Amicus Curiae Brief — West Virginia, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
Supreme Court briefJun 3, 2021
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No. 20-1530
In the Supreme Court of the United States
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
AND MICHAEL REGAN, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
DANIEL CAMERON
Attorney General of
Kentucky
BARRY L. DUNN
Deputy Attorney
General
Office of the Kentucky
Attorney General
700 Capital Ave., Ste.118
Frankfort, KY 40601
(502) 696-5300
Chad.Meredith@ky.gov
S. CHAD MEREDITH
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..........................................ii
STATEMENT OF INTEREST ...................................... 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .............................. 2
ARGUMENT .................................................................. 3
I. The EPA lacks authority to restructure the
power sector .............................................................. 3
A. Whether the power sector should be
restructured to address climate change is a
major question that Congress has not
delegated to the EPA .......................................... 4
B. This Court’s decision in Massachusetts v.
EPA did not give the EPA carte blanche
authority to regulate all emissions, much
less the ability to restructure the nation’s
power sector ........................................................ 9
II. Allowing the EPA to mandate generation
shifting disproportionately burdens some states
without the protection of the political process ...... 12
CONCLUSION ............................................................ 17
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Am. Lung Ass’n. v. EPA,
985 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2021) .............................. 9, 16
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000) ................................ 4, 8, 9, 10, 11
Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607 (1980) .................................................... 4
Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497 (2007) .................................... 2, 9, 10, 12
MCI Telecommunications Corp., v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994) ...... 8
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Comm’n,
461 U.S. 190 (1983) .................................................... 7
Util. Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,
573 U.S. 302 (2014) .............................................. 4, 12
CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES
U.S. Const. art. I ............................................................ 3
42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) .................................................... 7
42 U.S.C. § 7411(b) ........................................................ 7
42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(5) .................................................... 8
iii
42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) .................................................... 7
REGULATIONS
80 Fed. Reg. 64661 (Oct. 23, 2015).......................... 6, 10
83 Fed. Reg. 44746 (Aug. 31, 2018)............................... 5
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Josh Bivens, A Comprehensive Analysis of the
Employment Impacts of the EPA’s Proposed
Clean Power Plan, Economic Policy Institute
(Jun. 9, 2015) ............................................................ 13
Cong. Research Serv., R44922, The U.S. Coal
Industry: Historical Trends and Recent
Developments (2017) ................................................ 12
Congress Climate History, Center for Climate and
Energy Solutions ........................................................ 3
Congressional District 5, KY., Data USA ................... 15
David Marshall Coover III, Square Pegs and
Round Holes: Why the Environmental Protection
Agency’s New Section 111 Greenhouse Gas
Regulations Do Not Fit With Supreme Court
Precedent or Congressional Intent in the Clean
Air Act, 45 Tex. Envtl. L.J. 1 (2015) ........................ 10
Electricity in the United States, U.S. Energy
Information Administration .................................... 11
iv
EPA’s Clean Power Plan: An Economic Impact
Analysis, Energy Ventures Analysis (Nov. 13,
2015).......................................................... 5, 13, 14, 15
Fact Sheet: Clean Power Plan by the Numbers,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2017) ....... 13
Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency ......................... 4, 6
Greg Giroux, Rich, poor, young, old: Congressional
districts at a glance, Bloomberg Gov’t (Sept. 15,
2017).......................................................................... 14
Kentucky Coal Facts, Kentucky Coal Association
(2011) ........................................................................ 15
Kentucky Coal Facts, Kentucky Energy and
Environment Cabinet (2017).......................... 1, 13, 14
Kentucky Energy Profile, Kentucky Energy and
Environment Cabinet Office of Energy Policy
(2019) ........................................................................ 12
Naveena Sadasivam, Kentucky May Accidentally
Comply With EPA’s Clean Power Plan, Inside
Climate News (May 26, 2015) .................................. 11
Herman K. Trabish, Most states on track to meet
EPA Clean Power Plan, but political & legal
contention remains, Utility Dive (Jun. 16, 2015) .... 11
Quick Facts – Kentucky, U.S. Census Bureau ............ 14
v
U.S. Energy Information Administration –
Kentucky State Profile and Energy Estimates
....................................................................... 13, 14, 15
Adam Vaughn, Obama’s Clean Power Plan Hailed
as US’s Strongest Ever Climate Action, The
Guardian (Aug. 5, 2015) ............................................. 5
Wayne Winegarden & Alexander Specht, The
Clean Power Plan’s Economic Impact by Income
Group and Local Area, Pacific Research Institute
(2016) ........................................................................ 14
1
STATEMENT OF INTEREST 1
This case will determine the future of the coal
industry in Kentucky and elsewhere. The decision
below by the D.C. Circuit permits the Environmental
Protection Agency to reshape the nation’s power sector
by mandating emissions standards that will be
extraordinarily difficult—if not impossible—for
Kentucky’s coal-fired power plants to meet. That
decision—and its empowerment of the EPA to try to
eliminate coal—should not stand.
Coal is under attack. It has been for some time.
The D.C. Circuit’s decision permits the EPA to
continue this assault through unrealistic emissions
standards. If such standards endure, coal-fired power
plants cannot comply without limiting their
operations, shutting down, or investing in EPApreferred alternative energy. The war on coal has
already limited the operations of Kentucky’s coal
industry. The industry has shrunk by over 10,000 jobs
and 300 million tons in 20 years. 2 And it cannot
subsidize investment in the alternative sources that
the EPA prefers because such sources are not viable in
Kentucky’s coal communities.
A continued decline of the coal industry will
have devastating economic consequences. It will
1
2
Amicus has timely notified counsel for all parties of its intent
to file this brief. Sup. Ct. Rules 37.2(a), 37.4.
Kentucky Coal Facts, Kentucky Energy and Environment
Cabinet 9–14 (2017), https://eec.ky.gov/Energy/Coal%20
Facts%20%20Annual%20Editions/Kentucky%20Coal%20Fact
s%20-%2017th%20Edition%20(2017).pdf
[hereinafter
Kentucky Coal Facts, 2017].
2
increase the electricity rates in some of the nation’s
poorest regions. It will decrease the number of goodpaying jobs in those regions. It will deprive those
communities of tax revenue essential for their schools,
infrastructure, and emergency responders. And all this
will happen without allowing citizens from Kentucky
and other coal-producing states, through their elected
representatives, to have a say in the matter. For these
reasons, Kentucky has a strong interest in ensuring
that a critical component of the nation’s power sector
is not harmed because of the D.C. Circuit’s
misinterpretation of EPA authority.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Although portrayed as a simple extension of
Massachusetts v. EPA, the lower court’s decision does
what Congress never authorized by granting the EPA
unfettered authority to address climate change. As the
Clean Power Plan (“CPP”) demonstrated, the EPA—if
not properly constrained—will commandeer the Clean
Air Act to restructure the power sector by effectively
eliminating entire industries.
Such authority does not belong to the EPA. This
Court has never said that the EPA may regulate
emissions by reshaping how the nation’s power
demand is met or by selecting certain industries for
favorable treatment and others for elimination.
Decisions regarding climate change and the power
sector are major policy questions with vast economic
and political significance that should be handled by
Congress, where the people have a voice.
3
The significant and harmful impact of allowing
the EPA to restructure the power sector by greatly
reducing—possibly
even
eliminating—coal
is
exemplified by Kentucky and other similarly-situated
states who would bear the disproportionate burden.
ARGUMENT
I. The EPA lacks authority to restructure the
power sector.
This case is about who gets to make climatechange policy. Congress has the sole authority to
legislate. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. Yet agency
rulemaking like the CPP demonstrates a rejection of
this foundational principle. Agency rulemaking cannot
be a substitute for Congressional legislative action;
that Congress has been unable or unwilling to pass
climate-change legislation3 does not mean the EPA
may make climate-change policy in its stead. The
significance of climate-change policy indicates it falls
within the purview of Congress’ power, and unless
Congress delegates the authority to the EPA, the EPA
may not act.
3
See Congress Climate History, Center for Climate and Energy
Solutions,
https://www.c2es.org/content/congress-climatehistory/ (last visited May 24, 2021) (providing a history of
major climate change legislation and detailing failed
attempts, including the Cap and Trade legislation that passed
in the House (H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009)), but failed in the
Senate).
4
A. Whether the power sector should be
restructured to address climate change is
a major question that Congress has not
delegated to the EPA.
It is Congress that must make the “critical
policy decisions.” Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am.
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980). Therefore,
Congress must “speak clearly if it wishes to assign to
an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political
significance.’” Util. Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573
U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (quoting FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160); see also
Indus. Union Dept., 448 U.S. at 687 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (stating that the “filling
in of the blanks” can be left to the agencies, but the
“elected representatives of the people” must make the
“hard choices”). Here, the EPA sought to make
decisions of such significance without a clear
assignment from Congress.
According to the EPA, it promulgated the CPP
because it believed climate change was a significant
issue. At the time, the EPA asserted that “[c]limate
change is one of the greatest environmental and public
health challenges we face.” 4 It further declared:
“Taking action now is critical. Reducing CO2 emissions
from power plants, and driving investment in clean
energy technologies strategies that do so, is an
4
Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, 19january2017snapshot.e
pa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-plan_
.html (last visited May 19, 2021).
5
essential step in lessening the impacts of climate
change and providing a more certain future for our
health, our environment, and future generations.” 5 In
announcing the CPP, Brian Deese, an advisor to then
President Obama, asserted that the CPP represented
the “biggest step that any single president has made to
curb the carbon pollution that is fueling climate
change.” 6
Indeed, it was a big step that would have had
significant consequences had it not been later repealed
and replaced by the Affordable Clean Energy Rule. 7
Industry analysts projected that under the CPP’s
generation-shifting 8 strategy, wholesale electricity
costs would have increased by $214 billion. 9
Additionally, the power industry projected that it
would have had to spend $64 billion to replace the
capacity lost from coal-fired power plants. 10 The EPA’s
5
6
7
8
9
10
Id.
Adam Vaughn, Obama’s Clean Power Plan Hailed as US’s
Strongest Ever Climate Action, The Guardian (Aug. 5, 2015),
https://ourworld.unu.edu/en/obamas-clean-power-plan-hailedas-uss-strongest-ever-climate-action.
Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From
Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to
Emission Guideline Implementing Regulations; Revisions to
New Source Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44746 (Aug. 31,
2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60).
The phrases “generation shifting” and “power generation
shifting” refer to the CPP’s mandated shift away from energy
sources with higher carbon to lower carbon sources like
natural gas and renewables.
EPA’s Clean Power Plan: An Economic Impact Analysis,
Energy
Ventures
Analysis
4
(Nov.
13,
2015),
https://nma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/11.13.15-NMA_
EPAs-Clean-Power-Plan-An-Economic-Impact-Analysis.pdf.
Id. at 6.
6
own projections predicted that upward of 31,000 jobs
would be lost as a result of schemes like the CPP. 11
The EPA justified these costs and job losses
with the “important benefits” to health and the
climate expected to result from the CPP. 12 However,
the EPA cannot simply sidestep the major question
doctrine by conducting an analysis of costs, non-air
impacts, and energy requirements. Rather, the EPA’s
cost-benefit analysis for the CPP demonstrates the
vast significance of the issue by highlighting what is at
stake if the EPA is allowed to assert such sweeping
authority. The massive price tag and far-reaching
economic impacts make it obvious that the EPA
cannot act on such a major issue without clear
authority from Congress.
Congress, however, did not manifest clear intent
to give the EPA this authority—including to
restructure the nation’s power sector—when it enacted
42 U.S.C. § 7411. Section 7411 provides that “the
Administrator shall publish proposed regulations,
establishing Federal standards of performance” for
new stationary sources that “cause[], or contribute[]
significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be
11
12
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg.
64661, 64682 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
60). The EPA estimated a net decrease of 31,000 to 34,000
“job-years” by 2030. According to the EPA, a “job-year is not
an individual job; rather a job-year is the amount of work
performed by the equivalent of one full-time individual for
one year. For example, 20 job-years may represent 20 fulltime jobs or 40 half-time jobs.”
Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, supra note 4.
7
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42
U.S.C. § 7411(b). For existing sources, § 7411
mandates collaboration between the EPA and the
States, 13 and calls for the Administrator to “prescribe
regulations . . . under which each state shall submit to
the Administrator a plan” establishing “standards of
performance” and providing for “implementation and
enforcement.” 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1). The statute
defines a “standard of performance” as:
a standard for emissions of air pollutants
which reflects the degree of emission
limitation
achievable
through
the
application of the best system of emission
reduction which (taking into account the
cost of achieving such reduction and any
nonair quality health and environmental
impact and energy requirements) the
Administrator determines has been
adequately demonstrated.
42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
Congress would not have given the EPA
authority to restructure the power sector “in so cryptic
13
Historically, states have had control over the generation of
electricity. “Need for new power facilities, their economic
feasibility, and rates and services, are areas that have been
characteristically governed by the States.” Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461
U.S. 190, 205 (1983). Except for the authority of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission over the need for and pricing
of electrical power transmitted in interstate commerce,
“economic aspects of electrical generation have been
regulated for many years and in great detail by the states.”
Id. at 206.
8
a fashion.” See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160.
In MCI Telecommunications Corp., v. American
Telephone
&
Telegraph
Co.,
the
Federal
Communications Commission contended that because
Congress had statutorily given it the discretion to
“modify any requirement” imposed under the statute,
it possessed the authority to render voluntary certain
requirements that were otherwise mandatory. 512
U.S. 218, 225 (1994). This Court disagreed and
concluded that it “is highly unlikely that Congress
would leave the determination of whether an industry
will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated
to agency discretion . . . .” Id. at 231. Similarly, given
that § 7411 does not even authorize the Administrator
to require a new or modified source of pollution to
“install and operate any particular technological
system of continuous emission reduction to comply
with any . . . standard of performance,” 42 U.S.C.
§ 7411(b)(5), it is highly unlikely that Congress
intended for the EPA to wield § 7411(d) to take actions
that might have the effect of eliminating entire
industries from the power grid.
The EPA cannot simply claim authority to seize
control of the power sector; if Congress wants the EPA
to address climate change by radically restructuring
the power sector, it must say so clearly. Nothing in
§ 7411 demonstrates that intent by Congress.
9
B. This Court’s decision in Massachusetts v.
EPA did not give the EPA carte blanche
authority to regulate all emissions, much
less the ability to restructure the nation’s
power sector.
In rejecting the assertion that the CPP had to
be repealed because it was outside the scope of the
EPA’s congressionally granted authority, the lower
court relied on this Court’s decision in Massachusetts
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). In that case, this Court
held that the Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to
regulate new motor vehicle emissions if the EPA forms
a judgment that such emissions endanger public
health or welfare by contributing to climate change.
Id. at 529–533. This Court further opined that the
“broad language of § 202(a)(1) reflect[ed] an
intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to
forestall . . . obsolescence” in the face of “changing
circumstances and scientific developments.” Id. at 532.
The lower court now asserts that the same flexibility
should be found in § 7411, thereby giving the EPA
authority to restructure the nation’s power sector. Am.
Lung Ass’n. v. EPA, 985 F.3d 914, 947 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
Yet, regulating with the effect of potentially
eliminating entire power sources from the U.S. power
sector is an extreme measure that would overextend
the authority recognized in Massachusetts v. EPA. In
Massachusetts, this Court contrasted the regulation of
emissions from motor vehicles with the “extreme
measures,” 549 U.S. at 531, taken by the Federal Drug
Administration in FDA v. Brown & Williamson
10
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). This Court held in
Brown & Williamson that the FDA’s classification of
tobacco products as “drugs” or “devices” was outside
the agency’s authority because it was “unlikely that
Congress meant to ban tobacco products, which the
FDCA would have required had such products been
[thus] classified . . . .” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 531
(citing Brown & Williamson, at 135–37). In contrast,
EPA jurisdiction over greenhouse gas emissions from
motor vehicles would lead to “no such extreme
measures” because the “EPA would only regulate
emissions . . . .” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 531
(emphasis in original).
A power-generation-shifting strategy, like the
CPP, would be much more akin to the “extreme
measures” in Brown & Williamson than the mere
regulation of emissions in Massachusetts. After all, the
CPP would have dictated a nationwide change in how
and where electricity is produced, amounting to a
massive expansion of authority compared to regulating
carbon emissions at their source. The final CPP
required carbon emissions in the United States to be
reduced by 32% by 2030. 14 According to the EPA, this
drastic cut in carbon emissions could be accomplished
through power generation shifting—i.e., moving from
energy sources with higher carbon to lower carbon
sources like natural gas or renewables. 15 The result
14
15
80 Fed. Reg., supra note 11, at 64736.
See David Marshall Coover III, Square Pegs and Round
Holes: Why the Environmental Protection Agency’s New
Section 111 Greenhouse Gas Regulations Do Not Fit With
Supreme Court Precedent or Congressional Intent in the Clean
11
would have been the severely reduced operation, if not
the complete closure, of coal-fired power plants. 16 This
would be a significant change to the U.S. power grid,
which currently relies on coal-fired generation for
almost one-fifth of its power. 17 Yet, the lower court
asserted that the statutory authority given to the EPA
to identify the best system of emission reduction could
extend to such a plan.
Any EPA decision that incorporates generation
shifting, resulting in the elimination of some
industries from the power sector, is little different
than the extreme measures taken by the FDA in
Brown & Williamson. Mandatory generation shifting
is not a natural extension of the EPA’s authority
16
17
Air Act, 45 Tex. Envtl. L.J. 1, 24 (2015) (arguing this
represented a novel approach for the EPA’s selection of the
best system of emission reduction because while the EPA’s
past emission guidelines were based on systems available at
the affected source, the EPA newly asserted that the “highly
interconnected and integrated nature” of the power sector
allowed it to set emission caps that would require steps
beyond each affected source).
See Herman K. Trabish, Most states on track to meet EPA
Clean Power Plan, but political & legal contention remains,
Utility Dive (Jun. 16, 2015), https://www.utilitydive.com/
news/most-states-on-track-to-meet-epa-clean-power-plan-butpolitical-legal-co/400407/ (asserting that states can meet
emission standard goals by closing coal plants); see also
Naveena Sadasivam, Kentucky May Accidentally Comply
With EPA’s Clean Power Plan, Inside Climate News (May 26,
2015),
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/26052015/kent
ucky-may-accidentally-comply-epa-clean-power-plan-coal/
(noting that even the 18% cut in the proposed rule would
likely require “retiring coal plants” in Kentucky).
Electricity in the United States, U.S. Energy Information
Administration, https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electric
ity/electricity-in-the-us.php (last updated Mar. 18, 2021).
12
described by this Court in Massachusetts. An
interpretation that “would bring about an enormous
and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory
authority without clear congressional authorization” is
unreasonable. Util. Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573
U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (allowing the EPA to require
utilization of best-available control technology by
emission sources already subject to review, but not
permitting the EPA to “lay[] claim to extravagant
statutory authority over the national economy”). The
Court should take this opportunity to clarify that in
Massachusetts it was not indicating that the EPA’s
authority would include extreme measures like
restructuring the power sector.
II. Allowing the EPA to mandate generation
shifting disproportionately burdens some
states without the protection of the political
process.
Mandated generation shifting forces some states
to bear the disproportionate burden of addressing
climate change. The majority of coal reserves in the
United States—70%—is concentrated in five states:
Wyoming, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and
Kentucky. 18 Coal-powered electricity stimulates
economic growth in these states by lowering the costs
of doing business. 19 Because of coal, in 2019 Kentucky
18
19
Cong. Research Serv., R44922, The U.S. Coal Industry:
Historical Trends and Recent Developments 3 (2017).
Kentucky Energy Profile, Kentucky Energy and Environment
Cabinet
Office
of
Energy
Policy
2
(2019),
13
offered the seventh-lowest industrial electricity prices
in the United States and the lowest east of the
Mississippi River. 20 Any rule like the CPP, which
effectively mandates a shift away from coal power,
would place a disproportionate burden on these states
and stifle economic growth. For example, the EPA
estimated the reduction in coal-fired electricity
production under the CPP would lead to a loss of over
30,000 jobs. 21 Kentucky, which has the third-highest
number of operating coal mines 22 and the secondhighest number of coal workers in the United States, 23
would be severely impacted by such a rule.
The substantial workforce reductions will be
paired with devastating increases in the cost of
electricity. 24 Currently, Kentucky relies on coal-fired
20
21
22
23
24
https://eec.ky.gov/Energy/KY%20Energy%20Profile/Kentucky
%20Energy%20Profile%202019.pdf.
Id.
Josh Bivens, A Comprehensive Analysis of the Employment
Impacts of the EPA’s Proposed Clean Power Plan, Economic
Policy
Institute
28
(Jun.
9,
2015),
https://files.epi.org/pdf/79246.pdf.
U.S. Energy Information Administration – Kentucky State
Profile and Energy Estimates, https://www.eia.gov/state/
?sid=KY#:~:text=Kentucky%20has%20two%20oil%20refinerie
s,Virginia%2C%20Wyoming%2C%20and%20Missouri
(last
visited May 19, 2021).
Kentucky Coal Facts, 2017, supra note 2, at 29.
EPA’s Clean Power Plan: An Economic Impact Analysis,
supra note 9, at 4 (estimating that consumers will pay an
additional $214 billion for electricity between 2022 and 2030
under the Plan). But see Fact Sheet: Clean Power Plan by the
Numbers, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2 (2017),
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
2015-08/documents/fs-cpp-by-the-numbers.pdf (claiming the
CPP would reduce electric bills by around seven dollars per
month by 2030).
14
plants for 73% of its power. 25 Under a scheme like the
CPP, electricity costs in Kentucky would increase
27.3%. 26 While Kentuckians currently spend, on
average, 3.4% of their household income on electricity,
a scheme like the CPP would raise that by almost a
full percent. 27 Industry analysts project that the
increased
burden
from
average
electricity
expenditures would be much larger for low-income
neighborhoods. 28 This is particularly concerning for
Kentucky, where about 16% of the population lives
below
the
poverty
line. 29
Kentucky’s
fifth
congressional district—encompassing coal mines that
produce about one-third of Kentucky’s coal 30—is the
second most impoverished congressional district in the
nation. 31 The district already has an average poverty
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
U.S. Energy Information Administration – Kentucky State
Profile and Energy Estimates, supra note 22.
EPA’s Clean Power Plan: An Economic Impact Analysis,
supra note 9, at 3.
Wayne Winegarden & Alexander Specht, The Clean Power
Plan’s Economic Impact by Income Group and Local Area,
Pacific Research Institute 45 (2016), https://www.pacificre
search.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CleanPowerPlan_Reg
ressivityReduction_Web.pdf.
Id. at 16.
Quick
Facts
–
Kentucky,
U.S.
Census
Bureau,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/KY/POP060210
(last visited May 19, 2021).
Kentucky Coal Facts, 2017, supra note 2, at 17.
Greg Giroux, Rich, poor, young, old: Congressional districts at
a
glance,
Bloomberg
Gov’t
(Sept.
15,
2017),
https://about.bgov.com/news/rich-poor-young-old-congression
al-districts-glance/.
15
rate of 28.2%, which is over twice the national
average. 32
Additionally, although there may be states that
can add or switch easily to alternative energy sources,
states that have been large coal producers—like
Kentucky—often have geographic limitations that
inhibit switching to these sources. In fact, Kentucky
would require the largest capital investment in new
power plants compared to every other state (estimated
at $5.63 billion) to compensate for the loss of coal. 33
This would be the case for a variety of reasons. For
example, coal is one of the most abundant natural
resources in Kentucky, and, as of 2011, over 80% of
the original resource had yet to be mined. 34 And
Kentucky’s topography and climate preclude the use of
wind power as a substitute for coal power. 35
These potential consequences reinforce why
Congress—rather than the EPA—should consider
issues relating to climate change and the power sector.
In Congress, the states have representatives who can
32
33
34
35
Congressional
District
5,
KY.,
Data
USA,
https://datausa.io/profile/geo/congressional-district-5-ky (last
visited May 19, 2021).
EPA’s Clean Power Plan: An Economic Impact Analysis,
supra note 9, at 7.
Kentucky Coal Facts, Kentucky Coal Association at i (2011),
https://eec.ky.gov/Energy/Coal%20Facts%20%20Annual%20E
ditions/Kentucky%20Coal%20Facts%20%2011th%20Edition%20 (2009-2010).pdf.
See, e.g., U.S. Energy Information Administration – Kentucky
State Profile and Energy Estimates, supra note 22
(“Kentucky has few wind resources suitable for developing
utility-scale power projects, and no commercial wind power
facilities have been built in the state.”).
16
advocate for their interests. Permitting the EPA to
“regulate” emissions to the extent that it can mandate
the restructuring of the power sector eliminates one of
the principle protections of our Republic: policy must
be made by Congress through bicameralism and
presentment. Requiring policy to be made in this
manner protects the interests of small states and
minorities by requiring a consensus. “Major
regulations and reforms either reflect a broad political
consensus, or they do not become law.” Am. Lung
Ass’n. v. EPA, 985 F.3d 914, 997 (D.C. Cir. 2021)
(Walker, J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgment, dissenting in part). In contrast, the lower
court’s decision means the EPA can pick winners and
losers within the power sector, disproportionately
burdening coal and coal-producing states like
Kentucky. This is not a decision that should be left to
administrative agencies that are unaccountable to the
electorate. States like Kentucky must have a voice in
such decisions.
17
CONCLUSION
The petition for certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
DANIEL CAMERON
Attorney General of
Kentucky
BARRY L. DUNN
Deputy Attorney
General
Office of the Kentucky
Attorney General
700 Capital Ave., Ste.118
Frankfort, KY 40601
(502) 696-5300
Chad.Meredith@ky.gov
S. CHAD MEREDITH
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.