Reply Brief — West Virginia, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
Supreme Court briefFeb 17, 2022
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Nos. 20-1530, 20-1531, 20-1778, 20-1780
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
WEST VIRGINIA, ET AL.
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
THE NORTH AMERICAN COAL CORPORATION
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
WESTMORELAND MINING HOLDINGS LLC
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
NORTH DAKOTA
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
On Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER THE
NORTH AMERICAN COAL CORPORATION
YAAKOV M. ROTH
Counsel of Record
JEFFREY R. JOHNSON
BRINTON LUCAS
JONES DAY
JEFFERY D. UBERSAX
51 Louisiana Ave., NW
KUSHNER & HAMED CO., LPA Washington, DC 20001
1375 E. Ninth St., Ste. 1930 (202) 879-3939
yroth@jonesday.com
Cleveland, OH 44114
CHARLES T. WEHLAND
JONES DAY
77 W. Wacker Dr.
Chicago, IL 60601
Counsel for Petitioner
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii
INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 3
I.
II.
THE CLEAN AIR ACT CANNOT BEAR THE
PANEL’S OVERREACHING INTERPRETATION .......... 3
A.
This Case Concerns the Proper
Frame for the EPA’s Derivation
of Emission Limits ...................................... 3
B.
Expanding the EPA’s Frame to
the Entire Economy Requires
Unambiguous Text ..................................... 6
C.
The Act’s Text and Structure
Limit the EPA’s Frame to the
Individual Source ..................................... 11
THIS CASE REMAINS JUSTICIABLE ..................... 16
A.
Reinstating the CPP
Harms Petitioners .................................... 17
B.
Invalidation of the ACE Rule
Also Harms Petitioners ............................ 20
CONCLUSION ......................................................... 23
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. HHS,
141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021) .................................... 5, 6, 7
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish,
490 U.S. 605 (1989) .............................................. 18
Bloate v. United States,
559 U.S. 196 (2010) .............................................. 15
Chafin v. Chafin,
568 U.S. 165 (2013) ........................................ 18, 19
City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc.,
455 U.S. 283 (1982) .............................................. 19
Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper,
445 U.S. 326 (1980) .............................................. 18
Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus,
486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1973) .............................. 13
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
556 U.S. 502 (2009) .............................................. 21
Hearth, Patio & Barbecue Ass’n v. EPA,
11 F.4th 791 (D.C. Cir. 2021) ................................. 9
Knox v. SEIU,
567 U.S. 298 (2012) ........................................ 18, 19
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def.,
138 S. Ct. 617 (2018) ............................................ 19
NFIB v. DOL,
142 S. Ct. 661 (2022) ................................ 6, 7, 8, 10
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Nw. Fuel Co. v. Brock,
139 U.S. 216 (1891) .............................................. 18
Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256 (1979) .............................................. 14
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v.
Allstate Ins. Co.,
559 U.S. 393 (2010) .............................................. 14
Sierra Club v. Costle,
657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) .............................. 13
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co.,
578 U.S. 590 (2016) .............................................. 21
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,
462 U.S. 579 (1983) .............................................. 19
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
531 U.S. 457 (2001) ................................................ 3
STATUTES
42 U.S.C. § 7410 .................................................. 15, 16
42 U.S.C. § 7411 .................................................passim
42 U.S.C. § 7412 .................................................. 15, 16
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Press Release, EPA, EPA Administrator
Regan Announces New Initiatives to
Support Environmental Justice and
Climate Action (Apr. 23, 2021) ............................ 21
U.S. Energy Info. Admin.,
Electricity: State Electricity Profiles .................... 17
INTRODUCTION
The State, NGO, and Power Company Respondents
all seem to have forgotten how we got here. The D.C.
Circuit granted their petitions to vacate the ACE Rule.
Respondents filed those petitions because they stood
to benefit from the reinstatement of the CPP or a new
rulemaking under a more robust vision of the EPA’s
authority. To justify that relief, these Respondents
charged that the EPA fundamentally misunderstood
the scope of its power and, as a result, had not
considered sweeping supra-source measures to reduce
emissions on an industry-wide basis. The D.C. Circuit
adopted that reading of the statute and thus set aside
the ACE Rule, including its repeal of the CPP. And
that paved the way for the EPA, now back in these
Respondents’ corner, to declare its intent to write new
rules, on a clean slate, free of the source-specific
constraint it had previously identified in the Act and
embedded in its regulations.
Having prevailed, Respondents now downplay the
judgment below, denying the injuries that it inflicts on
Petitioners. To avoid the merits, they complain that
the scope of the EPA’s authority is too “hypothetical”
or “abstract” to resolve. And Senator Whitehouse goes
so far as to accuse Petitioners of ginning up litigation
to circumvent democracy. But it was Respondents who
sought vacatur of the ACE Rule. That relief harms
Petitioners (who may thus appeal it) for the very same
reasons as it benefits Respondents (who had standing
to seek it). And the “abstract” question presented is
the one Respondents put to the court below. Judicial
review is not a one-way ratchet for the administrative
state. Whether the D.C. Circuit correctly construed
the Act is now for this Court to decide.
2
And that is not a particularly difficult question. All
agree that § 7411 directs the EPA to identify the “best
system of emission reduction.” The dispute is over the
frame for that analysis. As Petitioners see it, the
statutory frame is the “existing source”—the facility
that emits the pollutant and to which the standards of
performance apply. As a matter of text and structure,
it follows that the EPA must find the “best system of
emission reduction” for that source: measures that an
individual facility can take to reduce emissions from
its operations. But the D.C. Circuit reasoned that the
EPA can zoom out from the source and adopt a “best
system” to reduce greenhouse gases for the industry.
That would empower the EPA to impose limits that
could only be met through systemic changes in power
generation, forced subsidization of renewable energy,
and assorted other climate-change measures that have
no real nexus to the plant supposedly being regulated.
Even Respondents do not claim the Clean Air Act
unambiguously supports this broader frame. That is
dispositive, because the EPA’s transformational role
under the panel’s reading cannot be inferred from
ambiguity. The court’s elevation of the EPA—from
making technical findings about which methods best
limit emissions from a plant, to large-scale policy
judgments balancing the economy against climate
change—runs head-long into the major-questions
doctrine. And even on its own terms, the Act’s text and
structure foreclose Respondents’ construction. Telling
a coal plant to shut down in favor of a wind farm is not
a “performance” standard reflecting “achievable”
limits “for” the plant any more than terminating a
worker’s employment is a “performance” plan based on
“achievable” expectations “for” the employee.
3
ARGUMENT
I.
THE CLEAN AIR ACT CANNOT BEAR THE PANEL’S
OVERREACHING INTERPRETATION.
The D.C. Circuit transformed the EPA’s cabined
power to ensure that each existing source operates as
cleanly as practicable into a sweeping authority to
reduce overall emissions by shifting power generation,
shutting down plants, compelling subsidization of
competitors, and imposing measures that operate well
beyond the level of any single source. That is a
fundamentally different type of authority, too broad to
be inferred from mere ambiguity. Yet not even
Respondents claim that the Act unambiguously vested
the EPA with that authority. In fact, its text and
structure point unambiguously the other way.
A. This Case Concerns the Proper Frame for
the EPA’s Derivation of Emission Limits.
1. Throughout their briefing, Respondents pretend
that the issue before the Court is whether a state may
authorize sources to satisfy a standard of performance
through “outside-the-fenceline” measures (like trading
emission credits, planting trees, or investing in solar
farms). SG.Br.26-30; NY.Br.28-31; Power.Br.25. But
the question presented is distinct and antecedent:
whether the EPA may rely on those measures to derive
emission limits that the standards then reflect. That
threshold question (how the limits may be set) does not
control the subsequent one (how states may comply).
Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457,
469-71 (2001) (while the EPA may not consider costs
“in formulating the standards,” states may do so “in
choosing the means” to “implement the standards”).
And only the EPA’s authority is at issue here.
4
Section 7411 contemplates two regulatory steps.
First, the EPA identifies the “best system of emission
reduction” and calculates the “degree of emission
limitation achievable” through its “application.” 42
U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1). Second, the states must establish
“standards of performance” that “reflect[]” that degree
of limitation, and provide for “implementation and
enforcement” of those standards. Id. § 7411(a)(1), (d).
This case concerns the first step: In identifying a best
system, is the EPA limited to reductions “achievable”
by the source, through “application” to the source? The
D.C. Circuit said no; it ruled that the EPA’s system
can include a broader set of higher-level measures.
Reversing that decision would not, however, resolve
whether the states’ “implementation” plans for those
source-level standards may authorize industry-level
measures to show compliance. Respondents’ contrary
argument, in the words of their amici, “confuses the
standard with the means of compliance.” Fmr.Power.
Execs.Br.17. Just because the standards must be
achievable using source-level measures does not mean
they must be achieved using source-level measures.
“The statute says nothing about the measures that
sources may use to comply with the standards.”
JA.133. Nor does that issue trigger federalism and
major-questions canons. And, historically, the Clean
Air Mercury Rule based its limits on available
technology while allowing states to satisfy those limits
using trading. SG.Br.38; NACCO.Br.47-48.
In all events, the question of compliance measures
is not before this Court. While the D.C. Circuit did
vacate a different part of the ACE Rule that limited
state discretion over compliance measures (JA.13135), no Petitioner sought review of that ruling.
5
2. Respondents also attempt to sow confusion about
Petitioners’ position by taking too literally the “fenceline” shorthand and by treating generation-shifting as
a distinct issue. E.g., SG.Br.27, 38. They are overcomplicating things. Petitioners’ point is that the EPA
must identify a “best system” at the source level,
meaning measures that can be taken by that source to
reduce emissions from that source’s normal operations.
That means generation-shifting is beyond the EPA’s
scope, since those measures expand the frame beyond
the source and challenge the premise that the source
will continue to operate. It also means the EPA cannot
just latch onto sources as an excuse to regulate their
owners—e.g., by requiring them to grow trees or invest
in wind energy. None of that reduces emissions from
the source. That missing nexus shows these are not
genuine attempts to regulate a source’s performance.
Cf. Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. HHS, 141 S. Ct. 2485,
2488-89 (2021) (CDC cannot regulate evictions based
on “downstream connection” to disease). The CPP was
full of such artifices, built on the faulty premise that
the analytical frame exceeds any given source.
In describing this dichotomy, “inside-the-fence” is
useful but inexact shorthand. Emission reductions
from using pre-cleaned fuel are achievable by the
source and thus fair game even if the cleaning occurs
elsewhere. SG.Br.38. And greenhouse gas reductions
from demolishing a plant and growing a forest instead
are beyond the EPA’s power, even if it happens on-site.
What matters is whether the limits are achievable by
reducing emissions from the source during normal
operations. If so, the EPA can demand standards that
reflect those best practices. If not, it is up to Congress
to authorize more aggressive regulatory action.
6
B. Expanding the EPA’s Frame to the Entire
Economy Requires Unambiguous Text.
Like the D.C. Circuit, Respondents do not claim the
Act unambiguously authorizes the EPA to set targets
based on a “system” of industry-wide transformations
rather than source-level modifications. But Congress
must “speak clearly when authorizing an agency to
exercise powers of ‘vast economic and political
significance.’ ” Ala. Ass’n, 141 S. Ct. at 2489. Just as
OSHA needed a clear statement to leave the “everyday
exercise” of workplace-safety regulation to “regulate
the hazards of daily life,” NFIB v. DOL, 142 S. Ct. 661,
665 (2022), the EPA needs one to convert technical
review of particular emission-control measures into
reconfiguration of the entire power supply.
1. Respondents try to avoid the major-questions
doctrine by protesting that it is too soon to evaluate
the consequences of the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation.
The Court cannot use the CPP to assess its impact,
because “market-based forces” supposedly effectuated
the same reductions anyway. SG.Br.2, 47. Nor can
the Court “speculat[e]” about whether the EPA might
go “too far” in a future rulemaking (NY.Br.41), without
risking an “advisory opinion[]” (Power.Br.20).
These objections all ignore that the D.C. Circuit set
aside the repeal of the CPP on the ground that the Act
“does not unambiguously bar a system of emission
reduction that includes generation shifting.” JA.118.
This case thus hinges on the scope of the power
Congress conferred on the EPA, not the validity of any
particular exercise of that power. Resolving the
former issue directly implicates the major-questions
doctrine, which demands clear statutory support when
7
agencies make “unprecedented” claims to “expansive”
authority. Ala. Ass’n, 141 S. Ct. at 2489. Indeed,
Respondents’ litigation strategy has teed up the
major-questions doctrine more directly than usual,
precisely because their theory (and thus the decision
below) turns on the scope of the EPA’s authority in
general, not the validity of any regulatory measure in
particular.
2. Respondents next argue that the major-questions
doctrine is not implicated by the parties’ dispute here,
because even inside-the-fenceline measures may have
major consequences, while some outside-the-fenceline
measures could prove trivial. SG.Br.46.
This too misses the point. To repeat, the doctrine
targets claims of expansive authority generally, not
just specific ways it has been deployed. See Ala. Ass’n,
141 S. Ct. at 2489 (asking “what measures” would be
“outside the CDC’s reach” under its “claim of
expansive authority”); NFIB, 142 S. Ct. at 665 (asking
whether OSHA’s position would “significantly expand
[its] regulatory authority”). It is always true that an
agency might exercise its conceded power aggressively
or its claimed power modestly. But the question is
whether the broader interpretation would expand the
agency’s sphere of delegated authority in a politically
or economically significant way. Here, what matters
is that the EPA’s attempt to stray beyond individual
smokestacks toward regulation of the power grid (and
beyond) is a step carrying great political and economic
import, even if the agency might not press the limits
of that power in each case, and even if exercise of its
legitimate authority has real-world impact as well.
8
Critically, Respondents are wrong to suggest there
is no material difference between an agency limited to
source-specific solutions and one empowered to halt
global warming by any means necessary. By zooming
out, the D.C. Circuit fundamentally transformed the
EPA’s role. Instead of making technical judgments
about the costs and benefits of installing a particular
kind of scrubber in a particular plant, the agency must
decide whether, from the viewpoint of the Nation as a
whole, certain kinds of power generation should be
curtailed or eliminated due to the risks of climate
change—not to mention the regulatory options to limit
the demand for electricity. These are tremendously
important, politically freighted questions—like the
propriety of a nationwide vaccine mandate—that fall
well outside the agency’s “sphere of expertise.” NFIB,
142 S. Ct. at 665. If Congress wants to hand them off
to the agency, it must (at minimum) do so clearly.
Relatedly, the EPA plays games by downplaying its
role as “intermediate” or “interstitial.” SG.Br.36, 45.
True, the agency does not directly order adoption of its
best system—unless states fail to get with the
program, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(2). But while states
otherwise retain discretion over compliance measures,
see supra at 3-4, the EPA’s “system” sets the floor by
defining the required reductions that states and their
sources must meet. Unless the system is premised on
source-level measures and the reductions “achievable”
by their application to a source, some sources will have
to scale back or close. As the CPP thus admitted, its
limits could be achieved only through generationshifting among owners of multiple sources. JA.579-80.
In practical effect, then, a supra-source system does
mandate supra-source compliance measures.
9
3. Respondents also insist the Act already “guard[s]
against … transformative consequences.” SG.Br.49.
The EPA must “account” for “cost[s],” “nonair quality
health,” “energy requirements,” and “environmental
impact” in determining whether its best system “has
been adequately demonstrated.” 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a).
But those considerations do not in any way close the
new regulatory horizons opened by the decision below.
Nor do they meaningfully limit the EPA’s exercise
of power more generally. “[B]est” is in the eye of the
beholder; it is hard to see how a minimally competent
EPA could be overturned for failing to “account” for
these factors. If doing so led administrators to forego
certain measures in the past (SG.Br.49), that was
agency discretion, not statutory compulsion. Indeed,
Respondents’ reassurances are belied by their silence
about most of the hypotheticals—like carbon taxes,
electric-car subsidies, and demand-side regulation of
electricity use. Respondents and their amici believe
that, without drastic emission cuts, climate change
will cause “catastrophic” harm and fatal “ ‘disasters,’ ”
“flooding” cities, causing “tens of thousands of deaths
per year,” subjecting “millions” to “health” problems,
and perhaps triggering “political crises” or “state
failure.” NGO.Br.11; Scientists.Br.5, 27-30, 33; Nat’l.
Park.Br.8; Medical.Br.5. Against all this calamity,
“cost” and “energy requirements” would lose every day
of the week. And while the EPA denies that it could
regulate “homes” under § 7411, the D.C. Circuit
upheld such a standard last year, observing that while
“wood stoves” keep many “American homes” warm,
their emissions threaten “grave health consequences”
to “major portions of the population.” Hearth, Patio &
Barbecue Ass’n v. EPA, 11 F.4th 791, 795-96 (2021).
10
4. Finally, Respondents claim that, unlike the novel
assertions of agency power that have triggered the
major-questions doctrine elsewhere, the D.C. Circuit’s
interpretation is “supported by historical precedent.”
SG.Br.49. Their examples prove otherwise.
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative is a
“cooperative effort” among states to reduce emissions;
it says nothing about the EPA’s power. The Acid Rain
Program at least involves federal legislation, but it
proves Congress speaks specifically when it envisions
drastic industry-wide measures such as capping sulfur
dioxide emissions and creating a system of tradeable
credits. NACCO.Br.42-43. The contrast between that
solid statutory foundation and the EPA’s present
attempt to discover world-altering power in dictionary
definitions of the word “system” is striking.
That leaves the Clean Air Mercury Rule. That rule
merely illustrates, however, that even though the EPA
must stay “inside the fence” when setting achievable
emission limits, states may venture beyond it when
authorizing compliance measures in “implementation”
plans. See supra at 3-4. In any event, this single (and
vacated) agency action from nearly twenty years ago
hardly establishes that the CPP and its ilk fall within
the EPA’s wheelhouse. If OSHA’s long history of “fire
[and] sanitation regulation[s]” could not ward off the
doctrine when it tried to pass a vaccine mandate
targeting “the hazards of daily life,” NFIB, 142 S. Ct.
at 665, then the Clean Air Mercury Rule’s sourceachievable metrics surely cannot support the EPA’s
desire to refashion the Nation’s daily supply (and use)
of electricity without clear congressional support.
11
C. The Act’s Text and Structure Limit the
EPA’s Frame to the Individual Source.
Canons aside, the statute itself compels the same
conclusion. With the statutory definitions inserted,
§ 7411(d) requires performance standards “which
reflec[t] the degree of emission limitation achievable
through the application of the best system of emission
reduction for any building, structure, facility, or
installation.” By any fair reading, that contemplates
a technical EPA determination about the measures a
particular facility could take to reduce emissions from
its own operations—i.e., filters on smokestacks, not
fundamental transformation of how Americans power
their lives. Respondents offer only a grab-bag of
debater’s points in response.
1. Respondents begin with a divide-and-conquer
approach, urging this Court to treat (a)(1)’s definition
of “standard of performance” and (d)(1)’s use of that
term as entirely independent. They place great weight
on the word “system” in (a)(1), while dismissing the
operative text in (d)(1) as bearing only on the “States,
not EPA.” SG.Br.31-33; see also Power.Br.27-29, 45.
This is the statutory-interpretation equivalent of
missing the forest for its trees—and then, ironically,
using the trees as license to regulate the forest.
It makes no sense to read the word “system”—or the
rest of the (a)(1) definition—in isolation. Rather, “as
EPA acknowledged when it issued the [CPP], the fact
that States must ultimately establish standards of
performance ‘for existing sources,’ 42 U.S.C.
§ 7411(d)(1), imposes ‘significant constraints on the
types of measures that may be included’ ” in the
agency’s chosen “system.” NY.Br.34 (quoting JA.733-
12
34). The EPA also recognized that “read in context,”
(a)(1)’s use of “achievable” and “application” limited
the agency’s range to tools “implementable by the
sources themselves.” JA.737. While the CPP sought
to evade these strictures by collapsing the distinction
between “source[s]” and their “owner[s],” even it
rejected the notion that a best system “includes
anything whatsoever that reduces emissions.” JA.737
& n.472. Respondents, like the D.C. Circuit, now
appear to have bulldozed even these guardrails.
2. Respondents ultimately contend the EPA may
zoom out and adopt any measure that operates “across
the board” and “in the aggregate.” SG.Br.35-36; see
also Power.Br.43 (arguing that “application” of best
system is “to the source category”). Again, not even
the CPP went that far, because this approach is so outof-step with the statutory structure and focus.
The CPP reasoned that because its “standards must
apply to the affected sources” under § 7411(d), it could
not require “actions taken by affected sources that do
not result in emission reductions from the affected
sources” themselves. JA.803. Telling source owners
to engage in “the planting of forests to sequester CO2,”
for instance, was out of bounds. Id. But the EPA and
most of its allies have evidently abandoned that limit
today. Rather, the agency’s current view is “[i]f one
source achieves compliance by reducing its emissions
and another by purchasing allowances, the ‘system’ is
still being applied to both” and hence permissible.
SG.Br.35. Replace “purchasing allowances” with
“planting trees,” “erecting solar panels,” or “donating
to the Sierra Club” and the point is the same.
13
This theory is at war with the statutory text and
structure. Respondents never explain how a standard
premised on a plant’s closure could be a “performance”
standard “for” that source—any more than a plan
directing a disabled student to drop out could be an
“educational” plan “for” (or “achievable” by) him. Nor
do they grapple with the fact that the EPA’s authority
over sources does not extend to commandeering their
owners to engage in unrelated climate mitigation. Nor
do they supply a reason why Congress would have
bothered to distinguish new from existing sources if
the EPA had unfettered power to regulate plants from
either category into oblivion. NACCO.Br.34, 40-42.
Respondents instead observe that the EPA looks at
factors like “ ‘cost’ ” and “ ‘energy requirements’ ” on a
broader scale. SG.Br.36; NY.Br.26. But even if that
were so, it does not suggest that the EPA can also set
the “ ‘degree of emission limitation achievable’ ” at the
highest level of generality, and thereby decree which
industries live or die. SG.Br.36. These factors come
into play in deciding whether a particular “system”
has been “adequately demonstrated,” which is distinct
from whether an emission “standard” is “achievable.”
Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 433
(D.C. Cir. 1973). Only “[a]fter” the EPA has identified
“emission levels that are ‘achievable’ ” by the source
can it then consider, “on the grand scale,” whether a
given system “represents the best balance of economic,
environmental, and energy considerations.” Sierra
Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1981). For
example, the ACE Rule accepted natural-gas co-firing
as “feasible,” yet declined to incorporate that measure
due to doubts that it could be “implemented on a
nationwide scale at [a] reasonable cost.” JA.1839-40.
14
In a similar vein, Respondents contend that since
any standard will have “some generation-shifting
effect,” there is no basis for distinguishing measures
that “will predictably cause some generation shifting”
from ones adopted “because of” such effects. SG.Br.3940; see also Power.Br.41. But that “mistakes what” a
standard “regulates for its incidental effects.” Shady
Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559
U.S. 393, 412 n.10 (2010) (plurality). Virtually any
emission standard will also have some effect on the
economy, but no one thinks that means the EPA can
use § 7411 to set monetary policy. Here as elsewhere,
it matters whether the government takes “a particular
course of action … ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’
its adverse effects.” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
And “statutory language” (SG.Br.40) does back up
this commonsense distinction.
Only the most
Machiavellian of bureaucrats would describe an
emission limit aimed at shutting down a disfavored
plant as a “performance” standard “for” the source—
just as only the most conniving of bosses would say a
project designed to get rid of an unwanted subordinate
was a “performance” plan “for” that employee.
3. With § 7411 against them, Respondents quickly
move on, scouring other provisions for “limiting
language” to contrast with the operative text here—or,
contradictorily, for “more specific” language showing
that Congress was comfortable with industry-wide
schemes elsewhere. SG.Br.33, 36; see also, e.g.,
Power.Br.30-35. While this grand tour through the
Clean Air Act may be of interest to environmental-law
aficionados, it offers no support for Respondents’
interpretation.
15
As for “limiting language,” the bulk of examples
involve specific technological solutions, such as “the
retrofit application of the best system of continuous
emission reduction.” SG.Br.32-33. But nobody says
§ 7411 confines the EPA to technological measures; it
can also consider methods, materials, and more.
NACCO.Br.43. The flaw in the D.C. Circuit’s reading
is that it would permit standards that a source cannot
itself achieve in any of those ways. Id.
Respondents also contend that § 7412(d) lists
hazardous-pollutant measures that are “restricted …
to source-specific controls.” Power.Br.35. That is not
accurate, though, as § 7412(d) authorizes measures
“including, but not limited to” these source-specific
tools. This provision therefore cuts the other way, as
Congress in § 7411 “declined to use an expansive or
illustrative term such as ‘including.’ ” Bloate v. United
States, 559 U.S. 196, 207 (2010).
Doing a complete reversal in the inference they seek
to draw, Respondents next point out that the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards Program allows states
to include “marketable permits” or “auctions” in their
compliance plans. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A); SG.Br.
31; NY.Br.26-27. All that shows is that Congress
knows how to provide that states may use such tools.
It does not suggest Congress empowered the EPA to
dragoon states into adopting these measures under
§ 7411—which contains no analogous language and is
focused on the source rather than the pollutant.
So too for Congress’s creation of a cap-and-trade
program to eliminate acid rain. Respondents’ only
explanation for the absence of similar language in
§ 7411 is that Congress “directly instituted a federal
16
trading system” to combat acid rain, whereas the
EPA’s selection of a “best system” here is just “an
intermediate step.” SG.Br.36-37. But there is no
meaningful difference between directly mandating a
cap-and-trade program and setting limits that states
can meet only by doing so. See supra at 8.
To the extent Respondents’ discussion of § 7411’s
neighbors is relevant at all, it is in failing to identify a
single example of the EPA using its authority under
§ 7410 or § 7412 to set a standard that a source could
not achieve by itself. That is telling, because § 7411(d)
serves as a regulatory backstop for the rare pollutant
not already covered by these programs. The idea that
Congress gave the EPA more power in this gap-filling
provision is something that could survive only in a
bureaucrat’s imagination.
II. THIS CASE REMAINS JUSTICIABLE.
Given their weakness on the merits, Respondents
opposed certiorari by contending that a partial stay of
the mandate meant there was no longer a live
controversy. The Court granted review, implicitly
rejecting those arguments. Respondents nonetheless
return with the same muddle of standing, mootness,
and ripeness objections.
None of those doctrines obstructs merits review.
Petitioners have standing to challenge the judgment
for the same reasons Respondents had standing to seek
it: Revival of the CPP would have winners and losers.
A temporary stay of that relief does not moot the case.
And at minimum, the orders below impose harm by
inviting the EPA to issue more burdensome rules on a
blank slate. Having secured that relief, Respondents
cannot now deny its significance.
17
A. Reinstating the CPP Harms Petitioners.
When states and industry first challenged the CPP
(resulting in this Court’s stay), nobody doubted their
standing. After all, the CPP imposed legal duties on
states, and its strict emission targets threatened the
existence of the already-struggling coal industry. The
judgment below vacates repeal of the CPP, imbuing it
anew with the force of law. Petitioners therefore are
again threatened with straightforward, tangible harm
from the judgment below.
Respondents argue that things have changed. First,
the NGO Respondents claim that the CPP is null as a
practical matter because its targets have already been
satisfied. Second, the EPA suggests it has shielded the
judgment from review by obtaining an order partially
staying the mandate pending a new rulemaking in the
future. The first theory is factually mistaken, while
the second is legally misguided.
1. The NGOs are simply wrong that the CPP’s goals
have been fully satisfied. The aggregate decline in
power-sector emissions projected under the CPP may
have already occurred, but many states—including
West Virginia and North Dakota—remain above their
CPP targets and are not projected to meet them by
2030. JA.1696 (map); JA.1662-63 (CPP targets); U.S.
Energy Info. Admin., Electricity: State Electricity
Profiles, https://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/ (2020
emission data). Overturning the CPP repeal thus
imposes concrete burdens on these states, and in turn
on the coal industry from reductions in demand. And
the fact that the CPP deadlines to submit state plans
have passed (NGO.Br.28) only exacerbates the harm
by making state compliance impossible.
18
Had the CPP truly become obsolete, Respondents
could not and would not have sued to revive it. Rather,
per the Power Company Respondents, replacing CPP
with the ACE Rule “increas[ed] the competitiveness of
coal-fired units,” thereby putting “additional pressure
on” coal’s “competi[tors].” C.A.Power.Br.6. That is
still true, and it is why Petitioners may seek to renew
that state of affairs through reversal.
2. The EPA does not dispute that overturning the
CPP’s repeal would harm Petitioners, but claims that
its motion to stay the mandate precludes them from
challenging that relief. Such “maneuvers designed to
insulate a decision from review by this Court,”
however, “must be viewed with a critical eye.” Knox v.
SEIU, 567 U.S. 298, 305 (2012). The EPA cites
nothing suggesting that a stay can defeat jurisdiction.
Both the law and common sense dictate otherwise.
As the EPA notes (SG.Br.15), appellate jurisdiction
turns on whether the lower court’s “judgment” harms
the party seeking review. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490
U.S. 605, 612, 618 (1989); see also Deposit Guar. Nat’l
Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980) (framing
inquiry as whether party seeking review is “aggrieved
by the judgment”). Here, the D.C. Circuit’s judgment
vacated the ACE Rule, including its “embedded repeal
of the [CPP].” JA.215. Petitioners are therefore
“asking for typical appellate relief”—that this Court
“reverse” the decision below and “undo what it has
done.” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 173 (2013); see
also Nw. Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U.S. 216, 219 (1891)
(courts always retain “[j]urisdiction to correct what
ha[s] been done”).
19
The panel’s later order that partially suspended its
mandate as to CPP repeal pending a new rulemaking
(JA.270) does not alter the adverse “judgment” under
review. If a panel’s issuance of the mandate, which
changes the facts on the ground, could not defeat
jurisdiction, United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462
U.S. 579, 581 n.2 (1983), then surely a temporary
preservation of the status quo cannot either.
While the EPA suggest that the stay “mooted” this
matter (SG.Br.17), a “case becomes moot only when it
is impossible for a court to grant ‘any effectual relief
whatever’ to the prevailing party.” Knox, 567 U.S. at
307. Here, reversal would prevent resuscitation of the
CPP. The EPA’s intent to promulgate a new rule may
make that resuscitation “uncertain” to occur, but
“uncertainty does not typically render cases moot.”
Chafin, 568 U.S. at 175. That must be the law, since
if the Court were to dismiss and the EPA chose to stick
with the CPP after all, the stay would expire, the CPP
would return, and Petitioners would lack recourse.
Moreover, now that the EPA supports the judgment
below, its stay motion amounts to “voluntary cessation
of a challenged practice,” which “does not deprive a
federal court of its power to determine the legality of
the practice.” City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle,
Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982). Nor does the EPA’s
intent to replace the CPP with some cousin, likely on
the same statutory understanding, moot Petitioners’
challenge to the judgment reviving it. Even a proposed
rule that “would rescind” the one under review cannot
moot a case, since the challenged rule, even if stayed,
“remains on the books.” Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of
Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 627 n.5 (2018). The EPA’s mere
promise to issue a new rule surely cannot suffice.
20
Perhaps recognizing that the stay does not truly
eliminate the harms to Petitioners from the judgment,
the EPA proposes in the alternative to partially vacate
the panel’s holding. But this offer only exposes the
flaws in the EPA’s theory. On its view, a stay defeats
standing, which in turn compels vacatur. So staying a
judgment ends up wiping it out. That bootstrapping
cannot be right.
B. Invalidation of the ACE Rule Also Harms
Petitioners.
Even if there were no chance of the CPP returning
to law, Petitioners would still have standing to
challenge the D.C. Circuit’s vacatur of the ACE Rule.
That vacatur imposes independent harm by giving the
EPA a blank slate to write a new rule consonant with
the broader power conferred by the court below.
Respondents argue that the vacatur of ACE does not
support standing, because no rule is even better for
Petitioners. True, but no rule is not on the table. The
EPA is obligated to promulgate new rules for existing
plants, and it has affirmed its intent to do so. JA.264.
The question is whether Petitioners are harmed by
vacatur of the ACE Rule in favor of a rule to be named
later. And the answer is yes, despite any uncertainty
over exactly what the EPA will do, since no future rule
here could be better for Petitioners. The panel set
aside the ACE Rule because the EPA failed to consider
more aggressive limits based on “systems” above the
source level. The matter was thus remanded not to
backtrack from a rule Respondents already decry as
toothless, but to let the EPA consider going further.
The judgment below is thus akin to elimination of a
regulatory safe harbor, which causes cognizable injury
21
even if the agency’s future enforcement plans remain
unknown. See U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes
Co., 578 U.S. 590, 599-600 (2016).
And for what it is worth, the EPA has not hidden its
agenda. The President has announced a new target—
more aggressive than the CPP’s—to create “a carbon
pollution-free power sector by 2035.” Westmoreland.
Cert.Reply.3 n.4. Of course, the EPA is “at the center
of delivering on this agenda.” Press Release, EPA,
EPA Administrator Regan Announces New Initiatives
to Support Environmental Justice and Climate Action
(Apr. 23, 2021). With new climate legislation stalled,
a CPP on steroids is the only way to reach that goal.
But even if there were legitimate doubt over the
EPA’s plans, it is disingenuous for Respondents to
claim that vacating the ACE Rule for consideration of
a more aggressive approach leaves Petitioners
unharmed. Respondents premised their own standing
to challenge the ACE Rule on the parallel potential for
a more robust replacement: “A ruling that the Act does
not require repeal of the [CPP] would compel EPA …
to consider measures it has found meaningfully limit
CO2.” C.A.NY.Br.29. If that prospect sufficed to give
New York standing to set aside ACE in the first place,
it equally suffices to give Petitioners standing to set
aside the decision below.
To be sure, the EPA could initiate a new rulemaking
to repeal and replace the ACE Rule even absent the
decision below. But the decision below makes doing so
far easier. “An agency may not … disregard rules that
are still on the books,” and must justify a change in
policy if a “prior policy has engendered serious reliance
interests.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556
22
U.S. 502, 515 (2009). Respondents want the decision
below to stay on the books in order to keep ACE off the
books, as that clears the field for a new EPA to begin
its new regulatory onslaught. Once again, Petitioners
suffer harm from that course for the same reason:
Reversing the decision below and reviving ACE would
make it harder for the EPA to flip positions and impose
more burdensome regulations on the coal industry.
Tellingly, even the EPA’s alternative suggestion
that the Court vacate part of the holding below comes
with the caveat that it “should not cause the ACE Rule
to become operative,” even though the panel’s only
basis for setting aside the ACE Rule was the legal
holding that would supposedly be wiped out. SG.Br.23
n.2. This pretzel of a proposal confirms the EPA’s true
goal: to secure a blank slate for a new rule. And
meanwhile, partial vacatur would not remedy either of
Petitioners’ harms from the judgment. It would not
prevent the CPP from springing back into law or the
EPA from bypassing the need to explain its flip-flop.
In any event, because the judgment inflicts cognizable
injuries on Petitioners, the Court should proceed to
decide the question it granted certiorari to resolve.
Finally, none of this amounts to an unripe challenge
to a future rule. This case is about the ACE Rule. The
panel vacated it at Respondents’ urging; Petitioners
ask the Court to reverse. None of the arguments
hinges on what a future rule may say. If that means
the case turns on an “abstract” question about the
scope of the EPA’s authority, that is only because
Respondents prevailed on their claim that the EPA
misunderstood that statutory power. If that was not
too “speculative” for the D.C. Circuit to decide, it is not
too “speculative” for this Court to reverse.
23
And that is exactly what this Court should do. The
EPA’s gestures toward a potential future rule really
amount to a prudential argument for delay. But delay
has its own costs—for the industry, the regulator, and
Congress alike. As this Court recognized by granting
review, now is the time for definitive resolution.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the judgment below.
FEBRUARY 2022
Respectfully submitted,
YAAKOV M. ROTH
Counsel of Record
JEFFREY R. JOHNSON
BRINTON LUCAS
JONES DAY
JEFFERY D. UBERSAX
51 Louisiana Ave., NW
KUSHNER & HAMED CO., LPA Washington, DC 20001
(202) 879-3939
1375 E. Ninth St., Ste. 1930
yroth@jonesday.com
Cleveland, OH 44114
CHARLES T. WEHLAND
JONES DAY
77 W. Wacker Dr.
Chicago, IL 60601
Counsel for Petitioner
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.