Reply Brief — West Virginia, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

Supreme Court briefFeb 17, 2022

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Nos. 20-1530, 20-1531, 20-1778, 20-1780

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

WEST VIRGINIA, ET AL.

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

THE NORTH AMERICAN COAL CORPORATION

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

WESTMORELAND MINING HOLDINGS LLC

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

NORTH DAKOTA

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

On Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER THE

NORTH AMERICAN COAL CORPORATION

YAAKOV M. ROTH

Counsel of Record

JEFFREY R. JOHNSON

BRINTON LUCAS

JONES DAY

JEFFERY D. UBERSAX

51 Louisiana Ave., NW

KUSHNER & HAMED CO., LPA Washington, DC 20001

1375 E. Ninth St., Ste. 1930 (202) 879-3939

yroth@jonesday.com

Cleveland, OH 44114

CHARLES T. WEHLAND

JONES DAY

77 W. Wacker Dr.

Chicago, IL 60601

Counsel for Petitioner

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 3

I.

II.

THE CLEAN AIR ACT CANNOT BEAR THE

PANEL’S OVERREACHING INTERPRETATION .......... 3

A.

This Case Concerns the Proper

Frame for the EPA’s Derivation

of Emission Limits ...................................... 3

B.

Expanding the EPA’s Frame to

the Entire Economy Requires

Unambiguous Text ..................................... 6

C.

The Act’s Text and Structure

Limit the EPA’s Frame to the

Individual Source ..................................... 11

THIS CASE REMAINS JUSTICIABLE ..................... 16

A.

Reinstating the CPP

Harms Petitioners .................................... 17

B.

Invalidation of the ACE Rule

Also Harms Petitioners ............................ 20

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 23

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. HHS,

141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021) .................................... 5, 6, 7

ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish,

490 U.S. 605 (1989) .............................................. 18

Bloate v. United States,

559 U.S. 196 (2010) .............................................. 15

Chafin v. Chafin,

568 U.S. 165 (2013) ........................................ 18, 19

City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc.,

455 U.S. 283 (1982) .............................................. 19

Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper,

445 U.S. 326 (1980) .............................................. 18

Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus,

486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1973) .............................. 13

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,

556 U.S. 502 (2009) .............................................. 21

Hearth, Patio & Barbecue Ass’n v. EPA,

11 F.4th 791 (D.C. Cir. 2021) ................................. 9

Knox v. SEIU,

567 U.S. 298 (2012) ........................................ 18, 19

Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def.,

138 S. Ct. 617 (2018) ............................................ 19

NFIB v. DOL,

142 S. Ct. 661 (2022) ................................ 6, 7, 8, 10

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Nw. Fuel Co. v. Brock,

139 U.S. 216 (1891) .............................................. 18

Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney,

442 U.S. 256 (1979) .............................................. 14

Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v.

Allstate Ins. Co.,

559 U.S. 393 (2010) .............................................. 14

Sierra Club v. Costle,

657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) .............................. 13

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co.,

578 U.S. 590 (2016) .............................................. 21

United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,

462 U.S. 579 (1983) .............................................. 19

Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,

531 U.S. 457 (2001) ................................................ 3

STATUTES

42 U.S.C. § 7410 .................................................. 15, 16

42 U.S.C. § 7411 .................................................passim

42 U.S.C. § 7412 .................................................. 15, 16

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Press Release, EPA, EPA Administrator

Regan Announces New Initiatives to

Support Environmental Justice and

Climate Action (Apr. 23, 2021) ............................ 21

U.S. Energy Info. Admin.,

Electricity: State Electricity Profiles .................... 17

INTRODUCTION

The State, NGO, and Power Company Respondents

all seem to have forgotten how we got here. The D.C.

Circuit granted their petitions to vacate the ACE Rule.

Respondents filed those petitions because they stood

to benefit from the reinstatement of the CPP or a new

rulemaking under a more robust vision of the EPA’s

authority. To justify that relief, these Respondents

charged that the EPA fundamentally misunderstood

the scope of its power and, as a result, had not

considered sweeping supra-source measures to reduce

emissions on an industry-wide basis. The D.C. Circuit

adopted that reading of the statute and thus set aside

the ACE Rule, including its repeal of the CPP. And

that paved the way for the EPA, now back in these

Respondents’ corner, to declare its intent to write new

rules, on a clean slate, free of the source-specific

constraint it had previously identified in the Act and

embedded in its regulations.

Having prevailed, Respondents now downplay the

judgment below, denying the injuries that it inflicts on

Petitioners. To avoid the merits, they complain that

the scope of the EPA’s authority is too “hypothetical”

or “abstract” to resolve. And Senator Whitehouse goes

so far as to accuse Petitioners of ginning up litigation

to circumvent democracy. But it was Respondents who

sought vacatur of the ACE Rule. That relief harms

Petitioners (who may thus appeal it) for the very same

reasons as it benefits Respondents (who had standing

to seek it). And the “abstract” question presented is

the one Respondents put to the court below. Judicial

review is not a one-way ratchet for the administrative

state. Whether the D.C. Circuit correctly construed

the Act is now for this Court to decide.

2

And that is not a particularly difficult question. All

agree that § 7411 directs the EPA to identify the “best

system of emission reduction.” The dispute is over the

frame for that analysis. As Petitioners see it, the

statutory frame is the “existing source”—the facility

that emits the pollutant and to which the standards of

performance apply. As a matter of text and structure,

it follows that the EPA must find the “best system of

emission reduction” for that source: measures that an

individual facility can take to reduce emissions from

its operations. But the D.C. Circuit reasoned that the

EPA can zoom out from the source and adopt a “best

system” to reduce greenhouse gases for the industry.

That would empower the EPA to impose limits that

could only be met through systemic changes in power

generation, forced subsidization of renewable energy,

and assorted other climate-change measures that have

no real nexus to the plant supposedly being regulated.

Even Respondents do not claim the Clean Air Act

unambiguously supports this broader frame. That is

dispositive, because the EPA’s transformational role

under the panel’s reading cannot be inferred from

ambiguity. The court’s elevation of the EPA—from

making technical findings about which methods best

limit emissions from a plant, to large-scale policy

judgments balancing the economy against climate

change—runs head-long into the major-questions

doctrine. And even on its own terms, the Act’s text and

structure foreclose Respondents’ construction. Telling

a coal plant to shut down in favor of a wind farm is not

a “performance” standard reflecting “achievable”

limits “for” the plant any more than terminating a

worker’s employment is a “performance” plan based on

“achievable” expectations “for” the employee.

3

ARGUMENT

I.

THE CLEAN AIR ACT CANNOT BEAR THE PANEL’S

OVERREACHING INTERPRETATION.

The D.C. Circuit transformed the EPA’s cabined

power to ensure that each existing source operates as

cleanly as practicable into a sweeping authority to

reduce overall emissions by shifting power generation,

shutting down plants, compelling subsidization of

competitors, and imposing measures that operate well

beyond the level of any single source. That is a

fundamentally different type of authority, too broad to

be inferred from mere ambiguity. Yet not even

Respondents claim that the Act unambiguously vested

the EPA with that authority. In fact, its text and

structure point unambiguously the other way.

A. This Case Concerns the Proper Frame for

the EPA’s Derivation of Emission Limits.

1. Throughout their briefing, Respondents pretend

that the issue before the Court is whether a state may

authorize sources to satisfy a standard of performance

through “outside-the-fenceline” measures (like trading

emission credits, planting trees, or investing in solar

farms). SG.Br.26-30; NY.Br.28-31; Power.Br.25. But

the question presented is distinct and antecedent:

whether the EPA may rely on those measures to derive

emission limits that the standards then reflect. That

threshold question (how the limits may be set) does not

control the subsequent one (how states may comply).

Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457,

469-71 (2001) (while the EPA may not consider costs

“in formulating the standards,” states may do so “in

choosing the means” to “implement the standards”).

And only the EPA’s authority is at issue here.

4

Section 7411 contemplates two regulatory steps.

First, the EPA identifies the “best system of emission

reduction” and calculates the “degree of emission

limitation achievable” through its “application.” 42

U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1). Second, the states must establish

“standards of performance” that “reflect[]” that degree

of limitation, and provide for “implementation and

enforcement” of those standards. Id. § 7411(a)(1), (d).

This case concerns the first step: In identifying a best

system, is the EPA limited to reductions “achievable”

by the source, through “application” to the source? The

D.C. Circuit said no; it ruled that the EPA’s system

can include a broader set of higher-level measures.

Reversing that decision would not, however, resolve

whether the states’ “implementation” plans for those

source-level standards may authorize industry-level

measures to show compliance. Respondents’ contrary

argument, in the words of their amici, “confuses the

standard with the means of compliance.” Fmr.Power.

Execs.Br.17. Just because the standards must be

achievable using source-level measures does not mean

they must be achieved using source-level measures.

“The statute says nothing about the measures that

sources may use to comply with the standards.”

JA.133. Nor does that issue trigger federalism and

major-questions canons. And, historically, the Clean

Air Mercury Rule based its limits on available

technology while allowing states to satisfy those limits

using trading. SG.Br.38; NACCO.Br.47-48.

In all events, the question of compliance measures

is not before this Court. While the D.C. Circuit did

vacate a different part of the ACE Rule that limited

state discretion over compliance measures (JA.13135), no Petitioner sought review of that ruling.

5

2. Respondents also attempt to sow confusion about

Petitioners’ position by taking too literally the “fenceline” shorthand and by treating generation-shifting as

a distinct issue. E.g., SG.Br.27, 38. They are overcomplicating things. Petitioners’ point is that the EPA

must identify a “best system” at the source level,

meaning measures that can be taken by that source to

reduce emissions from that source’s normal operations.

That means generation-shifting is beyond the EPA’s

scope, since those measures expand the frame beyond

the source and challenge the premise that the source

will continue to operate. It also means the EPA cannot

just latch onto sources as an excuse to regulate their

owners—e.g., by requiring them to grow trees or invest

in wind energy. None of that reduces emissions from

the source. That missing nexus shows these are not

genuine attempts to regulate a source’s performance.

Cf. Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. HHS, 141 S. Ct. 2485,

2488-89 (2021) (CDC cannot regulate evictions based

on “downstream connection” to disease). The CPP was

full of such artifices, built on the faulty premise that

the analytical frame exceeds any given source.

In describing this dichotomy, “inside-the-fence” is

useful but inexact shorthand. Emission reductions

from using pre-cleaned fuel are achievable by the

source and thus fair game even if the cleaning occurs

elsewhere. SG.Br.38. And greenhouse gas reductions

from demolishing a plant and growing a forest instead

are beyond the EPA’s power, even if it happens on-site.

What matters is whether the limits are achievable by

reducing emissions from the source during normal

operations. If so, the EPA can demand standards that

reflect those best practices. If not, it is up to Congress

to authorize more aggressive regulatory action.

6

B. Expanding the EPA’s Frame to the Entire

Economy Requires Unambiguous Text.

Like the D.C. Circuit, Respondents do not claim the

Act unambiguously authorizes the EPA to set targets

based on a “system” of industry-wide transformations

rather than source-level modifications. But Congress

must “speak clearly when authorizing an agency to

exercise powers of ‘vast economic and political

significance.’ ” Ala. Ass’n, 141 S. Ct. at 2489. Just as

OSHA needed a clear statement to leave the “everyday

exercise” of workplace-safety regulation to “regulate

the hazards of daily life,” NFIB v. DOL, 142 S. Ct. 661,

665 (2022), the EPA needs one to convert technical

review of particular emission-control measures into

reconfiguration of the entire power supply.

1. Respondents try to avoid the major-questions

doctrine by protesting that it is too soon to evaluate

the consequences of the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation.

The Court cannot use the CPP to assess its impact,

because “market-based forces” supposedly effectuated

the same reductions anyway. SG.Br.2, 47. Nor can

the Court “speculat[e]” about whether the EPA might

go “too far” in a future rulemaking (NY.Br.41), without

risking an “advisory opinion[]” (Power.Br.20).

These objections all ignore that the D.C. Circuit set

aside the repeal of the CPP on the ground that the Act

“does not unambiguously bar a system of emission

reduction that includes generation shifting.” JA.118.

This case thus hinges on the scope of the power

Congress conferred on the EPA, not the validity of any

particular exercise of that power. Resolving the

former issue directly implicates the major-questions

doctrine, which demands clear statutory support when

7

agencies make “unprecedented” claims to “expansive”

authority. Ala. Ass’n, 141 S. Ct. at 2489. Indeed,

Respondents’ litigation strategy has teed up the

major-questions doctrine more directly than usual,

precisely because their theory (and thus the decision

below) turns on the scope of the EPA’s authority in

general, not the validity of any regulatory measure in

particular.

2. Respondents next argue that the major-questions

doctrine is not implicated by the parties’ dispute here,

because even inside-the-fenceline measures may have

major consequences, while some outside-the-fenceline

measures could prove trivial. SG.Br.46.

This too misses the point. To repeat, the doctrine

targets claims of expansive authority generally, not

just specific ways it has been deployed. See Ala. Ass’n,

141 S. Ct. at 2489 (asking “what measures” would be

“outside the CDC’s reach” under its “claim of

expansive authority”); NFIB, 142 S. Ct. at 665 (asking

whether OSHA’s position would “significantly expand

[its] regulatory authority”). It is always true that an

agency might exercise its conceded power aggressively

or its claimed power modestly. But the question is

whether the broader interpretation would expand the

agency’s sphere of delegated authority in a politically

or economically significant way. Here, what matters

is that the EPA’s attempt to stray beyond individual

smokestacks toward regulation of the power grid (and

beyond) is a step carrying great political and economic

import, even if the agency might not press the limits

of that power in each case, and even if exercise of its

legitimate authority has real-world impact as well.

8

Critically, Respondents are wrong to suggest there

is no material difference between an agency limited to

source-specific solutions and one empowered to halt

global warming by any means necessary. By zooming

out, the D.C. Circuit fundamentally transformed the

EPA’s role. Instead of making technical judgments

about the costs and benefits of installing a particular

kind of scrubber in a particular plant, the agency must

decide whether, from the viewpoint of the Nation as a

whole, certain kinds of power generation should be

curtailed or eliminated due to the risks of climate

change—not to mention the regulatory options to limit

the demand for electricity. These are tremendously

important, politically freighted questions—like the

propriety of a nationwide vaccine mandate—that fall

well outside the agency’s “sphere of expertise.” NFIB,

142 S. Ct. at 665. If Congress wants to hand them off

to the agency, it must (at minimum) do so clearly.

Relatedly, the EPA plays games by downplaying its

role as “intermediate” or “interstitial.” SG.Br.36, 45.

True, the agency does not directly order adoption of its

best system—unless states fail to get with the

program, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(2). But while states

otherwise retain discretion over compliance measures,

see supra at 3-4, the EPA’s “system” sets the floor by

defining the required reductions that states and their

sources must meet. Unless the system is premised on

source-level measures and the reductions “achievable”

by their application to a source, some sources will have

to scale back or close. As the CPP thus admitted, its

limits could be achieved only through generationshifting among owners of multiple sources. JA.579-80.

In practical effect, then, a supra-source system does

mandate supra-source compliance measures.

9

3. Respondents also insist the Act already “guard[s]

against … transformative consequences.” SG.Br.49.

The EPA must “account” for “cost[s],” “nonair quality

health,” “energy requirements,” and “environmental

impact” in determining whether its best system “has

been adequately demonstrated.” 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a).

But those considerations do not in any way close the

new regulatory horizons opened by the decision below.

Nor do they meaningfully limit the EPA’s exercise

of power more generally. “[B]est” is in the eye of the

beholder; it is hard to see how a minimally competent

EPA could be overturned for failing to “account” for

these factors. If doing so led administrators to forego

certain measures in the past (SG.Br.49), that was

agency discretion, not statutory compulsion. Indeed,

Respondents’ reassurances are belied by their silence

about most of the hypotheticals—like carbon taxes,

electric-car subsidies, and demand-side regulation of

electricity use. Respondents and their amici believe

that, without drastic emission cuts, climate change

will cause “catastrophic” harm and fatal “ ‘disasters,’ ”

“flooding” cities, causing “tens of thousands of deaths

per year,” subjecting “millions” to “health” problems,

and perhaps triggering “political crises” or “state

failure.” NGO.Br.11; Scientists.Br.5, 27-30, 33; Nat’l.

Park.Br.8; Medical.Br.5. Against all this calamity,

“cost” and “energy requirements” would lose every day

of the week. And while the EPA denies that it could

regulate “homes” under § 7411, the D.C. Circuit

upheld such a standard last year, observing that while

“wood stoves” keep many “American homes” warm,

their emissions threaten “grave health consequences”

to “major portions of the population.” Hearth, Patio &

Barbecue Ass’n v. EPA, 11 F.4th 791, 795-96 (2021).

10

4. Finally, Respondents claim that, unlike the novel

assertions of agency power that have triggered the

major-questions doctrine elsewhere, the D.C. Circuit’s

interpretation is “supported by historical precedent.”

SG.Br.49. Their examples prove otherwise.

The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative is a

“cooperative effort” among states to reduce emissions;

it says nothing about the EPA’s power. The Acid Rain

Program at least involves federal legislation, but it

proves Congress speaks specifically when it envisions

drastic industry-wide measures such as capping sulfur

dioxide emissions and creating a system of tradeable

credits. NACCO.Br.42-43. The contrast between that

solid statutory foundation and the EPA’s present

attempt to discover world-altering power in dictionary

definitions of the word “system” is striking.

That leaves the Clean Air Mercury Rule. That rule

merely illustrates, however, that even though the EPA

must stay “inside the fence” when setting achievable

emission limits, states may venture beyond it when

authorizing compliance measures in “implementation”

plans. See supra at 3-4. In any event, this single (and

vacated) agency action from nearly twenty years ago

hardly establishes that the CPP and its ilk fall within

the EPA’s wheelhouse. If OSHA’s long history of “fire

[and] sanitation regulation[s]” could not ward off the

doctrine when it tried to pass a vaccine mandate

targeting “the hazards of daily life,” NFIB, 142 S. Ct.

at 665, then the Clean Air Mercury Rule’s sourceachievable metrics surely cannot support the EPA’s

desire to refashion the Nation’s daily supply (and use)

of electricity without clear congressional support.

11

C. The Act’s Text and Structure Limit the

EPA’s Frame to the Individual Source.

Canons aside, the statute itself compels the same

conclusion. With the statutory definitions inserted,

§ 7411(d) requires performance standards “which

reflec[t] the degree of emission limitation achievable

through the application of the best system of emission

reduction for any building, structure, facility, or

installation.” By any fair reading, that contemplates

a technical EPA determination about the measures a

particular facility could take to reduce emissions from

its own operations—i.e., filters on smokestacks, not

fundamental transformation of how Americans power

their lives. Respondents offer only a grab-bag of

debater’s points in response.

1. Respondents begin with a divide-and-conquer

approach, urging this Court to treat (a)(1)’s definition

of “standard of performance” and (d)(1)’s use of that

term as entirely independent. They place great weight

on the word “system” in (a)(1), while dismissing the

operative text in (d)(1) as bearing only on the “States,

not EPA.” SG.Br.31-33; see also Power.Br.27-29, 45.

This is the statutory-interpretation equivalent of

missing the forest for its trees—and then, ironically,

using the trees as license to regulate the forest.

It makes no sense to read the word “system”—or the

rest of the (a)(1) definition—in isolation. Rather, “as

EPA acknowledged when it issued the [CPP], the fact

that States must ultimately establish standards of

performance ‘for existing sources,’ 42 U.S.C.

§ 7411(d)(1), imposes ‘significant constraints on the

types of measures that may be included’ ” in the

agency’s chosen “system.” NY.Br.34 (quoting JA.733-

12

34). The EPA also recognized that “read in context,”

(a)(1)’s use of “achievable” and “application” limited

the agency’s range to tools “implementable by the

sources themselves.” JA.737. While the CPP sought

to evade these strictures by collapsing the distinction

between “source[s]” and their “owner[s],” even it

rejected the notion that a best system “includes

anything whatsoever that reduces emissions.” JA.737

& n.472. Respondents, like the D.C. Circuit, now

appear to have bulldozed even these guardrails.

2. Respondents ultimately contend the EPA may

zoom out and adopt any measure that operates “across

the board” and “in the aggregate.” SG.Br.35-36; see

also Power.Br.43 (arguing that “application” of best

system is “to the source category”). Again, not even

the CPP went that far, because this approach is so outof-step with the statutory structure and focus.

The CPP reasoned that because its “standards must

apply to the affected sources” under § 7411(d), it could

not require “actions taken by affected sources that do

not result in emission reductions from the affected

sources” themselves. JA.803. Telling source owners

to engage in “the planting of forests to sequester CO2,”

for instance, was out of bounds. Id. But the EPA and

most of its allies have evidently abandoned that limit

today. Rather, the agency’s current view is “[i]f one

source achieves compliance by reducing its emissions

and another by purchasing allowances, the ‘system’ is

still being applied to both” and hence permissible.

SG.Br.35. Replace “purchasing allowances” with

“planting trees,” “erecting solar panels,” or “donating

to the Sierra Club” and the point is the same.

13

This theory is at war with the statutory text and

structure. Respondents never explain how a standard

premised on a plant’s closure could be a “performance”

standard “for” that source—any more than a plan

directing a disabled student to drop out could be an

“educational” plan “for” (or “achievable” by) him. Nor

do they grapple with the fact that the EPA’s authority

over sources does not extend to commandeering their

owners to engage in unrelated climate mitigation. Nor

do they supply a reason why Congress would have

bothered to distinguish new from existing sources if

the EPA had unfettered power to regulate plants from

either category into oblivion. NACCO.Br.34, 40-42.

Respondents instead observe that the EPA looks at

factors like “ ‘cost’ ” and “ ‘energy requirements’ ” on a

broader scale. SG.Br.36; NY.Br.26. But even if that

were so, it does not suggest that the EPA can also set

the “ ‘degree of emission limitation achievable’ ” at the

highest level of generality, and thereby decree which

industries live or die. SG.Br.36. These factors come

into play in deciding whether a particular “system”

has been “adequately demonstrated,” which is distinct

from whether an emission “standard” is “achievable.”

Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 433

(D.C. Cir. 1973). Only “[a]fter” the EPA has identified

“emission levels that are ‘achievable’ ” by the source

can it then consider, “on the grand scale,” whether a

given system “represents the best balance of economic,

environmental, and energy considerations.” Sierra

Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1981). For

example, the ACE Rule accepted natural-gas co-firing

as “feasible,” yet declined to incorporate that measure

due to doubts that it could be “implemented on a

nationwide scale at [a] reasonable cost.” JA.1839-40.

14

In a similar vein, Respondents contend that since

any standard will have “some generation-shifting

effect,” there is no basis for distinguishing measures

that “will predictably cause some generation shifting”

from ones adopted “because of” such effects. SG.Br.3940; see also Power.Br.41. But that “mistakes what” a

standard “regulates for its incidental effects.” Shady

Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559

U.S. 393, 412 n.10 (2010) (plurality). Virtually any

emission standard will also have some effect on the

economy, but no one thinks that means the EPA can

use § 7411 to set monetary policy. Here as elsewhere,

it matters whether the government takes “a particular

course of action … ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’

its adverse effects.” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney,

442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).

And “statutory language” (SG.Br.40) does back up

this commonsense distinction.

Only the most

Machiavellian of bureaucrats would describe an

emission limit aimed at shutting down a disfavored

plant as a “performance” standard “for” the source—

just as only the most conniving of bosses would say a

project designed to get rid of an unwanted subordinate

was a “performance” plan “for” that employee.

3. With § 7411 against them, Respondents quickly

move on, scouring other provisions for “limiting

language” to contrast with the operative text here—or,

contradictorily, for “more specific” language showing

that Congress was comfortable with industry-wide

schemes elsewhere. SG.Br.33, 36; see also, e.g.,

Power.Br.30-35. While this grand tour through the

Clean Air Act may be of interest to environmental-law

aficionados, it offers no support for Respondents’

interpretation.

15

As for “limiting language,” the bulk of examples

involve specific technological solutions, such as “the

retrofit application of the best system of continuous

emission reduction.” SG.Br.32-33. But nobody says

§ 7411 confines the EPA to technological measures; it

can also consider methods, materials, and more.

NACCO.Br.43. The flaw in the D.C. Circuit’s reading

is that it would permit standards that a source cannot

itself achieve in any of those ways. Id.

Respondents also contend that § 7412(d) lists

hazardous-pollutant measures that are “restricted …

to source-specific controls.” Power.Br.35. That is not

accurate, though, as § 7412(d) authorizes measures

“including, but not limited to” these source-specific

tools. This provision therefore cuts the other way, as

Congress in § 7411 “declined to use an expansive or

illustrative term such as ‘including.’ ” Bloate v. United

States, 559 U.S. 196, 207 (2010).

Doing a complete reversal in the inference they seek

to draw, Respondents next point out that the National

Ambient Air Quality Standards Program allows states

to include “marketable permits” or “auctions” in their

compliance plans. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A); SG.Br.

31; NY.Br.26-27. All that shows is that Congress

knows how to provide that states may use such tools.

It does not suggest Congress empowered the EPA to

dragoon states into adopting these measures under

§ 7411—which contains no analogous language and is

focused on the source rather than the pollutant.

So too for Congress’s creation of a cap-and-trade

program to eliminate acid rain. Respondents’ only

explanation for the absence of similar language in

§ 7411 is that Congress “directly instituted a federal

16

trading system” to combat acid rain, whereas the

EPA’s selection of a “best system” here is just “an

intermediate step.” SG.Br.36-37. But there is no

meaningful difference between directly mandating a

cap-and-trade program and setting limits that states

can meet only by doing so. See supra at 8.

To the extent Respondents’ discussion of § 7411’s

neighbors is relevant at all, it is in failing to identify a

single example of the EPA using its authority under

§ 7410 or § 7412 to set a standard that a source could

not achieve by itself. That is telling, because § 7411(d)

serves as a regulatory backstop for the rare pollutant

not already covered by these programs. The idea that

Congress gave the EPA more power in this gap-filling

provision is something that could survive only in a

bureaucrat’s imagination.

II. THIS CASE REMAINS JUSTICIABLE.

Given their weakness on the merits, Respondents

opposed certiorari by contending that a partial stay of

the mandate meant there was no longer a live

controversy. The Court granted review, implicitly

rejecting those arguments. Respondents nonetheless

return with the same muddle of standing, mootness,

and ripeness objections.

None of those doctrines obstructs merits review.

Petitioners have standing to challenge the judgment

for the same reasons Respondents had standing to seek

it: Revival of the CPP would have winners and losers.

A temporary stay of that relief does not moot the case.

And at minimum, the orders below impose harm by

inviting the EPA to issue more burdensome rules on a

blank slate. Having secured that relief, Respondents

cannot now deny its significance.

17

A. Reinstating the CPP Harms Petitioners.

When states and industry first challenged the CPP

(resulting in this Court’s stay), nobody doubted their

standing. After all, the CPP imposed legal duties on

states, and its strict emission targets threatened the

existence of the already-struggling coal industry. The

judgment below vacates repeal of the CPP, imbuing it

anew with the force of law. Petitioners therefore are

again threatened with straightforward, tangible harm

from the judgment below.

Respondents argue that things have changed. First,

the NGO Respondents claim that the CPP is null as a

practical matter because its targets have already been

satisfied. Second, the EPA suggests it has shielded the

judgment from review by obtaining an order partially

staying the mandate pending a new rulemaking in the

future. The first theory is factually mistaken, while

the second is legally misguided.

1. The NGOs are simply wrong that the CPP’s goals

have been fully satisfied. The aggregate decline in

power-sector emissions projected under the CPP may

have already occurred, but many states—including

West Virginia and North Dakota—remain above their

CPP targets and are not projected to meet them by

2030. JA.1696 (map); JA.1662-63 (CPP targets); U.S.

Energy Info. Admin., Electricity: State Electricity

Profiles, https://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/ (2020

emission data). Overturning the CPP repeal thus

imposes concrete burdens on these states, and in turn

on the coal industry from reductions in demand. And

the fact that the CPP deadlines to submit state plans

have passed (NGO.Br.28) only exacerbates the harm

by making state compliance impossible.

18

Had the CPP truly become obsolete, Respondents

could not and would not have sued to revive it. Rather,

per the Power Company Respondents, replacing CPP

with the ACE Rule “increas[ed] the competitiveness of

coal-fired units,” thereby putting “additional pressure

on” coal’s “competi[tors].” C.A.Power.Br.6. That is

still true, and it is why Petitioners may seek to renew

that state of affairs through reversal.

2. The EPA does not dispute that overturning the

CPP’s repeal would harm Petitioners, but claims that

its motion to stay the mandate precludes them from

challenging that relief. Such “maneuvers designed to

insulate a decision from review by this Court,”

however, “must be viewed with a critical eye.” Knox v.

SEIU, 567 U.S. 298, 305 (2012). The EPA cites

nothing suggesting that a stay can defeat jurisdiction.

Both the law and common sense dictate otherwise.

As the EPA notes (SG.Br.15), appellate jurisdiction

turns on whether the lower court’s “judgment” harms

the party seeking review. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490

U.S. 605, 612, 618 (1989); see also Deposit Guar. Nat’l

Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980) (framing

inquiry as whether party seeking review is “aggrieved

by the judgment”). Here, the D.C. Circuit’s judgment

vacated the ACE Rule, including its “embedded repeal

of the [CPP].” JA.215. Petitioners are therefore

“asking for typical appellate relief”—that this Court

“reverse” the decision below and “undo what it has

done.” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 173 (2013); see

also Nw. Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U.S. 216, 219 (1891)

(courts always retain “[j]urisdiction to correct what

ha[s] been done”).

19

The panel’s later order that partially suspended its

mandate as to CPP repeal pending a new rulemaking

(JA.270) does not alter the adverse “judgment” under

review. If a panel’s issuance of the mandate, which

changes the facts on the ground, could not defeat

jurisdiction, United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462

U.S. 579, 581 n.2 (1983), then surely a temporary

preservation of the status quo cannot either.

While the EPA suggest that the stay “mooted” this

matter (SG.Br.17), a “case becomes moot only when it

is impossible for a court to grant ‘any effectual relief

whatever’ to the prevailing party.” Knox, 567 U.S. at

307. Here, reversal would prevent resuscitation of the

CPP. The EPA’s intent to promulgate a new rule may

make that resuscitation “uncertain” to occur, but

“uncertainty does not typically render cases moot.”

Chafin, 568 U.S. at 175. That must be the law, since

if the Court were to dismiss and the EPA chose to stick

with the CPP after all, the stay would expire, the CPP

would return, and Petitioners would lack recourse.

Moreover, now that the EPA supports the judgment

below, its stay motion amounts to “voluntary cessation

of a challenged practice,” which “does not deprive a

federal court of its power to determine the legality of

the practice.” City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle,

Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982). Nor does the EPA’s

intent to replace the CPP with some cousin, likely on

the same statutory understanding, moot Petitioners’

challenge to the judgment reviving it. Even a proposed

rule that “would rescind” the one under review cannot

moot a case, since the challenged rule, even if stayed,

“remains on the books.” Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of

Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 627 n.5 (2018). The EPA’s mere

promise to issue a new rule surely cannot suffice.

20

Perhaps recognizing that the stay does not truly

eliminate the harms to Petitioners from the judgment,

the EPA proposes in the alternative to partially vacate

the panel’s holding. But this offer only exposes the

flaws in the EPA’s theory. On its view, a stay defeats

standing, which in turn compels vacatur. So staying a

judgment ends up wiping it out. That bootstrapping

cannot be right.

B. Invalidation of the ACE Rule Also Harms

Petitioners.

Even if there were no chance of the CPP returning

to law, Petitioners would still have standing to

challenge the D.C. Circuit’s vacatur of the ACE Rule.

That vacatur imposes independent harm by giving the

EPA a blank slate to write a new rule consonant with

the broader power conferred by the court below.

Respondents argue that the vacatur of ACE does not

support standing, because no rule is even better for

Petitioners. True, but no rule is not on the table. The

EPA is obligated to promulgate new rules for existing

plants, and it has affirmed its intent to do so. JA.264.

The question is whether Petitioners are harmed by

vacatur of the ACE Rule in favor of a rule to be named

later. And the answer is yes, despite any uncertainty

over exactly what the EPA will do, since no future rule

here could be better for Petitioners. The panel set

aside the ACE Rule because the EPA failed to consider

more aggressive limits based on “systems” above the

source level. The matter was thus remanded not to

backtrack from a rule Respondents already decry as

toothless, but to let the EPA consider going further.

The judgment below is thus akin to elimination of a

regulatory safe harbor, which causes cognizable injury

21

even if the agency’s future enforcement plans remain

unknown. See U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes

Co., 578 U.S. 590, 599-600 (2016).

And for what it is worth, the EPA has not hidden its

agenda. The President has announced a new target—

more aggressive than the CPP’s—to create “a carbon

pollution-free power sector by 2035.” Westmoreland.

Cert.Reply.3 n.4. Of course, the EPA is “at the center

of delivering on this agenda.” Press Release, EPA,

EPA Administrator Regan Announces New Initiatives

to Support Environmental Justice and Climate Action

(Apr. 23, 2021). With new climate legislation stalled,

a CPP on steroids is the only way to reach that goal.

But even if there were legitimate doubt over the

EPA’s plans, it is disingenuous for Respondents to

claim that vacating the ACE Rule for consideration of

a more aggressive approach leaves Petitioners

unharmed. Respondents premised their own standing

to challenge the ACE Rule on the parallel potential for

a more robust replacement: “A ruling that the Act does

not require repeal of the [CPP] would compel EPA …

to consider measures it has found meaningfully limit

CO2.” C.A.NY.Br.29. If that prospect sufficed to give

New York standing to set aside ACE in the first place,

it equally suffices to give Petitioners standing to set

aside the decision below.

To be sure, the EPA could initiate a new rulemaking

to repeal and replace the ACE Rule even absent the

decision below. But the decision below makes doing so

far easier. “An agency may not … disregard rules that

are still on the books,” and must justify a change in

policy if a “prior policy has engendered serious reliance

interests.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556

22

U.S. 502, 515 (2009). Respondents want the decision

below to stay on the books in order to keep ACE off the

books, as that clears the field for a new EPA to begin

its new regulatory onslaught. Once again, Petitioners

suffer harm from that course for the same reason:

Reversing the decision below and reviving ACE would

make it harder for the EPA to flip positions and impose

more burdensome regulations on the coal industry.

Tellingly, even the EPA’s alternative suggestion

that the Court vacate part of the holding below comes

with the caveat that it “should not cause the ACE Rule

to become operative,” even though the panel’s only

basis for setting aside the ACE Rule was the legal

holding that would supposedly be wiped out. SG.Br.23

n.2. This pretzel of a proposal confirms the EPA’s true

goal: to secure a blank slate for a new rule. And

meanwhile, partial vacatur would not remedy either of

Petitioners’ harms from the judgment. It would not

prevent the CPP from springing back into law or the

EPA from bypassing the need to explain its flip-flop.

In any event, because the judgment inflicts cognizable

injuries on Petitioners, the Court should proceed to

decide the question it granted certiorari to resolve.

Finally, none of this amounts to an unripe challenge

to a future rule. This case is about the ACE Rule. The

panel vacated it at Respondents’ urging; Petitioners

ask the Court to reverse. None of the arguments

hinges on what a future rule may say. If that means

the case turns on an “abstract” question about the

scope of the EPA’s authority, that is only because

Respondents prevailed on their claim that the EPA

misunderstood that statutory power. If that was not

too “speculative” for the D.C. Circuit to decide, it is not

too “speculative” for this Court to reverse.

23

And that is exactly what this Court should do. The

EPA’s gestures toward a potential future rule really

amount to a prudential argument for delay. But delay

has its own costs—for the industry, the regulator, and

Congress alike. As this Court recognized by granting

review, now is the time for definitive resolution.

CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the judgment below.

FEBRUARY 2022

Respectfully submitted,

YAAKOV M. ROTH

Counsel of Record

JEFFREY R. JOHNSON

BRINTON LUCAS

JONES DAY

JEFFERY D. UBERSAX

51 Louisiana Ave., NW

KUSHNER & HAMED CO., LPA Washington, DC 20001

(202) 879-3939

1375 E. Ninth St., Ste. 1930

yroth@jonesday.com

Cleveland, OH 44114

CHARLES T. WEHLAND

JONES DAY

77 W. Wacker Dr.

Chicago, IL 60601

Counsel for Petitioner

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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