Petition for Rehearing — Irving F. Rounds, Jr., Petitioner v. Charles Koch, et al.

Supreme Court briefNov 19, 2020

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 20-248

Supreme Court of tfje flHntteb States:

IRVING F. ROUNDS JR.,

Petitioner,

vs.

CHARLES KOCH, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The First Circuit

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Irving F. Rounds, Jr.

Petitioner (Pro Se)

246 Beacon St.

Apt. 1

Clinton, MA 01510

781.504.8974

Email: roundsmechanical5@protonmail.com

RECEIVED

NOV 2 h 2020

WSfiJPIJSugiS

1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Has Irving Rounds, Jr. (hereinafter “Petitioner”) been

deprived of his right to a Jury Trial where the lower

courts:

A. Failed to provide him with said Jury trial on the

facts of his case under the 7th Amendment to the

United States Constitution?

B. Failed to provide him with said Jury Trial in ac­

cordance with Rule 65(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure when deciding to dismiss his Peti­

tions?

C. Failed to provide him with said Jury Trial in ac­

cordance with Rule 65(b)(2) of the Massachusetts

Rules of Civil Procedure when deciding to dismiss his

Petitions?

11

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Presented...............................................

i

Table of Contents....................................................

n

Table of Authorities................................................

in

Petition for Writ of Certiorari................................

1

Opinions Below.......................................................

Jurisdiction..............................................................

1

2

Constitutional Provisions......................................

2

Statement of the Case...........................................

3

1. The Petitioner’s legal efforts to report

(“Blow the Whistle”) on his former em­

ployer for violations of the Clean Air Act

to the U.S. EPA for illegally venting refrig­

erants were exercised in good faith...........

2. United States District Court Petitions.....

3. The U.S. Court of Appeals Decision...........

Legal Rationale for Granting the Writ................

3

4

7

8

To avoid erroneous deprivations of the right to a

jury trial, this Court should reconsider the de­

cisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit and the U.S. District Courts in

Boston and Worcester, Massachusetts denying

the Petitioner a jury trial...................................

8

Conclusion................................................................

10

Appendix (see original Appendix filed)

Ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295

U.S. 654 (1935)..................................................

9

Beacon Theaters v. Westover, 395 U.S. 500

(1959)..................................................................

9

Dimick v. Shied, 293 U.S. 474 (1935)....................

8

McCoy v. Goldstein, 652 F.2d 654 (6th Cir. 2008).

9

Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove and Robeson, 28

U.S. (3 Pet. 433) (1830)......................................

8

Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).......................

11

Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).

11

Wright v. Town of Southbridge, 2009 WL 415506

(D. Mass. Jan. 15, 2009)....................................

6

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1254

2

Constitutional Provisions

United States Constitution, Amendment

VII

2,8,9,10,11

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 42

1,2

1

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Petitioner, an individual who resides in Clin­

ton, Massachusetts, respectfully petitions this Court

for a Writ of Certiorari to review the judgments of the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and the U.S.

District Courts in Boston and Worcester, Massachu­

setts as provided in Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

OPINIONS BELOW

Rounds v. Environmental Protection Agency et al

1,5

Rounds v. Environmental Protection Agency et al

7

Rounds v. Koch et al 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9

Rounds v. U. S. Department of Justice et al 5

Rounds v. Baker et al

The decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit and the U.S. District Courts in Boston and

Worcester, Massachusetts denied the Petitioner’s Re­

quests for hearings for Injunctive Relief as well as his

demand for a Jury Trial.

These rulings and orders are attached at Appen­

dix (“App.”) at 1-3.

2

JURISDICTION

The Petitioner invokes this Court’s jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1254, having timely filed his original

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari within one hundred

fifty (150) days of the judgment of the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the First Circuit, within ninety (90) days

of judgment of the U.S. District Court in Boston and

within twenty-five (25) days of the decision of the U.S.

Supreme Court relative to his original Petition for a

Writ of Certiorari.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

United States Constitution, Amendment VII

“In suits at common law, where the value in

controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the

right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and

no fact tried by a jury, shall be Otherwise re­

examined in any Court of the United States,

than according to the rules of the common

law.”

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 42.

(a) Consolidation. If actions before the

court involve a common question of law or

fact, the court may:

(1) join for hearing or trial any or all

matters at issue in the actions;

(2) consolidate the actions; or

3

(3) issue any other orders to avoid un­

necessary cost or delay.

(b) Separate Trials. For convenience, to

avoid prejudice, or to expedite and econo­

mize, the court may order a separate trial of

one or more separate issues, claims, cross­

claims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.

When ordering a separate trial, the court

must preserve any federal right to a jury

trial.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1.

The Petitioner’s legal efforts to report

(“Blow the Whistle”) on his former em­

ployer for violations of the Clean Air Act to

the U.S. EPA for illegally venting refriger­

ants were exercised in good faith.

In January of 1998 the Petitioner was employed

with Airtron Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc.,

(herein “Airtron”) formerly of Oldsmar, Florida. At this

time he reported his employer to Special Agent Daniel

Green of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of

the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) at the

agency’s Tampa, Florida field office relative to numer­

ous violations of the Clean Air Act (i.e. illegal venting

of refrigerants, mold problems with installations of

HVAC systems, etc.). The Petitioner was concerned

with his safety and that of his ex-wife having received

death threats; he requested witness protection and

Agent Green guaranteed it. Over the ensuing months,

4

Agent Green would renege on this promise. Group

MAC, the parent company of the Petitioner’s employer,

Airtron, was partially owned by Charles and David

Koch (a/k/a the Koch Brothers). During a period of sub­

sequent years and to the present, the Petitioner has

been systematically threatened, harassed and intimi­

dated by agents and employees of Airtron, the Koch

Brothers and the U.S. Department of Justice to the ex­

tent that his health, his employment career and his

privacy (including but not limited to all communica­

tions) have been severely compromised (many of these

activities are evidenced by court filings and documents

included in the Appendix attached to this Memoran­

dum).

2.

United States District Court Petitions

The Petitioner has previously filed Complaints in

the United States District Courts in Boston and

Worcester, Massachusetts seeking redress against sev­

eral agencies and representatives of the United States

Government as well as private individuals for these

threats, intimidation and harassment (see Appendix

for Opinions below). Included in these actions are the

Petitioner’s various Motions seeking Injunctive Relief

for which the Petitioner specifically requested hear­

ings before the Court as well as his demand for a jury

trial. At no time did the District Courts (Hillman, J.

and Saylor, J.) allow the Petitioner an opportunity to

be heard and present his substantive and voluminous

evidence before the Courts while seeking injunctive re­

lief nor did the Courts honor his demand for a jury

5

trial. Furthermore, these judges summarily dismissed

the accompanying Complaints without seriously enter­

taining the Petitioner’s Motions, granting his request

for a jury trial or properly weighing the evidence as

outlined in Petitioner’s Complaints and as substanti­

ated in his materials included in the attached Appen­

dix (see Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration in the

attached Appendix at pages 11,12,15-17, 38-40).

The U.S. District Court (Saylor, J.) concluded that

the case was barred by the doctrine of sovereign im­

munity, that subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking

and therefore the Complaint was dismissed. That the

Court should ignore the Complaint of the Petitioner on

narrow immunity and jurisdictional grounds is not suf­

ficient argument which would warrant the outright

dismissal of this matter at this juncture.

Admittedly, the Petitioner, as a Pro se Complain­

ant, does not enjoy the legal training and knowledge of

the seasoned, legal practitioner prosecuting his claims

in the Federal Courts. The Court has made allowances

for Pro se litigants in numerous cases throughout our

history. The District Court (Saylor, J.) pointed this out

in its opinion citing the “less stringent standard” of the

Pro se litigant:

“When, as here, a motion to dismiss is filed against

a pro se litigant, any document filed by the pro se party

‘is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint,

however in artfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

6

Despite this allowance, the District Court goes on to

add that the Pro se plaintiff still has the responsibility

to state his/her Complaint with factual integrity: “ . . .

even a pro se plaintiff is required to ‘set forth factual

allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each

material element necessary to sustain recovery under

some actionable legal theory.’” Wright v. Town of

Southbridge, 2009 WL 415506 at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 15,

2009). The Court, when analyzing the Pro se Com­

plainant’s factual allegations, must give the Complain­

ant the benefit of the doubt as to their truthfulness at

least in the first instance: "... the district court must

construe the complaint liberally, treating all wellpleaded facts as true and analyzing all reasonable in­

ferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Aversa v. United

States, 99 F.3d 1200,1209-10 (1st Cir. 1996).

In this case, the Pro se Petitioner, lacking the level

of sophistication of the legal draftsman, buttressed his

“bare bones” allegations with Appendix materials

which he believed would sustain his case. Conse­

quently, his factual allegations contained in the body

of his Complaint are “brought to life” by his volumi­

nous documentation contained in the Appendix. This is

how this Petitioner "... set forth his factual allega­

tions and respect(ed) each material element necessary

to sustain his recovery under (an) actionable legal the­

ory.” (Wright v. Town of Southbridge noted above).

Lacking legal training, the Petitioner has not been

able to appreciate the legal niceties of the doctrine of

sovereign immunity and an asserted waiver of same,

appropriate subject-matter jurisdiction, the necessity

7

of administrative exhaustion of remedies and claims

advanced under the Federal Tort Claims Act. His argu­

ments contained in his Complaint are limited to the

difference between right and wrong which are ad­

vanced in a rudimentary way and guided by a fervent

belief in the Constitution of the United States of Amer­

ica and the requisite due process of law thereunder.

As a result, the opinion of the District Court

(Saylor, J.) contains language and legal references with

which this Petitioner was unfamiliar when filing his

Complaint and advancing his Appeals. Here, factual

allegations have been substantiated to the best of the

Petitioner’s ability with the aid of his Appendix.

3.

The U.S. Court of Appeals Decision

The Judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals indi­

cated that the Petitioner had "... fail(ed) to provide

any developed argumentation or legal authority in

support of his position” and alternatively that the

lower Court had not abused its discretion.

The Petitioner had filed with the Appeals Court

(as well as the District Court) extensive, factual mate­

rial contained in his Appendix which substantiated his

allegations against the defendants. At a minimum, his

documentation, when weighed in its best light, sup­

ported the need for injunctive relief or alternatively, a

hearing where oral argument provided the Petitioner

with an opportunity to be heard. The ruling of the Ap­

peals Court, particularly in its finding that the lower

Court had not abused its discretion, did lend misplaced

8

credence to the decision of the District Court(s) which

had ignored Petitioner’s justified plea for injunctive re­

lief, a hearing on the merits and a Jury Trial on the

facts of the case.

LEGAL RATIONALE FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of

the United States was originally designed by James

Madison to restrict official or arbitrary power while

protecting the individual in the context of litigation

against political corruption The Amendment requires

civil jury trials only in the federal courts; it has often

been said that it protects the people from tyranny

within the judicial system. Consequently, trial by jury

has always been integral to our democratic society.

The Petitioner in this case filed his Complaint, a

civil common law action, in the United States District

Courts seeking monetary damages as well as injunc­

tive relief. He did so in accordance with the matter of

Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove and Robeson, 28 U.S. (3

Pet. 433) (1830), where the U.S. Supreme Court had de­

termined that the term “common law” in the Seventh

Amendment meant at the time the common law of

England (It would be decreed approximately one hun­

dred (100) years later that the Amendment was to be

interpreted according to the common law of England

at the time the Amendment was ratified, that is, in

1791) (Dimick v. Shied, 293 U.S. 474) (1935)). Further­

more, the Court found during the same year in

9

Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S.

654 (1935) that the Seventh Amendment “preserves”

the “substance of the right, not mere matters of form

or procedure.”

Here, the Petitioner’s Complaint contains mixed

questions of law and equity (see Beacon Theaters v.

Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959)). The underlying ra­

tionale of the Seventh Amendment addresses the his­

toric line which separates the responsibilities of the

jury from that of the judge in civil cases. The basic

function of judges and juries are made clear in the

Amendment: questions of law are within the province

of the judge while questions of fact belong with the

jury. That is, at the very least, the directive of the

Amendment although at times the two have been

known to cross over one another.

What is unmistakable, though, is that “Together

with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment,

the Seventh Amendment guarantees civil litigants the

right to an impartial jury” (McCoy v. Goldstein, 652

F.2d 654 (6th Cir.) (2008). (Note: The Petitioner’s initial

prayer for a Writ of Certiorari along with his Petition

for Rehearing of same encompass these two constitu­

tional requisites). His demand for a jury trial specifi­

cally included in his Complaint must be preserved and

honored in accordance with the Seventh Amendment

and the Bill of Rights (see FRCP, Rules 38 & 39).

The Petitioner’s demands for a hearing relative to

his claims for injunctive relief were summarily

10

dismissed in the District Courts. The Courts’ failure to

honor claims for a jury trial “fly in the face” of Rule 65

(Injunctive Relief) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce­

dure (FRCP) as well as the Massachusetts Rules of

Civil Procedure (MRCP). FRCP at Rule 65 (a)(2) pro­

tects) the right to Jury Trial in this circumstance:

“But the Court must preserve any party’s

right to a jury trial.”

Similarly, MRCP (b)(2) addresses requests for in­

junctive relief and more specifically the Petitioner’s

right to a jury trial:

“This subdivision (b)(2) shall be so construed

and applied as to save to the parties any

rights they may have to trial by jury.”

These Rule provisions of both State and Federal

Civil Procedure within the Courts incorporate the

mandate of the Seventh Amendment. There can be

little doubt that those who drafted these Rules were

keenly aware of the need to emphasize and highlight

the right to a Jury Trial and the Seventh Amendment.

CONCLUSION

There are very few provisions of the United States

Constitution which are more sacrosanct than a citi­

zen’s right to a Jury Trial in those instances where the

law allows. Over two hundred years of the evolution of

our constitutional law, this right has played a key role

in distinguishing American jurisprudence from that of

11

virtually the entire world. The Seventh Amendment

and all that it entails are not to be taken lightly nor is

the historical significance of the right to a Jury Trial to

be ignored.

Here, the Petitioner has been effectively stigma­

tized by his pursuit of justice despite the fact that he

has a right to avoid such an intrusion by the actions of

the defendants (Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480) (1980).

Where governmental activity has caused the stigma to

occur, the intrusion is particularly egregious and the

need for due process is paramount. As the Court men­

tioned in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,437

(1971), “Where a person’s good name, reputation, honor

or integrity is at stake because of what the government

is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard

are essential.” The Petitioner has been denied his con­

stitutional right to a Jury Trial by the Judicial branch

of the American government: it would be a further in­

justice should the highest Court in the land follow the

decisions of the Courts below.

Wherefore, the Court should reconsider the deci­

sions of the U.S. Court of Appeals as well as those of

the U.S. District Courts in Boston and Worcester, Mas­

sachusetts denying the Petitioner his right to a Jury

Trial.

Respectfully submitted,

Irving F. Rounds, Jr.

Petitioner

12

CERTIFICATE OF PETITIONER

I, Irving F. Rounds, Jr. do hereby certify that I pre­

sent the within Petition for Rehearing for Writ of Cer­

tiorari in good faith, not for delay and restricted to the

grounds in Rule 44 of the Rules of the Supreme Court

of the United States.

Dated: November 19, 2020.

iRvmG F. Rounds, Jr. /

Petitioner

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.