Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Edward A. Caniglia, Petitioner v. Robert F. Strom, et al.

No. 20-___

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

EDWARD A. CANIGLIA,

Petitioner,

v.

ROBERT F. STROM, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The First Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Thomas W. Lyons

Rhiannon S. Huffman

STRAUSS, FACTOR, LAING &

LYONS

One Davol Square

Suite 305

Providence, RI 02903

Shay Dvoretzky

Counsel of Record

Amelia A. DeGory

JONES DAY

51 Louisiana Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 879-3939

sdvoretzky@jonesday.com

Amanda K. Rice

JONES DAY

150 W. Jefferson Ave.

Suite 2100

Detroit, MI 48226

Counsel for Petitioner

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the “community caretaking” exception

to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement

extends to the home.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner is Edward A. Caniglia.

Respondents are Robert F. Strom, as the Finance

Director of the City of Cranston; the City of

Cranston; Colonel Michael J. Winquist, in his official

capacity as Chief of the Cranston Police Department;

Russell C. Henry, Jr., individually and in his official

capacity as an Officer of the Cranston Police

Department; Brandon Barth, individually and in his

official capacity as an officer of the Cranston Police

Department; John Mastrati, individually and in his

official capacity as an officer of the Cranston Police

Department; Wayne Russell, individually and in his

official capacity as an officer of the Cranston Police

Department; and Austin Smith, individually and in

his official capacity as an officer of the Cranston

Police Department.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED..........................................i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING .......................... ii

TABLES OF AUTHORITIES .................................... v

INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1

OPINIONS BELOW ................................................... 4

JURISDICTION ......................................................... 4

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED ....... 4

STATEMENT ............................................................. 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ............... 10

I.

II.

COURTS ACROSS THE COUNTRY ARE

DEEPLY DIVIDED................................................ 11

A.

The Third, Seventh, Ninth, and

Tenth Circuits Have Held that the

Community Caretaking Exception

Does Not Extend to the Home ................. 12

B.

The Fifth, Eighth, and First Circuits

Have Held that the Community

Caretaking Exception Can Extend

to the Home .............................................. 15

C.

State Courts of Last Resort Are

Likewise Deeply Divided ......................... 17

THE DECISION BELOW IS WRONG ...................... 20

III. THIS CASE IS THE IDEAL VEHICLE TO

ADDRESS THIS IMPORTANT QUESTION................ 29

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 30

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(continued)

Page

APPENDIX A: Opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

(Mar. 13, 2020) ............................................... 1a

APPENDIX B: Opinion of the United States

District Court for the District of Rhode

Island (June 4, 2019) ................................... 50a

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635 (1987) .............................................. 27

Arizona v. Gant,

556 U.S. 332 (2009) .............................................. 25

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

563 U.S. 731 (2011) .............................................. 27

Boyd v. United States,

116 U.S. 616 (1886) .............................................. 24

Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart,

547 U.S. 398 (2006) .............................................. 29

Cady v. Dombrowski,

413 U.S. 433 (1973) ...................................... passim

California v. Acevedo,

500 U.S. 565 (1991) .............................................. 28

California v. Carney,

471 U.S. 386 (1985) .............................................. 25

California v. Ciraolo,

476 U.S. 207 (1986) .............................................. 24

Caniglia v. Strom,

396 F. Supp. 3d 227 (D.R.I. 2019) ......................... 4

Caniglia v. Strom,

953 F.3d 112 (1st Cir. 2020) .................................. 4

Cardwell v. Lewis,

417 U.S. 583 (1974) .............................................. 25

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Carpenter v. United States,

138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) .......................................... 23

Castagna v. Jean,

955 F.3d 211 (1st Cir. 2020) ................................ 16

Chambers v. Maroney,

399 U.S. 42 (1970) ............................................ 1, 21

Collins v. Virginia,

138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018) .............................. 24, 25, 26

Colorado v. Bertine,

479 U.S. 367 (1987) .............................................. 23

Coolidge v. New Hampshire,

403 U.S. 443 (1971) .............................................. 28

Cooper v. California,

386 U.S. 58 (1967) ................................................ 21

Corrigan v. Dist. of Columbia,

841 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ........................ 2, 11

Florida v. Jardines,

569 U.S. 1 (2013) ............................................ 23, 24

Georgia v. Randolph,

547 U.S. 103 (2006) .............................................. 24

Jones v. United States,

357 U.S. 493 (1958) .......................................... 3, 28

Katz v. United States,

389 U.S. 347 (1967) .............................................. 28

Mathis v. Cnty. of Lyon,

757 F. App’x 542 (9th Cir. 2018) ................... 13, 14

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

McDonald v. United States,

335 U.S. 451 (1948) .............................................. 23

Mincey v. Arizona,

437 U.S. 385 (1978) .............................................. 29

Payton v. New York,

445 U.S. 573 (1980) .................................... 3, 24, 26

People v. Ovieda,

446 P.3d 262 (Cal. 2019) ...................................... 18

Ray v. Twp. of Warren,

626 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010) ......................... passim

Rodriguez v. City of San Jose,

930 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2019) .......................... 9, 14

Silverman v. United States,

365 U.S. 505 (1961) .............................................. 24

Soldal v. Cook Cnty., Ill.,

506 U.S. 56 (1992) ................................................ 26

South Dakota v. Opperman,

428 U.S. 364 (1976) ........................................ 23, 25

State v. Deneui,

775 N.W.2d 221 (S.D. 2009)................................. 19

State v. Gill,

755 N.W.2d 454 (N.D. 2008) .......................... 18, 19

State v. Gracia,

826 N.W.2d 87 (Wis. 2013) ............................ 19, 20

State v. Pinkard,

785 N.W.2d 592 (Wis. 2010) ................................ 19

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

State v. Vargas,

63 A.3d 175 (N.J. 2013)........................................ 18

State v. Wilson,

350 P.3d 800 (Ariz. 2015) ............................... 17, 18

Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee,

751 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2014) .................. 2, 9, 11, 13

United States v. Bute,

43 F.3d 531 (10th Cir. 1994) ................................ 14

United States v. Erickson,

991 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1993) .......................... 13, 14

United States v. Karo,

468 U.S. 705 (1984) .............................................. 24

United States v. Pichany,

687 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1982) .................... 12, 13, 17

United States v. Quezada,

448 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2006) .............................. 15

United States v. Rodriguez-Morales,

929 F.2d 780 (1st Cir. 1991) ............................ 9, 27

United States v. Rohrig,

98 F.3d 1506 (6th Cir. 1996) ...................... 9, 16, 17

United States v. Smith,

820 F.3d 356 (8th Cir. 2016) ............................ 9, 15

United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct.,

407 U.S. 297 (1972) .............................................. 30

United States v. Williams,

354 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2003) ................................ 17

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

United States v. York,

895 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1990) .......................... 9, 15

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITIES

U.S. Const., amend. IV .......................................... 4, 24

28 U.S.C. § 1254 .......................................................... 4

1

INTRODUCTION

In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), this

Court held that police officers did not violate the

Fourth Amendment when they searched the trunk of

a car that had been towed after an accident. The

Court acknowledged that, “except in certain carefully

defined classes of cases,” police cannot search private

property without consent or a warrant. Id. at 439. It

emphasized, however, that “there is a constitutional

difference between houses and cars.” Id. (quoting

Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)).

“[P]olice officers . . . frequently investigate vehicle

accidents in which there is no claim of criminal

liability and engage in what, for want of a better

term, may be described as community caretaking

functions, totally divorced from the detection,

investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to

the violation of a criminal statute.” Id. at 441. The

Court thus held that a “caretaking ‘search’ conducted

. . . of a vehicle that was neither in the custody nor

on the premises of its owner . . . was not

unreasonable solely because a warrant had not been

obtained.” Id. at 447–48.

Cady drew on a line of cases “treating

automobiles differently from houses” for purposes of

the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 441; see also id. at

439–47 (discussing other automobile cases). And the

Court limited Cady’s rule to vehicle searches. See,

e.g., id. at 439 (emphasizing that “automobile

searches” are different); id. at 441–42 (explaining the

reasons why automobiles receive less Fourth

Amendment protection); id. at 441 (describing

“community caretaking functions” only in terms of

“vehicle accidents”); id. at 446–48 (announcing a

2

holding limited to searches of cars). As the opinion

took pains to make clear, it does not apply to houses.

See id. at 439–42 (emphasizing “[t]he constitutional

difference between . . . houses . . . and . . . vehicles”).

In the decades since Cady, however, the so-called

“community caretaking” exception has taken on a life

of its own. Courts across the country are deeply

divided about whether the “community caretaking”

exception can justify a warrantless intrusion into a

home. There is at least a four-to-three split on that

question among the federal Courts of Appeals. State

courts are similarly divided.

Courts have

acknowledged the split repeatedly, as did the

Defendants in their briefing below.

See, e.g.,

Pet.App.60a n.3 (“[C]ourts are split about whether

the community caretaking function standard [this]

Court first set forth in Cady in the vehicle context

also applies to searches of a home.”); Appellees’ App.

Ct. Br. at 34 (“[T]here is a split among the federal

circuits concerning whether the community

caretaking function applies outside of the automobile

context.”); Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 176–

77 (3d Cir. 2010) (acknowledging split); Sutterfield v.

City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 554 (7th Cir. 2014)

(same); Corrigan v. Dist. of Columbia, 841 F.3d 1022,

1034 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (same).

In the decision below, the First Circuit “join[ed]

ranks with those courts that have extended the

community caretaking exception beyond the motor

vehicle context.” Pet.App.16a. Police officers, the

court emphasized, “provide an infinite variety of

services to preserve and protect community safety.”

Id. And “the community caretaking doctrine,” in the

First Circuit’s view, “is designed to give police elbow

3

room to take appropriate action.” Id. “Given the

doctrine’s core purpose, its gradual expansion since

Cady, and the practical realities of policing,” the

First Circuit held “that the community caretaking

doctrine may, under the right circumstances, have

purchase outside the motor vehicle context”—

including to justify a “warrantless entry into an

individual’s home” Id. at 16a–17a.

The First Circuit chose the wrong side of the

circuit split. Exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s

warrant requirement are “jealously and carefully

drawn.” Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499

(1958). And Cady’s exception is about cars, and cars

only.

Extending it into the home—the most

protected of all private spaces, see, e.g., Payton v.

New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980)—would create a

loophole in the Fourth Amendment’s warrant

requirement wide enough to drive a truck through.

So long as an officer reasonably claims to be taking

care of the community, he can disregard the Fourth

Amendment’s protections.

This case, moreover, is an unusually good vehicle

for addressing this important question. The courts

below squarely decided it based on full briefing.

Both courts recognized the split of authority, which

is dispositive of Petitioner’s claim. Moreover, the

First Circuit opinion carefully sets the “stage” for the

“community caretaking” question by laying out the

assumptions on it which it relied and the principles

on which it did not—thus isolating the question

presented and teeing it up for this Court’s review.

Pet.App.10a–11a.

This Court should grant certiorari and hold that

the “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth

4

Amendment’s warrant requirement cannot justify

incursions into the home.

OPINIONS BELOW

The

District

Court’s

opinion

granting

Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment in

relevant part (Pet.App.50a–79a) is published at 396

F. Supp. 3d 227 (D.R.I. 2019). The First Circuit’s

opinion affirming the District Court’s judgment

(Pet.App.1a–49a) is published at 953 F.3d 112

(2020).

JURISDICTION

The First Circuit entered judgment on March 13,

2020. This petition was timely filed, consistent with

the Supreme Court’s March 19, 2020 Order, within

150 days of that judgment.

This Court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall

not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,

but upon probable cause, supported by Oath

or affirmation, and particularly describing

the place to be searched, and the persons or

things to be seized.

STATEMENT

1. Petitioner Edward Caniglia is a 68-year-old

man with no criminal history and no record of

violence. See D.Ct. Dkt. 44, ¶ 1. He had been

married to his wife Kim Caniglia for 22 years when,

5

on August 20, 2015, they had a disagreement inside

their Cranston, Rhode Island home.

See id.;

Pet.App.53a.

When the argument escalated,

Petitioner went into the bedroom and retrieved an

unloaded gun. Pet.App.53a. He returned to the

living room and, in a dramatic gesture, put the gun

on the table and said, “why don’t you just shoot me

and get me out of my misery.” Id. When Mrs.

Caniglia threatened to call 911, Petitioner left the

home. Id. Mrs. Caniglia did not call 911. Id. But

the argument continued when Petitioner returned

home. Id. at 54a. So Mrs. Caniglia decided to spend

the night at a motel. Id.

The next day, Mrs. Caniglia tried to call her

husband. Id. When he did not answer, she became

worried and called the Cranston police. Id. She

asked the police to make a “well call” to check on

Petitioner and to escort her home. Id. When

multiple officers arrived to meet her, Mrs. Caniglia

told them what had happened and that she was

concerned about her husband’s safety—including the

possibility that he could be suicidal. Id.

After calling Petitioner, who “sounded fine,” the

officers escorted Mrs. Caniglia back to the home,

where they instructed her to stay in the car while

they spoke with Petitioner on the back deck. Id. at

55a. Petitioner told the officers about what had

happened, and that he had said “just shoot me”

because he “couldn’t take it anymore.” Id. “He was

calm for the most part,” “seemed normal,” and said

“that he would never commit suicide.” Id. Mrs.

Caniglia then entered the home. Id.

2. Based on their conversations with Petitioner

and Mrs. Caniglia, the officers believed there was a

6

risk that Petitioner would harm himself. Id. As a

result, they summoned a rescue lieutenant from the

Cranston Fire Department to the Caniglias’ home.

Id. That officer told Petitioner that he was taking

him to a local hospital. Id. at 56a. Petitioner went

along after the police told him they would not take

his two handguns if he did so. Id. At the hospital, a

nurse and a social worker examined Petitioner. Id.

He was discharged the very same day, but had to pay

about $1000 for the visit. See id.; D.Ct. Dkt. 44,

¶ 143.

Meanwhile, the officers entered the Caniglias’

home to seize Petitioner’s guns. Pet.App.56a. The

officers believed “it was reasonable to do so based on

[Petitioner’s] state of mind,” and feared that

“[Petitioner] and others could be in danger” if guns

remained in the home. Id. After the officers falsely

represented to Mrs. Caniglia that Petitioner had

consented, she led the officers to the guns. Id. at

56a–57a. The officers then seized them. Id.

A few days later, Mrs. Caniglia went to the police

station to retrieve the guns. Id. at 57a. Officers

refused her request. Id. A month later, Petitioner

went to the police station with the same request. Id.

Again, the officers refused. Id. When Petitioner’s

attorney made the same request, he fared no better.

Id.

3. Petitioner sued the City of Cranston and the

individual officers in the Federal District Court for

the District of Rhode Island. Petitioner alleged, by

way of § 1983 claims, that Defendants had violated

his rights under the Second Amendment, the Fourth

Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process and Equal Protection Clauses. D.Ct. Dkt.

7

51, ¶¶ 72–82 He also brought claims under Rhode

Island law. Id. at ¶¶ 63–96. Petitioner sought

money damages, as well as declaratory and

injunctive relief. Id. at pp. 16–17. After Petitioner

filed suit, his guns were returned to him.

Pet.App.57a.

The parties cross-moved for summary judgment.

Id. at 53a. The District Court granted summary

judgment for Petitioner on only the due process

claim, finding that the City had violated his due

process rights by providing no process for recovering

his guns and arbitrarily denying his requests for

their return. Id. at 68a–72a, 79a. It granted

summary judgment for Defendants on the other

claims. Id. at 58a–68a, 72a–79a.

At issue here is Petitioner’s claim that the entry

into his home and resulting seizures—effected

without a warrant or civil order—violated his Fourth

Amendment rights. The officers’ only justification

for the entry and seizures was the “community

caretaking” exception. Id. at 59a–64a. And the

District Court acknowledged the circuit “split about

whether the community caretaking function

standard the United States Supreme Court first set

forth in Cady in the vehicle context also applies to

searches of a home.” Id. at 60a–61a n.3. Opining

that “community caretaking” “services could be

required not only in vehicles, but also in homes,” the

District Court sided with those courts that have

taken a broad view of the exception. Id. Because the

District Court found that the officers’ actions had

been “reasonable,” it held that the warrantless entry

and seizures were covered by the “community

caretaking” exception and, as a result, “did not

8

violate [Petitioner’s] rights

Amendment.” Id. at 64a.1

under

the

Fourth

4. The First Circuit affirmed. In so doing, the

court took care to isolate the dispositive legal issue.

The court assumed that the seizures and “the

officers’ entry into the home [were] not only

warrantless but also nonconsensual.” Id. at 11a; see

also id. at 9a–10a. The Defendants did not “contend

that their seizures . . . were carried out pursuant to a

state civil protection statute.” Id. at 12a. And they

did not “invoke either the exigent circumstances or

emergency aid exceptions to the warrant

requirement”—which the court noted would likely

not apply in any event. Id. at 11a–12a & n.5.

Instead, “[D]efendants [sought] to wrap both of the

contested seizures in the community caretaking

exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 11a.

The question for the court, accordingly, was

simple and clear: Did the “community caretaking”

exception justify the officers’ warrantless entry into

Petitioner’s home and the resulting seizures? The

answer it gave was just as straightforward: “Yes.”

The First Circuit recognized that this Court has

applied the “community caretaking exception” only

“in the motor vehicle context.” Id. at 2a, 13a. And,

indeed, until the decision below the First Circuit

1 The District Court ruled in the alternative that Petitioner’s

claim was barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Pet.App.64a–66a. That alternative holding, however, applied

only to Petitioner’s individual-capacity claims against the

officers.

As the First Circuit recognized, “[q]ualified

immunity . . . offers no refuge either to the City or to the

officers in their official capacities.” Pet.App.8a n.3.

9

itself had “applied the community caretaking

exception only in the motor vehicle context.” Id. at

14a.

The panel observed, however, that “the

doctrine’s reach outside the motor vehicle context”

differs across circuits. Id. at 14a–15a. Some circuits,

the court noted, have held that “the community

caretaking exception cannot justify a warrantless

entry into a home.” Id. at 15a (emphasis added)

(citing, e.g., Ray, 626 F.3d at 177, and Sutterfield,

751 F.3d at 554). Others, however, have held that

the exception “allows warrantless entries onto

private premises (including homes),” as well as

seizures from them, “in particular circumstances.”

Id. (citing, e.g., United States v. York, 895 F.2d 1026,

1029–30 (5th Cir. 1990), United States v. Rohrig, 98

F.3d 1506, 1521–23 (6th Cir. 1996), United States v.

Smith, 820 F.3d 356, 360–62 (8th Cir. 2016), and

Rodriguez v. City of San Jose, 930 F.3d 1123, 1137–

41 (9th Cir. 2019)).

The First Circuit “join[ed] ranks with those

courts that have extended the community caretaking

exception beyond the motor vehicle context.” Id. at

16a. “In taking [that] step,” the court emphasized

the “‘special role’ that police officers play in our

society.” Id. “[A] police officer,” according to the

court, “must act as a master of all emergencies, who

is ‘expected to . . . provide an infinite variety of

services to preserve and protect community safety.’”

Id. (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929

F.2d 780, 784–85 (1st Cir. 1991)).

And the

“community caretaking” exception, according to the

court, “is designed to give police elbow room to take

appropriate action when unforeseen circumstances

present some transient hazard that requires

10

immediate attention.” Id. Because “[t]hreats to

individual and community safety are not confined to

the highways” and in light of “the practical realities

of policing,” the court held that the “community

caretaking doctrine may, under the right

circumstances, have purchase outside the motor

vehicle context”—and, indeed, inside the home. Id.

Here, applying the “community caretaking”

exception to the home, the court found that the

officers had acted in a “community caretaking”

capacity because, rather than investigating a crime,

they were responding to an individual whom they

understood to be mentally unstable. See id. at 17a–

37a. The officers’ actions, according to the court,

were reasonable and consistent with good police

practices. See id. “Consequently,” the court held

that Defendants’ warrantless “actions fell under the

protective carapace of the community caretaking

exception and did not abridge the Fourth

Amendment.” Id. at 37a.

This petition followed.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Courts across the country are deeply divided

about whether the “community caretaking” exception

extends to the home. Four federal Courts of Appeals

have said no; three have said yes. State courts are

likewise split. The decision below conflicts both with

this Court’s conception of the “community

caretaking” exception as an automobile-specific

doctrine and with its broader jurisprudence about

the sanctity of the home. And this case is a good

vehicle for addressing this important question. This

Court should grant certiorari and reverse.

11

I.

COURTS ACROSS THE COUNTRY ARE DEEPLY

DIVIDED.

As both the District Court and the First Circuit

recognized, “courts are split about whether the

community caretaking function standard [this] Court

first set forth in Cady in the vehicle context also

applies to searches of a home.” Pet.App.60a n.3; see

also id. at 14a–15a (“[T]he doctrine’s reach outside

the motor vehicle context . . . admits of some

differences among the federal courts of appeals.”).

Courts have acknowledged that division of authority

repeatedly. See, e.g., Ray, 626 F.3d at 175–77

(recognizing “confusion among the circuits as to

whether the community caretaking exception set

forth in Cady applies to warrantless searches of the

home”); Sutterfield, 751 F.3d at 554 (observing that

“courts have divided over the scope of the community

caretaking doctrine”); Corrigan, 841 F.3d at 1034

(noting that “some circuits have confined the

community caretaking exception to automobiles,”

while others “have extended the exception to

warrantless searches of the home”).

Indeed,

Defendants conceded the split in their briefing below.

Appellees’ App. Ct. Br. at 34 (“[T]here is a split

among the federal circuits concerning whether the

community caretaking function applies outside of the

automobile context.”).

On one side, the Third, Seventh, Ninth, and

Tenth Circuits have held that the community

caretaking exception cannot justify warrantless

intrusions inside a home. On the other side, the

Fifth, Eighth, and now First Circuits have held that

the community caretaking exception does extend

beyond that threshold. State courts are likewise

12

deeply divided. That conflict is entrenched, and will

persist unless this Court intervenes.

A. The Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth

Circuits Have Held that the Community

Caretaking Exception Does Not Extend

to the Home.

At least four Circuits have held that the

“community caretaking” exception does not apply to

searches of or seizures from a home.

1. In Ray v. Township of Warren, 626 F.3d 170

(3d Cir. 2010), the Third Circuit addressed the

“community caretaking” exception in the context of

officers’ entry into a home to follow up on a mother’s

concerns about the safety of her daughter, who she

believed was inside. Id. at 171–72. Because Cady

was “expressly based on the distinction between

automobiles and homes,” the court held that the

“community caretaking” exception “cannot be used to

justify warrantless searches of a home.” Id. at 176–

77. The court did not rule out the possibility that

“the exception [might] ever apply outside the context

of an automobile search”—say, to a search of a nonresidential building. Id. at 177 (emphasis added).

“[I]n the context of a search of a home,” however, the

“community caretaking” exception “does not override

the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment

or the carefully crafted and well-recognized

exceptions to that requirement.”

Id. (emphasis

added).

2. Almost thirty years earlier, in United States v.

Pichany, 687 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1982), the Seventh

Circuit cabined the community caretaking exception

to searches of cars. Id. at 207. Confronted with

13

officers’ warrantless entry into a private warehouse,

the court concluded that there was “no basis” for

extending Cady beyond the context of vehicle

searches. Id. Doing so, the court reasoned, “would

require . . . ignor[ing] express language in the Cady

decision confining the ‘community caretaker’

exception to searches involving automobiles.” Id. at

208. Accordingly, the court declined to adopt “an

expansive construction of the [Cady] decision” that

would “allow[ ] warrantless searches of private

homes or businesses.” Id. at 209.

The Seventh Circuit more recently reaffirmed

that holding in Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751

F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2014). There, it counted itself

among the Courts of Appeals that have taken “the

narrow view” and “confined the community

caretaking exception to the automobile context.” Id.

at 554, 556.

3. In United States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529

(9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth Circuit addressed the

“community caretaking” exception in the context of

an officer’s decision to “pull[ ] back the plastic” from

an open basement window and look inside “in order

to determine whether [the] residence had been

burglarized.” Id. at 530. Like the Seventh Circuit,

the Ninth Circuit reasoned that this Court had

“intended to confine [Cady’s] holding to the

automobile exception and to foreclose an expansive

construction” of the “community caretaking”

exception. Id. at 532. “The fact that [the] officer

[was] performing a community caretaking function,”

the court thus held, “cannot itself justify a

warrantless search of a private residence.” Id. at

531; see also Mathis v. Cnty. of Lyon, 757 F. App’x

14

542, 545 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Erickson for the

proposition that the “community caretaking”

exception “applies only to the impounding and

inventory searches of motor vehicles”).2

4. Finally, in United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531

(10th Cir. 1994), the Tenth Circuit considered the

applicability of the “community caretaking”

exception to the search of a warehouse. An officer

entered the warehouse, suspecting burglary, after

noticing that the garage door was open. Id. at 532–

33. The court agreed with the Ninth and Seventh

Circuits that this Court’s decision in Cady “turned on

the ‘constitutional difference’ between searching a

house and searching an automobile.” Id. at 535

(quoting Cady, 413 U.S. at 439). It thus held the

“community caretaking” exception applies “only in

cases involving automobile searches.” Id.

2 In the decision below, the First Circuit counted the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez v. City of San Jose, 930 F.3d

1123 (9th Cir. 2019), on the other side of the split. See

Pet.App.15a. Although Rodriguez held that officers may enter

a home without a warrant “to investigate safety or medical

emergencies,” it did not purport to depart from Erickson’s

holding—echoed in Mathis—that “the ‘community caretaking

function . . . cannot itself justify a warrantless search.’”

Rodriguez, 930 F.3d at 1137 (quoting Erickson, 991 F.2d at

531–32); see also Mathis, 757 F. App’x at 545. To the contrary,

the court quoted Erickson for exactly that proposition.

Rodriguez, 930 F.3d at 1137.

15

B. The Fifth, Eighth, and First Circuits

Have

Held

that

the

Community

Caretaking Exception Can Extend to the

Home.

On the flipside, three other circuits have held

that the “community caretaking” exception can

justify warrantless intrusions into a home.

1. In United States v. York, 895 F.2d 1026 (5th

Cir. 1990), the Fifth Circuit addressed a warrantless

home entry in connection with a domestic

disturbance call. Id. at 1027. The court held that

the home entry was constitutional—despite the

absence of a warrant—because the officers had been

“community caretaking.” Id. at 1030. Because the

officers were acting in a caretaking capacity, the

court held that “[n]o fourth amendment ‘search’ took

place.” Id.

2. In United States v. Smith, 820 F.3d 356 (8th

Cir. 2016), officers responded to a request for a

welfare check on the defendant’s ex-girlfriend, who

was believed to be at his home. Id. at 358–59.

Citing its prior decision in United States v. Quezada,

448 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 2006), the Eighth

Circuit held that the “entry into [the defendant’s]

home was a justifiable exercise of [the officers’]

community caretaking function.” Smith, 820 F.3d at

360; see also Quezada, 448 F.3d at 1007 (applying

the “community caretaking” exception to a

warrantless home entry).

3. Finally, in the decision below, the First

Circuit outlined the “differences among the federal

courts of appeals” and “join[ed] ranks with those

courts that have extended the community caretaking

16

exception beyond the motor vehicle context” and into

the home. Pet.App.16a; see supra 7–9. It could

hardly have done so more clearly:

Understanding the core purpose of the

doctrine leads inexorably to the conclusion

that it should not be limited to the motor

vehicle context. Threats to individual and

community safety are not confined to the

highways.

Given the doctrine’s core

purpose, its gradual expansion since Cady,

and the practical realities of policing, we

think it plain that the community

caretaking doctrine may, under the right

circumstances, have purchase outside the

motor vehicle context. We so hold.

Pet.App.16a.

In the short time since the decision below came

down, the First Circuit has relied on the “community

caretaking” exception to justify a warrantless home

entry in another case. In Castagna v. Jean, 955 F.3d

211 (1st Cir. 2020), officers entered a home without a

warrant when they observed teenagers partying

inside.

“[A]pply[ing] the analysis laid out in

Caniglia,” the court held “that the officers’ entry was

justified under the community caretaking exception

to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 220. It thus

concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified

immunity. See id. at 224.3

3 In the decision below, the First Circuit counted the Sixth

Circuit’s decision in United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506 (6th

Cir. 1996), on this side of the split. See Pet.App.15a. But

Rohrig mentioned “community caretaking functions” only in the

17

C. State Courts of Last

Likewise Deeply Divided.

Resort

Are

Like the federal Courts of Appeals, state courts

of last resort have also split on whether the

“community caretaking” exception can justify an

intrusion into the home.

1. On the one hand, several state courts—

including the high courts of Arizona, California, New

Jersey, and North Dakota—have held that the

“community caretaking” exception does not apply to

searches of, or seizures from, a home.

In State v. Wilson, 350 P.3d 800 (Ariz. 2015), for

example, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed the

exception in the context of a warrantless home entry

based on suspicion that a toxic substance had been

spilled. Id. at 801. The court “agree[d] with the

Seventh Circuit” “that Cady ‘intended to confine the

holding to the automobile exception and to foreclose

an expansive construction of the decision allowing

warrantless searches of private homes or businesses.’”

Id. at 804 (citing Pichany, 687 F.2d at 209).

“Extending the community caretaker exception to

homes,” the court reasoned, “would substantially

reduce the protection of privacy afforded by the

(continued…)

context of applying the exigent circumstances exception. See 98

F.3d at 1521; see also id. at 1518 (“Exigent Circumstances

Justified the Warrantless Entry into Defendant’s Home in This

Case.”). More recently, the Sixth Circuit has made clear that,

“despite references to the doctrine in Rohrig, [it] doubt[s] that

community caretaking will generally justify warrantless entries

into private homes.” United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497,

508 (6th Cir. 2003).

18

warrant

requirement

without

significantly

increasing the ability of law enforcement to make

searches to protect the public.” Id. at 805.

In People v. Ovieda, 446 P.3d 262 (Cal. 2019), the

California

Supreme

Court

considered

the

applicability of the exception to a warrantless home

entry conducted “after family members reported [an

individual] was suicidal and had access to a gun.” Id.

at 266.

The court held that the “community

caretaking” exception did not apply.

“[T]he

community caretaking exception,” it reasoned, “is not

one of the carefully delineated exceptions to the

residential warrant requirement recognized by the

United States Supreme Court.” Id. at 276. That

concept, it concluded, applies “only in the context of

vehicle searches.” Id. at 296.

Similarly, in State v. Vargas, 63 A.3d 175 (N.J.

2013), the New Jersey Supreme Court considered the

“community caretaking” exception in connection with

a warrantless entry made after a landlord expressed

concern about a tenant’s apparent absence. Id. at

177. The court held that “the community-caretaking

doctrine is not a justification for the warrantless

entry and search of a home.” Id.

Finally, in State v. Gill, 755 N.W.2d 454 (N.D.

2008), the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed a

warrantless home entry based on officers’ concern for

the wellbeing of an individual who had previously

been in a car accident. “[T]he scope of an officer’s

community caretaking function,” the court reasoned,

“does not encompass dwelling places.” Id. at 461. It

therefore held “that a law enforcement officer’s entry

into a dwelling place cannot be justified alone on the

19

basis that the officer is acting in a community

caretaking capacity.” Id. at 459.

2. On the other hand, several state courts—

including the high courts of South Dakota, and

Wisconsin—have reached the opposite result.

In State v. Deneui, 775 N.W.2d 221 (S.D. 2009),

the South Dakota Supreme Court confronted “the

question whether the community caretaker doctrine,

which [it] previously applied to an automobile search,

should also be applied to a home search.” Id. at 226.

The case involved officers’ warrantless entry into a

home “to see if anyone inside needed assistance”

after “smelling ammonia fumes outside.” Id. The

court found that the entry was not justified either by

exigent circumstances or by any need for emergency

aid. See id. at 240. It held, however, that “the

community caretaker exception applie[d] to the

warrantless entry into this home.” Id. at 244.

Similarly, in State v. Gracia, 826 N.W.2d 87 (Wis.

2013), the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered

“whether a warrantless search of [the defendant’s]

bedroom was a valid exercise of the community

caretaker exception to the warrant requirement.” Id.

at 90. The officers entered the bedroom on the basis

of an alleged concern that the defendant had been

injured in a car accident. See id. at 92. Relying on

its prior decision in State v. Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d 592

(Wis. 2010), the court noted that the “community

caretaker function” can be “reasonably exercised

within the context of a home.” Gracia, 826 N.W.2d

at 94 (quoting Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d at 601). And it

ultimately concluded that “[t]he facts of th[e] case,

when balanced in light of the totality of the

circumstances, lead . . . to the conclusion that this

20

was a reasonable exercise

caretaker function.” Id. at 98.

of

the

community

II. THE DECISION BELOW IS WRONG.

The “community caretaking” exception this Court

recognized in Cady is a narrow carveout from the

Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement that

applies only to searches of motor vehicles. The First

Circuit’s contrary ruling stretches Cady beyond

recognition. It conflicts with Fourth Amendment

first principles. And it threatens to replace the

Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement with a

reasonableness regime that would balance away the

sanctity of the home and fundamentally alter the

relationship between the citizenry and the police.

1. In Cady, this Court considered the

constitutionality of a police search of an automobile

conducted in the wake of a car accident. 413 U.S at

436–37. The defendant was a Chicago police officer

who had crashed a rental car in West Bend,

Wisconsin. Id. at 435–36. The local police removed

the damaged car to a private garage and searched it

in an attempt to locate and secure defendant’s police

revolver. See id. at 436. The Court held that the

warrantless search was consistent with the Fourth

Amendment, under a newly minted “community

caretaking” exception. See id. at 448.

On nearly every page of its opinion, however, the

Cady Court was careful to emphasize that vehicle

searches are different.

• “One class of cases which constitutes at least a

partial exception to th[e] general rule [that

warrantless searches are unreasonable] is

automobile searches.” Id. at 439.

21

• “Although vehicles are ‘effects’ within the

meaning of the Fourth Amendment, ‘for the

purposes of the Fourth Amendment there is a

constitutional difference between houses and

cars.’” Id. (quoting Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52).

• “[S]earches of cars that are constantly movable

may make the search of a car without a warrant

a reasonable one although the result might be

the opposite in a search of a home, a store, or

other fixed piece of property.”

Id. at 440

(quoting Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59

(1967)).

• “[T]he application of Fourth Amendment

standards, originally intended to restrict only

the Federal Government, to the States presents

some difficulty when searches of automobiles

are involved.”

Id.; see also id. at 440–41

(describing the different circumstances under

which federal and state officers might search an

automobile).

• “Because of the extensive regulation of motor

vehicles and traffic, and also because of the

frequency with which a vehicle can become

disabled or involved in an accident on public

highways, the extent of police-citizen contact

involving automobiles will be substantially

greater than police-citizen contact in a home or

office.” Id. at 441.

• “Although the original justification advanced for

treating automobiles differently from houses,

insofar as warrantless searches of automobiles

by federal officers was concerned, was the

vagrant and mobile nature of the former,

22

warrantless searches of vehicles by state officers

have been sustained in cases in which the

possibilities of the vehicle’s being removed or

evidence in it destroyed were remote, if not

nonexistent.” Id. at 441–42 (citations omitted).

• “The constitutional difference between searches

of and seizures from houses and similar

structures and from vehicles stems both from

the ambulatory character of the latter and from

the fact that extensive, and often noncriminal

contact with automobiles will bring local

officials in ‘plain view’ of evidence, fruits, or

instrumentalities of a crime, or contraband.” Id.

at 442.

• “The Court’s previous recognition of the

distinction between motor vehicles and dwelling

places leads us to conclude that the type of

caretaking ‘search’ conducted here of a vehicle

that was neither in the custody nor on the

premises of its owner, and that had been placed

where it was by virtue of lawful police action,

was not unreasonable solely because a warrant

had not been obtained.” Id. at 447–48.

The Court, moreover, carefully tailored the

phrase “community caretaking” to the work that

“[l]ocal police officers” do in “investigat[ing] vehicle

accidents”: “Local police officers, unlike federal

officers, frequently investigate vehicle accidents in

which there is no claim of criminal liability and

engage in what, for want of a better term, may be

described as community caretaking functions, totally

divorced from the detection, investigation, or

23

acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a

criminal statute.” Id. at 441.

In the decades since, this Court has decided

dozens of cases challenging the constitutionality of

home searches. Never has it suggested that the

“community caretaking” exception could justify a

warrantless intrusion into the home.

To the

contrary, it has discussed that exception only in the

context of vehicle searches. See South Dakota v.

Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976) (“In the

interests of public safety and as part of what the

Court has called ‘community caretaking functions,’

automobiles are frequently taken into police

custody.” (citation omitted); Colorado v. Bertine, 479

U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (noting that “our cases accorded

deference to police caretaking procedures designed to

secure and protect vehicles and their contents within

police custody”).

2.

Cabining the “community caretaking”

exception to vehicle searches is consistent with the

special protections afforded to the home under the

Fourth Amendment. “Widespread hostility” to the

Crown’s intrusions into the home were a “driving

force behind the adoption of [that] Amendment.”

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2239

(2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting). It is precisely to

prevent such intrusions that “the Constitution

requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the

police before they violate the privacy of the home.”

McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455–56

(1948); see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6

(2013) (“At the Amendment’s ‘very core’ stands ‘the

right of a man to retreat into his own home and there

be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’”

24

(quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,

511 (1961))).

From the very beginning, accordingly, this Court

has recognized the “sanctity” of the home for

purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Boyd v. United

States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); Jardines, 569 U.S.

at 6 (“[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the

home is first among equals.”). “[P]rivate residences

are places in which the individual normally expects

privacy free of governmental intrusion not

authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is

plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as

justifiable.” United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714

(1984); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,

220 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Our decisions

have made clear that . . . a home is a place in which a

subjective expectation of privacy virtually always

will be legitimate.”). Indeed, in no setting “is the

zone of privacy more clearly defined than when

bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of

an individual’s home—a zone that finds its roots in

clear and specific constitutional terms: ‘The right of

the people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . shall

not be violated.’” Payton, 445 U.S. at 589 (quoting

U.S. Const. amend. IV). “We have, after all, lived

our whole national history with an understanding of

the ancient adage that a man’s house is his castle . . .

.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Vehicles, on the other hand, are near the very

bottom of the Fourth Amendment pile. By their

nature, cars move—and they do so through public

spaces. See Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1669

(2018) (noting “[t]he ‘ready mobility’ of vehicles”);

25

Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)

(plurality op.) (“A car has little capacity for escaping

public scrutiny.”). And “unlike homes, [they] are

subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental

regulation and controls, including periodic inspection

and licensing requirements.” Opperman, 428 U.S. at

368.

For those reasons, the reasonable expectation of

privacy in an “automobile is significantly less than

that relating to one’s home or office.” California v.

Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985). “As an everyday

occurrence, police stop and examine vehicles when

license plates or inspection stickers have expired, or

if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or

excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or other

safety equipment are not in proper working order.”

Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368. And under the so-called

“automobile exception,” “officers may search an

automobile without having obtained a warrant so

long as they have probable cause to do so.” Collins,

138 S. Ct. at 1670 (citing Carney, 471 U.S., at 392–

93). Even without probable cause, cars can be

searched incident to a lawful arrest “when it is

reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime

of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” Arizona v.

Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

As this Court made clear in Collins, these

vehicle-specific doctrines do not apply outside of that

context.

There, “Virginia ask[ed] the Court to

expand the scope of the automobile exception to

permit police to invade any space outside an

automobile even if the Fourth Amendment protects

that space.” 138 S. Ct. at 1671. This Court

26

emphatically declined. “Nothing in our case law,”

the Court explained, “suggests that the automobile

exception gives an officer the right to enter a home or

its curtilage to access a vehicle without a warrant.”

Id. To the contrary, “[e]xpanding the scope of the

automobile exception in this way would both

undervalue the core Fourth Amendment protection

afforded to the home and . . . untether the

automobile exception

from the justifications

underlying it.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

So too here.

This Court has consistently

“declined to expand the scope of other exceptions to

the warrant requirement to permit warrantless entry

into the home.” Id. at 1672. That has been true of

the plain-view doctrine, as well as of doctrines

allowing public arrests. See id.; Soldal v. Cook Cnty.,

Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 66 (1992); Payton, 445 U.S. at 587–

590. Like those other doctrines, “the rationales

underlying” the community caretaking exception

“are specific to the nature of a vehicle and the ways

in which it is distinct from a house.” Collins, 138

S.Ct. at 1672. And here, as there, “[t]o allow an

officer to rely on” the community caretaking

exception “to gain entry into a house . . . would

unmoor the exception from its justifications, render

hollow the core Fourth Amendment protection the

Constitution extends to the house . . . , and

transform what was meant to be an exception into a

tool with far broader application.” Id. at 1672–73.

3. The First Circuit’s rule would give police

officers a blank check to evade the warrant

requirement whenever they deem that doing so

would be in the community’s interest. The First

Circuit’s conception of the doctrine—which it

27

describes as “a catchall for the wide range of

responsibilities that police officers must discharge

aside from their criminal enforcement activities”—

seems nearly boundless.

Pet.App.13a (quoting

Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d at 785). Indeed, the

panel freely admitted that “[p]olice officers enjoy

wide latitude in deciding how best to execute their

community caretaking responsibilities.” Id. at 14a;

see id. at 20a (explaining that, when community

caretaking, officers are not bound by “established

protocols or fixed criteria” and need not select the

“least intrusive” of “reasonable choices among

available options” (quotations omitted)). And “in the

typical case,” the court held that officers need “only

act ‘within the realm of reason’ under the particular

circumstances.”

Id. at 14a (quoting RodriguezMorales, 929 F.2d at 786).

The First Circuit’s expansion of the “community

caretaking”

exception

fundamentally

mischaracterizes the job of a police officer. Police

officers are agents of the State, and they play an

important role in enforcing the law. But they are not

“master[s] of all emergencies” any more than they

are social workers or psychologists. Id. at 16a. Such

a dramatic expansion of an officer’s role, limited only

by “the realm of reason,” id. at 14a, is troubling when

considered, as in this case, through a de novo lens. It

is intolerable in the context of qualified immunity,

which allows recourse against individual officers only

when “‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently

clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would [have

understood] that what he is doing violates that

right.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)

(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

28

(1987)).

Absent a prior case directly on point

(unlikely, given the number of potentially

distinguishing facts at play in any particular case), it

is difficult to imagine a community-caretaking

scenario in which that standard would be satisfied.

In addition to fraying the citizenry-police

relationship, the First Circuit’s freewheeling

reasonableness regime does exactly what it sets out

to avoid—leaving officers “twisting in the wind”

without clear guidance on the bounds of their

authority. See Pet.App.18a. Time and time again,

this Court has emphasized “the virtue of providing

clear and unequivocal guidelines to the law

enforcement profession.” California v. Acevedo, 500

U.S. 565, 577 (1991) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Yet the First Circuit’s “within the universe

of reasonable choices” standard leaves officers

without any predictable means of determining what

the Fourth Amendment requires.

More fundamentally, it is the role of the courts—

not the police—to decide whether and when an

intrusion into the home is justified. “[T]he most

basic constitutional rule in this area is that ‘searches

conducted outside the judicial process, without prior

approval by judge or magistrate, are per se

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—

subject only to a few specially established and welldelineated exceptions.’” Coolidge v. New Hampshire,

403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971) (quoting Katz v. United

States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).

And those

exceptions are “jealously and carefully drawn.”

Jones, 357 U.S. at 499.

A “community caretaking” exception that

justifies warrantless home entries whenever they

29

seem “reasonable” turns the warrant requirement on

its head. Where there is a true exigency—a welldefined

concept

with

settled

boundaries—

warrantless entry into a home may be justified. See

generally, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385

(1978); Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398

(2006). Otherwise, a warrant—issued on the basis of

“probable cause,” not “reasonableness”—is what the

Fourth Amendment demands.

III. THIS CASE IS THE IDEAL VEHICLE TO ADDRESS

THIS IMPORTANT QUESTION.

This case is a clean vehicle for this Court to clear

up decades of “confusion among the circuits as to

whether the community caretaking exception set

forth in Cady applies to warrantless searches of the

home.” Ray, 626 F.3d at 175–77.

The question was fully briefed before, and

squarely decided by, both the District Court and the

Court of Appeals. “Community caretaking” was the

only justification both courts found for the entry. See

Pet.App.12a n.5 (noting that “the defendants seek

shelter only behind the community caretaking

exception”); id. at 11a (“[The defendants seek to wrap

both of the contested seizures in the community

caretaking exception to the warrant requirement.”).

The applicability of that exception to the home was

dispositive of Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim.

And, unlike many other cases, this one does not arise

in a qualified-immunity posture. See id. at 8a–9a n.3

(clarifying that the court “resolve[d] [Petitioner’s]

Fourth Amendment claims on the merits” because

“[q]ualified immunity . . . offers no refuge either to

the City or to the officers in their official capacities”).

30

In short: If this Court had been waiting for the

right case in which to take up this question, this is it.

Moreover, this question is important. “[P]hysical

entry of the home is the chief evil against which the

wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed . . . .”

United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313

(1972). The expansion of an amorphous exception—

which, according to the First Circuit, can cover

teenage parties, wellness checks, and anything else

an officer deems “reasonable” in the name of

community care—into that most private of spaces

authorizes exactly those intrusions the Founders

most feared. And the entrenched split of authority

leaves officers without much-needed guidance about

the scope of their authority—and citizens without

much-needed confidence in the supposed sanctity of

their homes.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

31

August 10, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

Thomas W. Lyons

Rhiannon S. Huffman

STRAUSS, FACTOR, LAING

& LYONS

One Davol Square

Suite 305

Providence, RI 02903

Shay Dvoretzky

Counsel of Record

Amelia A. DeGory

JONES DAY

51 Louisiana Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 879-3939

sdvoretzky@jonesday.com

Amanda K. Rice

JONES DAY

150 W. Jefferson Ave.

Suite 2100

Detroit, MI 48226

Counsel for Petitioner