................................................7

C. The Decision Below Is Wrong .......................8

CONCLUSION ..........................................................12

ADDENDUM

United States’ Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of Its Motion to

Certify

the

Dismissal

Orders

for

Interlocutory Appeal Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(b)

and

Request

for

Stay,

Government of Guam v. United States, No.

17-cv-2487 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2018), ECF No.

49-1 (excerpt) .......................................................1a

United States’ Reply in Support of Its Motion

to Certify the Dismissal Orders for

Interlocutory Appeal Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(b), Government of Guam v. United

States, No. 17-cv-2487 (D.D.C. Dec. 27,

2018), ECF No. 53 (excerpt) ..............................14a

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

Petition for Permission to Appeal Pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), Government of Guam

v. United States, No. 19-8001 (D.C. Cir.

Mar. 11, 2019) (excerpt).....................................19a

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Asarco LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,

866 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2017)................................5

Barton v. Barr,

140 S. Ct. 1442 (2020)............................................2

Bernstein v. Bankert,

733 F.3d 190 (7th Cir. 2012)...................... 5, 10, 11

Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. United States

Environmental Protection Agency,

759 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ................................9

Florida Power Corp. v. FirstEnergy Corp.,

810 F.3d 996 (6th Cir. 2015)............................5, 11

Honeycutt v. United States,

137 S. Ct. 1626 (2017)............................................2

Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v.

Sulyma,

140 S. Ct. 768 (2020)..............................................2

Lagos v. United States,

138 S. Ct. 1684 (2018)............................................2

NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co.,

768 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2014)..................................6

Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron

U.S.A., Inc.,

596 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2010) ...................................3

Pereira v. Sessions,

138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018)............................................2

Refined Metals Corp. v. NL Industries Inc.,

937 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2019)..............................5, 6

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.,

551 U.S. 128 (2007) ................................................2

United States v. Burlington Northern &

Santa Fe Railway Co.,

520 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 556

U.S. 599 (2009).......................................................2

United States v. Taylor,

752 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2014) ...................................3

STATUTES

42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) ....................................................8

42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) ....................................................8

42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) ....................................................8

42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) .......................................8, 10

OTHER AUTHORITY

Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ...................11

INTRODUCTION

The United States’ response confirms that

certiorari is warranted. The United States does not

deny that the CERCLA provisions at issue here are

critical to the operation of the Superfund program. It

does not deny that this Court routinely intervenes

when the circuits have split on the meaning of key

CERCLA provisions. It admits that the circuits are

split on the first question presented. BIO 10. And it

acknowledges that the result reached by the D.C.

Circuit below is “‘harsh’” (id. at 22) for Guam, which

is now left on the hook for a cleanup bill that would

amount to a trillion dollar outlay for the Federal

Government, even though the United States itself

built the dumpsite at issue and used it for decades to

dump toxic waste generated by the Navy. Pet. 24.

That is reason enough to grant certiorari.

But there is more. As the United States itself

repeatedly stressed in pursuing an interlocutory

appeal in this case, the circuits are also split on the

second question presented. Pet. 12, 17-18; see, e.g.,

Add. 8a-9a (identifying the “circuit split” produced by

“conflicting statutory interpretations” on the second

question); id. at 16a (emphasizing “sharp split of legal

authority” on second question); id. at 26a-31a

(detailing “circuit split” on second question).1

Remarkably, the United States now attempts to deny

that circuit conflict. BIO 10, 18-21. But the same

cases the United States relied on below to advance the

conflict now refute its effort to deny it.

Certiorari is warranted to resolve these circuit

conflicts. The United States does not deny that the

1

Excerpts from the relevant briefs are appended hereto.

2

issues are cleanly presented. The parties have clearly

joined battle on the merits. And the importance of

this case—both for the administration of CERCLA

and for Guam—underscore the need for review.

ARGUMENT

A. The Circuits Are Split On Both Questions

1. The United States concedes (at 10) that “the

first question presented is the subject of a circuit

conflict.”

The D.C. Circuit—after expressly

acknowledging the “‘split,’” Pet. App. 16a—joined the

Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in holding that a

non-CERCLA settlement can trigger CERCLA

Section 113(f)(3)(B), while the Second Circuit has

repeatedly held to the contrary. Pet. 14-17.

The United States calls the conflict “lopsided.”

BIO 14. But the interest in maintaining uniformity

of federal laws does not depend on the extent of the

conflict, and this Court thus routinely grants

certiorari to resolve “lopsided” splits.2 The United

States itself asked this Court to resolve a 3-1 split

implicating the same CERCLA provisions at issue

here in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551

U.S. 128, 133-34 (2007).

Particularly given

“CERCLA’s ‘policy favoring national uniformity,’”

resolving “inter-circuit conflicts” over the meaning of

its core provisions “is of paramount importance.”

United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,

2

See, e.g., Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442, 1447-48 (2020) (41 split); Intel Corp. Inv. Policy Comm. v. Sulyma, 140 S. Ct. 768,

775 & n.3 (2020) (6-1 split); Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105,

2113 & n.4 (2018) (6-1 split); Lagos v. United States, 138 S. Ct.

1684, 1687 (2018) (5-1 split); Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S.

Ct. 1626, 1631 & n.1 (2017) (5-1 split).

3

520 F.3d 918, 952 (9th Cir. 2008) (Bea, J., dissenting)

(citation omitted), rev’d, 556 U.S. 599 (2009).

The United States also suggests that the Second

Circuit has “signaled its willingness to reconsider” its

position. BIO 14-15 (citing Niagara Mohawk Power

Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 126 n.15

(2d Cir. 2010)). Hardly. The footnote in Niagara

Mohawk merely acknowledges—in dicta, as the

footnote itself recognizes—an argument in a footnote

in an amicus brief addressed to a different question.

596 F.3d at 126 n.15 (quoting Gov’t Amicus Br. 15 n.4,

Niagara Mohawk, 596 F.3d 112 (No. 08-3843), 2008

WL 10610074). Moreover, the court said nothing

about its “willingness” to do anything. For a circuit

notoriously reluctant to convene en banc, see United

States v. Taylor, 752 F.3d 254, 255-57 & n.1 (2d Cir.

2014) (Cabranes, J., dissenting), the dicta of a single

three-judge panel—one of whom was a district court

judge sitting by designation—hardly shows the

circuit’s “willingness” to revisit a longstanding

position it has repeatedly affirmed in precedential

decisions. BIO 15; see Pet. 15-16.

The important point is that the United States

concedes (at 10, 14) that the actual law of the Second

Circuit “conflict[s]” with the law in other circuits.

That admitted conflict warrants review.

2. The circuits are also split on the second

question presented: Whether a settlement “resolve[s]

. . . liability” under Section 113(f)(3)(B) if it explicitly

disclaims any liability determination and leaves the

settling party exposed to future liability. Pet. 17-20.

The United States’ remarkable attempt (at 18-22) to

deny that conflict before this Court fails.

4

a. In pursuing an interlocutory appeal in this

case, the United States explicitly and repeatedly

recognized the “circuit split” produced by “the

conflicting statutory interpretations and different

outcomes in both circuit and district courts” on the

second question presented. Add. 8a-9a; see id. at 15a16a (recognizing “clear differences of opinion in the

courts of appeal” and “sharp split of legal authority”);

id. at 22a, 26a-31a (recognizing “[t]he existence of a

circuit split” on the “controlling” question of “what it

means to ‘resolve . . . liability’ for ‘some or all of a

response action’ under Section 113(f)(3)(B)”). The

United States made these representations even after

“coordinat[ing] its legal position” with the Solicitor

General’s Office, id. at 17a-18a, including in a D.C.

Circuit brief filed by three of the attorneys who signed

the BIO here. Id. at 34a; see id. at 22a, 26a-31a.

The closest the United States comes to

acknowledging its stunning about-face is its passing

claim (at 21-22) that it merely noted circuit “tension”

in seeking an interlocutory appeal, but then changed

course in its D.C. Circuit “merits briefing.” That in

itself would be a classic bait-and-switch. Yet, even

that is false. As quoted above, the United States

consistently represented that there was a direct

“circuit split,” not simply “tension.” And the very first

page of its merits brief acknowledged that circuit

conflict, urging the D.C. Circuit to follow “the Ninth

Circuit’s construction of Section 113(f)(3)(B),” rather

than the contrary constructions adopted by “the Sixth

and Seventh Circuits.” Gov’t C.A. Br. 1.

The Court should reject the United States’

disingenuous attempt to disavow the very circuit

conflict it advanced below.

5

b. In any event, the circuit conflict is real. The

Sixth and Seventh Circuits have both “draw[n] a

bright line” for settlements with liability disclaimers

and conditional liability releases: They foreclose the

application of Section 113(f)(3)(B). Florida Power

Corp. v. FirstEnergy Corp., 810 F.3d 996, 1008 (6th

Cir. 2015); see Refined Metals Corp. v. NL Indus. Inc.,

937 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 2019) (these “two factors”

together are “dispositive” under Bernstein v. Bankert,

733 F.3d 190, 212-13 (7th Cir. 2012)). The Ninth

Circuit specifically “disagree[d] with the Sixth and

Seventh Circuits’ holdings in Florida Power and

Bernstein” regarding the “meaning of the phrase

‘resolved its liability.’” Asarco LLC v. Atlantic

Richfield Co., 866 F.3d 1108, 1123-25 (9th Cir.

2017). And the D.C. Circuit below likewise rejected

the Sixth and Seventh Circuits’ position and chose,

instead, to align with the Ninth Circuit. Pet. App.

23a-24a (citing Asarco, 866 F.3d at 1123-24). The

district court below explained this “clear” “split” in

detail. Pet. App. 38a-39a; see id. at 73a-85a.

The United States’ late-breaking attempt (at 1920) to reconcile these decisions now is unavailing.

Relying on the dissent in Florida Power, the United

States says that “[t]he Sixth Circuit has sometimes

held that a settlor had ‘resolved [its] liability’ within

the meaning of Section 113(f)(3)(B) even though the

settlement contained provisions similar to those” in

the 2004 CWA consent decree. BIO 20 (alteration in

original) (quoting Florida Power, 810 F.3d at 1017-18

(Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting)). But the majority in

Florida Power vigorously disagreed, reiterating that

court’s “bright line” regarding such provisions. 810

F.3d at 1006-09. That is the law in the Sixth Circuit.

6

Likewise, the United States claims that the

Seventh Circuit “held” in NCR Corp. v. George A.

Whiting Paper Co., 768 F.3d 682, 692 (7th Cir. 2014),

that a settlement can trigger Section 113(f)(3)(B)

“even if the covenant not to sue is conditioned on

satisfactory performance.” BIO 20. That is wrong, as

the Seventh Circuit itself has stressed: “In NCR, the

only factor that the court explicitly discussed as a

reason for distinguishing the settlement from the one

in Bernstein was the immediately effective (as opposed

to conditional nature) of the covenant not to

sue.” Refined Metals, 937 F.3d at 931 (second

emphasis added) (citing NCR, 768 F.3d at

692). There is “no doubt that [in NCR] the

immediately effective covenant not to sue was the

dispositive point.” Id. (emphasis added). So too

here—the conditional covenant would have been

dispositive had this case been in the Seventh Circuit.

Finally, the United States tries (at 18-19) to

reframe the issue as one of contract interpretation.

But as the United States itself explained below, this

is a “question of statutory construction, namely how

to properly interpret CERCLA § [113](f)(3)(B).” Add.

4a. Indeed, the “sole question” here is “whether the

2004 consent decree ‘resolve[d]’ Guam’s ‘liability . . .

for some or all of a response action’ within the

meaning of Section 113”—the answer to which turns

on “statutory text and purpose.” Gov’t C.A. Br. 18, 23

(alterations in original) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the cases in the conflict reach

different results not because of different settlement

provisions, but because of different statutory

interpretations

applied

to

indistinguishable

settlement provisions.

And despite vaguely

suggesting that the cases in the split involved

7

“different decrees” with different provisions, BIO 1819, the United States does not identify any material

differences. There are none. As the district court

detailed, the provisions at issue here are materially

identical to those in the cases from “[t]he Sixth,

Seventh, and Ninth Circuits” that form the circuit

split. Pet. App. 73a; see id. at 94a (“This Court has

dutifully compared the clauses in each of th[e] cases”

and found no “distinction [that] matters”).

The D.C. Circuit’s decision turned on whether a

settlement containing such provisions “resolve[s] . . .

liability” “within the meaning of section 113(f)(3)(B).”

Id. at 24a.

That is a question of statutory

interpretation—one on which the circuits are split.

B. The

Questions

Presented

Exceptionally Important

Are

The United States does not dispute the importance

of the questions presented to the Superfund program.

Pet. 21-22. It does not dispute that this Court has

repeatedly granted certiorari to resolve confusion

over the meaning and scope of Section 113 and related

provisions. Id. at 22. And it does not contest the

grave importance of this case for the people of Guam.

Id. at 24-25. All this strongly supports review.

The United States does try to minimize its own

decades-long role in contaminating the site by

suggesting (at 4) that it ended in 1950; but, in fact,

the United States continued to dump waste for

decades thereafter. Pet. 7. And while the United

States argues (at 23) that Guam is at fault too, it

misses the point: even assuming Guam shares some

responsibility, the decision below saddles Guam—

alone—with a staggering $160 million bill for the

cleanup of a dump built and exploited by the United

8

States for decades. That sum exceeds the combined

yearly budget for Guam’s Department of Public

Health and Social Services, Police Department, Fire

Department, Department of Public Works, Solid

Waste Authority, and Environmental Protection

Agency. The staggering consequences of this case for

Guam strongly support certiorari. Pet. 24-25.

Significantly, the United States also never

disputes that this case provides a clean vehicle for

resolving the questions presented. Id. at 25. Nor

could it, given that the United States recognized that

these were “controlling legal questions” in pursuing

an interlocutory appeal. Add. 26a. Both questions

were pressed and passed on below. This is an ideal

vehicle to decide these important issues.

C. The Decision Below Is Wrong

The United States’ arguments on the merits are

premature at this stage, but in any event only

underscore the need for this Court’s review.

1. On the first question, the United States claims

that Section 113(f)(3)(B) encompasses any settlement

that “requires a settling party to incur the costs of a

CERCLA ‘response action,’” which the United States

defines as “any action to ‘remove’ or ‘remedy’ releases

of substances.” BIO 10-11 (citation omitted). But this

paraphrasing rewrites the statute.

Section

113(f)(3)(B) actually says that the settlor must have

“resolved its liability” for—not merely “incur the costs

of”—a CERCLA response action.

42 U.S.C.

§ 9613(f)(3)(B) (emphasis added). And CERCLA

defines “response” to mean an action to “remove” or

“remedy” releases of “hazardous substances.” Id.

§ 9601(23)-(25) (emphasis added). The United States

9

omits “hazardous,” but that is an important limitation

on what qualifies as a response action.

Here, whatever costs Guam incurred, EPA

repeatedly assured Guam that it was not compelling

a CERCLA response action. Pet. 8-10. And because

the CWA consent decree was not a CERCLA

settlement, it says nothing about any hazardous

substance—the touchstone of a CERCLA response

action. Pet. 28 n.8; cf. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. U.S.

EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (CERCLA

imposes “liab[ility] for cleanup of a release of a

‘hazardous substance,’ but not for the cleanup of a

release of a ‘pollutant or contaminant’”).

Permitting non-CERCLA settlements to trigger

CERCLA contribution also thwarts what the United

States agrees (at 12) is a necessary component of

contribution—“resolv[ing] a common liability.” The

United States says that this liability need not be

liability “under CERCLA.” BIO 12-13 (emphasis

omitted). But that assertion flatly contradicts the

United States’ own arguments—in this case and

others—that Section 113(f)(3)(B) contribution is not

available unless the settlement resolves the nonsettling party’s liability under CERCLA. Pet. 26-27,

29. The United States makes no effort to reconcile

those positions. Nor does it address the bizarre result

produced by its contradiction: A consent decree

entered under a CWA provision from which the

United States is immune from liability somehow

resolved the United States’ liability. Id. at 27-28.3

3

Contrary to the United States’ suggestion (at 12), whether

a settlement triggers Section 113(f)(3)(B) is a different question

than whether a cost-recovery action is authorized under Section

107(a). Section 113(f)(3)(B) concerns the liability resolved in a

10

Like the D.C. Circuit, the United States (at 11)

ultimately grounds its interpretation in a negative

inference drawn from Section 113(f)(1). But as Guam

explained, that argument ignores that “response

action” is a CERCLA-specific term. Pet. 28-29.

2. On the second question, the United States’

position strips “resolved . . . liability” of meaning. 42

U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B).

According to the United

States, an agreement to take an action necessarily

resolves liability regardless of whether the agreement

(a) admits the settling party’s liability to take the

action, (b) disclaims any such liability, or (c) says

nothing about liability at all. That can’t be right.

Here, the United States claims that a consent decree

entered “without any finding of liability or admission

of liability against or by the Government of Guam,”

Pet. App. 140a (emphasis added), somehow “resolved”

Guam’s liability. That position “warps” the statutory

text “beyond recognition.” Id. at 90a.

The United States confuses “agree[ing] to perform

certain actions . . . to remedy an instance of

environmental contamination” with “settl[ing] the

issue of liability for that contamination.” Bernstein,

733 F.3d at 212. A party may agree to take an action

for any number of reasons, including simply to “avoid

protracted litigation.” Pet. App. 140a. Moreover, the

United States misquotes Black’s definition of

“liability”—“[t]he quality, state, or condition of being

settlement, while Section 107(a) concerns the action actually

taken. Moreover, the case comes to the Court on the “premise

that ‘Guam is permitted to proceed against the United States for

full cost recovery under section 107(a).’” Pet. App. 8a (quoting

Pet. App. 68a)). The only question here is whether a nonCERCLA settlement like the 2004 CWA decree can trigger

Section 113(f)(3)(B). See BIO (I).

11

legally obligated or accountable,” Liability, Black’s

Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added)—by

inexplicably omitting “legally.” BIO 15. That a party

has agreed to take an action does not mean that the

parties determined liability as to that action—i.e., an

independent legal obligation to perform the act.

Even if an agreement to undertake an act in a

settlement could be viewed as a “liability” (apart from

any independent legal obligation), an agreement that

disclaims the resolution of future liability—including

CERCLA liability—through conditional releases of

liability and reservations of rights cannot “resolve”

liability. Pet. 31-34. Such provisions make clear that

any liability “established” for actions “identified in the

decree” (BIO 17) will not be “resolved” “until

performance [is] complete.” Florida Power, 810 F.3d

at 1002-03 (quoting Bernstein, 733 F.3d at 212). The

United States’ contrary interpretation (at 15-16)

flouts the plain meaning of “resolved.”

The United States protests that this argument

“would ‘nullify [S]ection 113(f)(3)(B) in a host of

cases’” because of its “three-year limitations period.”

BIO 16-17 (citation omitted). But the only cases in

which Section 113(f)(3)(B) would be “nullif[ied]” are

cases in which the statute does not apply—cases in

which liability is not “resolved” when the agreement

is signed (and the limitations period begins to run).

Pet. 32-33. Settling parties in those cases are not

“den[ied]” relief (BIO 17)—they can recover costs

under Section 107(a), as Guam tried to do here. Pet.

32 n.9. Only by ignoring Section 113(f)(3)(B)’s text

and Section 107(a)’s existence does the United States

arrive at its supposedly “anomalous result.” BIO 17.

12

In the end, the United States’ merits arguments

simply confirm that the questions presented are

squarely joined and ripe for this Court’s review.

CONCLUSION

The petition should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

LEEVIN T. CAMACHO

Attorney General

JAMES L. CANTO II

Deputy Attorney General

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL

590 S. Marine Corps Drive

Suite 901

Tamuning, Guam 96913

JOHN D.S. GILMOUR

WILLIAM J. JACKSON

FABIO C. DWORSCHAK

KELLEY DRYE

& WARREN LLP

515 Post Oak Boulevard

Suite 900

Houston, TX 77027

GREGORY G. GARRE

Counsel of Record

ROMAN MARTINEZ

BLAKE E. STAFFORD

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

555 Eleventh Street, NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 637-2207

gregory.garre@lw.com

BEZALEL STERN

KELLEY DRYE

& WARREN LLP

3050 K Street, NW

Suite 400

Washington, DC 20007

Counsel for Petitioner

December 23, 2020

ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

United States’ Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of Its Motion to

Certify

the

Dismissal

Orders

for

Interlocutory Appeal Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(b)

and

Request

for

Stay,

Government of Guam v. United States, No.

17-cv-2487 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2018), ECF No.

49-1 (excerpt) .......................................................1a

United States’ Reply in Support of Its Motion

to Certify the Dismissal Orders for

Interlocutory Appeal Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(b), Government of Guam v. United

States, No. 17-cv-2487 (D.D.C. Dec. 27,

2018), ECF No. 53 (excerpt) ..............................14a

Petition for Permission to Appeal Pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), Government of Guam

v. United States, No. 19-8001 (D.C. Cir.

Mar. 11, 2019) (excerpt).....................................19a

1a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GOVERNMENT OF

GUAM,

Plaintiff,

1:17-cv-02487-KBJ

[ECF No. 49-1]

v.

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA,

Defendant.

THE UNITED STATES’ MEMORANDUM OF

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

ITS MOTION TO CERTIFY THE DISMISSAL

ORDERS FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) AND REQUEST

FOR STAY

***

In accordance with Local Rule 7(a), the United

States respectfully submits this memorandum in

support of its motion to certify the denial of the

United States’ motion to dismiss Guam’s amended

complaint for interlocutory appeal and request to stay

all proceedings pending a decision by the United

States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.1

1

In the Parties’ Joint Status Report, dated October 19, 2018,

the United States promptly advised the Court that it was

evaluating a potential interlocutory appeal. See ECF No. 40.

This process involved coordinating with interested federal

2a

I. INTRODUCTION

***

The purpose of this motion is not to re-argue the

issues presented in the motion to dismiss. Rather, the

United States respectfully requests that the Court

certify its orders for immediate appeal under 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b).2 As explained below, the Court’s

Rule 12(b)(6) decision involves controlling questions

of law and there are substantial grounds for

differences of opinion concerning the rulings on those

issues. An immediate appeal to the United States

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit may materially

advance the ultimate disposition of this CERCLA

litigation. If the D.C. Circuit accepts the appeal, a

agencies and seeking the necessary approvals within the United

States Department of Justice, including from the Solicitor

General. Although there is no specific deadline for seeking an

interlocutory appeal, this request is being made now to ensure

timeliness, pending the Solicitor General’s determination on

whether to authorize an appeal on behalf of the United States.

As stated in the motion, we will promptly advise the Court when

that determination is made.

2 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) reads as follows: “When a district judge,

in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable

under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order

involves a controlling question of law as to which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an

immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the

ultimate termination of the litigation, [the judge] shall so state

in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have

jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its

discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if

application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the

order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal

hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless

the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall

so order.”

3a

reversal may result in the termination of this action

and save both the Court and the Parties the enormous

burden and expense of conducting discovery

regarding the Ordot Dump’s operations from World

War II to the present, as well as save the additional

costs of litigating the claims and defenses through

summary judgment, a lengthy bench trial, and a

possible appeal after a final judgment is entered.

II. THE ELEMENTS OF § 1292(b) ARE EASILY

MET AND CERTIFIYING THE MOTION TO

DISMISS

DECISION

FOR

AN

INTERLOCUTORY

APPEAL

WILL

FURTHER THE SOUND ADMINSTRATION

OF JUSTICE.

Appellate review ordinarily must await entry of a

final judgment. However, district courts possess the

discretion to allow a party to appeal a non-final order

under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). See Nat’l Veterans Legal

Servs. Program v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 3d 150,

152 (D.D.C. 2018); APCC Servs. Inc. v. AT& T Corp.,

297 F. Supp. 2d 101, 104 (D.D.C. 2003). A trial court

may certify an order for interlocutory appeal when

three conditions are met: (1) the order involves a

controlling question of law, (2) a substantial ground

for difference of opinion concerning the ruling exists,

and (3) an immediate appeal may materially advance

the disposition of the litigation. See Howard v. Office

of the Chief Admin. Officer of the U.S. House of Reps.,

840 F. Supp. 2d 52, 55 (D.D.C. 2012) (granting a

request to allow interlocutory review); GTE New

Media Servs. Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 44 F. Supp. 2d

313, 316 (D.D.C. 1999) (same). Here, the three

elements Congress specified in § 1292(b) are clearly

satisfied and allowing the Parties to present the

4a

issues raised in the motion to dismiss to the D.C.

Circuit will promote judicial economy and efficiency.

See generally Am. Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 525

F.3d 1256, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (accepting an

interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

because “[w]ere [the D.C. Circuit] to conclude that the

[appellant] should have prevailed on summary

judgment, [its] consideration of [the] matter would

eliminate the need for further proceedings and

preserve judicial resources”); see also Ahrenholtz v.

Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., 219 F.3d 674, 677

(7th Cir. 2000) (emphasizing that it is the “duty” of

district and appellate courts to allow an immediate

appeal when the statutory criteria are met).

A. The

Decision

Involved

Questions of Law.

Controlling

The ruling on the United States’ motion to dismiss

encompasses several controlling questions of law, any

one of which satisfies § 1292(b)’s first element. The

United States’ challenge to the legal sufficiency of

Guam’s complaint involves a threshold question of

statutory construction, namely how to properly

interpret CERCLA § 9613(f)(3)(B). See, e.g., ECF No.

27-1 at 21-26 and ECF No. 33 at 19-25 (explaining the

United States’ legal position on this issue). Whether

the 2004 judicial settlement with the United States

allowed Guam to pursue a CERCLA contribution

claim under CERCLA § 9613(f)(3)(B) is a legal issue

that is subject to de novo review by the D.C. Circuit.

See, e.g., Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230,

1235 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Whether § 107(a) of CERCLA

grants parties a right to recover cleanup costs that

they directly incur in complying with a consent decree

is a matter of statutory interpretation subject to de

5a

novo review.”); see also Nat’l Veterans, 321 F. Supp.

3d at 152 (granting a petition for interlocutory appeal

on an issue of statutory construction).

In addition, the dismissal decision turned on a legal

interpretation of the 2004 consent decree’s terms.

The opinion discussed the legal significance of Guam’s

non-admission of liability in the consent decree, the

scope of the reservation of rights, whether the release

Guam obtained resolved any liability to perform the

alleged response actions, and whether the release was

conditioned on Guam fully performing all its

obligations at the Ordot Dump. See ECF No. 33 at 2325. The Court’s rulings on the meaning of the consent

decree’s terms are conclusions of law. As with the

statutory construction questions, the D.C. Circuit will

interpret the consent decree’s terms de novo on

appeal. See United States v. Volvo Powertrain Corp.,

758 F.3d 330, 337 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“we review the

district court’s construction of the consent decree . . .

de novo”); see also NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting

Paper Co., 768 F.3d 682, 692 (7th Cir. 2014) (refusing

to interpret § 9613(f)(3)(B) so narrowly that “no

consent order could resolve a party’s liability until the

work under it was complete”).

Under § 1292(b), a question of law is controlling

when a reversal would be required if decided

incorrectly. Howard, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 55. In other

words, controlling questions of law include issues that

would terminate an action if the district court’s

decision were reversed. APCC, 297 F. Supp. 2d at

105.

Even a procedural determination that

significantly impacts the action, but is not dispositive,

can be considered a controlling issue if it would save

the court and litigants time and expense. Id. Because

the United States raised dispositive legal questions at

6a

the outset in a motion to dismiss and the ruling

allowed Guam’s case to proceed, there is no doubt that

the legal issues presented are “controlling” for

purposes of § 1292(b). A different construction of

CERCLA § 9613(f)(3)(B) or how the 2004 consent

decree should be read in light of CERCLA and Guam’s

specific allegations (i.e., arguing that the settlement

required Guam to perform CERCLA response actions)

would likely change the outcome and terminate the

case. If the D.C. Circuit agrees with the United

States’ longstanding interpretation of CERCLA

§ 9613(f)(3)(B) and applies the plain meaning to the

2004 consent decree, Guam’s claims should be

dismissed. Guam’s CERCLA action would be barred

by the three-year statute of limitations if the D.C.

Circuit concludes that the 2004 consent decree

resolved at least some of Guam’s liability within the

meaning of CERCLA § 9613(f)(3)(B) to perform the

alleged response actions at the Ordot Dump. See

Trinity Indus. Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 735

F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The statutory language

of [§ 9613(f)(3)(B)] requires only the existence of a

settlement resolving liability to the United States” for

a response action); ASARCO, LLC v. Celanese

Chemical Co., 792 F.3d 1203, 1210 (9th Cir. 2015)

(“[A]ny contribution claim is subject to the three-year

statute of limitations . . . . When a person resolves its

liability to the United States or a State through an

administrative or judicially approved settlement, a

right to assert a contribution claim against other

PRPs also accrues.”).

7a

B. There Are Substantial

Differences of Opinion.

Grounds

for

There also are substantial grounds for differences

of opinion concerning the legal issues addressed in the

Court’s ruling.

Federal courts have frequently

observed that CERCLA is a complex statutory regime

and that some provisions are not a model of clarity.

See, e.g., Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space

Systems/Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 956-58 (9th Cir.

2013) (noting that CERCLA is a “complex regulatory

statute” with a web of sections, subsections,

definitions, exceptions, defenses, and administrative

provisions); Eagle-Picher Indust., Inc. v. EPA, 759

F.2d 922, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Relative to other

courts, the D.C. Circuit has decided few CERCLA

cases and there is virtually no relevant case law in

this Circuit on the interplay between CERCLA’s cost

recovery and contribution provisions. Indeed, the

D.C. Circuit has not addressed the dispositive legal

questions presented by the United States’ motion to

dismiss, including what is sufficient to “resolve” at

least some liability for purposes of CERCLA

§ 9613(f)(3)(B), or how a federal consent decree

reasonably should be interpreted consistent with

common sense and in light of CERCLA’s provisions

and policies. As this Court has recognized, a “dearth

of precedent” within the controlling jurisdiction often

is sufficient to show that there are grounds for

differences of opinion concerning a legal ruling.

APCC, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 107; see also Howard, 840

F. Supp. 2d at 55-56 (discussing the fractured

appellate opinions on a controlling issue).

In

performing its de novo review, the D.C. Circuit is free

to make its own independent assessment on the legal

viability of Guam’s CERCLA claims.

8a

Conflicting decisions in other circuits can establish

that there is room for different judicial opinions

concerning the controlling questions of law. APCC,

297 F. Supp. 2d at 107. Here, without the benefit of

guidance from the D.C. Circuit, the Court’s decision

grappled with the conflicting views espoused by the

Ninth and Sixth Circuits regarding the correct

interpretation of CERCLA § 9613(f)(3)(B). See, e.g.,

ECF No. 38 at 24-31. The Court chose to follow

Florida Power Corp. v. First Energy Corp, 810 F.3d

996 (6th Cir. 2015), a decision that the United States

argued was incorrect and inconsistent with both

CERCLA’s policies and EPA’s longstanding CERCLA

settlement practices. The circuit split nevertheless

remains relevant and counsels in favor of allowing an

interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b). See In re Cintas

Corp. Overtime Pay Arbitration Lit., No. M:06-cv01781-SBA, 2007 WL 1302496, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May

2, 2007) (granting a motion to certify an interlocutory

appeal in light of a circuit split on a legal issue that

was unresolved within the governing circuit).

Moreover, there is a strong dissent to the Sixth

Circuit’s panel opinion, see Florida Power, 810 F.3d at

1016 (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting), further

demonstrating that reasonable jurists on the same

appellate court can and do disagree regarding the

dispositive legal questions presented by the United

States’ motion to dismiss. Even the holdings of the

Sixth Circuit decisions that preceded Florida Power

are subject to different interpretations within the

Sixth Circuit and the different outcomes in those

cases are difficult to reconcile, as explained in the

Florida Power dissent and by the subsequent Ninth

Circuit decision in Asarco. See Asarco LLC v. Atlantic

Richfield Co., 866 F.3d 1108, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2017)

9a

(disagreeing with Sixth and Seventh Circuit decisions

finding that the United States “must divest itself of

its ability to enforce” a settlement by forgoing

standard reservations of rights in a consent decree).

Although the Court cited Bernstein v. Bankert, 733

F.3d 190 (7th Cir. 2013), see ECF No. 38 at 20-22, a

recent decision by a district court within the Seventh

Circuit read CERCLA and the relevant cases much

differently and ruled consistently with the legal

arguments the United States presented here. See

Refined Metals Corp. v. NL Indust., Inc., No. 1:17-cv02565- SEB-TAB, 2018 WL 4592110, at *4-6 (S.D.

Ind. Sept. 25, 2018). Specifically, Refined Metals held

that a Clean Air Act and RCRA consent decree

entered with the United States resolved at least some

of the plaintiff’s liability to perform response actions

and that the plaintiff’s CERCLA action was untimely

because it had not filed a lawsuit within three years

of the settlement. Id. (“The point is that Refined

unconditionally assumed a legal obligation and

unconditionally received a legal benefit in order to

resolve a legal dispute — not that it pronounced a

legal mea culpa.”). Given the conflicting statutory

interpretations and different outcomes in both circuit

and district courts, there are adequate grounds to

believe that the D.C. Circuit – in conducting its own

de novo review – may align with the majority view on

these legal questions and find substantial merit in the

United States’ Rule 12(b)(6) arguments.3

3

The Court did not directly address several of Guam’s legal

arguments, including its sweeping assertion that a Clean Water

Act consent decree can never constitute a settlement for

purposes of CERCLA § 9613(f)(3)(B). See ECF No. 38 at 35, n.13.

Although the D.C. Circuit has not ruled on this question of law,

the United States believes that the D.C. Circuit will follow the

10a

In sum, in the absence of controlling law to the

contrary, the D.C. Circuit may very well adopt the

reasoning in Asarco, which explained why the Ninth

Circuit believed that Florida Power was wrongly

decided and would undermine CERCLA’s goals. See

generally Kahl v. Bureau of Nat’l Aff., Inc., Civil

Action No. 09-0635 (KBJ), 2015 WL 13546450, at *2

(D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2015) (granting a petition for

interlocutory review based on the uncertainty of

determining the D.C. Circuit’s views on the intent

element of a defamation claim).4

Thus,

notwithstanding the Court’s understandable belief in

its ruling, substantial grounds for differences of

opinion exist concerning the legal sufficiency of

Guam’s CERCLA claims.

C. An Interlocutory Appeal Will Advance The

Efficient Disposition Of This Complex

CERCLA Matter.

An immediate appeal of the Court’s denial may

materially advance the disposition of the litigation. If

the D.C. Circuit finds the interpretation of CERCLA

§ 9613(f)(3)(B) set forth in the subject orders is

erroneous, a reversal is likely and Guam’s case should

be dismissed with prejudice. See Nat’l Veterans, 321

Third Circuit’s decision in Trinity, 735 F.3d at 136-37, and the

Ninth Circuit’s decision in Asarco, 866 F.3d at 1118-20, when

given the opportunity. See also Refined Metals, 2018 WL

4592110, at *4-6 (rejecting the same “position of doubtful

vitality” advocated by Guam).

4 Kahl illustrates that interlocutory appellate review can

promote efficiency and benefit the district court and parties. On

appeal, the D.C. Circuit clarified the applicable legal standards

and reversed the denial of summary judgment, thereby avoiding

an unnecessary trial on Kahl’s defamation claims. See 856 F.3d

106 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

11a

F. Supp. 3d at 155 (“As previously explained, if the

Court’s Order is reversed in the government’s favor,

the litigation will be over.”); Howard, 840 F. Supp. 2d

at 57 (“Conversely, if, post judgment, the Court of

Appeals were to conclude that it was error to allow

Howard’s transfer claims to go forward, then the

legislative branch would have been improperly

subjected to the burden of defending those claims.”).

Moreover, appellate review of the decision now would

be efficient because discovery will cover issues

ranging from World War II military engagements on

the Island to the many decades of Guam’s subsequent

waste disposal operations at the Ordot Dump. There

likely will be additional dispositive motions practice

at the summary judgment stage of the case and a

bench trial (if necessary) will consume judicial

resources. The fact that Guam is located thousands

of miles away from District of Columbia (and Guam

did not choose to the file its lawsuit on Guam) makes

this a more difficult, expensive, and time-consuming

matter to litigate. As noted above, in addition to

Guam’s government agencies and instrumentalities,

many large businesses and commercial interests sent

waste to the Ordot Dump for decades. Other parties

that arranged for the disposal of hazardous waste at

the Ordot Dump or transported such waste to the

Dump face CERCLA liability and may be joined in

this case. In sum, allowing an interlocutory appeal

could save both Parties substantial time and money

as well as conserve the judicial resources that

otherwise may be necessary to supervise discovery,

decide dispositive motions at the summary judgment

stage, and preside over what could be a lengthy bench

trial. See Nat’l Veterans, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 155

(finding that different outcomes on appeal “would

12a

conserve judicial resources and save the parties from

needless expenses”); GTE, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 316

(noting that discovery would entail numerous

depositions, plus documentary discovery, and the

trial would take “several weeks”).

As a practical matter, given the large sum of money

Guam is demanding, the United States cannot lightly

abandon the dispositive legal arguments it made

without strongly considering an eventual appeal to

the D.C. Circuit. See APCC, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 100

(“it would be far better for all concerned, including

plaintiffs, to have these matters resolved now, as

opposed to sometime in the distant future”).

According to its complaint, Guam is seeking more

than $160 million. As set forth in the prior motion to

dismiss briefing and the United States’ counterclaim,

however, Guam is liable under CERCLA as both the

longtime owner and operator of the Ordot Dump. The

United States also will show that Guam operated the

Ordot Dump in violation of RCRA and the Clean

Water Act for decades. Even after entering a federal

consent decree in 2004, Guam still did not meet its

legal obligations to take corrective actions and to close

the Ordot Dump. Instead, the United States was

forced to return to the federal court to compel Guam’s

compliance with the consent decree, and the court

ultimately determined that appointing a receiver was

necessary to take over the management of Guam’s

solid waste operations. A decade later, the court has

not concluded that Guam is prepared to meet its

obligations and resume its own waste management

operations without the receiver.

Nevertheless, Guam’s allegations will require

ample discovery and Guam already has served broad

discovery requests on the United States. The case will

13a

take at least several years to litigate even under

Guam’s case management proposal. The Parties

likely will spend many thousands of hours and the

United States will incur hundreds of thousands of

dollars in discovery and expert-related expenses to

defend this CERCLA case all the way through trial,

all of which would be unnecessary if the D.C. Circuit

concludes that Guam’s CERCLA claims should have

been terminated at the motion to dismiss stage. Thus,

both the law and the equities strongly weigh in favor

of allowing an interlocutory appeal.

***

14a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GOVERNMENT OF

GUAM,

Plaintiff and

Counterclaim

Defendant,

1:17-cv-02487-KBJ

[ECF No. 53]

v.

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA,

Defendant and

Counterclaim

Plaintiff.

DEFENDANT AND COUNTERCLAIM

PLAINTIFF UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF

ITS MOTION TO CERTIFY THE DISMISSAL

ORDERS FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

The requirements for interlocutory appeal are

clearly met here. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). In its

opposition, the Government of Guam (“Guam”)

concedes that one of the three statutory elements is

satisfied. See ECF No. 52 at 8 (admitting that the

Court’s dismissal order was based on a “controlling

question of law”). Guam also acknowledges that there

is room for courts to disagree on the controlling

15a

questions of law, but disputes that: (1) “substantial”

grounds for differences of opinion exist, and that: (2)

an interlocutory appeal will materially advance this

CERCLA litigation. Id. at 9-11. Guam’s arguments

are wrong on both counts.

Guam briefly questions whether the Solicitor

General will approve the United States’ appeal if the

Court grants the § 1292(b) motion. Id. at 6. That is

not an issue. As described below, the Solicitor

General has authorized the United States’ appeal in

this matter. The Government is prepared to pursue

an appeal in the D.C. Circuit upon certification of the

dismissal orders. As demonstrated in the United

States’ motion and memorandum of law, see ECF Nos.

49 & 49-1, § 1292(b) is fully satisfied and judicial

economy and efficiency strongly favor certification. If

the Court certifies the orders for appeal, a stay also is

appropriate. There is no immediate need for further

litigation in this Court or to commence burdensome

discovery if the United States is permitted to take the

next step and petition the D.C. Circuit to resolve the

dispositive legal questions raised in the United

States’ motion to dismiss.

I.

SECTION § 1292(b)’S FACTORS WEIGH

STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF ALLOWING

THE

UNITED

STATES’

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL.

A. Substantial Grounds for Differences of

Opinion Exist

Guam’s opposition acknowledges that there is no

governing law in the D.C. Circuit on the CERCLA

issues addressed in the Court’s decision and agrees

that there are clear differences of opinion in the courts

of appeal and district courts regarding the controlling

16a

issues of law. See ECF No. 52 at 9-10. Guam simply

asserts that those differences of opinion are not

substantial. It is evident, however, that the Ninth

Circuit’s rejection of the Sixth Circuit’s statutory

interpretation and the strong dissenting opinion in

Florida

Power

describing

the

flaws

and

inconsistencies in the Sixth Circuit’s case law meet

the § 1292(b) standard. See ECF No. 49-1 at 14-16

(U.S. brief noting that there is also a more recent

district court decision in Refined Metals, which is on

appeal to the Seventh Circuit, that conflicts with the

Guam decision). The Court’s 43-page opinion noted

that various federal courts have “reached different

conclusions” on the dispositive legal issues and

discussed those differences at length. ECF No. 38 at

20, see also id. at 20-27. Given the sharp split of legal

authority on the controlling questions of law and with

de novo review on appeal, it is reasonable to believe

that the D.C. Circuit will seriously consider aligning

with the Ninth Circuit’s view of CERCLA on the

dispositive legal questions. Thus, there is ample basis

to conclude that substantial grounds for differences of

opinion exist regarding the legal sufficiency of Guam’s

CERCLA claims. See ECF No. 49-1 at 13-14. And if

the D.C. Circuit agrees with the United States that a

CERCLA contribution claim was available to Guam

following the 2004 consent decree, there is no dispute

that Guam’s action is untimely and must be dismissed

as a matter of law.

***

17a

II. THE

SOLICITOR

GENERAL

HAS

AUTHORIZED THE UNITED STATES TO

PURSUE AN APPEAL IN THE D.C.

CIRCUIT.

Guam’s opposition questions whether the United

States has the necessary approval from the Solicitor

General or if the Government will pursue an appeal

should the Court choose to certify it. See ECF No. 52

at 6. Guam has no cause for concern in this regard.

As contemplated by the Court’s Minute Order

dated December 10, 2018, we can confirm that the

Solicitor General has provided the requisite

authorization for the United States to proceed with an

appeal of the dismissal orders in this matter. The

United States’ § 1292(b) request was not illusory, as

Guam has suggested, and the Court can be assured

that the United States will diligently pursue the

appeal if this motion is granted.

Moreover, the United States sought certification

within a reasonable time after the Court’s dismissal

order and decision explaining the rationale. See

Ahrenholtz v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., 219

F.3d 674, 676-77 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that Congress

created no specific deadline for requesting a district

court’s permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal

under § 1292(b)).

The United States promptly

advised both Guam and the Court of its interest in a

potential appeal shortly after the decision, see ECF

No. 40 at 1, ¶ B.1, and provided appropriate updates

as matters progressed. See, e.g., ECF No. 48 at 7, ECF

No. 51 at 2-3. Given the need for the United States to

consult with and coordinate its legal position with

multiple federal agencies and within the Department

of Justice, including within the Environment and

18a

Natural Resources Division and the Office of the

Solicitor General, there was no inordinate delay in

filing the § 1292(b) motion three weeks ago. See, e.g.,

generally Gamboa v. City of Chicago, Case No. 3-C219, 2004 WL 2877339, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2004)

(finding an adequate explanation for a 75-day interval

before filing a § 1292(b) motion); Marriott Int’l

Resorts, L.P. v. U.S., 63 Fed. Cl. 144, 145 (2004)

(granting the United States’ motion to certify a

decision for appeal following a 74-day interval after

the district court’s order).2

***

2

The D.C. Circuit accepted the interlocutory appeal in

Marriott and reversed the district court’s ruling. See 437 F.3d

1302 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The lone case that Guam cites on

timeliness – Memphis Publishing Co. v. FBI, 195 F. Supp. 3d 1,

2-3 (D.D.C. 2012) – is inapposite. Memphis Publishing arose in

entirely different circumstances and did not consider what is a

reasonable amount of time for the United States to file a

§ 1292(b) motion in the circumstances presented here. The issue

there was whether to put the FBI’s FOIA obligations on hold

while the Solicitor General considered an appeal on a discovery

ruling. Here, the United States filed its § 1292(b) motion on

December 6, and did not come close to reaching the 125-day

period referenced in Memphis Publishing. Nor did we ask to

defer any case management obligations or seek a stay until filing

the motion.

19a

No. 19-8001

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

GOVERNMENT OF GUAM,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Petitioner.

On Petition for Permission to Appeal from the

United States District Court for the District of

Columbia (No. 1:17-cv-02487-KBJ)

PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1292(B)

***

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Rule 5 of the

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the United

States respectfully petitions this Court for permission

to appeal an interlocutory order of the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia, dated

September 30, 2018, in Case No. 17-2487. A copy of

that order is appended to this petition.

See

Addendum (Add.) 2. The district court certified the

order for interlocutory appeal on February 28, 2019.

See Add. 44-66.

20a

STATEMENT OF CONTROLLING

QUESTION OF LAW

The Government of Guam sued the United States

under Sections 107 and 113 of the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and

Liability Act (“CERCLA”), seeking to recover costs of

closing Guam’s Ordot Dump. All parties and every

court of appeals to address the issue agree that the

two statutory sections create mutually exclusive

causes of action, such that where a party has

“resolved its liability to the United States . . . for some

or all of a response action” within the meaning of

Section 113, that party is limited to a Section 113

action and may not bring a Section 107 action. 42

U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B). The question presented by the

certified order is whether a 2004 consent decree in

which Guam agreed to take specific actions to close

Ordot resolved liability for costs of a response action

within the meaning of Section 113, such that Guam is

limited to proceeding under that section.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This case arises out of the United States’ longrunning efforts to require Guam to address

environmental violations at the Ordot Dump. In

2004, Guam entered into a Clean Water Act consent

decree with the United States Environmental

Protection Agency (“EPA”), in which Guam agreed to

take certain actions to close the overburdened and

illegally operated dump site. After years of inaction

by Guam following entry of the consent decree, a

federal court in Guam took the extraordinary step of

appointing a receiver to supervise the performance of

Guam’s responsibilities under the consent decree,

with Guam to pay the costs incurred by the receiver.

21a

In 2017, Guam filed this suit to recover costs,

including costs incurred by the federal receiver, from

the United States, which Guam alleges contributed

waste to the Ordot Dump while the U.S. Navy

governed the island, from 1898 to 1950, and

thereafter.

Guam pleaded claims under two separate sections

of CERCLA, which federal courts of appeal have

uniformly held provide mutually exclusive remedies.

Section 107(a)(4)(A) allows a State to recover “all costs

of removal or remedial action” from a person that is

potentially liable under the statute.

Section

113(f)(3)(B), on the other hand, provides a

contribution action for “[a] person who has resolved

its liability to the United States . . . for some or all

of a response action.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A),

9613(f)(3)(B).

The United States moved to dismiss Guam’s suit in

its entirety, on the grounds that the 2004 consent

decree between Guam and the EPA “resolved” Guam’s

liability for some or all of a response action at the

Ordot Dump, and that Section 113 thus provided

Guam’s exclusive remedy for suing the United States.

Add. 10-11. Under the statute, such claims must be

brought within three years of the entry of the consent

decree. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3)(B). Guam’s effort to

raise such claims in the present suit is more than a

decade too late.

The district court accepted that under the law of all

circuits to address the issue, to the extent the 2004

consent decree triggered now-tardy Section 113

contribution claims, Guam is barred from attempting

instead to proceed with a Section 107 cost-recovery

claim. Add. 16-17. The court nevertheless denied the

United States’ motion to dismiss because it believed

22a

that the 2004 consent decree did not resolve Guam’s

liability for some or all of a response action as

required by Section 113. Add. 18-19. According to the

court, even though Guam agreed in the consent decree

to perform actions that qualify as response actions

under CERCLA, the decree did not trigger a

contribution claim under Section 113 because the

consent decree provisions did not resolve whether

Guam was liable for the costs of the cleanup or

determine the scope of Guam’s liability. See Add. 43.

In deciding that the 2004 consent decree did not

give rise to a Section 113 contribution action, the

district court rejected the approach of a recent Ninth

Circuit decision assessing when a consent decree

triggers Section 113, and instead relied on cases from

the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. Add. 19-32. The

existence of a circuit split on which this Court has not

yet taken a side is, by itself, proof that there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion on the

district court’s resolution of the issue, as the district

court itself recognized. See Add. 55-56.

Resolving that issue in the government’s favor will

materially advance the termination of this case. By

contrast, further proceedings on the merits of Guam’s

claims would be lengthy, complicated, and

burdensome, requiring the parties to reconstruct

decades of past naval operations on Guam—including

activities that took place over a century ago—as well

as Guam’s own management of the dump from 1950

to the present. See Add. 58-63.

Accordingly, the Court should consider the

controlling legal issue now, so that time and resources

are not expended on unnecessary proceedings.

23a

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND

PROCEEDINGS BELOW

***

III. Proceedings below

***

The district court denied the United States’ motion

to dismiss. Add. 5. The court accepted the uniform

view of the federal appellate courts that “costrecovery claims under CERCLA section 107(a) and

contribution claims under CERCLA section

113(f)(3)(B) are exclusive of one another, such that

Guam is permitted to proceed against the United

States” for recovery of costs under Section 107(a)

“only if Guam’s right to contribution under section

113(f)(3)(B) has not been triggered.” Add. 17-18

(emphasis added). It nevertheless refused to dismiss

because, in its view, the 2004 consent decree did not

resolve Guam’s liability for all or even some of a

response action within the meaning of Section 113.

Add. 19-43.

In reaching that conclusion, the district court

relied in large part on the fact that the 2004 consent

decree, while making Guam responsible for taking

specific response actions by dates certain, expressly

withholds any admission of Guam’s statutory

liability. See Add. 26-29, 33-34. The district court

acknowledged that, while this Court has not yet

addressed the question, the Ninth Circuit recently

held that a consent decree containing such a

disclaimer of statutory liability may still give rise to a

Section 113 action, so long as the decree conclusively

establishes the party’s obligation to take all or even

some part of a response action. Add. 26-28 (citing

Asarco LLC 866 F.3d at 1124–25). But the court

24a

rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach, instead citing

decisions of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits to support

its view that a consent decree which declines to

resolve statutory liability cannot be read to resolve

liability for all or part of a response action. Add. 2225, 28-29 (citing Florida Power Corp. v. First Energy

Corp., 810 F.3d 996, 1004 (6th Cir. 2015); Bernstein,

733 F.3d at 212–16; ITT Indus., 506 F.3d at 460).

The district court likewise cited decisions of the

Sixth and Seventh Circuits, and rejected the approach

of the Ninth Circuit, in holding that certain other

provisions of the 2004 consent decree—specifically,

provisions reserving the EPA’s rights to enforce the

decree’s terms and making the United States’

covenant not to sue Guam conditional on Guam’s

performance of its obligations under the decree—

militated against finding that the decree triggered

Section 113. See Add. 26-30.

On February 28, 2019, the district court certified

its order denying the United States’ motion to dismiss

for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Add. 44. In the certification opinion, the court

explained that there was “no dispute” that the order

denying the motion to dismiss raised controlling

issues of law, particularly “how one best interprets

agreement language that expressly eschews liability

and reserves the right to sue, when the court

undertakes to evaluate whether a particular

agreement resolved the liability of a CERCLA

plaintiff for section 113(f)(3)(B) purposes.” Add. 5455. The court further reasoned that substantial

ground for difference of opinion on that issue exists,

given the dearth of in-circuit precedent on the issue

and the existence of a circuit-split among other courts

to have addressed the question. Add. 54-58. Finally,

25a

it determined that interlocutory appeal would

“materially advance” the litigation, in light of the

“potential for conservation of judicial resources and

avoidance of ‘needless expense’ to the parties,” by

obtaining this Court’s ruling on a dispositive

threshold legal question before the parties engage in

“wide-ranging and extensive” discovery. Add. 58-60.

REASONS WHY THE PETITION

SHOULD BE GRANTED

The standards for interlocutory appeal under 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b) are met in this case. In certifying the

order for appeal, the district court correctly

determined that the order presents a controlling

question of law with respect to which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion, and that

immediate appeal may materially advance the

ultimate termination of the litigation.

I. The certified order presents controlling

questions of law as to which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion.

Whether the 2004 consent decree resolves Guam’s

liability for some or all of a response action within the

meaning of Section 113 turns on the proper

construction of both Section 113 and the terms of the

consent decree itself—questions of law, which this

Court reviews de novo. See, e.g., Loving v. I.R.S., 742

F.3d 1013, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Our review of the

District Court’s statutory interpretation is de novo.”);

United States v. Volvo Powertrain Corp., 758 F.3d

330, 337 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“we review the district

court’s construction of the consent decree . . . de

novo”).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a question of law is

controlling when reversal would be required if the

26a

question was decided incorrectly by the lower court.

Howard v. Office of the Chief Admin. Officer of the

U.S. House of Reps., 840 F. Supp.2d 52, 55 (D.D.C.

2012); APCC Servs. Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 297 F.

Supp.2d 101, 105 (D.D.C. 2003). Whether the 2004

consent decree triggered a Section 113 claim plainly

meets that standard: if this Court agrees with the

United States that the 2004 consent decree resolved

Guam’s liability for some or all of the response actions

Guam agreed to undertake in that decree, then the

district court’s order declining to dismiss the case

must be reversed, because Guam would be limited to

bringing a Section 113 claim, the statutory period for

bringing which has already expired. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 9613(g)(3)(B). Indeed, Guam conceded as much

below. See Add. 54.

Equally plain is the fact that there is substantial

ground for difference of opinion regarding whether

the 2004 consent decree triggered a Section 113

action. This Court has never addressed what it

means to “resolve . . . liability” for “some or all of a

response action” under Section 113(f)(3)(B), nor what

a consent decree must include to meet that standard.

See Add. 55. A “dearth of precedent” on an issue

within the controlling jurisdiction is, by itself, often

sufficient to show that substantial grounds for

difference of opinion with a legal ruling exist. APCC,

297 F. Supp. 2d at 107; see also Howard, 840 F.

Supp.2d at 55–56 (discussing fractured appellate

opinions on controlling issue).

Here, that dearth of within-circuit authority is

compounded by the fact that the law outside this

circuit is split on the controlling legal questions. See

Add. 55-56. As the district court acknowledged both

in its certification order and the order denying the

27a

motion to dismiss, while the Sixth, Seventh, and

Ninth Circuits all agree that a Section 113 action is

not triggered “simply and solely because interested

parties ‘sign[ed] a settlement agreement,’” Add. 20

(quoting Bernstein, 733 F.3d at 213), some decisions

from those circuits diverge with regard to what

precisely such an agreement must contain to trigger

a contribution action. See Add. 55-56. In particular,

the Ninth Circuit on one hand and at least some

decisions of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits on the

other have taken different views on whether certain

features present in the 2004 consent decree—

including disclaimers of statutory liability and

conditional covenants not to sue—show that the

decree does not trigger a Section 113 action. See Add.

21-28, 56.

The district court sided with the Sixth and

Seventh Circuit decisions in finding that such

features precluded the 2004 consent decree from

resolving Guam’s liability for all or part of a response

action under Section 113. See Add. 33-37. But it

recognized that the fact that another of this Court’s

sister circuits may have resolved the issue differently

is itself compelling evidence that substantial ground

for difference of opinion exists. Add. 55-56; see, e.g.,

In re Cintas Corp. Overtime Pay Arbitration Lit., No.

M:06-cv-01781-SBA, 2007 WL 1302496, at *2 (N.D.

Cal. May 2, 2007) (granting motion to certify

interlocutory appeal in light of circuit split on legal

issue unresolved within the governing circuit).

Indeed, had Guam filed its CERCLA lawsuit in its

home forum within the Ninth Circuit, there is little

doubt that it would have no CERCLA cause of action.

That substantial ground for difference of opinion

exists—and that this Court accordingly might well

28a

diverge from the district court’s resolution of the

question—is further demonstrated here by the

persuasiveness of the Ninth Circuit position, which

the district court rejected.

First, the Ninth Circuit view that a consent decree

that, like the decree here, declines to establish a

party’s statutory liability may nevertheless trigger a

Section 113 contribution action, is consistent with

both the text and purpose of CERCLA. The text of

Section 113(f)(3)(B) provides an action for

contribution when a party has “resolve[d]” its

“liability” for “some or all of a response action.” 42

U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B). Here, the district court did not

dispute that Guam agreed in the 2004 consent decree

to perform certain acts that qualify as “response

actions” with CERCLA’s broad definition of that

phrase. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (defining

“response” to include “remove, removal, remedy, and

remedial action”).

Nevertheless, the district court, like the Sixth and

Seventh Circuit opinions it cited, assumed that, to

trigger Section 113(f)(3)(B), a consent decree must

conclusively determine that the party is liable under

the statute to perform those actions—or, at least,

cannot expressly disclaim a finding of statutory

liability. See Add. 22-26, 28-29. But that is not what

the text of Section 113 requires; the provision merely

requires that the party’s liability for—that is, legal

obligation to perform—the response actions at issue

be resolved—that is, conclusively settled—by the

consent decree. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B). The

statutory text takes no position on whether that legal

obligation stems from the party’s liability under

CERCLA, or from some other statute (such as the

29a

Clean Water Act), or merely from the terms of the

settlement agreement itself. See id.

Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit has recognized,

reading a requirement that the consent decree

establish liability for the response action under the

statute is at odds with CERCLA’s evident purpose.

See Asarco, 866 F.3d at 1125. As the Ninth Circuit

explained, “Congress’ intent in enacting § 113(f)(3)(B)

was to encourage prompt settlements that establish

[potentially responsible parties’] cleanup obligations

with certainty and finality.” Id. “[R]equiring a

[potentially responsible party] to concede liability”

under the statute in order to trigger a Section 113

contribution claim—as the district court did—“may

discourage [potentially responsible parties] from

entering into settlements” that enable prompt

cleanup in the first place. Id.

Second, the Ninth Circuit view that a consent

decree that preserves the government’s right to

enforce the decree and makes covenants not to sue

contingent on the party’s actual performance of its

obligations under the decree may still resolve the

party’s liability for a response action is also

persuasive. As previously stated, Section 113(f)(3)(B)

is triggered when a consent decree “resolve[s]”

liability for a response action.

42 U.S.C.

§ 6213(f)(3)(B).

The term “resolve” certainly

contemplates that a consent decree will settle

conclusively the question of whether a party must

perform the response actions in question. See Add. 19

(citing Asarco, 866 F.3d at 1122; Bernstein, 733 F.3d

at 211). But there is nothing unsettled about a

consent decree that clearly states what steps the

party is obligated to take, while also affirming that

the government may enforce the decree’s terms or

30a

decline to perform its corresponding promises, if the

party reneges on those obligations. As the Ninth

Circuit explained, “[a]n agreement may ‘resolve[]’”

liability for response actions—as required by Section

113(f)(3)(B)—“without hobbling the government’s

ability to enforce its terms if [that party] reneges.”

Asarco, 866 F.3d at 1125.

Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit recognized, the

contrary approach suggested by the Sixth and

Seventh Circuit decisions is at odds with both

CERCLA’s statutory context and Congressional

intent for that statute. See id. at 1124–25. With

regard to statutory context, CERCLA Section 122

provides that any covenant not to sue entered into by

the government will not “take effect until the

President certifies that remedial action has been

completed.” 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(3). Requiring that a

CERCLA consent decree nevertheless include an

unconditional covenant in order to resolve liability

under Section 113(f)(3)(B) would make it “unlikely”

that such an agreement “could ever resolve a party’s

liability,” given that such an unconditional covenant

would run afoul of Section 122. Asarco, 866 F.3d at

1124.

With regard to Congressional intent, CERCLA’s

legislative history expressly authorizes the

government to include in consent decrees “any

provisions allowing future enforcement action . . .

that [the government] determines are necessary and

appropriate to assure protection of public health,

welfare, and the environment.” H.R. Rep. No. 99-253,

at 102 (1985). As the Ninth Circuit noted, it would be

odd for Congress to promote inclusion of such

provisions in CERCLA consent decrees if Congress

contemplated that doing so would foreclose the

31a

consent decrees from triggering the right to seek

contribution under Section 113(f)(3)(B). Asarco, 866

F.3d at 1125.

For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit approach that

the district court rejected is more persuasive than the

approach that the district court adopted. Indeed, the

decisions on which the district court relied have met

with controversy and/or inconsistent application. For

example, the district court credited the Sixth Circuit’s

analysis in Florida Power Corp., a decision that the

United States argued was incorrect and inconsistent

with both CERCLA’s policies and EPA’s longstanding

CERCLA settlement practices, and which drew a

strong dissent.

See 810 F.3d at 1015-19

(Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting). Moreover, the Sixth

Circuit decisions that preceded Florida Power, on

which the Florida Power majority relied, are difficult

to reconcile, as explained by the Florida Power

dissent and by the Ninth Circuit in Asarco. Id.;

Asarco, 866 F.3d at 1124–25.

There is accordingly substantial ground to believe

that this Court would reverse the district court’s

decision in light of the Ninth Circuit’s cogent legal

analysis on the controlling question of whether the

2004 consent decree resolved Guam’s liability for

some or all of a response action within the meaning of

CERCLA Section 113.

II. Immediate appeal may materially advance

the ultimate termination of this case.

An immediate appeal may materially advance the

disposition of this litigation. If this Court agrees with

the United States that the 2004 consent decree

resolved Guam’s liability for some or all of a response

action within the meaning of Section 113(f)(3)(B),

32a

then the certified order should be reversed and

Guam’s case dismissed in full. As explained above, to

the extent the 2004 consent decree triggered a

contribution claim under Section 113(f)(3)(B), Guam

may not proceed with the Section 107 claim pleaded

in its complaint. See, e.g., Asarco, 866 F.3d at 1117;

Bernstein, 733 F.3d at 206; Solutia, 672 F.3d at 1236–

37; Morrison Enters., , 638 F.3d at 603–04; Agere, 602

F.3d at 229; Niagara Mohawk, 596 F.3d at 128; ITT

Indus., 506 F.3d at 458. And the Section 113 claim

that Guam pleaded in the alternative is time-barred.

See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3)(B). Immediate appeal is

therefore appropriate because resolution of an

interlocutory appeal in favor of the United States

would terminate this litigation in its entirety without

the need for further substantive proceedings in the

district court. See Howard, 840 F. Supp.2d at 57.

Deferring appellate review until a final judgment,

however, would require the parties to engage in

extensive discovery that may well be rendered

unnecessary if this Court ultimately decides that

Guam’s claims must be dismissed as a matter of law,

as the district court recognized. Add. 60. Guam seeks

to establish that the United States is liable for

contamination at the Ordot Dump based in part on

alleged United States activities that ceased nearly 70

years ago. See Add. 3. Discovery in this case will

therefore require the parties to establish a historical

record on issues ranging from World War II military

engagements on Guam, to the Navy’s historic

interactions with Ordot, to Guam’s waste disposal

operations in the ensuing decades. The fact that

Guam is located thousands of miles away from

District of Columbia (and Guam did not choose to the

file its lawsuit in Guam courts) will also make

33a

discovery into historical practices on Guam more

difficult, expensive, and time-consuming.

Furthermore, as noted, in addition to Guam’s

government agencies and instrumentalities, many

large businesses and commercial interests sent waste

to Ordot for decades. Other parties that arranged for

the disposal of hazardous waste at Ordot or

transported such waste to the landfill face CERCLA

liability and may ultimately be joined in this case,

further complicating and expanding the potential

scope of the CERCLA litigation in the district court.

See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).

Beyond the burden on the existing and potential

future parties to this litigation, the burden on judicial

resources will be significant if litigation proceeds. See

Add. 60. In addition to presiding over the extensive

discovery, the district court will likely be called upon

to hear dispositive motions at the summary judgment

stage and, if such motions are denied, to preside over

a bench trial.

In sum, allowing an interlocutory appeal at this

time could save the parties substantial time and

money, and also conserve judicial resources that

would otherwise be necessary to supervise discovery,

decide dispositive motions, and preside over a

potentially lengthy bench trial. These considerations

weigh in favor of permitting an immediate appeal,

which may obviate the need for further burdensome

litigation. See Nat’l Veterans Legal Servs. Program v.

United States, 321 F. Supp. 3d 150, 155 (D.D.C. 2018);

APCC, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 99-100; GTE New Media

Servs. Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 44 F. Supp. 2d 313, 316

(D.D.C. 1999).

34a

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for leave to

appeal should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Rachel Heron

JEFFREY BOSSERT

CLARK

Assistant Attorney

General

ERIC GRANT

Deputy Assistant

Attorney General

JENNIFER SCHELLER

NEUMANN

RACHEL HERON

Attorneys, Appellate

Section

Environment and Natural

Resources Division

U.S. Department of Justice

March 11, 2019

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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