Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ronald Jeremy Hyatt, Petitioner v. California

No. 20In the

Supreme Court of the United States

RONALD JEREMY HYATT,

Petitioner,

v.

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

Court of A ppeal of the State of California,

Second A ppellate District

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

A lan S. Yockelson

Law Offices of

A lan S. Yockelson

501 West Broadway,

Suite A-385

San Diego, CA 92101

(949) 290-6515

Stuart Goldfarb

Counsel of Record

Law Offices of

Stuart Goldfarb

16200 Ventura Boulevard,

Suite 225

Encino, CA 91436

(818) 788-9909

Counsel for Petitioner

304138

A

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the prosecution may refuse to disclose

the names and address of the 23 victims and additional

witnesses it intends to call at petitioner’s preliminary

hearing, or does that violate his Sixth Amendment right

to the effective assistance of counsel and to confront the

witnesses against him, and his right to due process of law

under the Fourteenth Amendment?

ii

LIST OF PARTIES

All parties are named in the case caption.

iii

LIST OF PROCEEDINGS

On January 11, 2021, the Superior Court of the

State of California for the County of Los Angeles denied

petitioner’s request for discovery in People of the State

of California v. Hyatt, No. BA488059-01. On February

26, 2021, the California Court of Appeal, Second District,

Division 8, denied petitioner Hyatt’s Petition for a Writ

of Mandate in Hyatt v. Superior Court, No. B310120. On

March 24, 2021, the California Supreme Court denied

Hyatt’s Petition for Review and application for stay in

Hyatt v. Superior Court, No. S267435.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

LIST OF PARTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

LIST OF PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

TABLE OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

OPINIONS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS . . . 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

1.

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

2.

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION . . . . . 7

1.

Petitioner’s Claim Is Reviewable . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2.

The Petition Should be Granted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

v

Table of Contents

Page

a.

The Right to Effective Assistance of

Counsel under the Sixth Amendment . . . . . 8

b.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth

Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

vi

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — DENIAL OF PETITION

F OR R E V I E W OF T H E S U PR E M E

C OU RT OF CA LI FOR N I A , FI LED

MARCH 24, 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a

APPENDIX B — ORDER OF THE COURT OF

APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION

EIGHT, FILED FEBRUARY 26, 2021 . . . . . . . . . . 2a

APPENDIX C — EXCERPT OF REPORTER’S

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS

ANGELES, DATED JANUARY 11, 2021 . . . . . . . . 4a

vii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Adams v. Illinois,

(1972) 405 U.S. 278, 92 S. Ct. 916 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Bailey v. Gray,

(E.D. Wis. 1976) 425 F. Supp. 602, aff’d

(7th Cir. 1978) 577 F.2d 747 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Bridgeforth v. Superior Ct.,

214 Cal.App.4th 1074, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 528 (2013) . . . 8

Coleman v. Alabama,

(1970) 399 U.S. 1, 90 S. Ct. 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 9, 11

Coleman v. Burnett,

477 F.2d 1187 (D.C.Cir. 1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Dennis v. United States,

384 U.S. 855, 86 S. Ct. 1840 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Fenenbock v. Dir. of Corr. for California,

692 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 13

Galindo v. Superior Court,

50 Cal.4th 1, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 673 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Gregory v. United States,

369 F.2d 185 (D.C.Cir. 1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

viii

Cited Authorities

Page

Holmes v. South Carolina,

547 U.S. 319, 126 S. Ct. 1727 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Magallan v. Superior Court,

(2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1444,

121 Cal.Rptr.3d 841 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Market Street R. Co. v.

Railroad Comm’n of California,

324 U.S. 548, 65 S. Ct. 770 (1945) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,

480 U.S. 39, 107 S. Ct. 989 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Pointer v. State of Texas,

380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Powell v. Alabama,

287 U.S. 45 (1932) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Smith v. State of Illinois,

390 U.S. 129, 88 S. Ct. 748 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 12

United States v. Black,

767 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

United States v. Girod,

646 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

United States v. Perez,

17 F. Supp. 3d 586 (S.D. Tex. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

ix

Cited Authorities

Page

United States v. Soape,

169 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

United States v. Valenzuela–Bernal,

458 U.S. 858, 102 S. Ct. 3440 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

White v. Ragen,

324 U.S. 760, 65 S. Ct. 978 (1945) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES

U.S. Const., amend. VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

U.S. Const., amend. XIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3, 11

28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Cal. Pen. Code § 1054.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Cal. Pen. Code § 1054.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

1

Petitioner Ronald Jeremy Hyatt respectfully petitions

for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal of the

State of California, Second Appellate District, to review

its judgment against him in Ronald Jeremy Hyatt v.

Superior Court of the State of California for the County

of Los Angeles, Respondent; The District Attorney of

the County of Los Angeles, Real Party in Interest. That

judgment denied petitioner’s petition for writ of mandate

directed to respondent superior court based on denial of

his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the effective

assistance of counsel and to confront the witnesses against

him.

OPINIONS BELOW

No written opinions were issued in this case. The

California Court of Appeal Order denying petitioner

Hyatt’s Petition for a Writ of Mandate was filed on

February 26, 2021 (Case No. B310120). App. 2a Also

appended is the Order of the California Supreme Court

filed on March 24, 2021, denying Hyatt’s Petition for

Review and application for stay (Case No. S267435). App.

1a

JURISDICTION

Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under

28 U.S.C. section 1257(a) on the ground that the trial

court’s order denied his rights to the effective assistance

of counsel and to confront the witnesses against him under

the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution.

2

The California Court of Appeal entered its order

rejecting petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

claims on February 26, 2021.

The California Supreme Court denied review and

application for a stay in this case on March 24, 2021. The

instant Petition for Writ of Certiorari is filed within 90

days of that order.

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The Si x th A mendment to the Unit ed Stat es

Constitution provides in relevant part: “In all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be

confronted with the witnesses against him . . . [and] to

have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides in relevant part: “ . . . [N]or shall

any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law. . . . ”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Overview

In this case, the prosecution has announced it intends

to call all of the 23 alleged victims, and possibly an

undetermined number of 50 other potential witnesses,

to testify against defendant at his upcoming preliminary

hearing. However, the prosecution has refused to disclose

the names and addresses of any of those victims and

witnesses. The trial court has upheld the prosecution’s

refusal, overruling petitioner’s demand for disclosure based

3

on his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance

of counsel, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause,

and on his right to due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment. Such discovery is necessary to defense

counsel’s effective representation of petitioner at the

preliminary hearing, by adequately investigating the

charges against petitioner and effectively cross-examining

the prosecution’s witnesses. Petitioner has sought relief

from the trial court’s unconstitutional order by filing

a petition for writ of mandate in the California Court

of Appeal and on its denial by a petition for review in

the California Supreme Court; in each court petitioner

reiterated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims

he initially raised in the trial court.

2. Background

Petitioner is a celebrity adult movie actor, also known

for acting in legitimate movies, speaking at seminars

conducted by professional organizations, semi-professional

harmonica playing and numerous television appearances

on talk-shows. The Los Angeles District Attorney has

alleged in a 35-Count Second Amended Felony Complaint

that petitioner committed serious (as well as lesser) sex

crimes upon 23 women between 1996 and 2020. Petitioner

is exposed to possible life sentences on several counts.

The discovery provided by the prosecution to

petitioner’s defense counsel consists of nearly 5,000 pages

of documents and three “thumb drives” containing such

materials as police incident reports, and arrest reports.

However, on all documents the last names, addresses

and phone numbers for all 23 victims and approximately

50 witnesses were redacted, and no birthdates were

4

disclosed. Review of the materials provided by the

prosecution reveals that most of the accusations are based

on vague and uncertain recollections of dates, locations,

times and acts allegedly committed by petitioner against

almost two dozen women between 1996 and 2020, most of

whom came forward only after petitioner’s initial arrest

in June, 2020 was extensively reported in the media.

By timely motion, petitioner requested discovery

of 1) full names, 2) dates of birth, 3) current locations/

addresses, 4) phone numbers and 5) email addresses

of the witnesses the prosecution may call to testify.

Petitioner maintained that he was entitled to timely

disclosure of information identifying the prosecution’s

witnesses in order to protect his right to confrontation

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and that timely

disclosure was also necessary to ensure petitioner’s Sixth

Amendment effective assistance of counsel and to protect

his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law.

(Exhibit “4,” 90-94.)

The prosecution has never denied it possesses all the

information sought by the defense.

At the January 11, 2021 hearing on petitioner’s motion

to disclose, the prosecutor acknowledged he intended to

call as witnesses at the preliminary hearing all 23 alleged

victims. But the prosecution did not decide “at this point

in time,” whether to call some number of additional

witnesses. The prosecutor further acknowledged it had

disclosed to the defense only the victims’ first names and

the first letter of their last names; for some victims the

individual’s driver’s license photograph had also been

supplied. Petitioner’s counsel, Stuart Goldfarb, explained

5

the dilemma the prosecution’s obduracy placed on the

defense. Counsel observed: “I haven’t been able in any way

to move forward on the case with my client to say this is

the person that allegedly you did something to.” (Exhibit

“6”, p. 110.) He explained:

“[W]here we are at today it’s critically important

that I be able to have this information for the

prelim for this reason. my client is charged on

numerous counts of forcible oral copulation,

rape, et cetera, but the dates that this occurred

date back to the 2004, and out of the so I need

the ability to be able to try to get my client to

be able to remember what happened or find out

information . . . .” Exhibit “6”, pp. 110-111.)

Mr. Goldfarb summed up: “[W]e have cases that date

back 25 years of alleged victims and having – my client

is in custody and having 4700 pages of discovery and

receiving another 500, I want the names of people so that

I can defend this case and do an investigation.” (Exhibit

“6”, pp. 111-112.)

Defense counsel inquired: “How can someone defend

a case if he doesn’t know who the victims are”? (Exhibit

“6”, p. 115.) Stressing the constitutional issue, counsel

observed: “it’s important for defense counsel to do the

investigation as early as they can and thorough complete

investigation, if it’s not done essentially it would amount

to a 6th Amendment violation, ineffective assistance of

counsel.” (Exhibit “6”, p. 117.) Nevertheless, the trial

court refused to order the prosecution to identify the

victims (including their names and addresses) who the

prosecution had stated it intended to call to testify (or

6

the additional witnesses whom it said it might) at the

preliminary hearing. (Exhibit “6”, p. 120.)

The court made no factual findings to support its

ruling. Under California law the prosecution’s disclosure

duties include “[t]he names and addresses of persons the

prosecutor intends to call as witnesses at trial,” Cal. Pen.

Code § 1054.1, and such disclosures must be made “at least

30 days prior to the trial.” Id., §1054.7. However, that duty

has been held to also apply when disclosure is reasonably

necessary to prepare for the preliminary hearing.

Magallan v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1444,

1458-1464, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 841, 851-857. Under California

law, “good cause” to deny, restrict, or defer disclosure “is

limited to threats or possible danger to the safety of a

victim or witness, possible loss or destruction of evidence,

or possible compromise of other investigations by law

enforcement.” Cal. Pen. Code § 1054.7.

The trial court did not question petitioner’s showing

that disclosure of the identities of the witnesses the

prosecution intended to call to testify against petitioner

at the preliminary hearing was necessary to defense

counsel’s preparation for the hearing and to effective

cross-examination of the prosecution’s many witnesses.

Nor did the court find that the prosecution had shown

statutory “good cause” to deny or restrict disclosure in

petitioner’s case, as there were no threats to the victims

or witnesses. Indeed, several of the victims stated that

they had no objection to the release of their information.

The sole reason the court gave for denying disclosure was:

“based as we are prior to the prelim,” the prosecution’s

disclosures were sufficient “for going forward with the

prelim. Different story once you get to trial, . . . but for the

7

moment I believe you have the information you’re entitled

to and that’s my ruling.” (Exhibit “6,” p. 120.)

Petitioner sought review of the trial court’s ruling by

filing a petition for writ of mandate in the California Court

of Appeal, reiterating the constitutional claims he made

for disclosure in the trial court, asserting that the court’s

ruling refusing to require the prosecution to identify its

witnesses denied petitioner his Sixth Amendment rights

to the effective assistance of counsel and to confront the

witnesses against him and his Fourteenth Amendment

right to due process. App. 2a. Division 8 of the Second

District Court of Appeal denied the petition on February

26, 2021, stating only: “Petitioner does not show that he

is entitled to extraordinary relief.” App. 2a. Petitioner

then sought further review by filing a petition for review

in the California Supreme Court, once more reiterating

his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. App. 1a.

Review was denied on March 24, 2021. App. 1a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

1. Petitioner’s Claim Is Reviewable

Although this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider

an interlocutory judgment and the decision below is

“not a final judgment or decree,” 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3);

Market Street R. Co. v. Railroad Comm’n of California,

324 U.S. 548, 551, 65 S.Ct. 770, 772 (1945), petitioner’s

Sixth Amendment claims are nonetheless reviewable

“because the Sixth Amendment issue will not survive

for this Court to review, regardless of the outcome of the

proceedings on remand.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480

U.S. 39, 48, 107 S. Ct. 989, 996 (1987). This is because

8

if petitioner is acquitted at trial, there will be no means

by which the State of California can obtain review to

determine whether the trial court correctly decided the

Sixth Amendment issue in denying discovery. The same

is true should petitioner be convicted; it will be impossible

to determine in retrospect whether if discovery had been

ordered he would have been bound over for trial at the

preliminary hearing, or the matter instead terminated

by an outcome favorable to petitioner. 480 U.S. 39, 48-49,

107 S. Ct. 989, 996.

2. The Petition Should be Granted

a.

The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel

under the Sixth Amendment

In California, as is true generally, the purpose of

preliminary hearings is “to weed out groundless or

unsupported charges of grave offenses and to relieve the

accused of the degradation and expense of a criminal trial.

Preliminary hearings ... operate as a judicial check on the

exercise of prosecutorial discretion and help ensure that

the defendant [is] not ... charged excessively.” Bridgeforth

v. Superior Ct., 214 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1086-1087, 154 Cal.

Rptr.3d 528, 537 (2013), internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Recognizing this reality, in Coleman v.

Alabama (1970) 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, the Court found

that the preliminary hearing “is a ‘critical stage’ of the

State’s criminal process at which the accused is ‘as much

entitled to such aid (of counsel) . . . as at the trial itself.’”

Id. at 9-10, quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57

(1932)). Coleman explained:

9

“Plainly the guiding hand of counsel at the

preliminary hearing is essential to protect

the indigent accused against an erroneous

or improper prosecution. First, the lawyer’s

skilled examination and cross-examination of

witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the

State’s case that may lead the magistrate to

refuse to bind the accused over. Second, in any

event, the skilled interrogation of witnesses

by an experienced lawyer can fashion a vital

impeachment tool for use in cross-examination

of the State’s witnesses at the trial, or preserve

testimony favorable to the accused of a witness

who does not appear at the trial. Third, trained

counsel can more effectively discover the case

the State has against his client and make

possible the preparation of a proper defense to

meet that case at the trial. Fourth, counsel can

also be influential at the preliminary hearing

in making effective arguments for the accused

on such matters as the necessity for an early

psychiatric examination or bail.” 399 U.S. at 9.1

But to afford effective assistance to a defendant,

counsel must be afforded access to the necessary tools. As

the Court has recognized “it is a denial of the accused’s

1. This Court soon made clear that Coleman applies to

preliminary hearings generally, not just those held under Alabama

law. See, e.g.,

Adams v. Illinois (1972) 405 U.S. 278, 278, 92 S.Ct. 916, 917.

To be specific, California courts recognize that Coleman applies

to that state’s preliminary hearings. See Galindo v. Superior

Court, 50 Cal.4th 1, 9, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 673 (2010).

10

constitutional right to a fair trial to force him to trial with

such expedition as to deprive him of the effective aid and

assistance of counsel.” White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764,

65 S.Ct. 978, 980 (1945).

“Nor can it be doubted that Coleman demands

more than the mere presence of counsel at the

hearing. The right to counsel which Coleman

declared would amount to no more than a pious

overture unless it is a right to counsel able to

function efficaciously in his client’s behalf. The

Sixth Amendment’s guaranty of counsel is a

pledge of effective assistance by counsel . . . .”

Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1204–05

(D.C. Cir. 1973) (n. omitted).

Furthermore, lower federal courts have recognized:

“In order to effectuate this right, defense counsel

must be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the

government’s witnesses.” United States v. Perez, 17 F.

Supp.3d 586, 594 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (citing Coleman v.

Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1201, 1204–05 (D.C.Cir.1973).

It is only “[i]f the evidence on the preliminary hearing,

at which a defendant is represented by counsel and has

an opportunity for cross examination and discovery

. . . [that] the rights of the defendant are fully protected.”

Bailey v. Gray (E.D. Wis. 1976) 425 F.Supp. 602, 604, aff’d

(7th Cir. 1978) 577 F.2d 747 (italics added).

Discovery of certain basic information clearly is

vital to defense counsel adequately serving his or her

constitutionally-assigned purpose. As noted, this Court

emphasized in Coleman that counsel’s “guiding hand”

was “essential to protect . . . against an erroneous or

11

improper prosecution” because “[f]irst, the lawyer’s

skilled examination and cross-examination of witnesses

may expose fatal weaknesses in the State’s case that

may lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused

over.” 399 U.S. at 9. In many prosecutions the credibility

of the accusing prosecution witnesses is a critical, even

the critical question – and that is emphatically true in

petitioner’s case where two dozen women have accused him

of inappropriate sexual conduct in incidents supposedly

dating back over 25 years.

More than 50 years ago the Court recognized that

“when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the very

starting point in ‘exposing falsehood and bringing out

the truth’” is to ascertain “who he is and where he lives.”

Smith v. State of Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131, 88 S. Ct. 748,

750 (1968), n. omitted, (citing Pointer v. State of Texas,

380 U.S. 400, 404, 85 S.Ct. 1065,1068). For that reason,

Smith determined that a defendant’s right to confront

the witnesses against him guaranteed by the Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendment, encompasses his right to

the prosecution witnesses’ true names and addresses.

This is because: “The witness’ name and address open

countless avenues of in-court examination and out-of-court

investigation.” Id. The Court in Smith made no bones

about it: “To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the

threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of crossexamination itself.” Id.

Petitioner Ron Jeremy Hyatt is a particularly wellknown performer in adult movies: he is listed in the

Guinness Book of World Records for “Most Appearances

in Adult Films,” having performed in more that 2000

films. Most of the accusations against him were made

12

after his well-publicized initial arrest. The credibility

of his accusers and their motives obviously pose major

questions. The prosecution’s concealing their identities

severely undermines his right to the effective assistance

of his counsel as the preliminary hearing approaches.

b.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth

Amendment

Whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth

Amendment applies to meet the defense’s need for

discovery of and access to prosecution witnesses prior

to trial has remained unsettled since this court failed

to resolve the question in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480

U.S. 39, 52, 107 S.Ct. 989 (1987). The Court should grant

certiorari in petitioner’s case to finally resolve that

important question.

Cogent reasons support the Confrontation Clause’s

application. To begin with, as discussed above the Court

recognized in Smith v. State of Illinois, supra, 390 U.S.

at 131, that counsel must know witnesses’ names and

addresses to effectively cross-examine them. And as

specifically tied to discovery, it has been reasoned that

“the right to have access to adverse witnesses before

trial” may be implied from the defendant’s rights under

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

and the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of

the Sixth Amendment as recognized in Holmes v. South

Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324, 126 S.Ct. 1727 (2006). See

Fenenbock v. Dir. of Corr. for California, 692 F.3d 910,

916, n. 5 (9th Cir. 2012).

13

The Ninth Circuit observed in Fenenbock that decisions

of this Court addressing analogous situations support that

view, citing United States v. Valenzuela–Bernal, 458

U.S. 858, 872, 102 S.Ct. 3440 (1982) (“discussing when

deportation of a witness might rise to the level of a due

process violation”) and Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S.

855, 873, 86 S.Ct. 1840 (1966) (“stating, with respect to

grand jury testimony, that ‘[i]n our adversary system for

determining guilt or innocence, it is rarely justifiable for

the prosecution to have exclusive access to a storehouse of

relevant fact,’ and that “[e]xceptions to this are justifiable

only by the clearest and most compelling considerations’”).

Fenenbock, at 916, n. 5. See also Gregory v. United

States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C.Cir.1966) (observing that

“elemental fairness and due process require[ ]’ that both

parties have an equal opportunity to interview witnesses);

United States v. Black, 767 F.2d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir. 1985)

(“It is true, as Black contends, that both sides have the

right to interview witnesses before trial”); United States

v. Girod, 646 F.3d 304, 311 (5th Cir. 2011) (“‘as a general

rule, “[w]itnesses ... to a crime are the property of neither

the prosecution nor the defense,”’” quoting United States

v. Soape, 169 F.3d 257, 270 (5th Cir. 1999)).

Nonetheless, in Ritchie, the Court was unable to

reach a majority consensus concerning the application of

the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause to pretrial

discovery. In the lead opinion, four justices expressed the

view that the Sixth Amendment’s “right to confrontation

is a trial right,” and does not require pretrial disclosure

of evidence that might be used to contradict unfavorable

testimony. 480 U.S. at 52–53, 107 S.Ct. at 999 (opn. of

Powell, J., concurred in by Rehnquist, C.J., White and

O’Connor, JJ.) But in two separate opinions, three other

14

justices suggested that denying a defendant pretrial access

to information necessary to effective cross-examination

could in certain circumstances they described, both of

which apply in petitioner’s case, violate the Confrontation

Clause: when “a defendant is denied pretrial access to

information that would make possible effective crossexamination of a crucial prosecution witness.” Id. at

61–66, 107 S.Ct. at pp. 1003–06 (conc. opn. of Blackmun,

J.); and when there has been “wholesale denial of access

to material that would serve as the basis for a significant

line of inquiry at trial.” id. at pp. 66–72, 107 S.Ct. at

pp. 1006–09 (dis. opn. of Brennan, J., concurred in by

Marshall, J.).

The two remaining justices expressed no view on this

issue. Id. 72–78, 107 S.Ct. at 1009–12 (dis. opn. of Stevens,

J., joined by Scalia, J., and by Brennan and Marshall,

JJ.).) Given the divided views of the justices of this Court

as reflected in the several opinions in Ritchie, it remains

unclear whether or to what extent the Confrontation

Clause of the Sixth Amendment grant pretrial discovery

rights to the accused. The Court should grant certiorari

to finally decide this important constitutional question.

15

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for certiorari

should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

A lan S. Yockelson

Law Offices of

A lan S. Yockelson

501 West Broadway,

Suite A-385

San Diego, CA 92101

(949) 290-6515

Stuart Goldfarb

Counsel of Record

Law Offices of

Stuart Goldfarb

16200 Ventura Boulevard,

Suite 225

Encino, CA 91436

(818) 788-9909

Counsel for Petitioner

APPENDIX

1a

Appendixof

A petition for

Appendix A — DENIAL

review of the SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA, FILED MARCH 24, 2021

Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District,

Division Eight - No. B310120

S267435

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

En Banc

RONALD JEREMY HYATT,

Petitioner,

v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

Real Party in Interest.

The petition for review and application for stay are

denied.

CANTIL-SAKAUYE

Chief Justice

2a

AppendixOF

B THE COURT OF

APPENDIX B — ORDER

APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION

EIGHT, FILED FEBRUARY 26, 2021

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

B310120

RONALD JEREMY HYATT,

Petitioner,

v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE

OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY

OF LOS ANGELES,

Respondent;

THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

Real Party in Interest.

(Jose I. Sandoval, Judge)

(Super. Ct. No. BA488059)

ORDER

3a

Appendix B

We have read and considered the petition for writ of

mandate filed on February 1, 2021.

Petitioner does not show that he is entitled to

extraordinary relief.

Accordingly, the petition is denied.

_____________________

GRIMES, Acting P. J.

_______________

STRATTON, J.

__________

WILEY, J.

4a

Appendix COF REPORTER’S

APPENDIX C — EXCERPT

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS

ANGELES, DATED JANUARY 11, 2021

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY

OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT NO. 50

HON. JOSE I. SANDOVAL, JUDGE

NO. BA488059-01

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff,

VS.

RONALD J. HYATT,

Defendant.

REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

JANUARY 11, 2021

[1]CASE NUMBER: BA488059-0l

CASE NAME:

PEOPLE V. HYATT, RONALD

5a

Appendix C

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA JANUARY 11, 2021

DEPARTMENT 50 HON. JOSE I. SANDOVAL, JUDGE

REPORTER:

CHERYLE LEWIS, CSR #6312

TIME:

A.M. SESSION

APPEARANCES:

T H E D E F E N DA N T P R E S E N T W I T H

COU NSEL ST UA RT G OLDFA R B, ESQ .,

PA U L T H O M P S O N A N D M A R L E N E

MARTINEZ, DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS

REPRESENTING THE PEOPLE OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE COURT: WE’RE ON THE RECORD NOW

IN THE MATTER INVOLVING RONALD JARED

HYATT, THIS IS CASE NO. BA488059.

APPEARANCES, COUNSEL.

MR . GOLDFARB: GOOD MORNING, YOUR

HONOR. STUART GOLDFARB APPEARING FOR

AND WITH MR. HYATT WHO IS PRESENT IN

CUSTODY.

MR. THOMPSON: PAUL THOMPSON FOR THE

PEOPLE AS WELL AS MARLENE MARTINEZ.

6a

Appendix C

THE COURT: I BELIEVE WE’RE TODAY 0 OF

30. ARE WE GOING TO STAY WITHIN THE PERIOD

TO GO FORWA RD WITH HIS PRELIMINA RY

HEARING?

MR. GOLDFARB: NO, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: GO AHEAD.

MR. GOLDFARB: I BELIEVE WE ARE 0 OF 10,

IF I’M NOT MISTAKEN.

***

[11]THE COURT: WELL, WE’VE HAD LOTS

OF DISCUSSIONS A BOUT DA POLICIES AND

WHETHER OR NOT THEY RISE TO THE LEVEL OF

ESTABLISHED APPELLATE COURT AUTHORITY

AND THE STATUTE. AND I DON’T MEAN ANY

DISRESPECT TO YOU OR ANY OTHER ELECTED

OFFICI A L. I’M DEA LING W ITH W HETHER

OR NOT YOU SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO THIS

INFORMATION BASED ON CITED AUTHORITY

BY BOTH PARTIES. I’M DEALING WITH WHAT

THE PENAL CODE WOULD PERMIT PRE-PRELIM.

I U NDERSTA ND YOU FEEL THING S H AV E

CHANGED AND THAT A SIMPLE PRELIMINARY

HEARING HAS RISEN TO THE LEVEL OF A MUCH

MORE IMPORTANT HEARING THAN IT MAY

HAVE BEEN IN YEARS PAST. BUT NOTING THAT

YOU’VE GOT ALL THIS INFORMATION, NOTING

AS COUNSEL SAID THAT THERE’S A PROBABLE

7a

Appendix C

CAUSE DETERMINATION FOR THE PRELIMINARY

HEARING, AND NOTING THAT APPARENTLY YOU

HAVE ENOUGH INFORMATION TO GO FORWARD,

AND CONSISTENT WITH THE PENAL CODE I’M

GOING TO DENY YOUR MOTION.

ANYTHING ELSE?

MR. THOMPSON: NO, YOUR HONOR.

MR. GOLDFARB: JUST RESPECTFULLY, YOUR

HONOR, IN MY MOTION I STATED THAT MANY

CASES HAVE SAID THAT IT’S IMPORTANT FOR

DEFENSE COUNSEL TO DO THE INVESTIGATION

A S EA RLY A S THEY CA N A ND THOROUGH

COMPLETE INVESTIGATION, IF IT’S NOT DONE

ESSENTIALLY IT WOULD AMOUNT TO A 6TH

A M EN DM EN T V IOL AT ION, I N EF F EC T I V E

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

THE COURT: I UNDERSTA ND TH AT. I’M

MAKING MY RULING BASED ON HERE WHAT

THE DA HAS GIVEN YOU THOUSANDS OF PAPERS

AND INFORMATION ABOUT THE JANE DOES

WHO MAY BE INQUIRED OF; AND I HAVE ASKED

HIM IF HE IS GOING TO GO [12]PROP 115 OR NOT,

HE DOESN’T KNOW AT THIS POINT IT MAY BE,

QUOTE UNQUOTE, OBSTACLES TO THAT. I’LL

LEAVE THAT TO HIS DETERMINATION AND

MANAGEMENT BUT MY RULING STANDS.

8a

Appendix C

NOW THEN, AGAIN, ARE WE 0 OF 30 TODAY?

THAT’S WHAT MY NOTES SHOW.

MR. THOMPSON: THE FRONT OF OUR FILE

SHOWS 0 OF 10.

THE COURT: LET ME CHECK WITH THE

CLERK.

(A DISCUSSION WAS HELD OFF

THE RECORD WITH THE CLERK.)

THE COURT: WE HAVE 0 OF 30. IF WE ARE

WRONG, DO LET ME KNOW. THAT’S WHAT MY -I RECORDED WHEN WE WERE BACK HERE ON

DECEMBER 14TH.

M R . T HOM P S ON: I T H I N K DEF ENSE’ S

POSITION IS THEY WANT MORE TIME ANYHOW

SO I DON’T THINK IT’S AN ISSUE.

MR . GOLDFARB: RESPECTFULLY, YOUR

HONOR -THE COURT: SURE.

MR . GOLDFA RB: - - I WA S A SK ING FOR

INITIALLY THE END OF MARCH AS 0 OF 30

AND THEY HAD A CONFLICT AND SO YOU HAD

INDICATED WHY DON’T WE SET IT AS A 0 OF 10

AND DEAL WITH IT THAT DATE.

9a

Appendix C

THE COURT: WHAT DATE WOULD YOU LIKE

MR. GOLDFARB?

MR. GOLDFARB: END OF M A RCH, YOUR

HONOR, AS A 0 OF 30.

THE COURT: BRIAN, GIVE ME A DATE THE

END OF MARCH.

MR. THOMPSON: YOUR HONOR, WE -- SO

WE’RE CONCERNED THAT THE CASE IS AGING.

THE END OF MARCH AS 0 OF 30 IS A LONG TIME

OUT. IS THERE NO POSSIBILITY THAT WE ARE

GOING

****