Reply Brief — Naum Morgovsky and Irina Morgovsky, Petitioners v. United States

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NO. 20-1595

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

________________

NAUM MORGOVSKY and IRINA MORGOVSKY,

v.

Petitioners,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

________________

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

________________

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

________________

MARISA C. MALECK

ANNE M. VOIGTS

KING & SPALDING LLP

Counsel of Record

1700 Pennsylvania Ave. NW NOAH STID

Washington, DC 20006

KING & SPALDING LLP

(202) 737-0500

601 S. California Avenue

mmaleck@kslaw.com

Suite 100

Palo Alto, CA 94304

(650) 422-6700

avoigts@kslaw.com

nstid@kslaw.com

Counsel for Petitioners

August 4, 2021

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS ........................ 1

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 2

I.

The Decision Below Warrants Review................ 2

Contrary to the Government’s Claims,

Section 2778(c)’s Delegation Doesn’t

Satisfy the Current Tests ............................. 2

The President’s Traditional Authority

Over Foreign Affairs Doesn’t Extend to

Rewriting Criminal Conspiracy Law ........... 4

This Question Is Cert-Worthy ..................... 7

This Is an Appropriate Vehicle to Revise

the “Mutated” Intelligible Principle

Doctrine ........................................................ 8

II. Respondent Doesn’t Dispute Is The Existence

Of A Circuit Split On The Second Question

Presented ............................................................. 8

III. Irina’s Challenge Wasn’t Waived...................... 10

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 12

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC,

329 U.S. 90 (1946)................................................ 2, 3

Blackledge v. Perry,

417 U.S. 21 (1974).................................................. 10

Class v. United States,

138 S. Ct. 798 (2018).............................................. 10

Ex parte Siebold,

100 U.S. 371 (1880)................................................ 12

Fahey v. Mallonee,

332 U.S. 245 (1947).................................................. 4

Gundy v. United States,

139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).................................... passim

Haynes Timberland, Inc. v. United States,

139 S. Ct. 288 (2018).............................................. 11

Henry v. United States,

139 S. Ct. 2615 (2019).............................................. 8

Lichter v. United States,

334 U.S. 742 (1948).................................................. 3

Loving v. United States,

517 U.S. 748 (1996).................................................. 6

Menna v. New York,

423 U.S. 61 (1975).................................................. 10

Mistretta v. United States,

488 U.S. 361 (1989).................................................. 2

Paul v. United States,

140 S. Ct. 342 (2019)................................................ 7

Touby v. United States,

500 U.S. 160 (1991).............................................. 3, 7

iii

United States v. Bibler,

495 F.3d 621 (9th Cir. 2007).................................. 11

United States v. Brown,

232 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2000).................................. 11

United States v. Chi Tong Kuok,

671 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2012).................................... 6

United States v. Davis,

139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).............................................. 5

United States v. Joseph,

811 F. App’x 595 (11th Cir. 2020) ......................... 11

United States v. Khattak,

273 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 2001) ................................... 11

United States v. Portillo-Munoz,

643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011).................................. 11

United States v. Snelson,

555 F.3d 681 (8th Cir. 2009).................................. 11

United States v. Soto,

794 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2015).................................... 9

United States v. Teeter,

257 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001) .................................... 11

United States v. Torres,

828 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2016)................................ 11

Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,

531 U.S. 457 (2001).................................................. 3

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 371 ............................................... 1, 5, 7, 8

21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(1) .................................................. 3

22 U.S.C. § 2778(a) ..................................................... 5

22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) ................................................. 2, 5

iv

Other Authorities

BIO,

Bowline v. United States,

140 S. Ct. 1129 (2020) (No. 19-5563) ...................... 9

BIO,

Cain v. United States,

141 S. Ct. 1082 (2021) (No. 20-5639) ...................... 9

BIO,

Galindo-Serrano v. United States,

140 S. Ct. 2646 (2020) (No. 19-7112) ...................... 9

BIO,

Guerrero v. United States,

140 S. Ct. 1300 (2020) (No. 19-6825) ...................... 9

The Federalist No. 78

(Clinton Roissiter ed., 1961)

(Alexander Hamilton) .............................................. 6

Sean Rosenmerkel, Matthew Durose,

& Donald Farole, Jr., Dep’t of Justice,

Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ 226846,

Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2006 Statistical Tables (rev. Nov. 22, 2010) .................. 10

USSC,

Overview of Federal Criminal Cases

Fiscal Year 2016 (2017) ......................................... 10

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

Respondent doesn’t dispute that Title 22 U.S.C.

Section 2778 of the Arms Export Control Act

(“AECA”), the statute under which Petitioners were

convicted, gives the Executive unfettered discretion to

determine what constitutes a crime. Nor does it

dispute that even within that broad delegation,

nothing expressly accorded the Executive the

authority to expand the potential penalties (or

eliminate elements) for conspiracy liability, which is

otherwise governed by 18 U.S.C. § 371. Accordingly,

Petitioners’ convictions were based on the Executive’s

unilateral decision to expand conspiracy liability (and

the punishment for it) beyond what Congress

provided.

In arguing against review, Respondent adopts a

Goldilocks approach, arguing that the Court shouldn’t

consider the first and third questions presented

because courts haven’t disagreed enough, or the

second question because courts have disagreed too

much. But all three questions warrant review.

Respondent also misstates Petitioners’ arguments

and contends this is a poor vehicle for answering those

questions. But the petition squarely presents the legal

issues, the appellate court considered the main issue

on the merits, and Petitioners’ convictions cannot

stand under the correct analysis.

2

ARGUMENT

I.

The Decision Below Warrants Review

Contrary to the Government’s Claims,

Section 2778(c)’s Delegation Doesn’t

Satisfy the Current Tests

Respondent suggests that Petitioners concede

that § 2778(c)’s delegation survives current caselaw.

BIO 13-14. Not so. Petitioners do not dispute that

this Court has held that, in some instances, a

delegation is constitutionally sufficient if Congress

delineates (1) “the general policy” to be pursued,

(2) the public agency applying it, and (3) “the

boundaries of th[e] delegated authority.” Mistretta v.

United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1989) (quoting

Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105

(1946)). But Section 2778 doesn’t define in any

meaningful way either the general policy to pursue or

the boundaries of that delegated authority. Pet. 17;

20-21.

Nevertheless, Respondent argues that Congress’s

policy of “further[ing] * * * world peace and the

security and foreign policy of the United States” by

“control[ling] the import and the export of defense

articles and defense services” in Section 2778(a)(1)

satisfies the requirement that Congress specify the

general policy to pursue. BIO 14. But this policy

guides only the President’s maintenance of the United

States Munitions List, not the creation of a criminal

penalty with an offense to be named later by the

Executive. Whether this general policy provides

enough guidance to determine which defense articles

should appear on that list is one thing. Whether it

provides a basis for unilaterally expanding the

3

application of and penalties for criminal conspiracy

beyond the Congressionally established ones is

entirely another.

But AECA also doesn’t identify the “boundaries of

the delegated authority.” Notably, the Government

doesn’t articulate any boundary for Section 2778(c)’s

delegation of criminal lawmaking authority, which

applies to “any person who willfully violates any

provision of this section … or any rule or regulation

issued under this section ….”

This unbounded

delegation of criminal lawmaking authority

distinguishes this case from many of those the

Government cites. BIO 11 n.1. In Gundy v. United

States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019), for example, the

authority delegated to the Attorney General to apply

SORNA’s registration requirements to pre-act

offenders

applied

to

“transition-period

implementation issues, and no further.” Similarly,

the delegation of authority to set air-quality standards

in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations was

limited to standards “requisite to protect public health

from the adverse effects of the pollutant in the

ambient air.” 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001). This

limitation runs parallel to Touby, where the authority

delegated only let the Attorney General designate a

drug as a controlled substance for criminal

enforcement if “necessary to avoid an imminent

hazard to the public safety.” Touby v. United States,

500 U.S. 160, 166 (1991) (quoting 21 U.S.C.

§ 811(h)(1)); see also Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S.

742, 787 (1948) (authority to set standards for

recovery of excessive profits from military contractors

explicitly “confined to the duration of the war or to a

short time thereafter”); Am. Power & Light Co., 329

4

U.S. at 105 (noting specific “standards for new

security issues,” and “conditions for acquisitions of

properties and securities”); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332

U.S. 245, 250 (1947) (authority to set rules for

reorganization of certain associations constrained to

“a single type of enterprise” with limited “problems of

insecurity and mismanagement,” applying only

known and established remedies). Each of these

delegations was upheld in part because of the tangible

boundaries mandated by Congress.

This petition is also more certworthy because the

Executive misused a broad delegation of power to alter

existing criminal conspiracy law. This Court has

noted that “[a] discretion to make regulations to guide

supervisory action in such matters may be

constitutionally permissible while it might not be

allowable to authorize creation of new crimes in

uncharted fields.” Id. at 250. Yet, according to

Respondent, Section 2778(c)’s delegation is broad

enough to allow the Executive to omit one element of

conspiracy liability and expand the available

maximum penalties.

The President’s Traditional Authority

Over Foreign Affairs Doesn’t Extend to

Rewriting Criminal Conspiracy Law

The Government relies on the recent dissent in

Gundy for the proposition that a delegation of broad

discretion doesn’t create a separation of powers issue

if it falls within the scope of an established executive

power, like foreign affairs. BIO 18 (citing Gundy, 139

S. Ct. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and

Thomas, J., dissenting)). Leaving aside the oddity of

Respondent relying on three Justices’ call to

5

reconsider the intelligible principle test to argue that

this Court shouldn’t reconsider it, that argument

misconstrues both the nature of Petitioners’ challenge

and what Section 2778(c) does here. 1

Article II of the Constitution gives the Executive

substantial discretion over foreign affairs. But that

authority encompasses the ability to define defense

articles and promulgate the United States Munitions

list, not to (re)define criminal offenses. Article I of the

Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers

herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the

United States.” But here, Section 2778(c) presents the

Executive with a fill-in-the-blank mechanism to make

an act a crime, a role reserved solely to Congress.

United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2325 (2019).

This gives the President unlimited authority to

1 That dissent proposed the following test:

“Does the statute

assign to the executive only the responsibility to make factual

findings? Does it set forth the facts that the executive must

consider and the criteria against which to measure them? And

most importantly, did Congress, and not the Executive Branch,

make the policy judgments?” Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch,

J., dissenting). A regulation like the one here that makes policy

judgments that contradict existing criminal law cannot stand.

Congress made a policy judgment to impose a penalty of “not

more than five years” for conspiracy, but the regulations here

expand that to 20 years. 18 U.S.C. § 371; 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c).

And Section 371 requires an overt act, while the regulation here

does not. Finally, while the Government relies on the criteria set

forth in Section 2778(a)(2)—like “whether the export of an article

would * * * support international terrorism” or “increase the

possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict,” 22 U.S.C.

§ 2778(a)(2)—those go to whether to grant a license, not whether

the Executive can or should weaken the requirements for

conspiratorial liability while increasing the associated penalties.

BIO 14.

6

“prescrib[e] the rules by which the duties and rights”

of citizens are determined, a quintessentially

legislative power. The Federalist No. 78, at 465

(Clinton Roissiter ed., 1961) (Alexander Hamilton);

Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2144 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

Respondent also misreads Loving v. United

States, 517 U.S. 748, 772 (1996), for the proposition

that congressional guidance and restrictions are not

necessary for delegations within the Executive’s

“traditional authority”—here, foreign affairs and

national security.

BIO 15.

But Loving doesn’t

actually support that rule. First, as Loving

emphasized, the delegation there was “set within

boundaries the President may not exceed.” Id. at 772.

Second, the delegation was “made to the President in

his role as Commander in Chief,” which “require[s]

him to take responsible and continuing action to

superintend the military, including the courtsmartial.” Id.

Respondent also fails to acknowledge that even

Loving expressly noted that delegations that call for

discretion beyond the President’s traditional authority

may be subject to higher scrutiny. Id.

Here,

Petitioners have never challenged the President’s

authority to promulgate the United States munitions

list, define items as defense articles, or regulate their

international commerce, just his ability to rewrite by

regulation statutory criminal law. That power falls

far outside the President’s traditional authority.

United States v. Chi Tong Kuok, 671 F.3d 931,

934-35 (9th Cir. 2012) doesn’t help Respondent for

similar reasons. Petitioners do not dispute Chi Tong

Kuok’s holding that Section 2778(a)(1) contained an

7

intelligible principle with respect to the President’s

authority to designate defense articles and services

and maintain the United States Munitions List.

Rather, Petitioners dispute that the Executive has the

authority to create a conspiracy charge without one of

the statutory elements, and with four times the

statutory maximum established by Congress. 18

U.S.C. § 371. Chi Tong Kuok didn’t consider that

issue.

This Question Is Cert-Worthy

Respondent doesn’t dispute that how the nondelegation doctrine applies in criminal cases is

unsettled. Touby, 500 U.S. at 165-66. Its focus on a

lack of circuit split ignores the improbability of one

developing because lower courts will rely intelligible

principle test until the Court revisits it. Indeed, that

only a handful of statutes have been struck down does

not evidence a lack of cert-worthiness, but underscores

that the “intelligible principle” test has “taken a life of

its own,” and provides no meaningful check upon

excessive delegation. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131-48

(Gorsuch, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J.,

dissenting).

Respondent ignores how several

members of this Court have recognized the need to

revisit this test to clarify that “[w]hile Congress can

enlist considerable assistance from the executive

branch in filling up details and finding facts, it may

never hand off to the [Executive] the power to write

his own criminal code.” Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2148

(Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2130-31 (Alito,

J., concurring); Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342

(2019) (mem.) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of

certiorari).

8

The Government nevertheless cites a petition to

argue that the Court should deny review here too.

BIO 8-9.

But unlike the Petitioners here, the

petitioner in Henry v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2615

(2019) (mem.), was validly charged with one count of

conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (in addition to

attempting to violate AECA). The petition did not ask

the Court to reconsider the intelligible principle test,

and so did not address the first issue here.

This Is an Appropriate Vehicle to Revise

the “Mutated” Intelligible Principle

Doctrine

Finally, this is an appropriate case in which to

(re)consider the intelligible principle test in the

criminal context. Contrary to Respondent’s assertion,

the issue was raised, albeit before sentencing, in the

district court, ER0595; the appellate court considered

it on the merits; and the question is one of law. Nor

would the result be the same under the Gundy

dissenters’ test. See supra note 2. If the delegation is

so broad as to allow the Executive Branch to

unilaterally rewrite criminal statutes to eliminate an

element and augment the penalties, that delegation

cannot stand. And if it is not broad enough, then a

regulation that does both those things also cannot

stand because it exceeds the scope of delegation.

Either way, this Court should grant review.

II. Respondent Doesn’t Dispute Is The

Existence Of A Circuit Split On The Second

Question Presented

Respondent primarily argues that the second

question presented does not warrant review despite

the existence of a deep Circuit split because, inter alia,

9

this Court has declined to resolve that split previously.

But the petitions Respondent relies on (BIO 9) are all

distinguishable, and each was a poor vehicle. For

example, in those cases, petitioners’ convictions were

supported by inevitable discovery of the relevant,

legally obtained evidence (BIO 17, Cain v. United

States, 141 S. Ct. 1082 (2021) (No. 20-5639)),

overwhelming corroborating evidence of guilt (BIO 25,

Galindo-Serrano v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 2646

(2020) (No. 19-7112)), a valid decision to bring a

second indictment based on newly discovered evidence

(BIO 23, Bowline v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1129

(2020) (No. 19-5563)), or a straightforward, eyewitness account in support of a finding of reasonable

suspicion (BIO 20-21, Guerrero v. United States, 140

S. Ct. 1300 (2020) (No. 19-6825)). But this petition

raises a constitutional challenge to the charging

statute and regulation going to the heart of whether

the Morgovskys were legally brought into court at all

and what penalties could be imposed, 2 and application

of the correct standard would lead to a different result.

This Court should grant review, resolve the split, and

remand for the Ninth Circuit to apply the correct

standard.

While the Ninth Circuit considered Naum’s constitutional

challenge to his conviction on the merits, it declined to consider

his other arguments. But see United States v. Soto, 794 F.3d 635,

655 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting that “the rulemaking history clarifies

that Rule 12 is generally directed at the district courts, not the

appellate courts” and that the Rule’s “good-cause standard may

be difficult to apply on appeal if the issue was not first raised at

the district court because review for good cause often requires

developing and analyzing facts to determine whether a defendant

has shown good cause for the late filing”).

2

10

III. Irina’s Challenge Wasn’t Waived

Finally, the Government argues, without citing

any authority, that Irina’s plea agreement waiver

automatically precludes her constitutional challenge

to the statute of conviction, notwithstanding Class v.

United States. BIO 29; 138 S. Ct. 798, 803 (2018)

(holding that “[a] guilty plea [does not] by itself bar[]

a federal criminal defendant from challenging the

constitutionality of the statute of conviction on direct

appeal”). Application of this rule would eviscerate this

Court’s holding in Class, and the rationale of the

Menna-Blackledge doctrine—which the Court applied

in Class. See id. at 803-04 (citing Menna v. New York,

423 U.S. 61, 63 & n.2 (1975) (per curiam); Blackledge

v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974)). Under that doctrine,

“a guilty plea does not bar a claim on appeal where on

the face of the record the court had no power to enter

the conviction or impose the sentence.” Class, 138 S.

Ct. at 804 (cleaned up). Roughly 95% of felony cases

are resolved by guilty pleas 3, and many necessarily

involve negotiated exchanges. The Government’s

interpretation would deprive many defendants of their

right to challenge an unconstitutional statute,

contravening Class. Id.

The Government claims that no case supports a

different interpretation that would allow defendants

to raise such challenges despite an appellate waiver,

but that’s wrong (and an issue over which both before

3 See USSC, Overview of Federal Criminal Cases Fiscal Year

2016, at 4 (2017); Sean Rosenmerkel, Matthew Durose, & Donald

Farole, Jr., Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ

226846, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2006 - Statistical

Tables, at 1 (rev. Nov. 22, 2010).

11

and after Class, circuits have disagreed). United

States v. Torres, 828 F.3d 1113, 1125 (9th Cir. 2016)

(“A waiver of appellate rights will also not apply if a

defendant’s sentence is ‘illegal,’ which includes a

sentence that ‘violates the Constitution.’” (quoting

United States v. Bibler, 495 F.3d 621, 624 (9th Cir.

2007), as amended (July 19, 2007))); United States v.

Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 2000) (express

knowing waiver will not bar certain constitutional

challenges to a sentence) with United States v. Joseph,

811 F. App’x 595, 597-98 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)

(an appeal waiver in a plea agreement is enforceable

even against a constitutional challenge to the statute

of conviction); United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643

F.3d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2011) (appellate waiver applies

to constitutional challenges).

And some courts

(though not all) have concluded that an appellate

waiver will not bar challenges where failing to

consider the claim results in a miscarriage of justice.”

See, e.g., United States v. Snelson, 555 F.3d 681, 685

(8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d

557, 562-63 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Teeter, 257

F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 2001). The Court should grant

cert to resolve this split of authority.

Nor has the Court denied a grant related to this

question before. Cf. BIO 9. The question in Haynes

concerned whether an appellate waiver implicitly

waives a collateral attack on a conviction. Haynes

Timberland, Inc. v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 288

(2018) (mem.). The question in Lowman asked

whether an appeal waiver can be enforced when a

sentence is based on “unreliable facts in violation of

the defendant’s due process rights.” Neither petition

asked whether an appellate waiver bars a

12

constitutional challenge to the statute of conviction

itself. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1880)

(“[a] conviction under [an unconstitutional law] is not

merely erroneous, but is illegal and void, and cannot

be a legal cause of imprisonment .... [and] if the laws

are unconstitutional and void, the Circuit Court

acquired no jurisdiction of the causes.”).

That

question should be resolved in this case.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant

the petition for certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

MARISA C. MALECK

ANNE M. VOIGTS

KING & SPALDING LLP

Counsel of Record

1700 Pennsylvania Ave. NW NOAH STID

Washington, DC 20006

KING & SPALDING LLP

(202) 737-0500

601 S. California Avenue

mmaleck@kslaw.com

Suite 100

Palo Alto, CA 94304

(650) 422-6700

avoigts@kslaw.com

nstid@kslaw.com

Counsel for Petitioners

August 4, 2021

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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