Amicus Curiae Brief — Xiulu Ruan, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefDec 21, 2021

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Nos. 20-1410 & 21-5261

================================================================================================================

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------DR. XIULU RUAN,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------SHAKEEL KAHN,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------On Writs Of Certiorari To The

United States Courts Of Appeals

For The Tenth And Eleventh Circuits

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

COMPASSION & CHOICES

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------TONKON TORP LLP

ROBERT A. KOCH

Counsel of Record

STEVEN M. WILKER

888 SW Fifth Avenue,

Suite 1600

Portland, OR 97204

Telephone: (503) 221-1440

robert.koch@tonkon.com

COMPASSION & CHOICES

KEVIN DÍAZ

101 SW Madison Street,

Unit 8009

Portland, OR 97207

Telephone: (503) 943-6535

Counsel for Amicus Curiae Compassion & Choices

================================================================================================================

COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964

WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................

ii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ......................

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..............................

2

ARGUMENT ........................................................

3

I.

II.

THE LAW PROVIDES A GOOD FAITH

DEFENSE FOR MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS ............................................................

3

EXCLUDING A GOOD FAITH DEFENSE

FOR MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS HARMS

END-OF-LIFE PATIENT CARE ...............

5

CONCLUSION..................................................... 11

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) ......................4

United States v. Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir.

2006) ..........................................................................5

United States v. Khan, 989 F.3d 806 (10th Cir.

2021) ................................................................ 2, 7, 11

United States v. Kohli, 847 F.3d 483 (7th Cir.

2017) ..........................................................................5

United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975) ...... 3, 4, 10

United States v. Ruan, 966 F.3d 1101 (11th Cir.

2020) ................................................................ 2, 7, 11

United States v. Sabean, 885 F.3d 27 (1st Cir.

2018) ..........................................................................4

United States v. Volkman, 797 F.3d 377 (6th Cir.

2015) ..........................................................................5

United States v. Wexler, 522 F.3d 194 (2d Cir.

2008) ..........................................................................5

STATUTES

21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) ...................................................3

21 U.S.C. § 802(21) ........................................................3

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) .....................................................3

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Am. Med. Ass’n, Health & Ethics Policy H-149.966:

Decisions Near End of Life, available at https://

policysearch.ama-assn.org/policyfinder/detail/

H-140.966%20Decisions%20Near%20the%20

End%20of%20Life?uri=%2FAMADoc%2FHOD.

xml-0-497.xml (last visited Dec. 16, 2021) ...............6

Andrea C. Enzinger et al., US Trends in Opioid

Access Among Patients with Poor Prognosis

Cancer Near the End-of-Life, 39 J. Clin. Oncology 2948 (2021) ................................................. 6, 9

Diane E. Hoffmann, Treating Pain v. Reducing

Drug Diversion and Abuse: Recalibrating the

Balance in Our Drug Control Laws and Policies, 1 St. Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol’y 231

(2008) ....................................................... 5, 6, 7, 8, 10

Donald M. Goldenbaum et al., Physicians

Charged with Opioid Analgesic-Prescribing

Offenses, 9 Pain Med. 737 (2008), available at

https://academic.oup.com/painmedicine/article/

9/6/737/1909323 (last visited Dec. 16, 2021) ........ 7, 8

Ian Ayres & Amen Jalal, The Impact of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs on U.S.

Opioid Prescriptions, 46 J. L. Med. & Ethics

387 (2018) ..................................................................6

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Joint Statement from 21 Health Orgs. & the

Drug Enf ’t Admin., Promoting Pain Relief

and Preventing Abuse of Pain Medications: A

Critical Balancing Act (2002), available at

https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/

advisories/painrelief.pdf (last visited Dec. 16,

2021) .............................................................. 5, 6, 8, 9

Karen O. Anderson et al., Racial and Ethnic

Disparities in Pain: Causes and Consequences

of Unequal Care, 10 J. Pain 1187 (2009),

available at https://www.sciencedirect.com/

science/article/abs/pii/S1526590009007755 (last

visited Dec. 16, 2021) ................................................8

Kelly K. Dineen & James M. DuBois, Between a

Rock and a Hard Place: Can Physicians Prescribe Opioids to Treat Pain Adequately While

Avoiding Legal Sanction?, 42 Am. J. L. & Med.

7 (2016) .............................................................. 7, 8, 9

Kelly K. Dineen, Definitions Matter: A Taxonomy

of Inappropriate Prescribing to Shape Effective Opioid Policy and Reduce Patient Harm,

67 U. Kan. L. Rev. 961 (2019) ........................ 6, 7, 8, 9

Kelly M. Hoffman et al., Racial Bias in Pain

Assessment and Treatment Recommendation,

and False Beliefs About Biological Differences

Between Blacks and Whites, Proc. Nat’l Academy Sci. (Mar. 1, 2016), available at https://

www.pnas.org/content/113/16/4296 (last visited

Dec. 16, 2021) ............................................................8

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Lindy Willmott et al., Providing Palliative Care

at the End of Life: Should Health Professionals Fear Regulation?, 26 J. L. & Med. 214

(2018), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/

papers.cfm?abstract_id=3274384 (last visited

Dec. 16, 2021) ............................................................9

Michael C. Barnes et al., Demanding Better: A

Case for Increased Funding and Involvement

of State Medical Boards in Response to

America’s Drug Abuse Crisis, 106 J. Med. Reg.

6 (2020), available at https://meridian.allen

press.com/jmr/article/106/3/6/447314/DemandingBetter-A-Case-for-Increased-Funding-and (last

visited Dec. 16, 2021) ...................................... 8, 9, 10

Nat’l Cancer Inst., Are Cancer Patients Getting

the Opioids They Need to Control Pain? (Sept.

16, 2020), available at https://www.cancer.

gov/news-events/cancer-currents-blog/2020/

opioids-cancer-pain-oncologists-decreasingprescriptions (last visited Dec. 16, 2021) .................9

Nat’l Cancer Inst., Opioid Use Drops Among

Cancer Patients at End of Life (Aug. 20, 2021),

available at https://www.cancer.gov/news-events/

cancer-currents-blog/2021/opioids-cancer-painend-of-life (last visited Dec. 16, 2021) .................. 6, 9

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Salimah H. Meghani et al., Time to Take Stock:

A Meta-Analysis and Systematic Review of

Analgesic Treatment Disparities for Pain in

the United States, 13 Pain Med. 150 (2012),

available at https://academic.oup.com/pain

medicine/article/13/2/150/1935962 (last visited

Dec. 16, 2021) ............................................................8

Sebastiano Mercadante et al., Controlled Sedation for Refractory Symptoms in Dying

Patients, 37 J. Pain & Symptom Mgmt. 771

(May 2009), available at https://www.science

direct.com/science/article/pii/S0885392408005

629 (last visited Dec. 16, 2021) .................................6

Vikram Jairam et al., Temporal Trends in Opioid

Prescribing Patterns Among Oncologists in the

Medicare Population, 113 J. Nat’l Cancer Inst.

274 (2021), available at https://academic.oup.

com/jnci/article/113/3/274/5891667 (last visited

Dec. 16, 2021) ............................................................9

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1

Compassion & Choices is the nation’s oldest,

largest, and most active 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization committed to improving care and expanding

choice at the end of life. Compassion & Choices advocates for high quality end-of-life medical care and

educates the public about available end-of-life options.

The organization’s stated vision is of a “society that

affirms life and accepts the inevitability of death,

embraces expanded options for compassionate dying,

and empowers everyone to choose end-of-life care that

reflects their values, priorities, and beliefs.”

To support this vision, Compassion & Choices

works to empower patients’ voices and agency in endof-life care, regardless of gender identity, age, sexuality,

race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, wealth, marital status, or disability. Compassion & Choices thus

files this amicus brief in support of petitioners to

highlight for the Court why the exclusion of a good

faith defense for practitioners under Section 841 of the

Controlled Substances Act not only contravenes the

law, but unduly chills the practice of medicine for

dying patients, particularly for pain and symptom

management for patients nearing the end of life.

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------1

Written consent to the filing of this brief has been granted

by all parties. No counsel for a party authored this brief, in whole

or in part, and no person other than amicus curiae and its counsel made any monetary contribution to fund the preparation or

submission of this brief.

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits interpreted Section 841 of the Controlled Substances Act to exclude a

good faith defense for practitioner doctors charged

under the Act for their prescribing practices. United

States v. Khan, 989 F.3d 806, 825–26 (10th Cir. 2021);

United States v. Ruan, 966 F.3d 1101, 1166–67 (11th

Cir. 2020). This Court should reverse. Both the text of

the Act and this Court’s case law require a knowing or

intentional violation to impose criminal liability, in

particular, a knowing or intentional breach of medical

standards on prescribing controlled substances. The

denial of a good faith defense contravenes that required mens rea.

In addition, the erosion and ultimate elimination

of a good faith defense for medical practitioners under

the Act has harmed, and will continue to harm, patient

care. Specifically, by seeking to criminalize negligent

prescribing practices, law enforcement has chilled

the willingness of medical practitioners to prescribe

opioids to relieve pain and other symptoms that often

escalate sharply for those at the end of life. This

vulnerable population and their families have been

robbed of dignity and autonomy at one of the most

critical, and private, times in their lives—an outcome

that Congress never intended.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

3

ARGUMENT

I.

THE LAW PROVIDES A GOOD FAITH DEFENSE FOR MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS

The plain text of the Controlled Substances Act

provides a good faith defense for the prescribing

practices of medical practitioners. The Act makes it

“unlawful for any person [to] knowingly or intentionally . . . distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance”

in an unauthorized way. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). But the

Act also authorizes licensed and registered medical

practitioners to issue prescriptions for a legitimate

medical purpose in the usual course of their professional practice. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(21) (allowing

such practitioners “to distribute, dispense, [and]

conduct research with . . . a controlled substance in the

course of professional practice”); 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a)

(allowing prescriptions “issued for a legitimate medical

purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the

usual course of his professional practice”). By rendering obsolete whether a practitioner knew or intended

to prescribe a controlled substance in a way that was

unauthorized, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits read

the terms “knowingly or intentionally” out of the

statute.

Similarly, this Court’s case law recognizes that

licensed and registered practitioners run afoul of the

Act only when they act as a drug “pusher” rather than

as a good-faith medical professional. United States v.

Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 143 (1975). In enacting the

Controlled Substances Act, “Congress was concerned

4

with the nature of the drug transaction, rather than

with the status of the defendant.” Id. at 134. At the

same time, “Congress understandably was concerned

that the drug laws not impede legitimate research and

that physicians be allowed reasonable discretion in

treating patients and testing new theories.” Id. at 143.

As a result, practitioners violate the Act if their

“conduct exceed[s] the bounds of professional practice”

despite “an honest effort to prescribe . . . in compliance

with an accepted standard of medical practice.” Id. at

142 & n.20 (internal quotation marks omitted). As

explained by this Court, under the Act, “Congress

regulates medical practice insofar as it bars doctors

from using their prescription-writing powers as a

means to engage in illicit drug dealing and trafficking

as conventionally understood. Beyond this, however,

the statute manifests no intent to regulate the practice

of medicine generally.” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S.

243, 270 (2006). This is due in part to federalism: in

the context of prescriptions by a medical professional,

“[t]he structure and operation of the [Controlled

Substances Act] presume and rely upon a functioning

medical profession regulated under the States’ police

powers.” Id.

In short, the Act criminalizes only those medical

practitioners who knowingly or intentionally act

without a legitimate purpose outside the usual course

of professional practice. As such, the law provides a

charged practitioner with a good faith defense due to

the mens rea required by the statute. See United States

v. Sabean, 885 F.3d 27, 44 (1st Cir. 2018) (“[E]ven a

5

negligent physician is inoculated against criminal

liability under Section 841(a) as long as he acts in good

faith.”); United States v. Kohli, 847 F.3d 483, 489–90

(7th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he evidence must show that the

physician not only intentionally distributed drugs, but

that he intentionally acted as a pusher rather than a

medical professional.” (cleaned up)); United States v.

Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] practitioner who acts outside the usual course of professional

practice may be convicted under § 841(a) only if he

does so intentionally.”); see also United States v. Wexler,

522 F.3d 194, 205 (2d Cir. 2008) (allowing an “objective”

good faith defense); United States v. Volkman, 797 F.3d

377, 387 (6th Cir. 2015) (same).

II.

EXCLUDING A GOOD FAITH DEFENSE

FOR MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS HARMS

END-OF-LIFE PATIENT CARE

Opioids and other controlled substances sit at the

cross-section of medicine and law. For many suffering

from severe, escalating pain, opioids may be the only

treatment option currently offered by modern medicine that provides relief.2 This is particularly true for

cancer patients and other individuals as they near

2

Joint Statement from 21 Health Orgs. & the Drug Enf ’t

Admin., Promoting Pain Relief and Preventing Abuse of Pain

Medications: A Critical Balancing Act (2002), available at https://

www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/advisories/painrelief.pdf (last

visited Dec. 16, 2021); Diane E. Hoffmann, Treating Pain v.

Reducing Drug Diversion and Abuse: Recalibrating the Balance

in Our Drug Control Laws and Policies, 1 St. Louis U. J. Health

L. & Pol’y 231, 266 (2008).

6

death.3 As declared by the American Medical Association, “[p]hysicians have an obligation to relieve pain

and suffering and to promote the dignity and autonomy of dying patients in their care.”4 And as reported

by the National Cancer Institute, opioids not only

improve quality of life in end-of-life care but, by “provid[ing] good supportive care, including pain management, people will actually live longer.”5

At the same time, over the past few decades,

opioid abuse became one of the worst drug overdose epidemics in the country’s history.6 In turn, law

3

Joint Statement, supra note 2; Hoffmann, supra note 2, at

266–67; Kelly K. Dineen, Definitions Matter: A Taxonomy of

Inappropriate Prescribing to Shape Effective Opioid Policy and

Reduce Patient Harm, 67 U. Kan. L. Rev. 961, 970 (2019); Nat’l

Cancer Inst., Opioid Use Drops Among Cancer Patients at End of

Life (Aug. 20, 2021), available at https://www.cancer.gov/newsevents/cancer-currents-blog/2021/opioids-cancer-pain-end-of-life

(last visited Dec. 16, 2021); Andrea C. Enzinger et al., US Trends

in Opioid Access Among Patients with Poor Prognosis Cancer

Near the End-of-Life, 39 J. Clin. Oncology 2948, 2955 (2021);

Sebastiano Mercadante et al., Controlled Sedation for Refractory

Symptoms in Dying Patients, 37 J. Pain & Symptom Mgmt. 771,

773, 777 (May 2009), available at https://www.sciencedirect.

com/science/article/pii/S0885392408005629 (last visited Dec. 16,

2021).

4

Am. Med. Ass’n, Health & Ethics Policy H-149.966: Decisions

Near End of Life, available at https://policysearch.ama-assn.

org/policyfinder/detail/H-140.966%20Decisions%20Near%20the%20

End%20of%20Life?uri=%2FAMADoc%2FHOD.xml-0-497.xml (last

visited Dec. 16, 2021).

5

Nat’l Cancer Inst., supra note 3.

6

Ian Ayres & Amen Jalal, The Impact of Prescription Drug

Monitoring Programs on U.S. Opioid Prescriptions, 46 J. L. Med.

& Ethics 387, 387 (2018).

7

enforcement began targeting opioid prescriptions

with the level of scrutiny previously applied to street

drugs like cocaine and heroin.7 As noted above in Part

I, part of that enforcement effort has included charging

medical practitioners for criminal violations of the

Controlled Substances Act due to prescribing practices

that, in the view of prosecutors, violated medical

practice standards, without due regard to the actual

state of mind of the practitioner. See, e.g., Khan, 989

F.3d at 825–26; Ruan, 966 F.3d at 1166–67.

These enhanced law enforcement efforts and

prosecutions have had a chilling effect on the prescribing of opioids by medical practitioners, including

those treating patients in good faith. Doctors are

trained to have a “truth bias”: to trust and empathize

with their patients.8 And no set definition exists for

what it means to overprescribe opioids, either medically or legally.9 Indeed, no consensus medical opinion

exists even on an upper limit for opioid prescriptions,

in volume or dosage, as opioids do not damage internal

organs like other pain relievers.10 Practitioners who

7

Hoffmann, supra note 2, at 234.

Hoffmann, supra note 2, at 257, 285, 303; Kelly K. Dineen

& James M. DuBois, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Can

Physicians Prescribe Opioids to Treat Pain Adequately While

Avoiding Legal Sanction?, 42 Am. J. L. & Med. 7, 16–18 (2016).

9

Dineen, supra note 3, at 966–68, 986–87, 990; Donald M.

Goldenbaum et al., Physicians Charged with Opioid AnalgesicPrescribing Offenses, 9 Pain Med. 737, 744 (2008), available at

https://academic.oup.com/painmedicine/article/9/6/737/1909323 (last

visited Dec. 16, 2021).

10

Hoffmann, supra note 2, at 270, 287.

8

8

“overprescribe” opioids in the eyes of law enforcement

may do so for reasons that range “from careful (e.g., a

careful prescriber being fooled by a person feigning

pain to divert drugs to the market) to criminal (a

provider knowingly abandoning their provider role for

self-gain).”11 But in a world in which their good faith

may or may not matter, many medical practitioners

simply choose to limit or avoid prescribing opioids

altogether, regardless of patient need.12 These impacts hit particularly hard in racially diverse and

underserved communities, which already experience

disparities in pain treatment and care.13

11

Dineen, supra note 3, at 985.

Joint Statement, supra note 2; Hoffmann, supra note 2, at

235, 293, 296, 309; Dineen & DuBois, supra note 8, at 12, 17–18,

21–22, 35–40; Goldenbaum et al., supra note 9, at 745; Michael C.

Barnes et al., Demanding Better: A Case for Increased Funding

and Involvement of State Medical Boards in Response to America’s

Drug Abuse Crisis, 106 J. Med. Reg. 6, 6–8, 10, 17 (2020),

available at https://meridian.allenpress.com/jmr/article/106/3/6/

447314/Demanding-Better-A-Case-for-Increased-Funding-and (last

visited Dec. 16, 2021).

13

Karen O. Anderson et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in

Pain: Causes and Consequences of Unequal Care, 10 J. Pain 1187

(2009), available at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/

abs/pii/S1526590009007755 (last visited Dec. 16, 2021); Kelly M.

Hoffman et al., Racial Bias in Pain Assessment and Treatment

Recommendation, and False Beliefs About Biological Differences

Between Blacks and Whites, Proc. Nat’l Academy Sci. (Mar. 1,

2016), available at https://www.pnas.org/content/113/16/4296

(last visited Dec. 16, 2021); Salimah H. Meghani et al., Time to

Take Stock: A Meta-Analysis and Systematic Review of Analgesic

Treatment Disparities for Pain in the United States, 13 Pain Med.

150 (2012), available at https://academic.oup.com/painmedicine/

article/13/2/150/1935962 (last visited Dec. 16, 2021).

12

9

This chilling effect also has extended to end-oflife medical care, including for those with terminal

cancer.14 For practitioners, “[a]n investigation alone

can be devastating[,] and a finding of liability can

trigger a cascade of consequences that make it impossible to practice medicine.”15 Therefore, rather than

focus on patient medical need, many practitioners fear

“being raided without notice, prosecuted and imprisoned, or losing their life savings to cover legal

costs.”16 This negative impact on patient care has

shown up most glaringly in emergency room visits: as

opioid prescriptions have dropped for those receiving

end-of-life care, emergency room visits for pain have

risen in kind.17

14

Joint Statement, supra note 2; Dineen, supra note 3, at

966; Nat’l Cancer Inst., supra note 3; Enzinger et al., supra note

3, at 2948, 2951, 2953, 2956; Nat’l Cancer Inst., Are Cancer

Patients Getting the Opioids They Need to Control Pain? (Sept. 16,

2020), available at https://www.cancer.gov/news-events/cancercurrents-blog/2020/opioids-cancer-pain-oncologists-decreasingprescriptions (last visited Dec. 16, 2021); Vikram Jairam et

al., Temporal Trends in Opioid Prescribing Patterns Among

Oncologists in the Medicare Population, 113 J. Nat’l Cancer Inst.

274, 274, 277, 280 (2021), available at https://academic.oup.

com/jnci/article/113/3/274/5891667 (last visited Dec. 16, 2021);

Lindy Willmott et al., Providing Palliative Care at the End of

Life: Should Health Professionals Fear Regulation?, 26 J. L. &

Med. 214, 215 nn.6–8 (2018) (collecting studies), available at

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3274384 (last

visited Dec. 16, 2021).

15

Dineen & DuBois, supra note 8, at 21–22.

16

Barnes et al., supra note 12, at 11.

17

Nat’l Cancer Inst., supra note 3; Enzinger et al., supra note

3, at 2948, 2951, 2953, 2956.

10

Patients receiving end-of-life care deserve better.

Medical practitioners prescribing opioids to such

patients in good faith are not drug pushers under the

Act. Moore, 423 U.S. at 143. Practitioners thus should

not have to suffer the specter of criminal liability

simply for treating such patients at such a vulnerable,

critical, and private time in their lives. Neither the text

of the statute nor this Court’s case law indicates that

Congress intended otherwise. Moreover, non-criminal

sanctions continue to protect the public, as the potential for professional discipline, loss of license, and civil

tort liability all serve as powerful deterrents against

reckless and negligent prescribing practices.18

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

18

Hoffmann, supra note 2, at 307; Barnes et al., supra note

12, at 10–17.

11

CONCLUSION

Interpreting Section 841 of the CSA to include a

good faith defense for the prescribing practices of

practitioner doctors comports with the plain text and

context of the statute, this Court’s case law, and the

needs and rights of those facing end-of-life care.

Compassion & Choices thus urges this Court to reverse

the Tenth and Eleventh Circuit decisions to the contrary in Khan and Ruan, respectively.

Respectfully submitted,

TONKON TORP LLP

ROBERT A. KOCH

Counsel of Record

STEVEN M. WILKER

888 SW Fifth Avenue,

Suite 1600

Portland, OR 97204

Telephone: (503) 221-1440

robert.koch@tonkon.com

COMPASSION & CHOICES

KEVIN DÍAZ

101 SW Madison Street,

Unit 8009

Portland, OR 97207

Telephone: (503) 943-6535

Counsel for Amicus Curiae Compassion & Choices

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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