Amicus Curiae Brief — Leslie Rutledge, Attorney General of Arkansas, et al., Petitioners v. Little Rock Family Planning Services, et al.
Supreme Court briefMay 13, 2021
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No. 20-1434
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
LESLIE RUTLEDGE, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
LITTLE ROCK FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES, ET AL.,
Respondents.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
BRIEF OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI AND
TWENTY-ONE OTHER STATES AS AMICI
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
ERIC S. SCHMITT
Missouri Attorney General
D. JOHN SAUER
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
JEFF P. JOHNSON
Deputy Solicitor General
OFFICE OF THE MISSOURI
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court Building
P.O. Box 899
Jefferson City, MO 65102
(573) 751-3321
John.Sauer@ago.mo.gov
Counsel for Amici Curiae
(Additional Counsel listed on signature page)
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ...............................1
ARGUMENT ...............................................................3
I.
Arkansas’s Prohibition Against Aborting
Unborn Children Solely Because They May
Have Down Syndrome Satisfies Any Level of
Constitutional Scrutiny .............................3
A. Arkansas’s law advances at least eight
compelling state interests .....................4
B. Arkansas’s law is narrowly tailored ... 14
II.
Arkansas’s Prohibition Against Down
Syndrome Abortions Is Not Per Se Invalid
Under Casey ............................................. 16
CONCLUSION ....................................................22
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte,
481 U.S. 537 (1987) ..................................................4
Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections,
137 S. Ct. 788 (2017) .............................................. 19
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574 (1983) .............................................. 4, 5
Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. and Ky.,
139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019) .......................... 2, 4, 5, 10, 16
Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942) ................................................ 19
FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund,
513 U.S. 88 (1994) .................................................. 17
Fisher v. University of Texas,
136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) ............................................ 19
Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124 (2004) .................. 10, 11, 14, 18, 21, 22
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964) ..................................................4
Illinois v. Lidster,
540 U.S. 419 (2004) ................................................ 17
Johnson v. California,
543 U.S. 499 (2005) ................................................ 19
iii
Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77 (1949) .................................................. 19
Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343 (1996) ................................................ 17
Little Rock Fam. Plan. Servs. v. Rutledge,
984 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2021) ....................................3
Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of
Ind. State Dep’t of Health,
917 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2018) .................................. 16
Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, Inc. v.
Comm’r of Indiana State Dep’t of Health,
888 F.3d 300 (7th Cir.) ................. 3, 9, 13, 14, 15, 19
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) .......................... 4, 17, 18, 19, 20
Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes,
940 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2019) .................................. 18
Preterm-Cleveland v. McCloud,
994 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. April 13, 2021) ....................3
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609 (1984) ..................................................4
Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) ................................................ 17
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
523 U.S. 83 (1998) .................................................. 17
iv
United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc.,
344 U.S. 33 (1952) .................................................. 17
Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702 (1997) .......................................... 10, 21
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,
575 U.S 433 (2015) ................................................. 19
Statutes
29 U.S.C. § 794 ............................................................4
42 U.S.C. § 12132 ........................................................4
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3603.02 ......................................2
Ark. Code Ann. 20-16-2102 .........................................3
Ark. Code Ann. § 20-16-2103(a) ................................ 15
HB 1110, 96th Leg. Sess. (S.D. 2021) ........................2
Ind. Code § 16-34-4-6 ..................................................2
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.731(2)(c) ......................................2
La. Rev. Stat. § 40:1061.1.2 ........................................2
Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-407.......................................2
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.038.1(6) .................................... 12
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.038.2 .................................... 2, 13
N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.1-04 ......................................2
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.10(B).......................................2
v
SD Stat. § 34-23A-90 ...................................................3
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-217 ......................................3
Utah Code § 76-7-302.4 ...............................................3
Other Authorities
AM. COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS,
COMMITTEE OPINION NO. 393: NEWBORN SCREENING
(2007) ....................................................................... 7
Peter A. Benn & Audrey R. Chapman, Practical and
Ethical Considerations of Noninvasive Prenatal
Diagnosis,
301 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2154, 2155 (2009) ............ 13
Remi Bertrand, Parents’ Perspective on Having a
Child with Down Syndrome in France,
179A AM. J. MED. GENET. 770, 781 (2019) ........... 10
LD Bryant, et al., Descriptive Information About
Down Syndrome: a Content Analysis of Serum
Screening Leaflets, PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 1057–63
(Dec. 2001) .............................................................. 9
Arthur L. Caplan, Chloe’s Law: A Powerful
Legislative Movement Challenging a Core Ethical
Norm of Genetic Testing, PLOS BIOLOGY 13(8)
(Aug. 2015) .......................................................... 6, 9
Alexandra DeSanctis, Iceland Eliminates People with
Down Syndrome, NATIONAL REVIEW
(Aug. 16, 2017) ........................................................ 9
vi
Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in
the Special-Care Nursery, 289 N. ENG. J. MED. 89
(Oct. 1973) ............................................................... 5
Gabriel Fernandez, Amy Bockerstette to Become First
Person with Down Syndrome to Compete in College
National Championship, CBS SPORTS.COM
(May 5, 2021) .......................................................... 2
Michael A. Grodin, et al., The Nazi Physicians as
Leaders in Eugenics and “Euthanasia”: Lessons for
Today, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 53–57
(Jan. 2018) ............................................................ 11
A. Guibilini, et al., After-Birth Abortion: Why Should
the Baby Live?, 39 J. OF MED. ETHICS 261-63
(2013) .................................................................... 12
Guttmacher Institute, State Legislation Tracker:
Abortion Due to Genetic Anomaly Banned (visited
May 5, 2021) ........................................................... 3
Sujatha Jesudason et al., Sex Selection in America:
Why It Persists and How We Can Change It, THE
ATLANTIC (May 31, 2012) .................................. 11
J. Johnston, et al., Supporting Women’s Autonomy in
Prenatal Testing, N. ENG. J. MED. 505–507
(Aug. 2017) .............................................................. 7
Lauren Knight, On Her Way: Grace’s Bus Stop, ST.
LOUIS MAGAZINE (March 21, 2014) ....................... 14
vii
KL Lawson, et al., The Portrayal of Down Syndrome
in Prenatal Screening Information Pamphlets, 34 J.
OBST. & GYN. CANADA 760–768 (Aug. 2012) ........ 14
Harry J. Lieman, M.D., et al., Sex Selection for
Family Balancing, AMA JOURNAL OF ETHICS
(2014) .................................................................... 11
Heidi Lindh et al., Characteristics and Perspectives of
Families Waiting to Adopt a Child with Down
Syndrome, GENETICS IN MED. (April 2007) ............ 9
Rita L. Marker et al., Euthanasia: a Historical
Overview, MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 2(2)
257–298 (1991) ...................................................... 11
T. Marteau, et al., Counseling Following Diagnosis of
a Fetal Abnormality: the Differing Approaches of
Obstetricians, Clinical Geneticists, and Genetic
Nurses, 31 J. MED. GENETICS 864–867
(Nov. 1994) .............................................................. 8
Martin J. McCaffery, Trisomy 13 and 18: Selecting
the road not previously taken, 172 AM. J. OF MED.
GENETICS, COMMENTARY, SEMINARS IN MEDICAL
GENETICS (Aug. 13, 2016) ....................................... 6
Linda McCabe, et al., Call for Change in Prenatal
Counseling for Down Syndrome, 158A AM. J. OF
MED. GENETICS 482, 482 (Feb. 7, 2012) ................. 8
Jenny McCoy, Chris Nikic Wants to Be the First
Ironman Finisher with Down Syndrome, RUNNER’S
WORLD (updated Nov. 7, 2020) ........................... 1, 2
viii
Pet., Infant Doe v. Bloomington Hosp., et al., at 8
(No. 83-437), denied 104 S. Ct. 394
(Nov. 7, 1983) .......................................................... 5
CD Roberts, et al., The Role of Genetic Counseling in
the Elective Termination of Pregnancies Involving
Fetuses with Disabilities, 36 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 48–
55 (Spring 2002) ..................................................... 7
Kate Santich, Maitland Triathlete Chris Nikic 1st
Person With Down Syndrome to Finish Ironman,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Nov. 9, 2020) ......................... 1
Marsha Saxton, Disability Rights and Selective
Abortion, in ABORTION WARS: A HALF CENTURY OF
STRUGGLE: 1950 TO 2000 (1998) ............................ 14
Peter Singer, Pulling Back the Curtain on the Mercy
Killing of Newborns, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 11, 2005) ...................................................... 12
Brian Skotko, et al., Family Perspectives about Down
Syndrome, AM. J. MED. GENETICS ANNUAL 930–41
(Apr. 2016) .............................................................. 9
Testimony of Frank Stephens, Down Syndrome:
Update on the State of the Science & Potential for
Discoveries Across Other Major Diseases Before the
H. Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Servs.,
and Ed. Comm. on Appropriations, at 2
(Oct. 25, 2017) ........................................... 12, 13, 14
ix
Kurt Streeter, Chris Nikic, You Are an Ironman. And
Your Journey Is Remarkable, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 16, 2020) ...................................................... 21
Michelle Sie Whitten, The Story of Two Syndromes,
Global Down Syndrome Foundation (available at
https://bit.ly/3vOaXIs) ........................................ 5, 6
George Will, The Real Down Syndrome Problem:
Accepting Genocide, WASH. POST
(March 14, 2018) ..................................................... 7
1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
On November 7, 2020, Chris Nikic became the first
person with Down syndrome to complete an Ironman
triathlon. The Ironman is a punishing test of physical
endurance, involving a 2.4-mile swim, 112-mile bike
ride, and a full marathon, completed consecutively
within a limited time. Jenny McCoy, Chris Nikic
Wants to Be the First Ironman Finisher with Down
Syndrome, RUNNER’S WORLD (updated Nov. 7, 2020).
Chris’s father said, “From the time he was born, we
were told by everyone that he’d never do anything or
amount to anything or be able to accomplish anything
beyond being able to tie his own shoes.” Kate Santich,
Maitland Triathlete Chris Nikic 1st Person With
Down Syndrome to Finish Ironman, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (Nov. 9, 2020). “The doctors and experts
said I couldn’t do anything,” Chris told a reporter after
his triumph. “So I said, ‘Doctor! Experts! You need
to stop doing this to me. You’re wrong!’” Id.
In 2018, Amy Bockerstette became the first person
with Down syndrome to receive an athletic
scholarship to college. A golfer from Arizona, she rose
to international fame when she played alongside Gary
Woodland at a Special Olympics event. Before sinking
a putt for par on one of the most famed holes in golf,
hole 16 at TPC Scottsdale, Amy said, “yeah, I got this.”
The video of her putt and optimistic demeanor
garnered over 43 million views on social media
platforms. On May 10, 2021, Amy “will make history
… as she becomes the first person with Down
syndrome to compete in a national collegiate athletic
1 All counsel of record received timely notice of the intent
to file this amicus brief under Rule 37.2.
2
championship,
the
NJCAA
golf
national
championship.” Gabriel Fernandez, Amy Bockerstette
to Become First Person with Down Syndrome to
Compete in College National Championship, CBS
SPORTS.COM (May 5, 2021).
The inspiration Chris Nikic and Amy Bockerstette
provides is irreplaceable.
People with Down
syndrome add unique joy, beauty, and diversity to our
society. Yet the abortion of children with Down
syndrome approaches genocidal levels, threatening
the Down syndrome community with complete
elimination. “[A]bortion is an act rife with the
potential for eugenic manipulation.” Box v. Planned
Parenthood of Ind. and Ky., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1787
(2019) (Thomas, J., concurring). All States share
Arkansas’s compelling interest in preventing the
eradication of people with Down syndrome through
the practice of eugenic abortion.
Amici curiae are the States of Missouri, Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and West
Virginia. Amici have a strong interest in protecting
their own Down syndrome populations and
preventing the extermination of people with Down
syndrome from society. At least eleven States have
enacted laws similar to Arkansas’s law to protect
disabled communities from eugenic abortion. See Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 188.038.2; 2021 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 286,
§ 2 (amending Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3603.02); Ind.
Code § 16-34-4-6; N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.1-04; Ohio
Rev. Code § 2919.10(B); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.731(2)(c);
La. Rev. Stat. § 40:1061.1.2; Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41407; HB 1110, 96th Leg. Sess. (S.D. 2021) (enacted
3
and codified at SD Stat. § 34-23A-90 (eff. July 1,
2021)); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-217; Utah Code § 767-302.4. Similar legislation is under consideration in
many other states. Guttmacher Institute, State
Legislation Tracker: Abortion Due to Genetic Anomaly
Banned (visited May 5, 2021).2 Since Arkansas’s
petition was filed, a three-circuit split on the validity
of such laws has emerged. Preterm-Cleveland v.
McCloud, 994 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. April 13, 2021) (en
banc) (upholding Ohio’s law); Little Rock Fam. Plan.
Servs. v. Rutledge, 984 F.3d 682, 690 (8th Cir. 2021)
(invalidating Arkansas’s law); Planned Parenthood of
Indiana & Kentucky, Inc. v. Comm’r of Indiana State
Dep’t of Health, 888 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir.), rev’d in
part on other grounds sub nom. Box v. Planned
Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, Inc., 139 S. Ct.
1780 (2019) (invalidating Indiana’s law). A suit
challenging Missouri’s law is on appeal in the Eighth
Circuit. Reproductive Health Services v. Parson, Nos.
19-2882, 19-3134 (8th Cir. argued Sept. 24, 2020).
The outcome of the current petition could control the
validity of all such laws. Amici with such laws have a
strong interest in defending their validity, and all
amici have a strong interest in retaining their
sovereign authority to enact such laws as they see fit.
ARGUMENT
I.
Arkansas’s Prohibition Against Aborting
Unborn Children Solely Because They May
Have Down Syndrome Satisfies Any Level of
Constitutional Scrutiny.
Arkansas’s Down Syndrome Discrimination by
Abortion Prohibition Act, Ark. Code Ann. 20-16-2102
2 https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy.
4
to 2107, is carefully tailored to advance at least eight
compelling state interests. Thus, it satisfies strict
scrutiny or any other level of scrutiny, including
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey’s less stringent “undue burden” standard. 505
U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
A.
Arkansas’s law advances at least eight
compelling state interests.
First, as Arkansas contends, its law advances the
State’s compelling interest in protecting an entire
class of persons from being targeted for elimination
solely because of disability. See Pet. 25–27. As Justice
Thomas noted in Box: “[T]his law and other laws like
it promote a State’s compelling interest in preventing
abortion from becoming a tool of modern-day
eugenics.” Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and
Kentucky, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1783 (2019) (Thomas,
J., concurring). In other contexts, the Court has
recognized that the States have a “compelling interest
in eliminating discrimination” that justifies some
restrictions on rights, even those that are actually
enumerated in the Constitution. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary
Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549
(1987); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623
(1984). Both Congress and the States may prohibit
the “moral and social wrong” of invidious
discrimination by private parties. Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964); Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983).
Eliminating invidious discrimination against the
disabled is a compelling state interest. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132; 29 U.S.C. § 794.
Second, Arkansas’s law advances the State’s
compelling interest in eradicating historical animus
5
and bias against persons with Down syndrome. The
history of medicalized discrimination against persons
with Down syndrome is both recent and appalling,
and the Down syndrome provision serves to eradicate
the ongoing vestiges of that history.
“Before the 1980s, the overwhelming majority of
people with Down syndrome in the United States were
placed in institutions, often times as infants or young
children.” Michelle Sie Whitten, The Story of Two
Syndromes, Global Down Syndrome Foundation
(available at https://bit.ly/3vOaXIs).
“[M]ost
professionals considered it impossible for people with
Down syndrome to learn how to speak properly, let
alone read and write,” and “most Americans believed
they should not be allowed in public spaces such as
movie theaters, malls or parks.”
Id.
This
discrimination was rooted in the eugenic movement’s
rejection of the “feeble-minded” as “unfit” and worthy
of “elimination.” Box, 139 S. Ct. at 1785–86 (Thomas,
J., concurring).
These prejudices against the disabled were deeply
entrenched in the medical profession. In 1973, a study
reported that Yale University NICU routinely
deprived disabled infants of simple, life-saving
treatments, leaving them to die. Duff & Campbell,
Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care
Nursery, 289 N. ENG. J. MED. 89 (Oct. 1973). Dr.
Walter L. Owens, the obstetrician in the infamous
“Baby Doe” case from Indiana, in court testimony
described children with Down syndrome as “mere
blobs.” Pet., Infant Doe v. Bloomington Hosp., et al.,
at 8 (No. 83-437), denied 104 S. Ct. 394 (Nov. 7, 1983).
This medicalized discrimination was literally fatal
for persons with Down syndrome. “Pictures of these
6
institutions and their ‘inmates’ show us bedlam –
cruel and unusual punishment for innocents whose
only crime is to have been born differently-abled.”
Whitten, supra. “Because of neglect, abuse, and lack
of access to education and medical care, people with
Down syndrome would die an early death.” Id. In
1960, the life expectancy for a person with Down
syndrome was 10 years. Pet. 4. Today that has
increased to 60 years. Whitten, supra. It was not
until well into the 1980s that the medical profession
uniformly
abandoned
recommendations
for
institutionalization of people with Down syndrome—
institutionalization that led to early death. Martin J.
McCaffery, Trisomy 13 and 18: Selecting the road not
previously taken, 172 AM. J. OF MED. GENETICS,
COMMENTARY, SEMINARS IN MEDICAL GENETICS (Aug.
13, 2016). Political action spearheaded by parent and
disability rights groups, not physicians, forced the
medical community to extend commonly accepted
medical interventions to Down syndrome patients. Id.
Despite radical changes in both treatment and
societal acceptance, this historical animus was not
eradicated from the medical profession.
The
persistent medicalized biases against Down syndrome
continue in the widespread practice of eugenic
abortion. As Arkansas compellingly describes, Pet. 5–
7, the medical profession’s biases continue to
influence parents of Down syndrome children at their
point of greatest vulnerability—i.e., immediately
upon learning of a prenatal screening or diagnosis of
Down syndrome. “When it comes to testing for Down
syndrome, the impact of genetic testing and
counseling is clear—abortions.” Arthur L. Caplan,
Chloe’s Law: A Powerful Legislative Movement
7
Challenging a Core Ethical Norm of Genetic Testing,
PLOS BIOLOGY 13(8) (Aug. 2015).
The institutionalized medical pessimism which
surrounds Down syndrome begins with ACOG
recommendations for universal prenatal genetic
screening. McCaffrey, supra; see also AM. COLLEGE OF
OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, COMMITTEE
OPINION NO. 393: NEWBORN SCREENING (2007).
Because Down syndrome has no prenatal treatment,
such screening may serve to create the opportunity to
abort the disabled. Unlike screening programs for a
host of disorders, when it comes to Down syndrome,
these prenatal genetic screenings offer no corrective
intervention or earlier introduction of therapies. The
“cure” for Down syndrome is the elimination of the
infant. Prenatal genetic-screening techniques, when
applied to Down syndrome, have thus been described
as “search-and-destroy technologies.” George Will,
The Real Down Syndrome Problem: Accepting
Genocide, WASH. POST (March 14, 2018).
When screening or diagnostic tests report the
possibility of Down syndrome, the counseling process
heavily favors abortion.
Although non-directive
counseling is a stated aim for prenatal counseling,
medical anthropologists have found that these
practices include “the ‘collective fiction’ that screening
can improve fetuses’ health and a ‘collective silence’
regarding the fact that a positive screening result
could eventually lead to a decision to abort.” J.
Johnston, et al., Supporting Women’s Autonomy in
Prenatal Testing, N. ENG. J. MED. 505–507 (Aug.
2017).
One survey found that, among women
receiving genetic counseling, “83% reported they did
not receive balanced counseling regarding the quality
of life for children with disabilities.” CD Roberts, et
8
al., The Role of Genetic Counseling in the Elective
Termination of Pregnancies Involving Fetuses with
Disabilities, 36 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 48–55 (Spring 2002).
Another survey of prenatal screening pamphlets
found that nearly one half of the statements portrayed
a negative message pertaining to Down syndrome,
while only 2.4% of the statements conveyed a positive
image of Down syndrome. KL Lawson, et al., The
Portrayal of Down Syndrome in Prenatal Screening
Information Pamphlets, 34 J. OBST. & GYN. CANADA
760–768 (Aug. 2012). Another survey of medical
professionals found that “[f]or Down syndrome, 60%
of obstetricians and 40% of geneticists reported
counseling for termination of pregnancy in a directive
manner.” T. Marteau, et al., Counseling Following
Diagnosis of a Fetal Abnormality: the Differing
Approaches of Obstetricians, Clinical Geneticists, and
Genetic Nurses, 31 J. MED. GENETICS 864–867 (Nov.
1994). Yet another survey found that “[g]enetic
counselors were more likely to emphasize clinical
information and negative aspects of the diagnosis,
while parents valued information regarding the
abilities and potential of individuals with Down
syndrome.” Linda McCabe, et al., Call for Change in
Prenatal Counseling for Down Syndrome, 158A AM. J.
OF MED. GENETICS 482, 482 (Feb. 7, 2012). Iceland,
where the elimination rate for Down syndrome is
virtually 100 percent, reportedly relies on “heavyhanded genetic counseling” to achieve that goal. Will,
The Real Down Syndrome Problem, supra.
In short, “women report feeling pressured by their
doctors . . . to choose abortion if the test reveals Down
syndrome or other abnormalities. It is taken for
granted in the medical community that no woman
would carry a Down-syndrome pregnancy to term.”
9
Alexandra DeSanctis, Iceland Eliminates People with
Down Syndrome, NATIONAL REVIEW (Aug. 16, 2017),
https://bit.ly/3w013TU. And “the impact of genetic
testing and counseling is clear—abortions.” Caplan,
supra. These negative attitudes of the medical
profession lag far behind those of society as a whole,
which has come to accept and celebrate people with
Down syndrome. Indeed, “[m]any families are eager
to adopt children with Down syndrome,” and there are
long wait lists to do so.
Heidi Lindh et al.,
Characteristics and Perspectives of Families Waiting
to Adopt a Child with Down Syndrome, GENETICS IN
MED. (April 2007).
Further, the negative focus of genetic counseling has
no basis in reality. As Arkansas notes, Pet. 4–5,
studies find overwhelming evidence of happiness, joy,
and personal satisfaction in the lives of people with
Down syndrome and their families. These surveys
demonstrate “that the overwhelming majority of
people with Down syndrome they surveyed indicate
they live happy and fulfilling lives,” and that “the
overwhelming majority of parents surveyed are happy
with their decision to have their child with Down
syndrome and indicate that their sons and daughters
are sources of great love and pride.” LD Bryant, et al.,
Descriptive Information About Down Syndrome: a
Content Analysis of Serum Screening Leaflets,
PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 1057–63 (Dec. 2001). Medical
literature and parent reports clearly show that
families with a Down syndrome member believe they
are better for it, at rates as high as 97 to 99 percent.
Brian Skotko, et al., Family Perspectives about Down
Syndrome, AM. J. MED. GENETICS ANNUAL 930–41
(Apr. 2016); see also Planned Parenthood of Ind. and
Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 888
10
F.3d 300, 315–16 (7th Cir. 2018) (“PPINK”) (Manion,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part). A study in France reported the following
typical reaction from a parent of a child with Down
syndrome: “It is the most beautiful experience of my
life. I have no regret and would not change anything
if it was possible.”
Remi Bertrand, Parents’
Perspective on Having a Child with Down Syndrome
in France, 179A AM. J. MED. GENET. 770, 781 (2019).
Yet, notwithstanding the beauty and happiness
associated with Down syndrome in real life,
medicalized bias results in the abortion of children
with Down syndrome at genocidal levels. In the
United States, abortion rates for Down syndrome
infants are at least 67 percent after a prenatal
diagnosis, and may be as high as 93 percent. Pet. 8.
“In Iceland, the abortion rate for children diagnosed
with Down syndrome in utero approaches 100%,” and
the rate is “98% in Denmark, 90% in the United
Kingdom, 77% in France, and 67% in the United
States.” Box, 139 S. Ct. at 1790–91 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). These staggering numbers are the latest
vestige of deeply entrenched, historical animus
against people with Down syndrome that persists in
the medical profession, and Arkansas has a
compelling interest in eradicating this animus.
Third, Arkansas’s law safeguards the integrity of
the medical profession by preventing doctors from
abandoning their traditional role as healers to become
the killers of disabled populations. “There can be no
doubt the government ‘has an interest in protecting
the integrity and ethics of the medical profession.’”
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2004) (quoting
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997)).
The Hippocratic tradition of “complete separation
11
between killing and curing” in the medical profession
is a “priceless possession which we cannot afford to
tarnish.” Margaret Mead, quoted in Rita L. Marker et
al., Euthanasia: a Historical Overview, MD. J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 2(2) 257–298 (1991).
Permitting the medical profession to become complicit
in targeting disabled people for elimination
undermines this “priceless possession.” Id. Recent
history
illustrates
the
medical
profession’s
susceptibility to corruption through the medicalized
killing of the disabled. See Michael A. Grodin, et al.,
The Nazi Physicians as Leaders in Eugenics and
“Euthanasia”: Lessons for Today, 108 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 53–57 (Jan. 2018). All citizens should be
deeply uncomfortable with physicians’ complicity in
killing disabled populations, and all States have a
compelling interest in preserving the integrity and
ethics of the medical profession.
Fourth, Arkansas’s law draws a clear boundary
against additional eugenic practices targeted at
disabled persons and others. This Court “has in the
past confirmed the validity of drawing boundaries to
prevent certain practices that extinguish life and are
close to actions that are condemned,” such as
infanticide and euthanasia. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at
158. Sex-selective abortion already occurs in the
United States under the euphemism “family
balancing.” See, e.g., Harry J. Lieman, M.D., et al.,
Sex Selection for Family Balancing, AMA JOURNAL OF
ETHICS (2014); see also Sujatha Jesudason et al., Sex
Selection in America: Why It Persists and How We Can
Change It, THE ATLANTIC (May 31, 2012). Prominent
ethicists have sought to justify not just abortion, but
also infanticide of disabled children, and such
infanticide is already practiced in the Netherlands in
12
some instances. Peter Singer, Pulling Back the
Curtain on the Mercy Killing of Newborns, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 11, 2005); A. Guibilini, et al., After-Birth
Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?, 39 J. OF MED.
ETHICS 261-63 (2013) (arguing that infanticide of
children with Down syndrome, among others, is
justified). As one man with Down syndrome testified
before Congress, “we are the canary in the eugenics
coal mine. Genomic research isn’t going to stop at
screening for Down syndrome. It won’t be long before
we can identify all manner of potentially expensive
medical or personality ‘deviations’ in the womb.”
Testimony of Frank Stephens, Down Syndrome:
Update on the State of the Science & Potential for
Discoveries Across Other Major Diseases Before the H.
Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Servs., and
Ed. Comm. on Appropriations, at 2 (Oct. 25, 2017)
(“Frank
Stephens’
Testimony”),
https://bit.ly/33AYHPk.
Fifth, as Arkansas emphasizes, its law counters the
stigma that eugenic abortion currently imposes on
living persons with Down syndrome and other
disabilities. Pet. 27–29. As the Missouri General
Assembly found in passing a similar Down syndrome
provision: “Eliminating unborn children with Down
Syndrome raises grave concerns for the lives of those
who do live with disabilities. It … fosters a false sense
that disability is something that could have been
avoidable, and is likely to increase the stigma
associated with disability.”
Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 188.038.1(6). “Permitting women who otherwise
want to bear a child to choose abortion because the
child has Down syndrome … increases the ‘stigma
associated with having a genetic disorder.’” PPINK,
888 F.3d at 315 (Manion, J., concurring in the
13
judgment) (quoting Peter A. Benn & Audrey R.
Chapman, Practical and Ethical Considerations of
Noninvasive Prenatal Diagnosis, 301 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 2154, 2155 (2009)). Arkansas’s law both
provides and reinforces the contrary, positive, antistigmatic message of people like Frank Stephens: “I
AM A MAN WITH DOWN SYNDROME AND MY
LIFE IS WORTH LIVING.”
Frank Stephens’
Testimony, at 1 (emphasis in original).
Sixth, Arkansas’s law ensures that the existing
Down syndrome community does not become starved
of resources for research and care for individuals with
Down syndrome. “Across the world, a notion is being
sold that maybe we don’t need to continue to do
research concerning Down syndrome. Why? Because
there are pre-natal screens that will identify Down
syndrome in the womb, and we can just terminate
those pregnancies.” Id. at 1. As abortion decimates
the Down syndrome community, resources and
support for existing individuals with Down syndrome
will inevitably dwindle away. See Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 188.038.6 (finding that Down syndrome abortions
“send a message of dwindling support” for people with
Down syndrome).
“[S]ome countries are now
celebrating the ‘eradication’ of Down syndrome
through
abortion,”
and
this
eradication
“disincentivizes research that might help [people with
Down syndrome] in the future.” PPINK, 888 F.3d at
315 (Manion, J., concurring in the judgment).
Seventh, Arkansas’s law protects against the
devaluation of all human life inherent in any decision
to target a person for elimination based on an
immutable characteristic. Targeting the disabled for
elimination “further coarsen[s] society to the
humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and
14
innocent human life, making it increasingly difficult
to protect such life.” Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157
(quoting Congressional Findings ¶ (14)(N)).
Arkansas’s law “expresses respect for the dignity of
human life.” Id. The epidemic of Down syndrome
abortions “perpetuates the odious view that some lives
are worth more than others.” PPINK, 888 F.3d at 315
(Manion, J., concurring in the judgment). Arkansas
counteracts the eugenic message that some people
“have too little value to exist.” Frank Stephens’
Testimony, at 1.
Eighth, Arkansas’s law fosters the diversity of
society and protects society from the incalculable loss
that would occur if people with Down syndrome were
eliminated. As the stories of Down syndrome heroes
like Chris Nikic, Amy Bockerstette, and countless
others attest, people with Down syndrome provide an
irreplaceable beauty, joy, and inspiration to their
communities and our society. They inspire us and
make us better people. “Human beings ‘of difference’
. . . have much to share with all of us about what it
means to be human.” Marsha Saxton, Disability
Rights and Selective Abortion, in ABORTION WARS: A
HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: 1950 TO 2000 (1998).
This is especially true of persons with Down
syndrome, as the experience of one St. Louis, Missouri
suburb illustrates. See Lauren Knight, On Her Way:
Grace’s Bus Stop, ST. LOUIS MAGAZINE (March 21,
2014). Our society would be incalculably diminished
if persons with Down syndrome were eliminated—and
we now stand on the brink of that genocidal outcome.
B. Arkansas’s law is narrowly tailored.
Arkansas’s law advances these many compelling
interests in the narrowest possible fashion. The law
15
prohibits abortions only if the discriminatory purpose
is the sole reason for the abortion: “A physician shall
not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an
abortion with the knowledge that a pregnant woman
is seeking an abortion solely on the basis of” a test
result, prenatal diagnosis, or other reason indicating
the child has Down syndrome. Ark. Code Ann. § 2016-2103(a). The law also requires the abortion
provider to have actual knowledge of that
discriminatory purpose, after reasonable inquiry. Id.
§ 20-16-2103(a), (b).
Thus, “it is hard to imagine legislation more
narrowly tailored to promote this interest than”
Arkansas’s law. PPINK, 888 F.3d at 316 (Manion, J.,
concurring). Arkansas “only prohibit[s] abortions
performed solely because of the … disability of the
unborn child. The doctor also must know that the
woman has sought the abortion solely for that
purpose.” Id. (emphasis in original). “These are
provisions that apply only to very specific situations
and carefully avoid targeting the purported general
right to pre-viability abortion.” Id. “They will not
affect the vast majority of women who choose to have
an abortion without considering the characteristics of
the child. Indeed, they will not even affect women who
consider the protected characteristics along with
other considerations.” Id. “If it is at all possible to
narrowly tailor abortion regulations, [Arkansas] has
done so.” Id.
Because it is narrowly tailored to advance many
compelling interests, Arkansas’s law satisfies strict
scrutiny. A fortiori, it satisfies any less stringent form
of scrutiny, including Casey’s undue-burden test and
rational-basis scrutiny—the latter of which is the
16
standard that actually applies here. See Pet. 18–22;
see also infra Part II.
II.
Arkansas’s Prohibition Against Down
Syndrome Abortions Is Not Per Se Invalid
Under Casey.
Despite the overwhelmingly powerful justification
for Arkansas’s law, the Eighth Circuit held that it is
“categorical[ly]” invalid under Casey because it
constitutes a pre-viability restriction of abortion. Pet.
App. 5a (citing Casey to conclude that the Supreme
Court’s “pre-viability rule is categorical”).
This
holding was in error. Casey does not dictate the
outcome of this case for at least seven reasons.
First, Casey did not consider or address the validity
of a Down syndrome provision, or any similar antidiscrimination provision. On the contrary, “the very
first paragraph of the respondents’ brief in Casey
made it clear to the Court that Pennsylvania’s
prohibition on sex-selective abortions was not being
challenged.” Box, 139 S. Ct. at 1792 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). “Whatever else might be said about
Casey, it did not decide whether the Constitution
requires States to allow eugenic abortions.” Id. “[T]he
constitutionality of other laws like [Arkansas’s] thus
remains an open question.” Id. “Casey did not
consider the validity of an anti-eugenics law. Judicial
opinions are not statutes; they resolve only the
situations presented for decision.”
Planned
Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State
Dep’t of Health, 917 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir. 2018)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc). When an issue was not “raised in the briefs
or argument nor discussed in the opinion of the
Court,” then “the case is not a binding precedent on
17
this point.” United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines,
Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952); see also, e.g., Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998);
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 n.2 (1996); FEC v.
NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 97 (1994).
This Court “often read[s] general language in
judicial opinions” as “referring in context to
circumstances similar to the circumstances then
before the Court and not referring to quite different
circumstances that the Court was not then
considering.” Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424
(2004). Casey should be no exception to this rule. Any
broad language in Casey was “not referring to quite
different circumstances that the Court was not then
considering,” id.—such as a restriction on abortions
performed for the sole purpose of eliminating an
unborn child who may have Down syndrome.
Second, prohibiting abortions for discriminatory
reasons is consistent with the plain language of both
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Casey. Roe
explicitly rejected the argument that a woman’s right
to abortion “is absolute and that she is entitled to
terminate her pregnancy … for whatever reason she
alone chooses.” 410 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
Roe emphasized: “With this we do not agree.” Id.
Thus, Roe left open the possibility that a State may
restrict abortion for prohibited reasons. Id. Citing
this very language from Roe, Casey stated only that a
State may not prohibit a woman from making the
“ultimate decision” to terminate a pre-viability
pregnancy, and it held that prior decisions “striking
down of some abortion regulations which in no real
sense deprived women of the ultimate decision” had
gone “too far.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 875. Casey
protected the mother’s autonomy in “the decision
18
whether to bear or beget a child,” but it never
protected the decision to bear only a child with preselected favored characteristics. Id. at 851. Here,
Arkansas’s law “in no real sense deprive[s] women of
the ultimate decision” whether to terminate a
pregnancy, id. at 875—it restricts only one of the
many reasons one might seek an abortion. All other
reasons are unaffected.
Third, both Casey and Gonzales upheld prohibitions
against certain kinds of pre-viability abortions that
were at least as restrictive as Arkansas’s law. Casey
upheld a complete restriction on pre-viability
abortions where the patient is a minor who does not
obtain parental consent or judicial bypass. 505 U.S.
at 899. Gonzales upheld a complete prohibition on
pre-viability abortions performed through the
gruesome “partial-birth abortion” procedure. 550 U.S.
at 135–38. Gonzales noted that Casey had “rejected
… the interpretation of Roe that considered all
previability regulations of abortion unwarranted.” Id.
at 146. Gonzales applied Casey’s undue-burden
standard to this restriction—it did not hold that all
pre-viability prohibitions of abortion are categorically
invalid. Id. at 150, 156. “What makes Gonzales
particularly applicable here is that there, as here, the
Court dealt not with a total ban against abortion but
with a regulation that prohibited abortion under
certain conditions.” Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, 940
F.3d 318, 327 (6th Cir. 2019) (Batchelder, J.,
dissenting). Under Gonzales, “pre-viability abortions
are subject to restriction, as that is precisely what
Gonzales upheld.” Id.
Fourth, one of Casey’s central conclusions was that
the strict scrutiny that had applied to abortion
restrictions after Roe was too stringent, because it
19
gave “too little acknowledgement” to valid state
interests in fetal life and women’s health. 505 U.S. at
871. Casey’s adoption of the undue-burden standard
was designed to relax the level of scrutiny on abortion
restrictions, not heighten it. Id. Yet the Eighth
Circuit’s rule of “categorical” invalidity does the
opposite—it makes the right to a pre-viability
abortion inviolable. This flips Casey on its head.
Fifth, the lower court’s interpretation of Casey has
the perverse result of elevating the “penumbral” right
to pre-viability abortion above enumerated rights,
such as freedom of speech and equal protection of the
law. “[E]ven the fundamental rights of the Bill of
Rights are not absolute.” Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77, 85 (1949). This Court has held that fundamental
rights recognized in its case law may be restricted by
government policies that are narrowly tailored to
advance compelling governmental interests. See, e.g.,
Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 137 S.
Ct. 788, 800–02 (2017); Fisher v. University of Texas,
136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016); Williams-Yulee v.
Florida Bar, 575 U.S 433, 444 (2015); Johnson v.
California, 543 U.S. 499, 512–14 (2005); Chaplinksy
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–73 (1942). Yet
the lower court’s holding protects pre-viability
abortion even from regulations that satisfy strict
scrutiny. It thus elevates the “penumbral” right to
pre-viability abortion above the Constitution’s most
fundamental enumerated rights. To treat “abortion
as a super-right, more sacrosanct even than the
enumerated rights in the Bill of Rights,” is an “absurd
result.”
PPINK, 888 F.3d at 311 (Manion, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
Sixth, in rejecting Roe’s trimester framework
completely, Casey itself recognized that “time ha[d]
20
overtaken some of Roe’s factual assumptions.” 505
U.S. at 860. Likewise, Casey did not consider, and
could not have considered, critical factual
developments relevant to Down syndrome, because
they were still occurring at the time. Casey was
decided as the transformation of societal attitudes
toward persons with disabilities, including Down
syndrome, was still ongoing, as reflected in the nearcontemporaneous passage of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. Likewise, the adverse impact of
abortion on the integrity of the medical profession—
which became evident to the Court later, at the time
of Gonzales—was neither mentioned nor considered in
Roe and Casey.
Seventh, Casey’s viability framework rested
explicitly on its holding that the State’s interests in
protecting fetal life and women’s health become
increasingly compelling as gestational age increases.
See 505 U.S. at 860, 870–71. For better or worse, the
Court determined that viability was the point in
pregnancy at which those interests, which increase
over time, became compelling enough to justify a
complete ban on abortion. See id. By contrast,
Arkansas’s anti-discrimination interest in protecting
children with Down syndrome from elimination is
equally compelling at any gestational age. Children
with Down syndrome are eliminated with equal
permanence regardless of whether the fetus was
viable at the time of the abortion, and regardless of
the gestational age at which the abortion occurs.
Casey’s viability framework, therefore, has no logical
application to an anti-discrimination provision like
Arkansas’s law.
In short, Arkansas’s law is not “categorically”
invalid under Casey, because Casey said nothing
21
about it. And the right to abort children with Down
syndrome is neither “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition” nor “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 720–21 (1997) (quotations omitted). On the
contrary, our society has repudiated the despicable
medicalized biases against disabled people that
terminated the lives of people Down syndrome for
decades and now fuel the epidemic of Down syndrome
abortions. Thus, Arkansas’s law is subject to rationalbasis scrutiny, and it is valid so long as it reasonably
“furthers the legitimate interest of the Government,”
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146—which it plainly does. See
Pet. 12–24.
***
“Chris’s dad, Nik Nikic, can rattle off a list of
obstacles his son faced in life: Open heart surgery at
five months old. Not being able to walk until age 4 or
eat solid food until age 5. Four major ear operations
at age 17. And struggling still, as a young adult, with
balance, slow reaction time, and low muscle tone.”
Jenny McCoy, Chris Nikic Wants to Be the First
Ironman Finisher with Down Syndrome, RUNNER’S
WORLD (Oct. 8, 2020). Chris and his dad faced
“negative perceptions and negative advice throughout
his first 18 years of Chris’s life, by all the
professionals.” Id. “I think of all the other parents
like me when their child is first born with Down
syndrome and they’re barraged with all kinds of
negative information ... Nobody talks to them about
what they could do if they set their mind to it.” Id.
“At every turn, experts spoke of Nikic in terms of
limits instead of possibilities.” Kurt Streeter, Chris
Nikic, You Are an Ironman. And Your Journey Is
22
Remarkable, N.Y. TIMES
https://nyti.ms/3y3geh8.
(Nov.
16,
2020),
At mile 10 of the marathon, the final leg of Chris’s
Ironman, he almost gave up due to weakness and
extreme pain. “At that point, Nik Nikic clutched his
son, drew him close and whispered in his ear: ‘Are you
going to let your pain win, or let your dreams win?’ …
‘My dreams,’ he told his father, ‘are going to win.’” Id.
The inspiration provided by people like Chris Nikic
is virtually impossible in Iceland, which has “cured”
Down syndrome by eliminating the children who have
it. Such inspiration is rapidly approaching extinction
in America, too. Arkansas’s law is narrowly tailored
to prevent this genocidal tragedy. The notion that
Casey prevents States from taking any action to stop
this tragedy reduces this Court’s abortion
jurisprudence to absurdity.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant
the petition for writ of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
ERIC S. SCHMITT
Missouri Attorney General
D. JOHN SAUER
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
JEFF P. JOHNSON
Deputy Solicitor General
OFFICE OF THE MISSOURI
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Supreme Court Building
207 West High Street
Jefferson City, MO 65102
(573) 751-3321
John.Sauer@ago.mo.gov
23
Additional Counsel
Steve Marshall
Attorney General
STATE OF ALABAMA
Douglas J. Peterson
Attorney General
STATE OF NEBRASKA
Treg R. Taylor
Attorney General
STATE OF ALASKA
Wayne Stenehjem
Attorney General
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
Mark Brnovich
Attorney General
STATE OF ARIZONA
Dave Yost
Attorney General
STATE OF OHIO
Ashley Moody
Attorney General
STATE OF FLORIDA
Mike Hunter
Attorney General
STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Christopher M. Carr
Attorney General
STATE OF GEORGIA
Alan Wilson
Attorney General
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Lawrence Wasden
Attorney General
STATE OF IDAHO
Jason R. Ravnsborg
Attorney General
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General
STATE OF INDIANA
Herbert H. Slatery III
Attorney General & Reporter
STATE OF TENNESSEE
Derek Schmidt
Attorney General
STATE OF KANSAS
Ken Paxton
Attorney General
STATE OF TEXAS
24
Jeff Landry
Attorney General
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Sean D. Reyes
Attorney General
STATE OF UTAH
Lynn Fitch
Attorney General
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
Patrick Morrisey
Attorney General
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
Austin Knudsen
Attorney General
STATE OF MONTANA
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