Amicus Curiae Brief — West Virginia, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

Supreme Court briefDec 20, 2021

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No. 20-1530

In the Supreme Court of the United States

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

BRIEF OF KENTU CKY, ARIZONA,

MISSISSIPPI, AND NEW HAMPSHIRE AS

AMICI CURIAE SU PPORTING PETITIONERS

DANIEL CAMERON

Attorney General of

Kentucky

BARRY L. DUNN

Deputy Attorney

General

MATTHEW F. KUHN

Solicitor General

BRETT R. NOLAN

Principal Deputy

Solicitor General

*Counsel of record

Office of the Kentucky

ALEXANDER Y. MAGERA

Assistant Solicitor

Attorney General

700 Capital Avenue, Ste. 118 General

Frankfort, KY 40601

(502) 696-5300

Brett.Nolan@ky.gov

Counsel for Amici Curiae

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE ..............................1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................1

ARGUMENT ................................................................3

I.

Regulating energy and utility markets is

primarily and historically a job for the

States, not the federal government ..................5

II.

The presumption against disrupting the

federal-state balance of power decisively

weighs against the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of Section 111(d) .....................................9

CONCLUSION ..........................................................15

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum.

Servs.,

141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021) (per curiam) ........... 10, 11, 15

Alden v. Maine,

527 U.S. 706 (1999) .......................................... 11, 12

Ark. Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Ark. Public Serv. Comm’n,

461 U.S. 375 (1983) .............................................. 5, 7

Bond v. United States,

572 U.S. 844 (2014) ................................ 7, 10, 12, 13

Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv.

Comm’n of N.Y.,

447 U.S. 557 (1980) .................................................. 7

Clark v. Martinez,

543 U.S. 371 (2005) .......................................... 12, 13

Conn. Dep’t of Public Utility Control v. F.E.R.C.,

569 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 2009) .................................. 8

F.E.R.C. v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n,

577 U.S. 260 (2016) ........................................ 7, 8, 13

Frost v. Corp. Comm’n,

278 U.S. 515 (1929) .............................................. 6, 8

Gregory v. Ashcroft,

501 U.S. 452 (1991) ............................................ 2, 10

Munn v. Illinois,

94 U.S. 113 (1876) .................................................... 6

iii

Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius,

567 U.S. 519 (2012) .......................................... 12, 13

New York v. F.E.R.C.,

535 U.S. 1 (2002) ...................................................... 9

New York v. United States,

505 U.S. 144 (1992) .................................................. 4

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.

Conservation & Dev. Comm’n,

461 U.S. 190 (1983) .................................. 6, 9, 14, 15

Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n

of Ind.,

332 U.S. 507 (1947) .................................................. 7

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,

331 U.S. 218 (1947) ............................................ 9, 10

Saenz v. Roe,

526 U.S. 489 (1999) ................................................ 12

U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Preservation

Ass’n,

140 S. Ct. 1837 (2020) ............................ 5, 10, 13, 14

Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,

573 U.S. 302 (2014) ................................................ 10

Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58 (1989) .............................................. 9, 10

Statutes

16 U.S.C. §§ 791a et seq. .............................................. 7

16 U.S.C. § 824(b) ........................................................ 8

42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) .................................................. 8

iv

42 U.S.C. § 7411 .......................................................... 4

42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) .................................................. 4

42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B) ............................................. 4

42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) ................................................ 1, 14

42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1).................................................. 4

Fla. Admin. Code. 25-14.001 ..................................... 15

Fla. Stat. § 350.011.................................................... 15

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 278.020 ............................................ 14

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 278.040(2) ........................................ 15

Other Authorities

John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under

the Clean Air Act, 54 Maryland L. Rev. 1183

(1995) .................................................................... 8, 9

EPA’s Clean Power Plan: An Economic Impact

Analysis, Energy Ventures Analysis (Nov. 13,

2015), https://perma.cc/4UKG-NY7B .................... 15

The Federalist No. 45 ................................................ 12

Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism &

Natural Res. Law, 14 N.Y.U. Env’t L. J. 179

(2005) ........................................................................ 8

Richard F. Hirsh, Emergence of Electrical

Utilities in America, Smithsonian Institution

(2002), https://perma.cc/ER77-72XA ................... 5, 6

William K. Jones, Origins of the Certificate of

Public Convenience and Necessity:

v

Developments in the States, 1870-1920, 79

Colum. L. Rev. 426 (1979) ........................................ 6

1

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE

This case is about whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the authority to usurp the

traditional police powers of the States to regulate utilities and the intrastate energy market. How this Court

answers that question will affect the amici States in

two important ways.

Narrowly, the amici States—like the State Petitioners—will bear the brunt of any regulatory action

from the EPA that requires significant generation

shifting from coal-fired fuel to renewable resources.

After all, the statutory provision at issue, 42 U.S.C.

§ 7411(d), puts the burden on the States to comply

with the EPA’s rule, and it is the States that must ensure their citizens maintain access to reliable and affordable energy during a destabilizing shift to whichever not-yet-established sources end up replacing coalfired fuel.

Broadly, the amici States have a strong interest in

protecting their historic police powers from unnecessary federal interference. How this Court resolves the

statutory question here could impact countless other

attempts by federal agencies to wield little-known

laws to intrude on the traditional powers of the States.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Constitution strikes a delicate balance between the power of the States and the federal government. The federal government’s authority is supreme

2

but limited, while the States retain broad police powers that must yield only when preempted by an otherwise lawful act of Congress.

This structural balance requires courts to exercise

caution before interpreting federal statutes to intrude

on the police power of the States. As this Court has

explained, “[i]t is incumbent upon the federal courts to

be certain of Congress’ intent before finding that federal law overrides this balance.” Gregory v. Ashcroft,

501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991). To that end, courts require

Congress to use exceedingly clear language before authorizing an intrusion on the authority that historically rests with the States. And from criminal law to

landlord-tenant relations, this Court has repeatedly

applied this statutory canon to prevent unnecessary

(and perhaps inadvertent) conflict between State and

federal power.

One such realm of historic State power is the authority to regulate utilities and the intrastate energy

market. The States have traditionally been the frontline regulators within this industry. From regulating

the size of the energy market more broadly to the rates

that utilities may charge their customers, the States

have exercised their general police power—a power

the federal government lacks—to ensure that their citizens have reliable and affordable electricity.

The D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of Section 111(d)

fundamentally disrupts the States’ authority in this

area and thus cannot be upheld unless the Clean Air

Act makes that power exceedingly clear. It does not.

3

The textual gymnastics that the D.C. Circuit relied on

below to explain the meaning of Section 111(d) defy

basic rules of grammar and statutory interpretation.

The decision required ignoring the difference between

plural and singular terms, redefining already-existing

terms, and stretching the ordinary meaning of language beyond its breaking point. But most importantly, it did all of this in a way that undermines

the purpose of Section 111(d), which is to allow the

States to custom fit the appropriate standards of performance for the already-existing power generators

that are necessary to maintain a stable and affordable

energy supply.

Affirming the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of Section 111(d) and restoring the Clean Power Plan would

lead to devastating economic effects for States like

Kentucky that depend on the abundant and low-cost

coal-powered energy as a primary source of electricity.

But more fundamentally, allowing a federal agency to

disrupt the States’ traditional police power through a

novel interpretation of an ancillary provision of a federal statute undermines the structural features of our

Constitution that make America what it is.

ARGUMENT

This case is about whether the Clean Air Act

(CAA) grants the EPA authority to regulate the coal

industry out of existence. The statute plainly does no

such thing.

4

Section 111 of the CAA grants the EPA and the

States a mix of authority to regulate certain emissions

from stationary power sources. 42 U.S.C. § 7411. For

new sources (i.e., power plants that have not yet been

built), the EPA has broad authority to establish emission limits by adopting a “standard of performance” for

each source category. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1), (b)(1)(B).

But for existing sources—power plants and other energy sources that are already integral to a State’s

power grid—the CAA grants the States the primary

authority to set those same standards. Id.

§ 7411(d)(1). The result is the kind of cooperative federalism that has become a hallmark of energy and environmental regulation in the United States. See New

York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1992).

Congress grants the EPA some power, while preserving or extending other authority directly to the States.

The dispute now before the Court is whether Section 111(d) authorizes the EPA to impose sweeping

emission standards with the intent and effect of shutting down existing, coal-fired power plants that are

otherwise critical to the energy grid in many States.

Under President Obama, the EPA asserted precisely

that kind of authority based on a novel reading of what

is an otherwise ancillary provision of the CAA. And

the D.C. Circuit agreed. But that reading of Section

111(d) would obliterate the careful balance the CAA

struck between State and federal power, and it would

do so at the expense of the historic powers of the State.

5

Textually, the D.C. Circuit’s reading of Section

111(d) is indefensible. But at most this is a close call.

And that’s a problem for the lower court’s expansive

reading of the EPA’s authority because regulating

utilities and the energy market is a power that historically belongs to the States. This Court has made clear

that Congress cannot “significantly alter the balance

between federal and state power” without “exceedingly clear language.” U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture

River Preservation Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. 1837, 1849–50

(2020). Yet nowhere in Section 111(d) is there anything resembling “exceedingly clear” language authorizing the EPA to engage in a wholesale restructuring

of the existing energy sector.

I. Regulating energy and utility markets is primarily and historically a job for the States,

not the federal government.

1. Regulating energy is one of those issues that

has long belonged to the States. See Ark. Elec. Co-op.

Corp. v. Ark. Public Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 377

(1983).

Thomas Edison built the first centralized power

plant in the late nineteenth century. See Richard F.

Hirsh, Emergence of Electrical Utilities in America,

Smithsonian Institution (2002), https://perma.cc/E

R77-72XA. Soon after, the market for electricity took

off. Businesses looking to capitalize on the new industry “sought franchises from municipal governments to

build power stations that would dot city landscapes.”

Id. And because most customers “needed to be within

one mile of a generating plant to receive power,” in the

6

beginning cities were “populated by numerous power

plants” owned by different companies. Id.

It is not hard to guess what happened next. Economies of scale took over, and consolidation became the

new game. Id. Natural monopolies emerged, and with

them, the need for some measure of regulatory control.

Id. But where should that regulation come from? It

started locally and soon moved to the States. Id. While

some municipal governments opted for wholly owned

utility companies, by 1914 “state regulation of utilities

became commonplace” with at least 45 States having

enacted laws providing “oversight of electric utilities.”

Id.

State regulation mostly covered the expected

ground. Like common carriers and other public goods,

see Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125–26 (1876), the

States historically required power companies “to serve

all customers without discrimination” and charge only

reasonable rates, Hirsh, supra 5. States also regulated

the “[n]eed for new power facilities, their economic feasibility, and rates and services.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.

v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461

U.S. 190, 205 (1983). With few exceptions, “these economic aspects of electrical generation have been regulated for many years and in great detail by the states.”

Id. at 206; see also William K. Jones, Origins of the

Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity: Developments in the States, 1870-1920, 79 Colum. L. Rev.

426, 454–55, 458–75 (1979).

Energy regulation falls neatly within the States’

broader police power. States have long regulated oth-

7

erwise private property “clothed with a public interest” that “affect[s] the community at large.” Munn, 94

U.S. at 126. Electric utilities are no different. See Frost

v. Corp. Comm’n, 278 U.S. 515, 534 (1929) (Brandeis,

J., dissenting); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric

Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,

569 (1980) (recognizing the “clear and substantial governmental interest” in making sure “that rates be fair

and efficient”). And unlike the federal government,

“[t]he States have broad authority to enact legislation

for the public good.” Bond v. United States, 572 U.S.

844, 854 (2014).

2. The federal government jumped into the energy

game in the mid-twentieth century when Congress enacted the Federal Power Act of 1935 (FPA). See 16

U.S.C. §§ 791a et seq. Not surprisingly, this initial

move into the States’ historic domain was done carefully.

The FPA only allowed the federal government to

regulate the interstate aspects of energy sales (primarily wholesale transactions and distribution). This

preserved the historic role of the States over the intrastate (or retail) energy market. See Ark. Elec. Co-op

Corp., 461 U.S. at 378–79. As this Court explained,

that jurisdictional line “was deliberate.” Panhandle E.

Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Ind., 332 U.S.

507, 516 (1947). Congress initiated the federal government’s reach into the energy market slowly and with

significant deference toward the traditional authority

of the States. And it has continued to “maintain[] a

zone of exclusive state jurisdiction” over “within-state

wholesale sales or . . . retail energy sales.” F.E.R.C. v.

8

Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 266–67 (2016)

(“EPSA”).

There is no doubt that the federal government’s

reach into the energy market has expanded significantly since Congress first enacted the FPA. The

Clean Water Act allows the federal government to regulate utilities through controls over water quality. The

same is true for emissions under the CAA. Yet even

though these pollution-control laws “greatly scaled

back” State autonomy, the “states continue to wield

considerable regulatory authority.” John P. Dwyer,

The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act,

54 Maryland L. Rev. 1183, 1190 (1995). Rather than

trying to preempt the field through an expansive interpretation of its Commerce Clause power, Congress

has made environmental regulation “fertile ground”

for “cooperative federalism.” See Robert L. Fischman,

Cooperative Federalism & Natural Res. Law, 14

N.Y.U. Env’t L. J. 179, 188 (2005). As even the CAA

makes clear, “air pollution prevention . . . and air pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 7401(a)(3).

Despite expanding federal power, consider what

parts of the utility and energy market the States still

retain exclusive (or near exclusive) authority over. The

States have control over retail electricity sales. See

EPSA, 577 U.S. at 279 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)).

They “retain the right to forbid new entrants from

providing new capacity” within their State borders,

Conn. Dep’t of Public Utility Control v. F.E.R.C., 569

F.3d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2009), just as they could a cen-

9

tury ago, see Frost, 278 U.S. at 534 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). And the States continue to maintain “authority over utility generation and resource portfolios.”

New York v. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1, 24 (2002). That

means the States today remain the primary regulators

over the utilities that produce and distribute energy to

their citizens.

There are plenty of good reasons for Congress to

have decided not to preempt the entire field of energy

regulation. The federal government, for example,

likely “needs state bureaucracies (with their technical

and administrative resources) and state politicians

(with their political and budgetary support) to achieve

its environmental goals.” Dwyer, supra 8 at 1190. The

EPA is not equipped to manage retail energy distribution at the local level. Yet whatever the reason may

be, Congress has intervened in only discrete aspects of

the utility market, and it thus continues to legislate

against the backdrop of “a field in which the States

have traditionally operated” and continue to operate

today. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 205.

II. The presumption against disrupting the federal-state balance of power decisively weighs

against the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of

Section 111(d).

1. When Congress “intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the States,” it must “make its intention

clear and manifest.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (quotation marks omitted). This

principle is deeply ingrained in this Court’s precedent.

See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230

10

(1947). It flows from the “assumption” that Congress

does not ordinarily intend to “suspend[]” the States’

police powers. Id. So when “Congress legislate[s] . . . in [a] field which the States have traditionally occupied,” the judiciary must start with a baseline

presumption that federal law has not “superseded”

State authority. Id. And that presumption is overcome

only when Congress makes it “exceedingly clear” that

Congress intends to “alter the balance between federal

and state power.” Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n, 140 S.

Ct. at 1849–50.

While similar to the Court’s major-questions doctrine, see Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573

U.S. 302, 324 (2014), the federalism canon is not limited to interpreting congressional delegations of

power. Rather, the rule guides all kinds of statutory

questions. The Court has used it to narrowly construe

the scope of a federal criminal statute. See Bond, 572

U.S. at 848. It has relied on the canon to limit the

reach of federal civil-rights laws, Will, 491 U.S. at 65;

Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991), and

to decide which agency has jurisdiction over federal

land, Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. at 1849–

50. And yes, the Court has wielded the canon to confine the scope of legislative delegations of power. See

Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,

141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021) (per curiam). No matter

the statutory context, courts must guard against inadvertent intrusions on traditional State power by ensuring that Congress makes its purpose “unmistakably clear.” Will, 491 U.S. at 65.

11

The federalism canon is a tool of statutory interpretation, not a constitutional doctrine limiting congressional power. It guides courts in deciding not

whether Congress could take a particular action, but

whether Congress intended to do so. This is perhaps

best illustrated in Alabama Realtors, the Court’s most

recent decision applying the canon. There, the Center

for Disease Control and Prevention claimed that a

statute providing it authority to “prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States . . . or

from one State . . . into any other,” allowed it to impose a moratorium on landlords evicting tenants during the pandemic. 141 S. Ct. at 2488. In ruling against

the CDC, the Court did not consider whether Congress

could give the CDC the kind of power it asserted under

the Commerce Clause or another one of its enumerated powers. Instead, the Court found that—because

“landlord-tenant relationship[s]” fall within a “particular domain of state law,” Congress must use “exceedingly clear language” to do so. Id. at 2489. Because

that kind of clear statement does not exist, the CDC

does not have the statutory authority it insisted upon.

Id.

This presumption against disturbing traditional

State power follows naturally from the structure of the

Constitution. After all, “[t]he States exist as a refutation of th[e] concept” that the federal government is

“the ultimate, preferred mechanism for expressing the

people’s will.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 759

(1999). That is, in fact, what makes this Nation so

12

unique. America divided its power not just between

the branches of a single government, but between governments themselves—“one state and one federal,

each protected from incursion by the other.” Saenz v.

Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504 n.17 (1999) (citation omitted).

And so the States “are not relegated to the role of mere

provinces or political corporations, but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty.”

Alden, 527 U.S. at 715. The result is a federal government that is supreme but limited, with States that retain “numerous and indefinite” powers that “extend to

all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs,

concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people.” The Federalist No. 45 (J. Madison).

It is this unique structural feature that compels

caution when interpreting federal statutes that may

interfere with the natural authority of the States. See

Bond, 572 U.S. at 848 (“Because our constitutional

structure leaves local criminal activity primarily to

the States, we have generally declined to read federal

law as intruding on that responsibility, unless Congress has clearly indicated that the law should have

such reach.”). Consider it a companion to another tool

of statutory interpretation—the canon of constitutional avoidance. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371,

381 (2005). Just as courts—recognizing that they comprise only one of three equal branches of the federal

government—should resist unnecessarily interpreting

an act of Congress so that it is unconstitutional, see

Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 538

13

(2012), so too must courts avoid unnecessarily interpreting federal statutes to disrupt the traditional balance of power between the States and the federal government. Both canons operate as “a means of giving

effect to congressional intent.” Clark, 543 U.S. at 382

(describing constitutional avoidance); Bond, 572 U.S.

at 858 (explaining the similar rationale for the federalism canon).

2. Applying the federalism canon here turns a

complicated disagreement over statutory interpretation into an easy bottom line. The CAA plainly intrudes on an area traditionally regulated by the

States. See supra 5–9. And the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of Section 111(d) expands on that intrusion exponentially—allowing a federal agency to wholly

transform the existing power sector in every State by

regulating unfavored energy sources out of existence.

Congress may grant that kind of authority only with

“exceedingly clear language.” Cowpasture River Pres.

Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. at 1849–50. No such language exists

here.

The State Petitioners ably explain why that is the

case, but consider just a few of the textual distortions

required to find support for the D.C. Circuit’s reading

of Section 111(d). To reach its determination, the D.C.

Circuit relied on redefining key terms and ignoring the

definition of others, State Pet’rs Br. at 40, transforming singular words into plurals, id. at 39, adopting hyperliteral definitions of “infinite breadth,” id. at 41

(quoting EPSA, 577 U.S. at 278), sidestepping basic

14

rules of grammar, id. at 37, and rendering entire

clauses illusory, id. at 41. And it used these textual

maneuvers to affirm outcomes (like implementing capand-trade emission controls) that Congress knows

how to prescribe directly but chose not to in Section

111(d). Id. at 42. A rigorous statutory analysis would

yield the conclusion that Section 111(d) simply does

not authorize the EPA to remake the Nation’s existing

energy market as it sees fit. See State Pet’rs Br. at 31–

44. And there is no “exceedingly clear” support for the

opposite determination. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n,

140 S. Ct. at 1849–50.

3. Yet the breadth of authority that the D.C. Circuit found in Section 111(d) is startling. The States

have traditionally had exclusive authority to regulate

things like the “[n]eed for new power facilities” and

“their economic feasibility.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461

U.S. at 205; see also supra 5–9; Ky. Rev. Stat.

§ 278.020. And Section 111(d) provides for that continuing regulatory authority by granting the States the

primary power to set standards of performance for existing sources that take into consideration the remaining useful life of each source. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d). Yet

the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of the statute would

allow the EPA to usurp that traditional State authority by making it economically infeasible to continue

operating existing coal-fired generators, thus requiring new kinds of electrical sources that the EPA has

selected for the States.

15

That, in turn, will require billions in investments

into new power plants to replace lost power capacity

from the loss of existing coal-fired electricity. See

EPA’s Clean Power Plan: An Economic Impact Analysis, Energy Ventures Analysis, 7–8 (Nov. 13, 2015),

https://perma.cc/4UKG-NY7B. New investments must

be paid for—and those costs would likely pass down to

the consumers through their rates. And the States are

the political bodies responsible for regulating those

rates. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 205; see e.g.,

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 278.040(2) (vesting “exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of rates and services” with the

Kentucky Public Service Commission); Fla. Stat.

§ 350.011; Fla. Admin. Code. 25-14.001. At every turn,

the D.C. Circuit’s blessing of the limitless authority

contemplated by the Clean Power Plan would amount

to an unprecedented intrusion into the energy sector

that implicates and commandeers the States’ traditional role of regulating utilities within their borders.

Section 111(d) “is a wafer-thin reed on which to rest

such sweeping power.” Alabama Realtors, 141 S. Ct.

at 2489.

CONCLUSION

The Court should reverse the judgment below.

16

Respectfully submitted,

DANIEL CAMERON

MATTHEW F. KUHN

Attorney General of

Solicitor General

Kentucky

BRETT R. NOLAN

BARRY L. DUNN

Principal Deputy

Deputy Attorney

Solicitor General

General

*Counsel of record

Office of the Kentucky

ALEXANDER Y. MAGERA

Assistant Solicitor

Attorney General

700 Capital Avenue, Ste. 118 General

Frankfort, KY 40601

(502) 696-5300

Brett.Nolan@ky.gov

Counsel for Amici Curiae

ADDITIONAL COUNSEL

MARK BRNOVICH

Attorney General of

Arizona

LYNN FITCH

Attorney General of

Mississippi

JOHN M. FORMELLA

Attorney General of

New Hampshire

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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