Respondents Brief — West Virginia, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
Supreme Court briefDec 13, 2021
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Nos. 20-1530, 20-1531, 20-1778, and 20-1780
In the Supreme Court of the United States
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS,
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
CARROLL WADE
MCGUFFEY III
TROUTMAN PEPPER
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
600 Peachtree St. N.E.
Suite 3000
Atlanta, GA 30308
MISHA TSEYTLIN
Counsel of Record
KEVIN M. LEROY
TROUTMAN PEPPER
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
227 W. Monroe St.
Suite 3900
Chicago, IL 60606
TIMOTHY L. MCHUGH
(608) 999-1240
TROUTMAN PEPPER
misha.tseytlin@
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP troutman.com
1001 Haxall Point,
15th Floor
Richmond, VA 23219
Counsel for National Mining Association
Additional Captions Listed on Inside Cover
THE NORTH AMERICAN COAL CORPORATION,
PETITIONER,
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.
WESTMORELAND MINING HOLDINGS LLC,
PETITIONER,
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA,
PETITIONER,
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
In 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d), an ancillary provision of
the Clean Air Act, did Congress constitutionally
authorize the Environmental Protection Agency to
issue significant rules—including those capable of
reshaping the nation’s electricity grids and
unilaterally decarbonizing virtually any sector of the
economy—without any limits on what the agency can
require so long as it considers cost, nonair impacts,
and energy requirements?
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners in 20-1530 are the States of West
Virginia, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming; and Mississippi
Governor Tate Reeves.
Each petitioner was a
respondent-intervenor below.
Petitioner in 20-1531 is The North American Coal
Corporation.
Petitioner in 20-1778 is Westmoreland Mining
Holdings, LLC.
Petitioner in 20-1780 is the State of North Dakota.
Respondents in 20-1530 who filed briefs in support
of certiorari were America’s Power, Basin Electric
Power Cooperative, and the National Mining
Association.
Each was a respondent-intervenor
below.
Respondents in 20-1530, 20-1531, 20-1778, 201780 who were petitioners below and filed briefs in
opposition to certiorari are Consolidated Edison, Inc.,
Exelon Corporation, National Grid USA, New York
Power Authority, Power Companies Climate
Coalition, Sacramento Municipal Utility District,
American Lung Association, American Public Health
Association, Appalachian Mountain Club, Center for
Biological Diversity, Chesapeake Bay Foundation,
Inc., Clean Air Council, Clean Wisconsin,
Conservation Law Foundation, Environmental
Defense Fund, Environmental Law & Policy Center,
iii
Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy,
Natural Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club,
Advanced Energy Economy, American Clean Power
Association (successor of the American Wind Energy
Association), Solar Energy Industries Association,
State of New York, State of California, State of
Colorado, State of Delaware, State of Hawaii, State of
Illinois, State of Maine, State of Maryland,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, People of the State
of Michigan, State of Minnesota, State of New Jersey,
State of New Mexico, State of North Carolina, State
of Oregon, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, State of
Rhode Island, State of Vermont, Commonwealth of
Virginia, State of Washington, State of Wisconsin,
District of Columbia, City of Boulder (CO), City of
Chicago, City and County of Denver, City of Los
Angeles, City of New York, City of Philadelphia, and
the City of South Miami (FL).
Respondent in 20-1530, 20-1531, 20-1778, 20-1780
who was a petitioner-intervenor below and filed a
brief in opposition to certiorari is the State of Nevada.
Respondents in 20-1530, 20-1531, 20-1778, 201780 who were respondents below are the United
States Environmental Protection Agency and Michael
Regan, in his official capacity as Administrator of the
United States Environmental Protection Agency
(substituted for the previous administrator under
Supreme Court Rule 35.3).
Respondents who were petitioners below and did
not file any brief at the certiorari stage are, by court
of appeals case number, as follows:
iv
In case no. 19-1175: Robinson Enterprises, Inc.,
Nuckles Oil Co., Inc., DBA Merit Oil Co.,
Construction Industry Air Quality Coalition, Liberty
Packing Co. LLC, Dalton Trucking, Inc., Norman R.
“Skip” Brown, Joanne Brown, The Competitive
Enterprise Institute, and the Texas Public Policy
Foundation.
In case no. 19-1185: Biogenic CO2 Coalition.
Respondents who were respondent-intervenors
below and did not file any brief at the certiorari stage
are Indiana Michigan Power Co., Kentucky Power
Co., Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, Southwestern
Electric Power Co., AEP Generating Co., AEP
Generation Resources, Inc., Wheeling Power Co.,
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, Indiana Energy Association and Indiana
Utility Group, International Brotherhood of
Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths,
Forgers & Helpers, AFL-CIO, Murray Energy Corp.,
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association,
Nevada Gold Mines, Newmont Nevada Energy
Investment, and PowerSouth Energy Cooperative.
v
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
National Mining Association is a non-profit
corporation that has no parent corporation; no
publicly held company owns 10% or more of National
Mining Association’s stock.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED ......................................... i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ........................ ii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ............v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................... viii
INTRODUCTION .......................................................1
OPINION BELOW ......................................................3
JURISDICTION ..........................................................3
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS .................3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................4
A. Section 111(d) Of The Clean Air Act ..........4
B. EPA Adopts The Clean Power Plan And
Then Repeals And Replaces It ....................6
C. The D.C. Circuit’s Decision Below ............11
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..........................12
ARGUMENT .............................................................16
I.
Congress Must Speak Clearly If It Wants To
Assign To An Agency The Authority To
Resolve A Major Policy Issue. ........................16
A. The
Major
Questions
Doctrine,
Nondelegation, And Chevron Deference ..16
1. The Major Questions Doctrine ............16
2. The Nondelegation Doctrine ...............20
vii
3. Chevron Deference ...............................24
B. The Major Questions Doctrine Should
Be A Threshold Inquiry To Any Chevron
Or Nondelegation Analysis. ......................26
C. This Court Should Hold That Three
Independently Sufficient Tests Identify
That A Rule Triggers The Major
Questions Doctrine....................................29
II. Whether The United States Should “Shift”
Away From Coal-Fired Generation Is A
Major Policy Question That Congress Did
Not Clearly Assign To EPA To Resolve. ........31
A. The Clean Power Plan Triggers The
Major Questions Doctrine Under All
Three Independently Sufficient Tests. .....31
1. Vast
Economic
And
Political
Significance ..........................................31
2. Assertion
Of
Enormous
And
Transformative Authority Never
Before Claimed ....................................39
3. Trespassing On The Traditional
Authority Of States And Other
Agencies ...............................................41
B. Section 111(d) Does Not Clearly
Authorize The Clean Power Plan. ............45
C. The
Panel
Majority’s
Contrary
Conclusion Below Was Wrong. .................48
CONCLUSION ..........................................................51
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum.
Servs.,
141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021) ................................. passim
Ark. Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n,
461 U.S. 375 (1983) ............................................ 41
BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. OSHA,
17 F.4th 604 (5th Cir. 2021) ................................ 1
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) ..................................... passim
Christensen v. Harris Cty.,
529 U.S. 576 (2000) ...................................... 19, 28
Clinton v. City of New York,
524 U.S. 417 (1998) ............................................ 20
Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC,
569 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ............................ 42
District of Columbia v. Dep’t of Labor,
819 F.3d 444 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ............................ 30
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
556 U.S. 502 (2009) ............................................ 27
ix
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000) ..................................... passim
Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co.,
376 U.S. 205 (1964) ............................................ 42
Gonzales v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243 (2006) ..................................... passim
Gundy v. United States,
139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) ................................. passim
Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, L.L.C.,
136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016) ........................................ 44
Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum
Inst.,
448 U.S. 607 (1980) ................................ 17, 18, 23
King v. Burwell,
576 U.S. 473 (2015) ..................................... passim
Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497 (2007) ............................................ 49
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
512 U.S. 218 (1994) ...................................... 16, 19
Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361 (1989) ............................................ 22
New Jersey v. EPA,
517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ........................ 6, 41
x
New York v. FERC,
535 U.S. 1 (2002) .......................................... 43, 44
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Comm’n,
461 U.S. 190 (1983) ............................................ 42
Paul v. United States,
140 S. Ct. 342 (2019)................................... passim
U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC,
855 F.3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ..................... passim
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,
573 U.S. 302 (2014) ..................................... passim
West Virginia v. EPA,
577 U.S. 1126 (2016) ............................................ 9
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
531 U.S. 457 (2001) ...................................... 17, 30
Statutes
16 U.S.C. § 824 ......................................................... 43
16 U.S.C. § 824o ....................................................... 43
42 U.S.C. § 7411 ................................................ passim
42 U.S.C. § 7651, et seq. ..................................... 46, 47
Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) ......................... 4
xi
Rules
42 Fed. Reg. 12,022 (Mar. 1, 1977) ...................... 5, 40
42 Fed. Reg. 55,796 (Oct. 18, 1977) ..................... 5, 40
44 Fed. Reg. 29,828 (May 22, 1979) .................... 5, 40
45 Fed. Reg. 26,294 (Apr. 17, 1980)..................... 5, 40
60 Fed. Reg. 65,387 (Dec. 19, 1995)..................... 5, 40
61 Fed. Reg. 9905 (Mar. 12, 1996) ....................... 5, 40
70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2005) .................... 6, 40
80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) .................. passim
84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019).................... passim
Proposed Legislation
Advancing Grid Storage Act,
H.R. 7313, 115th Cong. (2018) .......................... 35
American Clean Energy and Security Act,
H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) .......................... 35
American Energy and Conservation Act,
S. 3110, 114th Cong. (2016)............................... 35
American Renewable Energy and Efficiency Act,
H.R. 5301, 113th Cong. (2014) .......................... 36
Carbon Dioxide Capture Technology Prize Act,
S. 757, 112th Cong. (2011)................................. 36
xii
Clean Energy Standard Act,
S. 20, 111th Cong. (2010)................................... 36
Clean Industrial Technology Act,
S. 2300, 116th Cong. (2019)............................... 35
Climate Risk Disclosure Act,
S. 3481, 115th Cong. (2018)............................... 35
Climate Solutions Commission Act,
H.R. 6240, 114th Cong. (2016) .......................... 36
End Polluter Welfare Act,
S. 3080, 112th Cong. (2012)............................... 36
Integrated Energy Systems Act,
S. 2702, 116th Cong. (2019)............................... 35
Save Our Climate Act,
H.R. 3242, 112th Cong. (2011) .......................... 36
Super Pollutants Act,
S. 2911, 113th Cong. (2014)............................... 36
Other Authorities
Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,
65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013) ............................... 28
Adam Liptak & Coral Davenport, The New York
Times, Supreme Court Deals Blow to Obama’s
xiii
Efforts to Regulate Coal Emissions (Feb. 9,
2016) .................................................................... 37
Aditya Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive
Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation
and Future of Administrative Law,
133 Harv. L. Rev. 164 (2019) ............................. 22
Andrew Rafferty, Obama Unveils Ambitious Plan
to Combat Climate Change,
NBC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2015, 3:05 PM) .................. 6
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory
Interpretation,
129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118 (2016) ..................... 24, 26
Cass R. Sunstein, The American Nondelegation
Doctrine,
86 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1181 (2018).............. 18, 20
Evan Lehmann & Nathanael Massey, Obama
Warns Congress to Act on Climate Change, or
He Will,
Scientific Am. (Feb. 13, 2013)........................ 6, 36
Jeff St. John, PJM: Fuel Security Issues Won’t
Disrupt the Grid, Unless Coal & Nuclear
Closures Skyrocket, GreenTechMedia.com
(Nov. 1, 2018) ...................................................... 33
Joby Warrick, The Washington Post, White House
Set to Adopt Sweeping Curbs on Carbon
Pollution (Aug. 1, 2015) ...................................... 50
xiv
John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as
a Canon of Avoidance,
2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 223 (2000) ..........20, 23, 24, 27
Jonathan Adler, The Washington Post, Opinion:
Supreme Court Puts the Brakes on the EPA’s
Clean Power Plan (Feb. 9, 2016) ........................ 37
Jonathan H. Adler & Christopher J. Walker,
Delegation and Time,
105 Iowa L. Rev. 1931 (2020) ............................. 20
Lawrence Hurley & Valerie Volcovici, Reuters,
U.S. Supreme Court Blocks Obama's Clean
Carbon Emissions Plan (Feb. 9, 2016) ............... 37
Nat’l Ass’n of State Energy Officials, et al.,
Wages, Benefits, and Change: A Supplemental
Report to the Annual U.S. Energy and
Employment Report (2020) ................................. 34
Nat’l Mining Assoc., Coal: Reliable & Affordable
Power (Mar. 2021) ............................................... 34
Nat’l Research Council, Coal: Energy for the
Future (Nat’l Acads. Press 1995)........................ 32
Robert Walton, NERC Identifies 4 Regions Facing
Potential Summer Energy Shortages,
UtilityDive.com (May 18, 2021) ......................... 33
Seth Schwartz, Evaluation of the Immediate
Impact of the Clean Power Plan Rule on the
xv
Coal Industry (Energy Ventures Analysis, Inc.
Oct. 2015) ...................................................... 33, 38
Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of
Law and Policy,
38 Admin. L. Rev. 363 (1986) ...................... passim
U.S. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Sec. Agency,
Energy Sector ...................................................... 32
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Analysis of the Impacts
of the Clean Power Plan (May 2015) .................. 38
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Coal Explained: How
Much Coal is Left (Oct. 19, 2021) ....................... 32
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Law: A
Primer on How to Read Statutes and the
Constitution (2016) ............................................. 19
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking,
45 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1992) ............................... 24
INTRODUCTION
The Clean Power Plan involves a form of agency
overreach
that
has,
unfortunately,
become
increasingly more common since the Clean Power
Plan’s issuance: an agency seizes upon a snippet of
general statutory language and enlists that language
as claimed authority for settling a major policy issue
for the Nation. See, e.g., Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t
of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021)
(per curiam); BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. OSHA, 17 F.4th
604, 609–18 (5th Cir. 2021). When an agency acts in
this manner, the resulting rule offends the separation
of powers and the right of the people to be governed
by their elected representatives. Such administrative
action runs afoul of the major questions doctrine and
puts the underlying statute under threat of violating
the nondelegation doctrine.
Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7411(d),
the
authority
upon
which
the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) built the
Clean Power Plan, contains just two relevant
sentences.
The first sentence requires EPA to
establish a “procedure” under which States must
“establish[ ] standards of performance for any
existing source” of air emissions and “provide[ ] for
the implementation and enforcement of such
standards of performance.” The second sentence
merely clarifies the first to ensure that States may
consider, among other factors, the remaining useful
2
life of an existing source in applying a “standard of
performance” to it.
In adopting the Clean Power Plan, EPA claimed
to find lurking within these two sentences of
Section 111(d), as well as a definitional crossreference, the authority to force the entire power
sector away from fossil fuels and toward renewable
energy resources. EPA did so by asserting that
Section 111(d) gives it virtually unlimited discretion
to determine the “best” way to reduce carbon-dioxide
emissions from power plants, and EPA decided that
changing the resources used to generate electricity
would be best.
To effect that change, EPA
hypothesized how much it thought generation could
be shifted, and then adopted “emission performance
rates” for fossil fuel-fired units that had never before
been achieved by “any existing source.” Therefore,
and by design, the Clean Power Plan required the
power sector to transition away from coal-fired
generation.
While the National Mining Association strongly
agrees with State Petitioners that Section 111(d)’s
text unambiguously prohibits the Clean Power Plan,
and therefore this Court can uphold EPA’s 2018
repeal of the Plan on that basis alone, State Pets. Br.
Part II, the National Mining Association respectfully
submits that this Court should resolve this case
directly under the major questions doctrine. This
Court should hold that EPA in 2018 correctly
concluded that the Clean Power Plan was unlawful
3
because Congress, in adopting Section 111(d), did not
clearly delegate to EPA the authority to decide for the
Nation whether to replace coal-fired generation with
other energy resources. Taking this approach would
give guidance to lower courts, agencies, litigants, and
the people on how to deal with this increasingly
common form of agency overreach.
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the D.C. Circuit below is reported
at American Lung Association v. EPA, 985 F.3d 914
(D.C. Cir. 2021), and is reproduced in the Joint
Appendix. J.A.53–255.
JURISDICTION
The D.C. Circuit entered judgment on January
19, 2021. The petition for a writ of certiorari in No.
20-1530 was filed on April 29, 2021. The petition for
a writ of certiorari in No. 20-1531 was filed on April
30, 2021. The petitions for writs of certiorari in Nos.
20-1778 and 20-1780 were filed on June 18, 2021. The
petitions were granted on October 29, 2021 and the
cases were consolidated by the Court. This Court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Relevant statutory provisions from the Clean Air
Act appear in the Appendix to the Petition in 20-1530.
Pet.App.204a–09a.
4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Section 111(d) Of The Clean Air Act
In 1970, Congress enacted Section 111 of the
Clean Air Act, authorizing the regulation of air
pollutants emitted from stationary sources that
“cause[ ], or contribute[ ] significantly to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare.” Pub. L. 91-604, § 111, 84
Stat. 1676, 1683–84 (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 7411. For new
stationary sources that meet these criteria, Congress
directed EPA under Section 111(b) to promulgate
“standards
of
performance.”
42
U.S.C.
§ 7411(b)(1)(B). For existing stationary sources in
those same source categories, (i.e., those built before
the standards for new sources have been proposed),
Congress directed EPA under Section 111(d) to
“prescribe regulations which shall establish a
procedure” for States to “establish[ ] standards of
performance for any existing source” subject to
Section 111(d). Id. § 7411(d)(1).
Section 111(d) is a cooperative federalism regime.
Section 111 defines “standard of performance” as “a
standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects
the degree of emission limitation achievable through
the application of the best system of emission
reduction which (taking into account the cost of
achieving such reduction and any nonair quality
health and environmental impact and energy
requirements) the [EPA] Administrator determines
5
has been adequately demonstrated.” Id. § 7411(a)(1).
However, Congress only authorized EPA to
promulgate a “procedure” for the States to follow
when “establish[ing]” and “apply[ing]” standards of
performance for existing sources. Id. § 7411(d). In
other words, while EPA may determine the best
system of emission reduction and regulate new
sources directly, Congress left it to the States to
decide how to reduce emissions from existing
stationary sources. Section 111(d) thus protects state
authority to determine what levels of emission
reduction are achievable by these stationary sources.
The Clean Air Act also reserves to the States the
authority to “take into consideration, among other
factors, the remaining useful life of the existing
source to which such standard applies” when applying
a standard of performance to it. Id. § 7411(d)(1).
Prior to the Clean Power Plan, EPA had
promulgated only seven rules under Section 111(d)
since the provision’s enactment over 50 years ago,
including only one within the last 25 years, and that
one was vacated by the D.C. Circuit. See 42 Fed. Reg.
12,022 (Mar. 1, 1977) (fluorides from phosphate
fertilizer plants); 42 Fed. Reg. 55,796 (Oct. 18, 1977)
(acid mist from sulfuric acid plants); 44 Fed. Reg.
29,828 (May 22, 1979) (total reduced sulfur from kraft
pulp plants); 45 Fed. Reg. 26,294 (Apr. 17, 1980)
(fluorides from primary aluminum plants); 60 Fed.
Reg. 65,387 (Dec. 19, 1995) (various pollutants from
municipal waste combustors); 61 Fed. Reg. 9905 (Mar.
12, 1996) (landfill gases from municipal solid waste
6
landfills); 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2005)
(mercury from coal-fired power plants); New Jersey v.
EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 580 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
B. EPA Adopts The Clean Power Plan And
Then Repeals And Replaces It
Frustrated with what he believed to be Congress’s
inability to adopt comprehensive climate change
legislation, “President Obama ordered the EPA to do
what Congress wouldn’t.” J.A.220–22. President
Obama ordered EPA “to come up with executive
actions we can take, now and in the future, to reduce
pollution, prepare our communities for the
consequences of climate change, and speed the
transition to more sustainable sources of energy.”
Evan Lehmann & Nathanael Massey, Obama Warns
Congress to Act on Climate Change, or He Will,
Scientific Am. (Feb. 13, 2013).1 President Obama
intended this directive to be “the single most
important step America has ever taken in the fight
against global climate change.” Andrew Rafferty,
Obama Unveils Ambitious Plan to Combat Climate
Change, NBC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2015, 3:05 PM).2 The
Available at https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
obama-warns-congress-to-act-on-climate-change-or-he-will/ (all
websites last visited on December 12, 2021).
1
Available at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/barackobama/obama-unveils-ambitious-plan-combat-climatechangen403296.
2
7
result was the Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662
(Oct. 23, 2015), “arguably one of the most
consequential
rules ever
proposed
by
an
administrative agency,” J.A.225.
1. To achieve sufficient emissions reductions to
meet President Obama’s goals, EPA promulgated the
Clean Power Plan, and for the first time ever adopted
an interpretation of Section 111(d) that allowed the
agency to restructure the power sector through socalled “generation shifting.” 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,728–
29. In particular, EPA adopted national “emission
performance rates” for coal and gas power plants
based upon three so-called “Building Blocks.” Id. at
64,719–20, 64,752.
EPA developed two of the three building blocks
“from the perspective of the source category as a
whole,” rather than as a model system that States
might apply to individual existing sources. Id. at
64,744. Building Block 1, the only one consistent with
the text, context, and history of Section 111(d), was
based upon requiring improved combustion efficiency
at individual coal-fired generating facilities, which
can result in lower CO2 emissions per unit of electric
output. Id. at 64,745. Building Block 2, which
involved generation shifting, was based upon
displacing large quantities of existing coal-fired
generation with generation from existing natural gas
generating facilities. Id. at 64,745–46. Building
Block 3, which also involved generation shifting, was
based upon displacing both existing coal- and gas-
8
fired generation with large increases in generation
from new renewable energy resources. Id. at 64,747–
48.
EPA used these Building Blocks to set the
“emission performance rates” for existing fossil fuelfired power plants. The resulting rate for existing
coal-fired plants was 1,305 lbs CO2/MWh, and for
existing gas-fired plants was 771 lbs CO2/MWh. Id.
at 64,667. These “emission performance rates” were
the “chief regulatory requirement” of the Clean Power
Plan. Id. at 64,823. But these rates were just a
regulatory artifice, as no existing facility could meet
them through the application of pollution controls or
operational improvements that EPA determined to be
available for individual existing sources. Id. at
64,754. Indeed, these rates were stricter than the
emission rates EPA applied to new sources. Compare
id. at 64,512–13, Tbl. 1, with id. at 64,667.
To comply with these regulatory artifices, the
owners of power plants would need to pay to shift the
power sector away from coal-fired generation to
lower- or zero-emitting generation. Id. at 64,733.
They could do this either by building their own
renewable generation resources or by purchasing
emission allowances or credits from renewable energy
competitors through an emissions trading market
that EPA expected would develop. Id. at 64,669,
64,720, 64,725–26, 64,728, 64,731. These measures
would thus shift generation to new lower- or zero-
9
emitting generation. Id. at 64,911; see also id. at
64,745–47 (“generation shifts”).
Numerous parties—including the National
Mining Association—challenged the Clean Power
Plan in court; first, in the D.C. Circuit, and then
before this Court on a motion for a stay pending
appeal. J.A.223. These parties’ lead argument in
their applications for a stay to this Court was that
EPA’s reliance on novel, transformational generationshifting authority under Section 111(d) violated the
major questions doctrine, as articulated in Utility Air
Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014)
(“UARG”). See Coal Indus. Appl. For Immediate Stay
at 6–8, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 15A778
(U.S. Jan. 27, 2016); 29 States and State Agencies
Appl. For Stay at 15–18, West Virginia v. EPA,
No.15A773 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2016).
In an
“unprecedented intervention,” this Court “did what
[the D.C. Circuit] would not”—it stayed the Clean
Power Plan pending judicial review. J.A.223–24;
West Virginia v. EPA, 577 U.S. 1126 (2016).
2. Before the D.C. Circuit could complete its
merits review, EPA repealed the Clean Power Plan,
after concluding that it lacked statutory authority to
adopt it. See 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520, 32,522–23 (July 8,
2019); J.A.224. Simultaneous with this repeal, EPA
promulgated the Affordable Clean Energy (“ACE”)
Rule, which adopted heat rate improvement
measures as the “best system of emission reduction.”
84 Fed. Reg. at 32,520–21. The D.C. Circuit then
10
dismissed as moot all pending challenges to the Clean
Power Plan. Order, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 151363 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 17, 2019).
EPA offered two primary reasons for repealing
the Clean Power Plan. First, “Congress ‘spoke to the
precise question’ of the scope of [Clean Air Act] section
111(a)(1) and clearly precluded” consideration of
“measures wholly outside a particular source,” like
generation shifting. 84 Fed. Reg. at 32,526–27.
Second—and most relevant to the arguments in this
brief—“the major question[s] doctrine” required
repeal. Id. at 32,529. EPA discussed a number of
factors relevant to its major-questions conclusion: the
Clean Power Plan’s “generation-shifting scheme was
projected to have billions of dollars of impact on
regulated parties and the economy, would have
affected every electricity customer (i.e., all
Americans), [and] was subject to litigation involving
almost every State in the Union”; the rule’s
generation-shifting components “are far afield from
the core activity of [Clean Air Act] section 111”; there
is a “notable absence of a valid limiting principle to
basing a [Clean Air Act] section 111 rule on
generation shifting”; and the Clean Power Plan
“advanced a broad reading of [Clean Air Act] section
111(a)(1)” that “overextended federal authority into
matters traditionally reserved for states[.]”
Id.
Because major rules “must be supported by a clearstatement from Congress,” which was lacking here,
EPA concluded that it must repeal the Clean Power
Plan. Id.
11
C. The D.C. Circuit’s Decision Below
Numerous parties challenged EPA’s repeal of the
Clean Power Plan and its replacement with the ACE
Rule before the D.C. Circuit, and many other
parties—including the National Mining Association—
intervened to defend EPA’s actions. J.A.53–215. In a
2-1 decision, a panel of the D.C. Circuit held that
EPA’s repeal of the Clean Power Plan and its adoption
of the ACE Rule were unlawful, concluding that both
actions “hinged on a fundamental misconstruction of
Section 7411(d) of the Clean Air Act.” J.A.71–72.
Most relevant for the arguments in this brief, the
panel majority rejected EPA’s conclusion that the
major questions doctrine compelled the repeal of the
Clean Power Plan. J.A.135–55.
Judge Walker dissented, in relevant part, to
explain his concern regarding whether the Clean
Power Plan ran afoul of the major questions doctrine.
J.A.216–55. “The potential costs and benefits of the
2015 Rule are almost unfathomable,” with “wholesale
electricity’s cost [expected] to rise by $214 billion” and
an additional $64 billion “to replace shuttered
capacity.” J.A.226. On the other side of the equation,
the Clean Power Plan’s goal was to attempt to “lower
ocean levels; preserve glaciers; reduce asthma; make
hearts healthier; slow tropical diseases; abate
hurricanes; temper wildfires; reduce droughts; stop
many floods; rescue whole ecosystems; and save from
extinction up to half the species on earth.” J.A.227
(citation omitted). In short, no one could argue the
12
Clean Power Plan was a “minor” rule, J.A.228. Judge
Walker also noted that “[h]ardly any party in this case
makes a serious and sustained argument that § 111
includes
a
clear
statement
unambiguously
authorizing the EPA to consider off-site solutions like
generation shifting.” J.A.217, 224, 229, 230.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I. A case like this one, where an agency seeks to
resolve a national policy dispute by pointing to a
snippet of general language, implicates three
interrelated doctrines—the major questions doctrine
itself, nondelegation, and deference under Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
A.1. Under the major questions doctrine, an
agency only has the authority to decide a major
national
policy
if
Congress
clearly
and
unambiguously authorizes the agency to do so. This
doctrine furthers the separation of powers via a
statutory presumption that Congress would generally
not want administrative agencies to resolve national
policy issues.
2. The nondelegation doctrine is closely related to
the major questions doctrine and prohibits Congress
from delegating its lawmaking authority to
administrative agencies. Like the major questions
doctrine, the nondelegation doctrine ensures that
13
lawmaking follows the strictures of Article I of the
U.S. Constitution.
3. Chevron deference requires courts to defer in
certain, appropriate circumstances to an agency’s
reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory
language in the statutes that it administers, based on
the theory that Congress has implicitly delegated
authority to agencies to resolve such ambiguities.
Chevron deference intersects with the major
questions doctrine when agencies improperly argue
that courts should defer to agency interpretations
even when those interpretations empower the agency
to decide major national policies.
B. This Court should hold that the major
questions doctrine is a threshold inquiry. Applying
the major questions doctrine as a threshold analysis
would resolve most nondelegation cases, since
Congress rarely, if ever, specifically delegates major
policy questions to agencies, and would keep Chevron
within its traditional role.
C. This Court should hold that there are three
independently sufficient tests that trigger the
application of the major questions doctrine. First, the
doctrine should apply when an agency seeks to resolve
an issue of vast economic and political significance.
Multiple factors are relevant to this first test,
including the rule’s overall impact on the economy,
the number of people affected, the degree of
congressional and public attention to the issue, and
14
the amount of money involved. Second, the doctrine
should apply when the agency bases its regulatory
action on a never before claimed tool that would give
the agency enormous and transformative power.
Third, the doctrine should apply when the agency’s
actions encroach upon traditional state authority or
on the core expertise of another administrative
agency.
II. The Clean Power Plan’s shifting of electricity
generation resources from fossil fuels to renewable
energy resolves a major policy question that Congress
did not assign to EPA to decide.
A. The Clean Power Plan triggers the major
questions doctrine under each of the three
independently sufficient tests drawn from this
Court’s jurisprudence.
1. The Clean Power Plan is a rule of vast
economic and political significance. The Plan imposes
a substantial overall impact on the national economy,
while also eliminating a significant number of jobs
attributable to the energy sector. The number of
people affected by the Clean Power Plan is
exceedingly high, extending to every electric customer
in the country. Congress and the public have devoted
considerable attention to the question that the Plan
purports to resolve. Finally, the Plan implicates a
significant amount of money, as it is projected to raise
electricity-generation costs by hundreds of billions of
dollars.
15
2. The Clean Power Plan is an assertion of
enormous and transformative authority by the EPA.
The Plan’s core feature—generation shifting—
requires owners of power plants either to build their
own renewable generation resources or subsidize
lower-emitting resources by buying credits from their
competitors.
Under this generation shifting
methodology,
EPA
could
take
similarly
transformative steps in numerous other industries,
thereby rearranging the economy.
3. The Clean Power Plan trespasses on the
traditional powers of the States and strays into the
core zone of expertise of other federal agencies. The
regulation of utilities is a power traditionally reserved
to the States. The Clean Power Plan, however, usurps
this traditional state role by requiring States to shift
vast amounts of energy generation from fossil fuelfired plants to new renewable resources. In doing so,
the Clean Power Plan also intrudes upon the
expertise of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”)—the agency that administers
the Federal Power Act—which has authority over
interstate transmission of energy.
B. Because the Clean Power Plan implicates the
major questions doctrine, it could only be lawful if
Congress clearly and unambiguously authorized EPA
to promulgate it. However, Section 111(d) does not
contain such a clear statement of transformative
authority, as Section 111(d)’s prosaic terms nowhere
16
suggest that EPA has the power to transform the
nation’s energy mix.
C. The panel majority’s contrary conclusions
below are all incorrect. The panel majority’s approach
would render the major questions doctrine an
effective nullity by permitting agencies to settle
questions of nationwide importance based upon
snippets of general statutory text.
ARGUMENT
I.
Congress Must Speak Clearly If It Wants To
Assign To An Agency The Authority To
Resolve A Major Policy Issue.
A. The
Major
Questions
Doctrine,
Nondelegation, And Chevron Deference
1. The Major Questions Doctrine
In “a series of important cases” over the last few
decades, this Court has recognized that “major agency
rules” require “clear congressional authorization” to
be lawful. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381,
417 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from
the denial of rehearing en banc); see, e.g., MCI
Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218
(1994); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243
(2006); UARG, 573 U.S. at 302; Ala. Ass’n of Realtors,
141 S. Ct. at 2489; accord Whitman v. Am. Trucking
17
Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468–69 (2001); Indus. Union
Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
645–46 (1980) (Stevens, J., controlling opinion).
These cases stand for the proposition that for “an
agency to issue a major rule, Congress must clearly
authorize the agency to do so.” U.S. Telecom Ass’n,
855 F.3d at 419 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc); accord Ala. Ass’n of
Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489. “If a statute only
ambiguously supplies authority for the major rule,
the rule is unlawful” without any further inquiry.
U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 419 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); see,
e.g., Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 132–33, 161.
Thus, an agency may only “exercise regulatory
authority over a major policy question” if Congress
has either: “(i) expressly and specifically decide[d] the
major policy question itself and delegate[d] to the
agency the authority to regulate and enforce; or
(ii) expressly and specifically delegate[d] to the
agency the authority both to decide the major policy
question and to regulate and enforce.” Paul v. United
States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J.,
respecting the denial of certiorari) (collecting cases).
Two “overlapping and reinforcing presumptions”
provide the legal foundation and justification for the
major questions doctrine. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855
F.3d at 419 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc).
18
The first is “a separation of powers-based
presumption against the delegation of major
lawmaking authority from Congress to the Executive
Branch[.]” Id. (citing Indus. Union, 448 U.S. at 645–
46 (Stevens, J., controlling op.)); accord Indus. Union,
448 U.S. at 685 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment). “Under the Constitution’s separation of
powers, Congress makes the laws, and the Executive
implements and enforces the laws”; “[t]he Executive
Branch does not possess a general, free-standing
authority to issue binding legal rules.” U.S. Telecom
Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 419 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc). “The major
rules doctrine helps preserve the separation of powers
and operates as a vital check on expansive and
aggressive assertions of executive authority.” Id. at
417; accord Cass R. Sunstein, The American
Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1181,
1201–02 (2018).
The second is the “presumption that Congress
intends to make major policy decisions itself, not
leave those decisions to agencies.” U.S. Telecom
Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 419 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc); accord King v.
Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 485–86 (2015); Stephen
Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and
Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1986). Under the
“democratic values” embodied in our Constitution, “a
major policy change should be made by the most
democratically
accountable
process—Article I,
Section 7 legislation[.]” U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d
19
at 422 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc) (quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Interpreting Law: A Primer on How to Read Statutes
and the Constitution 289 (2016)). This constitutional
process requires “Congress [to] deliberate[ ] about”
any “change in [ ] major policies,” forcing it to remain
accountable to the people for the policy choices it
makes for the entire Nation. Id. (quoting Eskridge,
supra, at 289); accord Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267–68.
This Court has applied the major questions
doctrine at different stages of the statutory analysis.
Sometimes this Court appears to invoke the doctrine
at Chevron step one, where it counsels “hesitat[ion]
before concluding that Congress has intended” the
“implicit delegation” of a major question to an agency
via statutory “ambiguity.” Brown & Williamson, 529
U.S. at 159–60; Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S.
576, 589 n.* (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Other times this Court
considers this doctrine at Chevron step two,
concluding that an agency’s “interpretation” of a
statute is “unreasonable”—and therefore undeserving
of deference—where that interpretation would allow
the agency to answer a major question. UARG, 573
U.S. at 321, 323–24; see also MCI, 512 U.S. at 229–31.
And still other times, this Court invokes the doctrine
to hold that Congress never intended to delegate
resolving a major question to the agency. King, 576
U.S. at 485–86; Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267.
20
2. The Nondelegation Doctrine
The nondelegation doctrine is “closely related” to
the major questions doctrine. Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342
(Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of certiorari);
see Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141–42
(2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Jonathan H. Adler &
Christopher J. Walker, Delegation and Time, 105
Iowa L. Rev. 1931, 1946–49 (2020); Sunstein, supra,
at 1198–1200. Given that “the people ha[ve] vested
the power to prescribe rules limiting their liberties in
Congress alone,” Congress may not “alter that
arrangement” by delegating its “responsibility of
adopting legislation” to any other body. Gundy, 139
S. Ct. at 2133 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); accord Clinton
v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 464–65 (1998)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
“[O]nly the people’s elected representatives”—not the
executive—“may adopt new federal laws restricting
liberty.” Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
Like the major questions doctrine, the
nondelegation doctrine ensures that lawmaking
proceeds through the Article I lawmaking process. Id.
at 2133–35; John F. Manning, The Nondelegation
Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 223, 271 (2000) (calling this the doctrine’s
“central aim”). “[T]he framers went to great lengths
to make lawmaking difficult,” given that “the new
federal government’s most dangerous power was the
power to enact laws restricting people’s liberty.”
21
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2134 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Further, the Constitution requires “that legislating be
done . . . in a public process,” making “the lines of
accountability” between Congress and the people
“clear.” Id. “If Congress could pass off its legislative
power to the executive branch” via delegation,
however, “legislation would risk becoming nothing
more than the will of the current President”—and
“would not be few in number.” Id. at 2134–35.
“Accountability would suffer too,” since Congress
could take credit for addressing a social problem by
delegating the finding of a solution to the executive,
only to then blame the executive if the “measures he
chooses to pursue” are unpopular—with the executive
placing the blame on Congress in return. Id. at 2135.
Three “important guiding principles” aid in
deciding “whether Congress has unconstitutionally
divested itself of its legislative responsibilities.” Id.
at 2135–36. First, Congress itself must “make[ ] the
policy decisions when regulating private conduct” via
statute, although Congress “may authorize another
branch to ‘fill up the details’” of a statutory regime.
Id. at 2136 (citation omitted); accord Breyer, supra, at
370–71 (approving of Congress’s “leaving interstitial
matters” to agencies).
Second, Congress may
“prescribe[ ]” a “rule governing private conduct” and
“make the application of that rule depend on
executive fact-finding.” Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2136–37
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting); accord Aditya Bamzai,
Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor,
and the Formation and Future of Administrative Law,
22
133 Harv. L. Rev. 164, 182–83 (2019). That is, the
Constitution permits Congress to exercise its
lawmaking powers “expressly or conditionally” on
executive action, without running afoul of the
nondelegation doctrine. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). This remains true even if
“the power extended to the executive” in this
circumstance “may prove highly consequential.” Id.
Third, Congress may assign another branch “certain
non-legislative responsibilities” without causing
nondelegation concerns. Id. at 2137; accord Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Although “the Constitution vests all
federal legislative power in Congress alone,
Congress’s legislative authority sometimes overlaps
with [the] authority” vested in another branch by the
Constitution. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting). So, if Congress by statute delegates
certain matters to another branch that are already
“‘within the scope’” of that branch’s “‘power,’” that
raises no nondelegation concern.
Id. (citation
omitted).
Much of this Court’s nondelegation-doctrine case
law, properly understood, accords with these three
“traditional tests.” Id. at 2139. While this Court has,
at times, described the nondelegation doctrine as
requiring only that Congress provide an “intelligible
principle” when delegating legislative authority, the
“intelligible principle ‘test’” simply restates the
traditional nondelegation principles discussed above.
Id. at 2138–41. So, a statute “provides an intelligible
23
principle,” sufficient to satisfy the nondelegation
doctrine based upon the answers to the following
questions: “Does the statute assign to the executive
only the responsibility to make factual findings? Does
it set forth the facts that the executive must consider
and the criteria against which to measure them? And
most importantly, did Congress, and not the
Executive Branch, make the policy judgments?” Id.
at 2141.
The nondelegation doctrine is most consequential
when dealing with “major national policy decisions.”
Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342 (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the
denial of certiorari). The Constitution vests Congress
with the duty to set major policy for the Nation.
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2134–36 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting); accord Manning, supra, at 271 & n.223.
To carry out this Article I process, Congress must
“accommodate competing policy concerns” and reach
compromise legislative solutions, given Article I’s
difficult requirements. Manning, supra, at 271 &
n.223 (citation omitted); accord Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at
2134–36 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“difficult and
deliberative processes”). Thus, by design, Congress
may only enact major national policies after engaging
in “due deliberation,” striking a compromise, and
securing “approval of a supermajority of the people’s
representatives.” Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2134 (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting) (citation omitted); accord Indus.
Union, 448 U.S. at 685 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
the judgment); Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267 (“earnest
and profound debate”) (citation omitted). If Congress
24
could delegate “major national policy decisions” to
agencies, then Congress could empower the agencies
to impose the executive’s policy views, depriving the
people of Article I consensus and compromise. Paul,
140 S. Ct. at 342 (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the
denial of certiorari); see Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2134–35
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Manning, supra, at 271 &
n.223; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 631
(1992).
These Article I concerns do not arise to the same
degree when Congress delegates lesser, statutorygap-filling decisions to agencies. See Gundy, 139 S.
Ct. at 2136, 2141–42 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Breyer,
supra, at 370–71. An agency resolving “interstitial
matters” is generally of less consequence to the
people. See Breyer, supra, at 370–71; accord Gundy,
139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Thus, if
Congress sets out “consider[ations]” and “criteria” to
guide the agency’s discretion, delegation of those lessimportant matters does not generally offend Article I.
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting);
accord Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory
Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2152 (2016);
Breyer, supra, at 370–71.
3. Chevron Deference
The final relevant doctrine here is Chevron
deference, which, in appropriate circumstances,
25
requires courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable
interpretations of ambiguous statutory language that
the agency is charged with administering. Brown &
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159; Chevron, 467 U.S. at
844–45. Chevron deference “is premised on the theory
that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit
delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the
statutory gaps.” Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at
132, 159; see also King, 576 U.S. at 486. Thus, “when
an agency-administered statute is ambiguous with
respect to what it prescribes,” this Court understands
Congress to have “empowered the agency to resolve
the ambiguity”—such that this Court must defer to
the agency’s “reasonabl[e]” interpretations. UARG,
573 U.S. at 315; see Breyer, supra, at 373.
Chevron deference intersects with the major
questions doctrine when an agency improperly relies
on Chevron to resolve a major policy question for the
Nation. When properly confined to its traditional role
of allowing the agency to fill in the details of a
regulatory regime, the Chevron deference doctrine
proceeds in two steps. Under the first step, the court
“ask[s] whether the statute” that the agency
administers “is ambiguous.” King, 576 U.S. at 485. If
the statute is not ambiguous—meaning that
“Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue”—then the Chevron “inquiry is at an end; the
court must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.” Brown & Williamson,
529 U.S. at 132 (citations omitted). If the statute is
ambiguous, then, under the second step, the court
26
must ask “whether the agency’s interpretation is
reasonable.” King, 576 U.S. at 485. If it is, then the
court must defer to that agency interpretation even if
it is not “the reading the court would have reached if
the question initially had arisen in a judicial
proceeding.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 & n.11.
This approach creates serious constitutional
difficulties, however, when an agency improperly
claims Chevron deference in relying on general
statutory language to resolve a major national policy
question. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 419
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc); Kavanaugh, supra, at 2151–52.
B. The Major Questions Doctrine Should Be
A Threshold Inquiry To Any Chevron Or
Nondelegation Analysis.
This Court should hold that the major questions
doctrine operates as a threshold inquiry before any
further statutory or nondelegation doctrine analysis.
See U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 418–22
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc). When a court considers whether
an agency has the authority to promulgate a
challenged rule, the court should first determine
whether that rule purports to answer a “major policy
question.” Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342 (Kavanaugh, J.,
respecting the denial of certiorari). If the rule does
attempt to do so, the court must decide whether
Congress “expressly and specifically delegate[d] th[e]
27
authority” to answer such a “major policy question” to
the agency. Id. And if Congress did not clearly and
unambiguously delegate such authority to the agency,
the rule is unlawful on that basis alone. Id. If,
however, the court concludes that Congress took the
highly unusual step of clearly delegating the
resolution of that major policy issue to the agency, the
court would then need to analyze whether such a rare
delegation is constitutionally permissible under the
nondelegation doctrine.
Considering the major questions doctrine as a
threshold
matter,
before
Chevron
or
the
nondelegation doctrine, best reflects the intertwined
logic of these doctrines. The inquiries required by the
major questions doctrine—whether a rule implicates
a major question and, if so, whether the statutory
delegation is unambiguous, see id.—are logically prior
both to Chevron’s two-step framework and to any
nondelegation-doctrine analysis. If an agency’s rule
purports to resolve a major national policy, then that
rule is unlawful absent a clear statement from
Congress that it wants the agency to resolve that
issue. Id.; accord King, 576 U.S. at 485–86; Gonzales,
546 U.S. at 267. The major questions doctrine also
logically precedes the nondelegation analysis,
including as a matter of constitutional avoidance. See
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516
(2009); accord Manning, supra, at 223–24. After all,
if the court holds that the statute does not authorize
the rule under the major questions doctrine, no
28
nondelegation or Chevron inquiry would be needed or
appropriate.
This understanding of the major questions
doctrine would allow Chevron to remain within its
historical role, where agencies rely upon delegated
authority to resolve statutory ambiguities about the
details of a regulatory regime that Congress created.
See U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 419 (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc);
Kavanaugh, supra, at 2151–52.
As for the nondelegation doctrine, applying the
major questions doctrine first would often render that
doctrine unnecessary, given that Congress rarely—if
ever—explicitly delegates major policy questions to
agencies.
See, e.g., King, 576 U.S. at 485–86;
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267. The people rightly expect
Congress to “make the policy judgments” for the
Nation, consistent with its vested legislative power
under the Constitution, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting), rather than to “leave those
decisions to agencies,” U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at
419 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc). And, as an empirical matter,
Congress does not generally explicitly delegate to
agencies the responsibility to resolve such questions.
See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev.
901, 1003–06 (2013); accord Christensen, 529 U.S. at
29
589 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment); Breyer, supra, at 369–70. So, in
almost all challenges to a major administrative rule
on nondelegation grounds, a court could resolve the
case without invalidating the statute by concluding
that, under the major questions doctrine, Congress
had not unambiguously directed the agency to answer
that major question in the first place.
C. This Court Should Hold That Three
Independently Sufficient Tests Identify
That A Rule Triggers The Major
Questions Doctrine.
Three tests, drawn from this Court’s case law,
should be independently sufficient to demonstrate
that an agency has attempted to answer a major
question, requiring clear and unambiguous statutory
authority under the major questions doctrine.
Under the first test, the rule at issue implicates
the major questions doctrine if that rule involves a
decision of “vast economic and political significance.”
UARG, 573 U.S. at 324 (citations omitted); see, e.g.,
King, 576 U.S. at 486; Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S.
Ct. at 2489. Several factors help determine whether
the major questions doctrine applies under this first
test: “the overall impact on the economy,” U.S.
Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 422–23 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc);
accord Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159–60; “the
number of people affected,” U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855
30
F.3d at 422–23 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc); accord UARG, 573 U.S.
at 324; “the degree of congressional and public
attention to the issue,” U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d
at 422–23 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial
of rehearing en banc); Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267
(“earnest and profound debate across the country”)
(citation omitted); accord Breyer, supra, at 371
(“illuminate or stabilize a broad area of the law”); and
“the amount of money involved,” U.S. Telecom Ass’n,
855 F.3d at 422–23 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from
the denial of rehearing en banc); accord Ala. Ass’n of
Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489.
Under the second test, a rule triggers the major
questions doctrine when it is based upon a tool that
would give the relevant agency “enormous and
transformative” authority, including in future rules
that the agency may adopt. UARG, 573 U.S. at 324;
see, e.g., Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489
(“breathtaking amount of authority”; “unprecedented
[ ] [s]ince th[e] provision’s enactment”); Gonzales, 546
U.S. at 267 (“broad and unusual authority through an
implicit delegation”); accord Whitman, 531 U.S. at
468 (“alter[ing] the fundamental details of a
regulatory scheme”). Major questions under this test
often involve agencies divining “unheralded power,”
often from a “long-extant statute.” UARG, 573 U.S.
at 324; accord District of Columbia v. Dep’t of Labor,
819 F.3d 444, 446, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Kavanaugh,
J.) (the agency “advanced a novel reading of [a
statute] that would significantly enlarge” its scope).
31
Finally, under the third test, a rule triggers the
major questions doctrine if it involves the agency
trespassing on the traditional authority of the States,
Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489, or of other
agencies, see, e.g., King, 576 U.S. at 486; Gonzales,
546 U.S. at 266–67. These are circumstances in
which “[i]t is especially unlikely that Congress would
have delegated th[e] decision to the” agency, King,
576 U.S. at 486, as Congress does not “significantly
alter the balance between federal and state power”
through mere delegations to agencies, Ala. Ass’n of
Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489, or countenance agencies
“expand[ing] their power beyond” their “special
expertise,” Breyer, supra, at 370–71; accord King, 576
U.S. at 486; Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267.
II. Whether The United States Should “Shift”
Away From Coal-Fired Generation Is A
Major Policy Question That Congress Did
Not Clearly Assign To EPA To Resolve.
A. The Clean Power Plan Triggers The
Major Questions Doctrine Under All
Three Independently Sufficient Tests.
1. Vast
Economic
Significance
And
Political
The Clean Power Plan purports to answer a major
question of “vast economic and political significance,”
UARG, 573 U.S. at 324 (citations omitted), because of
the Plan’s overall effect on the economy, the number
32
of people that it impacts, the degree of congressional
and public attention that the issue and rule have
received, and the amount of money involved. U.S.
Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 422–23 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
Overall impact on the economy. The Clean Power
Plan would have had a substantial “overall impact on
the economy.” Id. at 423. The energy economy is part
of our Nation’s “uniquely critical” infrastructure,
given that it serves “an ‘enabling function’ across all
critical infrastructure sectors,” thereby “fuel[ing] the
economy of the 21st century.” U.S. Cybersecurity &
Infrastructure Sec. Agency, Energy Sector.3 Or, as the
majority below explained, “[e]lectrical power has
become virtually as indispensable to modern life as
air itself.” J.A.79. Accordingly, a robust and wellfunctioning energy sector is essential to our Nation’s
wellbeing, including its economic wellbeing.
Coal plays an important role in aiding and driving
the energy sector. Unlike many other forms of energy
production, coal is not a “resource limited” product in
the near- or long-term, meaning that the United
States has stable coal reserves available for decades
to come. Nat’l Research Council, Coal: Energy for the
Future 3–4 (Nat’l Acads. Press 1995); see U.S. Energy
Info. Admin., Coal Explained: How Much Coal is Left
(Oct. 19, 2021) (“Based on U.S. coal production in
2020, of about 0.535 billion short tons, the recoverable
3 Available at https://www.cisa.gov/energy-sector.
33
coal reserves would last about 470 years, and
recoverable reserves at producing mines would last
about 25 years.”).4 Further, coal is a resilient energy
source, is readily dispatchable, and has the capacity
to be stored onsite in quantities sufficient for months
of fuel. Jeff St. John, PJM: Fuel Security Issues Won’t
Disrupt the Grid, Unless Coal & Nuclear Closures
Skyrocket, GreenTechMedia.com (Nov. 1, 2018).5
Coal thus plays a critical role in maintaining the
energy grid’s reliability in the face of various
threats—from natural threats like the bitter cold, id.,
to more modern threats like cyberattacks, see Robert
Walton, NERC Identifies 4 Regions Facing Potential
Summer Energy Shortages, UtilityDive.com (May 18,
2021)6—making coal essential to the grid’s continued
operation.
The Clean Power Plan, by its core design, would
have a “massive negative impact on the U.S. coal
mining industry.” Seth Schwartz, Evaluation of the
Immediate Impact of the Clean Power Plan Rule on
the Coal Industry at 48 (Energy Ventures Analysis,
4 Available at https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/coal/
how-much-coal-is-left.php.
Available at https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/
read/pjm-fuel-security-wont-disrupt-grid-unless-coal-nuclearclosures.
5
6 Available at https://www.utilitydive.com/news/nerc-cyber
security-concerns-summer-energy-shortages-texas-california/60
0324/.
34
Inc. Oct. 2015).7 By eliminating any real growth
potential for the U.S. coal industry, the Clean Power
Plan would “by any financial measure—market
capitalization, share price, bond rating, access to
capital markets— . . . impair[ ] the ability of coal
companies” to remain “going concerns.” Id. at 57.
The Clean Power Plan’s shifting away from coalfired generation would also have major impacts on
employment. The energy sector, and the coal industry
in particular, are major contributors to employment
and economic growth. The coal industry directly
employs over 185,000 individuals. Nat’l Ass’n of State
Energy Officials, et al., Wages, Benefits, and Change:
A Supplemental Report to the Annual U.S. Energy
and Employment Report 47 (2020).8 And every one of
those jobs in coal mining “creat[es] [ ] 3.3 jobs”
elsewhere. Nat’l Mining Assoc., Coal: Reliable &
Affordable Power 1 (Mar. 2021).9 The Clean Power
Plan by its core design reduces demand for the
Nation’s supply of coal, as discussed above, which
would have a direct, negative impact on employment
in the coal industry.
Available
Final.pdf.
at
http://www.nma.org/pdf/EVA-Report-
Available
Report.pdf.
at
https://www.usenergyjobs.org/s/Wage-
7
8
9 Available at https://nma.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/
coal_reliable_power_2021.pdf.
35
Number of people affected. The Clean Power Plan
would have impacted almost everyone in the Nation,
thus the “number of people affected” is exceedingly
large.
U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 423
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc). As explained above, the Plan also
would have undermined the security and reliability of
the Nation’s energy sector and reduced energy sector
employment. Supra pp. 32–34. Thus, as EPA
correctly explained when repealing the Clean Power
Plan,
the
Plan’s
“generation-shifting
scheme . . . would have affected every electricity
customer (i.e., all Americans),” making it “a major
rule.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 32,529 (emphasis added).
Degree of congressional and public attention to the
issue. The Clean Power Plan received a high “degree
of congressional and public attention.” U.S. Telecom
Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 423 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc).
Since at least 2009, Congress has introduced—
but failed to pass—legislation that would have
“force[d] the electric-power industry to shift from
fossil fuels to renewable resources,” J.A.220, and
“dozens of other climate-related bills” have been
“introduced since then,” all to no avail. J.A.220–21
(citing American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R.
2454, 111th Cong. (2009); Integrated Energy Systems
Act, S. 2702, 116th Cong. (2019); Clean Industrial
Technology Act, S. 2300, 116th Cong. (2019);
Advancing Grid Storage Act, H.R. 7313, 115th Cong.
36
(2018); Climate Risk Disclosure Act, S. 3481, 115th
Cong. (2018); American Energy and Conservation
Act, S. 3110, 114th Cong. (2016); Climate Solutions
Commission Act, H.R. 6240, 114th Cong. (2016);
Super Pollutants Act, S. 2911, 113th Cong. (2014);
American Renewable Energy and Efficiency Act, H.R.
5301, 113th Cong. (2014); End Polluter Welfare Act,
S. 3080, 112th Cong. (2012); Save Our Climate Act,
H.R. 3242, 112th Cong. (2011); Carbon Dioxide
Capture Technology Prize Act, S. 757, 112th Cong.
(2011); Clean Energy Standard Act, S. 20, 111th
Cong. (2010)). Congress did not pass any of these
measures because “Senators from small states
blocked legislation they viewed as adverse to their
voters.” J.A.220–21.
EPA promulgated the Clean Power Plan in
response to President Obama’s view that Congress
had failed to address climate change sufficiently.
“President Obama ordered EPA to do what Congress
wouldn’t.”
J.A.222.
Specifically, the President
directed EPA “to come up with executive actions we
can take, now and in the future, to reduce pollution,
prepare our communities for the consequences of
climate change, and speed the transition to more
sustainable sources of energy.” Lehmann & Massey,
supra. The President’s directive culminated in EPA’s
Clean Power Plan.
The promulgation of the Clean Power Plan
received substantial public attention. Over 40 States
and dozens of other groups litigated its lawfulness in
37
federal court—either challenging or defending the
Plan. J.A.223. And when the D.C. Circuit refused to
stay implementation pending that court’s review, this
Court intervened and ordered a stay, in a decision
that drew still more broad, nationwide attention.
See., e.g., Adam Liptak & Coral Davenport, The New
York Times, Supreme Court Deals Blow to Obama’s
Efforts to Regulate Coal Emissions (Feb. 9, 2016);10
Jonathan Adler, The Washington Post, Opinion:
Supreme Court Puts the Brakes on the EPA’s Clean
Power Plan (Feb. 9, 2016);11 Lawrence Hurley &
Valerie Volcovici, Reuters, U.S. Supreme Court
Blocks Obama's Clean Carbon Emissions Plan (Feb.
9, 2016).12
The public attention for EPA’s repeal of the Clean
Power Plan and its replacement, the ACE Rule, was
as intense. After this repeal and replacement,
“politically diverse states and politically adverse
special interest groups” participated in more
litigation over the lawfulness of EPA’s actions, with a
number of litigants comparable to the number
involved in the initial round of litigation. J.A.224. In
Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/10/us/
politics/supreme-court-blocks-obama-epa-coal-emissionsregulations.html.
10
Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/09/supreme-court-puts-thebrakes-on-the-epas-clean-power-plan/.
11
Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usacourt-carbon-idUSKCN0VI2A0.
12
38
just this latest round of legal challenges, “the
briefing’s word count exceeded a quarter of a million
words,” “oral argument lasted roughly nine hours,”
and the “case’s caption alone runs beyond a dozen
pages.” Id.
Money involved. The Clean Power Plan involves
a significant “amount of money [ ] for regulated and
affected parties.” U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at
422–23 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc). In repealing the Clean Power
Plan, EPA explained that the Plan’s “generationshifting scheme was projected to have billions of
dollars of impact on regulated parties and the
economy,” which supported EPA’s own conclusion
that the Plan qualified as “a major rule.” 84 Fed. Reg.
at 32,529. EPA’s conclusions were correct, as the
Plan’s generation-shifting methodology has “almost
unfathomable” potential direct costs, with “wholesale
electricity’s cost [alone expected] to rise by $214
billion” and an additional $64 billion “to replace
shuttered capacity.” J.A.226; see also U.S. Energy
Info. Admin., Analysis of the Impacts of the Clean
Power Plan 63–64 (May 2015).13
Further, the
National Mining Association’s own evaluation of the
potential impact of the Plan’s generation shifting
confirms its dramatic impact on both the coal industry
and the country. See Schwartz, supra, at 1–2.
13 Available at https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/power
plants/cleanplan/pdf/powerplant.pdf.
39
2. Assertion
Of
Transformative
Before Claimed
Enormous
Authority
And
Never
The Clean Power Plan’s central feature—
generation shifting—is an “unheralded power” that
EPA had divined from a “long-extant statute,”
arrogating “enormous and transformative” authority
to itself “without clear congressional authorization.”
UARG, 573 U.S. at 324.
Generation shifting involves “an owner or
operator of a regulated source . . . ‘shift[ing]’ powerproducing operations to a different facility, such as a
nuclear power plant, through bilateral contracts for
capacity or by reducing utilization.” 84 Fed. Reg. at
32,527.
In practical terms, generation shifting
requires owners of power plants to “subsidiz[e] loweremitting sources” like wind farms by buying those
sources’ excess capacity, curtailing or shuttering their
own operations, or purchasing some form of credit
toward compliance from those other types of
generating resources. Id. at 32,527, 32,534.
Once armed with the generation-shifting tool,
EPA’s central-planning authority under Section
111(d) would be breathtaking. Nor could (or would)
this “enormous and transformative” authority,
UARG, 573 U.S. at 324, be confined to the power
sector. EPA could generation-shift virtually any
industry by using materially indistinguishable logic.
Just looking at the sources regulated under the
40
immediately prior EPA rule pursuant to Section
111(d), 61 Fed. Reg. 9905 (Mar. 12, 1996), EPA could
next decide that recycling plants are preferrable to
municipal landfills, in terms of their impact on air
emissions, and require a shift from the former to the
latter.
The Clean Power Plan’s assertion of generationshifting authority, if upheld by this Court, would be
unprecedented. In the 42 years between the adoption
of Section 111(d) in 1970 and the proposal of the Clean
Power Plan, EPA consistently read Section 111(d) to
require performance standards that are achievable by
individual sources based on applying a “best system
of emission reduction” to those individual sources.
See 42 Fed. Reg. 12,022 (Mar. 1, 1977) (fluorides from
phosphate fertilizer plants); 42 Fed. Reg. 55,796 (Oct.
18, 1977) (acid mist from sulfuric acid plants); 44 Fed.
Reg. 29,828 (May 22, 1979) (total reduced sulfur from
kraft pulp plants); 45 Fed. Reg. 26,294 (Apr. 17, 1980)
(fluorides from primary aluminum plants); 60 Fed.
Reg. 65,387 (Dec. 19, 1995) (various pollutants from
municipal waste combustors); 61 Fed. Reg. 9905 (Mar.
12, 1996) (landfill gases from municipal solid waste
landfills).
Supporters of the Clean Power Plan have cited the
Clean Air Mercury Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18,
2005), to claim that the Plan does not rest on a novel
assertion of EPA’s authority, see e.g., JA.126–27, but
that Rule does not help their cause. The D.C. Circuit
vacated the Clean Air Mercury Rule on other grounds,
41
so no court ever grappled with whether Section 111(d)
authorized that Rule’s emissions trading regime. See
New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 577–78. Further, in the
Clean Air Mercury Rule, the required emission
reductions were “based on control technology
available in the relevant timeframe” that could be
installed at the regulated source, 70 Fed. Reg. at
28,617, and EPA asserted that the standard could be
achieved without emission trading, id. at 28,620 &
n.5. That is, of course, not true for the Clean Power
Plan, since EPA did not establish its “emission
performance rates” based on what could be achieved
by installing controls at an existing source. See supra
pp. 7–9.
3. Trespassing On The Traditional
Authority Of States And Other
Agencies
The Clean Power Plan infringes on traditional
state authority, Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at
2489, while also straying into the zone of expertise of
other agencies, see, e.g., King, 576 U.S. at 486;
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267.
This Court has long held that “the regulation of
utilities is one of the most important of the functions
traditionally associated with the police power of the
States,” Ark. Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 377 (1983), which power
should not be “superseded” by statute “unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress,” Pac.
42
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation &
Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 206 (1983) (citations
omitted). Particularly relevant here, the “[n]eed for
new power facilities, their economic feasibility, and
rates and services, are areas that have been
characteristically governed by the States”—indeed,
the “franchise to operate a public utility . . . is a
special privilege which . . . may be granted or
withheld at the pleasure of the State.” Id. at 205
(citations omitted); see also Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util.
Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(“State and municipal authorities retain the right to
forbid new entrants from providing new capacity, to
require retirement of existing generators, to limit new
construction to more expensive, environmentallyfriendly units, or to take any other action in their role
as regulators of generation facilities without direct
interference from” FERC).
Congress has recognized and confirmed the
States’ constitutional authority in this area of
regulation. In the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 791a, et seq., Congress drew “a bright line easily
ascertained, between state and federal jurisdiction” in
the energy-regulation sphere. Fed. Power Comm’n v.
S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964). So,
under the Federal Power Act, “the States retain their
traditional responsibility in the field of regulating
electrical utilities for determining questions of need,
reliability, cost and other related state concerns.” Pac.
Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 205; S. Cal. Edison Co.,
376 U.S. at 215. This is why Congress cabined the
43
power of FERC—the federal agency charged with
fulfilling the federal government’s limited role in this
area—“to those matters which are not subject to
regulation by the States,” 16 U.S.C. § 824(a), and why
Congress disclaimed federal authority “over facilities
used for the generation of electric energy,” id.
§ 824(b)(1); see also id. § 824o(i)(2) (“This section does
not authorize . . . [FERC] to order the construction of
additional generation or transmission capacity[.]”).
Thus, even FERC lacks the power to interfere with
“state authority in such traditional areas as the . . .
administration of integrated resource planning and
. . . utility generation and resource portfolios.” New
York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 24 (2002).
The Clean Power Plan would have usurped
States’ traditional powers. To achieve the Plan’s
generation-shifting-based emission reductions, the
Plan would have in effect required States to shift from
fossil fuel-fired plants to new renewable resources. 80
Fed. Reg. at 64,732–33. Therefore, under the Clean
Power Plan, States would no longer have the full
breadth of their traditional authority to decide for
themselves their mix of energy resources. 84 Fed.
Reg. at 32,529.
As EPA explained, the “States’ reserved
authority” over energy regulation “includes control
over in-state ‘facilities used for the generation of
electric energy.’” 84 Fed. Reg. at 32,530 n.107
(citation omitted). Thus, among other things, federal
“‘law places beyond FERC[’s power] and leaves to the
44
States alone, the regulation of ‘any other sale’—most
notably, any retail sale—of electricity.’” Id. at 32,530
(quoting Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, L.L.C.,
136 S. Ct. 1288, 1292 (2016)). Indeed, Section 111
itself—EPA’s own alleged authority for the Clean
Power Plan—recognizes the State’s domain here. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (requiring Section 111(d)
rules must allow States to “take into consideration,
among other factors, the remaining useful life of the
existing source” when applying performance
standards). The Clean Power Plan “ignored the
statutory directive [in Section 111] to establish
standards for sources and overextended federal
authority into matters traditionally reserved for
states: ‘administration of integrated resource
planning and . . . utility generation and resource
portfolios.’” 84 Fed. Reg. at 32,529 (quoting New
York, 535 U.S. at 24) (emphasis added).
The Clean Power Plan would also have
simultaneously intruded upon FERC’s core powers.
As EPA explained when repealing the Clean Power
Plan, the Plan was “based largely on measures and
subjects exclusively left to FERC . . . , rather than
inflicting only permissible, incidental effects on
[FERC’s] domain[ ].” Id. at 32,530. The Plan’s forcing
of generation shifting across the entire energy sector
as a “best system of emission reduction” strays into
FERC’s authority to regulate the interstate
transmission of energy. See id.
45
B. Section
111(d)
Does
Not
Clearly
Authorize The Clean Power Plan.
Given that the Clean Power Plan triggers the
major questions doctrine, it could only be lawful if
Congress clearly and unambiguously delegated to
EPA via statute the authority to decide whether to
shift the power sector away from coal-fired energy to
renewable resources. But nothing in Section 111(d)
even arguably approaches a clear statement
authorizing EPA to make that decision. That is why
“[h]ardly any party in this case makes a serious and
sustained argument that § 111 includes a clear
statement unambiguously authorizing the EPA to
consider off-site solutions like generation shifting.”
J.A.217.
There could be no serious argument that Section
111(d) provides a sufficiently clear statement to
authorize the Clean Power Plan, under the major
questions doctrine. Section 111(d) contains only two
relevant sentences, and nothing in those sentences
comes close to containing the clear statement that the
major questions doctrine requires. The first sentence
requires EPA to establish a “procedure” for States—
not EPA—to establish “standards of performance” for
existing sources of emissions. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1).
The second sentence merely clarifies the first,
explaining that States must be allowed to “take into
consideration, among other factors, the remaining
useful life of the existing source” when applying a
standard of performance to “any particular source.”
46
Id.
While Section 111(d) cross-references the
definition of “standards of performance” to allow EPA
to select the “best system of emission reduction,”
those general words are not a clear grant to EPA of
the broad authority to demand a transformative shift
in the development and use of the Nation’s energy
resources.14
Congress’s direction in Title IV of the Clean Air
Act for EPA to address acid rain through a nationwide
cap-and-trade program provides a stark contrast to
the lack of clear authority for the Clean Power Plan
in Section 111(d). In Title IV, 42 U.S.C. § 7651, et seq.,
Congress addressed the acid rain problem by
explicitly setting a specific, numeric cap on sulfur
dioxide emissions and establishing an emission
allowance trading program based on the
determination that compliance could be achieved in
part through generation shifting. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7651–7651c; see also 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,770
(“Generation shift and [renewable energy] were part
of Congress’s basis for the Title IV emission
requirements[.]”). Thus, Title IV illustrates how
Congress would be expected to speak clearly in
establishing an emission allowance trading program
based on generation shifting. While the similarities
To be clear, National Mining Association strongly
supports State Petitioners’ argument that, in fact, this language
forecloses generation-shifting, State Pet. Br. Part II, but this
Court need not reach that argument given that the major
questions doctrine is a predicate inquiry, see supra Part I.B.
14
47
between the Acid Rain Program and the Clean Power
Plan are striking, the statutory authority underlying
them—Title IV and Section 111(d)—could not be any
more different. Compared to the two highly general
and ambiguous sentences comprising Section 111(d),
Title IV contains numerous provisions establishing
specific emission targets and allocating specific
allowance values to expressly named individual
facilities, and it provides significant detail on how to
implement the program, including how the trading
program should work. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651b-7651c.
In promulgating the Clean Power Plan, EPA cited
Congress’s reliance on generation shifting to address
the acid rain problem via Title IV as justification for
requiring generation shifting in the Clean Power Plan
promulgated under Section 111(d). 80 Fed. Reg. at
64,771. EPA claimed that “Congress’s reliance on
generation shifting and [renewable energy] to reduce
acid rain precursors from affected [electric generating
units] in Title IV strongly supports the EPA’s
authority to identify those same measures as part of
the CAA section 111 ‘system of emission reduction’ to
reduce CO2 emissions from those same sources.” Id.
This gets the major questions doctrine precisely
backwards: that Congress clearly established a
generation-shifting trading program to address acid
rain under Title IV only further illustrates that
Congress did not grant EPA the authority to wield
that same power under Section 111(d).
48
If this Court were to uphold the decision below
that Section 111(d) grants EPA the authority needed
to impose the generation-shifting Clean Power Plan,
that would raise grave constitutional concerns for the
statute. The Clean Power Plan does not merely “‘fill
up the details’” of a statutory regime assigned to EPA
by Congress. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted). It is, rather, EPA’s
attempt to address climate change precisely because
Congress has failed to act, using a transformational,
generation-shifting methodology. Nor does the Plan
implement “non-legislative responsibilities” that are
already “‘within the scope’” of the Executive Branch’s
“‘power.’” Id. at 2137 (citation omitted). Instead, the
Clean Power Plan deals with one of the most
important, “major national policy decisions” of our
time. Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342 (Kavanaugh, J.,
respecting the denial of certiorari). If Section 111(d)’s
general terms permit EPA to grasp that amount of
authority at its option, that provision would be
unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine.
See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
C. The
Panel
Majority’s
Contrary
Conclusion Below Was Wrong.
Nothing in the panel majority’s decision below
articulates any persuasive challenge to this analysis.
The panel majority concluded that the major
questions doctrine did not invalidate the Clean Power
49
Plan because “there is no question that the regulation
of greenhouse gas emissions by power plants across
the Nation falls squarely within the EPA’s
wheelhouse.” J.A.137 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007)). But Massachusetts v. EPA
does not suggest that EPA can enact any and all
regulations, no matter how transformative, as this
Court’s decision in UARG makes clear. 573 U.S. at
316–19.
The majority also incorrectly interpreted this
Court’s
major-questions-doctrine
jurisprudence,
unduly focusing the doctrine on “whom the EPA was
attempting to regulate.”
J.A.138–40 (emphasis
added). The major questions doctrine looks at far
more than just the target of agency regulations. U.S.
Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 422–23 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). As
explained above, three independently sufficient tests,
drawn from this Court’s case law, may demonstrate
that an agency has attempted to address a major
question. See supra Part I.C.
Finally, the panel majority’s conclusion that the
Clean Power Plan does not trigger the major
questions doctrine because it “does not impose”
generation shifting “on anyone,” and therefore it is
“entirely internal to the EPA,” is incorrect. J.A.142–
48. The CO2 emission performance rates that the
Clean Power Plan set based upon EPA’s generationshifting methodology cannot be achieved by
individual sources, making compliance by those
50
sources’ owners and operators possible only through
shifting the power sector away from coal-fired
generation toward renewable energy. See supra pp.
7–9. That is why, when announcing the Clean Power
Plan, the White House touted that the Plan would
“‘aggressive[ly] transform[ ] . . . the domestic energy
industry.’” Joby Warrick, The Washington Post, White
House Set to Adopt Sweeping Curbs on Carbon
Pollution (Aug. 1, 2015) (quoting White House fact
sheet to press).15 The decision of whether such a
transformation should occur, and at what pace, is one
that under the Constitution and laws of the United
States only Congress can make.
Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
health-science/white-house-set-to-adopt-sweeping-curbs-oncarbon-pollution/2015/08/01/ba6627fa-385c-11e5-b6731df005a0fb28_story.html.
15
51
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,
CARROLL WADE
MCGUFFEY III
TROUTMAN PEPPER
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
600 Peachtree St. N.E.
Suite 3000
Atlanta, GA 30308
MISHA TSEYTLIN
Counsel of Record
KEVIN M. LEROY
TROUTMAN PEPPER
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
227 W. Monroe St.
Suite 3900
Chicago, IL 60606
TIMOTHY L. MCHUGH
(608) 999-1240
TROUTMAN PEPPER
misha.tseytlin@
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP troutman.com
1001 Haxall Point,
15th Floor
Counsel for National
Richmond, VA 23219
Mining Association
December 2021
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.