Petition for Rehearing — Irving F. Rounds, Jr., Petitioner v. Charles Koch, et al.
Supreme Court briefNov 19, 2020
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 20-248
Supreme Court of tfje flHntteb States:
IRVING F. ROUNDS JR.,
Petitioner,
vs.
CHARLES KOCH, ET AL.,
Respondents.
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The First Circuit
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Irving F. Rounds, Jr.
Petitioner (Pro Se)
246 Beacon St.
Apt. 1
Clinton, MA 01510
781.504.8974
Email: roundsmechanical5@protonmail.com
RECEIVED
NOV 2 h 2020
WSfiJPIJSugiS
1
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Has Irving Rounds, Jr. (hereinafter “Petitioner”) been
deprived of his right to a Jury Trial where the lower
courts:
A. Failed to provide him with said Jury trial on the
facts of his case under the 7th Amendment to the
United States Constitution?
B. Failed to provide him with said Jury Trial in ac
cordance with Rule 65(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure when deciding to dismiss his Peti
tions?
C. Failed to provide him with said Jury Trial in ac
cordance with Rule 65(b)(2) of the Massachusetts
Rules of Civil Procedure when deciding to dismiss his
Petitions?
11
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Questions Presented...............................................
i
Table of Contents....................................................
n
Table of Authorities................................................
in
Petition for Writ of Certiorari................................
1
Opinions Below.......................................................
Jurisdiction..............................................................
1
2
Constitutional Provisions......................................
2
Statement of the Case...........................................
3
1. The Petitioner’s legal efforts to report
(“Blow the Whistle”) on his former em
ployer for violations of the Clean Air Act
to the U.S. EPA for illegally venting refrig
erants were exercised in good faith...........
2. United States District Court Petitions.....
3. The U.S. Court of Appeals Decision...........
Legal Rationale for Granting the Writ................
3
4
7
8
To avoid erroneous deprivations of the right to a
jury trial, this Court should reconsider the de
cisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit and the U.S. District Courts in
Boston and Worcester, Massachusetts denying
the Petitioner a jury trial...................................
8
Conclusion................................................................
10
Appendix (see original Appendix filed)
Ill
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295
U.S. 654 (1935)..................................................
9
Beacon Theaters v. Westover, 395 U.S. 500
(1959)..................................................................
9
Dimick v. Shied, 293 U.S. 474 (1935)....................
8
McCoy v. Goldstein, 652 F.2d 654 (6th Cir. 2008).
9
Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove and Robeson, 28
U.S. (3 Pet. 433) (1830)......................................
8
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).......................
11
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
11
Wright v. Town of Southbridge, 2009 WL 415506
(D. Mass. Jan. 15, 2009)....................................
6
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1254
2
Constitutional Provisions
United States Constitution, Amendment
VII
2,8,9,10,11
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 42
1,2
1
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
The Petitioner, an individual who resides in Clin
ton, Massachusetts, respectfully petitions this Court
for a Writ of Certiorari to review the judgments of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and the U.S.
District Courts in Boston and Worcester, Massachu
setts as provided in Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
OPINIONS BELOW
Rounds v. Environmental Protection Agency et al
1,5
Rounds v. Environmental Protection Agency et al
7
Rounds v. Koch et al 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9
Rounds v. U. S. Department of Justice et al 5
Rounds v. Baker et al
The decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit and the U.S. District Courts in Boston and
Worcester, Massachusetts denied the Petitioner’s Re
quests for hearings for Injunctive Relief as well as his
demand for a Jury Trial.
These rulings and orders are attached at Appen
dix (“App.”) at 1-3.
2
JURISDICTION
The Petitioner invokes this Court’s jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254, having timely filed his original
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari within one hundred
fifty (150) days of the judgment of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, within ninety (90) days
of judgment of the U.S. District Court in Boston and
within twenty-five (25) days of the decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court relative to his original Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Amendment VII
“In suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and
no fact tried by a jury, shall be Otherwise re
examined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common
law.”
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 42.
(a) Consolidation. If actions before the
court involve a common question of law or
fact, the court may:
(1) join for hearing or trial any or all
matters at issue in the actions;
(2) consolidate the actions; or
3
(3) issue any other orders to avoid un
necessary cost or delay.
(b) Separate Trials. For convenience, to
avoid prejudice, or to expedite and econo
mize, the court may order a separate trial of
one or more separate issues, claims, cross
claims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.
When ordering a separate trial, the court
must preserve any federal right to a jury
trial.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.
The Petitioner’s legal efforts to report
(“Blow the Whistle”) on his former em
ployer for violations of the Clean Air Act to
the U.S. EPA for illegally venting refriger
ants were exercised in good faith.
In January of 1998 the Petitioner was employed
with Airtron Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc.,
(herein “Airtron”) formerly of Oldsmar, Florida. At this
time he reported his employer to Special Agent Daniel
Green of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) at the
agency’s Tampa, Florida field office relative to numer
ous violations of the Clean Air Act (i.e. illegal venting
of refrigerants, mold problems with installations of
HVAC systems, etc.). The Petitioner was concerned
with his safety and that of his ex-wife having received
death threats; he requested witness protection and
Agent Green guaranteed it. Over the ensuing months,
4
Agent Green would renege on this promise. Group
MAC, the parent company of the Petitioner’s employer,
Airtron, was partially owned by Charles and David
Koch (a/k/a the Koch Brothers). During a period of sub
sequent years and to the present, the Petitioner has
been systematically threatened, harassed and intimi
dated by agents and employees of Airtron, the Koch
Brothers and the U.S. Department of Justice to the ex
tent that his health, his employment career and his
privacy (including but not limited to all communica
tions) have been severely compromised (many of these
activities are evidenced by court filings and documents
included in the Appendix attached to this Memoran
dum).
2.
United States District Court Petitions
The Petitioner has previously filed Complaints in
the United States District Courts in Boston and
Worcester, Massachusetts seeking redress against sev
eral agencies and representatives of the United States
Government as well as private individuals for these
threats, intimidation and harassment (see Appendix
for Opinions below). Included in these actions are the
Petitioner’s various Motions seeking Injunctive Relief
for which the Petitioner specifically requested hear
ings before the Court as well as his demand for a jury
trial. At no time did the District Courts (Hillman, J.
and Saylor, J.) allow the Petitioner an opportunity to
be heard and present his substantive and voluminous
evidence before the Courts while seeking injunctive re
lief nor did the Courts honor his demand for a jury
5
trial. Furthermore, these judges summarily dismissed
the accompanying Complaints without seriously enter
taining the Petitioner’s Motions, granting his request
for a jury trial or properly weighing the evidence as
outlined in Petitioner’s Complaints and as substanti
ated in his materials included in the attached Appen
dix (see Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration in the
attached Appendix at pages 11,12,15-17, 38-40).
The U.S. District Court (Saylor, J.) concluded that
the case was barred by the doctrine of sovereign im
munity, that subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking
and therefore the Complaint was dismissed. That the
Court should ignore the Complaint of the Petitioner on
narrow immunity and jurisdictional grounds is not suf
ficient argument which would warrant the outright
dismissal of this matter at this juncture.
Admittedly, the Petitioner, as a Pro se Complain
ant, does not enjoy the legal training and knowledge of
the seasoned, legal practitioner prosecuting his claims
in the Federal Courts. The Court has made allowances
for Pro se litigants in numerous cases throughout our
history. The District Court (Saylor, J.) pointed this out
in its opinion citing the “less stringent standard” of the
Pro se litigant:
“When, as here, a motion to dismiss is filed against
a pro se litigant, any document filed by the pro se party
‘is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint,
however in artfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
6
Despite this allowance, the District Court goes on to
add that the Pro se plaintiff still has the responsibility
to state his/her Complaint with factual integrity: “ . . .
even a pro se plaintiff is required to ‘set forth factual
allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each
material element necessary to sustain recovery under
some actionable legal theory.’” Wright v. Town of
Southbridge, 2009 WL 415506 at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 15,
2009). The Court, when analyzing the Pro se Com
plainant’s factual allegations, must give the Complain
ant the benefit of the doubt as to their truthfulness at
least in the first instance: "... the district court must
construe the complaint liberally, treating all wellpleaded facts as true and analyzing all reasonable in
ferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Aversa v. United
States, 99 F.3d 1200,1209-10 (1st Cir. 1996).
In this case, the Pro se Petitioner, lacking the level
of sophistication of the legal draftsman, buttressed his
“bare bones” allegations with Appendix materials
which he believed would sustain his case. Conse
quently, his factual allegations contained in the body
of his Complaint are “brought to life” by his volumi
nous documentation contained in the Appendix. This is
how this Petitioner "... set forth his factual allega
tions and respect(ed) each material element necessary
to sustain his recovery under (an) actionable legal the
ory.” (Wright v. Town of Southbridge noted above).
Lacking legal training, the Petitioner has not been
able to appreciate the legal niceties of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity and an asserted waiver of same,
appropriate subject-matter jurisdiction, the necessity
7
of administrative exhaustion of remedies and claims
advanced under the Federal Tort Claims Act. His argu
ments contained in his Complaint are limited to the
difference between right and wrong which are ad
vanced in a rudimentary way and guided by a fervent
belief in the Constitution of the United States of Amer
ica and the requisite due process of law thereunder.
As a result, the opinion of the District Court
(Saylor, J.) contains language and legal references with
which this Petitioner was unfamiliar when filing his
Complaint and advancing his Appeals. Here, factual
allegations have been substantiated to the best of the
Petitioner’s ability with the aid of his Appendix.
3.
The U.S. Court of Appeals Decision
The Judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals indi
cated that the Petitioner had "... fail(ed) to provide
any developed argumentation or legal authority in
support of his position” and alternatively that the
lower Court had not abused its discretion.
The Petitioner had filed with the Appeals Court
(as well as the District Court) extensive, factual mate
rial contained in his Appendix which substantiated his
allegations against the defendants. At a minimum, his
documentation, when weighed in its best light, sup
ported the need for injunctive relief or alternatively, a
hearing where oral argument provided the Petitioner
with an opportunity to be heard. The ruling of the Ap
peals Court, particularly in its finding that the lower
Court had not abused its discretion, did lend misplaced
8
credence to the decision of the District Court(s) which
had ignored Petitioner’s justified plea for injunctive re
lief, a hearing on the merits and a Jury Trial on the
facts of the case.
LEGAL RATIONALE FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States was originally designed by James
Madison to restrict official or arbitrary power while
protecting the individual in the context of litigation
against political corruption The Amendment requires
civil jury trials only in the federal courts; it has often
been said that it protects the people from tyranny
within the judicial system. Consequently, trial by jury
has always been integral to our democratic society.
The Petitioner in this case filed his Complaint, a
civil common law action, in the United States District
Courts seeking monetary damages as well as injunc
tive relief. He did so in accordance with the matter of
Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove and Robeson, 28 U.S. (3
Pet. 433) (1830), where the U.S. Supreme Court had de
termined that the term “common law” in the Seventh
Amendment meant at the time the common law of
England (It would be decreed approximately one hun
dred (100) years later that the Amendment was to be
interpreted according to the common law of England
at the time the Amendment was ratified, that is, in
1791) (Dimick v. Shied, 293 U.S. 474) (1935)). Further
more, the Court found during the same year in
9
Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S.
654 (1935) that the Seventh Amendment “preserves”
the “substance of the right, not mere matters of form
or procedure.”
Here, the Petitioner’s Complaint contains mixed
questions of law and equity (see Beacon Theaters v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959)). The underlying ra
tionale of the Seventh Amendment addresses the his
toric line which separates the responsibilities of the
jury from that of the judge in civil cases. The basic
function of judges and juries are made clear in the
Amendment: questions of law are within the province
of the judge while questions of fact belong with the
jury. That is, at the very least, the directive of the
Amendment although at times the two have been
known to cross over one another.
What is unmistakable, though, is that “Together
with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment,
the Seventh Amendment guarantees civil litigants the
right to an impartial jury” (McCoy v. Goldstein, 652
F.2d 654 (6th Cir.) (2008). (Note: The Petitioner’s initial
prayer for a Writ of Certiorari along with his Petition
for Rehearing of same encompass these two constitu
tional requisites). His demand for a jury trial specifi
cally included in his Complaint must be preserved and
honored in accordance with the Seventh Amendment
and the Bill of Rights (see FRCP, Rules 38 & 39).
The Petitioner’s demands for a hearing relative to
his claims for injunctive relief were summarily
10
dismissed in the District Courts. The Courts’ failure to
honor claims for a jury trial “fly in the face” of Rule 65
(Injunctive Relief) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce
dure (FRCP) as well as the Massachusetts Rules of
Civil Procedure (MRCP). FRCP at Rule 65 (a)(2) pro
tects) the right to Jury Trial in this circumstance:
“But the Court must preserve any party’s
right to a jury trial.”
Similarly, MRCP (b)(2) addresses requests for in
junctive relief and more specifically the Petitioner’s
right to a jury trial:
“This subdivision (b)(2) shall be so construed
and applied as to save to the parties any
rights they may have to trial by jury.”
These Rule provisions of both State and Federal
Civil Procedure within the Courts incorporate the
mandate of the Seventh Amendment. There can be
little doubt that those who drafted these Rules were
keenly aware of the need to emphasize and highlight
the right to a Jury Trial and the Seventh Amendment.
CONCLUSION
There are very few provisions of the United States
Constitution which are more sacrosanct than a citi
zen’s right to a Jury Trial in those instances where the
law allows. Over two hundred years of the evolution of
our constitutional law, this right has played a key role
in distinguishing American jurisprudence from that of
11
virtually the entire world. The Seventh Amendment
and all that it entails are not to be taken lightly nor is
the historical significance of the right to a Jury Trial to
be ignored.
Here, the Petitioner has been effectively stigma
tized by his pursuit of justice despite the fact that he
has a right to avoid such an intrusion by the actions of
the defendants (Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480) (1980).
Where governmental activity has caused the stigma to
occur, the intrusion is particularly egregious and the
need for due process is paramount. As the Court men
tioned in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,437
(1971), “Where a person’s good name, reputation, honor
or integrity is at stake because of what the government
is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard
are essential.” The Petitioner has been denied his con
stitutional right to a Jury Trial by the Judicial branch
of the American government: it would be a further in
justice should the highest Court in the land follow the
decisions of the Courts below.
Wherefore, the Court should reconsider the deci
sions of the U.S. Court of Appeals as well as those of
the U.S. District Courts in Boston and Worcester, Mas
sachusetts denying the Petitioner his right to a Jury
Trial.
Respectfully submitted,
Irving F. Rounds, Jr.
Petitioner
12
CERTIFICATE OF PETITIONER
I, Irving F. Rounds, Jr. do hereby certify that I pre
sent the within Petition for Rehearing for Writ of Cer
tiorari in good faith, not for delay and restricted to the
grounds in Rule 44 of the Rules of the Supreme Court
of the United States.
Dated: November 19, 2020.
iRvmG F. Rounds, Jr. /
Petitioner
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.