Petitioners Brief — Edward A. Caniglia, Petitioner v. Robert F. Strom, et al.

Supreme Court briefJan 8, 2021

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No. 20-157

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

EDWARD A. CANIGLIA,

Petitioner,

ROBERT F. STROM, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The First Circuit

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

Thomas W. Lyons

Rhiannon S. Huffman

STRAUSS, FACTOR,

LAING & LYONS

One Davol Square

Suite 305

Providence, RI 02903

Emma S. Gardner

SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,

MEAGHER & FLOM LLP

One Manhattan West

New York, NY 10001

Shay Dvoretzky

Counsel of Record

Jonathan L. Marcus

Emily J. Kennedy

Sylvia O. Tsakos

SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,

MEAGHER & FLOM LLP

1440 New York Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 371-7000

shay.dvoretzky@skadden.com

Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the “community caretaking” exception to

the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement

extends to the home.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner is Edward A. Caniglia.

Respondents are Robert F. Strom, as the Finance

Director of the City of Cranston; the City of Cranston;

Colonel Michael J. Winquist, in his official capacity as

Chief of the Cranston Police Department; Russell C.

Henry, Jr., individually and in his official capacity as

an Officer of the Cranston Police Department;

Brandon Barth, individually and in his official

capacity as an officer of the Cranston Police

Department; John Mastrati, individually and in his

official capacity as an officer of the Cranston Police

Department; Wayne Russell, individually and in his

official capacity as an officer of the Cranston Police

Department; and Austin Smith, individually and in

his official capacity as an officer of the Cranston Police

Department.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED..........................................i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING .......................... ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES....................................... v

INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1

OPINIONS BELOW ................................................... 3

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION........................... 3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS .......................... 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................... 3

PETITIONER AND HIS WIFE HAVE A

DISAGREEMENT IN THEIR HOME.......................... 3

II.

THE OFFICERS SEIZE PETITIONER AND HIS

HANDGUNS FROM HIS HOME WITHOUT A

WARRANT ............................................................. 5

III. THE LOWER COURTS UPHOLD THE

WARRANTLESS HOME ENTRY AND

SEIZURES BASED SOLELY ON THE

COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION................. 6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................. 10

ARGUMENT ............................................................ 12

CADY’S COMMUNITY CARETAKING

EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

APPLIES ONLY TO SEARCHES OF

AUTOMOBILES .................................................... 13

Cady Tailored The Community

Caretaking Exception To The

Unique Context Of Motor Vehicle

Searches ................................................... 13

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(continued)

Page

II.

The Court Has Never Applied The

Community Caretaking Exception

Outside The Context Of Vehicle

Searches ................................................... 16

Black-Letter Law Affirms Cady’s

Reliance On The Reduced Privacy

Interest In Vehicles.................................. 18

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT

HOMES BE INSULATED FROM THE

COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION............... 21

The Common Law Spurned

Warrantless Intrusions Into The

Home......................................................... 21

The Fourth Amendment Prohibits

Warrantless Entries Into The Home

In The Absence Of Consent Or

Exigent Circumstances ............................ 23

The Community Caretaking

Exception Is Antithetical To The

Fourth Amendment’s Protection Of

The Home ................................................. 30

III. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND

OTHERS HAVE AMPLE TOOLS TO HELP

PEOPLE IN NEED WITHOUT EXTENDING

CADY .................................................................. 33

IV. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXTENDING

CADY’S COMMUNITY CARETAKING

EXCEPTION ARE UNAVAILING ............................ 40

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 43

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Brigham City v. Stuart,

547 U.S. 398 (2006) ........................... 29, 32, 33, 34

Cady v. Dombrowski,

413 U.S. 433 (1973) ..................................... passim

California v. Acevedo,

500 U.S. 565 (1991) ....................................... 19, 28

Camara v. Mun. Ct.,

387 U.S. 523 (1967) ..................................... passim

Caniglia v. Strom,

953 F.3d 112 (1st Cir. 2020) ................................. 3

Caniglia v. Strom,

396 F. Supp. 3d 227 (D.R.I. 2019) ........................ 3

Cardwell v. Lewis,

417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality op.) ..................... 19

Carpenter v. United States,

138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) ......................................... 21

Carroll v. United States,

267 U.S. 132 (1925) ....................................... 18, 20

Castagna v. Jean,

955 F.3d 211 (1st Cir. 1991),

cert denied, 2020 WL 7132271

(Dec. 7, 2020) ....................................................... 42

Chambers v. Mahoney,

399 U.S. 42 (1970) ......................................... 18, 19

City & Cnty. of San Francisco v.

Sheehan,

135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015) ......................................... 34

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Clift v. Narragansett Television, L.P.,

688 A.2d 805 (R.I. 1996) ..................................... 39

Collins v. Virginia,

138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018) ................................. passim

Colorado v. Bertine,

479 U.S. 367 (1987) ................................. 17, 20, 31

Cooper v. California,

386 U.S. 58 (1967) ............................. 18, 19, 20, 25

Florida v. Jardines,

569 U.S. 1 (2013) ................................................. 23

Georgia v. Peterson,

543 S.E.2d 692 (Ga. 2001) .................................. 35

Georgia v. Randolph,

547 U.S. 103 (2006) ..................................... passim

Harris v. United States,

390 U.S. 234 (1968) ....................................... 18, 20

Horton v. California,

496 U.S. 128 (1990) ............................................. 27

Illinois v. Rodriguez,

497 U.S. 177 (1990) ............................................. 27

Kentucky v. King,

563 U.S. 452 (2011) ........................... 11, 23, 28, 29

Michigan v. Fisher,

558 U.S. 45 (2009) ................................... 33, 34, 35

Michigan v. Tyler,

436 U.S. 499 (1978) ............................................. 34

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Mincey v. Arizona,

437 U.S. 385 (1978) ..................................... passim

Missouri v. McNeely,

569 U.S. 141 (2013) ............................................. 36

North Carolina v. Willis,

121 S.E.2d 854 (N.C. 1961) ................................. 39

Olson v. Maryland,

56 A.3d 576

(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) ................................... 36

Payton v. New York,

445 U.S. 573 (1980) ..................................... passim

People v. Woods,

145 N.E.3d 80 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019) ...................... 35

Riley v. California,

573 U.S. 373 (2014) ........................... 27, 28, 36, 40

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,

412 U.S. 218 (1973) ............................................. 27

South Carolina v. Belcher,

685 S.E.2d 802 (S.C. 2009) ................................. 39

South Carolina v. Reese,

633 S.E.2d 898, 900 (S.C. 2006) ......................... 39

South Dakota v. Deneui,

775 N.W.2d 221 (S.D. 2009).......................... 32, 41

South Dakota v. Opperman,

428 U.S. 364 (1976) ..................................... passim

Steagald v. United States,

451 U.S. 204 (1981) ..................................... passim

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

United States v. Quezada,

448 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2006) ............................. 42

United States v. Ross,

456 U.S. 798 (1982) ............................................. 19

United States v. Santana,

427 U.S. 38 (1976) ............................................... 29

United States v. Smith,

820 F.3d 356 (8th Cir. 2016) ............................... 35

United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct.,

407 U.S. 297 (1972) ............................................... 2

United States v. York,

895 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1990) ....................... 35, 41

Wisconsin v. Markov,

840 N.W.2d 137 (Table), 2013 WL

5809640 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 30,

2013) .................................................................... 36

Wisconsin v. Matalonis,

875 N.W.2d 567 (Wis. 2016) ............................... 34

Wisconsin v. Pinkard,

785 N.W.2d 592 (Wis. 2010) ......................... 36, 41

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITIES

U.S. Const. amend. IV ...................................... passim

28 U.S.C. § 1254 ......................................................... 3

83 C.J.S. Suicide § 5 (2020) ...................................... 39

Ala. Code § 22-52-91 ................................................. 38

Alaska Stat. Ann. § 18.66.100.................................. 37

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Alaska Stat. Ann. § 18.66.100.................................. 37

Alaska Stat. Ann. § 47.30.700.................................. 38

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3602................................ 37

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-524.................................. 38

Ark. Code Ann. § 20-47-210 ..................................... 38

Cal. Fam. Code § 6389 ............................................. 37

Cal. Penal Code §§ 18125–18148 ............................. 38

Cal. Wel. & Inst. Code § 5150 .................................. 38

Cal. Wel. & Inst. Code § 5150.05 ............................. 38

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-14.5-103 .......................... 38

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-14.5-104 .......................... 38

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-65-105 ............................ 38

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17a-502 ............................. 38

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 29-38c ................................ 38

Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1045(a) .............................. 37

Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 7703 .................................. 38

Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 5004 .................................. 38

D.C. Code Ann. § 7-2510.4 ....................................... 38

D.C. Code Ann. § 21-521 .......................................... 38

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 394.463 ......................................... 38

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 790.233 ......................................... 37

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 790.401(4) ..................................... 38

Ga. Code Ann. § 37-3-41........................................... 38

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Ga. Code Ann. § 37-3-43........................................... 38

Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 134-7(f) ............................... 37

Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 134-64 ................................. 38

Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 334-59 ................................. 38

Idaho Code Ann. § 66-326 ........................................ 38

405 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/3-606 ............................ 38

725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/112A14(b)(14.5)............................................................ 37

Ind. Code Ann. § 12-26-5-1....................................... 38

Ind. Code Ann. § 34-26-5-9(d)(4) .............................. 37

Ind. Code Ann. § 35-47-3 .......................................... 38

Ind. Code Ann. § 35-47-14-2..................................... 38

Iowa Code Ann. § 229.1 ............................................ 38

Iowa Code Ann. § 236.5(1)(b)(2) ............................... 37

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-2953 ........................................ 38

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 202A.026 ............................... 38

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 202A.031 ............................... 38

La. Stat. Ann. § 28:53............................................... 38

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A,

§ 4007(1)(A-1) ...................................................... 37

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 34-B,

§ 3862................................................................... 38

Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law

§ 4-505(a)(2)(vii) .................................................. 37

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 4-506(f) ....................... 37

Md. Code Ann., Health–Gen § 10-622 ..................... 38

Md. Code Ann., Health–Gen § 10-623 ..................... 38

Md. Code Ann., Health–Gen § 10-625 ..................... 38

Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety

§§ 5-602–5-605 .................................................... 38

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 123, § 12 ........................ 38

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 140, § 131T .................... 38

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 209A, § 3B ..................... 37

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 330.1427 ........................ 39

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2950(1)(e) ................ 37

Minn. Stat. Ann. § 253B.051.................................... 39

Miss. Code Ann. § 41-21-67...................................... 39

Mo. Ann. Stat. § 632.300 .......................................... 39

Mont. Code Ann. § 40-15-201(2)(f) ........................... 37

Mont. Code Ann. § 53-21-129 ................................... 39

Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 42-924(1)(a)(vii)................... 37

Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 71-908 .................................. 39

Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 71-919 .................................. 39

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33.031 .................................. 37

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33.560 .................................. 38

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33.570 .................................. 38

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 433A.150.............................. 39

xii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 433A.160.............................. 39

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 135-C:27 .............................. 39

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 135-C:28 .............................. 39

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-B:4(I), (II) ..................... 37

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-28(j) .................................... 37

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-23 ....................................... 38

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-26 ....................................... 38

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-27.2 ....................................... 39

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-27.6 ....................................... 39

N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-17-5–40-17-07 ...................... 38

N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-1-10 ......................................... 39

N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 50B-3.1 ................................ 37

N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-07.1-02(4)(g) ................. 37

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6341................................................. 38

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6342................................................. 38

N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.39 ................................... 39

N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 122C-261 ............................. 39

N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 25-03.1-25 .......................... 39

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5122.10 ................................ 39

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43A, § 5-207 ............................ 39

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 166.527 .................................. 38

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 426.228 .................................. 39

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 426.232 .................................. 39

xiii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 426.233 .................................. 39

23 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann.

§ 6108(a)(7) .......................................................... 37

50 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7301 ................ 39

8 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 8-8.3-3(b) ........................... 38

8 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 8-8.3-4(a)-(b) ..................... 37

40.1 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 40.1-57(a)(1)................................................................... 39

S.C. Code Ann. § 44-17-410...................................... 39

S.D. Codified Laws § 25-10-24 ................................. 37

S.D. Codified Laws § 27A-10-1 ................................ 39

S.D. Codified Laws § 27A-10-3 ................................ 39

Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-403 ..................................... 39

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 85.022(b)(6) ........................ 37

Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.

§ 573.001.............................................................. 39

Utah Code Ann. § 62A-15-629 ................................. 39

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-603(2)(f) ........................... 37

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 4053 .................................... 38

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 4054 .................................... 38

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 7504 .................................... 39

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 7505 .................................... 39

Va. Code. Ann. § 19.2-152.14 ................................... 38

Va. Code. Ann. § 37.2-808 ........................................ 39

xiv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 7.94.010–

7.94.050 ............................................................... 38

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.41.800 ............................ 37

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 71.05-153 .......................... 39

W. Va. Code Ann. § 27-5-2 ....................................... 39

W. Va. Code Ann. § 48-27-403(a) ............................. 37

Wis. Stat. Ann. § 51.15 ............................................. 39

Wis. Stat. Ann. § 813.12(4m) ................................... 37

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 25-10-109 .................................... 39

H.R. 62, 31st Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska

2019) .................................................................... 38

H.R. 2367, 88th Gen. Assemb., 2020

Sess. (Iowa 2020)................................................. 38

S. 244, 2019 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2019) ........................... 38

H.R. 4283, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess.

(Mich. 2019) ......................................................... 38

S. 156, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess.

(Mich. 2019) ......................................................... 38

H.R. 9, 91st Leg. Sess., 2d Reg. Sess.

(Minn. 2020) ........................................................ 38

Leg. 58, 106th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.

(Neb. 2019) .......................................................... 38

H.R. 454, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.

(N.C. 2019) .......................................................... 38

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

H.R. 1075, 203rd Gen. Assemb.

(Pa. 2019)............................................................. 38

H.R. 1446, 111th Gen. Assemb.,

1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2019) ................................. 38

S. 1178, 111th Gen. Assemb.,

1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2019) ................................. 38

Assemb. 573, 104th Leg., 2019-2020

Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2019) ......................................... 38

OTHER AUTHORITIES

4 William Blackstone,

Commentaries on the Law of

England (4th ed. 1770) ....................................... 22

1 Richard Burn,

The Justice of the Peace, and the

Parish Officer (14th ed. 1780) ............................ 22

1 Joseph Chitty,

Practical Treatise on the Criminal

Law (2019) ........................................................... 22

Laura K. Donohue,

The Original Fourth Amendment,

83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1181 (2016)............................ 22

1 Matthew Hale,

The History of the Pleas of the

Crown (1736) ....................................................... 22

1 Wayne R. LaFave,

Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the

Fourth Amendment (5th ed. 2012) ..................... 27

INTRODUCTION

In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), this

Court held that police officers did not violate the

Fourth Amendment when they searched the trunk of

a car that had been towed after an accident. The Court

acknowledged that, “except in certain carefully

defined classes of cases,” police cannot search private

property without consent or a warrant. Id. at 439. It

emphasized, however, that “there is a constitutional

difference between houses and cars.” Id. (quoting

Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)).

“[P]olice officers . . . frequently investigate vehicle

accidents in which there is no claim of criminal

liability and engage in what, for want of a better term,

may be described as community caretaking functions,

totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or

acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a

criminal statute.” Id. at 441. The Court thus held that

a “caretaking ‘search’ conducted . . . of a vehicle that

was neither in the custody nor on the premises of its

owner . . . was not unreasonable solely because a

warrant had not been obtained.” Id. at 447–48.

Cady drew on a line of cases “treating automobiles

differently from houses” for purposes of the Fourth

Amendment. Id. at 441. And the Court limited Cady’s

rule to vehicle searches. See, e.g., id. at 446–48. As the

opinion took pains to make clear, Cady’s rule does not

apply to houses. See id. at 439–42.

That is because the Fourth Amendment’s “very

core” is “the right of a man to retreat into his own

home and there be free from unreasonable

governmental intrusion.” Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct.

1663, 1670 (2018) (citation omitted). Indeed, “physical

entry of the home is the chief evil against which the

wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”

United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313

(1972). The Fourth Amendment thus draws “a firm

line at the entrance to the house.” Payton v. New York,

445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). Absent consent or exigent

circumstances—exceptions that are “jealously and

carefully drawn,” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103,

109 (2006) (citation omitted)—warrantless entries

into the home are unreasonable and violate the

Fourth Amendment.

Despite these bedrock Fourth Amendment

principles, some lower courts, including the First

Circuit below, have extended Cady to justify

warrantless entries into, and seizures from, the home.

These courts have reimagined the community

caretaking function to include “an infinite variety of

services to preserve and protect community safety.”

Pet. App. 16a (quotations and citation omitted). And

while Cady carefully cabined its exception to searches

of vehicles in police custody, these courts have said

that the community caretaking exception “is designed

to give police elbow room to take appropriate action”

no matter where a public need arises. Id.

These lower courts are wrong. Extending an

exception designed for cars (the bottom of the Fourth

Amendment totem pole) to homes (the most protected

of all private spaces) would eviscerate the Fourth

Amendment’s warrant requirement. And for no good

reason: Law enforcement officers and others already

have ample other tools for helping people in need.

Cady’s community caretaking exception has no

place in the home. The decision below should be

reversed.

OPINIONS BELOW

The

District

Court’s

opinion

granting

Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment in

relevant part (Pet. App. 50a–79a) is published at 396

F. Supp. 3d 227 (D.R.I. 2019). The First Circuit’s

opinion affirming the District Court’s judgment (Pet.

App. 1a–49a) is published at 953 F.3d 112 (1st Cir.

2020).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The First Circuit entered judgment on March 13,

2020. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on

August 10, 2020 and granted on November 20, 2020.

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not

be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but

upon probable cause, supported by Oath or

affirmation, and particularly describing the

place to be searched, and the persons or

things to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

PETITIONER AND HIS WIFE

DISAGREEMENT IN THEIR HOME

HAVE

Petitioner Edward Caniglia is a 68-year-old man

with no criminal history and no record of violence,

misuse of guns, or self-harm. See J.A. 39, 46. He has

been married to his wife, Kim Caniglia, for 27 years.

See id. at 39. On August 20, 2015, Petitioner and Mrs.

Caniglia had a disagreement inside their Cranston,

Rhode Island home. See Pet. App. 3a, 53a. When the

argument escalated, Petitioner went into his bedroom

and retrieved an unloaded handgun. See id. at 53a;

J.A. 48–49. He returned downstairs. Then, in a

dramatic gesture, he put the unloaded gun on the

dining room table and said, “why don’t you just shoot

me and get me out of my misery?” See Pet. App. 3a,

53a; see also J.A. 48. When Mrs. Caniglia threatened

to call the police, Petitioner left for a drive. See J.A. 49;

see also Pet. App. 3a, 53a. Mrs. Caniglia did not call

the police. Pet. App. 53a. After Petitioner returned

home, the couple’s disagreement continued, and Mrs.

Caniglia decided to spend the night at a motel. See Pet.

App. 4a, 54a.

The next day, Mrs. Caniglia called her husband.

See id. at 54a. Petitioner was in the bathroom and

missed her call. See J.A. 49. Because he did not

answer, Mrs. Caniglia became worried and called the

Cranston Police Department. See Pet. App. 4a, 54a.

She asked the police to make a “well call” to check on

Petitioner and to escort her home. See id. at 54a.

When multiple officers arrived to meet her, Mrs.

Caniglia told them what had happened the night

before and that she was concerned about her

husband’s safety, including that he could be suicidal.

See id.; J.A. 49; see also Pet. App. 4a.

After calling Petitioner, who “sounded fine,” the

officers escorted Mrs. Caniglia back to the home,

where they instructed her to stay in the car while they

spoke with Petitioner on the back deck. See Pet. App.

55a. During their conversation, Petitioner “seemed

normal,” “was calm for the most part,” and said “that

he would never commit suicide.” See id.; see also

Incident Report 1, Caniglia v. Strom, 15-cv-525-JJM-

LDA (D.R.I. Dec. 17, 2018), ECF No. 44-21. Petitioner

told the officers about what had happened the

previous night, and explained that he had said “just

shoot me” in exasperation because he was sick of

arguing. See Pet. App. 5a, 55a.

II. THE OFFICERS SEIZE PETITIONER AND HIS

HANDGUNS FROM HIS HOME WITHOUT A

WARRANT

Based on their conversations with Petitioner and

Mrs. Caniglia, the officers believed there was a risk

that Petitioner would harm himself. See id. at 5a, 55a.

As one of the Respondents, Sergeant Barth, later

admitted, he “did not consult any specific

psychological or psychiatric criteria” or medical

professionals in reaching this conclusion, nor did he

recall any training he received on dealing with people

with mental health issues. J.A. 225. Instead, “just

going on [his] experience,” he summoned a rescue

lieutenant from the Cranston Fire Department to the

Caniglia family home. Id.; see Pet. App. 55a.

That officer told Petitioner that he was taking him

to a local hospital for a psychiatric evaluation. See Pet.

App. 5a, 56a. Petitioner did not go voluntarily. He

went along only after the police told him—falsely—

that if he submitted to an examination, they would not

confiscate his two handguns. See id.; J.A. 52. A

physician, a nurse, and a social worker all examined

Petitioner at the hospital. See Pet. App. 56a. They

discharged him on the spot. See id. But Petitioner had

to pay about $1,000 for the involuntary hospital visit.

See J.A. 61.

While Petitioner was being evaluated at the

hospital, the officers entered the Caniglia family home

to seize Petitioner’s handguns. See Pet. App. 6a, 56a.

The officers believed “it was reasonable to do so based

on [Petitioner’s] state of mind,” and feared that

“[Petitioner] and others could be in danger” if guns

remained in the home. See id. at 56a. The “officers

understood that the [handguns] belonged to

[Petitioner] and that he objected to their seizure.” See

id. at 6a. Indeed, when the officers told Petitioner they

would seize his handguns, he responded, “You’re not

confiscating anything.” See J.A. 51. Even so, they

falsely told Mrs. Caniglia that Petitioner had

consented to confiscating the guns. See Pet. App. 10a–

11a; J.A. 56. Based on that misrepresentation, Mrs.

Caniglia led the officers to the two handguns, located

in the bedroom and the garage, which the officers

seized. See J.A. 57; Pet. App. 6a, 56a–57a.

A few days later, Mrs. Caniglia went to the police

station to retrieve the handguns. See id. at 57a.

Officers refused her request. See id. A month later,

Petitioner went to the police station with the same

request. See id. Again, the officers refused. See id.

When Petitioner’s attorney made the same request, he

fared no better. See id.

III. THE

LOWER

COURTS

UPHOLD

THE

WARRANTLESS HOME ENTRY AND SEIZURES

BASED

SOLELY

THE

COMMUNITY

CARETAKING EXCEPTION

1. Petitioner sued the City of Cranston and the

individual officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the

Federal District Court for the District of Rhode Island.

Petitioner alleged that Respondents violated his

rights under the Second Amendment, the Fourth

Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process and Equal Protection Clauses. See id. at 53a.

He also brought claims under Rhode Island law. See

id. Only after Petitioner filed suit were his guns

finally returned to him. See id. at 57a.

The parties cross-moved for summary judgment.

See id. at 53a. The District Court granted summary

judgment for Petitioner on his Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process Clause claim, finding that

the City violated his due process rights by providing

no process for recovering his handguns and by

arbitrarily denying his requests for their return. See

id. at 70a–72a. It granted summary judgment for

Respondents on the other claims. See id. at 58a–78a.

At issue here is Petitioner’s claim that the entry

into his home and resulting seizures violated his

Fourth Amendment rights. Respondents’ only

justification for their nonconsensual, warrantless

entry and seizures was the “community caretaking”

exception to the warrant requirement. See Pet. App.

at 59a. The District Court acknowledged the circuit

“split about whether the community caretaking

function standard the United States Supreme Court

first set forth in Cady [v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433

(1973)] in the vehicle context also applies to searches

of a home.” Id. at 60a n.3. The District Court held that

it does, reasoning that “community caretaking”

services “could be required not only in vehicles, but

also in homes.” Id. Because the District Court found

that the officers’ actions were “reasonable,” it held

that the community caretaking exception justified the

warrantless entry and seizures. Id. at 64a.

2. The First Circuit affirmed. In doing so, the court

assumed that the seizures and “the officers’ entry into

the home [were] not only warrantless but also

nonconsensual.” Id. at 11a. It also emphasized that

the officers “[did] not invoke either the exigent

circumstances or emergency aid exceptions to the

warrant requirement,” and for good reason: Neither

would likely apply here. Id. at 11a–12a & n.5. Nor did

Respondents “contend that their seizures of the

plaintiff and his firearms were carried out pursuant

to a state civil protection statute.” Id. at 11a–12a.

Instead, Respondents sought “to wrap both of the

contested seizures in the community caretaking

exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 11a.

The First Circuit recognized that this Court has

applied the community caretaking exception only “in

the motor vehicle context,” and it noted that the

doctrine’s reach outside of the motor vehicle context

was “ill-defined.” Id. at 12a–14a. Even so, it “join[ed]

ranks with those courts that have extended the

community caretaking exception” to the home. Id. at

16a. “In taking [that] step,” the First Circuit

emphasized the “‘special role’ that police officers play

in our society.” Id. “[A] police officer,” according to the

First Circuit, “must act as a master of all emergencies,

who is ‘expected to . . . provide an infinite variety of

services to preserve and protect community safety.’”

Id. (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929

F.2d 780, 784–85 (1st Cir. 1991)). And the community

caretaking exception, according to the court, “is

designed to give police elbow room” to protect public

safety. Id.

To avoid giving police a “free pass,” however, the

First Circuit erected two purported “guardrails.” Id.

at 19a. First, “police officers must have ‘solid, noninvestigatory reasons’ for engaging in community

caretaking activities.” Id. at 20a. Second, the officers’

actions “must draw their essence either from state law

or sound police procedure.” Id. Yet that “‘sound police

procedure’ need not involve the application of either

established protocols or fixed criteria.” Id. Instead,

sound police procedure means “police officers’

‘reasonable choices’ among available options.” Id.

(citation omitted). According to the First Circuit,

“[t]he acid test” ultimately is whether the officers’

actions “are within the realm of reason.” Id. at 21a

(citation omitted).

Applying the community caretaking exception to

the seizure of Petitioner, the court held that the

officers acted reasonably, despite “[Petitioner’s]

relatively calm demeanor,” because “the facts

available to the officers at the time . . . warranted their

conclusion that [Petitioner] posed a serious and

imminent risk of harming himself or others.” Id. at

27a–28a. The court noted, however, that “imminent”

does not mean “the degree of immediacy typically

required under the exigent circumstances and

emergency aid exceptions.” Id. at 21a; see also id. at

12a n.5 (explaining that “the emergency aid exception

is typically employed in scenarios in which an

individual within a dwelling has already been

seriously injured or may be about to sustain such

injuries in a matter of moments” (emphasis added)).

Indeed, when the officers arrived, twelve hours had

passed without incident since Petitioner’s supposedly

suicidal statement. Id. at 53a–55a.

Applying the community caretaking exception to

the warrantless entry into Petitioner’s home and the

seizure of his handguns, the court similarly concluded

that “the officers could reasonably have believed,

based on the facts known to them at the time, that

leaving the guns in [Petitioner’s] home, accessible to

him, posed a serious threat of immediate harm.” Id. at

31a. While acknowledging that the officers could

“have accompanied [Petitioner] to the hospital to see

how events unfolded before taking action with respect

to his firearms,” the court explained that “we do not

require police officers to choose the least intrusive

means of fulfilling their community caretaking

responsibilities.” Id. at 34a. The court also concluded

that the officers’ actions “were consistent with sound

police procedure.” Id. at 35a. It did not, however,

identify any police procedures. Instead, it reasoned

that the police “must . . . be granted some measure of

discretion when taking plausible steps to protect

public safety,” and “[h]ere, the officers’ decision to

confiscate the firearms was a reasonable choice

among the available alternatives.” Id.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Respondents

violated

Petitioner’s

Fourth

Amendment rights when they seized him from his

home, and then seized his guns from his bedroom and

garage, all without a warrant. The only justification

Respondents offered for their conduct is Cady’s

community caretaking exception. But that narrow

exception for searches of vehicles in police custody

does not extend to the home. A contrary rule would

grant police a blank check to intrude upon the home

in the name of boundless “community caretaking”

functions. That result is antithetical to the Fourth

Amendment, irreconcilable with this Court’s

precedent, and unnecessary to protect people in need.

I. The community caretaking exception that this

Court recognized in Cady is a narrow carveout from

the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. It is

inextricably tied to three critical aspects of the search

in Cady: a vehicle, in police custody, searched

pursuant to standard police caretaking procedures.

Indeed, in crafting this exception, Cady was careful to

emphasize the “constitutional difference” between

automobiles—which have long been afforded little

privacy protection—and homes, which are at the

pinnacle of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy interests.

Cady, 413 U.S. at 439. The Court has never applied

Cady’s exception outside the vehicle context; to the

contrary, Cady’s progeny, like Cady itself, explicitly

recognize that searches of fixed structures should be

treated differently than searches of automobiles. That

diminished privacy interest in motor vehicles is firmly

grounded in black-letter Fourth Amendment doctrine.

II. When it comes to searches of the home, Cady’s

justifications for a community caretaking exception

are inapposite. “Freedom from intrusion into the

home or dwelling is the archetype of the privacy

protection secured by the Fourth Amendment.”

Payton, 445 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). The

common law spurned warrantless intrusions into the

home. In keeping with that long tradition, the Court

repeatedly has recognized that “searches and seizures

inside a home without a warrant are presumptively

unreasonable.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459

(2011) (citation omitted).

The “firm line” that the Fourth Amendment draws

“at the entrance to the house” does not waver to

permit warrantless entries based on communitycaretaking-like concerns about health and safety.

Payton, 445 U.S. at 590; see Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387

U.S. 523, 538 (1967). That firm line also means that

warrantless searches and seizures that are

permissible in some locations are unconstitutional in

the home. And the limited circumstances in which the

Court has permitted warrantless entry into the

home—consent and exigent circumstances—are

“jealously and carefully drawn.” Randolph, 547 U.S.

at 109 (citation omitted).

Extending the community caretaking exception to

homes would be anathema to the Fourth Amendment.

Cady’s vehicle-specific rationales cannot justify giving

police free rein to intrude homes in the name of

community caretaking.

III. Law enforcement officers and others already

have ample tools to help people in need without

extending Cady. The emergency aid doctrine

recognizes that police can enter a home to protect

occupants from imminent injury. If there is no true

emergency, police may be able to obtain a warrant.

And in the context of mental health crises, states have

statutory schemes that enable not only police, but also

family members, friends, and professionals, to

intervene.

IV. The lower courts that have extended Cady to

the home have not even tried to reconcile their rule

with the core principles underlying the Fourth

Amendment. Instead, they emphasize the importance

of police officers’ caretaking responsibilities. But they

fail to acknowledge the many existing tools that law

enforcement and others have at their disposal. Finally,

although courts have identified some purported limits

on the community caretaking doctrine, those limits

are illusory, and in any event cannot redeem a rule

that is fundamentally incompatible with bedrock

Fourth Amendment principles.

ARGUMENT

The community caretaking exception is a narrow

carveout to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant

requirement. There is no basis for expanding that

vehicle-specific exception to justify warrantless

intrusions into the home. To the contrary, the Fourth

Amendment prohibits doing so. Nor is there any good

reason to grant police such sweeping authority when

they already have ample other tools for helping people

in need.

CADY’S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION TO

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLIES ONLY TO

SEARCHES OF AUTOMOBILES

In Cady, this Court recognized a limited

community caretaking exception to the Fourth

Amendment’s warrant requirement that applies only

to searches of cars. The Court has never applied

Cady’s exception beyond that narrow context; in fact,

Cady and its progeny explicitly recognize that

searches of fixed structures should be treated

differently. That diminished privacy interest in

vehicles is firmly grounded in established Fourth

Amendment doctrine.

A. Cady

Tailored

The

Community

Caretaking Exception To The Unique

Context Of Motor Vehicle Searches

Cady considered the constitutionality of a police

search of an automobile conducted in the wake of a car

accident. 413 U.S at 436–37. The defendant was a

Chicago police officer who had crashed a rental car in

West Bend, Wisconsin. Id. at 435–36. After being

picked up by a passing motorist, the defendant called

the police. Id. at 436. Two officers met him at a tavern

and drove him back to the scene of the single-vehicle

accident. Id. On the way, the officers observed that the

defendant was drunk. See id. Upon arriving at the

scene of the accident, the officers called a tow truck to

move the damaged car to a private garage. See id. at

436.

Believing that “Chicago police officers were

required by regulation to carry their service revolvers

at all times,” the officers looked for the defendant’s

revolver before the car was towed. Id. at 436–37. They

did not find it on his person, on the car’s front seat, or

in the glove compartment. Id. at 436. After taking the

defendant to the West Bend police station—where he

was interviewed, arrested for drunk driving, and

ultimately transported to the hospital—one of the

officers drove to the garage where the rental car had

been towed. Id. The car had been “left outside by the

wrecker, and no police guard was posted.” Id. The

purpose of returning to the car “was to look for [the

defendant’s] service revolver,” consistent with that

police department’s standard practice, in order “to

protect the public from the possibility that a revolver

would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands.”

Id. at 437, 443. While searching for the revolver, the

officer discovered various items in the car that led to

the defendant’s prosecution and conviction for murder.

See id. at 437–39.

The Court upheld the warrantless search of the

defendant’s car under a newly minted “community

caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s

warrant requirement. Id. at 441, 448. Cady carefully

tailored the phrase “community caretaking” to the

work that “[l]ocal police officers” do in “investigat[ing]

vehicle accidents”: “Local police officers, unlike

federal officers, frequently investigate vehicle

accidents in which there is no claim of criminal

liability and engage in what, for want of a better term,

may be described as community caretaking functions,

totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or

acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a

criminal statute.” Id. at 441.

In concluding that “the type of caretaking ‘search’

conducted here . . . was not unreasonable solely

because a warrant had not been obtained,” id. at 447–

48, the Court emphasized three important aspects of

the search. First and foremost, the search was of a

vehicle, so it fell within “at least a partial exception”

to the rule that “a search of private property without

proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been

authorized by a valid search warrant.” Id. at 439

(quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 528–29). Nearly every

page of the Court’s opinion recognizes “[t]he

constitutional difference between searches of and

seizures from houses and similar structures and from

vehicles.” Id. at 442; see id. at 439–47; Pet. 20–22

(collecting quotes). That longstanding distinction

“stems both from the ambulatory character of the

latter and from the fact that extensive, and often

noncriminal contact with automobiles will bring local

officials in ‘plain view’ of evidence, fruits, or

instrumentalities of a crime, or contraband.” Cady,

413 U.S. at 442; see also id. at 441 (“Because of the

extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, and

also because of the frequency with which a vehicle can

become disabled or involved in an accident on public

highways, the extent of police-citizen contact

involving automobiles will be substantially greater

than police-citizen contact in a home or office.”).

Second, the already-reduced Fourth Amendment

protections in this context were further diminished

because the car “was neither in the custody nor on the

premises of its owner.” Id. at 447–48; see id. at 442–

43. Instead, it was in a form of “lawful” police custody.

Id. at 448. The wrecked car was “a nuisance along the

highway,” and the defendant (intoxicated and later

comatose) could not have arranged to have it towed.

Id. at 443.

Third, the police department’s custody of the car

triggered department protocols for securing the

vehicle and its contents. See id. at 439, 443, 447.

“[T]he search of the trunk to retrieve the revolver was

‘standard procedure in (that police) department,’ to

protect the public from the possibility that a revolver

would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands.”

Id. at 443.

B. The Court Has Never Applied The

Community

Caretaking

Exception

Outside The Context Of Vehicle Searches

The community caretaking exception is

inextricably tied to these three critical aspects of the

search in Cady: a vehicle, in police custody, searched

pursuant to standard police “caretaking” procedures.

Id. at 447. Indeed, the Court has applied Cady’s

community caretaking exception only twice—both

times to searches that share those characteristics.

South Dakota v. Opperman involved a “routine

inventory search of an automobile lawfully

impounded by police for violations of municipal

parking ordinances.” 428 U.S. 364, 365 (1976). In

holding that the warrantless search did not violate the

Fourth

Amendment,

Opperman

noted

that

“automobiles are frequently taken into police custody”

as part of “community caretaking functions.” Id. at

368 (quoting Cady, 413 U.S. at 441). As in Cady, the

Court tied that phrase to the role police play in

assisting with accidents and other “traffic-control

activities,” including removing “disabled,” “damaged,”

or illegally parked vehicles that “imped[e] traffic or

threaten[] public safety and convenience.” Id. at 368–

69. When police do remove or impound a vehicle, “local

police departments generally follow a routine practice

of securing and inventorying the automobiles’

contents.” Id. at 369.

Although Opperman determined that such

“caretaking procedures” were reasonable, it

emphasized that “warrantless examinations of

automobiles have been upheld in circumstances in

which a search of a home or office would not.” Id. at

367, 369. In particular, the Court noted that while a

warrant is required for an “administrative entry into

and inspection of private dwellings or commercial

premises to ascertain health or safety conditions,” a

warrant “has never been held applicable to

automobile inspections for safety purposes.” Id. at 367

n.2 (citing Camara, 387 U.S. 523); see also infra 23–

25.

Colorado v. Bertine likewise upheld an inventory

search of a van before it was towed to an

impoundment lot. 479 U.S. 367, 369 (1987). Surveying

cases “accord[ing] deference to police caretaking

procedures designed to secure and protect vehicles

and their contents within police custody,” Bertine

explained that automobile “inventory searches are

now a well-defined exception to the warrant

requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 371–

72. Those standardized procedures “help[] guard

against claims of theft, vandalism, or negligence,” and

protect the “police or others” from “dangerous

instrumentalities.” Id. at 373. When “administered in

good faith” and according to “standardized criteria,”

such inventory procedures “satisfy the Fourth

Amendment.” Id. at 374 & n.6.

C. Black-Letter

Law

Affirms

Reliance On The Reduced

Interest In Vehicles

Cady’s

Privacy

The Fourth Amendment has been interpreted

“practically since the beginning of the government, as

recognizing a necessary difference between a search of

a store, dwelling house, or other structure . . . and a

search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile for

contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure

a warrant.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153

(1925).

The earliest justifications for according

diminished privacy rights to automobiles were based

on their ready mobility, which made the destruction

of evidence more likely and the process of obtaining a

warrant less practical. See id.; see also Opperman, 428

U.S. at 367; Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51 (“[T]he car is

movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s

contents may never be found again if a warrant must

be obtained.”).

But the Court also has upheld warrantless

searches even when there is no risk the car will be

moved, “because the expectation of privacy with

respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than

that relating to one’s home or office.” Opperman, 428

U.S. at 367; see Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234,

236 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61–62

(1967). “Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to

pervasive and continuing governmental regulation

and controls, including periodic inspection and

licensing requirements.” Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368.

“As an everyday occurrence, police stop and examine

vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers

have expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust

fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or

other safety equipment are not in proper working

order.” Id. In addition, “[o]ne has a lesser expectation

of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is

transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence

or as the repository of personal effects.” Cardwell v.

Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality op.).

Moreover, “[a] car has little capacity for escaping

public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where

its occupants and its contents are in plain view.” Id.

Given these diminished privacy interests, the

Fourth Amendment allows warrantless searches of

cars in many instances where “the result might be the

opposite in a search of a home, a store, or other fixed

piece of property.” Cooper, 386 U.S. at 59. Officers

may, for example, “search an automobile without

having obtained a warrant so long as they have

probable cause to do so.” Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1670

(citing Carney, 471 U.S. at 392–93); see, e.g.,

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991)

(upholding warrantless search of containers within

vehicle); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825

(1982) (same); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52 (upholding

warrantless search of a car that police had probable

cause to believe contained evidence of a robbery);

Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162 (upholding warrantless

search of a car that police had probable cause to

believe contained contraband). By contrast, probable

cause alone is not sufficient to search a home; absent

consent or exigent circumstances, police cannot

search a home without a warrant. Steagald v. United

States, 451 U.S. 204, 217 (1981); see infra 23–30.

Apart from the investigation of crime, police also

may search cars that, like the defendant’s car in Cady,

are in some form of police custody. See, e.g., Cooper,

386 U.S. 58 (1967) (upholding warrantless search of a

vehicle impounded for forfeiture proceedings); Harris,

390 U.S. at 236 (upholding inventory search of car in

police custody). There are several justifications for

those “caretaking searches”: securing “the owner’s

property”; protecting “the police against claims or

disputes over lost or stolen property”; safeguarding

the police or others from any dangers that the

property may pose; and determining “whether a

vehicle has been stolen and thereafter abandoned.”

Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369 (citations omitted);

Bertine, 479 U.S. at 373; see also Harris, 390 U.S. at

236 (search was “a [permissible] measure taken to

protect the car while it was in police custody”); Cooper,

368 U.S. at 61–62 (“It would be unreasonable to hold

that the police, having to retain the car in their

custody for such a length of time, had no right, even

for their own protection, to search it.”).

Cady carved out a narrow exception to the Fourth

Amendment’s warrant requirement that is closely tied

to the distinct features of vehicle searches. Cady itself,

the cases on which it relied, and its progeny offer no

basis for extending that exception beyond the narrow

context in which it was created. To the contrary, as

Cady recognized, “the result might be the opposite in

a search of a home, a store, or other fixed piece of

property.” 413 U.S. at 440 (quoting Cooper, 386 U.S.

at 59).

II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT

HOMES BE INSULATED FROM THE COMMUNITY

CARETAKING EXCEPTION

Not only is Cady by its terms limited to searches

of cars, but fundamental Fourth Amendment

principles also block the community caretaking

exception from overtaking the home. Cars are at the

bottom of the Fourth Amendment pile. Homes, by

contrast, are at the top. “[W]idespread hostility” to the

Crown’s intrusions into the home were a “driving force

behind” the Fourth Amendment’s adoption. Carpenter

v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2239 (2018) (Thomas,

J., dissenting) (citation omitted). This Court

repeatedly has recognized that warrantless entries

into the home are unreasonable absent consent or

exigent circumstances. Allowing the police to invade

the home based on their everyday “catchall”

community caretaking responsibilities would be

anathema to the Fourth Amendment. Pet. App. 13a.

A. The Common Law Spurned Warrantless

Intrusions Into The Home

The common law prized the sanctity of the home

against warrantless intrusion. “The zealous and

frequent repetition of the adage that a ‘man’s house is

his castle,’ made it abundantly clear that both in

England and in the Colonies ‘the freedom of one’s

house’ was one of the most vital elements of English

liberty.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 596–97.

By the time of the Framing, “English legal

treatises, prominent law lords, the Court of Common

Pleas, the Court of King’s Bench, Parliament, and the

general public had come to embrace the broad

understanding that,” in general, “a warrant must

issue prior to search or seizure within the home.”

Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment,

83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1181, 1239 (2016); see id. at 1216–

40. Entering a home without permission—commonly

called the “breaking of doors”—was considered “so

violent, obnoxious, and dangerous a proceeding, that

it should be adopted only in extreme cases, where an

immediate arrest is requisite.” 1 Joseph Chitty,

Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law 36 (1819); see

4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of

England 226 (4th ed. 1770) (common-law term

“breaking of doors” did not require forcible entry but

included even “lifting up the latch”).

The principal common-law commentaries thus

reflect a “clear” “norm”: “in order to enter into a home,

the constable was required to first have a warrant—

unless he was in pursuit of a felon.” Donohue, supra,

at 1228–29; see id. at 1229–30. Some common-law

commentaries also recognized limited exigent

circumstances that would justify warrantless entry:

the need to “prevent bloodshed” arising from a violent

affray in a house; to suppress disorderly conduct “in a

house, at an unseasonable time of night, especially in

inns, taverns, or alehouses”; or to recapture a prisoner

who had escaped from custody. 1 Richard Burn, The

Justice of the Peace, and the Parish Officer 102–03

(14th ed. 1780); 1 Matthew Hale, The History of the

Pleas of the Crown 589 (1736). Apart from these

limited exceptions, however, entering the home

without a warrant or consent constituted trespass.

Donohue, supra, at 1314; see, e.g., Burn, supra, at 103;

Blackstone, supra, at 223.

B. The Fourth Amendment Prohibits

Warrantless Entries Into The Home In

The Absence Of Consent Or Exigent

Circumstances

Reflecting this common-law tradition, the Fourth

Amendment draws “a firm line at the entrance to the

house.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 590; see Florida v.

Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (“[W]hen it comes to the

Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals.”).

At its “very core,” the Fourth Amendment prioritizes

“the right of a man to retreat into his own home and

there be free from unreasonable governmental

intrusion.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 589–90 (citation

omitted). The Court has thus “consistently held that

the entry into a home to conduct a search or make an

arrest is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment

unless done pursuant to a warrant.” Steagald, 451

U.S. at 211; see King, 563 U.S. at 459 (“[S]earches and

seizures inside a home without a warrant are

presumptively unreasonable.” (citation omitted)).

1. The Fourth Amendment’s rigid protection of

the home does not bend to permit warrantless entries

based on community-caretaking-like “considerations

of health and safety.” Camara, 387 U.S. at 538. In

Camara, an apartment lessee was criminally

prosecuted for refusing to permit municipal officials to

inspect his dwelling for possible violations of the local

housing code. Id. at 525–27. He claimed that such

forced warrantless entries violated the Fourth

Amendment, and the Court agreed. Id. at 527, 534.

Camara acknowledged that “a routine inspection

of the physical condition of private property is a less

hostile intrusion than the typical policeman’s search

for the fruits and instrumentalities of crime,” but

emphasized that such searches nevertheless

“jeopardize” the Fourth Amendment’s protections. Id.

at 530; see id. at 534 (“[A]dministrative searches [of

the home] are significant intrusions upon the

interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.”). The

Court explained, moreover, that broad “statutory

safeguards” reflecting “legislative or administrative

assessment of broad factors such as the area’s age and

condition” are not sufficient to protect those interests.

Id. at 531–32. “The practical effect . . . is to leave the

occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the

field”—the very type of latitude the Court “ha[s]

consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a

disinterested party warrant the need to search.” Id. at

532–33.

Camara rejected the local government’s “vigorous[]

argu[ments] that the health and safety of entire urban

populations is dependent upon enforcement of

minimum fire, housing, and sanitation standards,”

and that warrantless “routine systematized

inspection[s]” were “the only effective means of

enforcing such codes.” Id. at 533. “In assessing

whether the public interest demands creation of a

general exception to the Fourth Amendment’s

warrant requirement, the question is not whether the

public interest justifies the type of search in question,

but whether the authority to search should be

evidenced by a warrant.” Id. Because there was no

reason to doubt that “fire, health, and housing code

inspection programs” could “achieve their goals within

the confines of a reasonable search warrant

requirement,” the Court did “not find the public need

argument dispositive.” Id. The defendant “had a

constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain

a warrant to search,” although “the facts that would

justify an inference of ‘probable cause’ to make an

inspection are clearly different from those that would

justify such an inference [in] a criminal investigation.”

Id. at 538, 540.

2. The “firm line” that the Fourth Amendment

draws “at the entrance to the house” also means that

a search or seizure that would be permissible in other

locations is often unconstitutional if it involves

“warrantless entry into a home.” Payton, 445 U.S. at

590; see also Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1670; Cooper, 386

U.S. at 59.

Particularly salient here, Collins confirmed that

vehicle-specific exceptions to the Fourth Amendment

do not “permit[] a police officer, uninvited and without

a warrant, to enter the curtilage of a home in order to

search a vehicle parked therein.” 138 S. Ct. at 1668.

The Court recognized that warrantless searches of

automobiles can be reasonable, in light of their “ready

mobility” and “pervasive regulation.” Id. at 1669–70;

see supra 18–20. But those “rationales appl[y] only to

automobiles and not to houses.” Collins, 138 S. Ct. at

1670; id. at 1672 (“[T]he rationales underlying the

automobile exception are specific to the nature of a

vehicle and the ways in which it is distinct from a

house.”). And “[w]hen it comes to the Fourth

Amendment, the home is first among equals.” Id.

(citation omitted). By physically intruding on the

curtilage of the defendant’s home, the police officer

“not only invaded [the defendant’s] Fourth

Amendment interest in the item searched, i.e., the

motorcycle, but also invaded [the defendant’s] Fourth

Amendment interest in the curtilage of his home.” Id.

at 1671.

The Court thus rejected Virginia’s argument that

“the automobile exception justifie[d] the invasion of

the curtilage.” Id. “Nothing in our case law,” Collins

explained, “suggests that the automobile exception

gives an officer the right to enter a home or its

curtilage to access a vehicle without a warrant.” Id. To

the contrary, “[e]xpanding the scope of the automobile

exception in this way would both undervalue the core

Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home

and . . . untether the automobile exception from the

justifications underlying it.” Id. (citation omitted).

As Collins noted, the Court has “declined to

expand the scope of other exceptions to the warrant

requirement to permit warrantless entry into the

home.” Id. at 1672. For example, while it is a “settled

rule that warrantless arrests in public places are

valid,” police may not enter a home to make an arrest

without a warrant (unless an exception such as

exigent circumstances applies). Payton, 445 U.S. at

587–90 (arrest warrant required to make arrest in

suspect’s home); see also Steagald, 451 U.S. at 217

(search warrant required to make arrest in third

party’s home). That is because “[f]reedom from

intrusion into the home or dwelling is the archetype

of the privacy protection secured by the Fourth

Amendment.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 587 (citation

omitted). Thus, even when there is probable cause for

a suspect’s arrest, “judicially untested determinations

are not reliable enough to justify” intrusions into a

home. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 213; see Payton, 445 U.S.

at 583, 587–90. “A contrary conclusion—that the

police, acting alone and in the absence of exigent

circumstances, may decide when there is sufficient

justification for searching the home of a third party

for the subject of an arrest warrant—would create a

significant potential for abuse.” Steagald, 451 U.S. at

215.

Similarly, the plain-view doctrine allows officers

to seize incriminating evidence without a warrant, but

only if they “have a lawful right of access to the object

itself.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37

(1990); see id. at 137 n.7 (“[E]ven where the object is

contraband, this Court has repeatedly stated and

enforced the basic rule that the police may not enter

and make a warrantless seizure.”). An officer

therefore cannot enter a house to seize “illegal drugs”

that he sees “through the window,” Collins, 138 S. Ct.

at 1672, even though he could seize the same item

from a public place, see, e.g., Horton, 496 U.S. at 137;

1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on

the Fourth Amendment § 2.2(a) (5th ed. 2012)

(discussing plain-view doctrine).

3. The limited exceptions in which the Court has

permitted warrantless entry into the home—consent

and exigent circumstances—are “jealously and

carefully drawn.” Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109 (citation

omitted). That approach both preserves the primacy

of the warrant process and ensures that police officers

have “clear guidance . . . through categorical rules.”

Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 398, (2014).

The Court has long recognized that the Fourth

Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches

and seizures “does not apply . . . to situations in which

voluntary consent has been obtained, either from the

individual whose property is searched, or from a third

party who possesses common authority over the

premises.” Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181

(1990) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,

171 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218

(1973)). After all, tenants who share their quarters

assume the risk that “any of the co-inhabitants has

the right to permit the inspection in his own right”

and that “any one of them may admit visitors, with

the consequence that a guest [is] obnoxious.”

Randolph, 547 U.S. at 110–11 (citation omitted).

But the Court has narrowly circumscribed this

exception, holding that “a warrantless search of a

shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal

of consent by a physically present resident cannot be

justified as reasonable as to him.” Id. at 120. A

“cooperative occupant’s” consent to a search cannot

“counter the force of an objecting individual’s claim to

security against the government’s intrusion into his

dwelling place.” Id. at 115. The Court acknowledged

that it was “drawing a fine line” by requiring a

physically present, vocal objector, but concluded that

such “formalism” was “justified” by the “practical

value” of easily applicable rules. Id. at 121; see also

Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 577 (emphasizing “the virtue of

providing clear and unequivocal guidelines to the law

enforcement profession” (citation omitted)).

Another “well-recognized exception” to the

warrant

requirement

arises

when

exigent

circumstances “make the needs of law enforcement so

compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” King, 563

U.S. at 460 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

“Such exigencies could include the need to prevent the

imminent destruction of evidence in individual cases,

to pursue a fleeing suspect, and to assist persons who

are seriously injured or are threatened with imminent

injury.” Riley, 573 U.S. at 402.

As with other exceptions, however, the exigent

circumstances exception is “strictly circumscribed,”

Randolph, 547 U.S. at 113 n.3 (citation omitted), and

must “be supported by a genuine exigency,” King, 563

U.S. at 470. Thus, the destruction of evidence must be

“imminent,” id. at 460 (citation omitted), and a “hot

pursuit” requires “some sort of a chase,” United States

v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976).

The exigency of “emergency aid” requires officers

to have “an objectively reasonable basis for believing

that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently

threatened with such injury.” Brigham City v. Stuart,

547 U.S. 398, 400, 402 (2006) (emphasis added). This

exigency is limited to situations where police

“reasonably believe that a person within is in need of

immediate aid,” so police need to act in a matter of

moments “to protect or preserve life or avoid serious

injury.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978)

(emphasis added) (citation omitted). Mincey thus

rejected Arizona’s so-called “murder scene exception”

allowing warrantless searches conducted in the

investigation of a homicide, even after the suspects

had been apprehended. Id. at 389, 395. The Court

acknowledged “the vital public interest in the prompt

investigation of the extremely serious crime of

murder,” but held that “the seriousness of the offense

under investigation” does not “itself create[] exigent

circumstances” that would justify a warrantless

search. Id. at 393–94. Nor did state supreme court

guidelines for such searches counterbalance a

homeowner’s invasion of privacy: the “unbridled

discretion” they conferred upon individual officers

was “precisely th[e] kind of judgmental assessment of

the reasonableness and scope of a proposed search

that the Fourth Amendment requires be made by a

neutral and objective magistrate, not a police officer.”

Id. at 395.

C. The Community Caretaking Exception Is

Antithetical To The Fourth Amendment’s

Protection Of The Home

Extending

the vehicle-specific community

caretaking exception articulated in Cady to the home

is irreconcilable with the Fourth Amendment

principles discussed above.

To begin, vehicles and homes are at opposite ends

of the spectrum when it comes to the Fourth

Amendment’s protections. See supra 18–20, 23–30.

And unlike the vehicles searched in Cady, Opperman,

and Bertine, which were entitled to even less

protection because they were in police custody, homes

are, by definition, “in the custody” and “on the

premises of [their] owner.” Cady, 413 U.S. at 447–48.

As with other vehicle-specific exceptions, “the

rationales underlying” the community caretaking

exception “are specific to the nature of a vehicle and

the ways in which it is distinct from a house.” Collins,

138 S. Ct. at 1672; see supra 18–20. Those rationales

cannot justify warrantless entries into the home,

“[g]iven the centrality of the Fourth Amendment

interest in the home and its curtilage and the

disconnect between that interest and the

justifications behind the automobile exception.”

Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1673.

The community caretaking exception’s broad

concerns about “health and safety” cannot justify

invading the home either. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538;

see also Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393–94 (rejecting “vital

public interest” arguments for categorical murderscene exception). “In assessing whether the public

interest demands creation of a general exception to

the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, the

question is not whether the public interest justifies

the type of search in question, but whether the

authority to search should be evidenced by a warrant.”

Camara, 387 U.S. at 533.

Lower courts have held that officers engaged in

“catchall” community caretaking are not bound by

“established protocols or fixed criteria” and need not

select the “least intrusive” of “reasonable choices

among available options.” Pet. App. 13a, 20a

(quotation marks and citations omitted); but see

Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374 (“Our decisions have always

adhered to the requirement that inventories be

conducted according to standardized criteria.”). This

wide latitude to invade private property is “precisely

th[e] kind of judgmental assessment of the

reasonableness and scope of a proposed search that

the Fourth Amendment requires be made by a neutral

and objective magistrate, not a police officer.” Mincey,

437 U.S. at 395; see Camara, 387 U.S. at 532–33 (“The

practical effect of this system is to leave the occupant

subject to the discretion of the official in the field. This

is precisely the discretion to invade private property

which we have consistently circumscribed by a

requirement that a disinterested party warrant the

need to search.”). As in Steagald, “[a] contrary

conclusion—that the police, acting alone and in the

absence of exigent circumstances, may decide when

there is sufficient justification [to invade a home]—

would create a significant potential for abuse.” 451

U.S. at 215.

The breadth and scope of “community caretaking”

functions, moreover, make it an exception inherently

incapable of being “jealously and carefully drawn.”

Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109 (citation omitted). The

“myriad” potential “community caretaking” functions

are “too numerous to list.” South Dakota v. Deneui,

775 N.W.2d 221, 242 (S.D. 2009); see Pet. App. 13a

(describing community caretaking as “a catchall for

the wide range of responsibilities that police officers

must discharge aside from their criminal enforcement

activities”) (citation omitted). And unlike exceptions

based on exigent circumstances, the community

caretaking exception is “not imbued with any definite

temporal dimensions” and does not require the same

“degree of immediacy.” Pet. App. 21a; see also

Opperman, 428 U.S. at 373 (upholding vehicle search

that took place one week after impoundment).

Extending the community caretaking exception to

the home would create an “exigency-lite” exception to

the Fourth Amendment and eviscerate the limitations

the Court has drawn on true exigent circumstances.

See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 402; see supra 29–30. It

would short-circuit the warrant requirement for no

good reason, since—absent a real exigency—officers

have time to obtain the warrant the Constitution

requires. See infra 36. And it would give officers no

guidance on what the bounds of “community

caretaking” might be.

In sum, “to allow an officer to rely on” the

community caretaking exception “to gain entry into a

house . . . would unmoor the exception from its

justifications, render hollow the core Fourth

Amendment protection the Constitution extends to

the house . . . , and transform what was meant to be

an exception into a tool with far broader application.”

Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1672–73.

III. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND OTHERS

HAVE AMPLE TOOLS TO HELP PEOPLE IN NEED

WITHOUT EXTENDING CADY

Nor do law enforcement officials need the blunt

force of a boundless, discretionary community

caretaking exception—especially at the cost of vital

Fourth Amendment rights and “a significant potential

for abuse.” Steagald, 451 U.S. at 215. To be sure, the

“wide range” of everyday “catchall” responsibilities

that police officers perform may serve the public

interest. Pet. App. 13a (citation omitted). But a

variety of existing tools already satisfy that interest.

And police are not the only ones in society who can

address the array of “community caretaking” needs;

medical and mental health professionals are often

better suited for the task.

A. Police already have ample tools to address a

number of “community caretaking” concerns in homes

in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment.

1. As discussed above, the longstanding exigent

circumstances exception allows police to “enter a

home without a warrant to render emergency

assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an

occupant from imminent injury.” Brigham City, 547

U.S. at 403 (citing Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392); see supra

29–30. “Officers do not need ironclad proof of a likely

serious, life-threatening injury,” but only “an

objectively reasonable basis for believing that medical

assistance was needed, or persons were in danger.”

Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (quotation

marks and citation omitted).

This Court has recognized the reasonableness of

warrantless entries to render true emergency aid in a

number of situations, including to extinguish a fire,

Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978); to

suppress a bloody fist fight, Brigham City, 547 U.S. at

400–01; to help a “gravely disabled,” schizophrenic

resident of a group home who had just threatened to

kill her social worker with a knife, City & Cnty. of San

Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1769–70, 1774–

75 (2015); and to help potential victims when officers

responding to a disturbance encountered a smashed

vehicle, bloody clothing, broken windows, and

resident screaming and throwing objects in the house,

Fisher, 558 U.S. at 45–46.

Many of the cases in which courts have extended

the community caretaking exception to the home

involve facts that likely would give officers “an

objectively reasonable basis for believing that medical

assistance was needed, or persons were in danger.” Id.

at 49 (quotation marks and citation omitted). For

example:

•

Officers responded to a medical call at 3

a.m., followed a trail of blood to a door that

was covered in blood, and observed blood in

the foyer and leading up to the stairwell

while speaking to the apparently

uninjured

occupant,

Wisconsin

Matalonis, 875 N.W.2d 567, 570–71 (Wis.

2016); cf. Fisher, 558 U.S. at 45–46, 48

(emergency aid doctrine applied where

officers saw “signs of a recent injury” and

reasonably could have believed victims

were inside);

•

A man asked for police assistance to safely

remove his family and their belongings

from a home after a co-occupant had come

home drunk and threatened the man and

his children, United States v. York, 895

F.2d 1026, 1029–30 (5th Cir. 1990); cf.

Randolph, 547 U.S. at 118 (recognizing

police authority to assist occupants

complaining of domestic violence as they

“collect belongings and get out safely”);

•

An individual reported that his friends left

a four-month-old baby alone in a house late

at night and that the baby was crying out,

see People v. Woods, 145 N.E.3d 80, 82, 84,

88 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019); cf. Georgia v.

Peterson, 543 S.E.2d 692, 696 (Ga. 2001)

(“Knowledge or the reasonable belief that

minor children in a residence are without

adult

supervision

exigent circumstance

that

authorizes

police entry to help those believed to be in

need of immediate aid.”); and

•

Police received a report that a woman

likely was being held against her will by

her ex-boyfriend, with whom she had a “nocontact order,” and who had weapons in his

home, United States v. Smith, 820 F.3d

356, 358 (8th Cir. 2016); cf. Fisher, 436

U.S. at 49 (emergency aid doctrine applies

where officers have “an objectively

reasonable basis for believing” that

“persons were in danger”).

2. When there is no exigency sufficient to justify

warrantless intrusion into the home, the Fourth

Amendment demands a warrant. See Steagald, 451

U.S. at 211. “[T]he warrant requirement is ‘an

important working part of our machinery of

government,’ not merely ‘an inconvenience to be

somehow “weighed” against the claims of police

efficiency.’” Riley, 573 U.S. at 401 (quoting Coolidge v.

New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433, 481 (1971)). But the

process of obtaining a warrant is increasingly “more

efficient.” Id. Most jurisdictions now “allow police

officers or prosecutors to apply for search warrants

remotely through various means, including telephonic

or radio communication, electronic communication

such as e-mail, and video conferencing.” Missouri v.

McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 154 (2013).

In many cases where courts have extended the

community caretaking exception, officers could have

obtained a warrant if a judge agreed there was

probable cause that a crime was being committed. See,

e.g., Olson v. Maryland, 56 A.3d 576, 605 (Md. Ct.

Spec. App. 2012) (“[T]he police had probable cause to

believe that appellant had committed and was

intending to commit the crime of disturbing the

peace.”); Wisconsin v. Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d 592, 595,

603 (Wis. 2010) (“reliable anonymous tip” that people

were inside residence with “cocaine, money and a

digital scale”); Wisconsin v. Markov, 840 N.W.2d 137

(Table), 2013 WL 5809640, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct.

30, 2013) (woman’s employer reported that she

unexpectedly missed work for two days and could not

be reached, and her son, who had a history of “conflict”

with his father, gave implausible explanation of his

parents’ whereabouts and told obvious lies to the

police).

B. While police have a number of tools for

discharging their “wide range of [community

caretaking] responsibilities,” Pet. App. 13a, they are

not the only people in society—or the ones best

suited—to address the array of concerns that arise

every day. Particularly in the context of mental health

issues, most jurisdictions have statutory schemes that

enable not only police, but also family members,

friends, and health professionals, to address

particular problems.

In a domestic violence situation, for example, most

states allow a person to seek a temporary or

permanent order for protection that would limit an

individual’s access to firearms.1

Other laws address broader concerns about the

possession of firearms. At least nineteen states and

the District of Columbia have enacted so-called “red

flag laws” that enable an individual to get a court

order to seize firearms from someone who “poses a

significant danger of causing imminent personal

injury to self or others.” 8 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 8-8.3-

1 See, e.g., Alaska Stat. Ann. §§ 18.66.100, 18.66.110; Ariz. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 13-3602; Cal. Fam. Code § 6389; Del. Code Ann. tit.

10, § 1045(a)(8), (11); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-1005(c)(10); Fla. Stat.

Ann. § 790.233; Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 134-7(f); 725 Ill. Comp.

Stat. Ann. 5/112A-14(b)(14.5); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-26-5-9(d)(4);

Iowa Code Ann. § 236.5(1)(b)(2); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A,

§ 4007(1)(A-1); Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law §§ 4-505(a)(2)(vii), 4506(f); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 209A, § 3B; Mich. Comp. Laws

Ann. § 600.2950(1)(e); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-15-201(2)(f); Neb.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 42-924(1)(a)(vii); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33.031;

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-B:4(I), (II); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2528(j); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 842-a; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 50B-3.1;

N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-07.1-02(4)(g); 23 Pa. Stat. and Cons.

Stat. Ann. § 6108(a)(7); 8 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 8-8.1-3(a)(4); S.D.

Codified Laws § 25-10-24; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 85.022(b)(6);

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-603(2)(f); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.

§ 9.41.800; W. Va. Code Ann. § 48-27-403(a); Wis. Stat. Ann.

§ 813.12(4m).

4(a)-(b); see id. § 8-8.3-3(b).2 At least ten more states

are considering similar laws.3

In addition, every state has an emergency hold law

providing for the temporary involuntary commitment

of individuals who are mentally ill and pose a danger

to themselves or others.4 Depending on the particular

2 See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code §§ 18125–18148; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§§ 13-14.5-103, 13-14.5-104; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 29-38c; Del.

Code Ann. tit. 10, § 7703; D.C. Code Ann. § 7-2510.4; Fla. Stat.

Ann. § 790.401(4); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 134-64; 430 Ill. Comp.

Stat. Ann. 67/35; Ind. Code Ann. §§ 35-47-14-2, 35-47-3; Md.

Code Ann., Pub. Safety §§ 5-602 to 5-605; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.

ch. 140, § 131T; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 33.560, 33.570; N.J. Stat.

Ann. §§ 2C:58-23, 2C:58-26; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-17-5 to 40-1707; N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 6341, 6342; Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 166.527;

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §§ 4053, 4054; Va. Code. Ann. § 19.2-152.14;

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 7.94.010–7.94.050.

3 See H.R. 62, 31st Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2019); H.R. 2367, 88th

Gen. Assemb., 2020 Sess. (Iowa 2020); S. 244, 2019 Reg. Sess.

(Ky. 2019); H.R. 4283, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2019); S. 156,

100th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2019); H.R. 9, 91st Leg. Sess., 2d

Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2020); Leg. 58, 106th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb.

2019); H.R. 454, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2019); H.R.

1075, 203rd Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2019); H.R. 1446, 111th Gen.

Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2019); S. 1178, 111th Gen.

Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2019); Assemb. 573, 104th Leg.,

2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2019).

See Ala. Code § 22-52-91; Alaska Stat. Ann. § 47.30.700; Ariz.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-524; Ark. Code Ann. § 20-47-210; Cal. Welf.

& Inst. Code §§ 5150, 5150.05; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-65-105;

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17a-502; Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 5004;

D.C. Code Ann. § 21-521; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 394.463; Ga. Code Ann.

§§ 37-3-41, 37-3-43; Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 334-59; Idaho Code

Ann. § 66-326; 405 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/3-606; Ind. Code Ann.

§ 12-26-5-1; Iowa Code Ann. § 229.1; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-2953;

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 202A.026, 202A.031; La. Stat. Ann.

§ 28:53; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 34-B, § 3862; Md. Code Ann.,

Health–Gen. §§ 10-622, 10-623, 10-625; Mass. Gen Laws Ann. ch.

state, this process can be initiated by physicians,

mental health professionals, family members, or law

enforcement officials.

And if these procedures are somehow insufficient

to address concerns about suicide that do not rise to

the level of an emergency, police officers may be able

to seek a warrant in jurisdictions that consider suicide

a crime. See, e.g., Clift v. Narragansett Television,

L.P., 688 A.2d 805 (R.I. 1996); North Carolina v.

Willis, 121 S.E.2d 854 (N.C. 1961); South Carolina v.

Reese, 633 S.E.2d 898, 900 (S.C. 2006), overruled on

other grounds by South Carolina v. Belcher, 685

S.E.2d 802 (S.C. 2009); see generally 83 C.J.S. Suicide

§ 5 (2020).

C. In contrast to these specialized tools, the

community caretaking exception grants law

enforcement broad discretion to invade homes to

discharge any of the “wide range” of everyday,

“catchall” responsibilities they handle “apart from

criminal enforcement.” Pet. App. 13a. Particularly in

123, § 12; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 330.1427; Minn. Stat. Ann.

§ 253B.051; Miss. Code Ann. § 41-21-67; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 632.300;

Mont. Code Ann. § 53-21-129; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 71-908, 71919; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 433A.150, 433A.160; N.H. Rev. Stat.

Ann. §§ 135-C:27, 135-C:28; N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 30:4-27.2, 30:427.6; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-10; N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.39;

N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 122C-261; N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 25-03.125; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5122.10; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43A, § 5207; Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 426.228, 426.232, 426.233; 50 Pa. Stat.

and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7301; 40.1 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 40.1-57(a)(1); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-17-410; S.D. Codified Laws §§ 27A10-1, 27A-10-3; Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-403; Tex. Health &

Safety Code Ann. § 573.001; Utah Code Ann. § 62A-15-629; Vt.

Stat. tit. 18, §§ 7504, 7505; Va. Code Ann. § 37.2-808; Wash. Rev.

Code Ann. § 71.05.153; W. Va. Code Ann. § 27-5-2; Wis. Stat.

Ann. § 51.15; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 25-10-109.

the context of sensitive mental health issues, those

are not the “judgmental assessment[s]” that police

officers should be making. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 395.

This case proves the point. In deciding to seize

Petitioner from his home for “involuntary emergency

psychiatric evaluation,” Sergeant Barth “did not

consult any specific psychological or psychiatric

criteria,” or any medical professionals. J.A. 225–26.

Nor did he “remember” any training on dealing with

individuals with mental health issues. Id. at 226.

Instead, he was “just going on [his] experience.” Id. at

225.

Police officers are not mental health professionals

equipped to make sensitive judgments about

specialized psychological issues. Requiring them to do

so, especially without any “clear guidance . . . through

categorical rules,” Riley, 573 U.S. at 398, places

unrealistic demands on officers and jeopardizes vital

Fourth Amendment rights. See supra 30–33. The cost

is not worth it.

IV. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXTENDING CADY’S

COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION ARE

UNAVAILING

The reasons that lower courts have offered for

extending Cady beyond the vehicle context to the

home are unpersuasive.

As an initial matter, none of the courts that has

embraced an expansive view of community caretaking

even tried to grapple with the constitutional

ramifications of its rule. Indeed, several of those

courts acknowledge that Cady relied on the

“‘constitutional difference’” between vehicles and

homes. Pet. App. 12a–13a (quoting Cady, 413 U.S. at

442); see also, e.g., Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d at 598; York,

895 F.2d at 1030. But they then make no effort to

explain how Fourth Amendment doctrine allows

Cady’s

vehicle-specific

community

caretaking

exception to balloon beyond its own terms. That

fundamental flaw in their analysis is dispositive. See

supra 21–33.

Instead of analyzing whether the community

caretaking exception is consistent with the Fourth

Amendment, courts skip to the importance of the

caretaking roles that police play. They emphasize that

“[t]hreats to . . . community safety are not confined to

the highways,” and that police must have the ability

to address “unforeseen circumstances present[ing]

some transient hazard that requires immediate

attention.” Pet. App. 16a; see also, e.g., Deneui, 775

N.W.2d at 239 (“The need to protect and preserve life

or avoid serious injury cannot be limited to

automobiles.”). But as we have explained, even a

“vital public interest” cannot excuse warrantless

intrusions of the home. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393; supra

23–25; see also Camara, 387 U.S. at 533. And these

courts fail to explain why existing doctrines and

statutory schemes are insufficient for police to help

those in legitimate need. See supra 33–39.

In an apparent effort to justify the “carte blanche”

that the community caretaking exception grants

officers to intrude upon the home, some courts have

pointed to two “guardrails” that curb officer discretion.

Pet. App. 19a. But no “guardrail” can redeem a rule

that is fundamentally incompatible with the Fourth

Amendment, see supra 30–33, and neither purported

limitation protects Fourth Amendment interests

anyway.

First, courts have emphasized the “‘noninvestigatory’” nature of “community caretaking

activities.” Pet. App. 20a (quoting United States v.

Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 785 (1st Cir. 1991));

see also Castagna v. Jean, 955 F.3d 211, 220–21 (1st

Cir. 2020) (“The function performed must be distinct

from the normal work of criminal investigation to be

within the heartland of the community caretaking

exception.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)),

cert denied, 2020 WL 7132271 (Dec. 7, 2020); United

States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 2006)

(emphasizing that “community caretaking” functions

“are unrelated to the officer’s duty to uncover criminal

activity”). But non-investigatory activities, even if

“‘less hostile” than “search[es] for the fruits and

instrumentalities of crime,” still “jeopardize” the

Fourth Amendment’s protections and constitute

“significant intrusions” upon the home. Camara, 387

U.S. at 530–31, 534; see supra 23–25. The noninvestigatory nature of community caretaking in a

home does not make an officer’s intrusion any less of

a constitutional violation.

Second, the First Circuit noted that officers must

act in accordance with state law or “sound police

procedure.” Pet. App. 20a. But that is hardly a

“guardrail,” because as that court also explained,

“‘sound police procedure’ need not involve the

application of either established protocols or fixed

criteria”; rather, it requires only “reasonable choices

among available options.” Id. at 19a–20a (citation

omitted); cf. Quezada, 448 F.3d at 1008 (officer’s entry

into dwelling lies outside the community caretaking

exception “only if no reasonable officer could have

believed that an emergency was at hand”). And in any

event, guidelines and standard procedures do not

substitute for a warrant when it comes to invading the

home. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394–95; Camara, 387

U.S. at 531–33. Such broad criteria leave an “occupant

subject to the discretion of the official in the field” and

usurp the warrant requirement. Camara, 387 U.S. at

532–33.

In sum, the courts that have extended the

community caretaking exception provide no sound

basis for doing so. Their rule is incompatible with the

Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home; they

ignore existing tools that police already have for

helping people during emergencies; and the purported

limitations they cite are illusory. There is no good

reason to grant police this blank check, and the

Fourth Amendment prohibits it.

Respondents

violated

Petitioner’s

Fourth

Amendment rights when they seized him from his

home, and then seized his guns from his bedroom and

garage, all without a warrant. The First Circuit held

that Cady’s community caretaking exception—and

that exception alone—justified Respondents’ actions.

Pet. App. 11a, 30a, 37a. But that narrow exception to

the warrant requirement applies only to automobiles,

and certainly does not extend to the home. See supra

14–16, 30–33. The First Circuit’s contrary conclusion

is wrong.

CONCLUSION

The judgment below should be reversed.

January 8, 2021

Respectfully submitted,

Thomas W. Lyons

Rhiannon S. Huffman

STRAUSS, FACTOR,

LAING & LYONS

One Davol Square,

Suite 305

Providence, RI 02903

Shay Dvoretzky

Counsel of Record

Jonathan L. Marcus

Emily J. Kennedy

Sylvia O. Tsakos

SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,

MEAGHER & FLOM LLP

1440 New York Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 371-7000

shay.dvoretzky@skadden.com

Emma S. Gardner

SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,

MEAGHER & FLOM LLP

One Manhattan West

New York, NY 10001

Counsel for Petitioner

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.