Reply Brief — Naum Morgovsky and Irina Morgovsky, Petitioners v. United States
Supreme Court briefAug 4, 2021
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NO. 20-1595
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
________________
NAUM MORGOVSKY and IRINA MORGOVSKY,
v.
Petitioners,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
________________
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
________________
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
________________
MARISA C. MALECK
ANNE M. VOIGTS
KING & SPALDING LLP
Counsel of Record
1700 Pennsylvania Ave. NW NOAH STID
Washington, DC 20006
KING & SPALDING LLP
(202) 737-0500
601 S. California Avenue
mmaleck@kslaw.com
Suite 100
Palo Alto, CA 94304
(650) 422-6700
avoigts@kslaw.com
nstid@kslaw.com
Counsel for Petitioners
August 4, 2021
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS ........................ 1
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 2
I.
The Decision Below Warrants Review................ 2
Contrary to the Government’s Claims,
Section 2778(c)’s Delegation Doesn’t
Satisfy the Current Tests ............................. 2
The President’s Traditional Authority
Over Foreign Affairs Doesn’t Extend to
Rewriting Criminal Conspiracy Law ........... 4
This Question Is Cert-Worthy ..................... 7
This Is an Appropriate Vehicle to Revise
the “Mutated” Intelligible Principle
Doctrine ........................................................ 8
II. Respondent Doesn’t Dispute Is The Existence
Of A Circuit Split On The Second Question
Presented ............................................................. 8
III. Irina’s Challenge Wasn’t Waived...................... 10
CONCLUSION ......................................................... 12
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC,
329 U.S. 90 (1946)................................................ 2, 3
Blackledge v. Perry,
417 U.S. 21 (1974).................................................. 10
Class v. United States,
138 S. Ct. 798 (2018).............................................. 10
Ex parte Siebold,
100 U.S. 371 (1880)................................................ 12
Fahey v. Mallonee,
332 U.S. 245 (1947).................................................. 4
Gundy v. United States,
139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).................................... passim
Haynes Timberland, Inc. v. United States,
139 S. Ct. 288 (2018).............................................. 11
Henry v. United States,
139 S. Ct. 2615 (2019).............................................. 8
Lichter v. United States,
334 U.S. 742 (1948).................................................. 3
Loving v. United States,
517 U.S. 748 (1996).................................................. 6
Menna v. New York,
423 U.S. 61 (1975).................................................. 10
Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361 (1989).................................................. 2
Paul v. United States,
140 S. Ct. 342 (2019)................................................ 7
Touby v. United States,
500 U.S. 160 (1991).............................................. 3, 7
iii
United States v. Bibler,
495 F.3d 621 (9th Cir. 2007).................................. 11
United States v. Brown,
232 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2000).................................. 11
United States v. Chi Tong Kuok,
671 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2012).................................... 6
United States v. Davis,
139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).............................................. 5
United States v. Joseph,
811 F. App’x 595 (11th Cir. 2020) ......................... 11
United States v. Khattak,
273 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 2001) ................................... 11
United States v. Portillo-Munoz,
643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011).................................. 11
United States v. Snelson,
555 F.3d 681 (8th Cir. 2009).................................. 11
United States v. Soto,
794 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2015).................................... 9
United States v. Teeter,
257 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001) .................................... 11
United States v. Torres,
828 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2016)................................ 11
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
531 U.S. 457 (2001).................................................. 3
Statutes
18 U.S.C. § 371 ............................................... 1, 5, 7, 8
21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(1) .................................................. 3
22 U.S.C. § 2778(a) ..................................................... 5
22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) ................................................. 2, 5
iv
Other Authorities
BIO,
Bowline v. United States,
140 S. Ct. 1129 (2020) (No. 19-5563) ...................... 9
BIO,
Cain v. United States,
141 S. Ct. 1082 (2021) (No. 20-5639) ...................... 9
BIO,
Galindo-Serrano v. United States,
140 S. Ct. 2646 (2020) (No. 19-7112) ...................... 9
BIO,
Guerrero v. United States,
140 S. Ct. 1300 (2020) (No. 19-6825) ...................... 9
The Federalist No. 78
(Clinton Roissiter ed., 1961)
(Alexander Hamilton) .............................................. 6
Sean Rosenmerkel, Matthew Durose,
& Donald Farole, Jr., Dep’t of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ 226846,
Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2006 Statistical Tables (rev. Nov. 22, 2010) .................. 10
USSC,
Overview of Federal Criminal Cases
Fiscal Year 2016 (2017) ......................................... 10
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
Respondent doesn’t dispute that Title 22 U.S.C.
Section 2778 of the Arms Export Control Act
(“AECA”), the statute under which Petitioners were
convicted, gives the Executive unfettered discretion to
determine what constitutes a crime. Nor does it
dispute that even within that broad delegation,
nothing expressly accorded the Executive the
authority to expand the potential penalties (or
eliminate elements) for conspiracy liability, which is
otherwise governed by 18 U.S.C. § 371. Accordingly,
Petitioners’ convictions were based on the Executive’s
unilateral decision to expand conspiracy liability (and
the punishment for it) beyond what Congress
provided.
In arguing against review, Respondent adopts a
Goldilocks approach, arguing that the Court shouldn’t
consider the first and third questions presented
because courts haven’t disagreed enough, or the
second question because courts have disagreed too
much. But all three questions warrant review.
Respondent also misstates Petitioners’ arguments
and contends this is a poor vehicle for answering those
questions. But the petition squarely presents the legal
issues, the appellate court considered the main issue
on the merits, and Petitioners’ convictions cannot
stand under the correct analysis.
2
ARGUMENT
I.
The Decision Below Warrants Review
Contrary to the Government’s Claims,
Section 2778(c)’s Delegation Doesn’t
Satisfy the Current Tests
Respondent suggests that Petitioners concede
that § 2778(c)’s delegation survives current caselaw.
BIO 13-14. Not so. Petitioners do not dispute that
this Court has held that, in some instances, a
delegation is constitutionally sufficient if Congress
delineates (1) “the general policy” to be pursued,
(2) the public agency applying it, and (3) “the
boundaries of th[e] delegated authority.” Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1989) (quoting
Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105
(1946)). But Section 2778 doesn’t define in any
meaningful way either the general policy to pursue or
the boundaries of that delegated authority. Pet. 17;
20-21.
Nevertheless, Respondent argues that Congress’s
policy of “further[ing] * * * world peace and the
security and foreign policy of the United States” by
“control[ling] the import and the export of defense
articles and defense services” in Section 2778(a)(1)
satisfies the requirement that Congress specify the
general policy to pursue. BIO 14. But this policy
guides only the President’s maintenance of the United
States Munitions List, not the creation of a criminal
penalty with an offense to be named later by the
Executive. Whether this general policy provides
enough guidance to determine which defense articles
should appear on that list is one thing. Whether it
provides a basis for unilaterally expanding the
3
application of and penalties for criminal conspiracy
beyond the Congressionally established ones is
entirely another.
But AECA also doesn’t identify the “boundaries of
the delegated authority.” Notably, the Government
doesn’t articulate any boundary for Section 2778(c)’s
delegation of criminal lawmaking authority, which
applies to “any person who willfully violates any
provision of this section … or any rule or regulation
issued under this section ….”
This unbounded
delegation of criminal lawmaking authority
distinguishes this case from many of those the
Government cites. BIO 11 n.1. In Gundy v. United
States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019), for example, the
authority delegated to the Attorney General to apply
SORNA’s registration requirements to pre-act
offenders
applied
to
“transition-period
implementation issues, and no further.” Similarly,
the delegation of authority to set air-quality standards
in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations was
limited to standards “requisite to protect public health
from the adverse effects of the pollutant in the
ambient air.” 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001). This
limitation runs parallel to Touby, where the authority
delegated only let the Attorney General designate a
drug as a controlled substance for criminal
enforcement if “necessary to avoid an imminent
hazard to the public safety.” Touby v. United States,
500 U.S. 160, 166 (1991) (quoting 21 U.S.C.
§ 811(h)(1)); see also Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S.
742, 787 (1948) (authority to set standards for
recovery of excessive profits from military contractors
explicitly “confined to the duration of the war or to a
short time thereafter”); Am. Power & Light Co., 329
4
U.S. at 105 (noting specific “standards for new
security issues,” and “conditions for acquisitions of
properties and securities”); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332
U.S. 245, 250 (1947) (authority to set rules for
reorganization of certain associations constrained to
“a single type of enterprise” with limited “problems of
insecurity and mismanagement,” applying only
known and established remedies). Each of these
delegations was upheld in part because of the tangible
boundaries mandated by Congress.
This petition is also more certworthy because the
Executive misused a broad delegation of power to alter
existing criminal conspiracy law. This Court has
noted that “[a] discretion to make regulations to guide
supervisory action in such matters may be
constitutionally permissible while it might not be
allowable to authorize creation of new crimes in
uncharted fields.” Id. at 250. Yet, according to
Respondent, Section 2778(c)’s delegation is broad
enough to allow the Executive to omit one element of
conspiracy liability and expand the available
maximum penalties.
The President’s Traditional Authority
Over Foreign Affairs Doesn’t Extend to
Rewriting Criminal Conspiracy Law
The Government relies on the recent dissent in
Gundy for the proposition that a delegation of broad
discretion doesn’t create a separation of powers issue
if it falls within the scope of an established executive
power, like foreign affairs. BIO 18 (citing Gundy, 139
S. Ct. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and
Thomas, J., dissenting)). Leaving aside the oddity of
Respondent relying on three Justices’ call to
5
reconsider the intelligible principle test to argue that
this Court shouldn’t reconsider it, that argument
misconstrues both the nature of Petitioners’ challenge
and what Section 2778(c) does here. 1
Article II of the Constitution gives the Executive
substantial discretion over foreign affairs. But that
authority encompasses the ability to define defense
articles and promulgate the United States Munitions
list, not to (re)define criminal offenses. Article I of the
Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States.” But here, Section 2778(c) presents the
Executive with a fill-in-the-blank mechanism to make
an act a crime, a role reserved solely to Congress.
United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2325 (2019).
This gives the President unlimited authority to
1 That dissent proposed the following test:
“Does the statute
assign to the executive only the responsibility to make factual
findings? Does it set forth the facts that the executive must
consider and the criteria against which to measure them? And
most importantly, did Congress, and not the Executive Branch,
make the policy judgments?” Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting). A regulation like the one here that makes policy
judgments that contradict existing criminal law cannot stand.
Congress made a policy judgment to impose a penalty of “not
more than five years” for conspiracy, but the regulations here
expand that to 20 years. 18 U.S.C. § 371; 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c).
And Section 371 requires an overt act, while the regulation here
does not. Finally, while the Government relies on the criteria set
forth in Section 2778(a)(2)—like “whether the export of an article
would * * * support international terrorism” or “increase the
possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict,” 22 U.S.C.
§ 2778(a)(2)—those go to whether to grant a license, not whether
the Executive can or should weaken the requirements for
conspiratorial liability while increasing the associated penalties.
BIO 14.
6
“prescrib[e] the rules by which the duties and rights”
of citizens are determined, a quintessentially
legislative power. The Federalist No. 78, at 465
(Clinton Roissiter ed., 1961) (Alexander Hamilton);
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2144 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Respondent also misreads Loving v. United
States, 517 U.S. 748, 772 (1996), for the proposition
that congressional guidance and restrictions are not
necessary for delegations within the Executive’s
“traditional authority”—here, foreign affairs and
national security.
BIO 15.
But Loving doesn’t
actually support that rule. First, as Loving
emphasized, the delegation there was “set within
boundaries the President may not exceed.” Id. at 772.
Second, the delegation was “made to the President in
his role as Commander in Chief,” which “require[s]
him to take responsible and continuing action to
superintend the military, including the courtsmartial.” Id.
Respondent also fails to acknowledge that even
Loving expressly noted that delegations that call for
discretion beyond the President’s traditional authority
may be subject to higher scrutiny. Id.
Here,
Petitioners have never challenged the President’s
authority to promulgate the United States munitions
list, define items as defense articles, or regulate their
international commerce, just his ability to rewrite by
regulation statutory criminal law. That power falls
far outside the President’s traditional authority.
United States v. Chi Tong Kuok, 671 F.3d 931,
934-35 (9th Cir. 2012) doesn’t help Respondent for
similar reasons. Petitioners do not dispute Chi Tong
Kuok’s holding that Section 2778(a)(1) contained an
7
intelligible principle with respect to the President’s
authority to designate defense articles and services
and maintain the United States Munitions List.
Rather, Petitioners dispute that the Executive has the
authority to create a conspiracy charge without one of
the statutory elements, and with four times the
statutory maximum established by Congress. 18
U.S.C. § 371. Chi Tong Kuok didn’t consider that
issue.
This Question Is Cert-Worthy
Respondent doesn’t dispute that how the nondelegation doctrine applies in criminal cases is
unsettled. Touby, 500 U.S. at 165-66. Its focus on a
lack of circuit split ignores the improbability of one
developing because lower courts will rely intelligible
principle test until the Court revisits it. Indeed, that
only a handful of statutes have been struck down does
not evidence a lack of cert-worthiness, but underscores
that the “intelligible principle” test has “taken a life of
its own,” and provides no meaningful check upon
excessive delegation. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131-48
(Gorsuch, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
Respondent ignores how several
members of this Court have recognized the need to
revisit this test to clarify that “[w]hile Congress can
enlist considerable assistance from the executive
branch in filling up details and finding facts, it may
never hand off to the [Executive] the power to write
his own criminal code.” Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2148
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2130-31 (Alito,
J., concurring); Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342
(2019) (mem.) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of
certiorari).
8
The Government nevertheless cites a petition to
argue that the Court should deny review here too.
BIO 8-9.
But unlike the Petitioners here, the
petitioner in Henry v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2615
(2019) (mem.), was validly charged with one count of
conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (in addition to
attempting to violate AECA). The petition did not ask
the Court to reconsider the intelligible principle test,
and so did not address the first issue here.
This Is an Appropriate Vehicle to Revise
the “Mutated” Intelligible Principle
Doctrine
Finally, this is an appropriate case in which to
(re)consider the intelligible principle test in the
criminal context. Contrary to Respondent’s assertion,
the issue was raised, albeit before sentencing, in the
district court, ER0595; the appellate court considered
it on the merits; and the question is one of law. Nor
would the result be the same under the Gundy
dissenters’ test. See supra note 2. If the delegation is
so broad as to allow the Executive Branch to
unilaterally rewrite criminal statutes to eliminate an
element and augment the penalties, that delegation
cannot stand. And if it is not broad enough, then a
regulation that does both those things also cannot
stand because it exceeds the scope of delegation.
Either way, this Court should grant review.
II. Respondent Doesn’t Dispute Is The
Existence Of A Circuit Split On The Second
Question Presented
Respondent primarily argues that the second
question presented does not warrant review despite
the existence of a deep Circuit split because, inter alia,
9
this Court has declined to resolve that split previously.
But the petitions Respondent relies on (BIO 9) are all
distinguishable, and each was a poor vehicle. For
example, in those cases, petitioners’ convictions were
supported by inevitable discovery of the relevant,
legally obtained evidence (BIO 17, Cain v. United
States, 141 S. Ct. 1082 (2021) (No. 20-5639)),
overwhelming corroborating evidence of guilt (BIO 25,
Galindo-Serrano v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 2646
(2020) (No. 19-7112)), a valid decision to bring a
second indictment based on newly discovered evidence
(BIO 23, Bowline v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1129
(2020) (No. 19-5563)), or a straightforward, eyewitness account in support of a finding of reasonable
suspicion (BIO 20-21, Guerrero v. United States, 140
S. Ct. 1300 (2020) (No. 19-6825)). But this petition
raises a constitutional challenge to the charging
statute and regulation going to the heart of whether
the Morgovskys were legally brought into court at all
and what penalties could be imposed, 2 and application
of the correct standard would lead to a different result.
This Court should grant review, resolve the split, and
remand for the Ninth Circuit to apply the correct
standard.
While the Ninth Circuit considered Naum’s constitutional
challenge to his conviction on the merits, it declined to consider
his other arguments. But see United States v. Soto, 794 F.3d 635,
655 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting that “the rulemaking history clarifies
that Rule 12 is generally directed at the district courts, not the
appellate courts” and that the Rule’s “good-cause standard may
be difficult to apply on appeal if the issue was not first raised at
the district court because review for good cause often requires
developing and analyzing facts to determine whether a defendant
has shown good cause for the late filing”).
2
10
III. Irina’s Challenge Wasn’t Waived
Finally, the Government argues, without citing
any authority, that Irina’s plea agreement waiver
automatically precludes her constitutional challenge
to the statute of conviction, notwithstanding Class v.
United States. BIO 29; 138 S. Ct. 798, 803 (2018)
(holding that “[a] guilty plea [does not] by itself bar[]
a federal criminal defendant from challenging the
constitutionality of the statute of conviction on direct
appeal”). Application of this rule would eviscerate this
Court’s holding in Class, and the rationale of the
Menna-Blackledge doctrine—which the Court applied
in Class. See id. at 803-04 (citing Menna v. New York,
423 U.S. 61, 63 & n.2 (1975) (per curiam); Blackledge
v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974)). Under that doctrine,
“a guilty plea does not bar a claim on appeal where on
the face of the record the court had no power to enter
the conviction or impose the sentence.” Class, 138 S.
Ct. at 804 (cleaned up). Roughly 95% of felony cases
are resolved by guilty pleas 3, and many necessarily
involve negotiated exchanges. The Government’s
interpretation would deprive many defendants of their
right to challenge an unconstitutional statute,
contravening Class. Id.
The Government claims that no case supports a
different interpretation that would allow defendants
to raise such challenges despite an appellate waiver,
but that’s wrong (and an issue over which both before
3 See USSC, Overview of Federal Criminal Cases Fiscal Year
2016, at 4 (2017); Sean Rosenmerkel, Matthew Durose, & Donald
Farole, Jr., Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ
226846, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2006 - Statistical
Tables, at 1 (rev. Nov. 22, 2010).
11
and after Class, circuits have disagreed). United
States v. Torres, 828 F.3d 1113, 1125 (9th Cir. 2016)
(“A waiver of appellate rights will also not apply if a
defendant’s sentence is ‘illegal,’ which includes a
sentence that ‘violates the Constitution.’” (quoting
United States v. Bibler, 495 F.3d 621, 624 (9th Cir.
2007), as amended (July 19, 2007))); United States v.
Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 2000) (express
knowing waiver will not bar certain constitutional
challenges to a sentence) with United States v. Joseph,
811 F. App’x 595, 597-98 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)
(an appeal waiver in a plea agreement is enforceable
even against a constitutional challenge to the statute
of conviction); United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643
F.3d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2011) (appellate waiver applies
to constitutional challenges).
And some courts
(though not all) have concluded that an appellate
waiver will not bar challenges where failing to
consider the claim results in a miscarriage of justice.”
See, e.g., United States v. Snelson, 555 F.3d 681, 685
(8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d
557, 562-63 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Teeter, 257
F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 2001). The Court should grant
cert to resolve this split of authority.
Nor has the Court denied a grant related to this
question before. Cf. BIO 9. The question in Haynes
concerned whether an appellate waiver implicitly
waives a collateral attack on a conviction. Haynes
Timberland, Inc. v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 288
(2018) (mem.). The question in Lowman asked
whether an appeal waiver can be enforced when a
sentence is based on “unreliable facts in violation of
the defendant’s due process rights.” Neither petition
asked whether an appellate waiver bars a
12
constitutional challenge to the statute of conviction
itself. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1880)
(“[a] conviction under [an unconstitutional law] is not
merely erroneous, but is illegal and void, and cannot
be a legal cause of imprisonment .... [and] if the laws
are unconstitutional and void, the Circuit Court
acquired no jurisdiction of the causes.”).
That
question should be resolved in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant
the petition for certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
MARISA C. MALECK
ANNE M. VOIGTS
KING & SPALDING LLP
Counsel of Record
1700 Pennsylvania Ave. NW NOAH STID
Washington, DC 20006
KING & SPALDING LLP
(202) 737-0500
601 S. California Avenue
mmaleck@kslaw.com
Suite 100
Palo Alto, CA 94304
(650) 422-6700
avoigts@kslaw.com
nstid@kslaw.com
Counsel for Petitioners
August 4, 2021
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