Amicus Curiae Brief — Public Watchdogs, Petitioner v. Southern California Edison Company, et al.

No. 20-1676

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

PUBLIC WATCHDOGS,

Petitioner,

v.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of A ppeals for the Ninth Circuit

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE and Amicus Curiae

Brief of Northwestern University Pritzker

School of Law Environmental Advocacy

Clinic, et al. in Support of Petitioner

Helen S. K ang

Director, Environmental

Law and Justice Clinic

Golden Gate University

School of Law

536 Mission Street

San Francisco, CA 94105

(415) 442-6693

Nancy C. Loeb

Counsel of Record

Director, Environmental

A dvocacy Clinic

Northwestern University

Pritzker School of Law

375 E. Chicago Avenue

Chicago, IL 60611

(312) 503-0052

n-loeb@law.northwestern.edu

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

(For Continuation of Appearances See Inside Cover)

July 1, 2021

305087

Oday Salim

Director, Environmental

Law & Sustainability

Clinic

University Of Michigan

School Of Law

701 South State Street

3018 Jeffries Hall

Ann Arbor, MI 48109

(734) 763-7087

Pedro Saade Llorens

A djunct Professor,

Environmental Law Clinic

Escuela De Derecho Upr

7 Ave. Universidad,

Suite 701

San Juan, PR 00925

(787) 397-9993

Nicholas J. Schroeck

Director, Environmental

Law Clinic

University of Detroit

Mercy School of Law

Riverfront Campus

George J. Asher Law Center,

Room 210

(313) 596-9817

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

3

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF

AS AMICI CURIAE

Amici Curiae (“Amici”) are five environmental legal

clinics. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.2(b), Amici

respectfully move for leave to file the accompanying brief

as amici curiae in support of the petition for a writ of

certiorari.

All parties were timely notified of proposed Amici’s

intent to file this brief. Petitioner has consented to the

filing of the brief. Amici are filing this motion because

we have been unable to secure consent from Respondent.*

Proposed Amici therefore file this motion seeking leave

to file the amicus brief. A copy of the proposed brief is

attached.

As more fully explained in the Appendix to this motion

and on page 1 of the attached brief under “Interests of

Amici Curiae,” Amici are environmental protection legal

clinics dedicated to providing legal representation and

advocacy services to people and organizations affected

by activities that cause actual or potential environmental

or human health hazards. Amici’s interests include the

protection of people and the environment from emissions

and discharges of hazardous substances in violation of

federal and state environmental laws. Accordingly, Amici

have a particular interest in ensuring the availability of

legal forums and procedures to protect those interests.

*Emails requesting consent were sent to Respondent on

June 15th, 2021, and June 20 th, 2021, and a voicemail was left with

Respondent on June 22nd, 2021. Email requesting consent was

sent to Petitioner on June 7th, 2021. As of this date, Petitioner

has consented, but we have not received a reply from Respondent.

4

This brief will assist the Court in determining whether

to grant certiorari because Amici are well-positioned to

point out the importance of this case in ensuring that

cases regarding environmental protection that involve

nuclear facilities, including environmental citizen suits,

may be heard by district courts. Amici are not motived

by a desire to influence the outcome of any pending case,

nor are Amici interested in the merits of this particular

case, Public Watchdogs v. Southern California Edison

Company, et al. Rather, Amici can inform the Court of

the broad implications of the Ninth Circuit’s viewpoint that

the Administrative Order Review Act requires virtually

all suits against parties engaged in the business of nuclear

materials be brought directly in the courts of appeals.

Accordingly, Amici respectfully request that the

Court grant leave to file the attached brief as Amici

Curiae.

Respectfully submitted,

Helen S. K ang

Director, Environmental

Law and Justice Clinic

Golden Gate University

School of Law

536 Mission Street

San Francisco, CA 94105

(415) 442-6693

Nancy C. Loeb

Counsel of Record

Director, Environmental

A dvocacy Clinic

Northwestern University

Pritzker School of Law

375 E. Chicago Avenue

Chicago, IL 60611

(312) 503-0052

n-loeb@law.northwestern.edu

5

Oday Salim

Director, Environmental

Law & Sustainability

Clinic

University Of Michigan

School Of Law

701 South State Street

3018 Jeffries Hall

Ann Arbor, MI 48109

(734) 763-7087

Pedro Saade Llorens

A djunct Professor,

Environmental Law Clinic

Escuela De Derecho Upr

7 Ave. Universidad,

Suite 701

San Juan, PR 00925

(787) 397-9993

Nicholas J. Schroeck

Director, Environmental

Law Clinic

University of Detroit

Mercy School of Law

Riverfront Campus

George J. Asher Law Center,

Room 210

(313) 596-9817

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Hobbs Act deprives a federal district

court of subject matter jurisdiction over state law and

Price-Anderson Act claims asserted by a private actor

against private party NRC licensees, on the ground such

claims are “ancillary or incidental to” an NRC final order?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

I.

ON ITS FACE, THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S

INTERPRETATION OF THE HOBBS ACT

IS OVERLY BROAD AND CONTRARY

TO THE PRECEDENTS OF THIS

COURT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S OVERLY BROAD

INTERPRETATION OF THE HOBBS

ACT’S EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION

PROVISION CONFLICTS WITH AND

WOULD INTERFERE WITH SPECIFIC

J U R I S DIC T IONA L PR OV I SIONS

OF FEDERAL EN VIRONMENTAL

LAWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

A. Citizen Suit Provisions – Which Place

Jurisdiction In The District Courts –

Are Key Elements In Enforcement

Of Federal Environmental Law . . . . . . . . . . 7

iii

Table of Contents

Page

B. The District Courts Are A Recognized

Forum For Environmental Citizen

Suits, Including Actions Involving NRC

Licensees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

C. The District Courts Are The Most

Efficient And Appropriate Venue

For Env i ron ment a l Cla i ms Not

D i r e c t l y R e l a t e d To A n N R C

Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN

PUBLIC WATCHDOGS WOULD ALSO

IMPROPERLY PRECLUDE DISTRICT

COURT JURISDICTION OVER STATE

LAW TORT CLAIMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

A. T his Cou r t ’s P recedent Clea rly

Recognizes Continuing Viability of State

Law Tort Claims Against NRC Licensed

Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

B. Tort Law Fills An Important Role In

Environmental Cases That The Ninth

Circuit’s Decision Would Preclude . . . . . . . 19

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

iv

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council

of Baltimore,

141 S. Ct. 1532 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Citizens for Alts. v. Cast Transp.,

No. CIV 99-321 MCA/ACT, 2004 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 34843 (D.N.M. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v.

GTE Sylvania, Inc.,

447 U.S. 102 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Controneo v. Shaw Env’t & Infrastructure, Inc.,

639 F.3d 186 (5th Cir. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Cook v. Rockwell International Corp.,

790 F.3d 1088 (10th Cir. 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Crawford v. Nat’l Lead Co.,

784 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Ohio 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Dumontier v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp.,

543 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion,

470 U.S. 729 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Friends of the Earth v. Carey,

535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

v

Cited Authorities

Page

Friends of the Earth v. Consol. Rail Corp.,

768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.

Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc.,

484 U.S. 49 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,

493 U.S. 20, 110 S. Ct. 304, 107 L. Ed. 2d 237

(1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc.,

446 U.S. 578 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II,

940 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys.,

835 F. Supp. 959 (W.D. Ky. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

NRDC, Inc. v. Train,

510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8

Nw. Envt’l Advocs. v. City of Portland,

56 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,

518 U.S. 1018 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

O’Connor v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,

13 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

vi

Cited Authorities

Page

PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey,

594 U.S.

, No. 19-1039 (June 29, 2021) . . . . . . . . 12

Public Watchdogs v. S. Cal. Edison,

984 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Ranier v. Union Carbide Corp.,

402 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Roberts v. Fla. Power & Light Co.,

146 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,

464 U.S. 238 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 19, 20

Steward v. Honeywell International, Inc.,

469 F. Supp. 3d 874 (S.D. Ill. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Student Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp. of New Jersey v.

Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co.,

642 F. Supp. 103 (D.N.J. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 14

Susquehanna Valley All. v.

Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor,

619 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 12, 13

Statutes and Other Authorities

15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

vii

Cited Authorities

Page

28 U.S.C. § 2342(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

28 U.S.C. § 5841 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

33 U.S.C. § 1311(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

33 U.S.C. § 1365 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 13

42 U.S.C. § 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

42 U.S.C. § 2239 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

42 U.S.C. § 2239(b)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

42 U.S.C. § 7604 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

42 U.S.C. § 9609 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

10 C.F.R. § 2.206 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 16

10 C.F.R. § 2.206(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

11 Ross Macfarlane & Lori Terry, Citizen Suits:

Impacts on Permitting and Agency Enforcement,

11.4 Nat’l Resources & Env’t 20 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . 7

viii

Cited Authorities

Page

Edward Lloyd, Citizen Suits and Defenses Against

Them, CW014 A.L.I.-C.L.E. 285 (2015) . . . . . . 7, 9, 16

Eileen Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen

Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on the

Road to Environmental Justice, 22 Ecology

L.Q. 1 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

H.R. Rep. No. 2122, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1950) . . . . 14

James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends

in Environmental Citizen Suits At 30,

10 Widener L. Rev. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Latham et al., The Intersection of Tort and

Environmental Law: Where the Twains

Should Meet and Depar t, 8 0 Fordham

L. Rev. 737 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 20

L a w s a n d E x e c u t i v e O r d e r s , h t t p s : //

w w w. e p a . g o v/ l a w s - r e g u l a t i o n s / l a w s and-executive-orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Patsy T. Mink, Nuclear Waste: The Most Compelling

Environmental Issue Facing the World Today,

8 Fordham Envt’l L. Rev. 165 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

S. Rep. No. 99-50 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

S. Rep. No. 650 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

ix

Cited Authorities

Page

Supreme Court Rule 37.2(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Supreme Court Rule 37.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

U.S. NRC, How the NRC Protects You, https://

www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/radiation/protects-you.

html#142873 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

U.S. NRC, Licensing, https://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/regulatory/licensing.html . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Preparation

of Environmental Reports for Nuclear Power

Stations, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1807/

ML18071A400.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

1

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1

The Northwestern University Pritzker School of

Law Environmental Advocacy Clinic is a nonprofit

environmental protection legal clinic dedicated to

providing legal representation and advocacy services

to people and organizations affected by activities that

cause actual or potential environmental or human health

hazards. Among the clinic’s interests are protection of

people and the environment from emissions and discharges

of hazardous substances in violation of federal and state

environmental laws and ensuring the availability of legal

forums and procedures to protect those interests.

T he G olden Gat e Un iver sit y S chool of Law

Environmental Law and Justice Clinic provides pro

bono legal representation and services to communities

bearing disproportionate environmental burdens.

Through litigation, policy advocacy, and education, the

clinic supports traditionally underrepresented groups

as they seek to improve their environmental conditions

and participate in environmental decision-making. As

1. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici curiae

(“Amici”) state that no counsel for any party authored this brief

in whole or in part and that no entity or person, aside from amici

curiae and their counsel made any monetary contribution towards

the preparation and submission of this brief. Pursuant to Supreme

Court Rule 37.2(a), Amici certify that counsel of record for all

parties received timely notice of amici curiae’s intent to file this

brief. The Petitioner consented to the filing of this brief in a letter

on file with the Clerk’s office. The Respondent has not responded

to Amici’s request and to the knowledge of amici curiae has not

consented to the filing of this brief, and this brief is being filed

pursuant to the attached motion for leave.

2

counsel for such groups, the clinic has filed numerous

enforcement actions, including citizens suits under

federal environmental laws. The clinic is also counsel in

a proceeding before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

which was initiated through a petition filed under 10 C.F.R.

§ 2.206.

The University of Michigan Law School Environmental

Law and Sustainability Clinic provides an opportunity

for students to learn how to practice environmental and

related areas of law. Founded in 1983, the clinic regularly

represents the National Wildlife Federation (NWF), its

state affiliates, and other similar organizations. The

clinic’s focus is on water and wildlife resources, public

lands, energy, and human health in the Great Lakes

watershed.

The University of Detroit Mercy School of Law

Environmental Law Clinic is a non-profit legal clinic

representing clients in a variety of water quality, energy,

air quality, and environmental justice matters. The

clinic’s work includes drafting comment letters on permit

applications; researching and developing legislative

proposals at the request of lawmakers and public interest

organizations; petitioning federal and state environmental

agencies for rulemaking; commenting on proposed federal,

state and international environmental agreements

and agency administrative rules; representing public

interest organizations in administrative permit decision

proceedings; challenging agency rulemaking and

permitting decisions in state and federal courts; and

bringing enforcement actions to set new precedents for

the application of existing statutes and regulations to

emerging environmental problems. The Environmental

3

Law Clinic works in partnership with the Great Lakes

Environmental Law Center.

The University of Puerto Rico School of Law

Environmental Law Clinic represents and advises

individuals and non-profit entities affected by or concerned

with environmental health and degradation, energy, and

the protection of natural resources.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The decision of the Ninth Circuit in Public Watchdogs

v. Southern California Edison Company is overly broad in

its interpretation of jurisdiction under the Administrative

Orders Review Act, 28 U.S.C. § 5841, et seq., also

known as the Hobbs Act (“Hobbs Act”). In holding

that the Hobbs Act precludes jurisdiction in the district

courts over any action that is “incidental” to a Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) license proceeding,

the decision effectively sweeps into exclusive Hobbs Act

jurisdiction all private actions against NRC licensees and

their contractors - including as Petitioners argue Price

Anderson Act (“PAA”) cases, which have long been held

to be properly brought in the district courts - and, of

particular concern to amici curiae (“Amici”) citizen suits

under federal environmental laws where jurisdiction is

specifically provided for in the district courts as well as

state causes of action not otherwise covered by the PAA.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner Public Watchdogs (“Petitioner”) brought

suit in federal district court against the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) and private defendant

4

nuclear energy companies and their decommissioning

subcontractor, alleging dangerous tortious conduct in

carrying out decommissioning activities at the San Onofre

Nuclear Generating Station and, inter alia, seeking to

enjoin that conduct under the Price Anderson Act and

traditional state tort remedies. The Ninth Circuit held

that Petitioner’s PAA claims and all other claims brought

fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of appeals

under the Hobbs Act because, “We must read the Hobbs

Act broadly to encompass not only all final NRC actions

in licensing proceedings, but also all decisions that are

preliminary, ancillary, or incidental to those licensing

proceedings.” Public Watchdogs v. S. Cal. Edison, 984 F.3d

744, 757-58 (9th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added). In effect, the

Ninth Circuit’s decision would bring within the scope of

the Hobbs Act – and the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts

of appeals – any cause of action of any type, by any party,

including private parties, against an NRC licensee. As

Petitioner explains, that decision is contrary to the long

history of district court jurisdiction over PAA claims by

private parties. It would also sweep into the exclusive

jurisdiction of the courts of appeals cases brought under

citizen suit provisions of numerous environmental statutes

that specifically provide for jurisdiction in the district

courts any time an NRC licensee is named as a defendant

as well as federal and state law claims by private parties

for which jurisdiction is more appropriately located in

district courts with established fact-finding procedures.

Amici urge the Court to grant certiorari to clarify

the scope of the Hobbs Act and correct the Ninth Circuit’s

overly broad interpretation of the Act.

5

I.

ON I T S FAC E , T H E N I N T H CI R C U I T ’ S

INTERPRETATION OF THE HOBBS ACT IS

OVERLY BROAD AND CONTRARY TO THE

PRECEDENTS OF THIS COURT.

Simply put, the Hobbs Act does not say what the

Ninth Circuit said it requires. The plain language of the

Hobbs Act is clear: “The Court of Appeals has exclusive

jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in

part), or to determine the validity of . . . [a]ll final orders

of the [NRC] made reviewable by section 2239 of title 42.”

28 U.S.C. § 2342(4). 2 Section 2239 provides for Hobbs Act

review of “[a]ny final order entered in any proceeding”

“for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending

of any license or construction permit, or application to

transfer control, and in any proceeding for the issuance

or modification of rules and regulations dealing with the

activities of licensees.” 42 U.S.C. § 2239(b)(1), (a)(1)(A).

As Petitioner rightly argues, this Court has held that

“strict fidelity” to the terms of judicial review provisions

that create or limit jurisdiction is required and, in the

context of the Hobbs Act, courts of appeals have limited

application of the exclusive jurisdiction provision to

challenges to direct agency action – i.e., agency orders,

regulations and rules. See Public Watchdogs Petition

for Certiorari (“Petition”) at 13. See also BP P.L.C.

v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct.

1532, 1542 (2021) (“[T]his Court’s task is to discern and

apply the law’s plain meaning as faithfully as we can”);

Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 110 S. Ct.

304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989) (“[A]bsent a clearly expressed

legislative intent to the contrary, the words of the statute

2. The NRC now exercises powers formerly exercised by

the Atomic Energy Commission and NRC orders are reviewable

in the courts of appeals under 42 U.S.C. § 2239.

6

are conclusive.”); Consumer Product Safety Comm’n

v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (“[T]he

starting point for interpreting a statute is the language

of the statute itself.”).

There is, in short, no statutory basis for the Ninth

Circuit’s broadening of the Hobbs Act’s jurisdiction

to encompass “all” decisions related to NRC licensees

including those that are no more than “incidental” to

NRC orders. Further, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation

risks doing serious damage to the carefully constructed

federal statutory framework for public enforcement of

environmental laws.

II. T H E N I N T H C I R C U I T ’ S O V E R L Y

BR OA D I N T ER PR ETAT ION OF T H E

HOBBS ACT’S EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION

P R OV I S I O N C O N F L I C T S W I T H A N D

WOU L D I N T E R F E R E W I T H S PE C I F IC

JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL

ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS.

Taken as written, the Ninth Circuit’s overbroad

interpretation of the Hobbs Act’s jurisdictional requirement

would force virtually any suit against any entity overseen

by the NRC – or even an entity contracting with an NRC

licensee – into the courts of appeals, thereby conflicting

with several federal statutes and undermining Congress’s

plan for enforcement of environmental laws.

7

A. Citizen Suit Provisions – Which Place

Jurisdiction In The District Courts – Are

Key Elements In Enforcement Of Federal

Environmental Law.

Beginning with passage of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”)

in 1970, most major federal environmental statutes provide

for a direct cause of action in federal district courts by

citizens to enforce the requirements of the statute. See

Edward Lloyd, Citizen Suits and Defenses Against Them,

CW014 A.L.I.-C.L.E. 285, 293 (2015) (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 7604) (“In 1970, Congress enacted the first citizen

suit provision in the Clean Air Act,” allowing citizens

“to sue for injunctive relief to force the regulated public

to comply with the requirements of the statute and to

require EPA to perform mandatory duties imposed on

it by the statute.”). Similar citizen-suit provisions have

been incorporated into several major environmental

statutes, including the Federal Water Pollution Control

Act (otherwise known as the Clean Water Act (“CWA”)),

33 U.S.C. § 1365, the Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”),

42 U.S.C. § 9609, and the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a), among

others. See e.g., 11 Ross Macfarlane & Lori Terry, Citizen

Suits: Impacts on Permitting and Agency Enforcement,

11.4 Nat’l Resources & Env’t 20, 21 (1997).

These citizen-suit provisions “reflect[] Congress’s

recognition that ‘[c]itizens can be a useful instrument for

detecting violations and bringing them to the attention of

the enforcement agencies and courts alike.’” NRDC, Inc.

v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 699–700 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (discussing

CAA legislative history). They were “designed to provide

8

a procedure permitting any citizen to bring an action

directly against polluters violating the . . . standards

and . . . restrictions imposed under the law or against the

Administrator grounded on his failure to discharge his

duty to enforce the statute.” Id. at 700 (emphasis added).

Moreover, “[t]he legislative history of the Clean Air Act

Amendments [also] reveals that the citizen suits provision

reflected a deliberate choice by Congress to widen citizen

access to the courts, as a supplemental and effective

assurance that the Act would be implemented and

enforced.” Id. (emphasis added). This legislative history

also “reflects Congress’ intention to grant broad authority

for citizen enforcement.” Nw. Envt’l Advocs. v. City of

Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,

518 (U.S. 1018) (1996). Indeed, “[u]nderstanding that there

would be undesirable underenforcement of environmental

laws because of limited regulatory resources, Congress

equipped many federal environmental laws with citizen

suit provisions, which essentially confer ‘private attorney

general status’ on the citizenry.” Eileen Gauna, Federal

Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and

Incentives on the Road to Environmental Justice, 22

Ecology L.Q. 1, 40 (1995). As such, “Congress made clear

that citizen groups are not to be treated as nuisances or

troublemakers but rather as welcomed participants in

the vindication of environmental interests.” Friends of

the Earth v. Consol. Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir.

1985) (quoting Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d

165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976) (referring to citizen suit provision

of the CAA)).

And, citizen suits in environmental cases have

furthered Congressional intent. “Citizen suits . . . have had

enormous impact in enhancing government enforcement of

9

environmental laws and in spurring government agencies

to implement such laws in a creative and expansive

manner. They have given citizens a new and expanded

role in the governance of the environment. Citizen

participation in environmental matters has evolved beyond

petitioning government, beyond commenting on proposed

governmental actions, to a partnership with government

in enforcing environmental laws and in assuring their

prompt implementation.” Lloyd, supra, at 290.

Citizen suits have also “achieved sig nif icant

environmental benefits,” and have “spawned new

environmental programs, expanded others, and assured

that Congressional directives were implemented by

sometimes recalcitrant and often overburdened agencies.

Congress has adopted the programs initiated in citizen

suits by amending statutes to incorporate these litigation

successes.” Id. at 280–91. In other words, “Citizen suits

work . . . . [They] have secured compliance by myriad

agencies and thousands of polluting facilities, diminished

pounds of pollution produced by the billions, and protected

hundreds of rare species and thousands of acres of

ecologically important land.” James R. May, Now More

Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits At

30, 10 Widener L. Rev. 1, 3–4.

Congress has expressed support for these impacts:

“In 1985 the Senate Committee on Environment and

Public Works recognized that citizens fulfilled their

enforcement role against violators of environmental

statutes as intended by these provisions.” Lloyd, supra, at

290. As the record indicated, “[c]itizen suits are a proven

enforcement tool. They operate as Congress intended—to

both spur and supplement to [sic] government enforcement

10

actions. They have deterred violators and achieved

significant compliance gains.” S. Rep. No. 99-50, at 28

(1985).

Notably as well, the citizen suit provisions were

enacted beginning in the 1970’s long after the Hobbs

Act and its jurisctional strictures were in place. The

jurisdictional placement of citizen suits in the district

courts would make no sense if Congress had intended

Hobbs Act jurisdiction to apply. Cf. Petition at 27 (“Even if

a conflict existed between these statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 2014

would control as the later-in-time act of Congress.”).

The potential preclusive effect on environmental

citizen suits of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Public

Watchdogs is broad and would defeat the purpose of

citizen suit provisions in a wide variety of environmental

cases unrelated to NRC orders, regulations or rules.

NRC licensing activities include construction, operation

and decommissioning of nuclear power plants as well as

export and import of nuclear materials, and construction,

operation and maintenance of nuclear waste disposal

sites and cover use of materials including medical,

industrial and academic uses of nuclear materials. See

U.S. NRC, Licensing, https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/

regulatory/licensing.html (last visited June 21, 2021).

Each of these activities intersects with areas addressed

by environmental laws, for example, the CAA and the

CWA, which are intended to be enforced in part by citizen

suits brought in the district courts. Indeed, the NRC’s

own rules recognize this intersection and the continuing

applicability of federal environmental statutes in NRC

licensing procedures. As an NRC regulatory guide states,

“In many cases, the NRC cannot issue a license or permit

11

until the appropriate State or other Federal agencies

[including the U.S. EPA] have granted licenses or permits

to the applicant. Applicants are required to comply with

applicable Federal and State environmental statutes.”

See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Preparation

of Environmental Reports for Nuclear Power Stations,

https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1807/ML18071A400.pdf

(last visited June 21, 2021). The Ninth Circuit’s opinion

would strip federal court oversight of the very statutes

the NRC’s own guide recognizes as applicable.

B. The District Courts Are A Recognized Forum

For Environmental Citizen Suits, Including

Actions Involving NRC Licensees.

Critical to consideration of Public Watchdogs’s

Petition, there is a history of these citizen-suit provisions

being used by plaintiffs to bring environmental suits

against operators of NRC-licensed nuclear facilities in the

district courts, a practice supported by the lower courts.

For example, the decision of the Third Circuit in

Susquehanna Valley All. v. Three Mile Island Nuclear

Reactor, 619 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1980) directly addresses

the issue and holds that citizen suit jurisdiction in

the district court under the CWA is not constrained

by the jurisdictional stricture of the Hobbs Act. In

Susquehanna Valley All., residents living near a nuclear

facility brought suit in federal district court against the

NRC, its Chairman, and the owner and operator of the

nuclear power plant, alleging that defendants planned

“to partially decontaminate” water contaminated with

nuclear waste, and “threaten[ed] to release this water

eventually into the Susquehanna River, where because

12

of the proposed decontamination system’s technological

limitations it [would] contaminate both municipal water

systems and fish and other wildlife used by the plaintiffs

for food” in violation of the CWA. Id. at 234.3 The Third

Circuit rejected defendants’ arguments that the Hobbs

Act required that these claims be brought initially in

administrative proceedings before the NRC (and, it

follows, on appeal from NRC administrative proceedings,

exclusively in the court of appeals). Accordingly, the

court held, “the district court erred in dismissing Count

III for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The NRC and

the Operators, perhaps anticipating that result, urge

that the dismissal should nevertheless be affirmed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Their theory is that NRC has authority to enforce the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act with respect to

radioactive discharges from nuclear power reactors,

and that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies prevents a district court from considering this

complaint. This argument is a variant of that which we

discussed . . . that the alleged violation of section 301(f),

33 U.S.C. § 1311(f), can be considered by the court of

3. Amici and Petitioner’s position is further supported

by this Court’s recent interpretation of 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) in

PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 594 U.S.

, No. 19-1039

(June 29, 2021). In PennEast Pipeline, this Court concluded that

a federal law claim that requires interpretation of a FERC order

does not fall within the appellate court’s “exclusive jurisdiction”

when that interpretation does not seek to “modify” or “set aside”

the FERC order. In PennEast Pipeline, neither the parties nor

the Court contended that § 717r(b) deprived the district court of

subject matter jurisdiction to hear the dispute or that the ongoing

parallel proceeding before FERC and the D.C. Circuit in any way

suggested that the district court proceeding should be dismissed.

See slip op. at 6-7; 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (original jurisdiction in

district court).

13

appeals when it reviews a final order of the NRC. There

is no room for that argument in the enforcement scheme

of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The citizens’

suit provision in section 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, contains

its own specification of the degree to which district courts

must defer to administrative agencies. Under the plain

language of that section, the district courts should defer

for sixty days, and at that point determine whether or not

the violation has been halted by administrative action [by

the Environmental Protection Agency] or otherwise. If

[ ] it has not been so halted, the citizen’s suit goes forward.”

Id. at 244.

Similarly, in Steward v. Honeywell International,

Inc., 469 F. Supp. 3d 874 (S.D. Ill. 2020), plaintiffs brought a

class action suit in federal district court, asserting various

causes of action including federal claims pursuant to the

RCRA, the CERCLA, and the CAA against the owner of

a nuclear facility, based on allegations that the plant had

“emitted air contaminated with radioactive and other

toxic materials,” which settled “into the [surrounding] soil

and buildings” over the years, “causing property loss and

damages.” Id. at 876. The district court allowed plaintiffs’

CERCLA and part of its CAA claim to survive a motion to

dismiss. And likewise, in Student Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp. of

New Jersey v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 642 F. Supp.

103, 109 (D.N.J. 1986), environmental groups brought suit

in federal district court under the citizen suit provision of

the CWA against nuclear power plant operators alleging

violations of federal and state water pollution permits.

The court determined that plaintiffs had standing to bring

the action and that they could sue for defendants’ past

violations of the CWA. Id. Further, because “no genuine

issues of material fact exist[ed] as to whether or not the

14

defendants’ permit violations [were] excusable,” the court

granted summary judgment for plaintiffs. Id.

Under the Ninth Circuit’s sweeping jurisdictional

holding in Public Watchdogs, none of these suits brought

under citizen suit provisions in federal district court

against NRC licensed entities would have been permitted

to go forward. Instead, contrary to the explicit legislative

framework, under the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, these cases

would have been forced initially into an administrative

procedure before the NRC with any appeal to the courts

of appeals. That is not what Congress intended and is not

what other courts have held.

C.

The District Courts Are The Most Efficient And

Appropriate Venue For Environmental Claims

Not Directly Related To An NRC Order.

As this Court has recognized, a significant purpose

underlying the location of cases covered by the Hobbs

Act was judicial efficiency by avoiding duplicative records

before the NRC and the district courts. Fla. Power &

Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 740 (1985) (quoting

H.R.Rep. No. 2122, 81 st Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1950) )

(“[T]he submission of the cases upon the records made

before the administrative agencies will avoid the making of

two records, one before the agency and one before the court,

and thus going over the same ground twice.”). That is not

the case in environmental citizen suit claims. The record

created by the NRC in its licensing procedures will say

nothing about subsequent actions by an NRC licensee that

violate environmental laws, for example, the environmental

effects of a discharge of nuclear tainted materials into

nearby groundwater or emissions of nuclear or non-nuclear

materials that violate state-issued CAA permits.

15

Moreover, the NRC is not the agency with expertise

to handle such claims in an administrative forum. Indeed,

the types of concerns most typically raised in citizen suits

involve violations of environmental standards, which are

generally set by the Environmental Protection Agency

or state environmental agencies, not the NRC. Contrast,

Laws and Executive Orders, https://www.epa.gov/lawsregulations/laws-and-executive-orders (last visited June

25, 2021) (“A number of laws serve as EPA’s foundation

for protecting the environment and public health”), with,

U.S. NRC How the NRC Protects You, (last visited

June 25 2021), https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/radiation/

protects-you.html#142873 (“[T]he NRC ensures that

users of radioactive materials keep radiation exposures

within the agency’s specified dose limits and as low as

reasonably achievable. In addition, users must obtain a

license from the NRC and be inspected to ensure that

they are following the agency’s regulations and safely

using radioactive materials.”). And, as this Court has

recognized, when an administrative agency does not

have the requisite procedures or substantive expertise to

evaluate a claim or develop a record, the district courts are

the more appropriate forum for a case to be brought than a

court of appeals, which the Ninth Circuit’s decision would

require. This is particularly true where the standard of

review by the appellate court is highly deferential as is the

case under the Hobbs Act. See Harrison v. PPG Indus.,

Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 586 (1980) (discussing the “mechanical

limitations of the courts of appeals”).

Further, and entirely contrary to Congressional

intent, sweeping environmental citizen suits under the

jurisdictional requisites of the Hobbs Act has the potential

to defeat any meaningful hearing of the citizen suit claims.

The NRC’s regulations allow “[a]ny person” to file a

16

“request” with the NRC to “institute a proceeding” for

modifying, suspending, or revoking a license to remedy

license violations. See C.F.R. § 2.206(a). However, as was

the case in Public Watchdogs’ § 2.206 petition related

to this case, the NRC has discretion whether to initiate

proceedings based on the complaint, see Petition at 10-11

and 25 and cases cited therein, and in the event it chooses

not to do so, no meaningful record is created by the agency

and a court of appeals’ review of that limited record is

conducted under a highly deferential standard. Id. at 25.

Finally, channeling citizen suit claims to the NRC

under the Hobbs Act would preclude the specific remedies

provided for by Congress for citizen suits brought to

enforce environmental statutes. As noted above, the

citizen suit provisions are in large part an enforcement

tool. Accordingly, the principal relief they offer is

injunctive relief. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.

Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 61 (1987)

(“These sorts of citizen suits—in which a citizen can

obtain an injunction but cannot obtain money damages

for himself—are a very useful additional tool in enforcing

environmental protection laws”); see also Lloyd, supra, at

295. However, the NRC generally is not the agency with

expertise in assessing violations of the environmental laws

and its injunctive authority does not extend to enforcement

of those laws.

In sum, the Ninth Circuit’s decision is vastly

overbroad. If allowed to stand, it would upset the carefully

constructed framework for citizen suit enforcement

established in most major federal environmental statutes

and disrupt long-established environmental litigation

regimes. Certiorari should be granted to prevent the

misdirection and possible preclusion of environmental

17

citizen suits from the Congressionally mandated district

court jurisdiction.

III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN PUBLIC

WATCHDOGS WOULD ALSO IMPROPERLY

PRECLUDE DISTRICT COURT JURISDICTION

OVER STATE LAW TORT CLAIMS.

W hile environmental citizen suits provide an

important vehicle for promoting compliance w ith

environmental laws, they are not an exclusive means

for challenging conduct that threatens environmental

or human health harms. This Court and the majority of

courts of appeals that have considered the issue have long

held that even in the context of nuclear regulation (first

by the Atomic Energy Commission and currently by the

NRC), that state tort claims retain viability as a vehicle for

environmental protection and to address tortious actions

by NRC licensed facilities. The Ninth Circuit’s decision

improperly precludes district court jurisdiction not only

over PAA cases, but also over these state law tort claims.

A.

This Court’s Precedent Clearly Recognizes

Continuing Viability of State Law Tort Claims

Against NRC Licensed Facilities.

The Court’s decision in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,

464 U.S. 238 (1984) is directly contravened by the Ninth

Circuit’s decision. In Silkwood, the Court expressly

concluded that state law tort remedies are not preempted

by either the Atomic Energy Act or NRC (then Atomic

Energy Commission) regulation. Id. at 253. (“The belief

that the NRC’s exclusive authority to set safety standards

did not foreclose the use of state tort remedies was

reaffirmed when the Price-Anderson Act was amended

18

in 1966. The 1966 amendment was designed to respond

to concerns about the adequacy of state law remedies.”)

(citing S.Rep. No. 650). As subsequent cases have held,

only the exclusive cause of action for “nuclear incidents”

under the PAA limits this principle. See Cook v. Rockwell

International Corp., 790 F.3d 1088, 1097 (10 th Cir. 2015)

(Gorsuch, J.) ( “[L]ittle in the [PAA’s] history suggests

an intent to preclude recovery or inhibit the operation of

state tort law in cases involving lesser nuclear occurrences

that don’t give rise to the sorts of injuries and damages

involved in more serious nuclear incidents. Indeed, the

evidence suggests that Congress sought to minimize

interference with State law so that the only interference

with State law is . . . in the exceedingly remote contingency

of a nuclear incident giving rise to damages in excess of

the amount of financial responsibility required together

with the amount of the government indemnity.”) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted). 4 While not

directly addressing jurisdictional issues – but proceeding

4. There is a possible conflict among the Circuits on whether

the PAA preempts all state actions irrespective of whether or not

a claim rises to the level of a “nuclear incident” covered by the

PAA. Compare and contrast Cook with e.g., Controneo v. Shaw

Env’t & Infrastructure, Inc., 639 F.3d 186, 199-202 (5th Cir. 2011);

Dumontier v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 543 F.3d 567, 571 (9th

Cir. 2008); Ranier v. Union Carbide Corp., 402 F.3d 608, 617 (6th

Cir. 2005); Roberts v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 146 F.3d 1305, 1308

(11th Cir. 1998); O’Connor v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d

1090, 1096 (7th Cir. 1994); In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, 940

F.2d 832, 854 (3d Cir. 1991). But see Cook, 790 F.3d at 1098 (“One

case on which the defendants place great emphasis simply says

[t]he PAA is the exclusive means of compensating victims for any

and all claims arising out of nuclear incidents. . . . But precisely

no one disputes this beside-the-point point. The issue before us

isn’t what happens in the event of a nuclear incident, but . . . what

happens in the face of a lesser occurrence.”) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted).

19

as though no jurisdictional barrier existed – other state

tort claims have gone forward in district courts. See e.g.,

Citizens for Alts. v. Cast Transp., No. CIV 99-321 MCA/

ACT, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34843, at *1 (D.N.M. 2004);

Lamb V. Martin Marietta Energy Sys., 835 F. Supp. 959,

965 (W.D. Ky.1993); Crawford v. Nat’l Lead Co., 784 F.

Supp. 439, 445 (S.D. Ohio 1989).

These cases could not have been brought originally

in the district courts under the Ninth Circuit’s Hobbs

Act jurisdictional channeling. Indeed, the effect of the

Ninth Circuit’s decision would be to overrule Silkwood

sub silencio.

B. Tor t Law Fills A n Impor ta nt Role In

Environmental Cases That The Ninth Circuit’s

Decision Would Preclude.

Tort law provides an important gap-filler to correct

environmental harms that serves a distinct purpose

from environmental statutes and their implementing

regulations. Latham et al., The Intersection of Tort and

Environmental Law: Where the Twains Should Meet

and Depart, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 737, 748–52 (2011). As

an NRC regional director testified in the Silkwood trial:

“[O]ur experience is that . . . equating compliance to

safety . . . is not a 100% guarantee . . . . Our experience

is that licenses are deficient in certain areas. It is hard

to foresee all the conditions that may exist that you

might want a license condition to touch on.” See Brief for

Appellant in Response to Brief of Solicitor General & In

Opposition to Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at

15, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984)

(No. 81-2159); see also Brief for States of Nevada, Ohio,

New York, Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine,

20

Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico & South

Carolina as Amicus Curiae in Support of Jurisdictional

Statement at 27–28, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464

U.S. 238 (1984) (No. 81-2159) (“licenses and regulations

say nothing about liability for tortious . . . injuries caused

by licensees,” the licensing regime cannot “be regarded

as [a] direct substitute[] for tort actions.”).

Further, while both environmental statutes and

regulations on one hand and tort remedies on the other

“may be said to impact environmental interests, . . . [an

environmental statute] prospectively regulates conduct,

mindful of minimizing harm to human health and the

environment, while the tort system acts to remedy a harm

that has occurred.” Latham, supra, at 755. Whereas

environmental regulations set generally prospective

standards, tort law “examines whether a harm is tortiously

caused by fault or unreasonable conduct.” Id. at 760.

The Ninth Circuit’s overbroad language would require

that a common law tort action brought against a private

defendant be pigeon-holed into the Hobbs Act’s narrow

jurisdictional channeling on the basis that the wrongful

conduct is somehow “incidental to” its NRC-licensed

activities. This result would again deprive litigants of the

important opportunity to fully litigate claims intended

to hold wrongdoers accountable for environmental (and

other) harms and would likewise preclude access to the

fact-finding and injunctive procedures normally available

in tort cases.

21

CONCLUSION

The storage of radioactive mater ials car r ies

tremendous environmental and public health risks. See

Patsy T. Mink, Nuclear Waste: The Most Compelling

Environmental Issue Facing the World Today, 8 Fordham

Envt’l L. Rev. 165, 165, 168 (2011) (emphasizing the

“environmental hazards of nuclear waste” and noting that

“it is hard to dispute that nuclear waste is a tremendous

health hazard”). Given these risks, courts should be

extremely cautious in deviating from well-established

environmental litigation procedures that have long

ensured compliance with environmental regulations.

Legal remedies under environmental law citizen suit

provisions, common law tort actions, and the Price

Anderson Act play a vital role in protecting our natural

resources, as well as public health and safety. These

causes of action must be allowed to proceed in trial courts,

where parties have an opportunity to build a record and

to litigate their claims based on the facts and under legal

standards provided by relevant statutes or common law

understandings.

The Ninth Circuit’s broad interpretation of the Hobbs

Act puts the continued viability of these important legal

actions at risk in the context of nuclear facilities—a context

in which accountability for environmental and public health

harms is especially critical. This harmful precedent risks

severely hindering enforcement of environmental laws

by giving private nuclear facility operators an expansive

shield against any suit to remedy wrongful conduct or

tortious conduct in trial courts - the forums best positioned

to litigate the merits of any such claims.

22

We urge the Court to grant certiorari and to limit

the Ninth Circuit’s holding so as to correct the overly

broad jurisdictional sweep of the Hobbs Act adopted by

that court.

Respectfully submitted,

Helen S. K ang

Nancy C. Loeb

Director, Environmental

Counsel of Record

Law and Justice Clinic Director, Environmental

Golden Gate University

A dvocacy Clinic

Northwestern University

School of Law

536 Mission Street

Pritzker School of Law

375 E. Chicago Avenue

San Francisco, CA 94105

Chicago, IL 60611

(415) 442-6693

(312) 503-0052

Oday Salim

n-loeb@law.northwestern.edu

Director, Environmental

Law & Sustainability

Pedro Saade Llorens

Clinic

A djunct Professor,

University Of Michigan

Environmental Law Clinic

School Of Law

Escuela De Derecho Upr

701 South State Street

7 Ave. Universidad,

3018 Jeffries Hall

Suite 701

Ann Arbor, MI 48109

San Juan, PR 00925

(734) 763-7087

(787) 397-9993

Nicholas J. Schroeck

Director, Environmental

Law Clinic

University of Detroit

Mercy School of Law

Riverfront Campus

George J. Asher Law Center,

Room 210

(313) 596-9817

Counsel for Amicus Curiae