Amicus Curiae Brief — West Virginia, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

Supreme Court briefJun 3, 2021

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No. 20-1530

In the Supreme Court of the United States

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

AND MICHAEL REGAN, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

DANIEL CAMERON

Attorney General of

Kentucky

BARRY L. DUNN

Deputy Attorney

General

Office of the Kentucky

Attorney General

700 Capital Ave., Ste.118

Frankfort, KY 40601

(502) 696-5300

Chad.Meredith@ky.gov

S. CHAD MEREDITH

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..........................................ii

STATEMENT OF INTEREST ...................................... 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .............................. 2

ARGUMENT .................................................................. 3

I. The EPA lacks authority to restructure the

power sector .............................................................. 3

A. Whether the power sector should be

restructured to address climate change is a

major question that Congress has not

delegated to the EPA .......................................... 4

B. This Court’s decision in Massachusetts v.

EPA did not give the EPA carte blanche

authority to regulate all emissions, much

less the ability to restructure the nation’s

power sector ........................................................ 9

II. Allowing the EPA to mandate generation

shifting disproportionately burdens some states

without the protection of the political process ...... 12

CONCLUSION ............................................................ 17

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Am. Lung Ass’n. v. EPA,

985 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2021) .............................. 9, 16

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120 (2000) ................................ 4, 8, 9, 10, 11

Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst.,

448 U.S. 607 (1980) .................................................... 4

Massachusetts v. EPA,

549 U.S. 497 (2007) .................................... 2, 9, 10, 12

MCI Telecommunications Corp., v. American

Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994) ...... 8

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.

Conservation & Dev. Comm’n,

461 U.S. 190 (1983) .................................................... 7

Util. Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,

573 U.S. 302 (2014) .............................................. 4, 12

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES

U.S. Const. art. I ............................................................ 3

42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) .................................................... 7

42 U.S.C. § 7411(b) ........................................................ 7

42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(5) .................................................... 8

iii

42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) .................................................... 7

REGULATIONS

80 Fed. Reg. 64661 (Oct. 23, 2015).......................... 6, 10

83 Fed. Reg. 44746 (Aug. 31, 2018)............................... 5

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Josh Bivens, A Comprehensive Analysis of the

Employment Impacts of the EPA’s Proposed

Clean Power Plan, Economic Policy Institute

(Jun. 9, 2015) ............................................................ 13

Cong. Research Serv., R44922, The U.S. Coal

Industry: Historical Trends and Recent

Developments (2017) ................................................ 12

Congress Climate History, Center for Climate and

Energy Solutions ........................................................ 3

Congressional District 5, KY., Data USA ................... 15

David Marshall Coover III, Square Pegs and

Round Holes: Why the Environmental Protection

Agency’s New Section 111 Greenhouse Gas

Regulations Do Not Fit With Supreme Court

Precedent or Congressional Intent in the Clean

Air Act, 45 Tex. Envtl. L.J. 1 (2015) ........................ 10

Electricity in the United States, U.S. Energy

Information Administration .................................... 11

iv

EPA’s Clean Power Plan: An Economic Impact

Analysis, Energy Ventures Analysis (Nov. 13,

2015).......................................................... 5, 13, 14, 15

Fact Sheet: Clean Power Plan by the Numbers,

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2017) ....... 13

Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency ......................... 4, 6

Greg Giroux, Rich, poor, young, old: Congressional

districts at a glance, Bloomberg Gov’t (Sept. 15,

2017).......................................................................... 14

Kentucky Coal Facts, Kentucky Coal Association

(2011) ........................................................................ 15

Kentucky Coal Facts, Kentucky Energy and

Environment Cabinet (2017).......................... 1, 13, 14

Kentucky Energy Profile, Kentucky Energy and

Environment Cabinet Office of Energy Policy

(2019) ........................................................................ 12

Naveena Sadasivam, Kentucky May Accidentally

Comply With EPA’s Clean Power Plan, Inside

Climate News (May 26, 2015) .................................. 11

Herman K. Trabish, Most states on track to meet

EPA Clean Power Plan, but political & legal

contention remains, Utility Dive (Jun. 16, 2015) .... 11

Quick Facts – Kentucky, U.S. Census Bureau ............ 14

v

U.S. Energy Information Administration –

Kentucky State Profile and Energy Estimates

....................................................................... 13, 14, 15

Adam Vaughn, Obama’s Clean Power Plan Hailed

as US’s Strongest Ever Climate Action, The

Guardian (Aug. 5, 2015) ............................................. 5

Wayne Winegarden & Alexander Specht, The

Clean Power Plan’s Economic Impact by Income

Group and Local Area, Pacific Research Institute

(2016) ........................................................................ 14

1

STATEMENT OF INTEREST 1

This case will determine the future of the coal

industry in Kentucky and elsewhere. The decision

below by the D.C. Circuit permits the Environmental

Protection Agency to reshape the nation’s power sector

by mandating emissions standards that will be

extraordinarily difficult—if not impossible—for

Kentucky’s coal-fired power plants to meet. That

decision—and its empowerment of the EPA to try to

eliminate coal—should not stand.

Coal is under attack. It has been for some time.

The D.C. Circuit’s decision permits the EPA to

continue this assault through unrealistic emissions

standards. If such standards endure, coal-fired power

plants cannot comply without limiting their

operations, shutting down, or investing in EPApreferred alternative energy. The war on coal has

already limited the operations of Kentucky’s coal

industry. The industry has shrunk by over 10,000 jobs

and 300 million tons in 20 years. 2 And it cannot

subsidize investment in the alternative sources that

the EPA prefers because such sources are not viable in

Kentucky’s coal communities.

A continued decline of the coal industry will

have devastating economic consequences. It will

1

2

Amicus has timely notified counsel for all parties of its intent

to file this brief. Sup. Ct. Rules 37.2(a), 37.4.

Kentucky Coal Facts, Kentucky Energy and Environment

Cabinet 9–14 (2017), https://eec.ky.gov/Energy/Coal%20

Facts%20%20Annual%20Editions/Kentucky%20Coal%20Fact

s%20-%2017th%20Edition%20(2017).pdf

[hereinafter

Kentucky Coal Facts, 2017].

2

increase the electricity rates in some of the nation’s

poorest regions. It will decrease the number of goodpaying jobs in those regions. It will deprive those

communities of tax revenue essential for their schools,

infrastructure, and emergency responders. And all this

will happen without allowing citizens from Kentucky

and other coal-producing states, through their elected

representatives, to have a say in the matter. For these

reasons, Kentucky has a strong interest in ensuring

that a critical component of the nation’s power sector

is not harmed because of the D.C. Circuit’s

misinterpretation of EPA authority.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Although portrayed as a simple extension of

Massachusetts v. EPA, the lower court’s decision does

what Congress never authorized by granting the EPA

unfettered authority to address climate change. As the

Clean Power Plan (“CPP”) demonstrated, the EPA—if

not properly constrained—will commandeer the Clean

Air Act to restructure the power sector by effectively

eliminating entire industries.

Such authority does not belong to the EPA. This

Court has never said that the EPA may regulate

emissions by reshaping how the nation’s power

demand is met or by selecting certain industries for

favorable treatment and others for elimination.

Decisions regarding climate change and the power

sector are major policy questions with vast economic

and political significance that should be handled by

Congress, where the people have a voice.

3

The significant and harmful impact of allowing

the EPA to restructure the power sector by greatly

reducing—possibly

even

eliminating—coal

is

exemplified by Kentucky and other similarly-situated

states who would bear the disproportionate burden.

ARGUMENT

I. The EPA lacks authority to restructure the

power sector.

This case is about who gets to make climatechange policy. Congress has the sole authority to

legislate. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. Yet agency

rulemaking like the CPP demonstrates a rejection of

this foundational principle. Agency rulemaking cannot

be a substitute for Congressional legislative action;

that Congress has been unable or unwilling to pass

climate-change legislation3 does not mean the EPA

may make climate-change policy in its stead. The

significance of climate-change policy indicates it falls

within the purview of Congress’ power, and unless

Congress delegates the authority to the EPA, the EPA

may not act.

3

See Congress Climate History, Center for Climate and Energy

Solutions,

https://www.c2es.org/content/congress-climatehistory/ (last visited May 24, 2021) (providing a history of

major climate change legislation and detailing failed

attempts, including the Cap and Trade legislation that passed

in the House (H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009)), but failed in the

Senate).

4

A. Whether the power sector should be

restructured to address climate change is

a major question that Congress has not

delegated to the EPA.

It is Congress that must make the “critical

policy decisions.” Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am.

Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980). Therefore,

Congress must “speak clearly if it wishes to assign to

an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political

significance.’” Util. Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573

U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (quoting FDA v. Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160); see also

Indus. Union Dept., 448 U.S. at 687 (Rehnquist, J.,

concurring in the judgment) (stating that the “filling

in of the blanks” can be left to the agencies, but the

“elected representatives of the people” must make the

“hard choices”). Here, the EPA sought to make

decisions of such significance without a clear

assignment from Congress.

According to the EPA, it promulgated the CPP

because it believed climate change was a significant

issue. At the time, the EPA asserted that “[c]limate

change is one of the greatest environmental and public

health challenges we face.” 4 It further declared:

“Taking action now is critical. Reducing CO2 emissions

from power plants, and driving investment in clean

energy technologies strategies that do so, is an

4

Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency, 19january2017snapshot.e

pa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-plan_

.html (last visited May 19, 2021).

5

essential step in lessening the impacts of climate

change and providing a more certain future for our

health, our environment, and future generations.” 5 In

announcing the CPP, Brian Deese, an advisor to then

President Obama, asserted that the CPP represented

the “biggest step that any single president has made to

curb the carbon pollution that is fueling climate

change.” 6

Indeed, it was a big step that would have had

significant consequences had it not been later repealed

and replaced by the Affordable Clean Energy Rule. 7

Industry analysts projected that under the CPP’s

generation-shifting 8 strategy, wholesale electricity

costs would have increased by $214 billion. 9

Additionally, the power industry projected that it

would have had to spend $64 billion to replace the

capacity lost from coal-fired power plants. 10 The EPA’s

5

6

7

8

9

10

Id.

Adam Vaughn, Obama’s Clean Power Plan Hailed as US’s

Strongest Ever Climate Action, The Guardian (Aug. 5, 2015),

https://ourworld.unu.edu/en/obamas-clean-power-plan-hailedas-uss-strongest-ever-climate-action.

Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From

Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to

Emission Guideline Implementing Regulations; Revisions to

New Source Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44746 (Aug. 31,

2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60).

The phrases “generation shifting” and “power generation

shifting” refer to the CPP’s mandated shift away from energy

sources with higher carbon to lower carbon sources like

natural gas and renewables.

EPA’s Clean Power Plan: An Economic Impact Analysis,

Energy

Ventures

Analysis

4

(Nov.

13,

2015),

https://nma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/11.13.15-NMA_

EPAs-Clean-Power-Plan-An-Economic-Impact-Analysis.pdf.

Id. at 6.

6

own projections predicted that upward of 31,000 jobs

would be lost as a result of schemes like the CPP. 11

The EPA justified these costs and job losses

with the “important benefits” to health and the

climate expected to result from the CPP. 12 However,

the EPA cannot simply sidestep the major question

doctrine by conducting an analysis of costs, non-air

impacts, and energy requirements. Rather, the EPA’s

cost-benefit analysis for the CPP demonstrates the

vast significance of the issue by highlighting what is at

stake if the EPA is allowed to assert such sweeping

authority. The massive price tag and far-reaching

economic impacts make it obvious that the EPA

cannot act on such a major issue without clear

authority from Congress.

Congress, however, did not manifest clear intent

to give the EPA this authority—including to

restructure the nation’s power sector—when it enacted

42 U.S.C. § 7411. Section 7411 provides that “the

Administrator shall publish proposed regulations,

establishing Federal standards of performance” for

new stationary sources that “cause[], or contribute[]

significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be

11

12

Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary

Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg.

64661, 64682 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.

60). The EPA estimated a net decrease of 31,000 to 34,000

“job-years” by 2030. According to the EPA, a “job-year is not

an individual job; rather a job-year is the amount of work

performed by the equivalent of one full-time individual for

one year. For example, 20 job-years may represent 20 fulltime jobs or 40 half-time jobs.”

Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, supra note 4.

7

anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42

U.S.C. § 7411(b). For existing sources, § 7411

mandates collaboration between the EPA and the

States, 13 and calls for the Administrator to “prescribe

regulations . . . under which each state shall submit to

the Administrator a plan” establishing “standards of

performance” and providing for “implementation and

enforcement.” 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1). The statute

defines a “standard of performance” as:

a standard for emissions of air pollutants

which reflects the degree of emission

limitation

achievable

through

the

application of the best system of emission

reduction which (taking into account the

cost of achieving such reduction and any

nonair quality health and environmental

impact and energy requirements) the

Administrator determines has been

adequately demonstrated.

42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).

Congress would not have given the EPA

authority to restructure the power sector “in so cryptic

13

Historically, states have had control over the generation of

electricity. “Need for new power facilities, their economic

feasibility, and rates and services, are areas that have been

characteristically governed by the States.” Pac. Gas & Elec.

Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461

U.S. 190, 205 (1983). Except for the authority of the Federal

Energy Regulatory Commission over the need for and pricing

of electrical power transmitted in interstate commerce,

“economic aspects of electrical generation have been

regulated for many years and in great detail by the states.”

Id. at 206.

8

a fashion.” See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160.

In MCI Telecommunications Corp., v. American

Telephone

&

Telegraph

Co.,

the

Federal

Communications Commission contended that because

Congress had statutorily given it the discretion to

“modify any requirement” imposed under the statute,

it possessed the authority to render voluntary certain

requirements that were otherwise mandatory. 512

U.S. 218, 225 (1994). This Court disagreed and

concluded that it “is highly unlikely that Congress

would leave the determination of whether an industry

will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated

to agency discretion . . . .” Id. at 231. Similarly, given

that § 7411 does not even authorize the Administrator

to require a new or modified source of pollution to

“install and operate any particular technological

system of continuous emission reduction to comply

with any . . . standard of performance,” 42 U.S.C.

§ 7411(b)(5), it is highly unlikely that Congress

intended for the EPA to wield § 7411(d) to take actions

that might have the effect of eliminating entire

industries from the power grid.

The EPA cannot simply claim authority to seize

control of the power sector; if Congress wants the EPA

to address climate change by radically restructuring

the power sector, it must say so clearly. Nothing in

§ 7411 demonstrates that intent by Congress.

9

B. This Court’s decision in Massachusetts v.

EPA did not give the EPA carte blanche

authority to regulate all emissions, much

less the ability to restructure the nation’s

power sector.

In rejecting the assertion that the CPP had to

be repealed because it was outside the scope of the

EPA’s congressionally granted authority, the lower

court relied on this Court’s decision in Massachusetts

v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). In that case, this Court

held that the Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to

regulate new motor vehicle emissions if the EPA forms

a judgment that such emissions endanger public

health or welfare by contributing to climate change.

Id. at 529–533. This Court further opined that the

“broad language of § 202(a)(1) reflect[ed] an

intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to

forestall . . . obsolescence” in the face of “changing

circumstances and scientific developments.” Id. at 532.

The lower court now asserts that the same flexibility

should be found in § 7411, thereby giving the EPA

authority to restructure the nation’s power sector. Am.

Lung Ass’n. v. EPA, 985 F.3d 914, 947 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

Yet, regulating with the effect of potentially

eliminating entire power sources from the U.S. power

sector is an extreme measure that would overextend

the authority recognized in Massachusetts v. EPA. In

Massachusetts, this Court contrasted the regulation of

emissions from motor vehicles with the “extreme

measures,” 549 U.S. at 531, taken by the Federal Drug

Administration in FDA v. Brown & Williamson

10

Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). This Court held in

Brown & Williamson that the FDA’s classification of

tobacco products as “drugs” or “devices” was outside

the agency’s authority because it was “unlikely that

Congress meant to ban tobacco products, which the

FDCA would have required had such products been

[thus] classified . . . .” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 531

(citing Brown & Williamson, at 135–37). In contrast,

EPA jurisdiction over greenhouse gas emissions from

motor vehicles would lead to “no such extreme

measures” because the “EPA would only regulate

emissions . . . .” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 531

(emphasis in original).

A power-generation-shifting strategy, like the

CPP, would be much more akin to the “extreme

measures” in Brown & Williamson than the mere

regulation of emissions in Massachusetts. After all, the

CPP would have dictated a nationwide change in how

and where electricity is produced, amounting to a

massive expansion of authority compared to regulating

carbon emissions at their source. The final CPP

required carbon emissions in the United States to be

reduced by 32% by 2030. 14 According to the EPA, this

drastic cut in carbon emissions could be accomplished

through power generation shifting—i.e., moving from

energy sources with higher carbon to lower carbon

sources like natural gas or renewables. 15 The result

14

15

80 Fed. Reg., supra note 11, at 64736.

See David Marshall Coover III, Square Pegs and Round

Holes: Why the Environmental Protection Agency’s New

Section 111 Greenhouse Gas Regulations Do Not Fit With

Supreme Court Precedent or Congressional Intent in the Clean

11

would have been the severely reduced operation, if not

the complete closure, of coal-fired power plants. 16 This

would be a significant change to the U.S. power grid,

which currently relies on coal-fired generation for

almost one-fifth of its power. 17 Yet, the lower court

asserted that the statutory authority given to the EPA

to identify the best system of emission reduction could

extend to such a plan.

Any EPA decision that incorporates generation

shifting, resulting in the elimination of some

industries from the power sector, is little different

than the extreme measures taken by the FDA in

Brown & Williamson. Mandatory generation shifting

is not a natural extension of the EPA’s authority

16

17

Air Act, 45 Tex. Envtl. L.J. 1, 24 (2015) (arguing this

represented a novel approach for the EPA’s selection of the

best system of emission reduction because while the EPA’s

past emission guidelines were based on systems available at

the affected source, the EPA newly asserted that the “highly

interconnected and integrated nature” of the power sector

allowed it to set emission caps that would require steps

beyond each affected source).

See Herman K. Trabish, Most states on track to meet EPA

Clean Power Plan, but political & legal contention remains,

Utility Dive (Jun. 16, 2015), https://www.utilitydive.com/

news/most-states-on-track-to-meet-epa-clean-power-plan-butpolitical-legal-co/400407/ (asserting that states can meet

emission standard goals by closing coal plants); see also

Naveena Sadasivam, Kentucky May Accidentally Comply

With EPA’s Clean Power Plan, Inside Climate News (May 26,

2015),

https://insideclimatenews.org/news/26052015/kent

ucky-may-accidentally-comply-epa-clean-power-plan-coal/

(noting that even the 18% cut in the proposed rule would

likely require “retiring coal plants” in Kentucky).

Electricity in the United States, U.S. Energy Information

Administration, https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electric

ity/electricity-in-the-us.php (last updated Mar. 18, 2021).

12

described by this Court in Massachusetts. An

interpretation that “would bring about an enormous

and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory

authority without clear congressional authorization” is

unreasonable. Util. Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573

U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (allowing the EPA to require

utilization of best-available control technology by

emission sources already subject to review, but not

permitting the EPA to “lay[] claim to extravagant

statutory authority over the national economy”). The

Court should take this opportunity to clarify that in

Massachusetts it was not indicating that the EPA’s

authority would include extreme measures like

restructuring the power sector.

II. Allowing the EPA to mandate generation

shifting disproportionately burdens some

states without the protection of the political

process.

Mandated generation shifting forces some states

to bear the disproportionate burden of addressing

climate change. The majority of coal reserves in the

United States—70%—is concentrated in five states:

Wyoming, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and

Kentucky. 18 Coal-powered electricity stimulates

economic growth in these states by lowering the costs

of doing business. 19 Because of coal, in 2019 Kentucky

18

19

Cong. Research Serv., R44922, The U.S. Coal Industry:

Historical Trends and Recent Developments 3 (2017).

Kentucky Energy Profile, Kentucky Energy and Environment

Cabinet

Office

of

Energy

Policy

2

(2019),

13

offered the seventh-lowest industrial electricity prices

in the United States and the lowest east of the

Mississippi River. 20 Any rule like the CPP, which

effectively mandates a shift away from coal power,

would place a disproportionate burden on these states

and stifle economic growth. For example, the EPA

estimated the reduction in coal-fired electricity

production under the CPP would lead to a loss of over

30,000 jobs. 21 Kentucky, which has the third-highest

number of operating coal mines 22 and the secondhighest number of coal workers in the United States, 23

would be severely impacted by such a rule.

The substantial workforce reductions will be

paired with devastating increases in the cost of

electricity. 24 Currently, Kentucky relies on coal-fired

20

21

22

23

24

https://eec.ky.gov/Energy/KY%20Energy%20Profile/Kentucky

%20Energy%20Profile%202019.pdf.

Id.

Josh Bivens, A Comprehensive Analysis of the Employment

Impacts of the EPA’s Proposed Clean Power Plan, Economic

Policy

Institute

28

(Jun.

9,

2015),

https://files.epi.org/pdf/79246.pdf.

U.S. Energy Information Administration – Kentucky State

Profile and Energy Estimates, https://www.eia.gov/state/

?sid=KY#:~:text=Kentucky%20has%20two%20oil%20refinerie

s,Virginia%2C%20Wyoming%2C%20and%20Missouri

(last

visited May 19, 2021).

Kentucky Coal Facts, 2017, supra note 2, at 29.

EPA’s Clean Power Plan: An Economic Impact Analysis,

supra note 9, at 4 (estimating that consumers will pay an

additional $214 billion for electricity between 2022 and 2030

under the Plan). But see Fact Sheet: Clean Power Plan by the

Numbers, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2 (2017),

https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/files/

2015-08/documents/fs-cpp-by-the-numbers.pdf (claiming the

CPP would reduce electric bills by around seven dollars per

month by 2030).

14

plants for 73% of its power. 25 Under a scheme like the

CPP, electricity costs in Kentucky would increase

27.3%. 26 While Kentuckians currently spend, on

average, 3.4% of their household income on electricity,

a scheme like the CPP would raise that by almost a

full percent. 27 Industry analysts project that the

increased

burden

from

average

electricity

expenditures would be much larger for low-income

neighborhoods. 28 This is particularly concerning for

Kentucky, where about 16% of the population lives

below

the

poverty

line. 29

Kentucky’s

fifth

congressional district—encompassing coal mines that

produce about one-third of Kentucky’s coal 30—is the

second most impoverished congressional district in the

nation. 31 The district already has an average poverty

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

U.S. Energy Information Administration – Kentucky State

Profile and Energy Estimates, supra note 22.

EPA’s Clean Power Plan: An Economic Impact Analysis,

supra note 9, at 3.

Wayne Winegarden & Alexander Specht, The Clean Power

Plan’s Economic Impact by Income Group and Local Area,

Pacific Research Institute 45 (2016), https://www.pacificre

search.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CleanPowerPlan_Reg

ressivityReduction_Web.pdf.

Id. at 16.

Quick

Facts

–

Kentucky,

U.S.

Census

Bureau,

https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/KY/POP060210

(last visited May 19, 2021).

Kentucky Coal Facts, 2017, supra note 2, at 17.

Greg Giroux, Rich, poor, young, old: Congressional districts at

a

glance,

Bloomberg

Gov’t

(Sept.

15,

2017),

https://about.bgov.com/news/rich-poor-young-old-congression

al-districts-glance/.

15

rate of 28.2%, which is over twice the national

average. 32

Additionally, although there may be states that

can add or switch easily to alternative energy sources,

states that have been large coal producers—like

Kentucky—often have geographic limitations that

inhibit switching to these sources. In fact, Kentucky

would require the largest capital investment in new

power plants compared to every other state (estimated

at $5.63 billion) to compensate for the loss of coal. 33

This would be the case for a variety of reasons. For

example, coal is one of the most abundant natural

resources in Kentucky, and, as of 2011, over 80% of

the original resource had yet to be mined. 34 And

Kentucky’s topography and climate preclude the use of

wind power as a substitute for coal power. 35

These potential consequences reinforce why

Congress—rather than the EPA—should consider

issues relating to climate change and the power sector.

In Congress, the states have representatives who can

32

33

34

35

Congressional

District

5,

KY.,

Data

USA,

https://datausa.io/profile/geo/congressional-district-5-ky (last

visited May 19, 2021).

EPA’s Clean Power Plan: An Economic Impact Analysis,

supra note 9, at 7.

Kentucky Coal Facts, Kentucky Coal Association at i (2011),

https://eec.ky.gov/Energy/Coal%20Facts%20%20Annual%20E

ditions/Kentucky%20Coal%20Facts%20%2011th%20Edition%20 (2009-2010).pdf.

See, e.g., U.S. Energy Information Administration – Kentucky

State Profile and Energy Estimates, supra note 22

(“Kentucky has few wind resources suitable for developing

utility-scale power projects, and no commercial wind power

facilities have been built in the state.”).

16

advocate for their interests. Permitting the EPA to

“regulate” emissions to the extent that it can mandate

the restructuring of the power sector eliminates one of

the principle protections of our Republic: policy must

be made by Congress through bicameralism and

presentment. Requiring policy to be made in this

manner protects the interests of small states and

minorities by requiring a consensus. “Major

regulations and reforms either reflect a broad political

consensus, or they do not become law.” Am. Lung

Ass’n. v. EPA, 985 F.3d 914, 997 (D.C. Cir. 2021)

(Walker, J., concurring in part, concurring in

judgment, dissenting in part). In contrast, the lower

court’s decision means the EPA can pick winners and

losers within the power sector, disproportionately

burdening coal and coal-producing states like

Kentucky. This is not a decision that should be left to

administrative agencies that are unaccountable to the

electorate. States like Kentucky must have a voice in

such decisions.

17

CONCLUSION

The petition for certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

DANIEL CAMERON

Attorney General of

Kentucky

BARRY L. DUNN

Deputy Attorney

General

Office of the Kentucky

Attorney General

700 Capital Ave., Ste.118

Frankfort, KY 40601

(502) 696-5300

Chad.Meredith@ky.gov

S. CHAD MEREDITH

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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