Amicus Curiae Brief — West Virginia, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
Supreme Court briefDec 20, 2021
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No. 20-1530
In the Supreme Court of the United States
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
BRIEF OF KENTU CKY, ARIZONA,
MISSISSIPPI, AND NEW HAMPSHIRE AS
AMICI CURIAE SU PPORTING PETITIONERS
DANIEL CAMERON
Attorney General of
Kentucky
BARRY L. DUNN
Deputy Attorney
General
MATTHEW F. KUHN
Solicitor General
BRETT R. NOLAN
Principal Deputy
Solicitor General
*Counsel of record
Office of the Kentucky
ALEXANDER Y. MAGERA
Assistant Solicitor
Attorney General
700 Capital Avenue, Ste. 118 General
Frankfort, KY 40601
(502) 696-5300
Brett.Nolan@ky.gov
Counsel for Amici Curiae
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE ..............................1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................1
ARGUMENT ................................................................3
I.
Regulating energy and utility markets is
primarily and historically a job for the
States, not the federal government ..................5
II.
The presumption against disrupting the
federal-state balance of power decisively
weighs against the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of Section 111(d) .....................................9
CONCLUSION ..........................................................15
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum.
Servs.,
141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021) (per curiam) ........... 10, 11, 15
Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999) .......................................... 11, 12
Ark. Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Ark. Public Serv. Comm’n,
461 U.S. 375 (1983) .............................................. 5, 7
Bond v. United States,
572 U.S. 844 (2014) ................................ 7, 10, 12, 13
Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm’n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557 (1980) .................................................. 7
Clark v. Martinez,
543 U.S. 371 (2005) .......................................... 12, 13
Conn. Dep’t of Public Utility Control v. F.E.R.C.,
569 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 2009) .................................. 8
F.E.R.C. v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n,
577 U.S. 260 (2016) ........................................ 7, 8, 13
Frost v. Corp. Comm’n,
278 U.S. 515 (1929) .............................................. 6, 8
Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991) ............................................ 2, 10
Munn v. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113 (1876) .................................................... 6
iii
Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519 (2012) .......................................... 12, 13
New York v. F.E.R.C.,
535 U.S. 1 (2002) ...................................................... 9
New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992) .................................................. 4
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Comm’n,
461 U.S. 190 (1983) .................................. 6, 9, 14, 15
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n
of Ind.,
332 U.S. 507 (1947) .................................................. 7
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218 (1947) ............................................ 9, 10
Saenz v. Roe,
526 U.S. 489 (1999) ................................................ 12
U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Preservation
Ass’n,
140 S. Ct. 1837 (2020) ............................ 5, 10, 13, 14
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,
573 U.S. 302 (2014) ................................................ 10
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58 (1989) .............................................. 9, 10
Statutes
16 U.S.C. §§ 791a et seq. .............................................. 7
16 U.S.C. § 824(b) ........................................................ 8
42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) .................................................. 8
iv
42 U.S.C. § 7411 .......................................................... 4
42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) .................................................. 4
42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B) ............................................. 4
42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) ................................................ 1, 14
42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1).................................................. 4
Fla. Admin. Code. 25-14.001 ..................................... 15
Fla. Stat. § 350.011.................................................... 15
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 278.020 ............................................ 14
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 278.040(2) ........................................ 15
Other Authorities
John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under
the Clean Air Act, 54 Maryland L. Rev. 1183
(1995) .................................................................... 8, 9
EPA’s Clean Power Plan: An Economic Impact
Analysis, Energy Ventures Analysis (Nov. 13,
2015), https://perma.cc/4UKG-NY7B .................... 15
The Federalist No. 45 ................................................ 12
Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism &
Natural Res. Law, 14 N.Y.U. Env’t L. J. 179
(2005) ........................................................................ 8
Richard F. Hirsh, Emergence of Electrical
Utilities in America, Smithsonian Institution
(2002), https://perma.cc/ER77-72XA ................... 5, 6
William K. Jones, Origins of the Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity:
v
Developments in the States, 1870-1920, 79
Colum. L. Rev. 426 (1979) ........................................ 6
1
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE
This case is about whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the authority to usurp the
traditional police powers of the States to regulate utilities and the intrastate energy market. How this Court
answers that question will affect the amici States in
two important ways.
Narrowly, the amici States—like the State Petitioners—will bear the brunt of any regulatory action
from the EPA that requires significant generation
shifting from coal-fired fuel to renewable resources.
After all, the statutory provision at issue, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7411(d), puts the burden on the States to comply
with the EPA’s rule, and it is the States that must ensure their citizens maintain access to reliable and affordable energy during a destabilizing shift to whichever not-yet-established sources end up replacing coalfired fuel.
Broadly, the amici States have a strong interest in
protecting their historic police powers from unnecessary federal interference. How this Court resolves the
statutory question here could impact countless other
attempts by federal agencies to wield little-known
laws to intrude on the traditional powers of the States.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Constitution strikes a delicate balance between the power of the States and the federal government. The federal government’s authority is supreme
2
but limited, while the States retain broad police powers that must yield only when preempted by an otherwise lawful act of Congress.
This structural balance requires courts to exercise
caution before interpreting federal statutes to intrude
on the police power of the States. As this Court has
explained, “[i]t is incumbent upon the federal courts to
be certain of Congress’ intent before finding that federal law overrides this balance.” Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991). To that end, courts require
Congress to use exceedingly clear language before authorizing an intrusion on the authority that historically rests with the States. And from criminal law to
landlord-tenant relations, this Court has repeatedly
applied this statutory canon to prevent unnecessary
(and perhaps inadvertent) conflict between State and
federal power.
One such realm of historic State power is the authority to regulate utilities and the intrastate energy
market. The States have traditionally been the frontline regulators within this industry. From regulating
the size of the energy market more broadly to the rates
that utilities may charge their customers, the States
have exercised their general police power—a power
the federal government lacks—to ensure that their citizens have reliable and affordable electricity.
The D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of Section 111(d)
fundamentally disrupts the States’ authority in this
area and thus cannot be upheld unless the Clean Air
Act makes that power exceedingly clear. It does not.
3
The textual gymnastics that the D.C. Circuit relied on
below to explain the meaning of Section 111(d) defy
basic rules of grammar and statutory interpretation.
The decision required ignoring the difference between
plural and singular terms, redefining already-existing
terms, and stretching the ordinary meaning of language beyond its breaking point. But most importantly, it did all of this in a way that undermines
the purpose of Section 111(d), which is to allow the
States to custom fit the appropriate standards of performance for the already-existing power generators
that are necessary to maintain a stable and affordable
energy supply.
Affirming the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of Section 111(d) and restoring the Clean Power Plan would
lead to devastating economic effects for States like
Kentucky that depend on the abundant and low-cost
coal-powered energy as a primary source of electricity.
But more fundamentally, allowing a federal agency to
disrupt the States’ traditional police power through a
novel interpretation of an ancillary provision of a federal statute undermines the structural features of our
Constitution that make America what it is.
ARGUMENT
This case is about whether the Clean Air Act
(CAA) grants the EPA authority to regulate the coal
industry out of existence. The statute plainly does no
such thing.
4
Section 111 of the CAA grants the EPA and the
States a mix of authority to regulate certain emissions
from stationary power sources. 42 U.S.C. § 7411. For
new sources (i.e., power plants that have not yet been
built), the EPA has broad authority to establish emission limits by adopting a “standard of performance” for
each source category. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1), (b)(1)(B).
But for existing sources—power plants and other energy sources that are already integral to a State’s
power grid—the CAA grants the States the primary
authority to set those same standards. Id.
§ 7411(d)(1). The result is the kind of cooperative federalism that has become a hallmark of energy and environmental regulation in the United States. See New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1992).
Congress grants the EPA some power, while preserving or extending other authority directly to the States.
The dispute now before the Court is whether Section 111(d) authorizes the EPA to impose sweeping
emission standards with the intent and effect of shutting down existing, coal-fired power plants that are
otherwise critical to the energy grid in many States.
Under President Obama, the EPA asserted precisely
that kind of authority based on a novel reading of what
is an otherwise ancillary provision of the CAA. And
the D.C. Circuit agreed. But that reading of Section
111(d) would obliterate the careful balance the CAA
struck between State and federal power, and it would
do so at the expense of the historic powers of the State.
5
Textually, the D.C. Circuit’s reading of Section
111(d) is indefensible. But at most this is a close call.
And that’s a problem for the lower court’s expansive
reading of the EPA’s authority because regulating
utilities and the energy market is a power that historically belongs to the States. This Court has made clear
that Congress cannot “significantly alter the balance
between federal and state power” without “exceedingly clear language.” U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture
River Preservation Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. 1837, 1849–50
(2020). Yet nowhere in Section 111(d) is there anything resembling “exceedingly clear” language authorizing the EPA to engage in a wholesale restructuring
of the existing energy sector.
I. Regulating energy and utility markets is primarily and historically a job for the States,
not the federal government.
1. Regulating energy is one of those issues that
has long belonged to the States. See Ark. Elec. Co-op.
Corp. v. Ark. Public Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 377
(1983).
Thomas Edison built the first centralized power
plant in the late nineteenth century. See Richard F.
Hirsh, Emergence of Electrical Utilities in America,
Smithsonian Institution (2002), https://perma.cc/E
R77-72XA. Soon after, the market for electricity took
off. Businesses looking to capitalize on the new industry “sought franchises from municipal governments to
build power stations that would dot city landscapes.”
Id. And because most customers “needed to be within
one mile of a generating plant to receive power,” in the
6
beginning cities were “populated by numerous power
plants” owned by different companies. Id.
It is not hard to guess what happened next. Economies of scale took over, and consolidation became the
new game. Id. Natural monopolies emerged, and with
them, the need for some measure of regulatory control.
Id. But where should that regulation come from? It
started locally and soon moved to the States. Id. While
some municipal governments opted for wholly owned
utility companies, by 1914 “state regulation of utilities
became commonplace” with at least 45 States having
enacted laws providing “oversight of electric utilities.”
Id.
State regulation mostly covered the expected
ground. Like common carriers and other public goods,
see Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125–26 (1876), the
States historically required power companies “to serve
all customers without discrimination” and charge only
reasonable rates, Hirsh, supra 5. States also regulated
the “[n]eed for new power facilities, their economic feasibility, and rates and services.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.
v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461
U.S. 190, 205 (1983). With few exceptions, “these economic aspects of electrical generation have been regulated for many years and in great detail by the states.”
Id. at 206; see also William K. Jones, Origins of the
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity: Developments in the States, 1870-1920, 79 Colum. L. Rev.
426, 454–55, 458–75 (1979).
Energy regulation falls neatly within the States’
broader police power. States have long regulated oth-
7
erwise private property “clothed with a public interest” that “affect[s] the community at large.” Munn, 94
U.S. at 126. Electric utilities are no different. See Frost
v. Corp. Comm’n, 278 U.S. 515, 534 (1929) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
569 (1980) (recognizing the “clear and substantial governmental interest” in making sure “that rates be fair
and efficient”). And unlike the federal government,
“[t]he States have broad authority to enact legislation
for the public good.” Bond v. United States, 572 U.S.
844, 854 (2014).
2. The federal government jumped into the energy
game in the mid-twentieth century when Congress enacted the Federal Power Act of 1935 (FPA). See 16
U.S.C. §§ 791a et seq. Not surprisingly, this initial
move into the States’ historic domain was done carefully.
The FPA only allowed the federal government to
regulate the interstate aspects of energy sales (primarily wholesale transactions and distribution). This
preserved the historic role of the States over the intrastate (or retail) energy market. See Ark. Elec. Co-op
Corp., 461 U.S. at 378–79. As this Court explained,
that jurisdictional line “was deliberate.” Panhandle E.
Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Ind., 332 U.S.
507, 516 (1947). Congress initiated the federal government’s reach into the energy market slowly and with
significant deference toward the traditional authority
of the States. And it has continued to “maintain[] a
zone of exclusive state jurisdiction” over “within-state
wholesale sales or . . . retail energy sales.” F.E.R.C. v.
8
Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 266–67 (2016)
(“EPSA”).
There is no doubt that the federal government’s
reach into the energy market has expanded significantly since Congress first enacted the FPA. The
Clean Water Act allows the federal government to regulate utilities through controls over water quality. The
same is true for emissions under the CAA. Yet even
though these pollution-control laws “greatly scaled
back” State autonomy, the “states continue to wield
considerable regulatory authority.” John P. Dwyer,
The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act,
54 Maryland L. Rev. 1183, 1190 (1995). Rather than
trying to preempt the field through an expansive interpretation of its Commerce Clause power, Congress
has made environmental regulation “fertile ground”
for “cooperative federalism.” See Robert L. Fischman,
Cooperative Federalism & Natural Res. Law, 14
N.Y.U. Env’t L. J. 179, 188 (2005). As even the CAA
makes clear, “air pollution prevention . . . and air pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401(a)(3).
Despite expanding federal power, consider what
parts of the utility and energy market the States still
retain exclusive (or near exclusive) authority over. The
States have control over retail electricity sales. See
EPSA, 577 U.S. at 279 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)).
They “retain the right to forbid new entrants from
providing new capacity” within their State borders,
Conn. Dep’t of Public Utility Control v. F.E.R.C., 569
F.3d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2009), just as they could a cen-
9
tury ago, see Frost, 278 U.S. at 534 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). And the States continue to maintain “authority over utility generation and resource portfolios.”
New York v. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1, 24 (2002). That
means the States today remain the primary regulators
over the utilities that produce and distribute energy to
their citizens.
There are plenty of good reasons for Congress to
have decided not to preempt the entire field of energy
regulation. The federal government, for example,
likely “needs state bureaucracies (with their technical
and administrative resources) and state politicians
(with their political and budgetary support) to achieve
its environmental goals.” Dwyer, supra 8 at 1190. The
EPA is not equipped to manage retail energy distribution at the local level. Yet whatever the reason may
be, Congress has intervened in only discrete aspects of
the utility market, and it thus continues to legislate
against the backdrop of “a field in which the States
have traditionally operated” and continue to operate
today. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 205.
II. The presumption against disrupting the federal-state balance of power decisively weighs
against the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of
Section 111(d).
1. When Congress “intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the States,” it must “make its intention
clear and manifest.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (quotation marks omitted). This
principle is deeply ingrained in this Court’s precedent.
See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
10
(1947). It flows from the “assumption” that Congress
does not ordinarily intend to “suspend[]” the States’
police powers. Id. So when “Congress legislate[s] . . . in [a] field which the States have traditionally occupied,” the judiciary must start with a baseline
presumption that federal law has not “superseded”
State authority. Id. And that presumption is overcome
only when Congress makes it “exceedingly clear” that
Congress intends to “alter the balance between federal
and state power.” Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n, 140 S.
Ct. at 1849–50.
While similar to the Court’s major-questions doctrine, see Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573
U.S. 302, 324 (2014), the federalism canon is not limited to interpreting congressional delegations of
power. Rather, the rule guides all kinds of statutory
questions. The Court has used it to narrowly construe
the scope of a federal criminal statute. See Bond, 572
U.S. at 848. It has relied on the canon to limit the
reach of federal civil-rights laws, Will, 491 U.S. at 65;
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991), and
to decide which agency has jurisdiction over federal
land, Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. at 1849–
50. And yes, the Court has wielded the canon to confine the scope of legislative delegations of power. See
Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,
141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021) (per curiam). No matter
the statutory context, courts must guard against inadvertent intrusions on traditional State power by ensuring that Congress makes its purpose “unmistakably clear.” Will, 491 U.S. at 65.
11
The federalism canon is a tool of statutory interpretation, not a constitutional doctrine limiting congressional power. It guides courts in deciding not
whether Congress could take a particular action, but
whether Congress intended to do so. This is perhaps
best illustrated in Alabama Realtors, the Court’s most
recent decision applying the canon. There, the Center
for Disease Control and Prevention claimed that a
statute providing it authority to “prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States . . . or
from one State . . . into any other,” allowed it to impose a moratorium on landlords evicting tenants during the pandemic. 141 S. Ct. at 2488. In ruling against
the CDC, the Court did not consider whether Congress
could give the CDC the kind of power it asserted under
the Commerce Clause or another one of its enumerated powers. Instead, the Court found that—because
“landlord-tenant relationship[s]” fall within a “particular domain of state law,” Congress must use “exceedingly clear language” to do so. Id. at 2489. Because
that kind of clear statement does not exist, the CDC
does not have the statutory authority it insisted upon.
Id.
This presumption against disturbing traditional
State power follows naturally from the structure of the
Constitution. After all, “[t]he States exist as a refutation of th[e] concept” that the federal government is
“the ultimate, preferred mechanism for expressing the
people’s will.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 759
(1999). That is, in fact, what makes this Nation so
12
unique. America divided its power not just between
the branches of a single government, but between governments themselves—“one state and one federal,
each protected from incursion by the other.” Saenz v.
Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504 n.17 (1999) (citation omitted).
And so the States “are not relegated to the role of mere
provinces or political corporations, but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty.”
Alden, 527 U.S. at 715. The result is a federal government that is supreme but limited, with States that retain “numerous and indefinite” powers that “extend to
all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs,
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people.” The Federalist No. 45 (J. Madison).
It is this unique structural feature that compels
caution when interpreting federal statutes that may
interfere with the natural authority of the States. See
Bond, 572 U.S. at 848 (“Because our constitutional
structure leaves local criminal activity primarily to
the States, we have generally declined to read federal
law as intruding on that responsibility, unless Congress has clearly indicated that the law should have
such reach.”). Consider it a companion to another tool
of statutory interpretation—the canon of constitutional avoidance. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371,
381 (2005). Just as courts—recognizing that they comprise only one of three equal branches of the federal
government—should resist unnecessarily interpreting
an act of Congress so that it is unconstitutional, see
Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 538
13
(2012), so too must courts avoid unnecessarily interpreting federal statutes to disrupt the traditional balance of power between the States and the federal government. Both canons operate as “a means of giving
effect to congressional intent.” Clark, 543 U.S. at 382
(describing constitutional avoidance); Bond, 572 U.S.
at 858 (explaining the similar rationale for the federalism canon).
2. Applying the federalism canon here turns a
complicated disagreement over statutory interpretation into an easy bottom line. The CAA plainly intrudes on an area traditionally regulated by the
States. See supra 5–9. And the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of Section 111(d) expands on that intrusion exponentially—allowing a federal agency to wholly
transform the existing power sector in every State by
regulating unfavored energy sources out of existence.
Congress may grant that kind of authority only with
“exceedingly clear language.” Cowpasture River Pres.
Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. at 1849–50. No such language exists
here.
The State Petitioners ably explain why that is the
case, but consider just a few of the textual distortions
required to find support for the D.C. Circuit’s reading
of Section 111(d). To reach its determination, the D.C.
Circuit relied on redefining key terms and ignoring the
definition of others, State Pet’rs Br. at 40, transforming singular words into plurals, id. at 39, adopting hyperliteral definitions of “infinite breadth,” id. at 41
(quoting EPSA, 577 U.S. at 278), sidestepping basic
14
rules of grammar, id. at 37, and rendering entire
clauses illusory, id. at 41. And it used these textual
maneuvers to affirm outcomes (like implementing capand-trade emission controls) that Congress knows
how to prescribe directly but chose not to in Section
111(d). Id. at 42. A rigorous statutory analysis would
yield the conclusion that Section 111(d) simply does
not authorize the EPA to remake the Nation’s existing
energy market as it sees fit. See State Pet’rs Br. at 31–
44. And there is no “exceedingly clear” support for the
opposite determination. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n,
140 S. Ct. at 1849–50.
3. Yet the breadth of authority that the D.C. Circuit found in Section 111(d) is startling. The States
have traditionally had exclusive authority to regulate
things like the “[n]eed for new power facilities” and
“their economic feasibility.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461
U.S. at 205; see also supra 5–9; Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 278.020. And Section 111(d) provides for that continuing regulatory authority by granting the States the
primary power to set standards of performance for existing sources that take into consideration the remaining useful life of each source. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d). Yet
the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of the statute would
allow the EPA to usurp that traditional State authority by making it economically infeasible to continue
operating existing coal-fired generators, thus requiring new kinds of electrical sources that the EPA has
selected for the States.
15
That, in turn, will require billions in investments
into new power plants to replace lost power capacity
from the loss of existing coal-fired electricity. See
EPA’s Clean Power Plan: An Economic Impact Analysis, Energy Ventures Analysis, 7–8 (Nov. 13, 2015),
https://perma.cc/4UKG-NY7B. New investments must
be paid for—and those costs would likely pass down to
the consumers through their rates. And the States are
the political bodies responsible for regulating those
rates. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 205; see e.g.,
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 278.040(2) (vesting “exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of rates and services” with the
Kentucky Public Service Commission); Fla. Stat.
§ 350.011; Fla. Admin. Code. 25-14.001. At every turn,
the D.C. Circuit’s blessing of the limitless authority
contemplated by the Clean Power Plan would amount
to an unprecedented intrusion into the energy sector
that implicates and commandeers the States’ traditional role of regulating utilities within their borders.
Section 111(d) “is a wafer-thin reed on which to rest
such sweeping power.” Alabama Realtors, 141 S. Ct.
at 2489.
CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the judgment below.
16
Respectfully submitted,
DANIEL CAMERON
MATTHEW F. KUHN
Attorney General of
Solicitor General
Kentucky
BRETT R. NOLAN
BARRY L. DUNN
Principal Deputy
Deputy Attorney
Solicitor General
General
*Counsel of record
Office of the Kentucky
ALEXANDER Y. MAGERA
Assistant Solicitor
Attorney General
700 Capital Avenue, Ste. 118 General
Frankfort, KY 40601
(502) 696-5300
Brett.Nolan@ky.gov
Counsel for Amici Curiae
ADDITIONAL COUNSEL
MARK BRNOVICH
Attorney General of
Arizona
LYNN FITCH
Attorney General of
Mississippi
JOHN M. FORMELLA
Attorney General of
New Hampshire
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.