Petitioners Brief — Arizona, et al., Petitioners v. City and County of San Francisco, California, et al.
Supreme Court briefDec 13, 2021
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No. 20-1775
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, ET AL.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
TYLER R. GREEN
CAMERON T. NORRIS
JEFFREY S. HETZEL
CONSOVOY MCCARTHY
PLLC
1600 Wilson Blvd.,
Suite 700
Arlington, VA 22209
MARK BRNOVICH
Attorney General
JOSEPH A. KANEFIELD
Chief Deputy and
Chief of Staff
BRUNN W. ROYSDEN III
Solicitor General
DREW C. ENSIGN
Deputy Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
KATE B. SAWYER
Assistant Solicitor General
KATLYN J. DIVIS
Assistant Attorney General
OFFICE OF THE ARIZONA
ATTORNEY GENERAL
2005 N. Central Ave.
Phoenix, AZ 85004
(602) 542-5025
drew.ensign@azag.gov
Counsel for Petitioners
(Additional Counsel listed on inside cover)
STEVE MARSHALL
Attorney General of Alabama
LESLIE RUTLEDGE
Attorney General of Arkansas
THEODORE E. ROKITA
Attorney General of Indiana
DEREK SCHMIDT
Attorney General of Kansas
JEFF LANDRY
Attorney General of Louisiana
LYNN FITCH
Attorney General of Mississippi
ERIC S. SCHMITT
Attorney General of Missouri
AUSTIN KNUDSEN
Attorney General of Montana
JOHN M. O’CONNOR
Attorney General of Oklahoma
ALAN WILSON
Attorney General of South Carolina
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas
PATRICK MORRISEY
Attorney General of West Virginia
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. §§1101 et seq., an alien is “inadmissible” if, “in
the opinion of the [Secretary of Homeland Security] at
the time of application for admission or adjustment of
status, [the alien] is likely at any time to become a
public charge.” 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(4)(A). Following
notice-and-comment rulemaking, the United States
Department
of
Homeland
Security
(DHS)
promulgated a final rule (the “Rule”) interpreting the
statutory term “public charge” and establishing a
framework for applying it.
Litigation about the Rule ensued, and the Second,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits affirmed preliminary
injunctions, while the Fourth Circuit initially
reversed. The United States sought review in multiple
cases, and this Court granted review of the Second
Circuit’s opinion. DHS v. New York, No. 20-449 (U.S.
Feb. 22, 2021). But the United States suddenly
announced it would no longer pursue its appeals. The
result was to leave in place a partial grant of summary
judgment and vacatur of the Rule in one district court,
applying nationwide—evading this Court’s review
and the procedures of the APA. Petitioners quickly
moved to intervene in the Ninth Circuit to protect
their interests previously represented by the United
States. The Ninth Circuit, however, denied
Petitioners’ motion.
The question presented is:
1. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred and/or
abused its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to
intervene.
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners are the State of Arizona; the State of
Alabama; the State of Arkansas; the State of Indiana;
the State of Kansas; the State of Louisiana; the State
of Mississippi; the State of Missouri; the State of
Montana; the State of Oklahoma; the State of South
Carolina; the State of Texas; and the State of West
Virginia.
Respondents (plaintiffs-appellees below) are the
City and County of San Francisco; the County of
Santa Clara; the State of California; the District of
Columbia; the State of Colorado; the State of
Delaware; the State of Hawaii; the State of Illinois;
the State of Maine; the State of Maryland; the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts; the State of
Minnesota; the State of Nevada; the State of New
Jersey; the State of New Mexico; the State of Oregon;
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; the State of
Rhode Island; the Commonwealth of Virginia; the
State of Washington; and Dana Nessel, Attorney
General on behalf of the People of Michigan.
Respondents (defendants-appellants below) are the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services;
the United States Department of Homeland Security;
Alejandro N. Mayorkas, in his official capacity as
Secretary of the United States Department of
Homeland Security; and Ur M. Jaddou, in her official
capacity as Director of the United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ....................................... i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS......................... ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................ v
OPINIONS BELOW ....................................................1
JURISDICTION ..........................................................1
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES
INVOLVED..................................................................1
INTRODUCTION ........................................................2
STATEMENT ..............................................................4
I.
History of Public Charge inadmissibility
.........................................................................4
II. The Public Charge Rule .................................6
III. Challenges to the Public Charge Rule ...........7
IV. The Biden Administration’s postcertiorari maneuvers ......................................9
V. Petitioners’ near-immediate intervention
to defend the Public Charge Rule ................ 13
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .......................... 15
ARGUMENT ............................................................. 18
I.
The Ninth Circuit erred in denying the
States’ motion to intervene. ......................... 18
A. The
States
satisfied
Rule
24(a)’s standard for intervention as
of right. ................................................... 19
1. The States’ motion to intervene
was timely. ....................................... 20
2. The States have a significant
protectable interest that could be
impaired. .......................................... 24
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
3. Respondents
no
longer
adequately represent the States’
interests. .......................................... 26
B. Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit
should have granted permissive
intervention. ........................................... 27
II. Respondents’ mootness arguments are
unpersuasive. ................................................ 29
A. If Petitioners intervene, they could
successfully defend the Rule.................. 30
B. If Petitioners intervene, they could
move for Munsingwear vacatur. ............ 34
III. Denying
intervention
in
these
circumstances would sow disorder............... 37
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 41
APPENDIX ......................................................... App. 1
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico
ex rel. Barez,
458 U.S. 592 (1982) ............................................... 25
Alvarez v. Smith,
558 U.S. 87 (2009) ........................................... 34, 36
American Petroleum Institute v. EPA,
No. 08-1277 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 1, 2009) ..................... 11
American Petroleum Institute v. EPA,
No. 13-1108 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2017) ................... 12
Arizona v. City & County of San Francisco,
No. 20-1775 (U.S. Aug. 23, 2021) .......................... 18
Arizona v. United States,
567 U.S. 387 (2012) ............................................... 25
Azar v. Allina Health Services,
139 S. Ct. 1804 (2019) ..................................... 13, 38
Azar v. Garza,
138 S. Ct. 1790 (2018) ..................................... 34, 35
Bakery Sales Drivers Local Union No. 33 v. Wagshal,
333 U.S. 437 (1948) ............................................... 33
Barnes v. Security Life of Denver Insurance Co.,
945 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 2019) ............................. 20
Biden v. Sierra Club,
No. 20-138 (U.S. Feb. 1, 2021) .............................. 14
Blount-Hill v. Zelman,
636 F.3d 278 (6th Cir. 2011) ................................. 19
Board of Regents of the University of Texas System v.
New Left Education Project,
414 U.S. 807 (1973) ............................................... 34
California v. HHS,
141 S. Ct. 192 (2020) ............................................. 17
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
California v. HHS,
941 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2019) ........................... 17, 32
CASA de Maryland v. Biden,
No. 19-2222, Dkt. 210 (4th Cir. Mar. 9, 2021) ...... 10
CASA de Maryland v. Biden,
No. 19-2222, Dkt. 211 (4th Cir. Mar. 11, 2021) .... 10
CASA de Maryland v. Biden,
No. 19-2222, Dkt. 215 (4th Cir. Mar. 11, 2021) .... 14
CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Biden,
No. 19-2222, Dkt. 216 (4th Cir. Mar. 18, 2021) .... 28
CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Trump,
414 F. Supp. 3d 760 (D. Md. 2019) .........................8
CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Trump,
No. 19-2222, Dkt. 21 (4th Cir. Dec. 9, 2019) ..........8
Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co.,
386 U.S. 129 (1967) ............................................... 26
Chafin v. Chafin,
568 U.S. 165 (2013) ............................. 29, 30, 34, 37
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
441 U.S. 281 (1979) ............................................... 38
Citizens for Balanced Use v. Montana Wilderness
Association,
647 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2011) ................................. 19
City & County of San Francisco v. USCIS,
No. 19-17213, Dkt. 138 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 2020) ....8
City & County of San Francisco v. USCIS,
No. 19-cv-4980, Dkt. 204
(N.D. Cal. May 26, 2021) ....................................... 15
City & County of San Francisco v. USCIS,
No. 19-cv-5210, Dkt. 299 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 23,
2021)....................................................................... 15
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc.,
455 U.S. 283 (1982) ............................................... 30
Cook County v. Mayorkas,
__F.R.D.__, 2021 WL 3633917
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2021) .................................. 21, 32
Cook County v. McAleenan,
417 F. Supp. 3d 1008 (N.D. Ill. 2019) .....................8
Cook County v. Texas,
No. 21-2561 (7th Cir. filed Aug. 24, 2021) ...... 14, 32
Cook County v. Wolf,
498 F. Supp. 3d 999 (N.D. Ill. 2020) .......................9
Cook County v. Wolf,
962 F.3d 208 (7th Cir. 2020) ............................... 5, 8
Cook County v. Wolf,
No. 19-cv-6334, Dkt. 254
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2021) ........................................ 11
Cook County v. Wolf,
No. 19-cv-6334, Dkt. 256
(N.D. Ill. May 12, 2021) ......................................... 14
Cook County v. Wolf,
No. 20-3150, Dkt. 23 (7th Cir. Mar. 9, 2021)........ 10
Cook County v. Wolf,
No. 20-3150, Dkt. 24-1 (7th Cir. Mar. 9, 2021) .... 10
Cook County v. Wolf,
No. 20-3150, Dkt. 25-1 (7th Cir. Mar. 11, 2021)... 14
Cook County v. Wolf,
No. 20-3150, Dkt. 26 (7th Cir. Mar. 15, 2021) ...... 28
Cook County v. Wolf,
No. 20-3150, Dkt. 21 (7th Cir. Nov. 19, 2020) ........9
Cooper v. Newsom,
13 F.4th 857 (9th Cir. 2021) .................................. 32
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Day v. Apoliona,
505 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2007) ................................. 18
DeFunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312 (1974) ............................................... 30
Democratic Executive Committee of Florida v.
National Republican Senatorial Committee,
950 F.3d 790 (11th Cir. 2020) ............................... 37
DHS v. New York,
140 S. Ct. 599 (2020) ...............................................8
DHS v. New York,
141 S. Ct. 1370 (2021) ..................................... 7, 8, 9
DHS v. Regents of the University of California,
140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) ........................................... 33
Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County,
299 U.S. 259 (1936) ............................................... 34
Elliott Industries Ltd. Partnership v. BP American
Production Co.,
407 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2005) ............................. 18
EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA,
795 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ............................... 12
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,
556 U.S. 208 (2009) ............................................... 26
Floyd v. City of New York,
770 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir. 2014) ................................. 20
Foman v. Davis,
371 U.S. 178 (1962) ............................................... 27
Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media,
139 S. Ct. 2356 (2019) ........................................... 40
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167 (2000) ............................................... 31
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Hollingsworth v. Perry,
558 U.S. 183 (2010) ........................................... 8, 13
International Union, United Auto, Aerospace &
Agricultural Implement Workers of
America v. Scofield,
382 U.S. 205 (1965) ............................................... 18
Karsner v. Lothian,
532 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ............................... 32
Knox v. Service Employees International Union,
LLC. 1000,
567 U.S. 298 (2012) ................................... 16, 29, 31
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson,
131 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997) ............................... 20
Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464 (1977) ............................................... 33
Maine v. Taylor,
477 U.S. 131 (1986) ............................................... 40
Make the Road New York v. Cuccinelli,
419 F. Supp. 3d 647 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ......................7
Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. v.
United States,
118 F.3d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ............................... 18
Mayorkas v. Cook County,
141 S. Ct. 1292 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2021) ...................... 10
Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC,
139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019) ........................................... 33
Mississippi v. EPA,
No. 08-1200 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 9, 2009) .................... 11
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,
561 U.S. 139 (2010) ............................................... 26
National Parks Conservation Association v. EPA,
759 F.3d 969 (8th Cir. 2014) ................................. 24
x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
National Waste & Recycling Association v. EPA,
No. 16-1372 (D.C. Cir. June 14, 2017) .................. 11
New York v. DHS,
408 F. Supp. 3d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ......................7
New York v. DHS,
969 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2020) .......................................8
Northeast Ohio Coalition for Homeless & Service
Employees International Union, Local 1199 v.
Blackwell,
467 F.3d 999 (6th Cir. 2006) ................................. 18
Pennsylvania v. DeVos,
No. 20-1468 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2021)...................... 12
Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association,
575 U.S. 92 (2015) ..................................... 13, 37, 38
Pharmaceutical Care Management
Association v. HHS,
No. 21-95, 2021 WL 624229
(D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2021) ........................................... 12
Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Kaul,
942 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2019) ................................. 20
Schultz v. United States,
594 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010) ............................... 20
Sierra Club v. EPA,
358 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 2004) ................................. 18
Sierra Club v. Espy,
18 F.3d 1202 (5th Cir. 1994) ................................. 20
St. Bernard Parish v. Lafarge North America, Inc.,
914 F.3d 969 (5th Cir. 2019) ................................. 19
State Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of
U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983) ................................................. 39
xi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida
Department of Environmental Protection,
560 U.S. 702 (2010) ............................................... 26
Tandon v. Newsom,
141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021) ..................................... 30, 31
T-Mobile Northeast LLC v. Town of Barnstable,
969 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2020) .................................... 20
Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America,
404 U.S. 528 (1972) ............................................... 26
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc.,
137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) ........................................... 31
U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall
Partnership,
513 U.S. 18 (1994) ..................................... 35, 36, 37
U.S. ex rel. McGough v. Covington Technologies Co.,
967 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1992) ............................... 22
United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,
432 U.S. 385 (1977) ......................................... 21, 22
United States v. Alisal Water Corp.,
370 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2004) ................................. 24
United States v. Munsingwear,
340 U.S. 36 (1950) ..................................... 34, 35, 37
United States v. Union Electric, Co.,
64 F.3d 1152 (8th Cir. 1995) ................................. 20
United States v. Weatherhead,
528 U.S. 1042 (1999) ............................................. 34
USCIS v. City & County of San Francisco,
(U.S. Jan. 21, 2021) (No. 20-962) ............................8
USCIS v. City & County of San Francisco,
141 S. Ct. 1292 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2021) ...................... 10
xii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Utahns for Better Transportation v. U.S. Department
of Transportation,
295 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2002) ............................. 24
Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill,
139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019) ........................................... 39
Walling v. James V. Reuter, Inc.,
321 U.S. 671 (1944) ............................................... 34
Wilderness Society v. U.S. Forest Service,
630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) ............................... 19
Wolf v. Cook County,
140 S. Ct. 681 (2020) ...............................................8
Wolf v. Cook County,
No. 20-450 (filed Oct. 7, 2020).................................8
STATUTES
5 U.S.C. § 551 ........................................................ 9, 37
5 U.S.C. § 553 ........................................................ 9, 37
5 U.S.C. § 706 ............................................................ 33
6 U.S.C. § 211 ..............................................................4
6 U.S.C. § 557 ..............................................................4
8 U.S.C. § 1103 ............................................................4
8 U.S.C. § 1182 ........................................................ 4, 5
8 U.S.C. § 1183 ............................................................5
8 U.S.C. § 1227 ............................................................4
28 U.S.C. § 2106 ........................................................ 34
Immigrant Fund Act, Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376,
§§1-2, 22 Stat. 214 ...................................................5
S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 347 (1950) .....5
xiii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
RULES
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 ................................................. 16, 23
S. Ct. R. 15(2) ............................................................ 26
REGULATIONS
46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (Oct. 29, 1981) ............................9
64 Fed. Reg. 28,676 (May 26, 1999) ............................6
64 Fed. Reg. 28,689 (May 26, 1999) ............................6
65 Fed. Reg. 41,281 (July 3, 2000) ............................ 10
70 Fed. Reg. 1,022 (Jan. 5, 2005) .............................. 10
76 Fed. Reg. 9,968 (Feb. 23, 2011) ............................ 10
82 Fed. Reg. 36,934 (Aug. 7, 2017) ........................... 10
83 Fed. Reg. 51,114 (Oct. 10, 2018) ........................ 6, 7
84 Fed. Reg. 41,292 (Aug. 14, 2019) ................... 4, 6, 7
86 Fed. Reg. 14,221 (Mar. 15, 2021) ............. 11, 33, 38
OTHER AUTHORITIES
13B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §3533.2.2
(3d ed. 2021)........................................................... 33
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and
Political Transitions, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 471, 528
(2011) ..................................................................... 38
Bethany A. Noll & Richard L. Revesz, Regulation in
Transition, 104 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 28 (2019)........... 11
Ed Whelan, Biden Administration Defies
Longstanding DOJ Norm on Agency Litigation,
Nat’l Rev. (Mar. 10, 2021), bit.ly/3Dk9GMh ........ 12
xiv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Erin Brady, Biden Administration Resuming
Trump’s ‘Remain in Mexico’ Policy Starting Next
Week, Newsweek (Dec. 2, 2021), bit.ly/3ppZm0r .. 31
March 19, 2020 Order, available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/
031920zr_d1o3.pdf................................................. 23
Peter Fox & Connor Raso, What a Biden
Administration Should Learn from the Trump
Administration’s Regulatory Reversals, Brookings
(Sept. 28, 2020), brook.gs/3IdtswD ....................... 12
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-205,
Improvements Needed to Monitoring and
Evaluation of Rules Development as Well as to the
Transparency of OMB Regulatory Reviews 5
(2009) ..................................................................... 39
Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Biden Reverses Course Again
After Backlash and Will Increase Refugee Limit,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 2021, nyti.ms/3Iehy5O........ 31
1
OPINIONS BELOW
The panel order denying intervention is reported
at 992 F.3d 742. Pet.App. 1-40. The panel opinion
affirming the preliminary injunctions is reported at
981 F.3d 742, Pet.App. 41-89, while the published
opinion of the same court staying the preliminary
injunction is reported at 944 F.3d 773, Pet.App. 90170. The opinions of the district courts are reported at
408 F. Supp. 3d 1057, Pet.App. 171-307, and 408 F.
Supp. 3d 1191, Pet.App. 308-368.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals denying
intervention was entered on April 8, 2021. The
petition for certiorari was timely filed on June 18,
2021, which this Court granted on October 29, 2021.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. §1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES
INVOLVED
The text of 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(4) is reproduced in
the Petition Appendix at Pet.App. 369-71. The text of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 is reproduced in
the appendix.
2
INTRODUCTION
Though this case stems from a regulatory dispute
about admissibility requirements for aliens, the core
question now before this Court is much simpler: Can
States seek relief in federal courts when the Executive
Branch evades a statutory command—and breaks
from decades of bipartisan practice—to reverse a prior
administration’s rule? The Biden Administration did
just that to rid itself of the Trump Administration’s
Public Charge Rule. And so far, federal courts of
appeals have silently refused States’ efforts to
intervene in cases that would let them check this
Executive misfeasance and protect their interests.
Had settled norms prevailed, the States could
have protected their interests through the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which
requires agencies to repeal notice-and-comment rules
through
a
successive
notice-and-comment
rulemaking. Recognizing as much, incoming
administrations routinely move to stay pending
litigation challenging notice-and-comment rules that
they plan to repeal via new rulemakings. The Biden
Administration itself has done so in a few instances.
But—with no warning—the administration broke
from that settled practice here. Instead of staying
pending Public Charge Rule litigation, the Biden
Administration decided to exploit it to evade the APA.
By the time the administration took office, several
district courts had already enjoined the Rule, and
appeals of those injunctions were ongoing—including
in petitions before this Court. So the administration
arranged to simultaneously dismiss all of those
appeals. It thereby restored the district court
judgments, including one partial final judgment in
3
Illinois vacating the Rule. Then, acquiescing in that
made-final-at-its-request Illinois judgment, the Biden
Administration bypassed notice and comment and
instead vacated the Rule based solely on that Illinois
judgment. In less than a week, this novel strategy
obliterated the Rule and deprived the Rule’s
supporters of any chance to protect their interests via
a notice-and-comment rulemaking.
But Petitioners—a coalition of States—saw what
was happening. So in less than a day, they moved to
intervene in a pending Ninth Circuit case challenging
the Rule. They invoked their significant protectable
interest in what the Government had previously
estimated was hundreds of millions of dollars in
budgetary obligations tied to the Rule. And they
pointed to the Government’s abandoning the case to
confirm that the existing parties no longer adequately
represented that interest.
Even so, the Ninth Circuit denied the States’
motion to intervene. Worse yet, it did so through a
one-line order with no analysis or explanation.
The Court should correct this manifest error. The
States satisfied every requirement for intervention.
And once they become intervenors, the States will
seek reversals or Munsingwear vacaturs of the district
court judgments against the Rule. They will thereby
constrain the Biden Administration to rescind its
repeal, which it predicated solely on the validity and
finality of those same judgments. In other words,
allowing Petitioners to intervene will require the
Biden Administration to follow the law and do what it
should have done in the first place: to respect the duly
enacted Rule until it repeals it through notice-andcomment rulemaking.
4
STATEMENT
I.
History of Public Charge inadmissibility
A. The INA has long provided that “[a]ny alien
who … in the opinion of the [Secretary of Homeland
Security] at the time of application for admission or
adjustment of status, is likely at any time to become a
public
charge
is
inadmissible.”
8
U.S.C.
§1182(a)(4)(A). 1 Executive-branch officials assessing
whether an alien clears that threshold “shall at a
minimum consider the alien’s (I) age; (II) health; (III)
family status; (IV) assets, resources, and financial
status; and (V) education and skills.” 8 U.S.C.
§1182(a)(4)(B). A separate INA provision provides
that an alien is deportable if, within five years of
entry, the alien “has become a public charge from
causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen since
entry[.]” 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(5).
Three
agencies
make
public-charge
determinations under this provision: DHS, for aliens
seeking admission at the border and aliens within the
country applying to adjust their status to that of a
lawful permanent resident; the Department of State,
for aliens abroad applying for visas; and the
Department of Justice, for aliens in removal
proceedings. See Inadmissibility on Public Charge
Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,294 n.3 (Aug. 14,
2019). This case arises from a Rule governing publiccharge determinations by DHS. Id.
The statute refers to the Attorney General, but in 2002
Congress transferred the authority to the Secretary of Homeland
Security. See 8 U.S.C. §1103; 6 U.S.C. §557; see also 6 U.S.C.
§211(c)(8).
1
5
Neither the Rule nor this INA provision affect
most immigrants—in any of their dealings with
DHS—because a variety of interrelated statutes
separately govern the provision of public benefits to
immigrants. See Cook County v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 208,
236 (7th Cir. 2020) (Barrett, J., dissenting). Instead,
this provision primarily applies to nonimmigrant visa
holders applying for permanent-resident status, as
well as a few other applicants in narrow
circumstances. Id.
B. The “public charge” ground of inadmissibility is
almost 140 years old. It dates to the first general
federal immigration statutes in 1882. See, e.g.,
Immigrant Fund Act, Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, §§12, 22 Stat. 214. But until 1996, Congress generally left
the contours of “public charge” to the agencies who
administered the statutes. See S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 347, 349 (1950); see also Cook County,
962 F.3d at 239-42 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
In 1996, however, Congress made substantive
changes to the “public charge” statutory provisions. It
provided that any family-sponsored applicant was to
be automatically deemed a “public charge” unless the
applicant procured a sponsor who guaranteed to pay
for any means-tested public benefits that the
applicant received, regardless of whether the benefits
were in cash or in kind. See 8 U.S.C. §§1182(a)(4)(C),
1183a. Many recognize that “the affidavit provision
reflects Congress’s view that the term ‘public charge’
encompasses supplemental as well as primary
dependence on public assistance.” See Cook County,
962 F.3d at 246 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
Yet just three years after Congress amended the
statute, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
6
proposed a rule that would have defined “public
charge” to mean an alien “who is likely to become
primarily dependent on the Government for
subsistence as demonstrated by either: (i) [t]he receipt
of public cash assistance for income maintenance
purposes, or (ii) [i]nstitutionalization for long-term
care at Government expense.” Inadmissibility and
Deportability on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg.
28,676, 28,681 (May 26, 1999). If the applicant was
likely to receive the same value of government
benefits in non-monetary form, the applicant was not
to be considered a public charge. See Field Guidance
on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge
Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,689, 28,692 (May 26, 1999).
When it announced the proposed rule, INS also
issued “field guidance” adopting the proposed rule’s
definition of “public charge.” 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,689.
The 1999 proposed rule was never actually finalized,
however, meaning DHS followed only the 1999
Guidance—which implemented the very same policy
as the proposed rule—until 2019. See 84 Fed. Reg. at
41,348 n.295.
II. The Public Charge Rule
In October 2018, DHS proposed a change from its
1999 Guidance on public-charge determinations by
publishing notice of a proposed rule and soliciting
comments. Inadmissibility on Public Charge
Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114 (Oct. 10, 2018). After
responding to comments timely submitted, DHS
adopted a final rule in August 2019. 84 Fed. Reg. at
41,501.
The Rule defines “public charge” to mean “an alien
who receives one or more public benefits as defined in
[the Rule] … for more than 12 months in the
7
aggregate within any 36-month period[.]” 84 Fed. Reg.
at 41,501. The designated public benefits include cash
assistance for income maintenance and certain noncash benefits, including most Medicaid benefits,
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits,
and federal housing assistance. Id. As the agency
explained, the Rule’s definition of “public charge”
differs from the 1999 Guidance in that (1) it
incorporates certain non-cash benefits and (2) it
replaces the “primarily dependent” standard with the
12-out-of-36-months measure of dependence. Id. at
41,294-95.
Consequently, the Rule “remov[ed] the artificial
distinction between cash and non-cash benefits, and
align[ed] public charge policy with the self-sufficiency
principles set forth in the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.” See 83
Fed. Reg. at 51,123. It also more accurately reflected
the public meaning of the statutory term “public
charge” and realigned the public-charge provision
with closely related statues governing benefits to
noncitizens. See DHS Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 14-20,
DHS v. New York, 141 S. Ct. 1370 (2021) (No. 20-449).
III. Challenges to the Public Charge Rule
In the weeks before the Rule was scheduled to
take effect, some States, municipalities, and private
organizations challenged the Rule in district courts in
four circuits—the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits. By October 2019, each district court had
preliminarily enjoined the Rule. 2
Make the Road N.Y. v. Cuccinelli, 419 F. Supp. 3d 647
(S.D.N.Y. 2019); New York v. DHS, 408 F. Supp. 3d 334 (S.D.N.Y.
2019); Cook County v. McAleenan, 417 F. Supp. 3d 1008 (N.D. Ill.
2
8
All those preliminary injunctions were stayed—
some by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, see Order,
CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Trump, No. 19-2222, Dkt.
21 (4th Cir. Dec. 9, 2019); Pet.App. 90-170, and the
remainder by this Court, see DHS v. New York, 140 S.
Ct. 599 (2020); Wolf v. Cook County, 140 S. Ct. 681
(2020). Granting those two stays required this Court
to find a reasonable likelihood that five Justices would
vote to reverse the lower-court decision. See
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (“To
obtain a stay pending the filing and disposition of a
petition for a writ of certiorari, an applicant must
show … a fair prospect that a majority of the Court
will vote to reverse the judgment below[.]”).
Nonetheless, the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
proceeded to affirm the preliminary injunctions on the
merits. 3
The United States filed petitions for writs of
certiorari seeking review of the decisions of the
Second and Seventh Circuits. See DHS v. New York,
No. 20-449 (filed Oct. 7, 2020); Wolf v. Cook County,
No. 20-450 (filed Oct. 7, 2020). Those petitions were
both fully briefed on December 23, 2020. In addition,
DHS obtained from the Ninth Circuit a stay of its
mandate and was in the process of seeking certiorari
review. Mot. to Stay Mandate, City & County of San
Francisco v. USCIS, No. 19-17213, Dkt. 138 (9th Cir.
Dec. 30, 2020); pet. for cert. filed, USCIS v. City &
County of San Francisco, (U.S. Jan. 21, 2021) (No. 20962).
2019); CASA de Md., Inc. v. Trump, 414 F. Supp. 3d 760 (D. Md.
2019); Pet.App. 308; Pet.App. 171.
See New York v. DHS, 969 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2020); Cook County
v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 208 (7th Cir. 2020); Pet.App. 41.
3
9
Meanwhile, the Northern District of Illinois had
reached a final judgment, vacating the Rule
nationwide. Cook County v. Wolf, 498 F. Supp. 3d 999
(N.D. Ill. 2020), stayed, No. 20-3150, Dkt. 21 (7th Cir.
Nov. 19, 2020).
This Court granted the Government’s petition for
a writ of certiorari in DHS v. New York, 141 S. Ct.
1370, on February 22, 2021.
IV. The Biden Administration’s post-certiorari
maneuvers
Despite this Court’s grant of certiorari, the Biden
Administration reversed course in its pending Public
Charge Rule litigation in this Court and several
others, and leveraged its reversals to attempt to
repeal the Rule. To be sure, standing alone, it’s hardly
noteworthy that the Biden Administration dislikes
the Public Charge Rule and wants to repeal it; new
administrations
often
disagree
with
their
predecessors’ policies. What is noteworthy is the
proper process for repealing the Public Charge Rule:
because the Trump Administration enacted it through
the rigors of notice-and-comment rulemaking, the
Biden
Administration—or
any
succeeding
administration—wishing to change it must likewise
repeal it through notice-and-comment rulemaking.
See 5 U.S.C. §553(b)-(c) (requiring notice and
comment for rulemaking); §551(5) (defining
rulemaking to include “repealing a rule”). In fact, for
decades, administrations from both parties have done
the hard work of notice and comment when repealing
a prior administration’s notice-and-comment rules. 4
E.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash
Protection, 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (Oct. 29, 1981) (repealing past
administration’s “requirements for installation of automatic
4
10
The
Biden
Administration
broke
that
longstanding, bipartisan norm. In the cases where
district courts had enjoined or vacated the Rule, the
Government arranged for the simultaneous dismissal
of all its appeals, including the writ of certiorari that
this Court had already granted. 5 Those voluntary
dismissals kept adverse district-court precedents on
the books and ended all appellate stays, thereby
reviving the district courts’ injunctions—including
the nationwide vacatur by the Northern District of
restraints in the front seating positions of passenger cars” after
providing for notice and comment); Provision of Abortion-Related
Services in Family Planning Services Projects, 65 Fed. Reg.
41,281 (July 3, 2000). (“revoking [past administration’s]
regulations … commonly known as the ‘Gag Rule’” after
providing for notice and comment); National Forest System Land
and Resource Management Planning; Removal of 2000 Planning
Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1,022 (Jan. 5, 2005) (“remov[ing] [past
administration’s national-forest] regulations … in their entirety”
after providing for notice and comment); Regulation for the
Enforcement of Federal Health Care Provider Conscience
Protection Laws, 76 Fed. Reg. 9,968 (Feb. 23, 2011) (rescind[ing],
in part, and revis[ing]” past administration’s Provider
Conscience Rule after providing for notice and comment); Repeal
of Consolidated Federal Oil and Gas and Federal and Indian
Coal Valuation Reform, 82 Fed. Reg. 36,934 (Aug. 7, 2017)
(“repeal[ing] in its entirety” past administration’s energy rule
after providing for notice and comment).
See Unopposed Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Appeal, Cook
County v. Wolf, No. 20-3150, Dkt. 23 (7th Cir. Mar. 9, 2021);
Order Dismissing Appeal, Cook County v. Wolf, No. 20-3150, Dkt.
24-1 (7th Cir. Mar. 9, 2021); Unopposed Motion to Voluntarily
Dismiss Appeal, CASA de Md. v. Biden, No. 19-2222, Dkt. 210
(4th Cir. Mar. 9, 2021); Order, CASA de Md. v. Biden, No. 192222, Dkt. 211 (4th Cir. Mar. 11, 2021); Mayorkas v. Cook
County, 141 S. Ct. 1292 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2021); USCIS v. City &
County of San Francisco, 141 S. Ct. 1292 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2021);
DHS v. New York, 141 S. Ct. 1292 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2021).
5
11
Illinois. Back in that particular district court, the
Government stipulated to another dismissal that
made the nationwide injunction final. See Cook
County v. Wolf, No. 19-cv-6334, Dkt. 254 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 12, 2021).
The agency then vacated the Rule without notice
and comment, citing the Northern District of Illinois’s
nationwide vacatur as the sole justification. See
Inadmissibility
on
Public Charge
Grounds;
Implementation of Vacatur, 86 Fed. Reg. 14,221 (Mar.
15, 2021). All told, this effective notice-andcommentless repeal took the Government less than a
week to pull off.
Nothing about the cases concerning the Rule
pending in other courts should have given the new
Biden Administration a toehold for abandoning
settled repeal-by-notice-and-comment practice. New
administrations always inherit litigation from the
prior administration—including challenges to rules
that the new administration dislikes. If the new
administration plans to repeal the challenged rule,
the Government traditionally asks the court to hold
the litigation in abeyance while the agency works on
the replacement. See Bethany A. Noll & Richard L.
Revesz, Regulation in Transition, 104 Minn. L. Rev. 1,
28 (2019). Abeyance prevents litigation over a rule
that will likely be repealed anyway, conserving the
resources of the parties, the government, and the
judiciary. Courts routinely grant these requests. 6 In
6 See, e.g., Order at 1, Am. Petrol. Inst. v. EPA, No. 08-1277 (D.C.
Cir. Apr. 1, 2009) (granting abeyance); Order at 1, Mississippi v.
EPA, No. 08-1200 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 9, 2009) (referencing granted
abeyance); Order at 1, Nat’l Waste & Recycling Ass’n v. EPA, No.
16-1372 (D.C. Cir. June 14, 2017) (granting abeyance); Order at
12
fact, the Biden Administration itself has made these
requests in other cases challenging Trump-era rules
that it plans to rescind. E.g., Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n
v. HHS, No. 21-95, 2021 WL 624229, at *1 (D.D.C.
Jan. 30, 2021) (pharmaceutical rebate rule); Minute
Order Granting Joint Motion to Hold Case in
Abeyance, Pennsylvania v. DeVos, No. 20-1468
(D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2021) (Title IX rule).
That contrast only highlights the anomaly in the
Biden Administration’s choice about the Public
Charge Rule. Traditionally the Government has not
simply dropped its litigation defenses and acquiesced
to a final substantive judgment against it, especially
one vacating its rule. Doing so would violate the
Justice Department’s “longstanding” “policy.” Peter
Fox & Connor Raso, What a Biden Administration
Should Learn from the Trump Administration’s
Regulatory Reversals, Brookings (Sept. 28, 2020),
brook.gs/3IdtswD; Ed Whelan, Biden Administration
Defies Longstanding DOJ Norm on Agency Litigation,
Nat’l Rev. (Mar. 10, 2021), bit.ly/3Dk9GMh.
This longstanding policy serves crucial interests.
Even putting aside the ethical concerns about zealous
advocacy, candor to courts, and the duty to defend
federal law, the Government’s refusal to defend
legally defensible regulations would eviscerate the
APA. By acquiescing to a judicial order, an agency
could bypass the usual notice-and-comment
requirements for repealing a rule. See EME Homer
City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 795 F.3d 118, 134 (D.C.
Cir. 2015). That notice-and-comment procedure is
essential. It “guards against excess in rulemaking.”
1, Am. Petrol. Inst. v. EPA, No. 13-1108 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2017)
(granting abeyance).
13
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 109 (2015)
(Scalia, J., concurring). It prevents “arbitrary
changes.” See Hollingsworth, 558 U.S. at 197. It “gives
affected parties fair warning of potential changes in
the law and an opportunity to be heard on those
changes.” Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct.
1804, 1816 (2019). And it “affords the agency a chance
to avoid errors and make a more informed decision.”
Id. Each of those interests fell victim to the Biden
Administration’s unprecedented gambit on the Public
Charge Rule, which it carried out through careful
planning, synchronous timing, and healthy collusion
with its now-nominal adversaries.
V. Petitioners’ near-immediate intervention to
defend the Public Charge Rule
One day after the Government initiated its
maneuver, Petitioners moved to intervene. They
explained that, per the agency’s own calculations, the
Public Charge Rule would save the States “about
$1.01 billion annually.” JA 62, 122. The Rule’s sudden
repeal thus required the States to make equally
sudden budget adjustments to account for these new
and unexpected costs. JA 56-59. The Government
would no longer protect this interest in maintaining
the Rule, the States explained, given that it had
effectively moved to the other side of the “v.” JA 6064. And the States explained that intervention was
timely because it came within the time to pursue an
appeal and just one day after the Biden
Administration stopped representing their interests.
JA 63-64. Until then, the States had expected the
Biden Administration to continue defending the rule,
an expectation fortified after the administration
changed its position in a series of other cases upon
taking office but continued defending the Public
14
Charge Rule. See, e.g., Mot. of Pet’rs. to Hold Briefing
Schedule in Abeyance, Biden v. Sierra Club, No. 20138 (U.S. Feb. 1, 2021). 7
The Government fiercely resisted Petitioners’
Ninth Circuit motion, and that court denied it. The
court’s unpublished order states, “The Motion to
Intervene … is DENIED,” without any reasoning
whatsoever. Pet.App. 13. The majority offered no
explanation despite a lengthy dissent from Judge
VanDyke.
Judge VanDyke concluded that the States were
entitled to intervention. Pet.App. 15. He explained
why Petitioners satisfied each of the four factors listed
in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). See
Pet.App. 29-34. He also warned that, “[b]y denying the
motion to intervene, we are sanctioning a collude-andcircumvent tactic by the parties, who clearly now
share the same agenda.” Pet.App. 33. Judge VanDyke
concluded that Petitioners’ motion was not moot.
Pet.App. 35. He recommended Munsingwear vacatur
as one form of relief that Petitioners could obtain.
Pet.App. 35-38.
Petitioners sought certiorari review, asking this
Court to review the denial of intervention, to review
Around the same time, similar coalitions of States moved to
intervene in other cases implicating the Rule, including in the
Northern District of Illinois. See Mot. to Recall the Mandate to
Permit Intervention as Appellant, Cook County v. Wolf, No. 203150, Dkt. 25-1 (7th Cir. Mar. 11, 2021); Opposed Motion for
Leave to Intervene as Defendant-Appellants, CASA de Md. v.
Biden, No. 19-2222, Dkt. 215 (4th Cir. Mar. 11, 2021); Opposed
Motion to Intervene, Cook County v. Wolf, No. 19-cv-6334, Dkt.
256 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2021). The appeal of the Northern District
of Illinois’s denial of intervention remains pending. See Cook
County v. Texas, No. 21-2561 (7th Cir. filed Aug. 24, 2021).
7
15
the merits of the Public Charge Rule, or to vacate the
lower courts’ decisions under Munsingwear. This
Court granted certiorari on the first question. The
district courts have stayed the underlying litigation
pending this Court’s decision. See Order Staying
Cases, City & County of San Francisco v. USCIS, No.
19-cv-4980, Dkt. 204 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2021); TextOnly Order, No. 19-cv-5210, Dkt. 299 (E.D. Wash.
Apr. 23, 2021).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The States satisfied the requirements for
intervention here. As to intervention as of right, all
four requirements were plainly met. The States’
motion to intervene was timely, filed a mere day after
it became clear that the Government no longer
intended to defend the Rule. The States also have
obvious protectable interests in the Rule being
upheld: on its face, the Rule estimated that it would
save States “about $1.01 billion annually.” JA 122.
And those interests could easily be impaired. Indeed,
the lower courts’ denials of intervention made that
risk manifest: without the States to defend the Rule,
it was collusively wiped off the face of the CFRs in less
than a week. Finally, because the United States
abandoned defense of its Rule—and indeed went on
active offense against it—it is not reasonably
contestable that Federal Defendants did not
adequately represent the States’ interests.
Because all of the requirements for intervention
as of right were met, the Ninth Circuit erred in
denying intervention and this Court can end its
inquiry there. But the Ninth Circuit also abused its
discretion in denying permissive intervention. The
requirements for such intervention were also met
16
here: the request was timely and the States sought to
raise “a claim or defense that shares with the main
action a common question of law or fact,” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 24(b)(1)(B)—i.e., argue that the Rule was
substantively and procedurally valid.
It is unclear if the Ninth Circuit attempted to
exercise any discretion on this issue: it offered no
reasoning whatsoever, and its order did not even
acknowledge the as-of-right/permissive distinction.
But if it did, the court abused its discretion.
Intervention would have prevented an audacious and
collusive
end-run
around
APA
rulemaking
requirements, and would have instead ensured that
issues of great importance would instead be decided
on the merits. Indeed, this Court had already granted
certiorari as to the validity of the Rule, and had also
granted multiple stays pending review. By permitting
collusion to replace legal argumentation as the sole
currency with any purchase on the outcome of the
case, the court of appeals abused its discretion.
Because the States were entitled to intervene both
as of right and permissively, the Ninth Circuit’s denial
of intervention must be reversed. And to the extent
that Respondents might rely on potential mootness to
evade this straightforward outcome, such contentions
would be unavailing. Mootness exists “only when it is
impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief
whatever to the prevailing party.” Knox v. Serv. Emps.
Int’l Union, LLC. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012)
(cleaned up). But effective relief is available here,
precluding any dismissal for mootness.
Respondents have previously argued that the
Northern District of Illinois’s vacatur compelled a
conclusion that this case was moot. But that out-of-
17
circuit vacatur does not moot the Ninth Circuit’s
consideration of the validity of the Public Charge
Rule. California v. HHS, 941 F.3d 410, 421-22 (9th
Cir. 2019), GVR’d, 141 S. Ct. 192 (2020). Nor is that
vacatur final—it is being actively challenged as this
case is briefed by a similar group of States.
But even if the dispute as to the validity of the
Public Charge Rule were moot, the States’ motion to
intervene at issue here is not. The States can still
obtain “effective relief” here by seeking a
Munsingwear
vacatur
post-intervention.
The
potential for such relief precludes the controversy
here from becoming moot.
An affirmance here would have grave practical
effects. As an initial matter, it would bless a
particularly pernicious practice that would likely
supplant the APA’s requirement of notice-andcomment rulemaking for repealing rules. Why bother
with the burdensome procedures of the APA when
surrendering to aligned groups is so easy? New
administrations might thus be marked by a flurry of
strategic surrenders until most or all disfavored rules
being challenged were vacated through contrivance.
An affirmance would also lead States and other
interested parties to seek intervention in virtually all
pending challenges to agency actions they looked upon
with favor whenever there is an impending change in
administration. That could easily be hundreds or even
thousands of cases. The waste of resources of the
Judiciary and parties that would occasion is both
enormous and pointless. Instead, permitting parties
to intervene after it becomes apparent that the
administration intends to change course is consistent
18
with all of this Court’s governing precedents and the
underlying purposes of intervention.
This Court should accordingly reverse the Ninth
Circuit’s
completely
unreasoned
denial
of
intervention, and remand so that the validity of the
Public Charge Rule can be considered on the merits.
ARGUMENT
I.
The Ninth Circuit erred in denying the
States’ motion to intervene.
While no Rule of Appellate Procedure specifically
governs intervention at the courts of appeals, this
Court has recognized that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24 serves as a “helpful analog[y]” when
considering intervention at the appellate level.
International Union, United Auto, Aerospace & Agric.
Implement Workers of Am. v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205,
216 (1965); see also U.S.BIO 13, Cal.BIO 8-9, Arizona
v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 20-1775 (U.S.
Aug. 23, 2021). Rule 24 reflects the fundamental
principles underlying intervention. See Scofield, 382
U.S. at 217 n.10 (“[T]he policies underlying
intervention [in the district courts] may be applicable
in appellate courts.”). Accordingly, federal courts of
appeals regularly look to Rule 24’s guidance when
ruling on motions to intervene on appeal. See, e.g.,
Day v. Apoliona, 505 F.3d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 2007); Ne.
Ohio Coal. for Homeless & Serv. Emps. Int’l Union,
Loc. 1199 v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1006 (6th Cir.
2006); Elliott Indus. Ltd. P’ship v. BP Am. Prod. Co.,
407 F.3d 1091, 1102 (10th Cir. 2005); Sierra Club v.
EPA, 358 F.3d 516, 517-18 (7th Cir. 2004);
Massachusetts Sch. of L. at Andover, Inc. v. United
States, 118 F.3d 776, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1997). And courts
generally
“follow
‘practical
and
equitable
19
considerations’” and construe the intervention factors
“‘broadly in favor of proposed intervenors.’”
Wilderness Soc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173,
1179 (9th Cir. 2011).
Despite the States satisfying Rule 24(a)’s
standard for intervention as of right, as well as Rule
24(b)’s requirements for permissive intervention, the
Ninth Circuit denied intervention—without a single
word of explanation. This Court should reverse those
errors and remand with instructions to grant
Petitioners’ motion to intervene.
A. The States satisfied Rule 24(a)’s standard
for intervention as of right.
Courts assessing a party’s motion to intervene as
of right under Rule 24(a) consider four distinct
elements: (1) whether “the intervention application is
timely”; (2) whether movants have “a significant
protectable interest relating to the property or
transaction that is the subject of the action”;
(3) whether “the disposition of the action may, as a
practical matter, impair or impede the applicant’s
ability to protect its interest”; and (4) whether “the
existing
parties” “adequately
represent
the
applicant’s interest.” Citizens for Balanced Use v.
Montana Wilderness Ass’n, 647 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir.
2011). The States’ motion to intervene satisfied each
of those elements. 8
This Court should review the Ninth Circuit’s denial of
intervention as of right de novo. The majority of circuits review
lower courts’ determinations as to the second, third, and fourth
factors de novo, while reviewing timeliness for an abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., St. Bernard Parish v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc.,
914 F.3d 969, 973 (5th Cir. 2019); Blount-Hill v. Zelman, 636
F.3d 278, 283 (6th Cir. 2011); Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v.
8
20
1. The States’ motion to intervene was
timely.
a. On March 9, 2021, the United States
announced, with no warning, the end of its defense of
the Public Charge Rule—and thus the end of
defending the States’ interests in this case. Despite
the lack of warning, the Petitioners moved to
Kaul, 942 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v. Union
Elec., Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1158 (8th Cir. 1995); Schultz v. United
States, 594 F.3d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010); Barnes v. Sec. Life of
Denver Ins. Co., 945 F.3d 1112, 1121 (10th Cir. 2019).
Many courts even review timeliness de novo when—as here—the
lower court’s determination has little or no reasoning attached to
it. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131
F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997) (reviewing timeliness de novo
because the district court denied the motion to intervene “in a
curt, one-sentence order without specifying whether or not its
denial was premised upon a finding of untimeliness”); Sierra
Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1205 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[W]here
the district court makes no finding regarding timeliness, we
review this factor de novo.”).
Other circuits apply an abuse of discretion standard when
reviewing motions to intervene. See, e.g., T-Mobile Ne. LLC v.
Town of Barnstable, 969 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 2020); Floyd v. City
of New York, 770 F.3d 1051, 1057 (2d Cir. 2014).
De novo review, however, most closely aligns with the text of Rule
24 and the concept of intervention of right. If movants have an
actual “right” to intervene, that right necessarily cannot be
dependent on the discretionary graces of the lower court. A right
that can be discretionarily denied by government officials is
hardly a right at all.
In any event, the standard of review as to timeliness matters
little here. Even if the abuse of discretion standard applied,
finding a one-day turnaround in moving to intervene untimely
would be a patent abuse of discretion.
21
intervene the very next day in the Ninth Circuit. 9 JA
55. The Ninth Circuit had not yet even issued its
mandate. There was no delay in the States’ response
to the United States’ sudden change of course.
Notably, Plaintiffs below raised a cursory
timeliness argument in the Ninth Circuit. JA 90. And
the Government gave a token nod to that argument
when opposing certiorari review. U.S.BIO at 19.
But it’s impossible to know whether the Ninth
Circuit thought that Petitioners should have moved to
intervene earlier, given that court’s refusal to supply
any reasoning. In contrast, the Northern District of
Illinois adopted that reasoning expressly, holding that
the States should have intervened as soon as
“November 7, 2020,” i.e., “when all creditable news
organizations declared candidate Biden the winner.”
Cook County v. Mayorkas, __F.R.D.__, 2021 WL
3633917, *9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2021). In that court’s
view, “[t]he States were required to react promptly to
that reasonable possibility”—the possibility that the
new Administration might abandon its defense of the
Rule at some point—“even if they could not predict
with certainty that DHS would take that course or
precisely when.” Id. at *12.
The proposition that the States should have
sought to intervene before the United States
abandoned the defense of its Rule, however,
contravenes this Court’s decision in United Airlines,
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 394-95 (1977). That
The motion to intervene was originally filed by eleven states,
with South Carolina moving the next day to join the original
motion, and Missouri similarly moving within two weeks. See No.
19-17213, Dkts. 145, 152.
9
22
decision recognizes two benchmarks to judge
timeliness—both of which confirm that intervention
was timely here.
First, the “critical fact” is how quickly would-be
intervenors acted once it became clear that existing
parties “would no longer” protect their interests. Id. at
394. Here, Petitioners acted within a single day of
discovering the Government’s surrender of its
successful and pending petitions for certiorari. That
overnight turn-around is all the more remarkable
since the United States changed position in numerous
other pending cases, see supra at 12, but did not
withdraw its petitions concerning the Public Charge
Rule (despite two re-lists)—conveying to any objective
observer an intent to continue defending the Rule.
Second, this Court looked to when intervention
was sought vis-à-vis final judgment and “the time
period in which the named plaintiffs could have taken
an appeal.” McDonald, 432 U.S. at 395-96. The
“critical inquiry in every such case is whether in view
of all the circumstances the intervenor acted promptly
after the entry of final judgment.” Id.; see also U.S. ex
rel. McGough v. Covington Techs. Co., 967 F.2d 1391,
1394 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The ‘general rule [is] that a
post-judgment motion to intervene is timely if filed
within the time allowed for the filing of an appeal.’”).
Here, the States filed their motion to intervene before
the Ninth Circuit’s mandate had even issued and with
over a month remaining in the window for filing a
petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the
Ninth Circuit’s December 2, 2020 opinion. 10 And the
10 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c), parties generally have 90 days to
file a petition for certiorari. That period was extended to 150 days
as a matter of course during the coronavirus pandemic. See
23
United States itself was pursuing review of the
equivalent adverse decisions of the Second and
Seventh Circuits. Supra at 8-9.
b. If this Court rejects that conclusion and holds
that the States should have intervened earlier—when
the United States was defending the Public Charge
Rule, including by seeking this Court’s review—it
would invite gross inefficiencies. Interested parties
would have to intervene in any case in which it was
conceivable that the original parties would change
their positions.
Under such an approach, States might need to
move for anticipatory intervention in thousands of
cases when there is a change in administration to
protect their interests against unforeseen reversals by
the Government. This would not only be a tremendous
waste of resources for courts and parties, but it may
also be barred by Rule 24 itself, which requires that
an intervenor demonstrate that its interests are not
adequately protected. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
Still, interested parties might feel compelled to move
to intervene in a host of cases between Election Day
and Inauguration Day so that they cannot be later
accused of intervening too late. If courts denied those
motions, interested parties would then need to keep
filing seriatim motions to intervene upon any new
hint of inadequate representation. And they would do
so until intervention was granted or the case reached
final conclusion—and potentially for hundreds or
March 19, 2020 Order, available at https://www.supremecourt.
gov/orders/courtorders/031920zr_d1o3.pdf. The States filed their
motion to intervene on March 10, 2021, well within the 150 days
allotted. JA 55.
24
thousands of cases every time an administration turns
over.
This Court’s guidance in McDonald, the contours
of Rule 24, and commonsense all support a finding
that the States’ motion—filed within one day of the
United States’ abandonment of its defense and filed
within the original time period for seeking this Court’s
review—was timely.
2. The States have a significant
protectable interest that could be
impaired.
The States have significant protectable interests
in the Public Charge Rule’s continuing validity that
could—indeed will—be impaired absent intervention.
Most simply, the Public Charge Rule will save the
States money. DHS expressly estimated that the Rule
would cumulatively save the States $1.01 billion
annually. JA 122. “The Rule itself predicts a 2.5
percent decrease in enrollment in public benefits
programs,” Pet.App. 68, and the federal government
only pays a portion of the costs of these programs.
Invalidating the Public Charge Rule will thus inflict
economic injury on the States, and the avoidance of
incurring such economic injury is a classic protectable
interest supporting intervention. United States v.
Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 2004);
Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 295
F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2002); National Parks
Conservation Ass’n v. EPA, 759 F.3d 969, 976 (8th Cir.
2014). And the potential impairment here is equally
obvious: absent intervention, Respondents’ collusive
conduct will deprive the States of all the benefits they
otherwise would have obtained under the Public
Charge Rule.
25
The States also have an important interest in
conserving their Medicaid and related social-welfare
budgets to ensure that they are able to adequately
provide for the economically disadvantaged. Alfred L.
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458
U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (States have “quasi-sovereign
interest[s] in the health and well-being—both
physical and economic—of [their] residents in
general.”). Recent spending bills notwithstanding,
state and federal social-spending budgets are not
unlimited, and freeing up dollars for those in greatest
need serves the States’ quasi-sovereign interests.
Beyond that, federal courts should be particularly
solicitous of State interests in the immigration
context. Congress, through preemption, has
substantially prevented States from protecting
themselves from immigration-related harms by
precluding them from enacting their own laws. See
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012)
(“The Government of the United States has broad,
undoubted power over the subject of immigration and
the status of aliens.”). Given federal preemption,
States frequently can protect their interests only by
ensuring that the federal government complies with
federal law, including both substantive immigration
law and the APA’s procedural requirements. Denying
intervention to the States in this context thus causes
particularly acute harms, since it effectively forecloses
one of the few (or only) avenues for the States to
protect their interests. See id. at 397 (“The
pervasiveness of federal regulation does not diminish
the importance of immigration policy to the States.”).
Finally, Rule 24(a)(2) does not require a party to
assert its own unique claim or defense to be a proper
intervenor.
Instead,
courts
routinely
allow
26
intervention by a party that does not assert a unique
claim or defense. See, e.g., Trbovich v. United Mine
Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 530-31, 537 (1972);
Cascade Nat. Gas Corp. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 386
U.S. 129, 135-36 (1967); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson
Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010); Entergy Corp. v.
Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009). And
sanctioning this new requirement would generally
undermine intervention.
3. Respondents no longer adequately
represent the States’ interests.
The adequacy of representation prong is not
reasonably disputable here. Without warning, the
United States abruptly abandoned its defense of the
Rule. In a matter of hours, and at the Government’s
insistence, litigation was abandoned and every case
about the Rule was dismissed—leaving only an
unreviewed, nationwide vacatur of the Rule in place.
No party now adequately represents the States’
interests because no remaining party defends the
Rule. In fact, not a single Respondent has suggested—
either in their Ninth Circuit briefs opposing
intervention, or in their briefs in opposition here—
that the United States adequately protected the
States’ interests. That failure constitutes a waiver of
any such contention. S. Ct. R. 15(2); see, e.g., Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Env’t
Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 729 (2010) (“Neither objection
appeared in the briefs in opposition to the petition for
writ
of
certiorari,
and
since
neither
is
jurisdictional, we deem both waived.”).
*
*
*
Because Petitioner States satisfied all the
requirements for intervention as of right here, the
27
Ninth Circuit erred in its unreasoned denial of the
States’ motion to intervene.
B. Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit should
have granted permissive intervention.
Under Rule 24(b)(1)(B), federal courts may permit
intervention by litigants who file a “timely motion”
and have “a claim or defense that shares with the
main action a common question of law or fact.” That
standard was satisfied here. As discussed, the States’
motion was timely. Supra at 20-24. And the States
sought to advance common legal arguments in defense
of the Rule—i.e., that the Public Charge Rule was
substantively and procedurally valid.
Equity also demanded a favorable exercise of
discretion on Petitioners’ motion. This Court had
already signaled the importance of this issue by
granting multiple stays and a writ of certiorari. Issues
of such importance should be decided on the merits
rather than by strategic surrenders. Indeed, “[i]t is too
late in the day and entirely contrary to the spirit of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on
the merits to be avoided on the basis of such mere
technicalities.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181
(1962).
Permissive
intervention
was
particularly
warranted given the unprecedentedly collusive nature
of Respondents’ actions. Respondents executed a
nationwide, multi-court, simultaneous strategic
surrender that (they hoped) would move so quickly
that no one could intervene before all challenges to the
Public Charge Rule were dismissed and appellate
mandates issued. And they very nearly succeeded,
foiled only by the States’ extraordinarily quick actions
and this Court granting certiorari.
28
It appears that no prior Administration—in our
Republic’s entire history—has ever engaged in
equivalent conduct. Certainly Respondents have
never identified anything remotely comparable in the
briefing below or their briefs in opposition here.
Denying intervention seeking to stop this normbreaking conduct cannot constitute an appropriate
exercise of discretion.
Beyond that, because denying Petitioners’ motion
allowed the Government to circumvent APA
rulemaking requirements, it was an abuse of
discretion to deny permissive intervention. The APA’s
rulemaking procedures are broadly solicitous of public
comments and thus burdensome by design. This no
doubt tempts agencies to circumvent APA rulemaking
via litigation surrender, which is remarkably
nonburdensome by comparison. But a core purpose of
intervention is to permit unnamed parties that would
be injured by existing parties’ litigation conduct to join
the suit and thereby attempt to prevent the
deprivation of their rights—including their APA
notice-and-comment rights. That’s one reason the
States sought intervention here, making the denial of
permissive intervention necessarily an abuse of
discretion.
Finally, given this case’s importance and Judge
VanDyke’s well-reasoned dissent, the Ninth Circuit’s
refusal to offer even a scintilla of reasoning was an
abuse of discretion. Worse yet, the Fourth and
Seventh Circuits likewise failed to offer any reasoning
whatsoever when denying motions to intervene and
recall the mandates of a similar group of States. Cook
County v. Wolf, No. 20-3150, Dkt. 26 (7th Cir. Mar. 15,
2021); CASA de Md., Inc. v. Biden, No. 19-2222, Dkt.
216 (4th Cir. Mar. 18, 2021).
29
This unwillingness to treat the States’ motions to
intervene seriously is troublesome, and this Court
should make plain that the complete absence of
reasoning in denying intervention in this context was
inappropriate.
II. Respondents’ mootness
unpersuasive.
arguments
are
Since this case started, Respondents have done all
they can to skirt Petitioners’ merits arguments. Most
prominently, they urged this Court to deny certiorari
based on mootness. They contended that the Ninth
Circuit correctly denied intervention because when
the States filed their motion, the underlying appeal
was moot. Respondents based that argument on the
Northern District of Illinois’s vacatur order and the
agency’s ensuing repeal of the Rule. See U.S.BIO 1012.
If Respondents re-raise their mootness argument
on the merits, it warrants the same credence now as
it did at the petition stage—that is, none. Because
Petitioners moved to intervene on March 10—before
the Government rescinded the Rule or the Northern
District of Illinois closed the case—the underlying
appeal self-evidently remained live. And even after
those events occurred, Petitioners’ motion to
intervene was not moot. A case is not moot if a litigant
retains any “‘concrete interest, however small, in the
outcome[.]’” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172
(2013). Mootness occurs “only when it is impossible for
a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the
prevailing party.” Knox, 567 U.S. at 307 (cleaned up).
Here, Petitioners could obtain effectual relief
upon intervening. A court could conclude that the
underlying dispute is not moot and sustain the Public
30
Charge Rule on the merits. Even if a court thought the
underlying appeal was moot, it could still grant
Petitioners meaningful relief by vacating all prior
decisions under Munsingwear.
That means Petitioners clear the mootness
threshold. Again, mootness does not depend on
whether a court would grant either form of relief, but
on whether it could. See Chafin, 568 U.S. at 174. It
will be “for lower courts at later stages of the litigation
to decide” whether Petitioners are “in fact entitled to
the relief” they seek. Id. at 177. What matters now is
that the possibility of relief not be “so implausible that
it may be disregarded” for purposes of jurisdiction. Id.
Far from implausible, that relief could and should be
granted after Petitioners intervene.
A. If Petitioners intervene, they could
successfully defend the Rule.
The Government’s decision to rescind the Rule
could not moot this case because its rescission is a
form of voluntary cessation. That “the government
withdraws or modifies a [policy] in the course of
litigation … does not necessarily moot the case.”
Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1297 (2021).
Rather, “[i]t is well settled that a defendant’s
voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not
deprive a federal court of its power to determine the
legality of the practice.” City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s
Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982). Any other rule
would allow the Government to frustrate “the ‘public
interest in having the legality of the [challenged]
practices settled.’” DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.
312, 318 (1974). A governmental defendant that tries
to moot a case through voluntary cessation “bears the
formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely
31
clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
190 (2000).
The Government cannot carry its formidable
burden here. This Court is “critical” of “postcertiorari
maneuvers designed to insulate a decision from
review[.]” Knox, 567 U.S. at 307. And the
Government’s maneuvers here were blatant. DHS’s
rescission of the Rule changes nothing because the
agency “retain[s] authority to reinstate [the prior
policy] at any time.” Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1297;
accord Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc.,
137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 n.1 (2017) (governor’s directive
to end an agency program did not moot the challenge
to that program because the State remained free to
“revert to its [prior] policy”). Not even the rigors of
notice-and-comment rulemaking stand in the agency’s
way, since the rescission bypassed that process. And,
as this case illustrates, a presidential administration
can change its opinion on immigration policy at any
time. See also Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Biden Reverses
Course Again After Backlash and Will Increase
Refugee Limit, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 2021,
nyti.ms/3Iehy5O (reversal on refugee limit); Erin
Brady, Biden Administration Resuming Trump’s
‘Remain in Mexico’ Policy Starting Next Week,
Newsweek (Dec. 2, 2021), bit.ly/3ppZm0r (reversal on
Remain-in-Mexico policy).
The Government might insist that its rescission
was involuntary, a mere response to the Northern
District of Illinois’s vacatur order. That argument
strips the word “involuntary” of all meaning. The
Government arranged to permanently enjoin itself by
dismissing its appeals, deactivating the appellate
32
stays, and rushing out a vacatur, while
simultaneously refusing to litigate the case that this
Court had already granted.
Regardless, the Ninth Circuit has held that even
a nationwide injunction in a different circuit does not
moot another case seeking the same relief. “[N]o court
has adopted the [contrary] view,” according to the
Ninth Circuit; courts treat the problem of conflicting
orders as “a prudential concern, not a jurisdictional
one.” California, 941 F.3d at 421-22. In this very case,
the Ninth Circuit held that nationwide injunctions
from other circuits could not moot the dispute over
whether the Public Charge Rule should be enjoined.
Pet.App. 122 (citing California, 941 F.3d at 423). It
could do the same here.
The Illinois vacatur also cannot moot anything
because the litigation over its legality is not yet final.
A coalition of States moved to intervene in that case.
The district court denied their motion, Cook County,
2021 WL 3633917, but the States are actively
appealing that denial. Cook County, No. 21-2561 (7th
Cir.). If this Court concludes that Petitioners should
have been granted intervention here, the Seventh
Circuit has no justifiable reason for denying
intervention there. And if the States can intervene
there, it will remove any doubt that they may
challenge the district court’s vacatur under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The possibility that a
Rule 60(b) motion could succeed defeats any
suggestion that the motion to intervene is moot. See
Cooper v. Newsom, 13 F.4th 857, 864 (9th Cir. 2021);
Karsner v. Lothian, 532 F.3d 876, 885 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
A successful Rule 60(b) motion would eliminate
not only the vacatur, but also the agency’s rescission
33
of the Public Charge Rule. According to the agency, it
rescinded the Rule for a single reason: “the agency’s
immediate need to implement the now-effective final
judgment” from Illinois. 86 Fed. Reg. at 14,221. In
fact, the agency made its rescission retroactive to the
date of that court’s order. Id. Without that vacatur,
the rescission would have no lawful basis. The agency
would likely have to rescind the rescission itself. If it
declined, Petitioners would sue the agency under the
APA and win. See 5 U.S.C. §706(2); e.g., DHS v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1910-15
(2020).
So even if the Government were right that the
Illinois vacatur forced its hand, the underlying appeal
would not be moot. As this Court has explained,
“compliance with a judicial decision does not moot a
case if it remains possible to undo the effects of
compliance[.]” Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v.
Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1661 (2019)
(cleaned up); accord Bakery Sales Drivers Loc. Union
No. 33 v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437, 442 (1948); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 468 n.4 (1977). When a government
defendant “amend[s] an ordinance or regulation as
required by an injunction,” the mere “possibility of
later repeal or revision defeats mootness.” 13B
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure §3533.2.2 (3d ed. 2021).
That is the case here. The sole basis for the
agency’s rescission was the Illinois vacatur.
Challenges to that vacatur remain pending and could
succeed, especially if this Court rules for Petitioners
here. And if one of those challenges succeeds, the
agency will have to rescind its rescission. No matter
that success on this strategy is “not assured”; the fact
34
that it exists defeats mootness. Chafin, 568 U.S. at
175.
B. If Petitioners intervene, they could move
for Munsingwear vacatur.
Even if Respondents were right that the
underlying appeal is moot, that fact would not make
Petitioners’ motion to intervene moot. When a case
becomes moot before all appellate options are
exhausted, the “‘established practice’” is to prevent
any collateral consequences by vacating all prior
decisions. Azar v. Garza, 138 S. Ct. 1790, 1792 (2018).
Petitioners could ask for vacatur if they were granted
intervention. And the possibility that they would
secure that relief is enough to sustain a live
controversy over their motion to intervene. See
Chafin, 568 U.S. at 176-77.
Munsingwear is “rooted in equity,” Garza, 138 S.
Ct. at 1792, and is thus inherently “flexible,” Alvarez
v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 94 (2009). It stems from this
Court’s broader power to “make such disposition of the
whole case as justice may require.” Walling v. James
V. Reuter, Inc., 321 U.S. 671, 677 (1944); see 28 U.S.C.
§2106. Courts vacate decisions when the dispute is
voluntarily mooted by the winner. Garza, 138 S. Ct. at
1792. They vacate decisions when the dispute is
mooted by happenstance. United States v.
Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 40 (1950). They even
vacate decisions when the dispute is mooted by the
loser. E.g., United States v. Weatherhead, 528 U.S.
1042 (1999); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys. v.
New Left Educ. Project, 414 U.S. 807 (1973); Duke
Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 299 U.S. 259, 268
(1936). In Munsingwear itself, the Court explained
that the federal government would have been entitled
35
to vacatur after it mooted the case by voluntarily
changing the challenged regulation, even though the
prior judgment went against it. 340 U.S. at 39.
Petitioners could obtain Munsingwear vacatur
here. If this case is moot, that’s due to the voluntary,
coordinated actions of Respondents. Some of those
Respondents were plaintiffs who won below, so it
“‘would certainly be … strange’” to let them “‘retain
the benefit of the judgment.’” Garza, 138 S. Ct. at
1792. And while the Government formally lost below,
that fact does not foreclose vacatur. See Munsingwear,
340 U.S. at 39. Now that the Government has
switched sides, it benefits from the Ninth Circuit’s
judgment as much as the Plaintiffs.
Nor does this Court’s decision in Bancorp counsel
against vacatur. Bancorp was a bankruptcy dispute
about the validity of a reorganization plan. After this
Court granted certiorari, both parties “stipulated to a
consensual plan of reorganization” and agreed that
the dispute was moot. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v.
Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 19-20 (1994). The
petitioner then asked for vacatur. Id. at 20. This Court
declined. It held that courts can refuse to award
vacatur where “the party seeking relief from the
judgment below”—that is, the petitioner—“caused the
mootness by voluntary action.” Id. at 24. The Court
focused on the petitioner’s role because a “‘suitor’s
conduct in relation to the matter at hand may
disentitle him to the relief he seeks.’” Id. at 25. A
petitioner who agreed to moot a case, the Court
explained, was like someone who “failed to appeal at
all.” Id. Such a party forfeits the right to contest the
underlying judgment, including by vacatur.
36
Like Munsingwear itself, the Bancorp exception is
equitable and flexible. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 29. The
Bancorp Court rejected the notion that “vacatur can
never be granted when mootness is produced” via
settlement. Id. at 29. Vacatur still could be
appropriate in “exceptional circumstances,” and
courts “must also take account of the public interest.”
Id. at 29, 26. The overarching command is to dispose
of moot cases “in the manner most consonant to justice
in view of the nature and character of the conditions
which have caused the case to become moot.” Id. at 24
(cleaned up).
The Bancorp exception should not apply here.
Petitioners would be the ones seeking vacatur, and
they in no way agreed to settle the underlying case.
Cf. id. at 26. They vigorously opposed Respondents’
case-mooting actions and tried to use the available
legal channels to stop them. This case thus does “not
present … the kind of voluntary forfeiture of a legal
remedy that led the Court in Bancorp to find that
considerations of fairness and equity tilted against
vacatur.” Alvarez, 558 U.S. at 97 (cleaned up). Nor
would denying Petitioners vacatur serve the “public
interest” or do “justice” here. Cf. Bancorp, 513 U.S at
26, 24. Exactly the opposite: It would reward collusive
litigation tactics, allow the Government to bypass the
APA, and leave precedents on the books that this
Court flagged as dubious.
To be sure, as Judge VanDyke recognized,
applying Munsingwear to this case would present a
question of first impression. See Pet.App. 37-38. But
Petitioners have powerful arguments for why that
remedy is appropriate here. Only intervention would
allow Petitioners to make their case.
37
Vacatur would provide Petitioners with important
relief. As it always does, vacatur would preserve all
“rights” and prevent any “prejudice[]” by
“eliminat[ing] a judgment” and “clear[ing] the path for
future relitigation[.]” Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40. It
would allow Arizona, Montana, and other Petitioners
to litigate the Public Charge Rule on a clean slate in
any pending or future lawsuits in the Ninth Circuit.
That important benefit keeps the underlying appeal
alive for purposes of deciding whether Munsingwear
vacatur is appropriate. See Democratic Exec. Comm.
of Fla. v. Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm., 950
F.3d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Bancorp, 513
U.S. at 21). And that important benefit, no matter how
“‘small’” or “‘partial’” it might be, means that a court
could do something meaningful if Petitioners are
allowed to intervene. Chafin, 568 U.S. at 172, 177. If
the Ninth Circuit denied Petitioners’ motion to
intervene based on mootness, it erred.
III. Denying
intervention
in
circumstances would sow disorder.
these
If Petitioners cannot intervene here, future
administrations
will
follow
the
Biden
Administration’s unfortunate blueprint. The victims
will be good government, agency accountability, and
the rule of law.
As explained, administrations seeking to repeal
rules have traditionally done so through the
statutorily required notice-and-comment process. The
APA itself “mandate[s] that agencies use the same
procedures when they amend or repeal a rule as they
used to issue the rule in the first instance.” Perez, 575
U.S. at 101; see also 5 U.S.C. §§553(b)-(c); 551(5).
Thus, “[a] rule promulgated by prior notice and
38
comment can generally be rescinded only by noticeand-comment procedures.” Anne Joseph O’Connell,
Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105
Nw. U. L. Rev. 471, 528 (2011). The Government
agrees. See Brief for the Fed. Pet’rs at 4, Perez, 575
U.S. 92 (Nos. 13-1041, 13-1052), 2014 WL 4101228, at
*30. (APA makes “no distinction … between initial
agency action and subsequent agency action undoing
or revising that action”).
The notice-and-comment procedure is a salutary
and essential feature of modern administrative law.
In mandating it, “Congress made a judgment that
notions of fairness and informed administrative
decisionmaking require that agency decisions be
made only after affording interested persons notice
and an opportunity to comment.” Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979).
The Biden Administration’s strategy bypassed
notice and comment completely. After the
Government arranged for the Rule’s vacatur by the
courts, the agency rapidly arranged for its vacatur by
executive fiat. The agency did not provide notice, did
not solicit comment, did not analyze the costs and
benefits of the change, and offered no reason for the
repeal besides “implement[ing] the judgment” of the
district court. 86 Fed. Reg. 14,221. By working
together with the plaintiffs challenging the Rule, the
Government got rid of a notice-and-comment
regulation in just one week.
The incentives for future administrations to follow
this blueprint are obvious. “Notice-and-comment
procedures are elaborate and take time to complete.”
Allina Health, 139 S. Ct. at 1822 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). One government study estimated that the
39
average rule making procedure under the APA took
around four years. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off.,
GAO-09-205, Improvements Needed to Monitoring
and Evaluation of Rules Development as Well as to the
Transparency of OMB Regulatory Reviews 5 (2009). In
addition to taking up time and energy, the notice-andcomment process also comes with exacting judicial
scrutiny, even when the agency’s new rule merely
restores a prior status quo. See State Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
Ethical rules and longstanding traditions are
(apparently) no longer enough to stop this tactic. The
only way to check norm-breaking actions like those at
issue here is by allowing parties who would be injured
by a judicial invalidation to intervene once the
Government stops defending the rule. Those
intervenors (often States) can raise all arguments in
defense of the rule, instead of letting it be vacated by
default; and the Government is free to join the
plaintiffs in arguing against the legality of its own
rule or actions. The intervenors may or may not
succeed. But at least the rule’s fate will be decided
based on competing arguments raised by adversaries,
rather than backroom deals cut by colluders.
Allowing intervention in those circumstances will
not cause any real problems, like a flood of
undesirable intervenors. Under existing law, an
intervenor can appeal a decision only if it
“independently demonstrate[s] [Article-III] standing.”
Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct.
1945, 1951 (2019). In other words, any intervenor
seeking to appeal a judgment that the original parties
do not challenge must establish its own actual or
imminent injury, traceable to the judgment below,
40
and redressable by a favorable appellate decision.
Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct.
2356, 2362 (2019). That requirement ensures only
those parties with “a sufficient stake in the outcome
of the controversy” will be able to continue a lawsuit,
while the vast majority of interested onlookers will
not. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 136 (1986). Article
III’s real limitations have and will continue to prevent
improper parties from abusing intervention.
In fact, it is the Government’s position that would
engender a flood of intervention motions. As
discussed, supra at 23-24, if every regulatory
challenge could become unreviewable when an
administration changes, interested parties would
have to preemptively move to intervene in every
ongoing case involving a rule that the new
administration might abandon. They could not wait
until the new administration actually changed
position because, as this case shows, it takes only days
for the case to be gone and the rule to be rescinded.
And the Government would then argue, as it argues
here, that the motion to intervene is moot.
Petitioners satisfy the requirements for
intervention and continue to have a live interest in the
outcome of this case. By holding that the Ninth Circuit
should have granted their motion, this Court will
retain order. It will prevent a revolution in regulatory
repeals, ensuring that sudden changes, coordinated
dismissals, and summary orders are not an acceptable
substitute for the APA’s notice-and-comment process.
It will convey to future administrations that similar
gambits will likely fail. And it will reiterate the right
of injured intervenors to take up abandoned causes on
appeal, while reassuring others that they need not
41
waste party or judicial resources on preemptive
intervention.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the Ninth Circuit’s
judgment denying Petitioners’ motion to intervene
and remand with instructions to grant that motion.
December 13, 2021
Respectfully Submitted,
TYLER R. GREEN
CAMERON T. NORRIS
JEFFREY S. HETZEL
CONSOVOY MCCARTHY
PLLC
1600 Wilson Blvd.,
Suite 700
Arlington, VA 22209
MARK BRNOVICH
Attorney General
JOSEPH A. KANEFIELD
Chief Deputy and
Chief of Staff
BRUNN W. ROYSDEN III
Solicitor General
DREW C. ENSIGN
Deputy Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
KATE B. SAWYER
Assistant Solicitor General
KATLYN J. DIVIS
Assistant Attorney General
OFFICE OF THE ARIZONA
ATTORNEY GENERAL
2005 N. Central Ave.
Phoenix, AZ 85004
(602) 542-5025
drew.ensign@azag.gov
Counsel for Petitioners
(Additional Counsel listed below)
42
STEVE MARSHALL
Attorney General of Alabama
LESLIE RUTLEDGE
Attorney General of Arkansas
THEODORE E. ROKITA
Attorney General of Indiana
DEREK SCHMIDT
Attorney General of Kansas
JEFF LANDRY
Attorney General of Louisiana
LYNN FITCH
Attorney General of Mississippi
ERIC S. SCHMITT
Attorney General of Missouri
AUSTIN KNUDSEN
Attorney General of Montana
JOHN M. O’CONNOR
Attorney General of Oklahoma
ALAN WILSON
Attorney General of South Carolina
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas
PATRICK MORRISEY
Attorney General of West Virginia
APPENDIX
i
APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 24……………………………………………App. 1
App. 1
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 24. Intervention
(a) Intervention of Right. On timely motion, the
court must permit anyone to intervene who:
(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by
a federal statute; or
(2) claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction that is the subject of the action, and
is so situated that disposing of the action may
as a practical matter impair or impede the
movant's ability to protect its interest, unless
existing parties adequately represent that
interest.
(b) Permissive Intervention.
(1) In General. On timely motion, the court may
permit anyone to intervene who:
(A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a
federal statute; or
(B) has a claim or defense that shares with the
main action a common question of law or
fact.
(2) By a Government Officer or Agency. On
timely motion, the court may permit a federal
or state governmental officer or agency to
intervene if a party’s claim or defense is based
on:
(A) a statute or executive order administered by
the officer or agency; or
(B) any regulation, order, requirement, or
agreement issued or made under the statute
or executive order.
App. 2
(3) Delay or Prejudice. In exercising its
discretion, the court must consider whether the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the original parties’ rights.
(c) Notice and Pleading Required. A motion to
intervene must be served on the parties as
provided in Rule 5. The motion must state the
grounds for intervention and be accompanied by a
pleading that sets out the claim or defense for
which intervention is sought.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.