Respondents Brief — West Virginia, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

Supreme Court briefDec 13, 2021

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Nos. 20-1530, 20-1531, 20-1778, and 20-1780

In the Supreme Court of the United States

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS,

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

CARROLL WADE

MCGUFFEY III

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

600 Peachtree St. N.E.

Suite 3000

Atlanta, GA 30308

MISHA TSEYTLIN

Counsel of Record

KEVIN M. LEROY

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

227 W. Monroe St.

Suite 3900

Chicago, IL 60606

TIMOTHY L. MCHUGH

(608) 999-1240

TROUTMAN PEPPER

misha.tseytlin@

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP troutman.com

1001 Haxall Point,

15th Floor

Richmond, VA 23219

Counsel for National Mining Association

Additional Captions Listed on Inside Cover

THE NORTH AMERICAN COAL CORPORATION,

PETITIONER,

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS.

WESTMORELAND MINING HOLDINGS LLC,

PETITIONER,

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS.

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA,

PETITIONER,

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS.

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

In 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d), an ancillary provision of

the Clean Air Act, did Congress constitutionally

authorize the Environmental Protection Agency to

issue significant rules—including those capable of

reshaping the nation’s electricity grids and

unilaterally decarbonizing virtually any sector of the

economy—without any limits on what the agency can

require so long as it considers cost, nonair impacts,

and energy requirements?

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners in 20-1530 are the States of West

Virginia, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia,

Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana,

Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South

Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming; and Mississippi

Governor Tate Reeves.

Each petitioner was a

respondent-intervenor below.

Petitioner in 20-1531 is The North American Coal

Corporation.

Petitioner in 20-1778 is Westmoreland Mining

Holdings, LLC.

Petitioner in 20-1780 is the State of North Dakota.

Respondents in 20-1530 who filed briefs in support

of certiorari were America’s Power, Basin Electric

Power Cooperative, and the National Mining

Association.

Each was a respondent-intervenor

below.

Respondents in 20-1530, 20-1531, 20-1778, 201780 who were petitioners below and filed briefs in

opposition to certiorari are Consolidated Edison, Inc.,

Exelon Corporation, National Grid USA, New York

Power Authority, Power Companies Climate

Coalition, Sacramento Municipal Utility District,

American Lung Association, American Public Health

Association, Appalachian Mountain Club, Center for

Biological Diversity, Chesapeake Bay Foundation,

Inc., Clean Air Council, Clean Wisconsin,

Conservation Law Foundation, Environmental

Defense Fund, Environmental Law & Policy Center,

iii

Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy,

Natural Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club,

Advanced Energy Economy, American Clean Power

Association (successor of the American Wind Energy

Association), Solar Energy Industries Association,

State of New York, State of California, State of

Colorado, State of Delaware, State of Hawaii, State of

Illinois, State of Maine, State of Maryland,

Commonwealth of Massachusetts, People of the State

of Michigan, State of Minnesota, State of New Jersey,

State of New Mexico, State of North Carolina, State

of Oregon, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, State of

Rhode Island, State of Vermont, Commonwealth of

Virginia, State of Washington, State of Wisconsin,

District of Columbia, City of Boulder (CO), City of

Chicago, City and County of Denver, City of Los

Angeles, City of New York, City of Philadelphia, and

the City of South Miami (FL).

Respondent in 20-1530, 20-1531, 20-1778, 20-1780

who was a petitioner-intervenor below and filed a

brief in opposition to certiorari is the State of Nevada.

Respondents in 20-1530, 20-1531, 20-1778, 201780 who were respondents below are the United

States Environmental Protection Agency and Michael

Regan, in his official capacity as Administrator of the

United States Environmental Protection Agency

(substituted for the previous administrator under

Supreme Court Rule 35.3).

Respondents who were petitioners below and did

not file any brief at the certiorari stage are, by court

of appeals case number, as follows:

iv

In case no. 19-1175: Robinson Enterprises, Inc.,

Nuckles Oil Co., Inc., DBA Merit Oil Co.,

Construction Industry Air Quality Coalition, Liberty

Packing Co. LLC, Dalton Trucking, Inc., Norman R.

“Skip” Brown, Joanne Brown, The Competitive

Enterprise Institute, and the Texas Public Policy

Foundation.

In case no. 19-1185: Biogenic CO2 Coalition.

Respondents who were respondent-intervenors

below and did not file any brief at the certiorari stage

are Indiana Michigan Power Co., Kentucky Power

Co., Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, Southwestern

Electric Power Co., AEP Generating Co., AEP

Generation Resources, Inc., Wheeling Power Co.,

Chamber of Commerce of the United States of

America, Indiana Energy Association and Indiana

Utility Group, International Brotherhood of

Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths,

Forgers & Helpers, AFL-CIO, Murray Energy Corp.,

National Rural Electric Cooperative Association,

Nevada Gold Mines, Newmont Nevada Energy

Investment, and PowerSouth Energy Cooperative.

v

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

National Mining Association is a non-profit

corporation that has no parent corporation; no

publicly held company owns 10% or more of National

Mining Association’s stock.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ......................................... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ........................ ii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ............v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................... viii

INTRODUCTION .......................................................1

OPINION BELOW ......................................................3

JURISDICTION ..........................................................3

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS .................3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................4

A. Section 111(d) Of The Clean Air Act ..........4

B. EPA Adopts The Clean Power Plan And

Then Repeals And Replaces It ....................6

C. The D.C. Circuit’s Decision Below ............11

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..........................12

ARGUMENT .............................................................16

I.

Congress Must Speak Clearly If It Wants To

Assign To An Agency The Authority To

Resolve A Major Policy Issue. ........................16

A. The

Major

Questions

Doctrine,

Nondelegation, And Chevron Deference ..16

1. The Major Questions Doctrine ............16

2. The Nondelegation Doctrine ...............20

vii

3. Chevron Deference ...............................24

B. The Major Questions Doctrine Should

Be A Threshold Inquiry To Any Chevron

Or Nondelegation Analysis. ......................26

C. This Court Should Hold That Three

Independently Sufficient Tests Identify

That A Rule Triggers The Major

Questions Doctrine....................................29

II. Whether The United States Should “Shift”

Away From Coal-Fired Generation Is A

Major Policy Question That Congress Did

Not Clearly Assign To EPA To Resolve. ........31

A. The Clean Power Plan Triggers The

Major Questions Doctrine Under All

Three Independently Sufficient Tests. .....31

1. Vast

Economic

And

Political

Significance ..........................................31

2. Assertion

Of

Enormous

And

Transformative Authority Never

Before Claimed ....................................39

3. Trespassing On The Traditional

Authority Of States And Other

Agencies ...............................................41

B. Section 111(d) Does Not Clearly

Authorize The Clean Power Plan. ............45

C. The

Panel

Majority’s

Contrary

Conclusion Below Was Wrong. .................48

CONCLUSION ..........................................................51

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum.

Servs.,

141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021) ................................. passim

Ark. Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv.

Comm’n,

461 U.S. 375 (1983) ............................................ 41

BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. OSHA,

17 F.4th 604 (5th Cir. 2021) ................................ 1

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837 (1984) ..................................... passim

Christensen v. Harris Cty.,

529 U.S. 576 (2000) ...................................... 19, 28

Clinton v. City of New York,

524 U.S. 417 (1998) ............................................ 20

Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC,

569 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ............................ 42

District of Columbia v. Dep’t of Labor,

819 F.3d 444 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ............................ 30

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,

556 U.S. 502 (2009) ............................................ 27

ix

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120 (2000) ..................................... passim

Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co.,

376 U.S. 205 (1964) ............................................ 42

Gonzales v. Oregon,

546 U.S. 243 (2006) ..................................... passim

Gundy v. United States,

139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) ................................. passim

Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, L.L.C.,

136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016) ........................................ 44

Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum

Inst.,

448 U.S. 607 (1980) ................................ 17, 18, 23

King v. Burwell,

576 U.S. 473 (2015) ..................................... passim

Massachusetts v. EPA,

549 U.S. 497 (2007) ............................................ 49

MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,

512 U.S. 218 (1994) ...................................... 16, 19

Mistretta v. United States,

488 U.S. 361 (1989) ............................................ 22

New Jersey v. EPA,

517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ........................ 6, 41

x

New York v. FERC,

535 U.S. 1 (2002) .......................................... 43, 44

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.

Conservation & Dev. Comm’n,

461 U.S. 190 (1983) ............................................ 42

Paul v. United States,

140 S. Ct. 342 (2019)................................... passim

U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC,

855 F.3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ..................... passim

Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,

573 U.S. 302 (2014) ..................................... passim

West Virginia v. EPA,

577 U.S. 1126 (2016) ............................................ 9

Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,

531 U.S. 457 (2001) ...................................... 17, 30

Statutes

16 U.S.C. § 824 ......................................................... 43

16 U.S.C. § 824o ....................................................... 43

42 U.S.C. § 7411 ................................................ passim

42 U.S.C. § 7651, et seq. ..................................... 46, 47

Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) ......................... 4

xi

Rules

42 Fed. Reg. 12,022 (Mar. 1, 1977) ...................... 5, 40

42 Fed. Reg. 55,796 (Oct. 18, 1977) ..................... 5, 40

44 Fed. Reg. 29,828 (May 22, 1979) .................... 5, 40

45 Fed. Reg. 26,294 (Apr. 17, 1980)..................... 5, 40

60 Fed. Reg. 65,387 (Dec. 19, 1995)..................... 5, 40

61 Fed. Reg. 9905 (Mar. 12, 1996) ....................... 5, 40

70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2005) .................... 6, 40

80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) .................. passim

84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019).................... passim

Proposed Legislation

Advancing Grid Storage Act,

H.R. 7313, 115th Cong. (2018) .......................... 35

American Clean Energy and Security Act,

H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) .......................... 35

American Energy and Conservation Act,

S. 3110, 114th Cong. (2016)............................... 35

American Renewable Energy and Efficiency Act,

H.R. 5301, 113th Cong. (2014) .......................... 36

Carbon Dioxide Capture Technology Prize Act,

S. 757, 112th Cong. (2011)................................. 36

xii

Clean Energy Standard Act,

S. 20, 111th Cong. (2010)................................... 36

Clean Industrial Technology Act,

S. 2300, 116th Cong. (2019)............................... 35

Climate Risk Disclosure Act,

S. 3481, 115th Cong. (2018)............................... 35

Climate Solutions Commission Act,

H.R. 6240, 114th Cong. (2016) .......................... 36

End Polluter Welfare Act,

S. 3080, 112th Cong. (2012)............................... 36

Integrated Energy Systems Act,

S. 2702, 116th Cong. (2019)............................... 35

Save Our Climate Act,

H.R. 3242, 112th Cong. (2011) .......................... 36

Super Pollutants Act,

S. 2911, 113th Cong. (2014)............................... 36

Other Authorities

Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman,

Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An

Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,

Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,

65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013) ............................... 28

Adam Liptak & Coral Davenport, The New York

Times, Supreme Court Deals Blow to Obama’s

xiii

Efforts to Regulate Coal Emissions (Feb. 9,

2016) .................................................................... 37

Aditya Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive

Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation

and Future of Administrative Law,

133 Harv. L. Rev. 164 (2019) ............................. 22

Andrew Rafferty, Obama Unveils Ambitious Plan

to Combat Climate Change,

NBC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2015, 3:05 PM) .................. 6

Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory

Interpretation,

129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118 (2016) ..................... 24, 26

Cass R. Sunstein, The American Nondelegation

Doctrine,

86 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1181 (2018).............. 18, 20

Evan Lehmann & Nathanael Massey, Obama

Warns Congress to Act on Climate Change, or

He Will,

Scientific Am. (Feb. 13, 2013)........................ 6, 36

Jeff St. John, PJM: Fuel Security Issues Won’t

Disrupt the Grid, Unless Coal & Nuclear

Closures Skyrocket, GreenTechMedia.com

(Nov. 1, 2018) ...................................................... 33

Joby Warrick, The Washington Post, White House

Set to Adopt Sweeping Curbs on Carbon

Pollution (Aug. 1, 2015) ...................................... 50

xiv

John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as

a Canon of Avoidance,

2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 223 (2000) ..........20, 23, 24, 27

Jonathan Adler, The Washington Post, Opinion:

Supreme Court Puts the Brakes on the EPA’s

Clean Power Plan (Feb. 9, 2016) ........................ 37

Jonathan H. Adler & Christopher J. Walker,

Delegation and Time,

105 Iowa L. Rev. 1931 (2020) ............................. 20

Lawrence Hurley & Valerie Volcovici, Reuters,

U.S. Supreme Court Blocks Obama's Clean

Carbon Emissions Plan (Feb. 9, 2016) ............... 37

Nat’l Ass’n of State Energy Officials, et al.,

Wages, Benefits, and Change: A Supplemental

Report to the Annual U.S. Energy and

Employment Report (2020) ................................. 34

Nat’l Mining Assoc., Coal: Reliable & Affordable

Power (Mar. 2021) ............................................... 34

Nat’l Research Council, Coal: Energy for the

Future (Nat’l Acads. Press 1995)........................ 32

Robert Walton, NERC Identifies 4 Regions Facing

Potential Summer Energy Shortages,

UtilityDive.com (May 18, 2021) ......................... 33

Seth Schwartz, Evaluation of the Immediate

Impact of the Clean Power Plan Rule on the

xv

Coal Industry (Energy Ventures Analysis, Inc.

Oct. 2015) ...................................................... 33, 38

Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of

Law and Policy,

38 Admin. L. Rev. 363 (1986) ...................... passim

U.S. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Sec. Agency,

Energy Sector ...................................................... 32

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Analysis of the Impacts

of the Clean Power Plan (May 2015) .................. 38

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Coal Explained: How

Much Coal is Left (Oct. 19, 2021) ....................... 32

William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Law: A

Primer on How to Read Statutes and the

Constitution (2016) ............................................. 19

William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,

Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement

Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking,

45 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1992) ............................... 24

INTRODUCTION

The Clean Power Plan involves a form of agency

overreach

that

has,

unfortunately,

become

increasingly more common since the Clean Power

Plan’s issuance: an agency seizes upon a snippet of

general statutory language and enlists that language

as claimed authority for settling a major policy issue

for the Nation. See, e.g., Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t

of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021)

(per curiam); BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. OSHA, 17 F.4th

604, 609–18 (5th Cir. 2021). When an agency acts in

this manner, the resulting rule offends the separation

of powers and the right of the people to be governed

by their elected representatives. Such administrative

action runs afoul of the major questions doctrine and

puts the underlying statute under threat of violating

the nondelegation doctrine.

Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 7411(d),

the

authority

upon

which

the

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) built the

Clean Power Plan, contains just two relevant

sentences.

The first sentence requires EPA to

establish a “procedure” under which States must

“establish[ ] standards of performance for any

existing source” of air emissions and “provide[ ] for

the implementation and enforcement of such

standards of performance.” The second sentence

merely clarifies the first to ensure that States may

consider, among other factors, the remaining useful

2

life of an existing source in applying a “standard of

performance” to it.

In adopting the Clean Power Plan, EPA claimed

to find lurking within these two sentences of

Section 111(d), as well as a definitional crossreference, the authority to force the entire power

sector away from fossil fuels and toward renewable

energy resources. EPA did so by asserting that

Section 111(d) gives it virtually unlimited discretion

to determine the “best” way to reduce carbon-dioxide

emissions from power plants, and EPA decided that

changing the resources used to generate electricity

would be best.

To effect that change, EPA

hypothesized how much it thought generation could

be shifted, and then adopted “emission performance

rates” for fossil fuel-fired units that had never before

been achieved by “any existing source.” Therefore,

and by design, the Clean Power Plan required the

power sector to transition away from coal-fired

generation.

While the National Mining Association strongly

agrees with State Petitioners that Section 111(d)’s

text unambiguously prohibits the Clean Power Plan,

and therefore this Court can uphold EPA’s 2018

repeal of the Plan on that basis alone, State Pets. Br.

Part II, the National Mining Association respectfully

submits that this Court should resolve this case

directly under the major questions doctrine. This

Court should hold that EPA in 2018 correctly

concluded that the Clean Power Plan was unlawful

3

because Congress, in adopting Section 111(d), did not

clearly delegate to EPA the authority to decide for the

Nation whether to replace coal-fired generation with

other energy resources. Taking this approach would

give guidance to lower courts, agencies, litigants, and

the people on how to deal with this increasingly

common form of agency overreach.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the D.C. Circuit below is reported

at American Lung Association v. EPA, 985 F.3d 914

(D.C. Cir. 2021), and is reproduced in the Joint

Appendix. J.A.53–255.

JURISDICTION

The D.C. Circuit entered judgment on January

19, 2021. The petition for a writ of certiorari in No.

20-1530 was filed on April 29, 2021. The petition for

a writ of certiorari in No. 20-1531 was filed on April

30, 2021. The petitions for writs of certiorari in Nos.

20-1778 and 20-1780 were filed on June 18, 2021. The

petitions were granted on October 29, 2021 and the

cases were consolidated by the Court. This Court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Relevant statutory provisions from the Clean Air

Act appear in the Appendix to the Petition in 20-1530.

Pet.App.204a–09a.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Section 111(d) Of The Clean Air Act

In 1970, Congress enacted Section 111 of the

Clean Air Act, authorizing the regulation of air

pollutants emitted from stationary sources that

“cause[ ], or contribute[ ] significantly to, air pollution

which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger

public health or welfare.” Pub. L. 91-604, § 111, 84

Stat. 1676, 1683–84 (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 7411. For new

stationary sources that meet these criteria, Congress

directed EPA under Section 111(b) to promulgate

“standards

of

performance.”

42

U.S.C.

§ 7411(b)(1)(B). For existing stationary sources in

those same source categories, (i.e., those built before

the standards for new sources have been proposed),

Congress directed EPA under Section 111(d) to

“prescribe regulations which shall establish a

procedure” for States to “establish[ ] standards of

performance for any existing source” subject to

Section 111(d). Id. § 7411(d)(1).

Section 111(d) is a cooperative federalism regime.

Section 111 defines “standard of performance” as “a

standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects

the degree of emission limitation achievable through

the application of the best system of emission

reduction which (taking into account the cost of

achieving such reduction and any nonair quality

health and environmental impact and energy

requirements) the [EPA] Administrator determines

5

has been adequately demonstrated.” Id. § 7411(a)(1).

However, Congress only authorized EPA to

promulgate a “procedure” for the States to follow

when “establish[ing]” and “apply[ing]” standards of

performance for existing sources. Id. § 7411(d). In

other words, while EPA may determine the best

system of emission reduction and regulate new

sources directly, Congress left it to the States to

decide how to reduce emissions from existing

stationary sources. Section 111(d) thus protects state

authority to determine what levels of emission

reduction are achievable by these stationary sources.

The Clean Air Act also reserves to the States the

authority to “take into consideration, among other

factors, the remaining useful life of the existing

source to which such standard applies” when applying

a standard of performance to it. Id. § 7411(d)(1).

Prior to the Clean Power Plan, EPA had

promulgated only seven rules under Section 111(d)

since the provision’s enactment over 50 years ago,

including only one within the last 25 years, and that

one was vacated by the D.C. Circuit. See 42 Fed. Reg.

12,022 (Mar. 1, 1977) (fluorides from phosphate

fertilizer plants); 42 Fed. Reg. 55,796 (Oct. 18, 1977)

(acid mist from sulfuric acid plants); 44 Fed. Reg.

29,828 (May 22, 1979) (total reduced sulfur from kraft

pulp plants); 45 Fed. Reg. 26,294 (Apr. 17, 1980)

(fluorides from primary aluminum plants); 60 Fed.

Reg. 65,387 (Dec. 19, 1995) (various pollutants from

municipal waste combustors); 61 Fed. Reg. 9905 (Mar.

12, 1996) (landfill gases from municipal solid waste

6

landfills); 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2005)

(mercury from coal-fired power plants); New Jersey v.

EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 580 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

B. EPA Adopts The Clean Power Plan And

Then Repeals And Replaces It

Frustrated with what he believed to be Congress’s

inability to adopt comprehensive climate change

legislation, “President Obama ordered the EPA to do

what Congress wouldn’t.” J.A.220–22. President

Obama ordered EPA “to come up with executive

actions we can take, now and in the future, to reduce

pollution, prepare our communities for the

consequences of climate change, and speed the

transition to more sustainable sources of energy.”

Evan Lehmann & Nathanael Massey, Obama Warns

Congress to Act on Climate Change, or He Will,

Scientific Am. (Feb. 13, 2013).1 President Obama

intended this directive to be “the single most

important step America has ever taken in the fight

against global climate change.” Andrew Rafferty,

Obama Unveils Ambitious Plan to Combat Climate

Change, NBC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2015, 3:05 PM).2 The

Available at https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/

obama-warns-congress-to-act-on-climate-change-or-he-will/ (all

websites last visited on December 12, 2021).

1

Available at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/barackobama/obama-unveils-ambitious-plan-combat-climatechangen403296.

2

7

result was the Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662

(Oct. 23, 2015), “arguably one of the most

consequential

rules ever

proposed

by

an

administrative agency,” J.A.225.

1. To achieve sufficient emissions reductions to

meet President Obama’s goals, EPA promulgated the

Clean Power Plan, and for the first time ever adopted

an interpretation of Section 111(d) that allowed the

agency to restructure the power sector through socalled “generation shifting.” 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,728–

29. In particular, EPA adopted national “emission

performance rates” for coal and gas power plants

based upon three so-called “Building Blocks.” Id. at

64,719–20, 64,752.

EPA developed two of the three building blocks

“from the perspective of the source category as a

whole,” rather than as a model system that States

might apply to individual existing sources. Id. at

64,744. Building Block 1, the only one consistent with

the text, context, and history of Section 111(d), was

based upon requiring improved combustion efficiency

at individual coal-fired generating facilities, which

can result in lower CO2 emissions per unit of electric

output. Id. at 64,745. Building Block 2, which

involved generation shifting, was based upon

displacing large quantities of existing coal-fired

generation with generation from existing natural gas

generating facilities. Id. at 64,745–46. Building

Block 3, which also involved generation shifting, was

based upon displacing both existing coal- and gas-

8

fired generation with large increases in generation

from new renewable energy resources. Id. at 64,747–

48.

EPA used these Building Blocks to set the

“emission performance rates” for existing fossil fuelfired power plants. The resulting rate for existing

coal-fired plants was 1,305 lbs CO2/MWh, and for

existing gas-fired plants was 771 lbs CO2/MWh. Id.

at 64,667. These “emission performance rates” were

the “chief regulatory requirement” of the Clean Power

Plan. Id. at 64,823. But these rates were just a

regulatory artifice, as no existing facility could meet

them through the application of pollution controls or

operational improvements that EPA determined to be

available for individual existing sources. Id. at

64,754. Indeed, these rates were stricter than the

emission rates EPA applied to new sources. Compare

id. at 64,512–13, Tbl. 1, with id. at 64,667.

To comply with these regulatory artifices, the

owners of power plants would need to pay to shift the

power sector away from coal-fired generation to

lower- or zero-emitting generation. Id. at 64,733.

They could do this either by building their own

renewable generation resources or by purchasing

emission allowances or credits from renewable energy

competitors through an emissions trading market

that EPA expected would develop. Id. at 64,669,

64,720, 64,725–26, 64,728, 64,731. These measures

would thus shift generation to new lower- or zero-

9

emitting generation. Id. at 64,911; see also id. at

64,745–47 (“generation shifts”).

Numerous parties—including the National

Mining Association—challenged the Clean Power

Plan in court; first, in the D.C. Circuit, and then

before this Court on a motion for a stay pending

appeal. J.A.223. These parties’ lead argument in

their applications for a stay to this Court was that

EPA’s reliance on novel, transformational generationshifting authority under Section 111(d) violated the

major questions doctrine, as articulated in Utility Air

Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014)

(“UARG”). See Coal Indus. Appl. For Immediate Stay

at 6–8, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 15A778

(U.S. Jan. 27, 2016); 29 States and State Agencies

Appl. For Stay at 15–18, West Virginia v. EPA,

No.15A773 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2016).

In an

“unprecedented intervention,” this Court “did what

[the D.C. Circuit] would not”—it stayed the Clean

Power Plan pending judicial review. J.A.223–24;

West Virginia v. EPA, 577 U.S. 1126 (2016).

2. Before the D.C. Circuit could complete its

merits review, EPA repealed the Clean Power Plan,

after concluding that it lacked statutory authority to

adopt it. See 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520, 32,522–23 (July 8,

2019); J.A.224. Simultaneous with this repeal, EPA

promulgated the Affordable Clean Energy (“ACE”)

Rule, which adopted heat rate improvement

measures as the “best system of emission reduction.”

84 Fed. Reg. at 32,520–21. The D.C. Circuit then

10

dismissed as moot all pending challenges to the Clean

Power Plan. Order, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 151363 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 17, 2019).

EPA offered two primary reasons for repealing

the Clean Power Plan. First, “Congress ‘spoke to the

precise question’ of the scope of [Clean Air Act] section

111(a)(1) and clearly precluded” consideration of

“measures wholly outside a particular source,” like

generation shifting. 84 Fed. Reg. at 32,526–27.

Second—and most relevant to the arguments in this

brief—“the major question[s] doctrine” required

repeal. Id. at 32,529. EPA discussed a number of

factors relevant to its major-questions conclusion: the

Clean Power Plan’s “generation-shifting scheme was

projected to have billions of dollars of impact on

regulated parties and the economy, would have

affected every electricity customer (i.e., all

Americans), [and] was subject to litigation involving

almost every State in the Union”; the rule’s

generation-shifting components “are far afield from

the core activity of [Clean Air Act] section 111”; there

is a “notable absence of a valid limiting principle to

basing a [Clean Air Act] section 111 rule on

generation shifting”; and the Clean Power Plan

“advanced a broad reading of [Clean Air Act] section

111(a)(1)” that “overextended federal authority into

matters traditionally reserved for states[.]”

Id.

Because major rules “must be supported by a clearstatement from Congress,” which was lacking here,

EPA concluded that it must repeal the Clean Power

Plan. Id.

11

C. The D.C. Circuit’s Decision Below

Numerous parties challenged EPA’s repeal of the

Clean Power Plan and its replacement with the ACE

Rule before the D.C. Circuit, and many other

parties—including the National Mining Association—

intervened to defend EPA’s actions. J.A.53–215. In a

2-1 decision, a panel of the D.C. Circuit held that

EPA’s repeal of the Clean Power Plan and its adoption

of the ACE Rule were unlawful, concluding that both

actions “hinged on a fundamental misconstruction of

Section 7411(d) of the Clean Air Act.” J.A.71–72.

Most relevant for the arguments in this brief, the

panel majority rejected EPA’s conclusion that the

major questions doctrine compelled the repeal of the

Clean Power Plan. J.A.135–55.

Judge Walker dissented, in relevant part, to

explain his concern regarding whether the Clean

Power Plan ran afoul of the major questions doctrine.

J.A.216–55. “The potential costs and benefits of the

2015 Rule are almost unfathomable,” with “wholesale

electricity’s cost [expected] to rise by $214 billion” and

an additional $64 billion “to replace shuttered

capacity.” J.A.226. On the other side of the equation,

the Clean Power Plan’s goal was to attempt to “lower

ocean levels; preserve glaciers; reduce asthma; make

hearts healthier; slow tropical diseases; abate

hurricanes; temper wildfires; reduce droughts; stop

many floods; rescue whole ecosystems; and save from

extinction up to half the species on earth.” J.A.227

(citation omitted). In short, no one could argue the

12

Clean Power Plan was a “minor” rule, J.A.228. Judge

Walker also noted that “[h]ardly any party in this case

makes a serious and sustained argument that § 111

includes

a

clear

statement

unambiguously

authorizing the EPA to consider off-site solutions like

generation shifting.” J.A.217, 224, 229, 230.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I. A case like this one, where an agency seeks to

resolve a national policy dispute by pointing to a

snippet of general language, implicates three

interrelated doctrines—the major questions doctrine

itself, nondelegation, and deference under Chevron,

U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

A.1. Under the major questions doctrine, an

agency only has the authority to decide a major

national

policy

if

Congress

clearly

and

unambiguously authorizes the agency to do so. This

doctrine furthers the separation of powers via a

statutory presumption that Congress would generally

not want administrative agencies to resolve national

policy issues.

2. The nondelegation doctrine is closely related to

the major questions doctrine and prohibits Congress

from delegating its lawmaking authority to

administrative agencies. Like the major questions

doctrine, the nondelegation doctrine ensures that

13

lawmaking follows the strictures of Article I of the

U.S. Constitution.

3. Chevron deference requires courts to defer in

certain, appropriate circumstances to an agency’s

reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory

language in the statutes that it administers, based on

the theory that Congress has implicitly delegated

authority to agencies to resolve such ambiguities.

Chevron deference intersects with the major

questions doctrine when agencies improperly argue

that courts should defer to agency interpretations

even when those interpretations empower the agency

to decide major national policies.

B. This Court should hold that the major

questions doctrine is a threshold inquiry. Applying

the major questions doctrine as a threshold analysis

would resolve most nondelegation cases, since

Congress rarely, if ever, specifically delegates major

policy questions to agencies, and would keep Chevron

within its traditional role.

C. This Court should hold that there are three

independently sufficient tests that trigger the

application of the major questions doctrine. First, the

doctrine should apply when an agency seeks to resolve

an issue of vast economic and political significance.

Multiple factors are relevant to this first test,

including the rule’s overall impact on the economy,

the number of people affected, the degree of

congressional and public attention to the issue, and

14

the amount of money involved. Second, the doctrine

should apply when the agency bases its regulatory

action on a never before claimed tool that would give

the agency enormous and transformative power.

Third, the doctrine should apply when the agency’s

actions encroach upon traditional state authority or

on the core expertise of another administrative

agency.

II. The Clean Power Plan’s shifting of electricity

generation resources from fossil fuels to renewable

energy resolves a major policy question that Congress

did not assign to EPA to decide.

A. The Clean Power Plan triggers the major

questions doctrine under each of the three

independently sufficient tests drawn from this

Court’s jurisprudence.

1. The Clean Power Plan is a rule of vast

economic and political significance. The Plan imposes

a substantial overall impact on the national economy,

while also eliminating a significant number of jobs

attributable to the energy sector. The number of

people affected by the Clean Power Plan is

exceedingly high, extending to every electric customer

in the country. Congress and the public have devoted

considerable attention to the question that the Plan

purports to resolve. Finally, the Plan implicates a

significant amount of money, as it is projected to raise

electricity-generation costs by hundreds of billions of

dollars.

15

2. The Clean Power Plan is an assertion of

enormous and transformative authority by the EPA.

The Plan’s core feature—generation shifting—

requires owners of power plants either to build their

own renewable generation resources or subsidize

lower-emitting resources by buying credits from their

competitors.

Under this generation shifting

methodology,

EPA

could

take

similarly

transformative steps in numerous other industries,

thereby rearranging the economy.

3. The Clean Power Plan trespasses on the

traditional powers of the States and strays into the

core zone of expertise of other federal agencies. The

regulation of utilities is a power traditionally reserved

to the States. The Clean Power Plan, however, usurps

this traditional state role by requiring States to shift

vast amounts of energy generation from fossil fuelfired plants to new renewable resources. In doing so,

the Clean Power Plan also intrudes upon the

expertise of the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission (“FERC”)—the agency that administers

the Federal Power Act—which has authority over

interstate transmission of energy.

B. Because the Clean Power Plan implicates the

major questions doctrine, it could only be lawful if

Congress clearly and unambiguously authorized EPA

to promulgate it. However, Section 111(d) does not

contain such a clear statement of transformative

authority, as Section 111(d)’s prosaic terms nowhere

16

suggest that EPA has the power to transform the

nation’s energy mix.

C. The panel majority’s contrary conclusions

below are all incorrect. The panel majority’s approach

would render the major questions doctrine an

effective nullity by permitting agencies to settle

questions of nationwide importance based upon

snippets of general statutory text.

ARGUMENT

I.

Congress Must Speak Clearly If It Wants To

Assign To An Agency The Authority To

Resolve A Major Policy Issue.

A. The

Major

Questions

Doctrine,

Nondelegation, And Chevron Deference

1. The Major Questions Doctrine

In “a series of important cases” over the last few

decades, this Court has recognized that “major agency

rules” require “clear congressional authorization” to

be lawful. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381,

417 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from

the denial of rehearing en banc); see, e.g., MCI

Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218

(1994); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120 (2000); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243

(2006); UARG, 573 U.S. at 302; Ala. Ass’n of Realtors,

141 S. Ct. at 2489; accord Whitman v. Am. Trucking

17

Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468–69 (2001); Indus. Union

Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,

645–46 (1980) (Stevens, J., controlling opinion).

These cases stand for the proposition that for “an

agency to issue a major rule, Congress must clearly

authorize the agency to do so.” U.S. Telecom Ass’n,

855 F.3d at 419 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the

denial of rehearing en banc); accord Ala. Ass’n of

Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489. “If a statute only

ambiguously supplies authority for the major rule,

the rule is unlawful” without any further inquiry.

U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 419 (Kavanaugh, J.,

dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); see,

e.g., Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 132–33, 161.

Thus, an agency may only “exercise regulatory

authority over a major policy question” if Congress

has either: “(i) expressly and specifically decide[d] the

major policy question itself and delegate[d] to the

agency the authority to regulate and enforce; or

(ii) expressly and specifically delegate[d] to the

agency the authority both to decide the major policy

question and to regulate and enforce.” Paul v. United

States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J.,

respecting the denial of certiorari) (collecting cases).

Two “overlapping and reinforcing presumptions”

provide the legal foundation and justification for the

major questions doctrine. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855

F.3d at 419 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the

denial of rehearing en banc).

18

The first is “a separation of powers-based

presumption against the delegation of major

lawmaking authority from Congress to the Executive

Branch[.]” Id. (citing Indus. Union, 448 U.S. at 645–

46 (Stevens, J., controlling op.)); accord Indus. Union,

448 U.S. at 685 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the

judgment). “Under the Constitution’s separation of

powers, Congress makes the laws, and the Executive

implements and enforces the laws”; “[t]he Executive

Branch does not possess a general, free-standing

authority to issue binding legal rules.” U.S. Telecom

Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 419 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting

from the denial of rehearing en banc). “The major

rules doctrine helps preserve the separation of powers

and operates as a vital check on expansive and

aggressive assertions of executive authority.” Id. at

417; accord Cass R. Sunstein, The American

Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1181,

1201–02 (2018).

The second is the “presumption that Congress

intends to make major policy decisions itself, not

leave those decisions to agencies.” U.S. Telecom

Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 419 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting

from the denial of rehearing en banc); accord King v.

Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 485–86 (2015); Stephen

Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and

Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1986). Under the

“democratic values” embodied in our Constitution, “a

major policy change should be made by the most

democratically

accountable

process—Article I,

Section 7 legislation[.]” U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d

19

at 422 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of

rehearing en banc) (quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr.,

Interpreting Law: A Primer on How to Read Statutes

and the Constitution 289 (2016)). This constitutional

process requires “Congress [to] deliberate[ ] about”

any “change in [ ] major policies,” forcing it to remain

accountable to the people for the policy choices it

makes for the entire Nation. Id. (quoting Eskridge,

supra, at 289); accord Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267–68.

This Court has applied the major questions

doctrine at different stages of the statutory analysis.

Sometimes this Court appears to invoke the doctrine

at Chevron step one, where it counsels “hesitat[ion]

before concluding that Congress has intended” the

“implicit delegation” of a major question to an agency

via statutory “ambiguity.” Brown & Williamson, 529

U.S. at 159–60; Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S.

576, 589 n.* (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment). Other times this Court

considers this doctrine at Chevron step two,

concluding that an agency’s “interpretation” of a

statute is “unreasonable”—and therefore undeserving

of deference—where that interpretation would allow

the agency to answer a major question. UARG, 573

U.S. at 321, 323–24; see also MCI, 512 U.S. at 229–31.

And still other times, this Court invokes the doctrine

to hold that Congress never intended to delegate

resolving a major question to the agency. King, 576

U.S. at 485–86; Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267.

20

2. The Nondelegation Doctrine

The nondelegation doctrine is “closely related” to

the major questions doctrine. Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342

(Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of certiorari);

see Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141–42

(2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Jonathan H. Adler &

Christopher J. Walker, Delegation and Time, 105

Iowa L. Rev. 1931, 1946–49 (2020); Sunstein, supra,

at 1198–1200. Given that “the people ha[ve] vested

the power to prescribe rules limiting their liberties in

Congress alone,” Congress may not “alter that

arrangement” by delegating its “responsibility of

adopting legislation” to any other body. Gundy, 139

S. Ct. at 2133 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); accord Clinton

v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 464–65 (1998)

(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

“[O]nly the people’s elected representatives”—not the

executive—“may adopt new federal laws restricting

liberty.” Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J.,

dissenting).

Like the major questions doctrine, the

nondelegation doctrine ensures that lawmaking

proceeds through the Article I lawmaking process. Id.

at 2133–35; John F. Manning, The Nondelegation

Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 Sup. Ct.

Rev. 223, 271 (2000) (calling this the doctrine’s

“central aim”). “[T]he framers went to great lengths

to make lawmaking difficult,” given that “the new

federal government’s most dangerous power was the

power to enact laws restricting people’s liberty.”

21

Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2134 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

Further, the Constitution requires “that legislating be

done . . . in a public process,” making “the lines of

accountability” between Congress and the people

“clear.” Id. “If Congress could pass off its legislative

power to the executive branch” via delegation,

however, “legislation would risk becoming nothing

more than the will of the current President”—and

“would not be few in number.” Id. at 2134–35.

“Accountability would suffer too,” since Congress

could take credit for addressing a social problem by

delegating the finding of a solution to the executive,

only to then blame the executive if the “measures he

chooses to pursue” are unpopular—with the executive

placing the blame on Congress in return. Id. at 2135.

Three “important guiding principles” aid in

deciding “whether Congress has unconstitutionally

divested itself of its legislative responsibilities.” Id.

at 2135–36. First, Congress itself must “make[ ] the

policy decisions when regulating private conduct” via

statute, although Congress “may authorize another

branch to ‘fill up the details’” of a statutory regime.

Id. at 2136 (citation omitted); accord Breyer, supra, at

370–71 (approving of Congress’s “leaving interstitial

matters” to agencies).

Second, Congress may

“prescribe[ ]” a “rule governing private conduct” and

“make the application of that rule depend on

executive fact-finding.” Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2136–37

(Gorsuch, J., dissenting); accord Aditya Bamzai,

Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor,

and the Formation and Future of Administrative Law,

22

133 Harv. L. Rev. 164, 182–83 (2019). That is, the

Constitution permits Congress to exercise its

lawmaking powers “expressly or conditionally” on

executive action, without running afoul of the

nondelegation doctrine. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136

(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). This remains true even if

“the power extended to the executive” in this

circumstance “may prove highly consequential.” Id.

Third, Congress may assign another branch “certain

non-legislative responsibilities” without causing

nondelegation concerns. Id. at 2137; accord Mistretta

v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J.,

dissenting). Although “the Constitution vests all

federal legislative power in Congress alone,

Congress’s legislative authority sometimes overlaps

with [the] authority” vested in another branch by the

Constitution. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J.,

dissenting). So, if Congress by statute delegates

certain matters to another branch that are already

“‘within the scope’” of that branch’s “‘power,’” that

raises no nondelegation concern.

Id. (citation

omitted).

Much of this Court’s nondelegation-doctrine case

law, properly understood, accords with these three

“traditional tests.” Id. at 2139. While this Court has,

at times, described the nondelegation doctrine as

requiring only that Congress provide an “intelligible

principle” when delegating legislative authority, the

“intelligible principle ‘test’” simply restates the

traditional nondelegation principles discussed above.

Id. at 2138–41. So, a statute “provides an intelligible

23

principle,” sufficient to satisfy the nondelegation

doctrine based upon the answers to the following

questions: “Does the statute assign to the executive

only the responsibility to make factual findings? Does

it set forth the facts that the executive must consider

and the criteria against which to measure them? And

most importantly, did Congress, and not the

Executive Branch, make the policy judgments?” Id.

at 2141.

The nondelegation doctrine is most consequential

when dealing with “major national policy decisions.”

Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342 (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the

denial of certiorari). The Constitution vests Congress

with the duty to set major policy for the Nation.

Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2134–36 (Gorsuch, J.,

dissenting); accord Manning, supra, at 271 & n.223.

To carry out this Article I process, Congress must

“accommodate competing policy concerns” and reach

compromise legislative solutions, given Article I’s

difficult requirements. Manning, supra, at 271 &

n.223 (citation omitted); accord Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at

2134–36 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“difficult and

deliberative processes”). Thus, by design, Congress

may only enact major national policies after engaging

in “due deliberation,” striking a compromise, and

securing “approval of a supermajority of the people’s

representatives.” Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2134 (Gorsuch,

J., dissenting) (citation omitted); accord Indus.

Union, 448 U.S. at 685 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in

the judgment); Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267 (“earnest

and profound debate”) (citation omitted). If Congress

24

could delegate “major national policy decisions” to

agencies, then Congress could empower the agencies

to impose the executive’s policy views, depriving the

people of Article I consensus and compromise. Paul,

140 S. Ct. at 342 (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the

denial of certiorari); see Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2134–35

(Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Manning, supra, at 271 &

n.223; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,

Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as

Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 631

(1992).

These Article I concerns do not arise to the same

degree when Congress delegates lesser, statutorygap-filling decisions to agencies. See Gundy, 139 S.

Ct. at 2136, 2141–42 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Breyer,

supra, at 370–71. An agency resolving “interstitial

matters” is generally of less consequence to the

people. See Breyer, supra, at 370–71; accord Gundy,

139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Thus, if

Congress sets out “consider[ations]” and “criteria” to

guide the agency’s discretion, delegation of those lessimportant matters does not generally offend Article I.

Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting);

accord Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory

Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2152 (2016);

Breyer, supra, at 370–71.

3. Chevron Deference

The final relevant doctrine here is Chevron

deference, which, in appropriate circumstances,

25

requires courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable

interpretations of ambiguous statutory language that

the agency is charged with administering. Brown &

Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159; Chevron, 467 U.S. at

844–45. Chevron deference “is premised on the theory

that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit

delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the

statutory gaps.” Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at

132, 159; see also King, 576 U.S. at 486. Thus, “when

an agency-administered statute is ambiguous with

respect to what it prescribes,” this Court understands

Congress to have “empowered the agency to resolve

the ambiguity”—such that this Court must defer to

the agency’s “reasonabl[e]” interpretations. UARG,

573 U.S. at 315; see Breyer, supra, at 373.

Chevron deference intersects with the major

questions doctrine when an agency improperly relies

on Chevron to resolve a major policy question for the

Nation. When properly confined to its traditional role

of allowing the agency to fill in the details of a

regulatory regime, the Chevron deference doctrine

proceeds in two steps. Under the first step, the court

“ask[s] whether the statute” that the agency

administers “is ambiguous.” King, 576 U.S. at 485. If

the statute is not ambiguous—meaning that

“Congress has directly spoken to the precise question

at issue”—then the Chevron “inquiry is at an end; the

court must give effect to the unambiguously

expressed intent of Congress.” Brown & Williamson,

529 U.S. at 132 (citations omitted). If the statute is

ambiguous, then, under the second step, the court

26

must ask “whether the agency’s interpretation is

reasonable.” King, 576 U.S. at 485. If it is, then the

court must defer to that agency interpretation even if

it is not “the reading the court would have reached if

the question initially had arisen in a judicial

proceeding.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 & n.11.

This approach creates serious constitutional

difficulties, however, when an agency improperly

claims Chevron deference in relying on general

statutory language to resolve a major national policy

question. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 419

(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of

rehearing en banc); Kavanaugh, supra, at 2151–52.

B. The Major Questions Doctrine Should Be

A Threshold Inquiry To Any Chevron Or

Nondelegation Analysis.

This Court should hold that the major questions

doctrine operates as a threshold inquiry before any

further statutory or nondelegation doctrine analysis.

See U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 418–22

(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of

rehearing en banc). When a court considers whether

an agency has the authority to promulgate a

challenged rule, the court should first determine

whether that rule purports to answer a “major policy

question.” Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342 (Kavanaugh, J.,

respecting the denial of certiorari). If the rule does

attempt to do so, the court must decide whether

Congress “expressly and specifically delegate[d] th[e]

27

authority” to answer such a “major policy question” to

the agency. Id. And if Congress did not clearly and

unambiguously delegate such authority to the agency,

the rule is unlawful on that basis alone. Id. If,

however, the court concludes that Congress took the

highly unusual step of clearly delegating the

resolution of that major policy issue to the agency, the

court would then need to analyze whether such a rare

delegation is constitutionally permissible under the

nondelegation doctrine.

Considering the major questions doctrine as a

threshold

matter,

before

Chevron

or

the

nondelegation doctrine, best reflects the intertwined

logic of these doctrines. The inquiries required by the

major questions doctrine—whether a rule implicates

a major question and, if so, whether the statutory

delegation is unambiguous, see id.—are logically prior

both to Chevron’s two-step framework and to any

nondelegation-doctrine analysis. If an agency’s rule

purports to resolve a major national policy, then that

rule is unlawful absent a clear statement from

Congress that it wants the agency to resolve that

issue. Id.; accord King, 576 U.S. at 485–86; Gonzales,

546 U.S. at 267. The major questions doctrine also

logically precedes the nondelegation analysis,

including as a matter of constitutional avoidance. See

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516

(2009); accord Manning, supra, at 223–24. After all,

if the court holds that the statute does not authorize

the rule under the major questions doctrine, no

28

nondelegation or Chevron inquiry would be needed or

appropriate.

This understanding of the major questions

doctrine would allow Chevron to remain within its

historical role, where agencies rely upon delegated

authority to resolve statutory ambiguities about the

details of a regulatory regime that Congress created.

See U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 419 (Kavanaugh,

J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc);

Kavanaugh, supra, at 2151–52.

As for the nondelegation doctrine, applying the

major questions doctrine first would often render that

doctrine unnecessary, given that Congress rarely—if

ever—explicitly delegates major policy questions to

agencies.

See, e.g., King, 576 U.S. at 485–86;

Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267. The people rightly expect

Congress to “make the policy judgments” for the

Nation, consistent with its vested legislative power

under the Constitution, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141

(Gorsuch, J., dissenting), rather than to “leave those

decisions to agencies,” U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at

419 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of

rehearing en banc). And, as an empirical matter,

Congress does not generally explicitly delegate to

agencies the responsibility to resolve such questions.

See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman,

Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An

Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,

Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev.

901, 1003–06 (2013); accord Christensen, 529 U.S. at

29

589 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring

in the judgment); Breyer, supra, at 369–70. So, in

almost all challenges to a major administrative rule

on nondelegation grounds, a court could resolve the

case without invalidating the statute by concluding

that, under the major questions doctrine, Congress

had not unambiguously directed the agency to answer

that major question in the first place.

C. This Court Should Hold That Three

Independently Sufficient Tests Identify

That A Rule Triggers The Major

Questions Doctrine.

Three tests, drawn from this Court’s case law,

should be independently sufficient to demonstrate

that an agency has attempted to answer a major

question, requiring clear and unambiguous statutory

authority under the major questions doctrine.

Under the first test, the rule at issue implicates

the major questions doctrine if that rule involves a

decision of “vast economic and political significance.”

UARG, 573 U.S. at 324 (citations omitted); see, e.g.,

King, 576 U.S. at 486; Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S.

Ct. at 2489. Several factors help determine whether

the major questions doctrine applies under this first

test: “the overall impact on the economy,” U.S.

Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 422–23 (Kavanaugh, J.,

dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc);

accord Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159–60; “the

number of people affected,” U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855

30

F.3d at 422–23 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the

denial of rehearing en banc); accord UARG, 573 U.S.

at 324; “the degree of congressional and public

attention to the issue,” U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d

at 422–23 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial

of rehearing en banc); Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267

(“earnest and profound debate across the country”)

(citation omitted); accord Breyer, supra, at 371

(“illuminate or stabilize a broad area of the law”); and

“the amount of money involved,” U.S. Telecom Ass’n,

855 F.3d at 422–23 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from

the denial of rehearing en banc); accord Ala. Ass’n of

Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489.

Under the second test, a rule triggers the major

questions doctrine when it is based upon a tool that

would give the relevant agency “enormous and

transformative” authority, including in future rules

that the agency may adopt. UARG, 573 U.S. at 324;

see, e.g., Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489

(“breathtaking amount of authority”; “unprecedented

[ ] [s]ince th[e] provision’s enactment”); Gonzales, 546

U.S. at 267 (“broad and unusual authority through an

implicit delegation”); accord Whitman, 531 U.S. at

468 (“alter[ing] the fundamental details of a

regulatory scheme”). Major questions under this test

often involve agencies divining “unheralded power,”

often from a “long-extant statute.” UARG, 573 U.S.

at 324; accord District of Columbia v. Dep’t of Labor,

819 F.3d 444, 446, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Kavanaugh,

J.) (the agency “advanced a novel reading of [a

statute] that would significantly enlarge” its scope).

31

Finally, under the third test, a rule triggers the

major questions doctrine if it involves the agency

trespassing on the traditional authority of the States,

Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489, or of other

agencies, see, e.g., King, 576 U.S. at 486; Gonzales,

546 U.S. at 266–67. These are circumstances in

which “[i]t is especially unlikely that Congress would

have delegated th[e] decision to the” agency, King,

576 U.S. at 486, as Congress does not “significantly

alter the balance between federal and state power”

through mere delegations to agencies, Ala. Ass’n of

Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489, or countenance agencies

“expand[ing] their power beyond” their “special

expertise,” Breyer, supra, at 370–71; accord King, 576

U.S. at 486; Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267.

II. Whether The United States Should “Shift”

Away From Coal-Fired Generation Is A

Major Policy Question That Congress Did

Not Clearly Assign To EPA To Resolve.

A. The Clean Power Plan Triggers The

Major Questions Doctrine Under All

Three Independently Sufficient Tests.

1. Vast

Economic

Significance

And

Political

The Clean Power Plan purports to answer a major

question of “vast economic and political significance,”

UARG, 573 U.S. at 324 (citations omitted), because of

the Plan’s overall effect on the economy, the number

32

of people that it impacts, the degree of congressional

and public attention that the issue and rule have

received, and the amount of money involved. U.S.

Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 422–23 (Kavanaugh, J.,

dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).

Overall impact on the economy. The Clean Power

Plan would have had a substantial “overall impact on

the economy.” Id. at 423. The energy economy is part

of our Nation’s “uniquely critical” infrastructure,

given that it serves “an ‘enabling function’ across all

critical infrastructure sectors,” thereby “fuel[ing] the

economy of the 21st century.” U.S. Cybersecurity &

Infrastructure Sec. Agency, Energy Sector.3 Or, as the

majority below explained, “[e]lectrical power has

become virtually as indispensable to modern life as

air itself.” J.A.79. Accordingly, a robust and wellfunctioning energy sector is essential to our Nation’s

wellbeing, including its economic wellbeing.

Coal plays an important role in aiding and driving

the energy sector. Unlike many other forms of energy

production, coal is not a “resource limited” product in

the near- or long-term, meaning that the United

States has stable coal reserves available for decades

to come. Nat’l Research Council, Coal: Energy for the

Future 3–4 (Nat’l Acads. Press 1995); see U.S. Energy

Info. Admin., Coal Explained: How Much Coal is Left

(Oct. 19, 2021) (“Based on U.S. coal production in

2020, of about 0.535 billion short tons, the recoverable

3 Available at https://www.cisa.gov/energy-sector.

33

coal reserves would last about 470 years, and

recoverable reserves at producing mines would last

about 25 years.”).4 Further, coal is a resilient energy

source, is readily dispatchable, and has the capacity

to be stored onsite in quantities sufficient for months

of fuel. Jeff St. John, PJM: Fuel Security Issues Won’t

Disrupt the Grid, Unless Coal & Nuclear Closures

Skyrocket, GreenTechMedia.com (Nov. 1, 2018).5

Coal thus plays a critical role in maintaining the

energy grid’s reliability in the face of various

threats—from natural threats like the bitter cold, id.,

to more modern threats like cyberattacks, see Robert

Walton, NERC Identifies 4 Regions Facing Potential

Summer Energy Shortages, UtilityDive.com (May 18,

2021)6—making coal essential to the grid’s continued

operation.

The Clean Power Plan, by its core design, would

have a “massive negative impact on the U.S. coal

mining industry.” Seth Schwartz, Evaluation of the

Immediate Impact of the Clean Power Plan Rule on

the Coal Industry at 48 (Energy Ventures Analysis,

4 Available at https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/coal/

how-much-coal-is-left.php.

Available at https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/

read/pjm-fuel-security-wont-disrupt-grid-unless-coal-nuclearclosures.

5

6 Available at https://www.utilitydive.com/news/nerc-cyber

security-concerns-summer-energy-shortages-texas-california/60

0324/.

34

Inc. Oct. 2015).7 By eliminating any real growth

potential for the U.S. coal industry, the Clean Power

Plan would “by any financial measure—market

capitalization, share price, bond rating, access to

capital markets— . . . impair[ ] the ability of coal

companies” to remain “going concerns.” Id. at 57.

The Clean Power Plan’s shifting away from coalfired generation would also have major impacts on

employment. The energy sector, and the coal industry

in particular, are major contributors to employment

and economic growth. The coal industry directly

employs over 185,000 individuals. Nat’l Ass’n of State

Energy Officials, et al., Wages, Benefits, and Change:

A Supplemental Report to the Annual U.S. Energy

and Employment Report 47 (2020).8 And every one of

those jobs in coal mining “creat[es] [ ] 3.3 jobs”

elsewhere. Nat’l Mining Assoc., Coal: Reliable &

Affordable Power 1 (Mar. 2021).9 The Clean Power

Plan by its core design reduces demand for the

Nation’s supply of coal, as discussed above, which

would have a direct, negative impact on employment

in the coal industry.

Available

Final.pdf.

at

http://www.nma.org/pdf/EVA-Report-

Available

Report.pdf.

at

https://www.usenergyjobs.org/s/Wage-

7

8

9 Available at https://nma.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/

coal_reliable_power_2021.pdf.

35

Number of people affected. The Clean Power Plan

would have impacted almost everyone in the Nation,

thus the “number of people affected” is exceedingly

large.

U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 423

(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of

rehearing en banc). As explained above, the Plan also

would have undermined the security and reliability of

the Nation’s energy sector and reduced energy sector

employment. Supra pp. 32–34. Thus, as EPA

correctly explained when repealing the Clean Power

Plan,

the

Plan’s

“generation-shifting

scheme . . . would have affected every electricity

customer (i.e., all Americans),” making it “a major

rule.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 32,529 (emphasis added).

Degree of congressional and public attention to the

issue. The Clean Power Plan received a high “degree

of congressional and public attention.” U.S. Telecom

Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 423 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting

from the denial of rehearing en banc).

Since at least 2009, Congress has introduced—

but failed to pass—legislation that would have

“force[d] the electric-power industry to shift from

fossil fuels to renewable resources,” J.A.220, and

“dozens of other climate-related bills” have been

“introduced since then,” all to no avail. J.A.220–21

(citing American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R.

2454, 111th Cong. (2009); Integrated Energy Systems

Act, S. 2702, 116th Cong. (2019); Clean Industrial

Technology Act, S. 2300, 116th Cong. (2019);

Advancing Grid Storage Act, H.R. 7313, 115th Cong.

36

(2018); Climate Risk Disclosure Act, S. 3481, 115th

Cong. (2018); American Energy and Conservation

Act, S. 3110, 114th Cong. (2016); Climate Solutions

Commission Act, H.R. 6240, 114th Cong. (2016);

Super Pollutants Act, S. 2911, 113th Cong. (2014);

American Renewable Energy and Efficiency Act, H.R.

5301, 113th Cong. (2014); End Polluter Welfare Act,

S. 3080, 112th Cong. (2012); Save Our Climate Act,

H.R. 3242, 112th Cong. (2011); Carbon Dioxide

Capture Technology Prize Act, S. 757, 112th Cong.

(2011); Clean Energy Standard Act, S. 20, 111th

Cong. (2010)). Congress did not pass any of these

measures because “Senators from small states

blocked legislation they viewed as adverse to their

voters.” J.A.220–21.

EPA promulgated the Clean Power Plan in

response to President Obama’s view that Congress

had failed to address climate change sufficiently.

“President Obama ordered EPA to do what Congress

wouldn’t.”

J.A.222.

Specifically, the President

directed EPA “to come up with executive actions we

can take, now and in the future, to reduce pollution,

prepare our communities for the consequences of

climate change, and speed the transition to more

sustainable sources of energy.” Lehmann & Massey,

supra. The President’s directive culminated in EPA’s

Clean Power Plan.

The promulgation of the Clean Power Plan

received substantial public attention. Over 40 States

and dozens of other groups litigated its lawfulness in

37

federal court—either challenging or defending the

Plan. J.A.223. And when the D.C. Circuit refused to

stay implementation pending that court’s review, this

Court intervened and ordered a stay, in a decision

that drew still more broad, nationwide attention.

See., e.g., Adam Liptak & Coral Davenport, The New

York Times, Supreme Court Deals Blow to Obama’s

Efforts to Regulate Coal Emissions (Feb. 9, 2016);10

Jonathan Adler, The Washington Post, Opinion:

Supreme Court Puts the Brakes on the EPA’s Clean

Power Plan (Feb. 9, 2016);11 Lawrence Hurley &

Valerie Volcovici, Reuters, U.S. Supreme Court

Blocks Obama's Clean Carbon Emissions Plan (Feb.

9, 2016).12

The public attention for EPA’s repeal of the Clean

Power Plan and its replacement, the ACE Rule, was

as intense. After this repeal and replacement,

“politically diverse states and politically adverse

special interest groups” participated in more

litigation over the lawfulness of EPA’s actions, with a

number of litigants comparable to the number

involved in the initial round of litigation. J.A.224. In

Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/10/us/

politics/supreme-court-blocks-obama-epa-coal-emissionsregulations.html.

10

Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/

volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/09/supreme-court-puts-thebrakes-on-the-epas-clean-power-plan/.

11

Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usacourt-carbon-idUSKCN0VI2A0.

12

38

just this latest round of legal challenges, “the

briefing’s word count exceeded a quarter of a million

words,” “oral argument lasted roughly nine hours,”

and the “case’s caption alone runs beyond a dozen

pages.” Id.

Money involved. The Clean Power Plan involves

a significant “amount of money [ ] for regulated and

affected parties.” U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at

422–23 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of

rehearing en banc). In repealing the Clean Power

Plan, EPA explained that the Plan’s “generationshifting scheme was projected to have billions of

dollars of impact on regulated parties and the

economy,” which supported EPA’s own conclusion

that the Plan qualified as “a major rule.” 84 Fed. Reg.

at 32,529. EPA’s conclusions were correct, as the

Plan’s generation-shifting methodology has “almost

unfathomable” potential direct costs, with “wholesale

electricity’s cost [alone expected] to rise by $214

billion” and an additional $64 billion “to replace

shuttered capacity.” J.A.226; see also U.S. Energy

Info. Admin., Analysis of the Impacts of the Clean

Power Plan 63–64 (May 2015).13

Further, the

National Mining Association’s own evaluation of the

potential impact of the Plan’s generation shifting

confirms its dramatic impact on both the coal industry

and the country. See Schwartz, supra, at 1–2.

13 Available at https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/power

plants/cleanplan/pdf/powerplant.pdf.

39

2. Assertion

Of

Transformative

Before Claimed

Enormous

Authority

And

Never

The Clean Power Plan’s central feature—

generation shifting—is an “unheralded power” that

EPA had divined from a “long-extant statute,”

arrogating “enormous and transformative” authority

to itself “without clear congressional authorization.”

UARG, 573 U.S. at 324.

Generation shifting involves “an owner or

operator of a regulated source . . . ‘shift[ing]’ powerproducing operations to a different facility, such as a

nuclear power plant, through bilateral contracts for

capacity or by reducing utilization.” 84 Fed. Reg. at

32,527.

In practical terms, generation shifting

requires owners of power plants to “subsidiz[e] loweremitting sources” like wind farms by buying those

sources’ excess capacity, curtailing or shuttering their

own operations, or purchasing some form of credit

toward compliance from those other types of

generating resources. Id. at 32,527, 32,534.

Once armed with the generation-shifting tool,

EPA’s central-planning authority under Section

111(d) would be breathtaking. Nor could (or would)

this “enormous and transformative” authority,

UARG, 573 U.S. at 324, be confined to the power

sector. EPA could generation-shift virtually any

industry by using materially indistinguishable logic.

Just looking at the sources regulated under the

40

immediately prior EPA rule pursuant to Section

111(d), 61 Fed. Reg. 9905 (Mar. 12, 1996), EPA could

next decide that recycling plants are preferrable to

municipal landfills, in terms of their impact on air

emissions, and require a shift from the former to the

latter.

The Clean Power Plan’s assertion of generationshifting authority, if upheld by this Court, would be

unprecedented. In the 42 years between the adoption

of Section 111(d) in 1970 and the proposal of the Clean

Power Plan, EPA consistently read Section 111(d) to

require performance standards that are achievable by

individual sources based on applying a “best system

of emission reduction” to those individual sources.

See 42 Fed. Reg. 12,022 (Mar. 1, 1977) (fluorides from

phosphate fertilizer plants); 42 Fed. Reg. 55,796 (Oct.

18, 1977) (acid mist from sulfuric acid plants); 44 Fed.

Reg. 29,828 (May 22, 1979) (total reduced sulfur from

kraft pulp plants); 45 Fed. Reg. 26,294 (Apr. 17, 1980)

(fluorides from primary aluminum plants); 60 Fed.

Reg. 65,387 (Dec. 19, 1995) (various pollutants from

municipal waste combustors); 61 Fed. Reg. 9905 (Mar.

12, 1996) (landfill gases from municipal solid waste

landfills).

Supporters of the Clean Power Plan have cited the

Clean Air Mercury Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18,

2005), to claim that the Plan does not rest on a novel

assertion of EPA’s authority, see e.g., JA.126–27, but

that Rule does not help their cause. The D.C. Circuit

vacated the Clean Air Mercury Rule on other grounds,

41

so no court ever grappled with whether Section 111(d)

authorized that Rule’s emissions trading regime. See

New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 577–78. Further, in the

Clean Air Mercury Rule, the required emission

reductions were “based on control technology

available in the relevant timeframe” that could be

installed at the regulated source, 70 Fed. Reg. at

28,617, and EPA asserted that the standard could be

achieved without emission trading, id. at 28,620 &

n.5. That is, of course, not true for the Clean Power

Plan, since EPA did not establish its “emission

performance rates” based on what could be achieved

by installing controls at an existing source. See supra

pp. 7–9.

3. Trespassing On The Traditional

Authority Of States And Other

Agencies

The Clean Power Plan infringes on traditional

state authority, Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at

2489, while also straying into the zone of expertise of

other agencies, see, e.g., King, 576 U.S. at 486;

Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267.

This Court has long held that “the regulation of

utilities is one of the most important of the functions

traditionally associated with the police power of the

States,” Ark. Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv.

Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 377 (1983), which power

should not be “superseded” by statute “unless that

was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress,” Pac.

42

Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation &

Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 206 (1983) (citations

omitted). Particularly relevant here, the “[n]eed for

new power facilities, their economic feasibility, and

rates and services, are areas that have been

characteristically governed by the States”—indeed,

the “franchise to operate a public utility . . . is a

special privilege which . . . may be granted or

withheld at the pleasure of the State.” Id. at 205

(citations omitted); see also Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util.

Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2009)

(“State and municipal authorities retain the right to

forbid new entrants from providing new capacity, to

require retirement of existing generators, to limit new

construction to more expensive, environmentallyfriendly units, or to take any other action in their role

as regulators of generation facilities without direct

interference from” FERC).

Congress has recognized and confirmed the

States’ constitutional authority in this area of

regulation. In the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.

§§ 791a, et seq., Congress drew “a bright line easily

ascertained, between state and federal jurisdiction” in

the energy-regulation sphere. Fed. Power Comm’n v.

S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964). So,

under the Federal Power Act, “the States retain their

traditional responsibility in the field of regulating

electrical utilities for determining questions of need,

reliability, cost and other related state concerns.” Pac.

Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 205; S. Cal. Edison Co.,

376 U.S. at 215. This is why Congress cabined the

43

power of FERC—the federal agency charged with

fulfilling the federal government’s limited role in this

area—“to those matters which are not subject to

regulation by the States,” 16 U.S.C. § 824(a), and why

Congress disclaimed federal authority “over facilities

used for the generation of electric energy,” id.

§ 824(b)(1); see also id. § 824o(i)(2) (“This section does

not authorize . . . [FERC] to order the construction of

additional generation or transmission capacity[.]”).

Thus, even FERC lacks the power to interfere with

“state authority in such traditional areas as the . . .

administration of integrated resource planning and

. . . utility generation and resource portfolios.” New

York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 24 (2002).

The Clean Power Plan would have usurped

States’ traditional powers. To achieve the Plan’s

generation-shifting-based emission reductions, the

Plan would have in effect required States to shift from

fossil fuel-fired plants to new renewable resources. 80

Fed. Reg. at 64,732–33. Therefore, under the Clean

Power Plan, States would no longer have the full

breadth of their traditional authority to decide for

themselves their mix of energy resources. 84 Fed.

Reg. at 32,529.

As EPA explained, the “States’ reserved

authority” over energy regulation “includes control

over in-state ‘facilities used for the generation of

electric energy.’” 84 Fed. Reg. at 32,530 n.107

(citation omitted). Thus, among other things, federal

“‘law places beyond FERC[’s power] and leaves to the

44

States alone, the regulation of ‘any other sale’—most

notably, any retail sale—of electricity.’” Id. at 32,530

(quoting Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, L.L.C.,

136 S. Ct. 1288, 1292 (2016)). Indeed, Section 111

itself—EPA’s own alleged authority for the Clean

Power Plan—recognizes the State’s domain here. See,

e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (requiring Section 111(d)

rules must allow States to “take into consideration,

among other factors, the remaining useful life of the

existing source” when applying performance

standards). The Clean Power Plan “ignored the

statutory directive [in Section 111] to establish

standards for sources and overextended federal

authority into matters traditionally reserved for

states: ‘administration of integrated resource

planning and . . . utility generation and resource

portfolios.’” 84 Fed. Reg. at 32,529 (quoting New

York, 535 U.S. at 24) (emphasis added).

The Clean Power Plan would also have

simultaneously intruded upon FERC’s core powers.

As EPA explained when repealing the Clean Power

Plan, the Plan was “based largely on measures and

subjects exclusively left to FERC . . . , rather than

inflicting only permissible, incidental effects on

[FERC’s] domain[ ].” Id. at 32,530. The Plan’s forcing

of generation shifting across the entire energy sector

as a “best system of emission reduction” strays into

FERC’s authority to regulate the interstate

transmission of energy. See id.

45

B. Section

111(d)

Does

Not

Clearly

Authorize The Clean Power Plan.

Given that the Clean Power Plan triggers the

major questions doctrine, it could only be lawful if

Congress clearly and unambiguously delegated to

EPA via statute the authority to decide whether to

shift the power sector away from coal-fired energy to

renewable resources. But nothing in Section 111(d)

even arguably approaches a clear statement

authorizing EPA to make that decision. That is why

“[h]ardly any party in this case makes a serious and

sustained argument that § 111 includes a clear

statement unambiguously authorizing the EPA to

consider off-site solutions like generation shifting.”

J.A.217.

There could be no serious argument that Section

111(d) provides a sufficiently clear statement to

authorize the Clean Power Plan, under the major

questions doctrine. Section 111(d) contains only two

relevant sentences, and nothing in those sentences

comes close to containing the clear statement that the

major questions doctrine requires. The first sentence

requires EPA to establish a “procedure” for States—

not EPA—to establish “standards of performance” for

existing sources of emissions. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1).

The second sentence merely clarifies the first,

explaining that States must be allowed to “take into

consideration, among other factors, the remaining

useful life of the existing source” when applying a

standard of performance to “any particular source.”

46

Id.

While Section 111(d) cross-references the

definition of “standards of performance” to allow EPA

to select the “best system of emission reduction,”

those general words are not a clear grant to EPA of

the broad authority to demand a transformative shift

in the development and use of the Nation’s energy

resources.14

Congress’s direction in Title IV of the Clean Air

Act for EPA to address acid rain through a nationwide

cap-and-trade program provides a stark contrast to

the lack of clear authority for the Clean Power Plan

in Section 111(d). In Title IV, 42 U.S.C. § 7651, et seq.,

Congress addressed the acid rain problem by

explicitly setting a specific, numeric cap on sulfur

dioxide emissions and establishing an emission

allowance trading program based on the

determination that compliance could be achieved in

part through generation shifting. See 42 U.S.C.

§§ 7651–7651c; see also 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,770

(“Generation shift and [renewable energy] were part

of Congress’s basis for the Title IV emission

requirements[.]”). Thus, Title IV illustrates how

Congress would be expected to speak clearly in

establishing an emission allowance trading program

based on generation shifting. While the similarities

To be clear, National Mining Association strongly

supports State Petitioners’ argument that, in fact, this language

forecloses generation-shifting, State Pet. Br. Part II, but this

Court need not reach that argument given that the major

questions doctrine is a predicate inquiry, see supra Part I.B.

14

47

between the Acid Rain Program and the Clean Power

Plan are striking, the statutory authority underlying

them—Title IV and Section 111(d)—could not be any

more different. Compared to the two highly general

and ambiguous sentences comprising Section 111(d),

Title IV contains numerous provisions establishing

specific emission targets and allocating specific

allowance values to expressly named individual

facilities, and it provides significant detail on how to

implement the program, including how the trading

program should work. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651b-7651c.

In promulgating the Clean Power Plan, EPA cited

Congress’s reliance on generation shifting to address

the acid rain problem via Title IV as justification for

requiring generation shifting in the Clean Power Plan

promulgated under Section 111(d). 80 Fed. Reg. at

64,771. EPA claimed that “Congress’s reliance on

generation shifting and [renewable energy] to reduce

acid rain precursors from affected [electric generating

units] in Title IV strongly supports the EPA’s

authority to identify those same measures as part of

the CAA section 111 ‘system of emission reduction’ to

reduce CO2 emissions from those same sources.” Id.

This gets the major questions doctrine precisely

backwards: that Congress clearly established a

generation-shifting trading program to address acid

rain under Title IV only further illustrates that

Congress did not grant EPA the authority to wield

that same power under Section 111(d).

48

If this Court were to uphold the decision below

that Section 111(d) grants EPA the authority needed

to impose the generation-shifting Clean Power Plan,

that would raise grave constitutional concerns for the

statute. The Clean Power Plan does not merely “‘fill

up the details’” of a statutory regime assigned to EPA

by Congress. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J.,

dissenting) (citation omitted). It is, rather, EPA’s

attempt to address climate change precisely because

Congress has failed to act, using a transformational,

generation-shifting methodology. Nor does the Plan

implement “non-legislative responsibilities” that are

already “‘within the scope’” of the Executive Branch’s

“‘power.’” Id. at 2137 (citation omitted). Instead, the

Clean Power Plan deals with one of the most

important, “major national policy decisions” of our

time. Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342 (Kavanaugh, J.,

respecting the denial of certiorari). If Section 111(d)’s

general terms permit EPA to grasp that amount of

authority at its option, that provision would be

unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine.

See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J.,

dissenting).

C. The

Panel

Majority’s

Contrary

Conclusion Below Was Wrong.

Nothing in the panel majority’s decision below

articulates any persuasive challenge to this analysis.

The panel majority concluded that the major

questions doctrine did not invalidate the Clean Power

49

Plan because “there is no question that the regulation

of greenhouse gas emissions by power plants across

the Nation falls squarely within the EPA’s

wheelhouse.” J.A.137 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA,

549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007)). But Massachusetts v. EPA

does not suggest that EPA can enact any and all

regulations, no matter how transformative, as this

Court’s decision in UARG makes clear. 573 U.S. at

316–19.

The majority also incorrectly interpreted this

Court’s

major-questions-doctrine

jurisprudence,

unduly focusing the doctrine on “whom the EPA was

attempting to regulate.”

J.A.138–40 (emphasis

added). The major questions doctrine looks at far

more than just the target of agency regulations. U.S.

Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 422–23 (Kavanaugh, J.,

dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). As

explained above, three independently sufficient tests,

drawn from this Court’s case law, may demonstrate

that an agency has attempted to address a major

question. See supra Part I.C.

Finally, the panel majority’s conclusion that the

Clean Power Plan does not trigger the major

questions doctrine because it “does not impose”

generation shifting “on anyone,” and therefore it is

“entirely internal to the EPA,” is incorrect. J.A.142–

48. The CO2 emission performance rates that the

Clean Power Plan set based upon EPA’s generationshifting methodology cannot be achieved by

individual sources, making compliance by those

50

sources’ owners and operators possible only through

shifting the power sector away from coal-fired

generation toward renewable energy. See supra pp.

7–9. That is why, when announcing the Clean Power

Plan, the White House touted that the Plan would

“‘aggressive[ly] transform[ ] . . . the domestic energy

industry.’” Joby Warrick, The Washington Post, White

House Set to Adopt Sweeping Curbs on Carbon

Pollution (Aug. 1, 2015) (quoting White House fact

sheet to press).15 The decision of whether such a

transformation should occur, and at what pace, is one

that under the Constitution and laws of the United

States only Congress can make.

Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/

health-science/white-house-set-to-adopt-sweeping-curbs-oncarbon-pollution/2015/08/01/ba6627fa-385c-11e5-b6731df005a0fb28_story.html.

15

51

CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the judgment of the

Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings.

Respectfully submitted,

CARROLL WADE

MCGUFFEY III

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

600 Peachtree St. N.E.

Suite 3000

Atlanta, GA 30308

MISHA TSEYTLIN

Counsel of Record

KEVIN M. LEROY

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

227 W. Monroe St.

Suite 3900

Chicago, IL 60606

TIMOTHY L. MCHUGH

(608) 999-1240

TROUTMAN PEPPER

misha.tseytlin@

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP troutman.com

1001 Haxall Point,

15th Floor

Counsel for National

Richmond, VA 23219

Mining Association

December 2021

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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