Petitioners Brief — Arizona, et al., Petitioners v. City and County of San Francisco, California, et al.

Supreme Court briefDec 13, 2021

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No. 20-1775

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

THE STATE OF ARIZONA, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

TYLER R. GREEN

CAMERON T. NORRIS

JEFFREY S. HETZEL

CONSOVOY MCCARTHY

PLLC

1600 Wilson Blvd.,

Suite 700

Arlington, VA 22209

MARK BRNOVICH

Attorney General

JOSEPH A. KANEFIELD

Chief Deputy and

Chief of Staff

BRUNN W. ROYSDEN III

Solicitor General

DREW C. ENSIGN

Deputy Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

KATE B. SAWYER

Assistant Solicitor General

KATLYN J. DIVIS

Assistant Attorney General

OFFICE OF THE ARIZONA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

2005 N. Central Ave.

Phoenix, AZ 85004

(602) 542-5025

drew.ensign@azag.gov

Counsel for Petitioners

(Additional Counsel listed on inside cover)

STEVE MARSHALL

Attorney General of Alabama

LESLIE RUTLEDGE

Attorney General of Arkansas

THEODORE E. ROKITA

Attorney General of Indiana

DEREK SCHMIDT

Attorney General of Kansas

JEFF LANDRY

Attorney General of Louisiana

LYNN FITCH

Attorney General of Mississippi

ERIC S. SCHMITT

Attorney General of Missouri

AUSTIN KNUDSEN

Attorney General of Montana

JOHN M. O’CONNOR

Attorney General of Oklahoma

ALAN WILSON

Attorney General of South Carolina

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of Texas

PATRICK MORRISEY

Attorney General of West Virginia

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8

U.S.C. §§1101 et seq., an alien is “inadmissible” if, “in

the opinion of the [Secretary of Homeland Security] at

the time of application for admission or adjustment of

status, [the alien] is likely at any time to become a

public charge.” 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(4)(A). Following

notice-and-comment rulemaking, the United States

Department

of

Homeland

Security

(DHS)

promulgated a final rule (the “Rule”) interpreting the

statutory term “public charge” and establishing a

framework for applying it.

Litigation about the Rule ensued, and the Second,

Seventh, and Ninth Circuits affirmed preliminary

injunctions, while the Fourth Circuit initially

reversed. The United States sought review in multiple

cases, and this Court granted review of the Second

Circuit’s opinion. DHS v. New York, No. 20-449 (U.S.

Feb. 22, 2021). But the United States suddenly

announced it would no longer pursue its appeals. The

result was to leave in place a partial grant of summary

judgment and vacatur of the Rule in one district court,

applying nationwide—evading this Court’s review

and the procedures of the APA. Petitioners quickly

moved to intervene in the Ninth Circuit to protect

their interests previously represented by the United

States. The Ninth Circuit, however, denied

Petitioners’ motion.

The question presented is:

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred and/or

abused its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to

intervene.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners are the State of Arizona; the State of

Alabama; the State of Arkansas; the State of Indiana;

the State of Kansas; the State of Louisiana; the State

of Mississippi; the State of Missouri; the State of

Montana; the State of Oklahoma; the State of South

Carolina; the State of Texas; and the State of West

Virginia.

Respondents (plaintiffs-appellees below) are the

City and County of San Francisco; the County of

Santa Clara; the State of California; the District of

Columbia; the State of Colorado; the State of

Delaware; the State of Hawaii; the State of Illinois;

the State of Maine; the State of Maryland; the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts; the State of

Minnesota; the State of Nevada; the State of New

Jersey; the State of New Mexico; the State of Oregon;

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; the State of

Rhode Island; the Commonwealth of Virginia; the

State of Washington; and Dana Nessel, Attorney

General on behalf of the People of Michigan.

Respondents (defendants-appellants below) are the

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services;

the United States Department of Homeland Security;

Alejandro N. Mayorkas, in his official capacity as

Secretary of the United States Department of

Homeland Security; and Ur M. Jaddou, in her official

capacity as Director of the United States Citizenship

and Immigration Services.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ....................................... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS......................... ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................ v

OPINIONS BELOW ....................................................1

JURISDICTION ..........................................................1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES

INVOLVED..................................................................1

INTRODUCTION ........................................................2

STATEMENT ..............................................................4

I.

History of Public Charge inadmissibility

.........................................................................4

II. The Public Charge Rule .................................6

III. Challenges to the Public Charge Rule ...........7

IV. The Biden Administration’s postcertiorari maneuvers ......................................9

V. Petitioners’ near-immediate intervention

to defend the Public Charge Rule ................ 13

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .......................... 15

ARGUMENT ............................................................. 18

I.

The Ninth Circuit erred in denying the

States’ motion to intervene. ......................... 18

A. The

States

satisfied

Rule

24(a)’s standard for intervention as

of right. ................................................... 19

1. The States’ motion to intervene

was timely. ....................................... 20

2. The States have a significant

protectable interest that could be

impaired. .......................................... 24

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

3. Respondents

no

longer

adequately represent the States’

interests. .......................................... 26

B. Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit

should have granted permissive

intervention. ........................................... 27

II. Respondents’ mootness arguments are

unpersuasive. ................................................ 29

A. If Petitioners intervene, they could

successfully defend the Rule.................. 30

B. If Petitioners intervene, they could

move for Munsingwear vacatur. ............ 34

III. Denying

intervention

in

these

circumstances would sow disorder............... 37

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 41

APPENDIX ......................................................... App. 1

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico

ex rel. Barez,

458 U.S. 592 (1982) ............................................... 25

Alvarez v. Smith,

558 U.S. 87 (2009) ........................................... 34, 36

American Petroleum Institute v. EPA,

No. 08-1277 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 1, 2009) ..................... 11

American Petroleum Institute v. EPA,

No. 13-1108 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2017) ................... 12

Arizona v. City & County of San Francisco,

No. 20-1775 (U.S. Aug. 23, 2021) .......................... 18

Arizona v. United States,

567 U.S. 387 (2012) ............................................... 25

Azar v. Allina Health Services,

139 S. Ct. 1804 (2019) ..................................... 13, 38

Azar v. Garza,

138 S. Ct. 1790 (2018) ..................................... 34, 35

Bakery Sales Drivers Local Union No. 33 v. Wagshal,

333 U.S. 437 (1948) ............................................... 33

Barnes v. Security Life of Denver Insurance Co.,

945 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 2019) ............................. 20

Biden v. Sierra Club,

No. 20-138 (U.S. Feb. 1, 2021) .............................. 14

Blount-Hill v. Zelman,

636 F.3d 278 (6th Cir. 2011) ................................. 19

Board of Regents of the University of Texas System v.

New Left Education Project,

414 U.S. 807 (1973) ............................................... 34

California v. HHS,

141 S. Ct. 192 (2020) ............................................. 17

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

California v. HHS,

941 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2019) ........................... 17, 32

CASA de Maryland v. Biden,

No. 19-2222, Dkt. 210 (4th Cir. Mar. 9, 2021) ...... 10

CASA de Maryland v. Biden,

No. 19-2222, Dkt. 211 (4th Cir. Mar. 11, 2021) .... 10

CASA de Maryland v. Biden,

No. 19-2222, Dkt. 215 (4th Cir. Mar. 11, 2021) .... 14

CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Biden,

No. 19-2222, Dkt. 216 (4th Cir. Mar. 18, 2021) .... 28

CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Trump,

414 F. Supp. 3d 760 (D. Md. 2019) .........................8

CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Trump,

No. 19-2222, Dkt. 21 (4th Cir. Dec. 9, 2019) ..........8

Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso

Natural Gas Co.,

386 U.S. 129 (1967) ............................................... 26

Chafin v. Chafin,

568 U.S. 165 (2013) ............................. 29, 30, 34, 37

Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,

441 U.S. 281 (1979) ............................................... 38

Citizens for Balanced Use v. Montana Wilderness

Association,

647 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2011) ................................. 19

City & County of San Francisco v. USCIS,

No. 19-17213, Dkt. 138 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 2020) ....8

City & County of San Francisco v. USCIS,

No. 19-cv-4980, Dkt. 204

(N.D. Cal. May 26, 2021) ....................................... 15

City & County of San Francisco v. USCIS,

No. 19-cv-5210, Dkt. 299 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 23,

2021)....................................................................... 15

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc.,

455 U.S. 283 (1982) ............................................... 30

Cook County v. Mayorkas,

__F.R.D.__, 2021 WL 3633917

(N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2021) .................................. 21, 32

Cook County v. McAleenan,

417 F. Supp. 3d 1008 (N.D. Ill. 2019) .....................8

Cook County v. Texas,

No. 21-2561 (7th Cir. filed Aug. 24, 2021) ...... 14, 32

Cook County v. Wolf,

498 F. Supp. 3d 999 (N.D. Ill. 2020) .......................9

Cook County v. Wolf,

962 F.3d 208 (7th Cir. 2020) ............................... 5, 8

Cook County v. Wolf,

No. 19-cv-6334, Dkt. 254

(N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2021) ........................................ 11

Cook County v. Wolf,

No. 19-cv-6334, Dkt. 256

(N.D. Ill. May 12, 2021) ......................................... 14

Cook County v. Wolf,

No. 20-3150, Dkt. 23 (7th Cir. Mar. 9, 2021)........ 10

Cook County v. Wolf,

No. 20-3150, Dkt. 24-1 (7th Cir. Mar. 9, 2021) .... 10

Cook County v. Wolf,

No. 20-3150, Dkt. 25-1 (7th Cir. Mar. 11, 2021)... 14

Cook County v. Wolf,

No. 20-3150, Dkt. 26 (7th Cir. Mar. 15, 2021) ...... 28

Cook County v. Wolf,

No. 20-3150, Dkt. 21 (7th Cir. Nov. 19, 2020) ........9

Cooper v. Newsom,

13 F.4th 857 (9th Cir. 2021) .................................. 32

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Day v. Apoliona,

505 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2007) ................................. 18

DeFunis v. Odegaard,

416 U.S. 312 (1974) ............................................... 30

Democratic Executive Committee of Florida v.

National Republican Senatorial Committee,

950 F.3d 790 (11th Cir. 2020) ............................... 37

DHS v. New York,

140 S. Ct. 599 (2020) ...............................................8

DHS v. New York,

141 S. Ct. 1370 (2021) ..................................... 7, 8, 9

DHS v. Regents of the University of California,

140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) ........................................... 33

Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County,

299 U.S. 259 (1936) ............................................... 34

Elliott Industries Ltd. Partnership v. BP American

Production Co.,

407 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2005) ............................. 18

EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA,

795 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ............................... 12

Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,

556 U.S. 208 (2009) ............................................... 26

Floyd v. City of New York,

770 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir. 2014) ................................. 20

Foman v. Davis,

371 U.S. 178 (1962) ............................................... 27

Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media,

139 S. Ct. 2356 (2019) ........................................... 40

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental

Services (TOC), Inc.,

528 U.S. 167 (2000) ............................................... 31

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Hollingsworth v. Perry,

558 U.S. 183 (2010) ........................................... 8, 13

International Union, United Auto, Aerospace &

Agricultural Implement Workers of

America v. Scofield,

382 U.S. 205 (1965) ............................................... 18

Karsner v. Lothian,

532 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ............................... 32

Knox v. Service Employees International Union,

LLC. 1000,

567 U.S. 298 (2012) ................................... 16, 29, 31

League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson,

131 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997) ............................... 20

Maher v. Roe,

432 U.S. 464 (1977) ............................................... 33

Maine v. Taylor,

477 U.S. 131 (1986) ............................................... 40

Make the Road New York v. Cuccinelli,

419 F. Supp. 3d 647 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ......................7

Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. v.

United States,

118 F.3d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ............................... 18

Mayorkas v. Cook County,

141 S. Ct. 1292 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2021) ...................... 10

Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC,

139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019) ........................................... 33

Mississippi v. EPA,

No. 08-1200 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 9, 2009) .................... 11

Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,

561 U.S. 139 (2010) ............................................... 26

National Parks Conservation Association v. EPA,

759 F.3d 969 (8th Cir. 2014) ................................. 24

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

National Waste & Recycling Association v. EPA,

No. 16-1372 (D.C. Cir. June 14, 2017) .................. 11

New York v. DHS,

408 F. Supp. 3d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ......................7

New York v. DHS,

969 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2020) .......................................8

Northeast Ohio Coalition for Homeless & Service

Employees International Union, Local 1199 v.

Blackwell,

467 F.3d 999 (6th Cir. 2006) ................................. 18

Pennsylvania v. DeVos,

No. 20-1468 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2021)...................... 12

Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association,

575 U.S. 92 (2015) ..................................... 13, 37, 38

Pharmaceutical Care Management

Association v. HHS,

No. 21-95, 2021 WL 624229

(D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2021) ........................................... 12

Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Kaul,

942 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2019) ................................. 20

Schultz v. United States,

594 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010) ............................... 20

Sierra Club v. EPA,

358 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 2004) ................................. 18

Sierra Club v. Espy,

18 F.3d 1202 (5th Cir. 1994) ................................. 20

St. Bernard Parish v. Lafarge North America, Inc.,

914 F.3d 969 (5th Cir. 2019) ................................. 19

State Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of

U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Co.,

463 U.S. 29 (1983) ................................................. 39

xi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida

Department of Environmental Protection,

560 U.S. 702 (2010) ............................................... 26

Tandon v. Newsom,

141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021) ..................................... 30, 31

T-Mobile Northeast LLC v. Town of Barnstable,

969 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2020) .................................... 20

Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America,

404 U.S. 528 (1972) ............................................... 26

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc.,

137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) ........................................... 31

U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall

Partnership,

513 U.S. 18 (1994) ..................................... 35, 36, 37

U.S. ex rel. McGough v. Covington Technologies Co.,

967 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1992) ............................... 22

United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,

432 U.S. 385 (1977) ......................................... 21, 22

United States v. Alisal Water Corp.,

370 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2004) ................................. 24

United States v. Munsingwear,

340 U.S. 36 (1950) ..................................... 34, 35, 37

United States v. Union Electric, Co.,

64 F.3d 1152 (8th Cir. 1995) ................................. 20

United States v. Weatherhead,

528 U.S. 1042 (1999) ............................................. 34

USCIS v. City & County of San Francisco,

(U.S. Jan. 21, 2021) (No. 20-962) ............................8

USCIS v. City & County of San Francisco,

141 S. Ct. 1292 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2021) ...................... 10

xii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Utahns for Better Transportation v. U.S. Department

of Transportation,

295 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2002) ............................. 24

Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill,

139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019) ........................................... 39

Walling v. James V. Reuter, Inc.,

321 U.S. 671 (1944) ............................................... 34

Wilderness Society v. U.S. Forest Service,

630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) ............................... 19

Wolf v. Cook County,

140 S. Ct. 681 (2020) ...............................................8

Wolf v. Cook County,

No. 20-450 (filed Oct. 7, 2020).................................8

STATUTES

5 U.S.C. § 551 ........................................................ 9, 37

5 U.S.C. § 553 ........................................................ 9, 37

5 U.S.C. § 706 ............................................................ 33

6 U.S.C. § 211 ..............................................................4

6 U.S.C. § 557 ..............................................................4

8 U.S.C. § 1103 ............................................................4

8 U.S.C. § 1182 ........................................................ 4, 5

8 U.S.C. § 1183 ............................................................5

8 U.S.C. § 1227 ............................................................4

28 U.S.C. § 2106 ........................................................ 34

Immigrant Fund Act, Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376,

§§1-2, 22 Stat. 214 ...................................................5

S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 347 (1950) .....5

xiii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

RULES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 ................................................. 16, 23

S. Ct. R. 15(2) ............................................................ 26

REGULATIONS

46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (Oct. 29, 1981) ............................9

64 Fed. Reg. 28,676 (May 26, 1999) ............................6

64 Fed. Reg. 28,689 (May 26, 1999) ............................6

65 Fed. Reg. 41,281 (July 3, 2000) ............................ 10

70 Fed. Reg. 1,022 (Jan. 5, 2005) .............................. 10

76 Fed. Reg. 9,968 (Feb. 23, 2011) ............................ 10

82 Fed. Reg. 36,934 (Aug. 7, 2017) ........................... 10

83 Fed. Reg. 51,114 (Oct. 10, 2018) ........................ 6, 7

84 Fed. Reg. 41,292 (Aug. 14, 2019) ................... 4, 6, 7

86 Fed. Reg. 14,221 (Mar. 15, 2021) ............. 11, 33, 38

OTHER AUTHORITIES

13B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §3533.2.2

(3d ed. 2021)........................................................... 33

Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and

Political Transitions, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 471, 528

(2011) ..................................................................... 38

Bethany A. Noll & Richard L. Revesz, Regulation in

Transition, 104 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 28 (2019)........... 11

Ed Whelan, Biden Administration Defies

Longstanding DOJ Norm on Agency Litigation,

Nat’l Rev. (Mar. 10, 2021), bit.ly/3Dk9GMh ........ 12

xiv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Erin Brady, Biden Administration Resuming

Trump’s ‘Remain in Mexico’ Policy Starting Next

Week, Newsweek (Dec. 2, 2021), bit.ly/3ppZm0r .. 31

March 19, 2020 Order, available at

https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/

031920zr_d1o3.pdf................................................. 23

Peter Fox & Connor Raso, What a Biden

Administration Should Learn from the Trump

Administration’s Regulatory Reversals, Brookings

(Sept. 28, 2020), brook.gs/3IdtswD ....................... 12

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-205,

Improvements Needed to Monitoring and

Evaluation of Rules Development as Well as to the

Transparency of OMB Regulatory Reviews 5

(2009) ..................................................................... 39

Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Biden Reverses Course Again

After Backlash and Will Increase Refugee Limit,

N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 2021, nyti.ms/3Iehy5O........ 31

1

OPINIONS BELOW

The panel order denying intervention is reported

at 992 F.3d 742. Pet.App. 1-40. The panel opinion

affirming the preliminary injunctions is reported at

981 F.3d 742, Pet.App. 41-89, while the published

opinion of the same court staying the preliminary

injunction is reported at 944 F.3d 773, Pet.App. 90170. The opinions of the district courts are reported at

408 F. Supp. 3d 1057, Pet.App. 171-307, and 408 F.

Supp. 3d 1191, Pet.App. 308-368.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals denying

intervention was entered on April 8, 2021. The

petition for certiorari was timely filed on June 18,

2021, which this Court granted on October 29, 2021.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. §1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES

INVOLVED

The text of 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(4) is reproduced in

the Petition Appendix at Pet.App. 369-71. The text of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 is reproduced in

the appendix.

2

INTRODUCTION

Though this case stems from a regulatory dispute

about admissibility requirements for aliens, the core

question now before this Court is much simpler: Can

States seek relief in federal courts when the Executive

Branch evades a statutory command—and breaks

from decades of bipartisan practice—to reverse a prior

administration’s rule? The Biden Administration did

just that to rid itself of the Trump Administration’s

Public Charge Rule. And so far, federal courts of

appeals have silently refused States’ efforts to

intervene in cases that would let them check this

Executive misfeasance and protect their interests.

Had settled norms prevailed, the States could

have protected their interests through the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which

requires agencies to repeal notice-and-comment rules

through

a

successive

notice-and-comment

rulemaking. Recognizing as much, incoming

administrations routinely move to stay pending

litigation challenging notice-and-comment rules that

they plan to repeal via new rulemakings. The Biden

Administration itself has done so in a few instances.

But—with no warning—the administration broke

from that settled practice here. Instead of staying

pending Public Charge Rule litigation, the Biden

Administration decided to exploit it to evade the APA.

By the time the administration took office, several

district courts had already enjoined the Rule, and

appeals of those injunctions were ongoing—including

in petitions before this Court. So the administration

arranged to simultaneously dismiss all of those

appeals. It thereby restored the district court

judgments, including one partial final judgment in

3

Illinois vacating the Rule. Then, acquiescing in that

made-final-at-its-request Illinois judgment, the Biden

Administration bypassed notice and comment and

instead vacated the Rule based solely on that Illinois

judgment. In less than a week, this novel strategy

obliterated the Rule and deprived the Rule’s

supporters of any chance to protect their interests via

a notice-and-comment rulemaking.

But Petitioners—a coalition of States—saw what

was happening. So in less than a day, they moved to

intervene in a pending Ninth Circuit case challenging

the Rule. They invoked their significant protectable

interest in what the Government had previously

estimated was hundreds of millions of dollars in

budgetary obligations tied to the Rule. And they

pointed to the Government’s abandoning the case to

confirm that the existing parties no longer adequately

represented that interest.

Even so, the Ninth Circuit denied the States’

motion to intervene. Worse yet, it did so through a

one-line order with no analysis or explanation.

The Court should correct this manifest error. The

States satisfied every requirement for intervention.

And once they become intervenors, the States will

seek reversals or Munsingwear vacaturs of the district

court judgments against the Rule. They will thereby

constrain the Biden Administration to rescind its

repeal, which it predicated solely on the validity and

finality of those same judgments. In other words,

allowing Petitioners to intervene will require the

Biden Administration to follow the law and do what it

should have done in the first place: to respect the duly

enacted Rule until it repeals it through notice-andcomment rulemaking.

4

STATEMENT

I.

History of Public Charge inadmissibility

A. The INA has long provided that “[a]ny alien

who … in the opinion of the [Secretary of Homeland

Security] at the time of application for admission or

adjustment of status, is likely at any time to become a

public

charge

is

inadmissible.”

8

U.S.C.

§1182(a)(4)(A). 1 Executive-branch officials assessing

whether an alien clears that threshold “shall at a

minimum consider the alien’s (I) age; (II) health; (III)

family status; (IV) assets, resources, and financial

status; and (V) education and skills.” 8 U.S.C.

§1182(a)(4)(B). A separate INA provision provides

that an alien is deportable if, within five years of

entry, the alien “has become a public charge from

causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen since

entry[.]” 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(5).

Three

agencies

make

public-charge

determinations under this provision: DHS, for aliens

seeking admission at the border and aliens within the

country applying to adjust their status to that of a

lawful permanent resident; the Department of State,

for aliens abroad applying for visas; and the

Department of Justice, for aliens in removal

proceedings. See Inadmissibility on Public Charge

Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,294 n.3 (Aug. 14,

2019). This case arises from a Rule governing publiccharge determinations by DHS. Id.

The statute refers to the Attorney General, but in 2002

Congress transferred the authority to the Secretary of Homeland

Security. See 8 U.S.C. §1103; 6 U.S.C. §557; see also 6 U.S.C.

§211(c)(8).

1

5

Neither the Rule nor this INA provision affect

most immigrants—in any of their dealings with

DHS—because a variety of interrelated statutes

separately govern the provision of public benefits to

immigrants. See Cook County v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 208,

236 (7th Cir. 2020) (Barrett, J., dissenting). Instead,

this provision primarily applies to nonimmigrant visa

holders applying for permanent-resident status, as

well as a few other applicants in narrow

circumstances. Id.

B. The “public charge” ground of inadmissibility is

almost 140 years old. It dates to the first general

federal immigration statutes in 1882. See, e.g.,

Immigrant Fund Act, Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, §§12, 22 Stat. 214. But until 1996, Congress generally left

the contours of “public charge” to the agencies who

administered the statutes. See S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st

Cong., 2d Sess. 347, 349 (1950); see also Cook County,

962 F.3d at 239-42 (Barrett, J., dissenting).

In 1996, however, Congress made substantive

changes to the “public charge” statutory provisions. It

provided that any family-sponsored applicant was to

be automatically deemed a “public charge” unless the

applicant procured a sponsor who guaranteed to pay

for any means-tested public benefits that the

applicant received, regardless of whether the benefits

were in cash or in kind. See 8 U.S.C. §§1182(a)(4)(C),

1183a. Many recognize that “the affidavit provision

reflects Congress’s view that the term ‘public charge’

encompasses supplemental as well as primary

dependence on public assistance.” See Cook County,

962 F.3d at 246 (Barrett, J., dissenting).

Yet just three years after Congress amended the

statute, the Immigration and Naturalization Service

6

proposed a rule that would have defined “public

charge” to mean an alien “who is likely to become

primarily dependent on the Government for

subsistence as demonstrated by either: (i) [t]he receipt

of public cash assistance for income maintenance

purposes, or (ii) [i]nstitutionalization for long-term

care at Government expense.” Inadmissibility and

Deportability on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg.

28,676, 28,681 (May 26, 1999). If the applicant was

likely to receive the same value of government

benefits in non-monetary form, the applicant was not

to be considered a public charge. See Field Guidance

on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge

Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,689, 28,692 (May 26, 1999).

When it announced the proposed rule, INS also

issued “field guidance” adopting the proposed rule’s

definition of “public charge.” 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,689.

The 1999 proposed rule was never actually finalized,

however, meaning DHS followed only the 1999

Guidance—which implemented the very same policy

as the proposed rule—until 2019. See 84 Fed. Reg. at

41,348 n.295.

II. The Public Charge Rule

In October 2018, DHS proposed a change from its

1999 Guidance on public-charge determinations by

publishing notice of a proposed rule and soliciting

comments. Inadmissibility on Public Charge

Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114 (Oct. 10, 2018). After

responding to comments timely submitted, DHS

adopted a final rule in August 2019. 84 Fed. Reg. at

41,501.

The Rule defines “public charge” to mean “an alien

who receives one or more public benefits as defined in

[the Rule] … for more than 12 months in the

7

aggregate within any 36-month period[.]” 84 Fed. Reg.

at 41,501. The designated public benefits include cash

assistance for income maintenance and certain noncash benefits, including most Medicaid benefits,

Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits,

and federal housing assistance. Id. As the agency

explained, the Rule’s definition of “public charge”

differs from the 1999 Guidance in that (1) it

incorporates certain non-cash benefits and (2) it

replaces the “primarily dependent” standard with the

12-out-of-36-months measure of dependence. Id. at

41,294-95.

Consequently, the Rule “remov[ed] the artificial

distinction between cash and non-cash benefits, and

align[ed] public charge policy with the self-sufficiency

principles set forth in the Personal Responsibility and

Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.” See 83

Fed. Reg. at 51,123. It also more accurately reflected

the public meaning of the statutory term “public

charge” and realigned the public-charge provision

with closely related statues governing benefits to

noncitizens. See DHS Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 14-20,

DHS v. New York, 141 S. Ct. 1370 (2021) (No. 20-449).

III. Challenges to the Public Charge Rule

In the weeks before the Rule was scheduled to

take effect, some States, municipalities, and private

organizations challenged the Rule in district courts in

four circuits—the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth

Circuits. By October 2019, each district court had

preliminarily enjoined the Rule. 2

Make the Road N.Y. v. Cuccinelli, 419 F. Supp. 3d 647

(S.D.N.Y. 2019); New York v. DHS, 408 F. Supp. 3d 334 (S.D.N.Y.

2019); Cook County v. McAleenan, 417 F. Supp. 3d 1008 (N.D. Ill.

2

8

All those preliminary injunctions were stayed—

some by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, see Order,

CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Trump, No. 19-2222, Dkt.

21 (4th Cir. Dec. 9, 2019); Pet.App. 90-170, and the

remainder by this Court, see DHS v. New York, 140 S.

Ct. 599 (2020); Wolf v. Cook County, 140 S. Ct. 681

(2020). Granting those two stays required this Court

to find a reasonable likelihood that five Justices would

vote to reverse the lower-court decision. See

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (“To

obtain a stay pending the filing and disposition of a

petition for a writ of certiorari, an applicant must

show … a fair prospect that a majority of the Court

will vote to reverse the judgment below[.]”).

Nonetheless, the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits

proceeded to affirm the preliminary injunctions on the

merits. 3

The United States filed petitions for writs of

certiorari seeking review of the decisions of the

Second and Seventh Circuits. See DHS v. New York,

No. 20-449 (filed Oct. 7, 2020); Wolf v. Cook County,

No. 20-450 (filed Oct. 7, 2020). Those petitions were

both fully briefed on December 23, 2020. In addition,

DHS obtained from the Ninth Circuit a stay of its

mandate and was in the process of seeking certiorari

review. Mot. to Stay Mandate, City & County of San

Francisco v. USCIS, No. 19-17213, Dkt. 138 (9th Cir.

Dec. 30, 2020); pet. for cert. filed, USCIS v. City &

County of San Francisco, (U.S. Jan. 21, 2021) (No. 20962).

2019); CASA de Md., Inc. v. Trump, 414 F. Supp. 3d 760 (D. Md.

2019); Pet.App. 308; Pet.App. 171.

See New York v. DHS, 969 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2020); Cook County

v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 208 (7th Cir. 2020); Pet.App. 41.

3

9

Meanwhile, the Northern District of Illinois had

reached a final judgment, vacating the Rule

nationwide. Cook County v. Wolf, 498 F. Supp. 3d 999

(N.D. Ill. 2020), stayed, No. 20-3150, Dkt. 21 (7th Cir.

Nov. 19, 2020).

This Court granted the Government’s petition for

a writ of certiorari in DHS v. New York, 141 S. Ct.

1370, on February 22, 2021.

IV. The Biden Administration’s post-certiorari

maneuvers

Despite this Court’s grant of certiorari, the Biden

Administration reversed course in its pending Public

Charge Rule litigation in this Court and several

others, and leveraged its reversals to attempt to

repeal the Rule. To be sure, standing alone, it’s hardly

noteworthy that the Biden Administration dislikes

the Public Charge Rule and wants to repeal it; new

administrations

often

disagree

with

their

predecessors’ policies. What is noteworthy is the

proper process for repealing the Public Charge Rule:

because the Trump Administration enacted it through

the rigors of notice-and-comment rulemaking, the

Biden

Administration—or

any

succeeding

administration—wishing to change it must likewise

repeal it through notice-and-comment rulemaking.

See 5 U.S.C. §553(b)-(c) (requiring notice and

comment for rulemaking); §551(5) (defining

rulemaking to include “repealing a rule”). In fact, for

decades, administrations from both parties have done

the hard work of notice and comment when repealing

a prior administration’s notice-and-comment rules. 4

E.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash

Protection, 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (Oct. 29, 1981) (repealing past

administration’s “requirements for installation of automatic

4

10

The

Biden

Administration

broke

that

longstanding, bipartisan norm. In the cases where

district courts had enjoined or vacated the Rule, the

Government arranged for the simultaneous dismissal

of all its appeals, including the writ of certiorari that

this Court had already granted. 5 Those voluntary

dismissals kept adverse district-court precedents on

the books and ended all appellate stays, thereby

reviving the district courts’ injunctions—including

the nationwide vacatur by the Northern District of

restraints in the front seating positions of passenger cars” after

providing for notice and comment); Provision of Abortion-Related

Services in Family Planning Services Projects, 65 Fed. Reg.

41,281 (July 3, 2000). (“revoking [past administration’s]

regulations … commonly known as the ‘Gag Rule’” after

providing for notice and comment); National Forest System Land

and Resource Management Planning; Removal of 2000 Planning

Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1,022 (Jan. 5, 2005) (“remov[ing] [past

administration’s national-forest] regulations … in their entirety”

after providing for notice and comment); Regulation for the

Enforcement of Federal Health Care Provider Conscience

Protection Laws, 76 Fed. Reg. 9,968 (Feb. 23, 2011) (rescind[ing],

in part, and revis[ing]” past administration’s Provider

Conscience Rule after providing for notice and comment); Repeal

of Consolidated Federal Oil and Gas and Federal and Indian

Coal Valuation Reform, 82 Fed. Reg. 36,934 (Aug. 7, 2017)

(“repeal[ing] in its entirety” past administration’s energy rule

after providing for notice and comment).

See Unopposed Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Appeal, Cook

County v. Wolf, No. 20-3150, Dkt. 23 (7th Cir. Mar. 9, 2021);

Order Dismissing Appeal, Cook County v. Wolf, No. 20-3150, Dkt.

24-1 (7th Cir. Mar. 9, 2021); Unopposed Motion to Voluntarily

Dismiss Appeal, CASA de Md. v. Biden, No. 19-2222, Dkt. 210

(4th Cir. Mar. 9, 2021); Order, CASA de Md. v. Biden, No. 192222, Dkt. 211 (4th Cir. Mar. 11, 2021); Mayorkas v. Cook

County, 141 S. Ct. 1292 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2021); USCIS v. City &

County of San Francisco, 141 S. Ct. 1292 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2021);

DHS v. New York, 141 S. Ct. 1292 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2021).

5

11

Illinois. Back in that particular district court, the

Government stipulated to another dismissal that

made the nationwide injunction final. See Cook

County v. Wolf, No. 19-cv-6334, Dkt. 254 (N.D. Ill.

Mar. 12, 2021).

The agency then vacated the Rule without notice

and comment, citing the Northern District of Illinois’s

nationwide vacatur as the sole justification. See

Inadmissibility

on

Public Charge

Grounds;

Implementation of Vacatur, 86 Fed. Reg. 14,221 (Mar.

15, 2021). All told, this effective notice-andcommentless repeal took the Government less than a

week to pull off.

Nothing about the cases concerning the Rule

pending in other courts should have given the new

Biden Administration a toehold for abandoning

settled repeal-by-notice-and-comment practice. New

administrations always inherit litigation from the

prior administration—including challenges to rules

that the new administration dislikes. If the new

administration plans to repeal the challenged rule,

the Government traditionally asks the court to hold

the litigation in abeyance while the agency works on

the replacement. See Bethany A. Noll & Richard L.

Revesz, Regulation in Transition, 104 Minn. L. Rev. 1,

28 (2019). Abeyance prevents litigation over a rule

that will likely be repealed anyway, conserving the

resources of the parties, the government, and the

judiciary. Courts routinely grant these requests. 6 In

6 See, e.g., Order at 1, Am. Petrol. Inst. v. EPA, No. 08-1277 (D.C.

Cir. Apr. 1, 2009) (granting abeyance); Order at 1, Mississippi v.

EPA, No. 08-1200 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 9, 2009) (referencing granted

abeyance); Order at 1, Nat’l Waste & Recycling Ass’n v. EPA, No.

16-1372 (D.C. Cir. June 14, 2017) (granting abeyance); Order at

12

fact, the Biden Administration itself has made these

requests in other cases challenging Trump-era rules

that it plans to rescind. E.g., Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n

v. HHS, No. 21-95, 2021 WL 624229, at *1 (D.D.C.

Jan. 30, 2021) (pharmaceutical rebate rule); Minute

Order Granting Joint Motion to Hold Case in

Abeyance, Pennsylvania v. DeVos, No. 20-1468

(D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2021) (Title IX rule).

That contrast only highlights the anomaly in the

Biden Administration’s choice about the Public

Charge Rule. Traditionally the Government has not

simply dropped its litigation defenses and acquiesced

to a final substantive judgment against it, especially

one vacating its rule. Doing so would violate the

Justice Department’s “longstanding” “policy.” Peter

Fox & Connor Raso, What a Biden Administration

Should Learn from the Trump Administration’s

Regulatory Reversals, Brookings (Sept. 28, 2020),

brook.gs/3IdtswD; Ed Whelan, Biden Administration

Defies Longstanding DOJ Norm on Agency Litigation,

Nat’l Rev. (Mar. 10, 2021), bit.ly/3Dk9GMh.

This longstanding policy serves crucial interests.

Even putting aside the ethical concerns about zealous

advocacy, candor to courts, and the duty to defend

federal law, the Government’s refusal to defend

legally defensible regulations would eviscerate the

APA. By acquiescing to a judicial order, an agency

could bypass the usual notice-and-comment

requirements for repealing a rule. See EME Homer

City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 795 F.3d 118, 134 (D.C.

Cir. 2015). That notice-and-comment procedure is

essential. It “guards against excess in rulemaking.”

1, Am. Petrol. Inst. v. EPA, No. 13-1108 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2017)

(granting abeyance).

13

Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 109 (2015)

(Scalia, J., concurring). It prevents “arbitrary

changes.” See Hollingsworth, 558 U.S. at 197. It “gives

affected parties fair warning of potential changes in

the law and an opportunity to be heard on those

changes.” Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct.

1804, 1816 (2019). And it “affords the agency a chance

to avoid errors and make a more informed decision.”

Id. Each of those interests fell victim to the Biden

Administration’s unprecedented gambit on the Public

Charge Rule, which it carried out through careful

planning, synchronous timing, and healthy collusion

with its now-nominal adversaries.

V. Petitioners’ near-immediate intervention to

defend the Public Charge Rule

One day after the Government initiated its

maneuver, Petitioners moved to intervene. They

explained that, per the agency’s own calculations, the

Public Charge Rule would save the States “about

$1.01 billion annually.” JA 62, 122. The Rule’s sudden

repeal thus required the States to make equally

sudden budget adjustments to account for these new

and unexpected costs. JA 56-59. The Government

would no longer protect this interest in maintaining

the Rule, the States explained, given that it had

effectively moved to the other side of the “v.” JA 6064. And the States explained that intervention was

timely because it came within the time to pursue an

appeal and just one day after the Biden

Administration stopped representing their interests.

JA 63-64. Until then, the States had expected the

Biden Administration to continue defending the rule,

an expectation fortified after the administration

changed its position in a series of other cases upon

taking office but continued defending the Public

14

Charge Rule. See, e.g., Mot. of Pet’rs. to Hold Briefing

Schedule in Abeyance, Biden v. Sierra Club, No. 20138 (U.S. Feb. 1, 2021). 7

The Government fiercely resisted Petitioners’

Ninth Circuit motion, and that court denied it. The

court’s unpublished order states, “The Motion to

Intervene … is DENIED,” without any reasoning

whatsoever. Pet.App. 13. The majority offered no

explanation despite a lengthy dissent from Judge

VanDyke.

Judge VanDyke concluded that the States were

entitled to intervention. Pet.App. 15. He explained

why Petitioners satisfied each of the four factors listed

in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). See

Pet.App. 29-34. He also warned that, “[b]y denying the

motion to intervene, we are sanctioning a collude-andcircumvent tactic by the parties, who clearly now

share the same agenda.” Pet.App. 33. Judge VanDyke

concluded that Petitioners’ motion was not moot.

Pet.App. 35. He recommended Munsingwear vacatur

as one form of relief that Petitioners could obtain.

Pet.App. 35-38.

Petitioners sought certiorari review, asking this

Court to review the denial of intervention, to review

Around the same time, similar coalitions of States moved to

intervene in other cases implicating the Rule, including in the

Northern District of Illinois. See Mot. to Recall the Mandate to

Permit Intervention as Appellant, Cook County v. Wolf, No. 203150, Dkt. 25-1 (7th Cir. Mar. 11, 2021); Opposed Motion for

Leave to Intervene as Defendant-Appellants, CASA de Md. v.

Biden, No. 19-2222, Dkt. 215 (4th Cir. Mar. 11, 2021); Opposed

Motion to Intervene, Cook County v. Wolf, No. 19-cv-6334, Dkt.

256 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2021). The appeal of the Northern District

of Illinois’s denial of intervention remains pending. See Cook

County v. Texas, No. 21-2561 (7th Cir. filed Aug. 24, 2021).

7

15

the merits of the Public Charge Rule, or to vacate the

lower courts’ decisions under Munsingwear. This

Court granted certiorari on the first question. The

district courts have stayed the underlying litigation

pending this Court’s decision. See Order Staying

Cases, City & County of San Francisco v. USCIS, No.

19-cv-4980, Dkt. 204 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2021); TextOnly Order, No. 19-cv-5210, Dkt. 299 (E.D. Wash.

Apr. 23, 2021).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The States satisfied the requirements for

intervention here. As to intervention as of right, all

four requirements were plainly met. The States’

motion to intervene was timely, filed a mere day after

it became clear that the Government no longer

intended to defend the Rule. The States also have

obvious protectable interests in the Rule being

upheld: on its face, the Rule estimated that it would

save States “about $1.01 billion annually.” JA 122.

And those interests could easily be impaired. Indeed,

the lower courts’ denials of intervention made that

risk manifest: without the States to defend the Rule,

it was collusively wiped off the face of the CFRs in less

than a week. Finally, because the United States

abandoned defense of its Rule—and indeed went on

active offense against it—it is not reasonably

contestable that Federal Defendants did not

adequately represent the States’ interests.

Because all of the requirements for intervention

as of right were met, the Ninth Circuit erred in

denying intervention and this Court can end its

inquiry there. But the Ninth Circuit also abused its

discretion in denying permissive intervention. The

requirements for such intervention were also met

16

here: the request was timely and the States sought to

raise “a claim or defense that shares with the main

action a common question of law or fact,” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 24(b)(1)(B)—i.e., argue that the Rule was

substantively and procedurally valid.

It is unclear if the Ninth Circuit attempted to

exercise any discretion on this issue: it offered no

reasoning whatsoever, and its order did not even

acknowledge the as-of-right/permissive distinction.

But if it did, the court abused its discretion.

Intervention would have prevented an audacious and

collusive

end-run

around

APA

rulemaking

requirements, and would have instead ensured that

issues of great importance would instead be decided

on the merits. Indeed, this Court had already granted

certiorari as to the validity of the Rule, and had also

granted multiple stays pending review. By permitting

collusion to replace legal argumentation as the sole

currency with any purchase on the outcome of the

case, the court of appeals abused its discretion.

Because the States were entitled to intervene both

as of right and permissively, the Ninth Circuit’s denial

of intervention must be reversed. And to the extent

that Respondents might rely on potential mootness to

evade this straightforward outcome, such contentions

would be unavailing. Mootness exists “only when it is

impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief

whatever to the prevailing party.” Knox v. Serv. Emps.

Int’l Union, LLC. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012)

(cleaned up). But effective relief is available here,

precluding any dismissal for mootness.

Respondents have previously argued that the

Northern District of Illinois’s vacatur compelled a

conclusion that this case was moot. But that out-of-

17

circuit vacatur does not moot the Ninth Circuit’s

consideration of the validity of the Public Charge

Rule. California v. HHS, 941 F.3d 410, 421-22 (9th

Cir. 2019), GVR’d, 141 S. Ct. 192 (2020). Nor is that

vacatur final—it is being actively challenged as this

case is briefed by a similar group of States.

But even if the dispute as to the validity of the

Public Charge Rule were moot, the States’ motion to

intervene at issue here is not. The States can still

obtain “effective relief” here by seeking a

Munsingwear

vacatur

post-intervention.

The

potential for such relief precludes the controversy

here from becoming moot.

An affirmance here would have grave practical

effects. As an initial matter, it would bless a

particularly pernicious practice that would likely

supplant the APA’s requirement of notice-andcomment rulemaking for repealing rules. Why bother

with the burdensome procedures of the APA when

surrendering to aligned groups is so easy? New

administrations might thus be marked by a flurry of

strategic surrenders until most or all disfavored rules

being challenged were vacated through contrivance.

An affirmance would also lead States and other

interested parties to seek intervention in virtually all

pending challenges to agency actions they looked upon

with favor whenever there is an impending change in

administration. That could easily be hundreds or even

thousands of cases. The waste of resources of the

Judiciary and parties that would occasion is both

enormous and pointless. Instead, permitting parties

to intervene after it becomes apparent that the

administration intends to change course is consistent

18

with all of this Court’s governing precedents and the

underlying purposes of intervention.

This Court should accordingly reverse the Ninth

Circuit’s

completely

unreasoned

denial

of

intervention, and remand so that the validity of the

Public Charge Rule can be considered on the merits.

ARGUMENT

I.

The Ninth Circuit erred in denying the

States’ motion to intervene.

While no Rule of Appellate Procedure specifically

governs intervention at the courts of appeals, this

Court has recognized that Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 24 serves as a “helpful analog[y]” when

considering intervention at the appellate level.

International Union, United Auto, Aerospace & Agric.

Implement Workers of Am. v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205,

216 (1965); see also U.S.BIO 13, Cal.BIO 8-9, Arizona

v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 20-1775 (U.S.

Aug. 23, 2021). Rule 24 reflects the fundamental

principles underlying intervention. See Scofield, 382

U.S. at 217 n.10 (“[T]he policies underlying

intervention [in the district courts] may be applicable

in appellate courts.”). Accordingly, federal courts of

appeals regularly look to Rule 24’s guidance when

ruling on motions to intervene on appeal. See, e.g.,

Day v. Apoliona, 505 F.3d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 2007); Ne.

Ohio Coal. for Homeless & Serv. Emps. Int’l Union,

Loc. 1199 v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1006 (6th Cir.

2006); Elliott Indus. Ltd. P’ship v. BP Am. Prod. Co.,

407 F.3d 1091, 1102 (10th Cir. 2005); Sierra Club v.

EPA, 358 F.3d 516, 517-18 (7th Cir. 2004);

Massachusetts Sch. of L. at Andover, Inc. v. United

States, 118 F.3d 776, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1997). And courts

generally

“follow

‘practical

and

equitable

19

considerations’” and construe the intervention factors

“‘broadly in favor of proposed intervenors.’”

Wilderness Soc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173,

1179 (9th Cir. 2011).

Despite the States satisfying Rule 24(a)’s

standard for intervention as of right, as well as Rule

24(b)’s requirements for permissive intervention, the

Ninth Circuit denied intervention—without a single

word of explanation. This Court should reverse those

errors and remand with instructions to grant

Petitioners’ motion to intervene.

A. The States satisfied Rule 24(a)’s standard

for intervention as of right.

Courts assessing a party’s motion to intervene as

of right under Rule 24(a) consider four distinct

elements: (1) whether “the intervention application is

timely”; (2) whether movants have “a significant

protectable interest relating to the property or

transaction that is the subject of the action”;

(3) whether “the disposition of the action may, as a

practical matter, impair or impede the applicant’s

ability to protect its interest”; and (4) whether “the

existing

parties” “adequately

represent

the

applicant’s interest.” Citizens for Balanced Use v.

Montana Wilderness Ass’n, 647 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir.

2011). The States’ motion to intervene satisfied each

of those elements. 8

This Court should review the Ninth Circuit’s denial of

intervention as of right de novo. The majority of circuits review

lower courts’ determinations as to the second, third, and fourth

factors de novo, while reviewing timeliness for an abuse of

discretion. See, e.g., St. Bernard Parish v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc.,

914 F.3d 969, 973 (5th Cir. 2019); Blount-Hill v. Zelman, 636

F.3d 278, 283 (6th Cir. 2011); Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v.

8

20

1. The States’ motion to intervene was

timely.

a. On March 9, 2021, the United States

announced, with no warning, the end of its defense of

the Public Charge Rule—and thus the end of

defending the States’ interests in this case. Despite

the lack of warning, the Petitioners moved to

Kaul, 942 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v. Union

Elec., Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1158 (8th Cir. 1995); Schultz v. United

States, 594 F.3d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010); Barnes v. Sec. Life of

Denver Ins. Co., 945 F.3d 1112, 1121 (10th Cir. 2019).

Many courts even review timeliness de novo when—as here—the

lower court’s determination has little or no reasoning attached to

it. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131

F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997) (reviewing timeliness de novo

because the district court denied the motion to intervene “in a

curt, one-sentence order without specifying whether or not its

denial was premised upon a finding of untimeliness”); Sierra

Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1205 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[W]here

the district court makes no finding regarding timeliness, we

review this factor de novo.”).

Other circuits apply an abuse of discretion standard when

reviewing motions to intervene. See, e.g., T-Mobile Ne. LLC v.

Town of Barnstable, 969 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 2020); Floyd v. City

of New York, 770 F.3d 1051, 1057 (2d Cir. 2014).

De novo review, however, most closely aligns with the text of Rule

24 and the concept of intervention of right. If movants have an

actual “right” to intervene, that right necessarily cannot be

dependent on the discretionary graces of the lower court. A right

that can be discretionarily denied by government officials is

hardly a right at all.

In any event, the standard of review as to timeliness matters

little here. Even if the abuse of discretion standard applied,

finding a one-day turnaround in moving to intervene untimely

would be a patent abuse of discretion.

21

intervene the very next day in the Ninth Circuit. 9 JA

55. The Ninth Circuit had not yet even issued its

mandate. There was no delay in the States’ response

to the United States’ sudden change of course.

Notably, Plaintiffs below raised a cursory

timeliness argument in the Ninth Circuit. JA 90. And

the Government gave a token nod to that argument

when opposing certiorari review. U.S.BIO at 19.

But it’s impossible to know whether the Ninth

Circuit thought that Petitioners should have moved to

intervene earlier, given that court’s refusal to supply

any reasoning. In contrast, the Northern District of

Illinois adopted that reasoning expressly, holding that

the States should have intervened as soon as

“November 7, 2020,” i.e., “when all creditable news

organizations declared candidate Biden the winner.”

Cook County v. Mayorkas, __F.R.D.__, 2021 WL

3633917, *9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2021). In that court’s

view, “[t]he States were required to react promptly to

that reasonable possibility”—the possibility that the

new Administration might abandon its defense of the

Rule at some point—“even if they could not predict

with certainty that DHS would take that course or

precisely when.” Id. at *12.

The proposition that the States should have

sought to intervene before the United States

abandoned the defense of its Rule, however,

contravenes this Court’s decision in United Airlines,

Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 394-95 (1977). That

The motion to intervene was originally filed by eleven states,

with South Carolina moving the next day to join the original

motion, and Missouri similarly moving within two weeks. See No.

19-17213, Dkts. 145, 152.

9

22

decision recognizes two benchmarks to judge

timeliness—both of which confirm that intervention

was timely here.

First, the “critical fact” is how quickly would-be

intervenors acted once it became clear that existing

parties “would no longer” protect their interests. Id. at

394. Here, Petitioners acted within a single day of

discovering the Government’s surrender of its

successful and pending petitions for certiorari. That

overnight turn-around is all the more remarkable

since the United States changed position in numerous

other pending cases, see supra at 12, but did not

withdraw its petitions concerning the Public Charge

Rule (despite two re-lists)—conveying to any objective

observer an intent to continue defending the Rule.

Second, this Court looked to when intervention

was sought vis-à-vis final judgment and “the time

period in which the named plaintiffs could have taken

an appeal.” McDonald, 432 U.S. at 395-96. The

“critical inquiry in every such case is whether in view

of all the circumstances the intervenor acted promptly

after the entry of final judgment.” Id.; see also U.S. ex

rel. McGough v. Covington Techs. Co., 967 F.2d 1391,

1394 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The ‘general rule [is] that a

post-judgment motion to intervene is timely if filed

within the time allowed for the filing of an appeal.’”).

Here, the States filed their motion to intervene before

the Ninth Circuit’s mandate had even issued and with

over a month remaining in the window for filing a

petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the

Ninth Circuit’s December 2, 2020 opinion. 10 And the

10 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c), parties generally have 90 days to

file a petition for certiorari. That period was extended to 150 days

as a matter of course during the coronavirus pandemic. See

23

United States itself was pursuing review of the

equivalent adverse decisions of the Second and

Seventh Circuits. Supra at 8-9.

b. If this Court rejects that conclusion and holds

that the States should have intervened earlier—when

the United States was defending the Public Charge

Rule, including by seeking this Court’s review—it

would invite gross inefficiencies. Interested parties

would have to intervene in any case in which it was

conceivable that the original parties would change

their positions.

Under such an approach, States might need to

move for anticipatory intervention in thousands of

cases when there is a change in administration to

protect their interests against unforeseen reversals by

the Government. This would not only be a tremendous

waste of resources for courts and parties, but it may

also be barred by Rule 24 itself, which requires that

an intervenor demonstrate that its interests are not

adequately protected. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).

Still, interested parties might feel compelled to move

to intervene in a host of cases between Election Day

and Inauguration Day so that they cannot be later

accused of intervening too late. If courts denied those

motions, interested parties would then need to keep

filing seriatim motions to intervene upon any new

hint of inadequate representation. And they would do

so until intervention was granted or the case reached

final conclusion—and potentially for hundreds or

March 19, 2020 Order, available at https://www.supremecourt.

gov/orders/courtorders/031920zr_d1o3.pdf. The States filed their

motion to intervene on March 10, 2021, well within the 150 days

allotted. JA 55.

24

thousands of cases every time an administration turns

over.

This Court’s guidance in McDonald, the contours

of Rule 24, and commonsense all support a finding

that the States’ motion—filed within one day of the

United States’ abandonment of its defense and filed

within the original time period for seeking this Court’s

review—was timely.

2. The States have a significant

protectable interest that could be

impaired.

The States have significant protectable interests

in the Public Charge Rule’s continuing validity that

could—indeed will—be impaired absent intervention.

Most simply, the Public Charge Rule will save the

States money. DHS expressly estimated that the Rule

would cumulatively save the States $1.01 billion

annually. JA 122. “The Rule itself predicts a 2.5

percent decrease in enrollment in public benefits

programs,” Pet.App. 68, and the federal government

only pays a portion of the costs of these programs.

Invalidating the Public Charge Rule will thus inflict

economic injury on the States, and the avoidance of

incurring such economic injury is a classic protectable

interest supporting intervention. United States v.

Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 2004);

Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 295

F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2002); National Parks

Conservation Ass’n v. EPA, 759 F.3d 969, 976 (8th Cir.

2014). And the potential impairment here is equally

obvious: absent intervention, Respondents’ collusive

conduct will deprive the States of all the benefits they

otherwise would have obtained under the Public

Charge Rule.

25

The States also have an important interest in

conserving their Medicaid and related social-welfare

budgets to ensure that they are able to adequately

provide for the economically disadvantaged. Alfred L.

Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458

U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (States have “quasi-sovereign

interest[s] in the health and well-being—both

physical and economic—of [their] residents in

general.”). Recent spending bills notwithstanding,

state and federal social-spending budgets are not

unlimited, and freeing up dollars for those in greatest

need serves the States’ quasi-sovereign interests.

Beyond that, federal courts should be particularly

solicitous of State interests in the immigration

context. Congress, through preemption, has

substantially prevented States from protecting

themselves from immigration-related harms by

precluding them from enacting their own laws. See

Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012)

(“The Government of the United States has broad,

undoubted power over the subject of immigration and

the status of aliens.”). Given federal preemption,

States frequently can protect their interests only by

ensuring that the federal government complies with

federal law, including both substantive immigration

law and the APA’s procedural requirements. Denying

intervention to the States in this context thus causes

particularly acute harms, since it effectively forecloses

one of the few (or only) avenues for the States to

protect their interests. See id. at 397 (“The

pervasiveness of federal regulation does not diminish

the importance of immigration policy to the States.”).

Finally, Rule 24(a)(2) does not require a party to

assert its own unique claim or defense to be a proper

intervenor.

Instead,

courts

routinely

allow

26

intervention by a party that does not assert a unique

claim or defense. See, e.g., Trbovich v. United Mine

Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 530-31, 537 (1972);

Cascade Nat. Gas Corp. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 386

U.S. 129, 135-36 (1967); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson

Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010); Entergy Corp. v.

Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009). And

sanctioning this new requirement would generally

undermine intervention.

3. Respondents no longer adequately

represent the States’ interests.

The adequacy of representation prong is not

reasonably disputable here. Without warning, the

United States abruptly abandoned its defense of the

Rule. In a matter of hours, and at the Government’s

insistence, litigation was abandoned and every case

about the Rule was dismissed—leaving only an

unreviewed, nationwide vacatur of the Rule in place.

No party now adequately represents the States’

interests because no remaining party defends the

Rule. In fact, not a single Respondent has suggested—

either in their Ninth Circuit briefs opposing

intervention, or in their briefs in opposition here—

that the United States adequately protected the

States’ interests. That failure constitutes a waiver of

any such contention. S. Ct. R. 15(2); see, e.g., Stop the

Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Env’t

Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 729 (2010) (“Neither objection

appeared in the briefs in opposition to the petition for

writ

of

certiorari,

and

since

neither

is

jurisdictional, we deem both waived.”).

*

*

*

Because Petitioner States satisfied all the

requirements for intervention as of right here, the

27

Ninth Circuit erred in its unreasoned denial of the

States’ motion to intervene.

B. Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit should

have granted permissive intervention.

Under Rule 24(b)(1)(B), federal courts may permit

intervention by litigants who file a “timely motion”

and have “a claim or defense that shares with the

main action a common question of law or fact.” That

standard was satisfied here. As discussed, the States’

motion was timely. Supra at 20-24. And the States

sought to advance common legal arguments in defense

of the Rule—i.e., that the Public Charge Rule was

substantively and procedurally valid.

Equity also demanded a favorable exercise of

discretion on Petitioners’ motion. This Court had

already signaled the importance of this issue by

granting multiple stays and a writ of certiorari. Issues

of such importance should be decided on the merits

rather than by strategic surrenders. Indeed, “[i]t is too

late in the day and entirely contrary to the spirit of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on

the merits to be avoided on the basis of such mere

technicalities.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181

(1962).

Permissive

intervention

was

particularly

warranted given the unprecedentedly collusive nature

of Respondents’ actions. Respondents executed a

nationwide, multi-court, simultaneous strategic

surrender that (they hoped) would move so quickly

that no one could intervene before all challenges to the

Public Charge Rule were dismissed and appellate

mandates issued. And they very nearly succeeded,

foiled only by the States’ extraordinarily quick actions

and this Court granting certiorari.

28

It appears that no prior Administration—in our

Republic’s entire history—has ever engaged in

equivalent conduct. Certainly Respondents have

never identified anything remotely comparable in the

briefing below or their briefs in opposition here.

Denying intervention seeking to stop this normbreaking conduct cannot constitute an appropriate

exercise of discretion.

Beyond that, because denying Petitioners’ motion

allowed the Government to circumvent APA

rulemaking requirements, it was an abuse of

discretion to deny permissive intervention. The APA’s

rulemaking procedures are broadly solicitous of public

comments and thus burdensome by design. This no

doubt tempts agencies to circumvent APA rulemaking

via litigation surrender, which is remarkably

nonburdensome by comparison. But a core purpose of

intervention is to permit unnamed parties that would

be injured by existing parties’ litigation conduct to join

the suit and thereby attempt to prevent the

deprivation of their rights—including their APA

notice-and-comment rights. That’s one reason the

States sought intervention here, making the denial of

permissive intervention necessarily an abuse of

discretion.

Finally, given this case’s importance and Judge

VanDyke’s well-reasoned dissent, the Ninth Circuit’s

refusal to offer even a scintilla of reasoning was an

abuse of discretion. Worse yet, the Fourth and

Seventh Circuits likewise failed to offer any reasoning

whatsoever when denying motions to intervene and

recall the mandates of a similar group of States. Cook

County v. Wolf, No. 20-3150, Dkt. 26 (7th Cir. Mar. 15,

2021); CASA de Md., Inc. v. Biden, No. 19-2222, Dkt.

216 (4th Cir. Mar. 18, 2021).

29

This unwillingness to treat the States’ motions to

intervene seriously is troublesome, and this Court

should make plain that the complete absence of

reasoning in denying intervention in this context was

inappropriate.

II. Respondents’ mootness

unpersuasive.

arguments

are

Since this case started, Respondents have done all

they can to skirt Petitioners’ merits arguments. Most

prominently, they urged this Court to deny certiorari

based on mootness. They contended that the Ninth

Circuit correctly denied intervention because when

the States filed their motion, the underlying appeal

was moot. Respondents based that argument on the

Northern District of Illinois’s vacatur order and the

agency’s ensuing repeal of the Rule. See U.S.BIO 1012.

If Respondents re-raise their mootness argument

on the merits, it warrants the same credence now as

it did at the petition stage—that is, none. Because

Petitioners moved to intervene on March 10—before

the Government rescinded the Rule or the Northern

District of Illinois closed the case—the underlying

appeal self-evidently remained live. And even after

those events occurred, Petitioners’ motion to

intervene was not moot. A case is not moot if a litigant

retains any “‘concrete interest, however small, in the

outcome[.]’” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172

(2013). Mootness occurs “only when it is impossible for

a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the

prevailing party.” Knox, 567 U.S. at 307 (cleaned up).

Here, Petitioners could obtain effectual relief

upon intervening. A court could conclude that the

underlying dispute is not moot and sustain the Public

30

Charge Rule on the merits. Even if a court thought the

underlying appeal was moot, it could still grant

Petitioners meaningful relief by vacating all prior

decisions under Munsingwear.

That means Petitioners clear the mootness

threshold. Again, mootness does not depend on

whether a court would grant either form of relief, but

on whether it could. See Chafin, 568 U.S. at 174. It

will be “for lower courts at later stages of the litigation

to decide” whether Petitioners are “in fact entitled to

the relief” they seek. Id. at 177. What matters now is

that the possibility of relief not be “so implausible that

it may be disregarded” for purposes of jurisdiction. Id.

Far from implausible, that relief could and should be

granted after Petitioners intervene.

A. If Petitioners intervene, they could

successfully defend the Rule.

The Government’s decision to rescind the Rule

could not moot this case because its rescission is a

form of voluntary cessation. That “the government

withdraws or modifies a [policy] in the course of

litigation … does not necessarily moot the case.”

Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1297 (2021).

Rather, “[i]t is well settled that a defendant’s

voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not

deprive a federal court of its power to determine the

legality of the practice.” City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s

Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982). Any other rule

would allow the Government to frustrate “the ‘public

interest in having the legality of the [challenged]

practices settled.’” DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.

312, 318 (1974). A governmental defendant that tries

to moot a case through voluntary cessation “bears the

formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely

31

clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not

reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth,

Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,

190 (2000).

The Government cannot carry its formidable

burden here. This Court is “critical” of “postcertiorari

maneuvers designed to insulate a decision from

review[.]” Knox, 567 U.S. at 307. And the

Government’s maneuvers here were blatant. DHS’s

rescission of the Rule changes nothing because the

agency “retain[s] authority to reinstate [the prior

policy] at any time.” Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1297;

accord Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc.,

137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 n.1 (2017) (governor’s directive

to end an agency program did not moot the challenge

to that program because the State remained free to

“revert to its [prior] policy”). Not even the rigors of

notice-and-comment rulemaking stand in the agency’s

way, since the rescission bypassed that process. And,

as this case illustrates, a presidential administration

can change its opinion on immigration policy at any

time. See also Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Biden Reverses

Course Again After Backlash and Will Increase

Refugee Limit, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 2021,

nyti.ms/3Iehy5O (reversal on refugee limit); Erin

Brady, Biden Administration Resuming Trump’s

‘Remain in Mexico’ Policy Starting Next Week,

Newsweek (Dec. 2, 2021), bit.ly/3ppZm0r (reversal on

Remain-in-Mexico policy).

The Government might insist that its rescission

was involuntary, a mere response to the Northern

District of Illinois’s vacatur order. That argument

strips the word “involuntary” of all meaning. The

Government arranged to permanently enjoin itself by

dismissing its appeals, deactivating the appellate

32

stays, and rushing out a vacatur, while

simultaneously refusing to litigate the case that this

Court had already granted.

Regardless, the Ninth Circuit has held that even

a nationwide injunction in a different circuit does not

moot another case seeking the same relief. “[N]o court

has adopted the [contrary] view,” according to the

Ninth Circuit; courts treat the problem of conflicting

orders as “a prudential concern, not a jurisdictional

one.” California, 941 F.3d at 421-22. In this very case,

the Ninth Circuit held that nationwide injunctions

from other circuits could not moot the dispute over

whether the Public Charge Rule should be enjoined.

Pet.App. 122 (citing California, 941 F.3d at 423). It

could do the same here.

The Illinois vacatur also cannot moot anything

because the litigation over its legality is not yet final.

A coalition of States moved to intervene in that case.

The district court denied their motion, Cook County,

2021 WL 3633917, but the States are actively

appealing that denial. Cook County, No. 21-2561 (7th

Cir.). If this Court concludes that Petitioners should

have been granted intervention here, the Seventh

Circuit has no justifiable reason for denying

intervention there. And if the States can intervene

there, it will remove any doubt that they may

challenge the district court’s vacatur under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The possibility that a

Rule 60(b) motion could succeed defeats any

suggestion that the motion to intervene is moot. See

Cooper v. Newsom, 13 F.4th 857, 864 (9th Cir. 2021);

Karsner v. Lothian, 532 F.3d 876, 885 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

A successful Rule 60(b) motion would eliminate

not only the vacatur, but also the agency’s rescission

33

of the Public Charge Rule. According to the agency, it

rescinded the Rule for a single reason: “the agency’s

immediate need to implement the now-effective final

judgment” from Illinois. 86 Fed. Reg. at 14,221. In

fact, the agency made its rescission retroactive to the

date of that court’s order. Id. Without that vacatur,

the rescission would have no lawful basis. The agency

would likely have to rescind the rescission itself. If it

declined, Petitioners would sue the agency under the

APA and win. See 5 U.S.C. §706(2); e.g., DHS v.

Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1910-15

(2020).

So even if the Government were right that the

Illinois vacatur forced its hand, the underlying appeal

would not be moot. As this Court has explained,

“compliance with a judicial decision does not moot a

case if it remains possible to undo the effects of

compliance[.]” Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v.

Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1661 (2019)

(cleaned up); accord Bakery Sales Drivers Loc. Union

No. 33 v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437, 442 (1948); Maher v.

Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 468 n.4 (1977). When a government

defendant “amend[s] an ordinance or regulation as

required by an injunction,” the mere “possibility of

later repeal or revision defeats mootness.” 13B

Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure §3533.2.2 (3d ed. 2021).

That is the case here. The sole basis for the

agency’s rescission was the Illinois vacatur.

Challenges to that vacatur remain pending and could

succeed, especially if this Court rules for Petitioners

here. And if one of those challenges succeeds, the

agency will have to rescind its rescission. No matter

that success on this strategy is “not assured”; the fact

34

that it exists defeats mootness. Chafin, 568 U.S. at

175.

B. If Petitioners intervene, they could move

for Munsingwear vacatur.

Even if Respondents were right that the

underlying appeal is moot, that fact would not make

Petitioners’ motion to intervene moot. When a case

becomes moot before all appellate options are

exhausted, the “‘established practice’” is to prevent

any collateral consequences by vacating all prior

decisions. Azar v. Garza, 138 S. Ct. 1790, 1792 (2018).

Petitioners could ask for vacatur if they were granted

intervention. And the possibility that they would

secure that relief is enough to sustain a live

controversy over their motion to intervene. See

Chafin, 568 U.S. at 176-77.

Munsingwear is “rooted in equity,” Garza, 138 S.

Ct. at 1792, and is thus inherently “flexible,” Alvarez

v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 94 (2009). It stems from this

Court’s broader power to “make such disposition of the

whole case as justice may require.” Walling v. James

V. Reuter, Inc., 321 U.S. 671, 677 (1944); see 28 U.S.C.

§2106. Courts vacate decisions when the dispute is

voluntarily mooted by the winner. Garza, 138 S. Ct. at

1792. They vacate decisions when the dispute is

mooted by happenstance. United States v.

Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 40 (1950). They even

vacate decisions when the dispute is mooted by the

loser. E.g., United States v. Weatherhead, 528 U.S.

1042 (1999); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys. v.

New Left Educ. Project, 414 U.S. 807 (1973); Duke

Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 299 U.S. 259, 268

(1936). In Munsingwear itself, the Court explained

that the federal government would have been entitled

35

to vacatur after it mooted the case by voluntarily

changing the challenged regulation, even though the

prior judgment went against it. 340 U.S. at 39.

Petitioners could obtain Munsingwear vacatur

here. If this case is moot, that’s due to the voluntary,

coordinated actions of Respondents. Some of those

Respondents were plaintiffs who won below, so it

“‘would certainly be … strange’” to let them “‘retain

the benefit of the judgment.’” Garza, 138 S. Ct. at

1792. And while the Government formally lost below,

that fact does not foreclose vacatur. See Munsingwear,

340 U.S. at 39. Now that the Government has

switched sides, it benefits from the Ninth Circuit’s

judgment as much as the Plaintiffs.

Nor does this Court’s decision in Bancorp counsel

against vacatur. Bancorp was a bankruptcy dispute

about the validity of a reorganization plan. After this

Court granted certiorari, both parties “stipulated to a

consensual plan of reorganization” and agreed that

the dispute was moot. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v.

Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 19-20 (1994). The

petitioner then asked for vacatur. Id. at 20. This Court

declined. It held that courts can refuse to award

vacatur where “the party seeking relief from the

judgment below”—that is, the petitioner—“caused the

mootness by voluntary action.” Id. at 24. The Court

focused on the petitioner’s role because a “‘suitor’s

conduct in relation to the matter at hand may

disentitle him to the relief he seeks.’” Id. at 25. A

petitioner who agreed to moot a case, the Court

explained, was like someone who “failed to appeal at

all.” Id. Such a party forfeits the right to contest the

underlying judgment, including by vacatur.

36

Like Munsingwear itself, the Bancorp exception is

equitable and flexible. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 29. The

Bancorp Court rejected the notion that “vacatur can

never be granted when mootness is produced” via

settlement. Id. at 29. Vacatur still could be

appropriate in “exceptional circumstances,” and

courts “must also take account of the public interest.”

Id. at 29, 26. The overarching command is to dispose

of moot cases “in the manner most consonant to justice

in view of the nature and character of the conditions

which have caused the case to become moot.” Id. at 24

(cleaned up).

The Bancorp exception should not apply here.

Petitioners would be the ones seeking vacatur, and

they in no way agreed to settle the underlying case.

Cf. id. at 26. They vigorously opposed Respondents’

case-mooting actions and tried to use the available

legal channels to stop them. This case thus does “not

present … the kind of voluntary forfeiture of a legal

remedy that led the Court in Bancorp to find that

considerations of fairness and equity tilted against

vacatur.” Alvarez, 558 U.S. at 97 (cleaned up). Nor

would denying Petitioners vacatur serve the “public

interest” or do “justice” here. Cf. Bancorp, 513 U.S at

26, 24. Exactly the opposite: It would reward collusive

litigation tactics, allow the Government to bypass the

APA, and leave precedents on the books that this

Court flagged as dubious.

To be sure, as Judge VanDyke recognized,

applying Munsingwear to this case would present a

question of first impression. See Pet.App. 37-38. But

Petitioners have powerful arguments for why that

remedy is appropriate here. Only intervention would

allow Petitioners to make their case.

37

Vacatur would provide Petitioners with important

relief. As it always does, vacatur would preserve all

“rights” and prevent any “prejudice[]” by

“eliminat[ing] a judgment” and “clear[ing] the path for

future relitigation[.]” Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40. It

would allow Arizona, Montana, and other Petitioners

to litigate the Public Charge Rule on a clean slate in

any pending or future lawsuits in the Ninth Circuit.

That important benefit keeps the underlying appeal

alive for purposes of deciding whether Munsingwear

vacatur is appropriate. See Democratic Exec. Comm.

of Fla. v. Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm., 950

F.3d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Bancorp, 513

U.S. at 21). And that important benefit, no matter how

“‘small’” or “‘partial’” it might be, means that a court

could do something meaningful if Petitioners are

allowed to intervene. Chafin, 568 U.S. at 172, 177. If

the Ninth Circuit denied Petitioners’ motion to

intervene based on mootness, it erred.

III. Denying

intervention

in

circumstances would sow disorder.

these

If Petitioners cannot intervene here, future

administrations

will

follow

the

Biden

Administration’s unfortunate blueprint. The victims

will be good government, agency accountability, and

the rule of law.

As explained, administrations seeking to repeal

rules have traditionally done so through the

statutorily required notice-and-comment process. The

APA itself “mandate[s] that agencies use the same

procedures when they amend or repeal a rule as they

used to issue the rule in the first instance.” Perez, 575

U.S. at 101; see also 5 U.S.C. §§553(b)-(c); 551(5).

Thus, “[a] rule promulgated by prior notice and

38

comment can generally be rescinded only by noticeand-comment procedures.” Anne Joseph O’Connell,

Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105

Nw. U. L. Rev. 471, 528 (2011). The Government

agrees. See Brief for the Fed. Pet’rs at 4, Perez, 575

U.S. 92 (Nos. 13-1041, 13-1052), 2014 WL 4101228, at

*30. (APA makes “no distinction … between initial

agency action and subsequent agency action undoing

or revising that action”).

The notice-and-comment procedure is a salutary

and essential feature of modern administrative law.

In mandating it, “Congress made a judgment that

notions of fairness and informed administrative

decisionmaking require that agency decisions be

made only after affording interested persons notice

and an opportunity to comment.” Chrysler Corp. v.

Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979).

The Biden Administration’s strategy bypassed

notice and comment completely. After the

Government arranged for the Rule’s vacatur by the

courts, the agency rapidly arranged for its vacatur by

executive fiat. The agency did not provide notice, did

not solicit comment, did not analyze the costs and

benefits of the change, and offered no reason for the

repeal besides “implement[ing] the judgment” of the

district court. 86 Fed. Reg. 14,221. By working

together with the plaintiffs challenging the Rule, the

Government got rid of a notice-and-comment

regulation in just one week.

The incentives for future administrations to follow

this blueprint are obvious. “Notice-and-comment

procedures are elaborate and take time to complete.”

Allina Health, 139 S. Ct. at 1822 (Breyer, J.,

dissenting). One government study estimated that the

39

average rule making procedure under the APA took

around four years. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off.,

GAO-09-205, Improvements Needed to Monitoring

and Evaluation of Rules Development as Well as to the

Transparency of OMB Regulatory Reviews 5 (2009). In

addition to taking up time and energy, the notice-andcomment process also comes with exacting judicial

scrutiny, even when the agency’s new rule merely

restores a prior status quo. See State Motor Vehicle

Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).

Ethical rules and longstanding traditions are

(apparently) no longer enough to stop this tactic. The

only way to check norm-breaking actions like those at

issue here is by allowing parties who would be injured

by a judicial invalidation to intervene once the

Government stops defending the rule. Those

intervenors (often States) can raise all arguments in

defense of the rule, instead of letting it be vacated by

default; and the Government is free to join the

plaintiffs in arguing against the legality of its own

rule or actions. The intervenors may or may not

succeed. But at least the rule’s fate will be decided

based on competing arguments raised by adversaries,

rather than backroom deals cut by colluders.

Allowing intervention in those circumstances will

not cause any real problems, like a flood of

undesirable intervenors. Under existing law, an

intervenor can appeal a decision only if it

“independently demonstrate[s] [Article-III] standing.”

Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct.

1945, 1951 (2019). In other words, any intervenor

seeking to appeal a judgment that the original parties

do not challenge must establish its own actual or

imminent injury, traceable to the judgment below,

40

and redressable by a favorable appellate decision.

Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct.

2356, 2362 (2019). That requirement ensures only

those parties with “a sufficient stake in the outcome

of the controversy” will be able to continue a lawsuit,

while the vast majority of interested onlookers will

not. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 136 (1986). Article

III’s real limitations have and will continue to prevent

improper parties from abusing intervention.

In fact, it is the Government’s position that would

engender a flood of intervention motions. As

discussed, supra at 23-24, if every regulatory

challenge could become unreviewable when an

administration changes, interested parties would

have to preemptively move to intervene in every

ongoing case involving a rule that the new

administration might abandon. They could not wait

until the new administration actually changed

position because, as this case shows, it takes only days

for the case to be gone and the rule to be rescinded.

And the Government would then argue, as it argues

here, that the motion to intervene is moot.

Petitioners satisfy the requirements for

intervention and continue to have a live interest in the

outcome of this case. By holding that the Ninth Circuit

should have granted their motion, this Court will

retain order. It will prevent a revolution in regulatory

repeals, ensuring that sudden changes, coordinated

dismissals, and summary orders are not an acceptable

substitute for the APA’s notice-and-comment process.

It will convey to future administrations that similar

gambits will likely fail. And it will reiterate the right

of injured intervenors to take up abandoned causes on

appeal, while reassuring others that they need not

41

waste party or judicial resources on preemptive

intervention.

CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the Ninth Circuit’s

judgment denying Petitioners’ motion to intervene

and remand with instructions to grant that motion.

December 13, 2021

Respectfully Submitted,

TYLER R. GREEN

CAMERON T. NORRIS

JEFFREY S. HETZEL

CONSOVOY MCCARTHY

PLLC

1600 Wilson Blvd.,

Suite 700

Arlington, VA 22209

MARK BRNOVICH

Attorney General

JOSEPH A. KANEFIELD

Chief Deputy and

Chief of Staff

BRUNN W. ROYSDEN III

Solicitor General

DREW C. ENSIGN

Deputy Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

KATE B. SAWYER

Assistant Solicitor General

KATLYN J. DIVIS

Assistant Attorney General

OFFICE OF THE ARIZONA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

2005 N. Central Ave.

Phoenix, AZ 85004

(602) 542-5025

drew.ensign@azag.gov

Counsel for Petitioners

(Additional Counsel listed below)

42

STEVE MARSHALL

Attorney General of Alabama

LESLIE RUTLEDGE

Attorney General of Arkansas

THEODORE E. ROKITA

Attorney General of Indiana

DEREK SCHMIDT

Attorney General of Kansas

JEFF LANDRY

Attorney General of Louisiana

LYNN FITCH

Attorney General of Mississippi

ERIC S. SCHMITT

Attorney General of Missouri

AUSTIN KNUDSEN

Attorney General of Montana

JOHN M. O’CONNOR

Attorney General of Oklahoma

ALAN WILSON

Attorney General of South Carolina

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of Texas

PATRICK MORRISEY

Attorney General of West Virginia

APPENDIX

i

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 24……………………………………………App. 1

App. 1

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 24. Intervention

(a) Intervention of Right. On timely motion, the

court must permit anyone to intervene who:

(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by

a federal statute; or

(2) claims an interest relating to the property or

transaction that is the subject of the action, and

is so situated that disposing of the action may

as a practical matter impair or impede the

movant's ability to protect its interest, unless

existing parties adequately represent that

interest.

(b) Permissive Intervention.

(1) In General. On timely motion, the court may

permit anyone to intervene who:

(A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a

federal statute; or

(B) has a claim or defense that shares with the

main action a common question of law or

fact.

(2) By a Government Officer or Agency. On

timely motion, the court may permit a federal

or state governmental officer or agency to

intervene if a party’s claim or defense is based

on:

(A) a statute or executive order administered by

the officer or agency; or

(B) any regulation, order, requirement, or

agreement issued or made under the statute

or executive order.

App. 2

(3) Delay or Prejudice. In exercising its

discretion, the court must consider whether the

intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the

adjudication of the original parties’ rights.

(c) Notice and Pleading Required. A motion to

intervene must be served on the parties as

provided in Rule 5. The motion must state the

grounds for intervention and be accompanied by a

pleading that sets out the claim or defense for

which intervention is sought.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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