Respondents Brief — West Virginia, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
Supreme Court briefDec 13, 2021
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Nos. 20-1530, 20-1531, 20-1778, and 20-1780
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
________________________________
WEST VIRGINIA, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND
MICHAEL REGAN, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondents.
________________________________
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
________________________________
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AMERICA’S POWER IN
SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
________________________________
F. WILLIAM BROWNELL
ERICA N. PETERSON
HUNTON ANDREWS
KURTH LLP
2200 Pennsylvania
Avenue, NW,
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20037
(202) 955-1500
ELBERT LIN
Counsel of Record
HUNTON ANDREWS
KURTH LLP
951 East Byrd Street,
East Tower
Richmond, VA 23219
elin@HuntonAK.com
(804) 788-8200
December 13, 2021
Counsel for Respondent
America’s Power
Additional Captions Listed on Inside Cover
THE NORTH AMERICAN COAL CORPORATION
PETITIONER,
V.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.
________________________________
WESTMORELAND MINING HOLDINGS, LLC,
PETITIONER,
V.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
RESPONDENTS.
________________________________
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA,
PETITIONER,
V.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
RESPONDENTS.
________________________________
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
In 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d), an ancillary provision of the
Clean Air Act, did Congress constitutionally authorize
the Environmental Protection Agency to issue
significant rules—including those capable of
reshaping the nation’s electricity grids and
unilaterally decarbonizing virtually any sector of the
economy—without any limits on what the agency can
require so long as it considers cost, nonair impacts,
and energy requirements?
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners are the States of West Virginia,
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana,
Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, and Wyoming; and Mississippi Governor
Tate Reeves. Each petitioner was a respondentintervenor below.
Petitioner in 20-1531 is The North American Coal
Corporation.
Petitioner in 20-1778 is Westmoreland Mining
Holdings, LLC.
Petitioner in 20-1780 is the State of North Dakota.
Respondents in 20-1530 who filed briefs in support
of certiorari were America’s Power, Basin Electric
Power Cooperative, and the National Mining
Association. Each was a respondent-intervenor below.
Respondents in 20-1530, 20-1531, 20-1778, 201780 who were petitioners below and filed briefs in
opposition to certiorari are Consolidated Edison, Inc.,
Exelon Corporation, National Grid USA, New York
Power Authority, Power Companies Climate
Coalition, Sacramento Municipal Utility District,
American Lung Association, American Public Health
Association, Appalachian Mountain Club, Center for
Biological Diversity, Chesapeake Bay Foundation,
Inc., Clean Air Council, Clean Wisconsin,
Conservation Law Foundation, Environmental
iii
Defense Fund, Environmental Law & Policy Center,
Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy,
Natural Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club,
Advanced Energy Economy, American Clean Power
Association (successor of the American Wind Energy
Association), Solar Energy Industries Association,
State of New York, State of California, State of
Colorado, State of Delaware, State of Hawaii, State of
Illinois, State of Maine, State of Maryland,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, People of the State
of Michigan, State of Minnesota, State of New Jersey,
State of New Mexico, State of North Carolina, State of
Oregon, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, State of
Rhode Island, State of Vermont, Commonwealth of
Virginia, State of Washington, State of Wisconsin,
District of Columbia, City of Boulder (CO), City of
Chicago, City and County of Denver, City of Los
Angeles, City of New York, City of Philadelphia, and
the City of South Miami (FL).
Respondent in 20-1530, 20-1531, 20-1778, 20-1780
who was a petitioner-intervenor below and filed a
brief in opposition to certiorari is the State of Nevada.
Respondents in 20-1530, 20-1531, 20-1778, 201780 who were respondents below are the United
States Environmental Protection Agency and Michael
Regan, in his official capacity as Administrator of the
United States Environmental Protection Agency
(substituted for the previous administrator under
Supreme Court Rule 35.3).
iv
Respondents who were petitioners below and did
not file any brief at the certiorari stage are, by court
of appeals case number, as follows:
In case no. 19-1175: Robinson Enterprises, Inc.,
Nuckles Oil Co., Inc., DBA Merit Oil Co., Construction
Industry Air Quality Coalition, Liberty Packing Co.
LLC, Dalton Trucking, Inc., Norman R. “Skip” Brown,
Joanne Brown, The Competitive Enterprise Institute,
and the Texas Public Policy Foundation.
In case no. 19-1185: Biogenic CO2 Coalition.
Respondents who were respondent-intervenors
below and did not file any brief at the certiorari stage
are Indiana Michigan Power Co., Kentucky Power Co.,
Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, Southwestern
Electric Power Co., AEP Generating Co., AEP
Generation Resources, Inc., Wheeling Power Co.,
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, Indiana Energy Association and Indiana
Utility Group, International Brotherhood of
Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths,
Forgers & Helpers, AFL-CIO, Murray Energy Corp.,
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association,
Nevada Gold Mines, Newmont Nevada Energy
Investment, and PowerSouth Energy Cooperative.
v
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Respondent America’s Power is a trade association
comprised of companies involved in the production of
electricity from coal. It has no parent corporation, and
no publicly held company owns a 10 percent or greater
interest in America’s Power.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED .......................................... i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ......................... ii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ........... vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................... viii
INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................... 3
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 6
I.
II.
The major questions doctrine protects against
expansions of executive branch authority
through ambiguous language. ............................ 6
A.
Deferring to agency views of ambiguous
statutory language raises separation of
powers concerns. ......................................... 6
B.
The major questions doctrine avoids
separation of powers concerns in certain
instances of statutory ambiguity. ............ 10
This Court’s application of the major questions
doctrine has reflected, and should continue to
reflect, its significant purpose. ......................... 12
A.
The major questions doctrine is triggered
whether an agency’s assertion of authority
is “major” in the particular application or
more generally transformative................. 12
B.
The major questions doctrine requires a
court to assess whether a statute clearly
grants an agency the claimed authority. . 17
vii
III. The major questions doctrine confirms that EPA
had no discretion but to repeal the CPP. ......... 20
A.
The CPP is exactly the kind of agency claim
of authority for which the major questions
doctrine exists. .......................................... 20
B.
EPA is correct that the major questions
doctrine can and does confirm its analysis
of the statute at Chevron step one. .......... 31
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 33
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs.,
141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021) (per curiam) ............ passim
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984)...................................... passim
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,
579 U.S. 261 (2016)................................................ 9
Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. RRs.,
575 U.S. 43 (2015).................................................. 9
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000)...................................... passim
Gonzales v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243 (2006).................................. 14, 16, 30
Gundy v. United States,
139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).................................. 7, 8, 12
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch,
834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016).............................. 9
King v. Burwell,
576 U.S. 473 (2015).............................................. 18
ix
Marbury v. Madison,
1 Cranch 137 (1803)............................................. 11
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Telephone & Telegraph
Co.,
512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994) .......................... 13, 16, 26
Michigan v. EPA,
576 U.S. 743 (2015)............................................ 7, 8
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983).................................................. 8
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n,
575 U.S. 92 (2015).................................................. 7
U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC,
855 F.3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2017) .............................. 10
Union Elec. Co. v. EPA,
427 U.S. 246 (1976).............................................. 22
United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218 (2001)................................................ 8
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,
573 U.S. 302 (2014)...................................... passim
Wayman v. Southard,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825) ................................. 7
x
Statutes and Constitutional Provision
33 U.S.C. § 1311 ........................................................ 21
33 U.S.C. § 1313 ........................................................ 21
33 U.S.C. § 1316 ........................................................ 21
42 U.S.C. § 7409 ........................................................ 21
42 U.S.C. § 7411 .................................................... 1, 21
42 U.S.C. § 7412 ........................................................ 21
42 U.S.C. § 7479(3).................................................... 21
42 U.S.C. § 7651-7651o ............................................. 22
42 U.S.C. § 7671-7671q ............................................. 22
CAA Title IV-A .......................................................... 22
CAA Title IV .............................................................. 26
CAA Title VI .............................................................. 22
Clean Energy Jobs & Am. Power Act,
S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009) .......................... 22, 30
Climate Prot. Act of 2013,
S. 332, 113th Cong. (2013) .................................. 30
Controlled Substances Act ........................................ 14
Public Health Service Act ......................................... 15
xi
U.S. Const., art. I, § 1 ................................................. 7
Other Authorities
40 C.F.R. pt. 60, subpts............................................. 23
80 Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015) .......................... 23
Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory
Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and
the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 1003
(2013) .................................................................... 12
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation,
129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2150 (2016) ............. 10, 18
EPA, EPA-452/R-15-003, Regulatory Impact Analysis
for the Clean Power Plan Final Rule 3-22, 6-25
(Aug. 2015, replaced Oct. 23, 2015),
https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/docs/ria/utilities_ri
a_final-clean-power-plan-existing-units_201508.pdf .................................................................... 28
EPA, Fact Sheet, Overview of the Clean Power Plan,
Cutting Carbon Pollution From Power Plants 3
(undated),
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/sites/production/files/2
015-08/documents/fs-cpp-overview.pdf ............... 29
xii
NMA, EPA’s Clean Power Plan An Economic Impact
Analysis 2 (undated),
http://nma.org/attachments/article/2368/11.13.15
%20NMA
_EPAs%20Clean%20Power%20Plan%20%20An%
20Economic%20Impact%20Analysis.pdf ............ 28
S. Con. Res. 8, S. Amdt. 646, 113th Cong. (2013) .... 30
S. Rep. No. 95-370 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326 ............................................... 22
Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law
and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1986) ... 11
U.S. Energy Information Administration, Analysis of
the Impacts of the Clean Power Plan 63-64 (Fig.
39) (May 2015),
https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/powerplant
s/cleanplan/pdf/powerplant.pdf ........................... 29
1
INTRODUCTION
The major questions doctrine is an important
canon of statutory construction that protects the
separation of powers when an agency asserts
expansive authority based on statutory ambiguity.
Where statutes include ambiguity, judicial deference
to an agency’s interpretation raises separation of
powers concerns. This Court’s major questions
doctrine addresses these concerns in part by
recognizing that Congress must speak clearly—and
not through ambiguity—if it wishes to authorize an
agency to exercise enormous and transformative
regulatory power over a significant portion of the
economy.
It is difficult to imagine a better illustration of the
need for the major questions doctrine than this case.
In 2015, the EPA claimed to have discovered in a
scarcely used, narrowly tailored provision of the Clean
Air Act (CAA) breathtaking power to reorganize the
energy generation sector. The Clean Power Plan
(CPP) used CAA section 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d),
to set greenhouse gas emission standards for existing
power plants that were unachievable through controls
at any individual source. Under the CPP, owners and
operators of regulated sources would be required to
reduce operations and shift generation to lower
emitting generators, or would be required to shut
down if that alternative generation was not available.
The CPP never went into effect, however, because in
early 2016, this Court stayed the rule pending
litigation brought by a broad coalition of states, trade
2
and labor associations, and regulated entities. Then in
2019, EPA repealed the CPP, recognizing that the
regulation exceeded the agency’s statutory authority
because section 111(d) is limited to systems of controls
that can be applied at individual sources. Among
other reasons, EPA invoked the major questions
doctrine.
This litigation, in which America’s Power
intervened in support of EPA alongside Petitioners
here, followed. This case is about whether EPA
correctly concluded that it was required to repeal the
CPP, and to replace it with a rule premised on controls
that could be applied at individual sources (the
“Affordable Clean Energy” rule).
There are many reasons supporting EPA’s
conclusion that it lacked statutory power to adopt the
generation shifting measures in CPP, but this brief
focuses on only one: the major questions doctrine. As
Petitioners explain, the plain-text and context of
section 111(d) clearly provide that the CPP exceeded
EPA’s statutory authority. America’s Power does not
repeat those arguments here. Instead, this brief
supplements Petitioners’ discussion of EPA’s
invocation of the major questions doctrine—i.e., that
the interpretation of section 111(d) on which the CPP
was based would bring about an enormous and
transformative expansion of EPA’s regulatory
authority without clear congressional authorization.
As discussed below, the authority claimed by EPA in
the CPP falls squarely in the domain of the major
questions doctrine.
3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As a supplement to Petitioners’ arguments on the
major questions doctrine, this brief proceeds in three
parts. First, it explains the important function played
by the major questions doctrine in protecting the
separation of powers in certain cases of statutory
ambiguity. Second, it explains that the doctrine’s
purpose has informed, and should continue to inform,
how this Court applies it. And third, it explains how
the major questions doctrine clearly applies here and
supports EPA’s conclusion that the agency was
required to repeal the CPP.
I. The major questions doctrine is a canon of
statutory interpretation that prevents significant
expansion of executive branch authority based solely
on statutory ambiguity. Deference to an agency’s
reading of an ambiguous statute raises two potential
separation of powers concerns: abdication to the
executive branch of the judiciary’s power to say what
the law is and the unauthorized transfer of legislative
authority to the executive branch. The major
questions doctrine addresses those concerns in part by
requiring courts to find a clear statement from
Congress where an agency claims extraordinary and
transformative powers. The doctrine thus operates as
a vital check on the executive branch and also avoids
unnecessary resort to the non-delegation doctrine by
reading narrowly a statute that would otherwise
implicate non-delegation concerns.
4
II. When determining whether the major questions
doctrine applies, this Court has taken a flexible
approach that reflects the important constitutional
separation of powers purpose the doctrine serves. It
has looked to both whether a particular rule is “major”
and whether the agency has more generally asserted
transformative statutory authority. Either has been
sufficient to trigger the major questions doctrine. This
Court has also applied the major questions doctrine at
all steps of the Chevron analysis. No matter what step
of the Chevron analysis an agency might invoke in
defense of a rule, the Court has undertaken the same
task: it has looked to the statute itself to determine
whether Congress clearly grants the authority the
agency has claimed. If Congress did not do so, the
agency cannot use ambiguity to justify its action.
III.A.1. The CPP satisfies both tests this Court has
employed to determine whether the major questions
doctrine applies. In support of CPP, EPA interpreted
section 111(d) to authorize standards that compel
massive reductions in existing generation based on
projections that alternative forms of generation will
replace that existing generation. This is exactly the
type of unprecedented authority that constitutes a
major question. EPA’s reading not only transforms
section 111 from how it has long been understood but
also expands EPA’s authority to include remaking the
energy sector. Indeed, under its newfound authority,
EPA could restructure virtually any industry to
achieve emission reductions.
5
2. The CPP also fits within the types of cases where
this Court has found that the vast economic and
political significance of the particular rule being
reviewed triggers the major questions doctrine.
Estimates from industry and EPA show that the CPP
has significant economic impact. The rule is also
clearly politically significant for many reasons,
including that it seeks to address an issue that
Congress has repeatedly considered but declined to
take on.
B. Finally, EPA was correct in concluding that the
major questions doctrine provided independent
confirmation that the CPP exceeded the agency’s
authority. As Petitioners explain, the plain-text and
context of section 111(d) alone make this apparent.
But EPA was also right to consider the major
questions doctrine. Even though the agency had found
the statute unambiguous at Chevron step one, the
agency correctly recognized that the major questions
doctrine is a canon of statutory construction that can
be and is applied at any step of Chevron to determine
whether the agency’s interpretation is contrary to law.
It applies here and further confirms that EPA was
required to repeal the CPP.
6
ARGUMENT
I. The major questions doctrine protects
against expansions of executive branch
authority through ambiguous language.
The major questions doctrine prohibits agencies
from exercising vast regulatory authority based solely
on statutory silence or ambiguity. It provides that
when an agency seeks to exercise major regulatory
authority, the agency must identify a clear statement
from Congress granting such authority. Put another
way, the doctrine bars judicial deference to agency
interpretation of ambiguous statutory language in
certain circumstances.
The doctrine thus plays a critical role in protecting
the separation of powers. As explained below,
deferring to agency views of statutory ambiguity
raises at least two separation of powers concerns.
Indeed, that is why Chevron has come under recent
criticism by several members of this Court. The major
questions doctrine avoids these concerns in cases
where an agency claims extraordinary and expansive
power over a significant portion of the economy.
A. Deferring to agency views of ambiguous
statutory language raises separation of
powers concerns.
Deference to an agency’s understanding of
ambiguous statutes raises two potential separation of
powers concerns. First, yielding to an agency’s views
7
may abdicate to the executive branch the judiciary’s
constitutional duty to interpret statutes. “Those who
ratified the Constitution knew that legal texts would
often contain ambiguities.” Perez v. Mortg. Bankers
Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 119 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). And “[t]he judicial power was understood
to include the power to resolve these ambiguities.”
Ibid.; The Federalist No. 78, at 467 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[t]he
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar
province of the courts.”). Deference to an agency,
however,
precludes
judges
from
exercising
independent judgment on the best reading of
ambiguous statutory language in favor of the agency’s
preferred reading. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 761
(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Second, deference to an agency’s interpretation of
an ambiguous statutory term invites an unauthorized
transfer of legislative authority to the executive
branch. The Constitution provides that “[a]ll
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States.” U.S. Const., art. I, § 1
(emphasis added). This Court has thus long insisted
that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative
power, while recognizing that Congress can obtain the
assistance of executive agencies by conferring on them
authority to implement and enforce the laws. Gundy
v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (citing
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42–43
(1825)). Yielding to an agency’s understanding of
ambiguous
statutory
language
removes
an
independent judicial check on whether the line has
8
been crossed from executive branch assistance to
lawmaking.
This Court’s Chevron doctrine is premised on the
notion that agencies may be entrusted to sort out
statutory ambiguities because such ambiguities
merely reflect Congress’s enlistment of executive
branch assistance. This Court explained in Chevron
that it understood statutory ambiguities as policy
“gap[s] left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress” for
the agency to fill. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). Critically,
however, a court must first review the statute to
determine whether such a gap exists and the contours
of that gap. That prevents an agency from being the
arbiter of both the scope of its authority and how it
exercises that authority, as it would violate the
separation of powers for an agency to define the scope
of its own delegated authority. Michigan, 576 U.S. at
761–62 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Put simply, the Court’s precedents hold that “an
agency can fill in statutory gaps” where courts find
that “‘statutory circumstances’ indicate that Congress
meant to grant it such powers.” Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at
2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting United States
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001)). Once the
judiciary has resolved any question regarding the
scope of a congressional delegation, an agency may
implement Congress’s directive based on the relevant
factors within the scope of that delegation. Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983). If
9
implementing that congressional directive includes
giving meaning to terms in the statute that are
susceptible of multiple interpretations (i.e., that are
ambiguous), the agency’s implementation of that
congressional directive may include adopting an
interpretation that is “reasonable” (i.e., not “arbitrary
and capricious” or “an abuse of discretion”) and within
the scope of the delegation determined by the
judiciary. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
But as several members of this Court have noted,
Chevron raises serious separation of powers questions
even as so limited. Among them is the concern that
Chevron’s core premises are both wrong and
unconstitutional. Some have questioned whether
ambiguity is fairly considered a delegation by
Congress of gap-filling policy-making powers to
executive agencies. See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs.,
LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261, 286 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“Chevron’s fiction that ambiguity in a
statutory term is best construed as an implicit
delegation of power”) And some have questioned
whether Congress can even delegate such power, see,
e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. RRs., 575 U.S. 43,
70 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“[T]he discretion inherent in executive power does not
comprehend the discretion to formulate generally
applicable rules of private conduct.”); GutierrezBrizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1153 (10th Cir.
2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (explaining that even
if Congress intended to delegate legislative authority
through ambiguity “[t]he Supreme Court has long
recognized that under the Constitution ‘congress
10
cannot delegate legislative power to the president’”);
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation,
129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2150 (2016) (reviewing Robert
A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes (2014)) (“Chevron
itself is an atextual invention by courts. In many
ways, Chevron is nothing more than a judicially
orchestrated shift of power from Congress to the
Executive Branch.”).
Moreover, even accepting the constitutionality of
Chevron in principle, its presumptions do not always
bear out in practice. Again, the theory of Chevron is
that a statutory ambiguity “reflects Congress’s
implicit delegation of authority for the agency to make
policy and issue rules within the reasonable range of
the statutory ambiguity.” U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC,
855 F.3d 381, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). This
assumes that the intent to delegate and the breadth
of the intended delegation can be discerned from the
statute. But in reality, that is not always true. And
where congressional intent is not clear, deference by a
court to an agency’s resolution of statutory ambiguity
gives an agency exactly what it should never have: the
power to define the scope of its own authority.
B. The major questions doctrine avoids
separation of powers concerns in certain
instances of statutory ambiguity.
In the face of concerns about Chevron and its
treatment of statutory ambiguity, the major questions
doctrine is a canon of statutory construction that
11
prohibits a “major” exercise of agency authority based
solely on statutory silence or ambiguity. This
interpretive doctrine is based on the presumption that
Congress will “speak clearly if it wishes to assign to
an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political
significance.’” Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573
U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (UARG) (quoting FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160
(2000)). After all, “Congress is more likely to have
focused upon, and answered, major questions, while
leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in
the course of the statute’s daily administration.”
Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law
and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1986).
The major questions doctrine “operates as a vital
check on expansive and aggressive assertions of
executive authority” and “preserve[s] the separation
of powers.” United States Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at
417 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc). To begin with, by demanding
clarity the doctrine eliminates any doubt about
whether Congress intended to delegate certain
authority at all. Furthermore, in refusing to accept
ambiguity, the major questions doctrine ensures that
the judiciary must fulfill its duty to “say what the law
is.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).
The major questions doctrine also avoids
unnecessary invalidation of a statute under the nondelegation doctrine. In its current form, the nondelegation doctrine requires Congress to lay down
principles sufficient to guide the agency’s exercise of
12
authority. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123. And where, after
applying traditional canons of statutory construction,
the bounds of the congressional delegation are
unclear, the non-delegation doctrine may be
implicated. Ibid. The major questions doctrine avoids
non-delegation problems by resolving statutory
ambiguity to exclude “major questions” not clearly
addressed by Congress. Id. at 2142 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (“we apply the major questions doctrine in
service of the constitutional rule that Congress may
not divest itself of its legislative power by transferring
that power to an executive agency.”); see also Abbe R.
Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory
Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:
Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 1003 (2013) (the major
questions doctrine “supports a presumption of
nondelegation in the face of statutory ambiguity over
major policy questions.”).
II. This Court’s application of the major
questions doctrine has reflected, and should
continue to reflect, its significant purpose.
A. The major questions doctrine is triggered
whether an agency’s assertion of
authority is “major” in the particular
application or more generally
transformative.
When deciding to apply the major questions
doctrine, this Court has looked both to whether a
particular rule or action is “major” and to whether the
13
asserted authority is generally transformative. See,
e.g., Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021) (per curiam);
UARG, 573 U.S. at 324. In examining a specific rule
or action, this Court has considered measurable
metrics, such as the number of people affected by the
rule and the economic impact of the rule, as well as
public attention to the issue. And when considering
the nature of the asserted authority more generally,
this Court has considered how long-extant statutes
have previously been used and interpreted, as well as
the potential reach of the claimed power.
In MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Telephone &
Telegraph Co., for example, this Court looked to the
transformative nature of the agency’s reading of the
statute. 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994). There, this Court
rejected the FCC’s rule that completely exempted
certain telephone companies from rate-filing
requirements based on the FCC’s statutory authority
to modify such requirements. In doing so, this Court
reasoned that “[i]t is highly unlikely that Congress
would leave the determination of whether an industry
will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated
to agency discretion.” Ibid. The agency’s position, the
Court explained, was no less than “a fundamental
revision of the statute.” Ibid.
In Brown & Williamson, this Court likewise looked
mainly to the far-reaching implications of the asserted
authority in rejecting the FDA’s claim to jurisdiction
to regulate the tobacco industry. 529 U.S. at 159. This
Court explained that Congress would be expected to
14
have spoken clearly if it wished to authorize such
broad authority to “regulate an industry constituting
a significant portion of the American economy” with a
“unique place in American history and society.” Ibid.
It also noted that under the FDA’s view of the law, the
agency “would have the authority to ban cigarettes
and smokeless tobacco entirely.” Ibid.
This Court followed a similar approach in finding
that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) did not
grant the Attorney General authority to prohibit
physicians from prescribing controlled substances for
assisted suicide based on the major questions
doctrine. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 262 (2006).
In that case, the Court concluded that “the Attorney
General claims extraordinary authority,” explaining
that it “would be anomalous for Congress to have so
painstakingly described the Attorney General’s
limited authority to deregister a single physician or
schedule a single drug, but to have given him, just by
implication, authority to declare an entire class of
activity . . . a criminal violation of the CSA.” Ibid.
In contrast, this Court looked in UARG to both the
measurable impact of the specific EPA rule, as well as
the transformative power claimed by the agency. EPA
claimed under the CAA “[t]he power to require
permits for the construction and modification of tens
of thousands, and the operation of millions, of small
sources nationwide” based on their greenhouse gas
emissions. UARG, 573 U.S. at 324. Such expansive
authority, the Court said, “falls comfortably within
the class of authorizations that [this Court has] been
15
reluctant to read into ambiguous statutory text.” Ibid.
But it was not just the measurable impact of the
particular regulation that warranted major questions
treatment. EPA’s reading of the CAA, this Court also
said, brought “about an enormous and transformative
expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority” and would
have given the agency “unheralded power.” Ibid.
Finally, in the most recent application of the major
questions doctrine to the Centers for Disease Control’s
eviction moratorium, this Court once again relied on
both immediate impacts and sweeping potential
applications in finding the major questions doctrine
applicable. In Alabama Association of Realtors, this
Court found the doctrine triggered by the CDC’s claim
to authority under the Public Health Service Act to
enact a moratorium on evictions during the COVID19 pandemic. The Court looked first to the
moratorium’s vast economic impact, noting that “[a]t
least 80% of the country, including between 6 and 17
million tenants” would be affected by the moratorium,
which would impose “nearly $50 billion” in costs. Ala.
Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489. But “the issues
at stake [were] not merely financial.” Ibid. The CDC’s
reading would also grant it “a breathtaking amount of
authority” with seemingly no limit. Ibid. Indeed, the
CDC’s reading of the statute would allow it to
“mandate free grocery delivery to the homes of the sick
or vulnerable” or “[r]equire manufacturers to provide
free computers to enable people to work from home.”
Ibid. Such a breathtaking expansion of CDC’s
authority required clear congressional authorization.
Ibid.
16
The takeaway from these cases is that this Court
has been flexible in its consideration of both legal and
practical factors in determining what triggers the
major questions doctrine. In several cases, the
doctrine has been found to apply solely because an
agency has claimed legally transformative authority.
In MCI Telecomms. Corp., the Court applied the major
questions doctrine because FCC’s interpretation
would bring about a “fundamental revision of the
statute.” 512 U.S. at 231. In Brown & Williamson, the
Court focused only on the “breadth of the authority”
FDA asserted and what FDA might do with it. 529
U.S. at 159–60. And in Gonzales, this Court found the
major questions doctrine applied based on the
“extraordinary authority” the Attorney General
claimed, without assessing any measurable impact of
the rule. 546 U.S. at 262.
As for the cases where this Court found both
substantial measurable impact and a transformative
assertion of regulatory authority, none suggests that
both were necessary. In UARG, this Court recognized
the significant economic impact of EPA’s rule and
then noted “[m]oreover” the “extravagant” and
transformative nature of the power EPA claimed. 573
U.S. at 324. Similarly, in Alabama Association of
Realtors, this Court concluded that the substantial
economic impact of the CDC’s eviction moratorium
made it “exactly the kind” of rule subject to the major
questions doctrine. 141 S. Ct. at 2489. It then
additionally noted that the CDC’s understanding of
the statute was “[i]ndeed . . . breathtaking.” Ibid. If
17
anything, the Court appeared to be moved more by the
“unprecedented” and “sweeping” nature of CDC’s
“claim of expansive authority,” as it proceeded to spin
out hypotheticals illustrating the limitless reach of
the CDC’s theory. Ibid.
This flexibility makes sense given the important
constitutional purpose of the major questions
doctrine. It ensures that an extravagant assertion of
authority does not escape closer scrutiny. For
example, a rule that does not itself have broadly
measurable impacts may nevertheless be premised on
a theory of the statute that would permit a variety of
other wide-reaching and significant rules. The
separation of powers concerns with such a theory of
the statute, even if one particular application of it has
only minimal impact, are no less serious.
B. The major questions doctrine requires a
court to assess whether a statute clearly
grants an agency the claimed authority.
The major questions doctrine is a canon of
statutory construction that has been, and should be,
applied to statutory text irrespective of under which
step of Chevron the interpretation is presented.
Depending on the posture of the case, the major
questions doctrine has been applied as a canon of
statutory construction both to assist judicial
resolution of the scope of an agency’s authority in the
first instance, as well as to reject agency assertions of
deference to its interpretation under Chevron step
two. In all events, the court’s task is the same once it
18
is determined that the major questions doctrine
applies: to assess whether the statute clearly grants
the agency the claimed authority.
For example, the major questions doctrine has
been used by courts to determine whether an agency
has any business regulating under a statute at all—
what has sometimes been called Chevron step zero.
See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 485 (2015); Brown
& Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159. In those cases, this
Court explained that even if one were to accept the
premise often attributed to Chevron—that a statute’s
ambiguity is an implicit delegation—in cases
involving major questions “‘there may be reason to
hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended
such an implicit delegation.’” King, 576 U.S. at 485
(quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159).
Because of the expansive nature of the authority
claimed, the Court refused to accept that the mere
presence of ambiguity necessitated application of
Chevron two-step. Instead, the major questions
doctrine required a threshold inquiry into whether the
statute clearly provided the regulatory authority
claimed by the agency. Kavanaugh, supra at 2152.
Other cases have come to the Court in a very
different posture. Unlike King and Brown &
Williamson, in some cases there is no question that
Congress charged the agency with implementing the
statute to address the subject matter of concern. The
issue instead is the scope of that delegation, and
whether the agency may justify its claim of expanded
regulatory authority as a reasonable interpretation of
19
the statute entitled to deference under Chevron step
two.
Yet in those cases, the Court has applied the major
questions inquiry in the same way as in King and
Brown & Williamson. It has asked whether the
statutory text clearly grants the authority claimed by
the agency. If not, the Court has deemed the agency’s
reading contrary to law and therefore unreasonable
and entitled to no deference under Chevron. For
instance, in applying the major questions doctrine to
the eviction moratorium, this Court reasoned that
“[e]ven if the text were ambiguous,” the CDC’s reading
was simply not permitted. Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141
S. Ct. at 2489. This Court followed a similar approach
in UARG. Addressing the agency’s plea for deference
under Chevron step two, this Court rejected EPA’s
reading of the statute as “patently unreasonable” as a
matter of law and held that it “does not merit
deference.” 573 U.S. at 321.
In sum, the major questions inquiry is identical
irrespective of the Chevron framework. However a
case reaches a court, the interpretive task is the same
once it is determined that the major questions
doctrine applies. Whether presented at Chevron step
zero, one, or two, the major question doctrine is simply
a canon of statutory construction that asks whether
the statute clearly grants an agency the claimed
authority. That is how this Court has treated the
doctrine, and it is also consistent with the doctrine’s
preservation of the separation of powers by making
the question of authority one that a court must
20
answer. As Judge Walker summed up below, “[e]ither
a statute clearly endorses a major rule, or there can
be no major rule.” J.A. 230 (Walker, J., concurring in
part).
III.
The major questions doctrine confirms
that EPA had no discretion but to repeal
the CPP.
A. The CPP is exactly the kind of agency
claim of authority for which the major
questions doctrine exists.
The CPP satisfies both tests that this Court has
employed to determine whether the major questions
doctrine applies. It is premised on a transformative
expansion of a long-extant statute. And it is also a rule
with
wide-reaching
economic
and
political
consequence.
1. The Clean Power Plan represents an
unheralded expansion of EPA’s
authority under CAA section 111(d).
EPA’s interpretation of section 111(d) in support of
the CPP is exactly the type of unprecedented
authority that constitutes a major question. The CPP
is premised on turning section 111(d) from a “control
system” program into a provision that allows EPA to
require source owners across the country to reduce
production or to shut-down. This transformative
reading of section 111(d)—which would permit EPA to
compel reductions in existing source production that
21
can only be reclaimed by restructuring an entire
industry—is precisely the sort of significant and
unprecedented expansion of regulatory authority that
must be clearly authorized by Congress.
Environmental statutes, including the CAA, have
employed a variety of approaches to pollution control.
One common pollution-reduction approach used by
Congress in environmental statutes is to direct EPA
to establish emission or effluent limitations based on
the pollution reductions that can be achieved by
incorporating pollution control systems into new
sources or retrofitting them into existing sources. See,
e.g., CAA sections 111, 112, 169(3), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411,
7412, 7479(3); CWA sections 301(b), 306, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311(b), 1316. These control system programs focus
regulatory attention on measures that reduce an
individual source’s emissions at all levels of operation,
and not on reducing or eliminating source operation.
See, e.g., J.A. 330 (“[O]ur traditional interpretation
and implementation of CAA section 111 has allowed
regulated entities to produce as much of a particular
good as they desire provided that they do so through
an appropriately clean . . . process.”).
A second approach used by Congress has been to
direct EPA to establish limitations on the
concentration of pollution in air or water, at a level
that is protective of public health or welfare. See, e.g.,
CAA section 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409; CWA section 303,
33 U.S.C. § 1313. Implementation of these ambient
concentration-based
programs
could
require
curtailment of production or even shut down of a
22
specific source if needed to prevent exceedances of the
health or welfare-based concentration limit. See, e.g.,
Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976).
Under a third approach, Congress has established
programs for entire industrial categories that directly
regulate source operation. See, e.g., CAA Titles IV-A
and VI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o and §§ 7671-7671q.
Under the CAA’s Acid Rain “cap-and-trade” program,
for example, Congress allocated sulfur dioxide (SO2)
“allowances” to individual sources. A source can meet
its allowance allocation by controlling emissions, by
limiting production, or by shutting down. Another
example is the Stratospheric Ozone Protection
program of CAA Title VI, which explicitly phases out
specific types of production, subject to phase-down
schedules and safety valves to manage associated
economic and societal dislocation. Congress’s efforts to
craft climate change legislation based on this third
approach—essentially industrial and economic
restructuring to reduce carbon emissions—have failed
to produce any political consensus.1
As Petitioners have demonstrated, section 111
says nothing about reductions in production and
source shut-down. Instead, for more than 40 years,
section 111 has been considered the paradigm for
individual source control-system programs. S. Rep.
No. 95-370, at 50 (1977), reprinted in 1977
1 See, e.g., Clean Energy Jobs & Am. Power Act, S. 1733,
111th Cong. (2009) (rejecting greenhouse gas cap-and-trade
program).
23
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4375. Until the CPP, the section
111 program focused on lowering emissions
reductions by control systems, not by reductions in the
operation of a facility. Once EPA identified the “best
system of emission reduction” (BSER) for new sources
and the BSER for existing sources in an industrial
source category, EPA sets emission standards for
those sources based on those control systems.2
As recently as 2015, EPA set CAA section 111
carbon dioxide (CO2) standards for new coal-fired
generating facilities based on this well-established
understanding of section 111. In that new source
performance standard (NSPS) rule, EPA evaluated
control systems that could be incorporated into the
design of new coal-fired facilities and concluded that
carbon capture control systems were adequately
demonstrated. The NSPS was based on incorporation
of those controls into facility design. 80 Fed. Reg.
64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015).
But
EPA
abandoned
this
traditional
understanding of section 111 when it came to existing
coal-fired generating facilities. Unlike for new
facilities, EPA concluded that carbon capture systems
were not demonstrated for existing coal-fired
generation and therefore could not be BSER for those
Each of the approximately one hundred new source
performance standards that EPA has set in more than 60 source
categories has been based on a control system that can be applied
to reduce emissions regardless of level of operation at the
regulated source itself. See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 60, subpts. CbOOOO.
2
24
sources. That left heat rate (i.e., efficiency)
improvements as the only CO2 reduction system upon
which to base an existing source standard. But
because efficiency improvements would not produce
the level of emission reductions needed to achieve the
Administration’s climate change goals, J.A. 577, J.A.
658, and because Congress had not enacted the capand-trade climate change legislation recommended by
the Administration, id. at 439–43 (congressional
action on climate change limited to research,
monitoring, and data collection), EPA concluded that
it had no choice but to undertake an “‘aggressive
transformation’” of the mix of electric generation
under section 111 using standards that would require
fossil generating units to reduce production or shut
down. Id. at 225 (quoting White House Fact Sheet);
see also id. at 683 (“Given EGU’s large contribution to
U.S. GHG emissions, any attempt to address . . .
climate change must necessarily include significant
emission reductions from this sector.”). In the CPP,
EPA required each existing coal-fired unit to meet a
numerical performance standard expressed in pounds
of CO2 per megawatt hour generated (CO2 lbs/MWhr).
This performance standard was set at a level roughly
30 to 40 percent below the CO2 lbs/MWhr performance
rate associated with coal-fired generation.3
Because there was no demonstrated CO2 control
system capable of reducing CO2 emissions from these
3 EPA set the CPP performance rate at 1,305 lbs/MWhr,
which is roughly 38% below the typical CO2 performance rate
for a coal-fired unit of 2,100 lbs/MWhr. J.A. 300, J.A. 1362.
25
sources by 30 to 40 percent, EPA created a “system” of
“emission reduction credits” (ERCs) that represented
operation of “clean” generation, i.e., renewable energy
(RE) generation with zero CO2 emissions. ERCs would
be required for each megawatt hour of continued
operation at existing units.4 Through this credit
“system,” new “clean” generation would come to
replace existing fossil generation in at least two ways.
Id. at 579–80 (“[M]ost of the CO2 controls need to come
in the form of . . . replacement of higher emitting
generation with lower- or zero-emitting generation.”);
id. at 584 (BSER requires “replacement of defined
quantities of fossil generation by RE generation.”); id.
at 676 (“[T]he volume of coal-fired generation will
decrease.”). The cost of credits would increase the cost
of, and reduce the demand for, existing generation.
And if credits could not be obtained, the only way to
comply would be to simply curtail production or shut
down existing units. Id. at 697 (Reduced operations
would still require “that the owner/operator . . .
acquire[] . . . ERCs to use in computing . . . compliance”
for all remaining operations.).
Because compliance with the uniform performance rate
cannot be achieved through available controls, the ERC “system”
uses a legal fiction to demonstrate “compliance” through trading
of ERCs and averaging. For example, assuming for ease of
calculation that (i) an existing unit emits 2,000 pounds of CO2
each megawatt hour it generates, and (ii) a CPP standard for that
unit was 1,000 lbs/MWhr, the owner of the unit would have to
ଶ ୪ୠୱ/୦୰ ା ୪ୠୱ/୦୰
ൌ
hold one renewable energy credit ሺ
ଶ
1000 lbs/MWhrሻ to meet the CPP standard.
4
26
EPA projected that by using section 111 to regulate
production under an approach similar to CAA Title IV,
id. at 607 (CPP “resembles . . . the emissions trading
program enacted [by Congress] in Title IV of the 1990
CAA Amendments.”); id. at 292 (“BSER mirrors
Congress’s approach to regulating . . . as exemplified
by Title IV of the CAA.”); id. at 611 (Emissions
“trading [is] an integral part of the BSER analysis.”),
it could achieve emission reductions that would
satisfy the Administration’s CO2 climate change
goals. Id. at 290 (“This final rule is a significant step
forward in implementing the President’s Climate
Action Plan.”); id. at 345 (The CPP “constitutes a
major commitment . . . and international leadership .
. . on the part of the U.S.”); id. at 446–48.
But by transforming CAA section 111 from a
control systems program into a program under which
EPA is authorized to compel substantial reductions in
production at or the shutdown of existing facilities
within an industrial category, EPA has walked
straight into the teeth of the major questions doctrine.
This approach is not only transformative from the way
section 111 has long been understood, but it is also
extraordinarily expansive. Indeed, that was the goal:
to claim through section 111 the authority to remake
the energy sector. And that is precisely the sort of
extravagant claim to authority that this Court has
found to trigger the major questions doctrine. MCI
Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 231 (“a fundamental
revision of the statute” from rate-regulation for all
carriers to rate-regulation only where the agency
deems necessary); see also UARG, 573 U.S. at 324
27
(“unheralded power to regulate” greenhouse gas
emissions from millions of small sources that had
never been regulated before).
And that is not even the half of it. EPA’s broad
reading of “system” in section 111 to include any set of
steps or measures that would require owners and
operators to reduce CO2 emissions through forced
reductions in production would give EPA “a
breathtaking amount of authority,” Ala. Ass’n of
Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489, in areas well beyond its
expertise. Under its newfound authority, EPA could
limit production in virtually any industry based on the
claim that production could be shifted to lower
emitting facilities that may or may not even exist at
the time EPA promulgates the rule. As with the CPP,
EPA could cap emissions for any industrial sector
based on projections that lower emitting facilities
would be able to meet future product demand, or
perhaps even projections regarding measures directed
at consumers to reduce demand for products from
disfavored sources. See, e.g., JA at 144, note 10
(“[D]emand-side energy efficiency . . . [is] a policy tool”
available under section 111(d).). Having capped
emissions for an industrial sector, EPA could (as it did
under CPP) create a trading program to subsidize
preferred production. In other words, by constraining
production in any industrial sector with facilities that
emit CO2, EPA could force consumers of that
industry’s products to switch to EPA’s preferred
modes of production. There is virtually no limit to how
this playbook could be run: it could apply to electric
utilities today and the paper products, refining, or
28
transportation sectors tomorrow. Such sweeping
power to act as the central planner for entire
industrial sectors falls comfortably within the cases
where this Court has found clear congressional
authorization required. Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S.
Ct. at 2489 (applying major questions doctrine where
the government identified no limit beyond that the
agency “deem a measure ‘necessary’”).
2. The Clean Power Plan also triggers
the major questions doctrine because
of its significant economic and
political impact.
The CPP also fits within the types of cases where
this Court has found that the “vast ‘economic and
political significance’” of a particular rule trigger the
major questions doctrine. UARG, 573 U.S. at 324.
The economic impact of the CPP is alone enough to
qualify as significant. Industry analysts estimated the
CPP would cause wholesale electricity costs to rise by
$214 billion and cost another $64 billion in terms of
replacing shuttered capacity.5 Even EPA’s own
analysis identified billions of dollars in compliance
costs, as well as the elimination of thousands of jobs.6
5 NMA, EPA's Clean Power Plan An Economic Impact
Analysis 2 (undated),
http://nma.org/attachments/article/2368/11.13.15%20NMA
_EPAs%20Clean%20Power%20Plan%20%20An%20Economic%2
0Impact%20Analysis.pdf.
6 See, e.g., EPA, EPA-452/R-15-003, Regulatory Impact
Analysis for the Clean Power Plan Final Rule 3-22, 6-25 (Aug.
29
In terms of total costs, the Department of Energy
projected that a federal mandate to restructure the
Nation’s energy grid, like CPP, would impose
hundreds of billions of dollars in lost GDP from 2015
to 2040.7 The rule is also indisputably significant from
the standpoint of estimated benefits, which EPA
anticipated would reach between $26 billion and $45
billion.8 By any of these metrics, the estimated
potential economic impact of the CPP is comparable to
other cases where this Court has found a major
question. See Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489
(finding significant economic impact based on nearly
$50 billion in estimated costs); UARG, 573 U.S. at 324
(economic significance based on requiring permits for
the operation of millions of small sources nationwide).
Contrary to the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion below,
J.A. 148–50, it is immaterial that the CPP’s mandated
generation shifting might impose fewer costs than
other controls that EPA potentially could have
employed, such as carbon capture and storage. The
question is not whether EPA selected the least costly
2015, replaced Oct. 23, 2015),
https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/docs/ria/utilities_ria_fin al-cleanpower-plan-existing-units_2015-08.pdf .
7 See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Analysis of
the Impacts of the Clean Power Plan 63-64 (Fig. 39) (May 2015),
https://w
ww.eia.gov/analysis/requests/powerplants/cleanplan/pdf/powerp
lant.pdf.
8 EPA, Fact Sheet, Overview of the Clean Power Plan,
Cutting Carbon Pollution From Power Plants 3 (undated),
https://archive.ep a.gov/epa/sites/production/files/201508/documents/fs-cpp-overview.pdf.
30
approach, but whether the approach that it did choose
is itself economically significant.
As for its political impact, that too qualifies the
CPP as significant. By almost any metric, the CPP is
an issue subject to “‘earnest and profound debate’
across the country.” Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267
(citation omitted). Indeed, the CPP generated 4.3
million comments during the rulemaking process.
Perhaps more important, the CPP was an effort to
take executive action where legislative action had
previously failed. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S.
at 143–51 (taking into account Congress’s
consideration of proposals that would have granted an
agency power it later asserted unilaterally); see also
U.S. Telecom. Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 417 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc)
(finding the FCC’s net neutrality rule unlawful
because Congress failed to clearly authorize it despite
having debated net neutrality for many years). It is by
now well known that Congress has not enacted
general climate change legislation. In fact, it has
repeatedly rejected a number of generation-shifting
approaches, including a carbon tax, S. Con. Res. 8, S.
Amdt. 646, 113th Cong. (2013); fees on greenhouse gas
emissions, Climate Prot. Act of 2013, S. 332, 113th
Cong. (2013); and a greenhouse gas cap-and-trade
program. Clean Energy Jobs & Am. Power Act, S.
1733, 111th Cong. (2009).
31
B. EPA is correct that the major questions
doctrine can and does confirm its analysis of
the statute at Chevron step one.
EPA explained that
[w]hile [it] believes that [its action repealing the CPP]
is based on the only permissible reading of the statute
and would reach that conclusion even without
consideration of the major questions doctrine, the
EPA believes that that doctrine should apply here and
that its application confirms the unambiguously
expressed intent of CAA section 111.
J.A. 1770. In other words, EPA concluded both that
the plain text unambiguously precludes the CPP at
Chevron step one and that the major questions
doctrine also bars the CPP.
As explained above, that is precisely how the major
questions doctrine does and should work. Where the
doctrine applies, it requires a court to assess whether
the statute clearly grants the agency the claimed
authority. The major questions doctrine is a canon of
statutory
construction
that
simply
(and
independently) asks whether the statute clearly
grants an agency the claimed authority. If not, the
agency action is unlawful, regardless of where in the
Chevron analysis the doctrine is applied.
Here, section 111(d) does not clearly authorize
EPA to exercise the extraordinary power it has
claimed—namely, to set greenhouse gas emission
32
standards for existing power plants that are
unachievable through controls at any individual
source, but rather require owners and operators of
regulated sources to reduce their operations or to shut
them down. That reading is not supported by the plain
text. And it is confirmed by the major questions
doctrine. EPA was right that it was required to repeal
the CPP.
33
CONCLUSION
The decision below should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH
LLP
ELBERT LIN
Counsel Of Record
951 East Byrd Street, East
Tower
Richmond, Virginia 23219
elin@HuntonAK.com
(804) 788-8200
F. WILLIAM BROWNELL
ERICA N. PETERSON
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH
LLP
2200 Pennsylvania Avenue,
NW, Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20037
(202) 955-1500
December 13, 2021
Counsel for Respondent
America’s Power
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.