Respondents Brief — West Virginia, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

Supreme Court briefDec 13, 2021

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Nos. 20-1530, 20-1531, 20-1778, and 20-1780

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

________________________________

WEST VIRGINIA, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND

MICHAEL REGAN, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondents.

________________________________

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

________________________________

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AMERICA’S POWER IN

SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

________________________________

F. WILLIAM BROWNELL

ERICA N. PETERSON

HUNTON ANDREWS

KURTH LLP

2200 Pennsylvania

Avenue, NW,

Suite 900

Washington, DC 20037

(202) 955-1500

ELBERT LIN

Counsel of Record

HUNTON ANDREWS

KURTH LLP

951 East Byrd Street,

East Tower

Richmond, VA 23219

elin@HuntonAK.com

(804) 788-8200

December 13, 2021

Counsel for Respondent

America’s Power

Additional Captions Listed on Inside Cover

THE NORTH AMERICAN COAL CORPORATION

PETITIONER,

V.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS.

________________________________

WESTMORELAND MINING HOLDINGS, LLC,

PETITIONER,

V.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

RESPONDENTS.

________________________________

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA,

PETITIONER,

V.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

RESPONDENTS.

________________________________

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

In 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d), an ancillary provision of the

Clean Air Act, did Congress constitutionally authorize

the Environmental Protection Agency to issue

significant rules—including those capable of

reshaping the nation’s electricity grids and

unilaterally decarbonizing virtually any sector of the

economy—without any limits on what the agency can

require so long as it considers cost, nonair impacts,

and energy requirements?

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners are the States of West Virginia,

Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana,

Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,

Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota,

Texas, Utah, and Wyoming; and Mississippi Governor

Tate Reeves. Each petitioner was a respondentintervenor below.

Petitioner in 20-1531 is The North American Coal

Corporation.

Petitioner in 20-1778 is Westmoreland Mining

Holdings, LLC.

Petitioner in 20-1780 is the State of North Dakota.

Respondents in 20-1530 who filed briefs in support

of certiorari were America’s Power, Basin Electric

Power Cooperative, and the National Mining

Association. Each was a respondent-intervenor below.

Respondents in 20-1530, 20-1531, 20-1778, 201780 who were petitioners below and filed briefs in

opposition to certiorari are Consolidated Edison, Inc.,

Exelon Corporation, National Grid USA, New York

Power Authority, Power Companies Climate

Coalition, Sacramento Municipal Utility District,

American Lung Association, American Public Health

Association, Appalachian Mountain Club, Center for

Biological Diversity, Chesapeake Bay Foundation,

Inc., Clean Air Council, Clean Wisconsin,

Conservation Law Foundation, Environmental

iii

Defense Fund, Environmental Law & Policy Center,

Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy,

Natural Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club,

Advanced Energy Economy, American Clean Power

Association (successor of the American Wind Energy

Association), Solar Energy Industries Association,

State of New York, State of California, State of

Colorado, State of Delaware, State of Hawaii, State of

Illinois, State of Maine, State of Maryland,

Commonwealth of Massachusetts, People of the State

of Michigan, State of Minnesota, State of New Jersey,

State of New Mexico, State of North Carolina, State of

Oregon, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, State of

Rhode Island, State of Vermont, Commonwealth of

Virginia, State of Washington, State of Wisconsin,

District of Columbia, City of Boulder (CO), City of

Chicago, City and County of Denver, City of Los

Angeles, City of New York, City of Philadelphia, and

the City of South Miami (FL).

Respondent in 20-1530, 20-1531, 20-1778, 20-1780

who was a petitioner-intervenor below and filed a

brief in opposition to certiorari is the State of Nevada.

Respondents in 20-1530, 20-1531, 20-1778, 201780 who were respondents below are the United

States Environmental Protection Agency and Michael

Regan, in his official capacity as Administrator of the

United States Environmental Protection Agency

(substituted for the previous administrator under

Supreme Court Rule 35.3).

iv

Respondents who were petitioners below and did

not file any brief at the certiorari stage are, by court

of appeals case number, as follows:

In case no. 19-1175: Robinson Enterprises, Inc.,

Nuckles Oil Co., Inc., DBA Merit Oil Co., Construction

Industry Air Quality Coalition, Liberty Packing Co.

LLC, Dalton Trucking, Inc., Norman R. “Skip” Brown,

Joanne Brown, The Competitive Enterprise Institute,

and the Texas Public Policy Foundation.

In case no. 19-1185: Biogenic CO2 Coalition.

Respondents who were respondent-intervenors

below and did not file any brief at the certiorari stage

are Indiana Michigan Power Co., Kentucky Power Co.,

Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, Southwestern

Electric Power Co., AEP Generating Co., AEP

Generation Resources, Inc., Wheeling Power Co.,

Chamber of Commerce of the United States of

America, Indiana Energy Association and Indiana

Utility Group, International Brotherhood of

Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths,

Forgers & Helpers, AFL-CIO, Murray Energy Corp.,

National Rural Electric Cooperative Association,

Nevada Gold Mines, Newmont Nevada Energy

Investment, and PowerSouth Energy Cooperative.

v

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Respondent America’s Power is a trade association

comprised of companies involved in the production of

electricity from coal. It has no parent corporation, and

no publicly held company owns a 10 percent or greater

interest in America’s Power.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED .......................................... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ......................... ii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ........... vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................... viii

INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................... 3

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 6

I.

II.

The major questions doctrine protects against

expansions of executive branch authority

through ambiguous language. ............................ 6

A.

Deferring to agency views of ambiguous

statutory language raises separation of

powers concerns. ......................................... 6

B.

The major questions doctrine avoids

separation of powers concerns in certain

instances of statutory ambiguity. ............ 10

This Court’s application of the major questions

doctrine has reflected, and should continue to

reflect, its significant purpose. ......................... 12

A.

The major questions doctrine is triggered

whether an agency’s assertion of authority

is “major” in the particular application or

more generally transformative................. 12

B.

The major questions doctrine requires a

court to assess whether a statute clearly

grants an agency the claimed authority. . 17

vii

III. The major questions doctrine confirms that EPA

had no discretion but to repeal the CPP. ......... 20

A.

The CPP is exactly the kind of agency claim

of authority for which the major questions

doctrine exists. .......................................... 20

B.

EPA is correct that the major questions

doctrine can and does confirm its analysis

of the statute at Chevron step one. .......... 31

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 33

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Human

Servs.,

141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021) (per curiam) ............ passim

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837 (1984)...................................... passim

Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,

579 U.S. 261 (2016)................................................ 9

Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. RRs.,

575 U.S. 43 (2015).................................................. 9

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120 (2000)...................................... passim

Gonzales v. Oregon,

546 U.S. 243 (2006).................................. 14, 16, 30

Gundy v. United States,

139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).................................. 7, 8, 12

Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch,

834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016).............................. 9

King v. Burwell,

576 U.S. 473 (2015).............................................. 18

ix

Marbury v. Madison,

1 Cranch 137 (1803)............................................. 11

MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Telephone & Telegraph

Co.,

512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994) .......................... 13, 16, 26

Michigan v. EPA,

576 U.S. 743 (2015)............................................ 7, 8

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

463 U.S. 29 (1983).................................................. 8

Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n,

575 U.S. 92 (2015).................................................. 7

U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC,

855 F.3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2017) .............................. 10

Union Elec. Co. v. EPA,

427 U.S. 246 (1976).............................................. 22

United States v. Mead Corp.,

533 U.S. 218 (2001)................................................ 8

Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,

573 U.S. 302 (2014)...................................... passim

Wayman v. Southard,

23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825) ................................. 7

x

Statutes and Constitutional Provision

33 U.S.C. § 1311 ........................................................ 21

33 U.S.C. § 1313 ........................................................ 21

33 U.S.C. § 1316 ........................................................ 21

42 U.S.C. § 7409 ........................................................ 21

42 U.S.C. § 7411 .................................................... 1, 21

42 U.S.C. § 7412 ........................................................ 21

42 U.S.C. § 7479(3).................................................... 21

42 U.S.C. § 7651-7651o ............................................. 22

42 U.S.C. § 7671-7671q ............................................. 22

CAA Title IV-A .......................................................... 22

CAA Title IV .............................................................. 26

CAA Title VI .............................................................. 22

Clean Energy Jobs & Am. Power Act,

S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009) .......................... 22, 30

Climate Prot. Act of 2013,

S. 332, 113th Cong. (2013) .................................. 30

Controlled Substances Act ........................................ 14

Public Health Service Act ......................................... 15

xi

U.S. Const., art. I, § 1 ................................................. 7

Other Authorities

40 C.F.R. pt. 60, subpts............................................. 23

80 Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015) .......................... 23

Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory

Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical

Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and

the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 1003

(2013) .................................................................... 12

Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation,

129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2150 (2016) ............. 10, 18

EPA, EPA-452/R-15-003, Regulatory Impact Analysis

for the Clean Power Plan Final Rule 3-22, 6-25

(Aug. 2015, replaced Oct. 23, 2015),

https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/docs/ria/utilities_ri

a_final-clean-power-plan-existing-units_201508.pdf .................................................................... 28

EPA, Fact Sheet, Overview of the Clean Power Plan,

Cutting Carbon Pollution From Power Plants 3

(undated),

https://archive.epa.gov/epa/sites/production/files/2

015-08/documents/fs-cpp-overview.pdf ............... 29

xii

NMA, EPA’s Clean Power Plan An Economic Impact

Analysis 2 (undated),

http://nma.org/attachments/article/2368/11.13.15

%20NMA

_EPAs%20Clean%20Power%20Plan%20%20An%

20Economic%20Impact%20Analysis.pdf ............ 28

S. Con. Res. 8, S. Amdt. 646, 113th Cong. (2013) .... 30

S. Rep. No. 95-370 (1977), reprinted in 1977

U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326 ............................................... 22

Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law

and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1986) ... 11

U.S. Energy Information Administration, Analysis of

the Impacts of the Clean Power Plan 63-64 (Fig.

39) (May 2015),

https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/powerplant

s/cleanplan/pdf/powerplant.pdf ........................... 29

1

INTRODUCTION

The major questions doctrine is an important

canon of statutory construction that protects the

separation of powers when an agency asserts

expansive authority based on statutory ambiguity.

Where statutes include ambiguity, judicial deference

to an agency’s interpretation raises separation of

powers concerns. This Court’s major questions

doctrine addresses these concerns in part by

recognizing that Congress must speak clearly—and

not through ambiguity—if it wishes to authorize an

agency to exercise enormous and transformative

regulatory power over a significant portion of the

economy.

It is difficult to imagine a better illustration of the

need for the major questions doctrine than this case.

In 2015, the EPA claimed to have discovered in a

scarcely used, narrowly tailored provision of the Clean

Air Act (CAA) breathtaking power to reorganize the

energy generation sector. The Clean Power Plan

(CPP) used CAA section 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d),

to set greenhouse gas emission standards for existing

power plants that were unachievable through controls

at any individual source. Under the CPP, owners and

operators of regulated sources would be required to

reduce operations and shift generation to lower

emitting generators, or would be required to shut

down if that alternative generation was not available.

The CPP never went into effect, however, because in

early 2016, this Court stayed the rule pending

litigation brought by a broad coalition of states, trade

2

and labor associations, and regulated entities. Then in

2019, EPA repealed the CPP, recognizing that the

regulation exceeded the agency’s statutory authority

because section 111(d) is limited to systems of controls

that can be applied at individual sources. Among

other reasons, EPA invoked the major questions

doctrine.

This litigation, in which America’s Power

intervened in support of EPA alongside Petitioners

here, followed. This case is about whether EPA

correctly concluded that it was required to repeal the

CPP, and to replace it with a rule premised on controls

that could be applied at individual sources (the

“Affordable Clean Energy” rule).

There are many reasons supporting EPA’s

conclusion that it lacked statutory power to adopt the

generation shifting measures in CPP, but this brief

focuses on only one: the major questions doctrine. As

Petitioners explain, the plain-text and context of

section 111(d) clearly provide that the CPP exceeded

EPA’s statutory authority. America’s Power does not

repeat those arguments here. Instead, this brief

supplements Petitioners’ discussion of EPA’s

invocation of the major questions doctrine—i.e., that

the interpretation of section 111(d) on which the CPP

was based would bring about an enormous and

transformative expansion of EPA’s regulatory

authority without clear congressional authorization.

As discussed below, the authority claimed by EPA in

the CPP falls squarely in the domain of the major

questions doctrine.

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

As a supplement to Petitioners’ arguments on the

major questions doctrine, this brief proceeds in three

parts. First, it explains the important function played

by the major questions doctrine in protecting the

separation of powers in certain cases of statutory

ambiguity. Second, it explains that the doctrine’s

purpose has informed, and should continue to inform,

how this Court applies it. And third, it explains how

the major questions doctrine clearly applies here and

supports EPA’s conclusion that the agency was

required to repeal the CPP.

I. The major questions doctrine is a canon of

statutory interpretation that prevents significant

expansion of executive branch authority based solely

on statutory ambiguity. Deference to an agency’s

reading of an ambiguous statute raises two potential

separation of powers concerns: abdication to the

executive branch of the judiciary’s power to say what

the law is and the unauthorized transfer of legislative

authority to the executive branch. The major

questions doctrine addresses those concerns in part by

requiring courts to find a clear statement from

Congress where an agency claims extraordinary and

transformative powers. The doctrine thus operates as

a vital check on the executive branch and also avoids

unnecessary resort to the non-delegation doctrine by

reading narrowly a statute that would otherwise

implicate non-delegation concerns.

4

II. When determining whether the major questions

doctrine applies, this Court has taken a flexible

approach that reflects the important constitutional

separation of powers purpose the doctrine serves. It

has looked to both whether a particular rule is “major”

and whether the agency has more generally asserted

transformative statutory authority. Either has been

sufficient to trigger the major questions doctrine. This

Court has also applied the major questions doctrine at

all steps of the Chevron analysis. No matter what step

of the Chevron analysis an agency might invoke in

defense of a rule, the Court has undertaken the same

task: it has looked to the statute itself to determine

whether Congress clearly grants the authority the

agency has claimed. If Congress did not do so, the

agency cannot use ambiguity to justify its action.

III.A.1. The CPP satisfies both tests this Court has

employed to determine whether the major questions

doctrine applies. In support of CPP, EPA interpreted

section 111(d) to authorize standards that compel

massive reductions in existing generation based on

projections that alternative forms of generation will

replace that existing generation. This is exactly the

type of unprecedented authority that constitutes a

major question. EPA’s reading not only transforms

section 111 from how it has long been understood but

also expands EPA’s authority to include remaking the

energy sector. Indeed, under its newfound authority,

EPA could restructure virtually any industry to

achieve emission reductions.

5

2. The CPP also fits within the types of cases where

this Court has found that the vast economic and

political significance of the particular rule being

reviewed triggers the major questions doctrine.

Estimates from industry and EPA show that the CPP

has significant economic impact. The rule is also

clearly politically significant for many reasons,

including that it seeks to address an issue that

Congress has repeatedly considered but declined to

take on.

B. Finally, EPA was correct in concluding that the

major questions doctrine provided independent

confirmation that the CPP exceeded the agency’s

authority. As Petitioners explain, the plain-text and

context of section 111(d) alone make this apparent.

But EPA was also right to consider the major

questions doctrine. Even though the agency had found

the statute unambiguous at Chevron step one, the

agency correctly recognized that the major questions

doctrine is a canon of statutory construction that can

be and is applied at any step of Chevron to determine

whether the agency’s interpretation is contrary to law.

It applies here and further confirms that EPA was

required to repeal the CPP.

6

ARGUMENT

I. The major questions doctrine protects

against expansions of executive branch

authority through ambiguous language.

The major questions doctrine prohibits agencies

from exercising vast regulatory authority based solely

on statutory silence or ambiguity. It provides that

when an agency seeks to exercise major regulatory

authority, the agency must identify a clear statement

from Congress granting such authority. Put another

way, the doctrine bars judicial deference to agency

interpretation of ambiguous statutory language in

certain circumstances.

The doctrine thus plays a critical role in protecting

the separation of powers. As explained below,

deferring to agency views of statutory ambiguity

raises at least two separation of powers concerns.

Indeed, that is why Chevron has come under recent

criticism by several members of this Court. The major

questions doctrine avoids these concerns in cases

where an agency claims extraordinary and expansive

power over a significant portion of the economy.

A. Deferring to agency views of ambiguous

statutory language raises separation of

powers concerns.

Deference to an agency’s understanding of

ambiguous statutes raises two potential separation of

powers concerns. First, yielding to an agency’s views

7

may abdicate to the executive branch the judiciary’s

constitutional duty to interpret statutes. “Those who

ratified the Constitution knew that legal texts would

often contain ambiguities.” Perez v. Mortg. Bankers

Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 119 (2015) (Thomas, J.,

concurring). And “[t]he judicial power was understood

to include the power to resolve these ambiguities.”

Ibid.; The Federalist No. 78, at 467 (Alexander

Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[t]he

interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar

province of the courts.”). Deference to an agency,

however,

precludes

judges

from

exercising

independent judgment on the best reading of

ambiguous statutory language in favor of the agency’s

preferred reading. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 761

(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).

Second, deference to an agency’s interpretation of

an ambiguous statutory term invites an unauthorized

transfer of legislative authority to the executive

branch. The Constitution provides that “[a]ll

legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a

Congress of the United States.” U.S. Const., art. I, § 1

(emphasis added). This Court has thus long insisted

that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative

power, while recognizing that Congress can obtain the

assistance of executive agencies by conferring on them

authority to implement and enforce the laws. Gundy

v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (citing

Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42–43

(1825)). Yielding to an agency’s understanding of

ambiguous

statutory

language

removes

an

independent judicial check on whether the line has

8

been crossed from executive branch assistance to

lawmaking.

This Court’s Chevron doctrine is premised on the

notion that agencies may be entrusted to sort out

statutory ambiguities because such ambiguities

merely reflect Congress’s enlistment of executive

branch assistance. This Court explained in Chevron

that it understood statutory ambiguities as policy

“gap[s] left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress” for

the agency to fill. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res.

Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). Critically,

however, a court must first review the statute to

determine whether such a gap exists and the contours

of that gap. That prevents an agency from being the

arbiter of both the scope of its authority and how it

exercises that authority, as it would violate the

separation of powers for an agency to define the scope

of its own delegated authority. Michigan, 576 U.S. at

761–62 (Thomas, J., concurring).

Put simply, the Court’s precedents hold that “an

agency can fill in statutory gaps” where courts find

that “‘statutory circumstances’ indicate that Congress

meant to grant it such powers.” Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at

2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting United States

v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001)). Once the

judiciary has resolved any question regarding the

scope of a congressional delegation, an agency may

implement Congress’s directive based on the relevant

factors within the scope of that delegation. Motor

Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983). If

9

implementing that congressional directive includes

giving meaning to terms in the statute that are

susceptible of multiple interpretations (i.e., that are

ambiguous), the agency’s implementation of that

congressional directive may include adopting an

interpretation that is “reasonable” (i.e., not “arbitrary

and capricious” or “an abuse of discretion”) and within

the scope of the delegation determined by the

judiciary. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.

But as several members of this Court have noted,

Chevron raises serious separation of powers questions

even as so limited. Among them is the concern that

Chevron’s core premises are both wrong and

unconstitutional. Some have questioned whether

ambiguity is fairly considered a delegation by

Congress of gap-filling policy-making powers to

executive agencies. See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs.,

LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261, 286 (2016) (Thomas, J.,

concurring) (“Chevron’s fiction that ambiguity in a

statutory term is best construed as an implicit

delegation of power”) And some have questioned

whether Congress can even delegate such power, see,

e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. RRs., 575 U.S. 43,

70 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)

(“[T]he discretion inherent in executive power does not

comprehend the discretion to formulate generally

applicable rules of private conduct.”); GutierrezBrizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1153 (10th Cir.

2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (explaining that even

if Congress intended to delegate legislative authority

through ambiguity “[t]he Supreme Court has long

recognized that under the Constitution ‘congress

10

cannot delegate legislative power to the president’”);

Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation,

129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2150 (2016) (reviewing Robert

A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes (2014)) (“Chevron

itself is an atextual invention by courts. In many

ways, Chevron is nothing more than a judicially

orchestrated shift of power from Congress to the

Executive Branch.”).

Moreover, even accepting the constitutionality of

Chevron in principle, its presumptions do not always

bear out in practice. Again, the theory of Chevron is

that a statutory ambiguity “reflects Congress’s

implicit delegation of authority for the agency to make

policy and issue rules within the reasonable range of

the statutory ambiguity.” U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC,

855 F.3d 381, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J.,

dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). This

assumes that the intent to delegate and the breadth

of the intended delegation can be discerned from the

statute. But in reality, that is not always true. And

where congressional intent is not clear, deference by a

court to an agency’s resolution of statutory ambiguity

gives an agency exactly what it should never have: the

power to define the scope of its own authority.

B. The major questions doctrine avoids

separation of powers concerns in certain

instances of statutory ambiguity.

In the face of concerns about Chevron and its

treatment of statutory ambiguity, the major questions

doctrine is a canon of statutory construction that

11

prohibits a “major” exercise of agency authority based

solely on statutory silence or ambiguity. This

interpretive doctrine is based on the presumption that

Congress will “speak clearly if it wishes to assign to

an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political

significance.’” Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573

U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (UARG) (quoting FDA v. Brown

& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160

(2000)). After all, “Congress is more likely to have

focused upon, and answered, major questions, while

leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in

the course of the statute’s daily administration.”

Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law

and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1986).

The major questions doctrine “operates as a vital

check on expansive and aggressive assertions of

executive authority” and “preserve[s] the separation

of powers.” United States Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at

417 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of

rehearing en banc). To begin with, by demanding

clarity the doctrine eliminates any doubt about

whether Congress intended to delegate certain

authority at all. Furthermore, in refusing to accept

ambiguity, the major questions doctrine ensures that

the judiciary must fulfill its duty to “say what the law

is.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).

The major questions doctrine also avoids

unnecessary invalidation of a statute under the nondelegation doctrine. In its current form, the nondelegation doctrine requires Congress to lay down

principles sufficient to guide the agency’s exercise of

12

authority. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123. And where, after

applying traditional canons of statutory construction,

the bounds of the congressional delegation are

unclear, the non-delegation doctrine may be

implicated. Ibid. The major questions doctrine avoids

non-delegation problems by resolving statutory

ambiguity to exclude “major questions” not clearly

addressed by Congress. Id. at 2142 (Gorsuch, J.,

dissenting) (“we apply the major questions doctrine in

service of the constitutional rule that Congress may

not divest itself of its legislative power by transferring

that power to an executive agency.”); see also Abbe R.

Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory

Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of

Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:

Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 1003 (2013) (the major

questions doctrine “supports a presumption of

nondelegation in the face of statutory ambiguity over

major policy questions.”).

II. This Court’s application of the major

questions doctrine has reflected, and should

continue to reflect, its significant purpose.

A. The major questions doctrine is triggered

whether an agency’s assertion of

authority is “major” in the particular

application or more generally

transformative.

When deciding to apply the major questions

doctrine, this Court has looked both to whether a

particular rule or action is “major” and to whether the

13

asserted authority is generally transformative. See,

e.g., Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Human

Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021) (per curiam);

UARG, 573 U.S. at 324. In examining a specific rule

or action, this Court has considered measurable

metrics, such as the number of people affected by the

rule and the economic impact of the rule, as well as

public attention to the issue. And when considering

the nature of the asserted authority more generally,

this Court has considered how long-extant statutes

have previously been used and interpreted, as well as

the potential reach of the claimed power.

In MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Telephone &

Telegraph Co., for example, this Court looked to the

transformative nature of the agency’s reading of the

statute. 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994). There, this Court

rejected the FCC’s rule that completely exempted

certain telephone companies from rate-filing

requirements based on the FCC’s statutory authority

to modify such requirements. In doing so, this Court

reasoned that “[i]t is highly unlikely that Congress

would leave the determination of whether an industry

will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated

to agency discretion.” Ibid. The agency’s position, the

Court explained, was no less than “a fundamental

revision of the statute.” Ibid.

In Brown & Williamson, this Court likewise looked

mainly to the far-reaching implications of the asserted

authority in rejecting the FDA’s claim to jurisdiction

to regulate the tobacco industry. 529 U.S. at 159. This

Court explained that Congress would be expected to

14

have spoken clearly if it wished to authorize such

broad authority to “regulate an industry constituting

a significant portion of the American economy” with a

“unique place in American history and society.” Ibid.

It also noted that under the FDA’s view of the law, the

agency “would have the authority to ban cigarettes

and smokeless tobacco entirely.” Ibid.

This Court followed a similar approach in finding

that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) did not

grant the Attorney General authority to prohibit

physicians from prescribing controlled substances for

assisted suicide based on the major questions

doctrine. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 262 (2006).

In that case, the Court concluded that “the Attorney

General claims extraordinary authority,” explaining

that it “would be anomalous for Congress to have so

painstakingly described the Attorney General’s

limited authority to deregister a single physician or

schedule a single drug, but to have given him, just by

implication, authority to declare an entire class of

activity . . . a criminal violation of the CSA.” Ibid.

In contrast, this Court looked in UARG to both the

measurable impact of the specific EPA rule, as well as

the transformative power claimed by the agency. EPA

claimed under the CAA “[t]he power to require

permits for the construction and modification of tens

of thousands, and the operation of millions, of small

sources nationwide” based on their greenhouse gas

emissions. UARG, 573 U.S. at 324. Such expansive

authority, the Court said, “falls comfortably within

the class of authorizations that [this Court has] been

15

reluctant to read into ambiguous statutory text.” Ibid.

But it was not just the measurable impact of the

particular regulation that warranted major questions

treatment. EPA’s reading of the CAA, this Court also

said, brought “about an enormous and transformative

expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority” and would

have given the agency “unheralded power.” Ibid.

Finally, in the most recent application of the major

questions doctrine to the Centers for Disease Control’s

eviction moratorium, this Court once again relied on

both immediate impacts and sweeping potential

applications in finding the major questions doctrine

applicable. In Alabama Association of Realtors, this

Court found the doctrine triggered by the CDC’s claim

to authority under the Public Health Service Act to

enact a moratorium on evictions during the COVID19 pandemic. The Court looked first to the

moratorium’s vast economic impact, noting that “[a]t

least 80% of the country, including between 6 and 17

million tenants” would be affected by the moratorium,

which would impose “nearly $50 billion” in costs. Ala.

Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489. But “the issues

at stake [were] not merely financial.” Ibid. The CDC’s

reading would also grant it “a breathtaking amount of

authority” with seemingly no limit. Ibid. Indeed, the

CDC’s reading of the statute would allow it to

“mandate free grocery delivery to the homes of the sick

or vulnerable” or “[r]equire manufacturers to provide

free computers to enable people to work from home.”

Ibid. Such a breathtaking expansion of CDC’s

authority required clear congressional authorization.

Ibid.

16

The takeaway from these cases is that this Court

has been flexible in its consideration of both legal and

practical factors in determining what triggers the

major questions doctrine. In several cases, the

doctrine has been found to apply solely because an

agency has claimed legally transformative authority.

In MCI Telecomms. Corp., the Court applied the major

questions doctrine because FCC’s interpretation

would bring about a “fundamental revision of the

statute.” 512 U.S. at 231. In Brown & Williamson, the

Court focused only on the “breadth of the authority”

FDA asserted and what FDA might do with it. 529

U.S. at 159–60. And in Gonzales, this Court found the

major questions doctrine applied based on the

“extraordinary authority” the Attorney General

claimed, without assessing any measurable impact of

the rule. 546 U.S. at 262.

As for the cases where this Court found both

substantial measurable impact and a transformative

assertion of regulatory authority, none suggests that

both were necessary. In UARG, this Court recognized

the significant economic impact of EPA’s rule and

then noted “[m]oreover” the “extravagant” and

transformative nature of the power EPA claimed. 573

U.S. at 324. Similarly, in Alabama Association of

Realtors, this Court concluded that the substantial

economic impact of the CDC’s eviction moratorium

made it “exactly the kind” of rule subject to the major

questions doctrine. 141 S. Ct. at 2489. It then

additionally noted that the CDC’s understanding of

the statute was “[i]ndeed . . . breathtaking.” Ibid. If

17

anything, the Court appeared to be moved more by the

“unprecedented” and “sweeping” nature of CDC’s

“claim of expansive authority,” as it proceeded to spin

out hypotheticals illustrating the limitless reach of

the CDC’s theory. Ibid.

This flexibility makes sense given the important

constitutional purpose of the major questions

doctrine. It ensures that an extravagant assertion of

authority does not escape closer scrutiny. For

example, a rule that does not itself have broadly

measurable impacts may nevertheless be premised on

a theory of the statute that would permit a variety of

other wide-reaching and significant rules. The

separation of powers concerns with such a theory of

the statute, even if one particular application of it has

only minimal impact, are no less serious.

B. The major questions doctrine requires a

court to assess whether a statute clearly

grants an agency the claimed authority.

The major questions doctrine is a canon of

statutory construction that has been, and should be,

applied to statutory text irrespective of under which

step of Chevron the interpretation is presented.

Depending on the posture of the case, the major

questions doctrine has been applied as a canon of

statutory construction both to assist judicial

resolution of the scope of an agency’s authority in the

first instance, as well as to reject agency assertions of

deference to its interpretation under Chevron step

two. In all events, the court’s task is the same once it

18

is determined that the major questions doctrine

applies: to assess whether the statute clearly grants

the agency the claimed authority.

For example, the major questions doctrine has

been used by courts to determine whether an agency

has any business regulating under a statute at all—

what has sometimes been called Chevron step zero.

See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 485 (2015); Brown

& Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159. In those cases, this

Court explained that even if one were to accept the

premise often attributed to Chevron—that a statute’s

ambiguity is an implicit delegation—in cases

involving major questions “‘there may be reason to

hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended

such an implicit delegation.’” King, 576 U.S. at 485

(quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159).

Because of the expansive nature of the authority

claimed, the Court refused to accept that the mere

presence of ambiguity necessitated application of

Chevron two-step. Instead, the major questions

doctrine required a threshold inquiry into whether the

statute clearly provided the regulatory authority

claimed by the agency. Kavanaugh, supra at 2152.

Other cases have come to the Court in a very

different posture. Unlike King and Brown &

Williamson, in some cases there is no question that

Congress charged the agency with implementing the

statute to address the subject matter of concern. The

issue instead is the scope of that delegation, and

whether the agency may justify its claim of expanded

regulatory authority as a reasonable interpretation of

19

the statute entitled to deference under Chevron step

two.

Yet in those cases, the Court has applied the major

questions inquiry in the same way as in King and

Brown & Williamson. It has asked whether the

statutory text clearly grants the authority claimed by

the agency. If not, the Court has deemed the agency’s

reading contrary to law and therefore unreasonable

and entitled to no deference under Chevron. For

instance, in applying the major questions doctrine to

the eviction moratorium, this Court reasoned that

“[e]ven if the text were ambiguous,” the CDC’s reading

was simply not permitted. Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141

S. Ct. at 2489. This Court followed a similar approach

in UARG. Addressing the agency’s plea for deference

under Chevron step two, this Court rejected EPA’s

reading of the statute as “patently unreasonable” as a

matter of law and held that it “does not merit

deference.” 573 U.S. at 321.

In sum, the major questions inquiry is identical

irrespective of the Chevron framework. However a

case reaches a court, the interpretive task is the same

once it is determined that the major questions

doctrine applies. Whether presented at Chevron step

zero, one, or two, the major question doctrine is simply

a canon of statutory construction that asks whether

the statute clearly grants an agency the claimed

authority. That is how this Court has treated the

doctrine, and it is also consistent with the doctrine’s

preservation of the separation of powers by making

the question of authority one that a court must

20

answer. As Judge Walker summed up below, “[e]ither

a statute clearly endorses a major rule, or there can

be no major rule.” J.A. 230 (Walker, J., concurring in

part).

III.

The major questions doctrine confirms

that EPA had no discretion but to repeal

the CPP.

A. The CPP is exactly the kind of agency

claim of authority for which the major

questions doctrine exists.

The CPP satisfies both tests that this Court has

employed to determine whether the major questions

doctrine applies. It is premised on a transformative

expansion of a long-extant statute. And it is also a rule

with

wide-reaching

economic

and

political

consequence.

1. The Clean Power Plan represents an

unheralded expansion of EPA’s

authority under CAA section 111(d).

EPA’s interpretation of section 111(d) in support of

the CPP is exactly the type of unprecedented

authority that constitutes a major question. The CPP

is premised on turning section 111(d) from a “control

system” program into a provision that allows EPA to

require source owners across the country to reduce

production or to shut-down. This transformative

reading of section 111(d)—which would permit EPA to

compel reductions in existing source production that

21

can only be reclaimed by restructuring an entire

industry—is precisely the sort of significant and

unprecedented expansion of regulatory authority that

must be clearly authorized by Congress.

Environmental statutes, including the CAA, have

employed a variety of approaches to pollution control.

One common pollution-reduction approach used by

Congress in environmental statutes is to direct EPA

to establish emission or effluent limitations based on

the pollution reductions that can be achieved by

incorporating pollution control systems into new

sources or retrofitting them into existing sources. See,

e.g., CAA sections 111, 112, 169(3), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411,

7412, 7479(3); CWA sections 301(b), 306, 33 U.S.C.

§§ 1311(b), 1316. These control system programs focus

regulatory attention on measures that reduce an

individual source’s emissions at all levels of operation,

and not on reducing or eliminating source operation.

See, e.g., J.A. 330 (“[O]ur traditional interpretation

and implementation of CAA section 111 has allowed

regulated entities to produce as much of a particular

good as they desire provided that they do so through

an appropriately clean . . . process.”).

A second approach used by Congress has been to

direct EPA to establish limitations on the

concentration of pollution in air or water, at a level

that is protective of public health or welfare. See, e.g.,

CAA section 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409; CWA section 303,

33 U.S.C. § 1313. Implementation of these ambient

concentration-based

programs

could

require

curtailment of production or even shut down of a

22

specific source if needed to prevent exceedances of the

health or welfare-based concentration limit. See, e.g.,

Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976).

Under a third approach, Congress has established

programs for entire industrial categories that directly

regulate source operation. See, e.g., CAA Titles IV-A

and VI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o and §§ 7671-7671q.

Under the CAA’s Acid Rain “cap-and-trade” program,

for example, Congress allocated sulfur dioxide (SO2)

“allowances” to individual sources. A source can meet

its allowance allocation by controlling emissions, by

limiting production, or by shutting down. Another

example is the Stratospheric Ozone Protection

program of CAA Title VI, which explicitly phases out

specific types of production, subject to phase-down

schedules and safety valves to manage associated

economic and societal dislocation. Congress’s efforts to

craft climate change legislation based on this third

approach—essentially industrial and economic

restructuring to reduce carbon emissions—have failed

to produce any political consensus.1

As Petitioners have demonstrated, section 111

says nothing about reductions in production and

source shut-down. Instead, for more than 40 years,

section 111 has been considered the paradigm for

individual source control-system programs. S. Rep.

No. 95-370, at 50 (1977), reprinted in 1977

1 See, e.g., Clean Energy Jobs & Am. Power Act, S. 1733,

111th Cong. (2009) (rejecting greenhouse gas cap-and-trade

program).

23

U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4375. Until the CPP, the section

111 program focused on lowering emissions

reductions by control systems, not by reductions in the

operation of a facility. Once EPA identified the “best

system of emission reduction” (BSER) for new sources

and the BSER for existing sources in an industrial

source category, EPA sets emission standards for

those sources based on those control systems.2

As recently as 2015, EPA set CAA section 111

carbon dioxide (CO2) standards for new coal-fired

generating facilities based on this well-established

understanding of section 111. In that new source

performance standard (NSPS) rule, EPA evaluated

control systems that could be incorporated into the

design of new coal-fired facilities and concluded that

carbon capture control systems were adequately

demonstrated. The NSPS was based on incorporation

of those controls into facility design. 80 Fed. Reg.

64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015).

But

EPA

abandoned

this

traditional

understanding of section 111 when it came to existing

coal-fired generating facilities. Unlike for new

facilities, EPA concluded that carbon capture systems

were not demonstrated for existing coal-fired

generation and therefore could not be BSER for those

Each of the approximately one hundred new source

performance standards that EPA has set in more than 60 source

categories has been based on a control system that can be applied

to reduce emissions regardless of level of operation at the

regulated source itself. See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 60, subpts. CbOOOO.

2

24

sources. That left heat rate (i.e., efficiency)

improvements as the only CO2 reduction system upon

which to base an existing source standard. But

because efficiency improvements would not produce

the level of emission reductions needed to achieve the

Administration’s climate change goals, J.A. 577, J.A.

658, and because Congress had not enacted the capand-trade climate change legislation recommended by

the Administration, id. at 439–43 (congressional

action on climate change limited to research,

monitoring, and data collection), EPA concluded that

it had no choice but to undertake an “‘aggressive

transformation’” of the mix of electric generation

under section 111 using standards that would require

fossil generating units to reduce production or shut

down. Id. at 225 (quoting White House Fact Sheet);

see also id. at 683 (“Given EGU’s large contribution to

U.S. GHG emissions, any attempt to address . . .

climate change must necessarily include significant

emission reductions from this sector.”). In the CPP,

EPA required each existing coal-fired unit to meet a

numerical performance standard expressed in pounds

of CO2 per megawatt hour generated (CO2 lbs/MWhr).

This performance standard was set at a level roughly

30 to 40 percent below the CO2 lbs/MWhr performance

rate associated with coal-fired generation.3

Because there was no demonstrated CO2 control

system capable of reducing CO2 emissions from these

3 EPA set the CPP performance rate at 1,305 lbs/MWhr,

which is roughly 38% below the typical CO2 performance rate

for a coal-fired unit of 2,100 lbs/MWhr. J.A. 300, J.A. 1362.

25

sources by 30 to 40 percent, EPA created a “system” of

“emission reduction credits” (ERCs) that represented

operation of “clean” generation, i.e., renewable energy

(RE) generation with zero CO2 emissions. ERCs would

be required for each megawatt hour of continued

operation at existing units.4 Through this credit

“system,” new “clean” generation would come to

replace existing fossil generation in at least two ways.

Id. at 579–80 (“[M]ost of the CO2 controls need to come

in the form of . . . replacement of higher emitting

generation with lower- or zero-emitting generation.”);

id. at 584 (BSER requires “replacement of defined

quantities of fossil generation by RE generation.”); id.

at 676 (“[T]he volume of coal-fired generation will

decrease.”). The cost of credits would increase the cost

of, and reduce the demand for, existing generation.

And if credits could not be obtained, the only way to

comply would be to simply curtail production or shut

down existing units. Id. at 697 (Reduced operations

would still require “that the owner/operator . . .

acquire[] . . . ERCs to use in computing . . . compliance”

for all remaining operations.).

Because compliance with the uniform performance rate

cannot be achieved through available controls, the ERC “system”

uses a legal fiction to demonstrate “compliance” through trading

of ERCs and averaging. For example, assuming for ease of

calculation that (i) an existing unit emits 2,000 pounds of CO2

each megawatt hour it generates, and (ii) a CPP standard for that

unit was 1,000 lbs/MWhr, the owner of the unit would have to

ଶ଴଴଴ ୪ୠୱ/୑୛୦୰ ା ଴ ୪ୠୱ/୑୛୦୰

ൌ

hold one renewable energy credit ሺ

ଶ

1000 lbs/MWhrሻ to meet the CPP standard.

4

26

EPA projected that by using section 111 to regulate

production under an approach similar to CAA Title IV,

id. at 607 (CPP “resembles . . . the emissions trading

program enacted [by Congress] in Title IV of the 1990

CAA Amendments.”); id. at 292 (“BSER mirrors

Congress’s approach to regulating . . . as exemplified

by Title IV of the CAA.”); id. at 611 (Emissions

“trading [is] an integral part of the BSER analysis.”),

it could achieve emission reductions that would

satisfy the Administration’s CO2 climate change

goals. Id. at 290 (“This final rule is a significant step

forward in implementing the President’s Climate

Action Plan.”); id. at 345 (The CPP “constitutes a

major commitment . . . and international leadership .

. . on the part of the U.S.”); id. at 446–48.

But by transforming CAA section 111 from a

control systems program into a program under which

EPA is authorized to compel substantial reductions in

production at or the shutdown of existing facilities

within an industrial category, EPA has walked

straight into the teeth of the major questions doctrine.

This approach is not only transformative from the way

section 111 has long been understood, but it is also

extraordinarily expansive. Indeed, that was the goal:

to claim through section 111 the authority to remake

the energy sector. And that is precisely the sort of

extravagant claim to authority that this Court has

found to trigger the major questions doctrine. MCI

Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 231 (“a fundamental

revision of the statute” from rate-regulation for all

carriers to rate-regulation only where the agency

deems necessary); see also UARG, 573 U.S. at 324

27

(“unheralded power to regulate” greenhouse gas

emissions from millions of small sources that had

never been regulated before).

And that is not even the half of it. EPA’s broad

reading of “system” in section 111 to include any set of

steps or measures that would require owners and

operators to reduce CO2 emissions through forced

reductions in production would give EPA “a

breathtaking amount of authority,” Ala. Ass’n of

Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489, in areas well beyond its

expertise. Under its newfound authority, EPA could

limit production in virtually any industry based on the

claim that production could be shifted to lower

emitting facilities that may or may not even exist at

the time EPA promulgates the rule. As with the CPP,

EPA could cap emissions for any industrial sector

based on projections that lower emitting facilities

would be able to meet future product demand, or

perhaps even projections regarding measures directed

at consumers to reduce demand for products from

disfavored sources. See, e.g., JA at 144, note 10

(“[D]emand-side energy efficiency . . . [is] a policy tool”

available under section 111(d).). Having capped

emissions for an industrial sector, EPA could (as it did

under CPP) create a trading program to subsidize

preferred production. In other words, by constraining

production in any industrial sector with facilities that

emit CO2, EPA could force consumers of that

industry’s products to switch to EPA’s preferred

modes of production. There is virtually no limit to how

this playbook could be run: it could apply to electric

utilities today and the paper products, refining, or

28

transportation sectors tomorrow. Such sweeping

power to act as the central planner for entire

industrial sectors falls comfortably within the cases

where this Court has found clear congressional

authorization required. Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S.

Ct. at 2489 (applying major questions doctrine where

the government identified no limit beyond that the

agency “deem a measure ‘necessary’”).

2. The Clean Power Plan also triggers

the major questions doctrine because

of its significant economic and

political impact.

The CPP also fits within the types of cases where

this Court has found that the “vast ‘economic and

political significance’” of a particular rule trigger the

major questions doctrine. UARG, 573 U.S. at 324.

The economic impact of the CPP is alone enough to

qualify as significant. Industry analysts estimated the

CPP would cause wholesale electricity costs to rise by

$214 billion and cost another $64 billion in terms of

replacing shuttered capacity.5 Even EPA’s own

analysis identified billions of dollars in compliance

costs, as well as the elimination of thousands of jobs.6

5 NMA, EPA's Clean Power Plan An Economic Impact

Analysis 2 (undated),

http://nma.org/attachments/article/2368/11.13.15%20NMA

_EPAs%20Clean%20Power%20Plan%20%20An%20Economic%2

0Impact%20Analysis.pdf.

6 See, e.g., EPA, EPA-452/R-15-003, Regulatory Impact

Analysis for the Clean Power Plan Final Rule 3-22, 6-25 (Aug.

29

In terms of total costs, the Department of Energy

projected that a federal mandate to restructure the

Nation’s energy grid, like CPP, would impose

hundreds of billions of dollars in lost GDP from 2015

to 2040.7 The rule is also indisputably significant from

the standpoint of estimated benefits, which EPA

anticipated would reach between $26 billion and $45

billion.8 By any of these metrics, the estimated

potential economic impact of the CPP is comparable to

other cases where this Court has found a major

question. See Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489

(finding significant economic impact based on nearly

$50 billion in estimated costs); UARG, 573 U.S. at 324

(economic significance based on requiring permits for

the operation of millions of small sources nationwide).

Contrary to the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion below,

J.A. 148–50, it is immaterial that the CPP’s mandated

generation shifting might impose fewer costs than

other controls that EPA potentially could have

employed, such as carbon capture and storage. The

question is not whether EPA selected the least costly

2015, replaced Oct. 23, 2015),

https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/docs/ria/utilities_ria_fin al-cleanpower-plan-existing-units_2015-08.pdf .

7 See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Analysis of

the Impacts of the Clean Power Plan 63-64 (Fig. 39) (May 2015),

https://w

ww.eia.gov/analysis/requests/powerplants/cleanplan/pdf/powerp

lant.pdf.

8 EPA, Fact Sheet, Overview of the Clean Power Plan,

Cutting Carbon Pollution From Power Plants 3 (undated),

https://archive.ep a.gov/epa/sites/production/files/201508/documents/fs-cpp-overview.pdf.

30

approach, but whether the approach that it did choose

is itself economically significant.

As for its political impact, that too qualifies the

CPP as significant. By almost any metric, the CPP is

an issue subject to “‘earnest and profound debate’

across the country.” Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267

(citation omitted). Indeed, the CPP generated 4.3

million comments during the rulemaking process.

Perhaps more important, the CPP was an effort to

take executive action where legislative action had

previously failed. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S.

at 143–51 (taking into account Congress’s

consideration of proposals that would have granted an

agency power it later asserted unilaterally); see also

U.S. Telecom. Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 417 (Kavanaugh, J.,

dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc)

(finding the FCC’s net neutrality rule unlawful

because Congress failed to clearly authorize it despite

having debated net neutrality for many years). It is by

now well known that Congress has not enacted

general climate change legislation. In fact, it has

repeatedly rejected a number of generation-shifting

approaches, including a carbon tax, S. Con. Res. 8, S.

Amdt. 646, 113th Cong. (2013); fees on greenhouse gas

emissions, Climate Prot. Act of 2013, S. 332, 113th

Cong. (2013); and a greenhouse gas cap-and-trade

program. Clean Energy Jobs & Am. Power Act, S.

1733, 111th Cong. (2009).

31

B. EPA is correct that the major questions

doctrine can and does confirm its analysis of

the statute at Chevron step one.

EPA explained that

[w]hile [it] believes that [its action repealing the CPP]

is based on the only permissible reading of the statute

and would reach that conclusion even without

consideration of the major questions doctrine, the

EPA believes that that doctrine should apply here and

that its application confirms the unambiguously

expressed intent of CAA section 111.

J.A. 1770. In other words, EPA concluded both that

the plain text unambiguously precludes the CPP at

Chevron step one and that the major questions

doctrine also bars the CPP.

As explained above, that is precisely how the major

questions doctrine does and should work. Where the

doctrine applies, it requires a court to assess whether

the statute clearly grants the agency the claimed

authority. The major questions doctrine is a canon of

statutory

construction

that

simply

(and

independently) asks whether the statute clearly

grants an agency the claimed authority. If not, the

agency action is unlawful, regardless of where in the

Chevron analysis the doctrine is applied.

Here, section 111(d) does not clearly authorize

EPA to exercise the extraordinary power it has

claimed—namely, to set greenhouse gas emission

32

standards for existing power plants that are

unachievable through controls at any individual

source, but rather require owners and operators of

regulated sources to reduce their operations or to shut

them down. That reading is not supported by the plain

text. And it is confirmed by the major questions

doctrine. EPA was right that it was required to repeal

the CPP.

33

CONCLUSION

The decision below should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH

LLP

ELBERT LIN

Counsel Of Record

951 East Byrd Street, East

Tower

Richmond, Virginia 23219

elin@HuntonAK.com

(804) 788-8200

F. WILLIAM BROWNELL

ERICA N. PETERSON

HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH

LLP

2200 Pennsylvania Avenue,

NW, Suite 900

Washington, D.C. 20037

(202) 955-1500

December 13, 2021

Counsel for Respondent

America’s Power

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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